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**System
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Corporation**

**FINAL REPORT
TASK ORDER EG-13**

**DETERMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF REVISED
SCREENING SYSTEM FOR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT**

**DTIC
ELECTE
SEP 4 1980**

**PHILIP G. BENSON
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**Prepared for:
HEAD, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
AND PERSONAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT
COMNAVMILPERSCOM (N-6) U.S. NAVY**

APRIL 1980

TM-(L)-6788/000/00

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interpretation of comparative findings, and nine recommendations were made to improve upon overseas screening and selection procedures.



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GLOSSARY

<u>ACRONYM</u>	<u>MEANING</u>	<u>PAGE FIRST INTRODUCED</u>
BUPERS	Bureau of Personnel (Integrated into NMPC, Navy Military Personnel Command, in November 1978)	1-2
ETM	Enlisted Transfer Manual	1-2
NOAI	Navy Overseas Assignment Inventory	1-2
CONUS	Continental United States	2-1
NMPC	Navy Military Personnel Command (Formerly BUPERS which was Bureau of Personnel)	2-1
NMPC-40	Director, Enlisted Distribution Division	2-1
NMPC-84	Director, Law Enforcement and Correction	2-1
NMPC-83	Director, Enlisted Performance Division	2-1
ASMRO	Armed Services Medical Regulating Office	2-1
EAD	Enlisted Assignment Document: Computerized system used by detailers; contains coded synopses of performance ratings, etc.	2-2
PRO	Personnel Record On-Line: System which contains more information on service person than EAD, including summaries of information in Service Jackets.	2-2
RIS	Remote Inquiry System: System which provides even more information, telling "where anyone in Navy is at, at a given time".	2-2
SSN	Social Security Number	2-2
Y	Classified from screening as "suitable"	2-3
N	Classified from screening as "unsuitable"	2-3
R	Was "returned" to CONUS	2-3
Y-7	Screened "suitable" in year 1977	2-3
N-8	Screened "unsuitable" in year 1978	2-3
R-8	Was "returned" to CONUS in year 1978	2-3

<u>ACRONYM</u>	<u>MEANING</u>	<u>PAGE FIRST INTRODUCED</u>
ICDA	International Classification of Diseases	2-6
Q	Classified from screening as "questionable"	2-6
NJP	Non Judicial Punishment: Not a criminal charge; person not taken to trial; reprimand, usually by Commanding Officer	3-7
MEDEVACS	Individuals medically evacuated from overseas sites to CONUS	3-18
FTC	Fleet Training Center	3-31
NTC	Naval Training Center	4-2
SSC	Service School Command	4-2
NETC	Navy Education and Training Command	5-2
EPMC	Enlisted Personnel Manpower Center	5-2

TERM

Suitability or Suitable Screen	Rating assigned to Navy individual and appears in the Enlisted Transfer Manual for individual who has been assigned to overseas duty and is declared a suitable candidate to serve overseas.
Nonsuitable or Nonsuitable-Screen	Rating assigned to Navy individual who has been assigned to overseas duty and is declared unsuitable due to drug usage or criminal activities or poor performance or medical problems or dependent problems or other reason.
Returnee	Individual who has been returned (also a rating in Enlisted Transfer Manual) to CONUS for any of various reasons. The returnees in this report generally allude to individuals returned for unsuitability for overseas assignment.
Questionable Screen	Rating ascribed to an individual (by Navy medical officer, according to an International Classification of Diseases) whose medical incapacitation is of questionable status regarding suitability for overseas assignment.
Deselectees	Individuals not selected for overseas assignment on the basis of screening.

TERM

Marginal
Performance

Military performance which does not warrant returning Navy person to CONUS but does warrant a rating of "unsuitable" for a second tour overseas. The unsuitability rating might be due to Navy person's problems with dependents.

Billet

Berth, position; assignment for tour of duty by official order directing that the member of a military force be provided with board and lodging (quarters).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The screening and selection of enlisted personnel for overseas assignment is an important aspect of overseas Navy operations, and has received a great deal of attention in the past decade. The nature and extent of the problem in terms of ultimate failure to fulfill the overseas assignment was examined in a study conducted for calendar year 1974. Enlisted personnel were identified who had terminated their overseas assignment early and were returned to the United States for reasons that could have been avoided through a better screening system. The results showed that the problem was indeed severe: the percentage of early returnees was too great; and the dollar losses were extreme.

The overseas screening and selection system was subsequently examined and thoroughly revised. The new system was first implemented at the major service schools, and on April 8, 1977,* BUPERS NOTICE 1300 was issued to promulgate the system throughout the Navy. Since that time, the system has been formally incorporated into the Enlisted Transfer Manual.

The study summarized here was undertaken to assess the impact of the new system in comparison to the 1974 baseline study.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the study were to:

- Determine the total number of people assigned overseas during the study period (May 1, 1978 through April 30, 1979).
- Determine the total number of people who were screened out as unsuitable for overseas assignment.
- Determine the total number who were reassigned due to unsuitability.

* BUPERS (Bureau of Personnel) NOTICE 1300 was replaced by BUPERSINST (Bureau of Personnel Instruction) 1300.26F (23 February 1978)

categorize this number into unsuitability factors and overseas assignment location, and reduce the total number to only those who were found to be unsuitable for reasons that could have been detected prior to overseas assignment.

- Estimate the dollar losses of the unsuitability cases, using the same cost accounting procedure employed for the 1974 results.
- Compare the new data to the 1974 baseline year.

APPROACH

Information relating to these goals was derived through study of data available at the Bureau of Navy Personnel* and the Armed Services Medical Regulating Office (ASMRO) in Washington, D.C. Six different categories of personnel were studied:

1. Personnel screened out and not selected for overseas assignment by Continental United States (CONUS) commands.
2. Personnel screened out and not selected for a second continuous overseas tour by overseas commands.
3. Personnel found to be unsuitable for overseas duty by overseas commands and returned early to CONUS.
4. Personnel incarcerated overseas in foreign or military prisons and returned early to CONUS for a new billet or discharge.
5. Personnel administratively discharged from overseas commands before expiration of their tour of military obligation.
6. Personnel medically evacuated from overseas commands before completion of their tours.

* Billets in the Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS) were integrated into NMPC, Navy Military Personnel Command, in November, 1978.

The method employed for this study was not exactly the same as that for 1974. There was complete data available from all sources for this twelve month study period, while the lack of data necessitated sampling and estimation from three of the four sources for the 1974 period.

RESULTS

The results of the study concerning personnel in the latter four categories listed above, who returned early from overseas duty compared to the 1974 baseline year, are summarized below.

- The total number of enlisted Navy personnel returned to CONUS prior to completion of their tours for reasons that could have been detected during screening was 393. This was a 76% decrease in early returns as compared with the 1974 study, in which the number was 1665.
- In addition to these 393, some 100 people were identified as marginal performers. While not returned to CONUS prematurely, they were screened out by an overseas command and not selected for a second continuous overseas tour. This group was comprised of higher enlisted paygrades than the returnee group, had more dependent problems, and less drug abuse problems.
- This figure (393) represented 1.11% of all enlisted personnel processed for overseas assignment during the study period (393 divided by 35,369). This is compared with 6.05% found in 1974 (1665 divided by 27,505).
- A conservative estimate of the annual dollar loss to the Navy of these personnel who did not complete their tour was \$1,798,761. This was based on an individual early return cost estimated at \$4,577, which included movement overseas, detailing, processing, and loss resulting from an open billet. These figures compared favorably with those found in 1974, in which the dollar loss was \$6,154,000., based on an individual figure of \$3,700.

- Males comprised 92% of the total group of early returns, and females 8%. This was a 5% relative increase for females, probably due to an increased number of females in the Navy compared to 1974.
- The total group was comprised of: 64% who were rated, compared to 36% who were not; the largest rated group was Administrative and Clerical (39%), followed by Aviation (21%), Engineering and Hull Group (15%), and the Deck Group (12%); the largest non-rated group was the Seaman (56%), followed by Fireman (27%), and Airman (17%). This was a 5% relative increase in rated personnel compared to 1974, although the largest rated and non-rated groups remained the same.
- The paygrade with the largest number of returnees was E-1 (30%), followed by E-2 (23%), E-3 (22%), and E-4 (12%). The E-5 through E-9 paygrades made up 13% of the total. This was a shift toward lower paygrades being returned compared to 1974.
- Although many reasons for unsuitability were given, over half of the early returnees were unable to complete their overseas tours because of disciplinary problems (36%), or drug abuse (20%). Other major reasons were psychiatric problems (18%) and alcohol abuse (12%). These figures were similar to the 1974 data, except for an 11% relative increase in disciplinary problems.
- Early returnees came from more than 77 separate overseas commands. As in 1974, the USS Midway at Yokosuka, Japan had the highest number of those returned early (11%). This was followed by the USS Oklahoma (7%) also at Yokosuka, the USS Gilmore at Sardinia (6%), and the Naval Station at Subic Bay in the Philippines (5%). Returnees from all commands in Japan made up 34% of the total.
- The median overseas tour length of early returns was 13-18 months, the modal value was 7-12 months; 17% had been overseas 6 months or less; 47%, 1 year or less; 73%, 18 months or less; and 91%, 2 years or less. This represented a shift from 1974 to longer tour lengths

before early return, with fewer people being returned in less than one year.

- Some 81% of early returnees were on their first tours of overseas duty, which was a relative increase of 8% compared to 1974.
- The six prior commands having the highest number of early returns were: the Fleet Training Center at Norfolk, Virginia (38); the Service School Command at San Diego, California (37); the Service School Command at Great Lakes, Illinois (35); the Naval Air Technical Training Command at Millington, Tennessee (18); and the Naval Technical Training Command at Meridian, Mississippi (16). Compared to 1974, the NTC at Millington showed a great improvement, from 61 to 18 early returns.
- Evidence that required screening had been completed for the early returnees was found in 70% of the cases. No screening had been done for 22%, and no information about prior screening was available for 8%. This is a marked contrast to the 1974 study, in which only 9% of early returnees had been screened.

The results of this study concerning personnel who were screened out and not selected for overseas assignment are summarized below.

- Evidence that overseas screening had been completed was found for 19,981 of the 35,369 processed, or 57%.
- There was a total of 755 people screened out and not selected for overseas assignment during this study period. This represented 2.14% (755 divided by 35,369) of all enlisted personnel who were processed for overseas assignment during the study period. This was an increase of 481 people compared to 1974, although the percentage difference was small (2.14% compared to 1.71% in 1974) because of the larger number of people processed during this study period.

- Males comprised 91% of those not selected, and females 9%. This was a relative increase of 4% for females, probably due to an increased number of females in the Navy.
- The total group was comprised of 71% who were rated, and 29% who were not, which was a relative increase of 6% for rated personnel over 1974. The largest rated group was Administrative and Clerical (29%), followed by Engineering and Hull Specialists (14%), and Medical (10%). The largest non-rated group was the Seaman (12%) followed by Fireman (9%), and Airmen (8%).
- The paygrade with the largest number of deselectees was E-1 (40%), followed by E-3 (22%), E-2 (14%), E-4 (10%), and E-5 (8%). The E-6 through E-8 paygrades made up (6%) of the total, and there were no E-9 paygrade personnel deselected. As was the case in 1974, most deselectees were found in the lower paygrades.
- Although there were some 38 reasons given for unsuitability, the three most significant were disciplinary violations (31%), drugs (29%), and criminal problems (23%). The disciplinary violations comprised exactly the same relative percentage in 1974, although the percentages of those screened out for drug abuse and criminal problems were higher during this study period, while the percentage for dependent problems was lower.
- These personnel were being screened for a variety of intended overseas commands. Of the total not selected, 87 were bound for the USS Midway at Yokosuda, Japan; 34 for the USS Gilmore at Sardinia; and 34 for the USS LaSalle. These were the three intended overseas commands with the highest number of personnel who were screened out. The Commands were located in a variety of countries; the four which had the highest number of people deselected were: Japan (219), Italy (51), Guam (46), and Spain (38). The highest number screened out in 1974 were being considered for the Naval Station at Keflavik, Iceland (18).

- These personnel were screened out by a variety of CONUS commands, but the four commands screening out the most were the Naval Administration Command of the Naval Training Center at Great Lakes, Illinois (101), the Personnel Support Branch of the Naval Training Center at San Diego, California (101), the Service School Command at Great Lakes, Illinois (83), and the Service School Command at San Diego, California (57).

The special problems in overseas screening at the Fleet Training Center in Norfolk, Virginia were examined during the study. Results summarized above showed that the prior command of the largest number of overseas failures had come from FTC Norfolk.

The problem faced by the Fleet Training Center (FTC) staff was that more than half of the trainees they received were not properly screened for overseas assignment by their commands. Also, these people were not prepared for departure overseas. Many had no passports, no birth certificates, and no port calls. Because these people were supposed to depart for their new overseas command upon completion of their training, the burden for completion of these unfinished tasks fell upon the FTC staff, which added some 31% to their workload. The FTC staff is organized and manned to conduct training, not to conduct overseas screening and make preparations on a "crash" basis for the overseas departure of hundreds of people.

The Recruit Training Command (RTC) and the Service School Command (SSC) of the Naval Training Center at Orlando, Florida were the sources of most of these problems. This was consistent with the findings of the 1974 baseline study, where it was found that not one of the 26 early return cases that had come from RTC Orlando had not been screened, and only 3 of the 8 from SSC Orlando had been screened.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The results of this study are very positive, indicating a vast improvement in the Navy overseas screening and selection system in reducing the number of overseas failures. The comparatively higher number of those found unsuitable for overseas assignment and screened out also showed a positive

trend, indicating an increased compliance with the new overseas screening procedures. Even when the method differences between this study and the 1974 baseline study are considered, the magnitude of the improvement figures outweigh any error effects.

It must be concluded from these results that efforts of the Navy over the past seven years to improve the overseas screening system have worked, at least in terms of compliance with screening procedures and a reduction in overseas failures. The finding that there were still nearly two million dollars being lost through replacement of early returns for reasons that could have been detected may be disturbing to some. However, it may simply not be possible to gain significant improvement over the figure of 1.11% of these detailed overseas being returned early.

There are several areas in the screening and selection system that require attention, however, in order for the system to operate more effectively. It was found that about 43% of those processed for overseas duty are still not being screened according to the required procedures. Each of the areas in need of attention is addressed in the recommendations presented below.

RECOMMENDATION ONE

It is apparent that the overseas screening and selection procedures contained in the Enlisted Transfer Manual are being applied unevenly across the many commands responsible for assignment of overseas personnel. An effective strategy for improving this situation would be for all those responsible for screening to attend a short (one-day) training course on overseas screening. This type of course was designed, developed, and implemented very successfully for the Training Commands at Great Lakes, San Diego, and Millington. This of course was a one-time implementation, however, and it is doubtful that any of those who were trained are still doing overseas screening. The training course should be institutionalized through the Navy Education and Training Command (NETC) procedures, so that all Personnelmen are required to attend the one-day course as a normal part of their training pipeline. This recommendation is stated as follows:

- The training course for overseas screening and selection developed in 1976 under contract #N00600-73-D-0780, Task Order #76/78, should be reviewed, revised, and incorporated into the NETC system and made a requirement for all Personnelmen involved in the overseas assignment process.

RECOMMENDATION TWO

The problems associated with overseas screening and preparation at the Fleet Training Center (FTC) at Norfolk and the Naval Training Center at Orlando indicate that there is a gap at these locations in an otherwise fairly well functioning system for overseas screening. The NTC at Orlando and the Enlisted Personnel Manpower Center (EPMC) at New Orleans were never directly involved in the various improvement efforts carried out over the past years. It is therefore recommended that:

- A special team should be tasked to visit EPMC, NTC Orlando, and the FTC at Norfolk to review the situation and examine the overseas screening problems. Assistance strategies to be performed by the team should be to provide detailed briefings on the overseas screening process and to conduct a one-day training course for all those responsible for overseas screening at NTC Orlando.

RECOMMENDATION THREE

There was a great deal of improvement apparent in the data systems available during this study as compared with the 1974 study. One of the recommendations made at that time was to systematize and streamline the information regarding overseas assignment so that a study such as this could be completed more quickly and easily. Also, it was suggested that a feedback mechanism be developed within NMPC so that overseas screening compliance checks could be made and overseas failure rates could be routinely determined. Although the data was much more complete and easier to obtain for this than for the earlier study, data collection still required many months for completion and a great deal of footwork and cross-checking. It is recommended that:

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- The systematic improvements, including computerization, made by NMPC in the overseas screening, selection, and tracking process should be continued. A system should be developed within NMPC-40 that consolidates overseas personnel disposition data maintained at NMPC-83 and 84, as well as data for Naval personnel at ASMRO. This system should allow the present type of study to be completed more quickly and easily and the data to be periodically fed back throughout the system.

Most importantly, the payoff to the Navy would be that (1) an in-house study could be done, and (2) this system would serve as an automatic quality control indicator.

RECOMMENDATION FOUR

It was mentioned in the introduction to this report that a Navy Overseas Assignment Inventory (NOAI) had been developed as a predictor instrument for use in the overseas screening process, but that it had not been incorporated into the system. It is now recommended that:

- A final decision should be made regarding use of the NOAI as a part of the overseas screening process. Given the results of this study, the Navy may not consider it to be cost-effective to fully employ the instrument throughout the system. However, several of the key overseas adjustment scales contained in the NOAI should be incorporated into the screening interview and therefore made a part of the training course for those who do the screening.

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The personnel interviewed at NTC Norfolk set forth several specific recommendations for improvement of the overseas screening system. They are listed below for consideration:

- Controls should be maintained to insure that personnel ranking no lower than Chief Petty Officer or Petty Officer First Class

should conduct overseas screening. Also, controls should insure that Commanding Officers or their designees sign the required overseas screening document.

- The orders issued for lower ranking personnel assigned overseas from the Recruit Training Centers should clearly state the unaccompanied status of the assignment. The nature and consequences of this status should also be clearly explained to these personnel prior to departure from the Recruit Training Centers.
- NMPC and EPMC should not issue orders for overseas assignment until evidence of overseas screening has been received by them. Compliance with overseas screening directives is now required and is to be received within ten days of notice, but there are many cases of overseas orders issued with no screening being done.
- All those involved in the overseas screening process should attend a training course developed specifically for assisting them in carrying out their duties.
- The criteria for use and possession of marijuana as a disqualifying factor for overseas assignment contained in the Enlisted Transfer Manual should be reviewed and clarified.

SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

The Navy has been engaged since 1973 in a comprehensive effort to improve the screening and selection of enlisted personnel for overseas assignment. The first phase, completed in 1974, consisted of a study of the literature on the subject, a review of current practices used by government agencies and private organizations, and assessment of current Navy procedures (Tucker, July, 1974). The results indicated that very little definitive knowledge had been gained in this field and that a fully operational personnel selection system with proven success did not exist for selecting personnel for overseas assignment. This first phase ended with recommendations that included revising the screening and selection procedures for enlisted personnel.

Before taking action on this recommendation, it was decided to examine the nature and extent of the overseas selection problem in the Navy more closely. The second phase therefore consisted of identifying, for calendar year 1974, those who had terminated their overseas assignment early and were returned to the United States for reasons that could have been avoided through a better screening system (Tucker & Schiller, May, 1975).* The results were rather disturbing. The percentage of early returnees was judged as being too great, and the dollar losses were deemed excessive. A total of 1,665 enlisted personnel were prematurely returned from overseas assignment during 1974, which represented 6.05% of all personnel assigned overseas for that year. This figure included only those people returned for reasons that could have been detected prior to assignment overseas. A dollar figure was placed on the extent of this problem, and a very conservative estimate showed the annual loss to be in excess of six million dollars.

With these results in hand, the Navy took action on the Phase One recommendation. Phase Three, then, began with a thorough examination of the overseas screening process, particularly at the major service schools, which send many young enlisted personnel overseas for their first tours of duty. Weaknesses in the process were identified, and the procedures were

*References are listed in Appendix A, and the 1974 Baseline Study is contained in Appendix B.

thoroughly revised (Tucker, Benson, Dickinson, Mohr, & Shiklar, August, 1976). The new, revised system was first implemented at the major service schools, and on April 8, 1977, BUPERS NOTICE 1300 * was issued to promulgate the system Navy-wide. Since that time, the system has been formally incorporated into the Enlisted Transfer Manual.

An on-site review of the new system indicated that it was in place and working well (Benson, Hautaloma, and Tucker, June, 1978). It was felt that the new system would do much to reduce the early return cases of many of the types identified in the 1974 study.

However, it was also felt that the new screening system may not identify certain types of potential overseas failures, particularly those associated with attitudinal and psychological problems. Also, the new system depends upon review of performance in the Navy, and therefore is limited when applied to recruits and other young people who are being assigned overseas for the first time. Finally, it is known that, in addition to those obvious failures who have to be returned to the United States, there are many who fail to adapt but remain at their overseas posts. These people live and work under personal stress, which affects their private lives as well as their job performance.

Phase Four of the overall effort was therefore initiated in order to anticipate the adaptation failure problems not identified in the new screening system and to provide more information for selection decisions. This phase consisted of the development and longitudinal validation of an overseas adjustment predictor instrument, called the Navy Overseas Assignment Inventory (NOAI). This phase was completed in August of 1978, and the results were quite promising for use of the NOAI as a part of the screening procedure (Tucker, Benson, & Blanchard, 1978). At this writing, however, the instrument has not been incorporated into the screening system.

The present study constitutes Phase Five of the process. The 1974 baseline study was repeated, bringing the process full circle through determination of the impact of the new screening system compared to the 1974 baseline data.

*BUPERS (Bureau of Personnel) NOTICE 1300 was replaced by BUPERSINST (Bureau of Personnel Instruction) 1300.26F (23 February 1978).

1.2 PROJECT PURPOSE AND GOALS

The primary purpose of this project was to determine the impact of the revised screening system for overseas assignment for mid-1978 through mid-1979 as compared to the 1974 baseline year in terms of those individuals who were reassigned from overseas billets due to unsuitability for reasons that could have been detected prior to assignment.

The specific goals were to:

- Determine the total number of people assigned overseas during the study period (May 1, 1978 through April 30, 1979).
- Determine the total number of people who were screened out as unsuitable for overseas assignment.
- Determine the total number who were reassigned due to unsuitability, categorize this number into unsuitability factors and overseas assignment location, and reduce the total number to only those who were found to be unsuitable for reasons that could have been detected prior to overseas assignment.
- Estimate the dollar losses of the unsuitability cases, using the same cost accounting procedure employed for the 1974 results.
- Compare the new data to the 1974 baseline year.

1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

An executive summary, which presents a synopsis of the project, results, conclusions, and recommendations has been prepared under separate cover. The project itself is presented in this report in some detail in terms of the method employed, data sources, information generated, and results. The results are presented in tabular form, accompanied by brief discussions. Finally, conclusions are drawn from the results, and recommendations are made.

SECTION 2 - METHOD

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This project attempted to duplicate the data base of the 1974 study. A Navy yeoman was assigned to this study to assist in locating the required information which was contained in messages from Navy commands, reports, computer printouts, and various service documents. From these sources of data, information was obtained on personnel screened unsuitable for overseas duty and on personnel who did not complete tours of duty and were returned early to the Continental United States (CONUS).

The following four sources were utilized in the compilation of data.

- Navy Military Personnel Command (NMPC) - 40 was the source for data regarding: (1) personnel screened by a CONUS command as unsuitable for overseas duty; (2) personnel screened by an overseas command as unsuitable for another overseas tour of duty; and (3) personnel screened unsuitable for an overseas command and returned early to CONUS.
- NMPC - 84 was the source for records regarding personnel incarcerated overseas and returned early to CONUS for a new billet or discharge.
- NMPC - 83 was the source for data on personnel administratively discharged from overseas commands before expiration of their tour of military obligation.
- ASMRO is an acronym for the Armed Services Medical Regulating Office. This was the source for data about personnel medically evacuated from overseas commands before completion of their tour.

2.2 PROCEDURE

Based on the 1974 study, data collection forms were developed to record pertinent data. Personnel in each of the above categories were recorded

*Formerly PERS-51. Billets in the Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS) were integrated into NMPC in November 1978.

and an Enlisted Assignment Document (EAD) was obtained and reviewed (using social security numbers) to determine if an individual was in fact an early returnee. A review of other data sources, including Enlisted Personnel Jackets, the Remote Inquiry System (RIS), and the Personnel Record On-Line (PRO), indicated that the EAD was, in fact, the most accurate and current record available for an individual within the parameters of this study. RIS and PRO are both generated from the Master Enlisted File in Washington. The Former is maintained in New Orleans and only reflects where the individual is presently billeted. PRO is maintained in Washington and contains selected information about an individual's service record. Service Jackets, for the most part, did not yield any additional data. If the information was not present on the EAD it was not in the microfiched service jacket record. The same findings applied when using the RIS and PRO systems. Accuracy of information on the EAD was confirmed and spot checks were done throughout the study to reaffirm their validity. The only complete history of an individual is with the individual's command and is the original file which accompanies him from billet to billet. Other records were summaries of pertinent data, which usually did not apply to the requirements of this study. For these reasons, the EADs supplied the bulk of the data except in rare instances where the other sources were used to confirm information.

As a final step, all data entries were cross-checked across all four sources to eliminate duplicates. For the most part, there were few duplicates among the sources. A few duplicates appeared in the administrative discharges and criminal incarceration files (NMPC - 83 and - 84) and in NMPC - 40 and ASMRO; however, each data source was, to a large extent, distinct.

Data losses occurred when there was no EAD for an individual. These appeared on a "no match" listing indicating that the social security number (SSN) ordered was no longer in the computer records and an EAD did not exist. If there was no EAD available for the data sheet, the SSN in question was found on the no match list so that all data sheets could be accounted for. Since there was no valid method of determining if the individual was in fact discharged, those individuals had to be dropped from the sample. Efforts to locate those individuals from the bidex file in NMPC - 40 by name to determine SSNs was of little success. Usually dis-

charge information is only retained for six months, and there was no accurate way of making category assignments without records.

A final problem occurred in determining if an individual had been screened prior to the present study. When a new suitability code is assigned, the old one is erased on the EAD. For example, an individual could have been screened Y7 (suitable) in 1977 and then have been screened again in 1978 and found unsuitable (N8) or returned (R8). Only the 1978 code could appear on the EAD and there would be no record of the previous 1977 screen. The microfiched files usually did not contain that portion of the individual's total record which included prior screening information. These individuals were included in the sample as unknown prior screens.

The data collection period selected for this study was 1 May 1978 - 30 April 1979. Data collection sheets were compiled for this period, tallied, and presented by frequency of occurrence. Details of the various data sources and specific problems appear in the following discussion.

2.2.1 NMPC - 40 - PERSONNEL DECLARED UNSUITABLE FOR OVERSEAS DUTY.

Messages concerning the unsuitability of Navy personnel assigned to overseas duty are received by NMPC - 40 and individuals are assigned a suitability rating (Y = suitable; N = unsuitable; or R = returned) which appears on the EAD. Personnel are declared unsuitable for various reasons, including drug usage, criminal activities, poor performance, medical problems, and dependent problems. In reviewing these messages, three categories emerged.

- (1) Personnel screened unsuitable by a CONUS command for overseas duty. This category included personnel screened for deployed billets that may require presence in a foreign country. For example, the USS LaSalle is homeported in Norfolk, but overseas screening is routinely done.
- (2) Personnel assigned overseas who were screened unsuitable by their overseas commands for further overseas assignment but who completed their tour. This category included personnel who have

completed one tour and were considered for an additional overseas assignment.

- (3) Personnel assigned overseas who were declared unsuitable and returned to CONUS early, i.e., did not complete their tour of duty.

Data collection forms were developed for these categories which included sex, social security number, rate, grade, date of report, command issuing report, intended or prior command (whichever was applicable), and reason for unsuitability. Additionally, the overseas screens and early return forms recorded amount of time overseas before report and term of overseas tour of duty (first, second, etc.).

The major problem in gathering these data concerned determining which personnel were actually returned early. Often an individual was marked as an early returnee but in fact was retained overseas until his tour was completed and should have been classified as screened unsuitable for further overseas duty. This distinction could only be made after examining the EADs. Therefore, many of the individuals who had been classified as early returnees by the Navy personnel receiving the messages in NMPC - 40 were actually not returned early. It became apparent that often the messages were recommendations from commanding officers but had not been acted upon. Other messages reported routine screens performed for individuals who had completed one overseas tour of duty and were being assigned another tour but were screened unsuitable for further duty by their overseas command. In a few instances, individuals who had been screened unsuitable by CONUS commands were actually sent to an overseas billet.

2.2.2 NMPC - 83 - ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGES.

A manual sorting of all Enlisted Performance Processing Sheets for individuals homeported overseas who were granted administrative discharges was made by the Navy personnel assigned to this study. Data collection sheets were developed, which included name, social security number, sex, rate, grade, overseas command and homeport, date of discharge, evidence of prior screening, and reason and type of discharge. Prior command information

was obtained from the EADs which also confirmed if individuals had been discharged per the information in the files.

2.2.3 NMPC - 84 - CRIMINAL INCARCERATIONS.

Prisoner Data Cards were manually sorted by Navy personnel to identify those individuals homeported overseas who were incarcerated in military prisons during the study period (personnel incarcerated in civilian prisons were obtained from another data source, discussed later in this section.). These data cards listed all individuals who had been incarcerated for up to three months in overseas military facilities and included those transferred to CONUS to complete sentences. Since this data source was examined in July, 1979, it was felt that most personnel incarcerated during the study period appeared in these records.

The prisoner data card used by NMPC - 84 has been adapted to direct computer entry and that bureau is currently producing various monthly statistics. Unfortunately, these statistical statements did not contain all the information required for this study and data sheets had to be completed for each entry. In addition to name, social security number, sex, rate, paygrade, overseas command, prior command, and evidence of screening, the data collection form listed the guilty offense, sentence, date and place of incarceration, and proposed duty upon completion of sentence. This last item had to be confirmed through EADs, and four categories emerged: (1) personnel returned to overseas billet; (2) personnel returned early to CONUS for further duty; (3) personnel returned to CONUS to serve sentences greater than three months; and (4) personnel discharged early from the service. Since some of the individuals in this last category also appeared in NMPC - 83 data, all names were transferred to that data source for tabulation. These individuals were discharged early for frequency of involvement, i.e., continuous infraction of military regulations, and they logically belonged to the tally for NMPC - 83.

As a final check of personnel returned to CONUS to serve longer sentences, the military prisons in Norfolk, Philadelphia, and San Francisco were contacted by Navy personnel to determine how many individuals had been transferred from overseas to serve prison sentences during the study period.

This process resulted in only one individual being added to the sample and it duplicated those individuals who had been identified from the files in NMPC - 84.

For individuals incarcerated in foreign prisons during the study time, the Report of United States Personnel in Post-Trial Confinement in Foreign Penal Institutions was consulted. This report lists all military personnel by branch of service and appears quarterly. Since the report for 1 March 1979 - 31 May 1979 was not in print at the time of data collection, the 1978 report for that period was substituted and guaranteed a full year of data. Through the use of this report and the EADs, work sheets were completed and contained the same information as listed above for military incarceration with the exception of duty after sentence completed.

2.2.4 ASMRO - PERSONNEL MEDICALLY EVACUATED FROM OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT.

At ASMRO in the Pentagon, a computer run was generated which listed all Navy personnel medically evacuated from overseas commands. Data collection forms were developed for recording information that included name, social security number, rate, paygrade, sex, medical diagnosis, medical evacuation site and destination, and date of evacuation. EADs were examined, from which homeport command, prior command, and evidence of screening were obtained.

Individuals were listed by ICDA code (International Classification of Diseases). These codes were compiled and a Navy hospital corpsman reviewed them to determine which diseases could be detected in the overseas screening process, which diseases were questionable as to identification in screening, and which diseases could not have been detected. All individuals in the last category were eliminated from the sample of early returns. The remaining personnel were divided into two categories: those with diseases definitely screenable (Y), and those with diseases that were questionable screens (Q). All evacuees since 1979 were listed with their social security numbers. For those evacuated in 1978, it was necessary to match their names and SSNs using the bidex file in NMPC - 40. EADs were examined for this sample and only those homeported overseas were retained

for further investigation. The final step in the process was to separate those individuals who had been returned early for medical reasons from those who had been evacuated for a short period of treatment and then returned to their billets. This latter category could not be considered as returnees since their billets were not filled by other personnel nor were their tours shortened.

A computer run for the dependents of Navy personnel was also obtained from ASMRO and subjected to the same process as listed above, with one exception: only those evacuated in 1979 were studied. The 1978 data were not examined since it was not possible to identify the SSNs for 1978 with only the dependent's name. In analyzing the EADs for the 1979 sample, it was seen that only one Navy member was returned to CONUS early for the medical evacuation of a dependent; thus no analysis could be prepared for this category. Unless the Navy member accompanied his or her dependent, there was no documentation to indicate whether the transfer was permanent or temporary for the dependent.

2.3 DIFFERENCES IN METHOD COMPARED TO THE 1974 BASELINE STUDY

There were significant differences in the method employed for this study as compared with the 1974 study. It had been recommended as a result of that study that the information system regarding overseas screening, assignment, and subsequent disposition of personnel be streamlined and computerized so that complete data would be readily available. This recommendation had not been fully realized, but a great deal of improvement had been made which resulted in much more complete information available for the present study than for the earlier one.

Specifically, there were complete data available from all four sources for this twelve-month study period, while the lack of data for the 1974 period necessitated sampling and estimation from three of the four sources. These three were:

- ASMRO - The twelve-month estimate was made from data available on medical evacuations made for July through December of 1974.

- NMPC - 84 - Twelve-month data were available for those incarcerated in foreign prisons and those who were returned to CONUS to complete their sentences, but those confined in Navy overseas correctional facilities and then discharged to CONUS were estimated from the most recent reporting period available - September and October of 1974.
- NMPC - 83 - The twelve-month estimate was made from data available on those who were administratively discharged for the period of September 1974 through February 1975.

SECTION 3 - RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1 PERSONNEL NOT SELECTED FOR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

The results of data analysis based upon information collected from NMPC - 40 files and coded on worksheets are presented below. Each result or set of results is followed by a brief interpretive discussion.

3.1.1 SUMMARY INDEX

The total number of enlisted personnel screened out and not selected for overseas duty during this study period of mid-1978 through mid-1979 was 755. The actual number of enlisted personnel processed for overseas duty was 35,369.^{*} This results in an index of 2.14% (755 divided by 35,369).

This index represents an increase in the number of people screened out for overseas duty when compared to the 1974 baseline year. In 1974, only 274 people were screened out, and 16,030 people were processed for overseas duty. This results in an index of 1.71%. Therefore, although there was a substantial increase in the number of people screened out, the index did not increase substantially because of the much larger number of people processed during the present study period.

*Incidentally, of the 35,369 total, fifty-six and a half percent (56.49%), or 19,981, had submitted to overseas screening. See page 3-13 for further discussion of evidence of compliance with overseas screening directives.

3.1.2 ANALYSIS OF DESELECTEES BY SEX

Table 1 presents a breakdown of deselectees by sex.

TABLE 1
ANALYSIS OF DESELECTEES BY SEX

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Number of People Not Selected</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Male	685	90.7%
Female	<u>70</u>	9.3%
Total	755	

Males comprised about 91% of the personnel not selected for overseas duty, while females comprised about 9%. For 1974, 94.5% were male and 5.5% were female. These results reflect a proportional increase in females not selected when compared to the 1974 data. This phenomenon is probably due to increases in the number of women in the Navy.

3.1.3 ANALYSIS OF DESELECTEES BY RATING

Table 2 lists the rating categories of deselectees. Rated or designated non-rated personnel made up 71% of the total.

TABLE 2
ANALYSIS OF DESELECTEES BY RATING

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number of People Not Selected</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Non-rated	219	29%
Rated	<u>536</u>	71%
Total	755	

Breakdown of Non-Rated Personnel

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number of People</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Seaman Recruit	63	
Seaman Apprentice	15	
Seaman	<u>14</u>	
Total	92	12.2%

TABLE 2 (continued)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number of People</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Fireman Recruit	53	
Fireman Apprentice	10	
Fireman	6	
Total	69	9.1%
Airman Recruit	45	
Airman Apprentice	5	
Airman	8	
Total	58	7.7%

Breakdown of Rated Personnel

<u>Rating</u>	<u>Number of People</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
<u>Deck Group</u>		
Boatswain's Mate	7	
Operations Specialists	6	
Sonar Technician	5	
Ocean Systems Technician	3	
Signalman	2	
Quartermaster	2	
Master-at-Arms	1	
Total	26	3.4%

<u>Rating</u>	<u>Number of People</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
<u>Ordnance Group</u>		
Gunner's Mate	9	
Fire Control Technician	6	
Torpedoman's Mate	4	
Missile Technician	1	
Total	20	2.6%

<u>Rating</u>	<u>Number of People</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
<u>Electronics and Precision Instruments Group</u>		
Electronics Technician	16	
Data System Technician	5	
Total	21	2.8%

TABLE 2 (continued)

<u>Rating</u>	<u>Number of People</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
<u>Administrative and Clerical Group</u>		
Radioman	111	
Mess Management Specialist	34	
Ship's Serviceman	26	
Data Processing Technician	15	
Yeoman	8	
Storekeeper	6	
Cryptologic Technician	5	
Postal Clerk	5	
Personnel Man	2	
Intelligence Specialist	1	
Journalist	1	
Disbursing	1	
Total	215	28.5%

<u>Rating</u>	<u>Number of People</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
<u>Engineering and Hull Group</u>		
Machinist's Mate	33	
Hull Maintenance Technician	22	
Boiler Technician	22	
Engineman	13	
Machinery Repairman	5	
Interior Communications Electrician	5	
Electronic's Mate	4	
Molder	1	
Total	105	13.9%

<u>Rating</u>	<u>Number of People</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
<u>Construction Group</u>		
Construction Recruit	9	
Construction Apprentice	2	
Utilitiesman	4	
Equipment Operator	3	
Engineering Aid	2	
Construction Electrician	1	
Steelworker	1	
Builder	1	
Total	23	3.0%

TABLE 2 (continued)

<u>Rating</u>	<u>Number of People</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
<u>Aviation Group</u>		
Aviation Ordnanceman	10	
Aviation Machinist's Mate	7	
Aviation Structural Mechanic	6	
Aviation Storekeeper	5	
Aviation Boatswain's Mate	5	
Aviation Electronic's Mate	2	
Aerographer's Mate	2	
Aviation Maintenance Administrationman	1	
Photographer's Mate	1	
Air Controlman	1	
Aviation Fire Control Technician	1	
Aviation Antisubmarine Warfare Operator	1	
Aviation Antisubmarine Warfare Technician	1	
Total	43	5.7%

<u>Rating</u>	<u>Number of People</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
<u>Medical Group</u>		
*Hospitalman Recruit	23	
*Hospitalman Apprentice	8	
*Hospitalman	16	
Hospital Corpsman	28	
Total	75	9.9%

<u>Rating</u>	<u>Number of People</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Dentalman Recruit	3	
Dentalman Apprentice	1	
Dentalman	1	
Dental Technician	1	
Total	6	.8%

<u>Rating</u>	<u>Number of People</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
<u>Miscellaneous</u>		
Musician	2	
Total	2	.2%
NON-RATED	219	29.0%
RATED	536	70.9%

*Note: Indicated in the 1974 study to be Non-Rated.

The largest rated group was Administrative and Clerical (28.5%), followed by Engineering and Hull specialists (13.9%), and Medical (9.9%). The largest non-rated group was the Seaman (12.2%), followed by Fireman (9.1%), and Airmen (7.7%).

3.1.4 ANALYSIS OF DESELECTEES BY PAYGRADE

Table 3 presents a breakdown of deselectees by paygrade.

TABLE 3
ANALYSIS OF DESELECTEES BY PAYGRADE

<u>Paygrade Groupings</u>	<u>Number of People Not Selected</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
E-1 to E-3	574	76.0%
E-4 to E-6	165	21.7
E-7 to E-9	16	2.1
Total	755	

<u>Paygrade Categories</u>	<u>Number of People Not Selected</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
E-1	303	40.1%
E-2	104	13.8
E-3	167	22.1
E-4	78	10.3
E-5	57	7.5
E-6	30	3.9
E-7	13	1.7
E-8	3	0.4
E-9	0	0.0

The paygrade with the largest number of deselectees was E-1 (40.1%), followed by E-3 (22.1%), E-2 (13.8%), E-4 (10.3%), and E-5 (7.5%). The E-6 through E-8 paygrades made up 6.0% of the total, and there were no E-9 paygrade personnel deselected. As was the case in 1974, most deselectees were found in the lower paygrades.

3.1.5 REASONS FOR UNSUITABILITY AMONG DESESLECTEES

An analysis of reasons given for Overseas Unsuitability among deselectees is presented in Table 4.

TABLE 4

REASONS FOR UNSUITABILITY AMONG DESELECTEES

<u>Reason</u>	<u>Number of People</u>	<u>% of Sample (N=755)</u>
<u>Disciplinary</u>		
NJPs	191	
Discipline, no NJPs	20	
Court Martial	8	
Misconduct	7	
Captain's Mast	4	
Total	<u>230</u>	30.5%
<u>Drugs</u>		
Pre-service use	120	
In-service use	14	
Involvement with Marijuana (not specified)	9	
Possession/use of drugs	<u>75</u>	
Total	<u>218</u>	28.9%
<u>Criminal</u>		
Pre-service civil convictions	54	
Civil arrests/convictions (in service)	53	
Traffic violations	28	
Deserter	31	
Fraud enlistment	<u>6</u>	
Total	<u>172</u>	22.8%
<u>Medical</u>		
Not specified	32	
Temporary condition	13	
Alcohol abuse/intoxication	33	
Dental	23	
Psychiatric problems	16	
Pregnancy	6	
Poor attitude/motivation	5	
Obesity	5	
Immature Personality	<u>1</u>	
Total	<u>134</u>	17.7%

TABLE 4 (continued)

<u>Reason</u>	<u>Number of People</u>	<u>% of Sample (N=755)</u>
<u>Dependent</u>		
Dependents not suitable	8	
Medical	25	
Family problems	15	
Marital problems	7	
Total	55	7.3%
<u>Miscellaneous</u>		
Unsatisfactory/marginal performance	31	
Awaiting bad conduct discharge	4	
Indebtedness	16	
Humanitarian	8	
Member requests different orders	3	
Member will not obli-serve	3	
Academic problems	2	
Not to be retained in Navy to complete tour	2	
Member requests discharge	1	
Total	70	9.2%
<u>Other</u>		
No reason given - blank	17	
"Member not suitable"		
no reason	48	
Total	65	8.6

Note: The total percentage in Table 4 sums to 125. This percentage exceeds 100% because there was more than one reason stated for suitability in 25% of the cases. Percentages are based on the total sample population of 755.

There were more than 38 reasons given for unsuitability screening; however, these reasons could be grouped into 7 major categories. Of these categories, the three most significant were disciplinary violations (30.5%), drugs (28.9%), and criminal problems (22.8%). Far more detail was available than in 1974, indicating that those doing the screening may have been more attentive to subtle cues.

3.1.6 CONUS COMMANDS OF DESELECTEES

An analysis of the CONUS commands that deselected personnel for overseas assignment appears in Table 5.

TABLE 5
SCREENING COMMANDS

<u>Command</u>	<u>Number of People Not Selected</u>
Naval Administration Command, Great Lakes, Illinois	101
Personnel Support Branch, Naval Training Center, San Diego, California	101
Service School Command, Great Lakes, Illinois	83
Service School Command, San Diego, California	57
Personnel Support Branch, Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia	43
Naval School of Health Sciences San Diego, California	37
Naval Recruit Training Command San Diego, California	34
Naval Recruit Training Command Orlando, Florida	21
Naval Construction Training Center Gulfport, Mississippi	18
Naval Administration Command, Orlando, Florida	13

TABLE 5 (continued)

Command	<u>Number of People Not Selected</u>
Naval Administration Command, San Diego, California	12
Fleet Training Center Norfolk, Virginia	<u>10</u>
Total	530 (70%)
Other commands (less than 1%)	<u>225 (30%)</u> 755

Personnel were screened out by a variety of CONUS commands, but the four commands screening out the most members were the Naval Administration Command of the Naval Training Center at Great Lakes, Illinois (101), the Personnel Support Branch of the Naval Training Center at San Diego, California (101), the Service School Command at Great Lakes, Illinois (83), and the Service School Command at San Diego, California (57).

3.1.7 INTENDED OVERSEAS COMMANDS OF DESELECTEES

Table 6 shows a breakdown of the intended overseas commands for personnel who were not selected for overseas duty. In addition, Table 7 gives a breakdown of the countries of these intended billets.

TABLE 6
INTENDED OVERSEAS COMMAND

<u>Intended Command</u>	<u>Number of People Not Selected</u>
USS Midway, Yokosuka, Japan	87
USS Gilmore, Sardinia	34
USS LaSalle *	34
USS Albany, Gaeta, Italy	24
USS Canopus, Rota, Spain	23
Naval Regional Medical Center, Okinawa	22
Naval Station, Adak, Alaska	19
USS Holland, Holy Loch, Scotland	18
Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba	18
USS Oklahoma City, Yokosuka, Japan	16
3rd Force Service Support Group, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific-Japan	16
Naval Facilities, Midway Island	13
USS Hunley, Guam	12
Naval Communication Area Master Station, West Pacific-Guam	12
USS Worden, Yokosuka, Japan	11
Naval Communications Station, Diego Garcia	10
USS White Plains, Yokosuka, Japan	<u>9</u>
Total	378
Other commands (less than 1%)	273
No information	76
Multiple messages; cannot determine command	<u>28</u>
	755

*Note: Because of the nature of the LaSalle's duties, overseas screening is routinely done even though the ship is home-ported in Norfolk, Virginia.

TABLE 7
COUNTRY OF INTENDED BILLET

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number of People Not Selected</u>
Japan	219
Italy	51
Guam	46
Spain	38
(USS LaSalle)*	(34)
Sardinia	31
Cuba	28
Alaska	26
Philippines	20
Midway Island	19
Scotland	17
Iceland	16
Diego Garcia	16
Puerto Rico	10
Bermuda	5
Greece	5
Newfoundland	4
Other countries (less than 4)	66
No information	76
Multiple messages; cannot determine command	<u>28</u>
Total	755

*Note: Because of the nature of the LaSalle's duties, it is impossible to assign a country.

Personnel were being screened for a variety of intended overseas commands. Of the total not selected, 87 were bound for the USS Midway at Yokosuka, Japan; 34 for the USS Gilmore at Sardinia; and 34 for the USS LaSalle. These three intended overseas commands had the highest number of personnel who were screened out.

The Commands were located in a variety of countries; the four which had the highest number of people deselected were: Japan (219), Italy (51), Guam (46), and Spain (38).

3.1.8 EVIDENCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH OVERSEAS SCREENING DIRECTIVES

There was evidence, of course, that overseas screening had been completed for the 755 people who had been found unsuitable for overseas assignment. In addition, evidence that overseas screening had been completed was found for 19,226 of those processed for overseas duty during the study period. This evidence was in the form of screening codes located on the EAD and available through computer retrieval at NMPC - 40. Therefore, evidence that overseas screening had been done was found for a total of 19,981 of the 35,369 processed, or 56.49%.

3.2 PERSONNEL RETURNED EARLY FROM OVERSEAS DUTY

The results of data analysis for personnel returned early from overseas duty due to unsuitability for reasons that might have been detected during overseas screening are presented in this section of the report. Again, where necessary, each result or set of results is followed by a brief interpretation.

3.2.1 TOTAL NUMBER OF EARLY RETURNEES AND SUMMARY INDEX

The total number of enlisted Navy personnel returned to CONUS prior to completion of their tour of duty was 393, as broken down in Table 8. This number represents a very marked decrease in early returns as compared with the number in the 1974 study which was 1665.

TABLE 8

TOTAL NUMBER OF EARLY OVERSEAS RETURNEES

<u>Total Number of Returnees:</u>	A.	49 Declared Unsuitable (NMPC - 51 - files)
	B.	74 Medical Evacuations (ASMRO)
	C.	41 Criminal Offenders (NMPC - 84)
	D.	<u>229</u> Administrative Discharges (NMPC - 83)
<u>Total</u>		393

<u>Where:</u>	A.	Personnel Declared Unsuitable:	49 Declared and returned.
	B.	Medical Evacuations:	122 Total evacuations from overseas billets.
		Minus	48 Evacuated for reasons that could not have been screened.
		Total:	74
	C.	Criminal Offenders:	22 Transferred to new billet.
			14 Transferred for sentencing.
			5 Confined in foreign prisons.
		Total:	41
	D.	Administrative Discharges:	229 Discharged and returned.

Table 8 shows that for the present study period, the total number of enlisted Navy personnel returned to CONUS prior to completion of their tour was 393. * All of these personnel were found unsuitable for reasons that might have been detected before being detailed overseas. When this figure is divided by those annually detailed overseas (see page 3-1 of this report), the result is 1.11% (393 divided by 35,369). Only a little more than 1% of enlisted personnel annually detailed overseas failed to complete their tour of duty for reasons that might have been detected beforehand. This is a much lower figure than was the case in the comparison year of 1974 when the percentage was 6.05%.

*Not included in this number are the "marginal performers" who were not returned to CONUS but were screened out as unsuitable for a second tour. See discussion on pages 3-36 and 3-37.

A comparison of these early return figures with those of 1974 appears in Table 9. Overall, there was a 76% decrease in the number of early returns with only the administrative discharge category showing an increase (38%).

TABLE 9
EARLY OVERSEAS RETURNEES IN 1978-1979
COMPARED WITH THOSE IN 1974

<u>Category</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1978-79</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>% Change</u>
Declared Unsuitable (NMPC - 40)	192	49	-143	-74.48%
Medical Evacuations (ASMRO)	809	74	-735	-90.85%
Criminal Offenders (NMPC - 84)	498	41	-457	-91.77%
Administrative Discharges (NMPC - 83)	<u>166</u>	<u>229</u>	<u>+ 63</u>	<u>+37.95%</u>
Total	1665	393	-1272	-76.40%

3.2.2 FINANCIAL LOSS TO THE NAVY OF EARLY RETURNEES

An estimate of the dollar costs resulting from those who returned early from overseas duty is given in Table 10.

TABLE 10
COST ESTIMATE OF OVERSEAS SELECTION FAILURES

<u>Average Rotational Costs.</u>	\$2,840.00
<u>Detailing and Placement Costs</u>	\$ 48.00
a. detailer $\frac{\$13,000/\text{year}}{2,080 \text{ hours}} =$	\$6.25/hour
$\frac{1}{2}$ hour per individual =	\$3.13
b. detailer support $\frac{\$8,040/\text{year}}{2,080 \text{ hours}} =$	\$3.86/hour
$\frac{1}{2}$ hour per individual =	\$1.93
c. Sending command	
screening by CO .4 hour x \$15.13/hour =	\$ 6.05
miscellaneous processing 2 hours x \$7.40/hour =	14.80
	<u>\$20.85</u>
d. Receiving command	
miscellaneous processing 3 hours x \$7.40/hour =	\$22.20
<u>Costs of an Open Billet Overseas.</u>	\$1,689.00
a. average overseas failure results in a two month open billet	
b. average total worth of individuals to the Navy, based on the 393 people who returned early =	\$ 844.80
c. two months x \$844.80 =	\$ 1,689.60
<u>Total Cost Per Individual.</u>	\$4,577.00
<u>Total Cost for 1979</u>	\$1,798,761.00
a. 393 people returned early during study period	
b. cost per individual =	\$4,577.00
c. 393 x 4577 =	\$1,798,761.00

As indicated in the methods section of this report, the data in Table 10 reflect an extremely conservative estimate. This data shows that the annual dollar loss to the Navy of these personnel who did not complete their overseas tour was \$1,798,761.00. This represented an individual early return cost of \$4,577.00, which included movement overseas, detailing, processing, and loss resulting from an open billet.

This figure compares very favorably with the comparison year of 1974, where the loss estimate was \$6,154,000.00, based on an individual cost of \$3,700.00. This is a decrease of 70.77%, despite four years of inflation and rising costs.

3.2.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE RETURNEE SAMPLE

The remainder of the results section of this report deals with various breakdowns which describe the personnel who returned early.

3.2.4 ANALYSIS OF EARLY RETURNEES BY SEX

Table 11 on the following page presents a breakdown of early returnees by sex, as well as by sex according to the reason for early return.

TABLE 11
ANALYSIS OF EARLY RETURNEES BY SEX

For All Reasons

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Male	360	91.6%
Female	33	8.4
Total	393	

Declared Unsuitable by CO

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Male	43	87.7%
Female	6	12.3
Total	49	

MEDEVACS

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Male	62	83.8%
Female	12	16.2
Total	74	

Criminal Offenders

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Male	39	95.1%
Female	2	4.9
Total	41	

Administrative Discharges

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Male	216	94.3%
Female	13	5.7
Total	229	

The results presented in Table 11 show that males comprised 91.6% of the total group of early returnees while females comprised 8.4%. This increase in the proportion of females in every category as compared with the baseline year of 1974 is clearly an indication of greater numbers of Navy women being given overseas billets. It would be inappropriate to conclude that women are doing less well as a total group without considering the number of women overseas.

3.2.5 ANALYSIS OF EARLY RETURNEES BY RATING

Table 12 lists the rating categories of early returnees.

TABLE 12
ANALYSIS OF EARLY RETURNEES BY RATING

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>	<u>% of Rated</u>
Non-Rated	139	35.6%
Rated	254	64.4
Total	393	

Breakdown of Non-Rated Personnel

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>	<u>% of Rated</u>
Seaman Recruit	36	
Seaman Apprentice	28	
Seaman	14	
Total	78	56.1%
Fireman Recruit	21	
Fireman Apprentice	12	
Fireman	4	
Total	37	26.6%
Airman Recruit	14	
Airman Apprentice	6	
Airman	4	
Total	24	17.3%

TABLE 12 (continued)

<u>Rating</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>	<u>% of Rated</u>
<u>Construction Group</u>		
Construction Mechanic	1	
Equipment Operator	3	
Builder	1	
Utilitiesman	1	
Total	6	2.36%
<u>Deck Group</u>		
Boatswain's Mate	5	
Ocean Systems Technician	17	
Operations Specialist	4	
Signalman	2	
Sonar Technician	1	
Quartermaster	1	
Total	30	11.81%
<u>Medical Group</u>		
Hospital Corpsman	7	
Hospitalman Recruit	2	
Hospitalmar. Apprentice	4	
Hospitalman	1	
Total	14	5.51%
<u>Ordnance Group</u>		
Torpedoman's Mate	1	
Fire Control Technician	2	
Gunner's Mate	3	
Total	6	2.36%
<u>Electronic and Precision Instruments Group</u>		
Electronics Technician	4	
Opticalman	1	
Total	5	1.97%
<u>Dental Group</u>		
Dental Technician	3	
Dental Apprentice	1	
Dentalman	1	
Total	5	1.97%

TABLE 12 (continued)

Breakdown of Rated Personnel

<u>Rating</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>	<u>% of Rated</u>
<u>Administrative and Clerical Group</u>		
Radioman	42	
Yeoman	6	
Mess Management Specialist	10	
Storekeeper	12	
Personnelman	2	
Ship's Serviceman	6	
Postal Clerk	9	
Data Processing Technician	4	
Legalman	1	
Cryptologic Technician	8	
Total	100	39.37%
<u>Engineering and Hull Group</u>		
Electrician's Mate	4	
Machinist's Mate	7	
Boiler Technician	7	
Engineman	11	
Hull Maintenance Technician	6	
Interior Communications Technician	1	
Machinery Repairman	1	
Total	37	14.57%
<u>Aviation Group</u>		
Aviation Structural Mechanic	9	
Aviation Machinist's Mate	6	
Aviation Storekeeper	4	
Aviation Electrician's Mate	1	
Aviation Boatswain's Mate	8	
Aerographer's Mate	1	
Aviation Support Equipment Technician	1	
Aviation Anti-Submarine Warfare Operator	1	
Air Controlman	2	
Aviation Maintenance Administrationman	5	
Aviation Ordnanceman	5	
Photographer's Mate	5	
Aviation Electronics Technician	2	
Tradesman	1	
Total	51	20.07%

Rated or designated non-rated personnel made up 64.4% of the total, compared to 35.6% who were not rated. The largest rated group was Administrative and Clerical (39.37%), followed by Aviation (20.7%), Engineering and Hull Group (14.57%), and the Deck Group (11.81%). The largest non-rated group was the Seaman (56.1%), followed by Fireman (26.6%) and Airman (17.3%).

3.2.6 ANALYSIS OF EARLY RETURNEES BY PAYGRADE

Table 13 presents a breakdown of early returnees by paygrade.

TABLE 13

<u>Paygrade Categories</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>	<u>% of Total¹</u>
E-1	118	30.0%
E-2	92	23.4
E-3	87	22.1
E-4	45	11.5
E-5	19	4.8
E-6	19	4.8
E-7	13	3.3
E-8	0	0.0
E-9	0	0.0
Total	393	

The paygrade with the largest number of returnees was E-1 (30.0%), followed by E-2 (23.4%), E-3 (22.1%), and E-4 (11.5%). The E-5 through E-9 paygrade groups made up 12.9% of the total. When compared to 1974 data, this percentage shows a shift toward lower paygrades being returned.

3.2.7 REASONS FOR EARLY RETURN

An analysis of the reasons for early returns from overseas duty is presented in Table 14.

TABLE 14
ANALYSIS OF REASONS FOR EARLY RETURN

<u>Reason</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
<u>Disciplinary Problems</u>		36.0%
NJPs	6	1.4%
Various infractions of military regulations	66	15.1%
Habitual infraction of military regulations	85	19.5%
<u>Drugs</u>		34.3%
Use/sale/possession	89	20.4%
Alcohol abuse	53	12.1%
Drug addiction	8	1.8%
<u>Medical</u>		25.1%
Psychiatric	77	17.6%
Homosexual	15	3.4%
Pregnant	2	0.5%
Skin problems	3	0.7%
Asthma	1	0.2%
Congenital problems	6	1.4%
Diabetes	1	0.2%
Tuberculosis	1	0.2%
Not specified	4	0.9%

TABLE 14 (continued)

<u>Miscellaneous</u>		2.4%
Marginal performance*	5	1.1%
Embarrassment to U.S.	3	0.7%
Financial	1	0.2%
Sent in error	1	0.2%
Administrative burden	1	0.2%
 <u>Dependent</u>		 2.0%
Medical	7	1.6%
Behavior	1	0.2%
Marital difficulty	1	0.2%

*See discussion on marginal performance on pages 3-36 and 3-37.

Note: Total number of reasons is 437, due to multiple reasons for returns in some cases.

Table 14 shows that over 70% of the early returnees were unable to complete their overseas tour of duty because of disciplinary problems or drug abuse. When psychiatric reasons are added, fully 87.9% of the early returns are accounted for.

3.2.8 OVERSEAS COMMANDS OF EARLY RETURNEES

Table 15 lists the overseas commands of early returnees as well as the countries of early returnees. The USS Midway had the highest number, which was also the case in 1974.

TABLE 15

<u>Country & Commands</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>
<u>JAPAN</u>	
USS Midway, Yokosuka	44
USS Oklahoma, Yokosuka	26
USS White Plains, Yokosuka	15
Command Fleet Activity, Yokosuka	11
Yokosuka (not specified)	5
USS Worden, Yokosuka	5
USS Lockwood, Yokosuka	3
Command Fleet Activity, Okinawa	5
Okinawa (not specified)	2
Naval Reg. Medical Center, Okinawa	3
Naval Security Group Activity, Misawa	3
Honshu, Atsugi	2
Other Commands	<u>10</u>
Total	134

TABLE 15 (continued)

ITALY

USS Gilmore, Sardinia	23
Naval Air Facilities, Sigonella	10
Sicily (not specified)	1
La Maddalena Site Camp	3
Naples (not specified)	2
USS Albany, Gaeta	2
Other Commands	<u>5</u>
Total	46

GUAM

Naval Communication Area, Master Station, West Pacific	5
Guam (not specified)	8
Naval Facilities, Guam	3
Naval Air Station, Guam	3
Naval Air Station, Agana	9
Faireconron, Guam	2
Other Commands	<u>5</u>
Total	35

SPAIN

USS Canopus, Rota	10
Naval Station, Rota	6
Rota (not specified)	5
Naval Communications Station, Rota	5
USS Oak Ridge, Rota	4
Other Commands	<u>5</u>
Total	35

TABLE 15 (continued)

ICELAND

Naval Station, Keflavik	<u>13</u>
Total	13

PHILIPPINES

Naval Station, Subic Bay	19
Naval Air Station, Cubi Point	10
Philippines (not specified)	3
Recunit, Subic Bay	2
Other Commands	<u>6</u>
Total	40

CUBA

Naval Air Station, Guantanamo Bay	6
Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay	4
Cuba (not specified)	3
Other Commands	<u>2</u>
Total	15

UNITED KINGDOM

USS Holland, Holy Loch, Scotland	4
Scotland (not specified)	1
Naval Security Group Activity, Edzell, Scotland	2
Naval Facilities, Brawdy, Wales	2
Other Commands	<u>2</u>
Total	11

TABLE 15 (continued)

PUERTO RICO

Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads	3
Naval Reg. Medical Center, Roosevelt Roads	2
Other Commands	<u>7</u>
Total	12

AUSTRALIA

Naval Communications Station, Harold E. Holt	4
Australia (not specified)	5
Other Commands	<u>1</u>
Total	10

ADAK, ALASKA

Adak (not specified)	6
Other Commands	<u>1</u>
Total	7

BERMUDA

Naval Air Station, Bermuda	5
Naval Facilities, Bermuda	<u>4</u>
Total	9

ANTIGUA

Naval Facilities, Antigua	2
Other Commands	<u>1</u>
Total	3

TABLE 15 (continued)

MIDWAY ISLAND

Midway Island (not specified)	2
Other Commands	<u>2</u>
Total	4

GREECE

Naval Communications Station, Nea Makri, Greece	<u>3</u>
Total	3

NEWFOUNDLAND

Naval Facilities, Argentina	<u>3</u>
Total	3

OTHER COMMANDS

Commands with less than 1%	13
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3.2.9 ANALYSIS OF EARLY RETURNEES BY LENGTH OF TIME OVERSEAS

Table 16 presents a breakdown of the length of time overseas among early returnees at the time of their return to the United States.

TABLE 16
ANALYSIS OF EARLY RETURNEES BY LENGTH OF TIME OVERSEAS

<u>Time Overseas</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Less than 1 month	7	1.8%
1-6 months	60	15.3
7-12 months	119	30.3
13-18 months	102	26.0
19-24 months	71	18.0
25-30 months	21	5.3
31-36 months	7	1.8
More than 36 months	5	1.3
No information	<u>1</u>	0.3
	Total	393

The median overseas tour length of early returnees was 13-18 months. The modal value was 7-12 months.

3.2.10 FREQUENCY OF FIRST OVERSEAS TOUR AMONG EARLY RETURNEES

Table 17 presents an analysis of early returnees in terms of first overseas tour of duty as compared to second tour or more.

TABLE 17
ANALYSIS OF FIRST OVERSEAS TOUR AMONG EARLY RETURNEES

<u>Tour Number</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
First	319	81.2%
Second	40	10.2
Third or more	7	1.8
No information	<u>27</u>	6.9
Total	393	

Some 81.2% of early returnees were on their first tour of overseas duty. Only 12% had previously spent at least one complete tour overseas. These figures are quite similar to those found in 1974 where 73.2% were on their first tour and 20.3% had completed at least one complete tour.

3.2.11 PRIOR COMMANDS OF EARLY RETURNEES

Table 18 lists the prior commands from which early returnees had been detailed overseas. Early returnees had come from various CONUS commands prior to overseas assignment. The prior commands having the highest number were the Fleet Training Center at Norfolk, Virginia (38), the Service School Command at San Diego, California (37), and the Service School Command at Great Lakes, Illinois (35). The Service School Commands at San Diego and Great Lakes also had high numbers of people returning in 1974, with (51) and (48), respectively. The NATTC at Millington showed a substantial decrease in early returns as compared to 1974, i.e., 18 versus 61.

The finding that the Fleet Training Center (FTC) at Norfolk had the highest number of early returns deserves special consideration.

The problem situation at Norfolk was identified during the course of the study and has been addressed at some length in Section IV of this report.

TABLE 18
PRIOR COMMANDS OF EARLY RETURNS

<u>Command</u>	<u>Number of Returnees</u>
Prior Billet unknown	102
Fleet Training Center, Norfolk Virginia	38
Service School Command, San Diego, Calif.	37
Service School Command, Great Lakes, Ill.	35
Naval Air Technical Training Command, Millington, Tennessee	18
Fleet Training Center, San Diego, Calif.	18
Naval Technical Training Command, Meridian, Miss.	16
Naval Air Technical Training Command, Lakehurst, N.J.	9
Fleet Antisubmarine Warfare Training Center, Norfolk, Virginia	7
Hawaii (not specified)	7
Naval Construction Training Center, Gulfport, Miss.	3
May Port, Fla. (not specified)	3
Other Commands	<u>100</u>
Total	<u>393</u>

3.2.12 EVIDENCE OF OVERSEAS SCREENING OF EARLY RETURNS

Table 19 presents information regarding evidence of overseas screening of early returns.

TABLE 19
EVIDENCE OF OVERSEAS SCREENING OF EARLY RETURNS

<u>Evidence of Overseas Screening Present</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Yes	276	70.2%
No	86	21.9
No information	<u>31</u>	7.9
Total	393	

Evidence that overseas screening had been done was found for 70.2% of those who had returned early from overseas assignment. This is a marked contrast to the 1974 study in which only 9.1% of early returnees had been screened and 73.7% had no evidence of screening.

3.2.13 OVERSEAS SCREENING BY PRIOR COMMANDS

The screening given early returnees was examined to determine the extent to which specific commands had performed the required overseas screening procedures. These results are listed in Table 20.

TABLE 20

PRIOR CONUS BILLET AND EVIDENCE OF SCREENING

<u>Prior CONUS & Screen</u>	<u>Number</u>
<u>Prior Billet Unknown</u>	
Screening done	69
No Screening done	29
Unknown if screening done	<u>4</u>
Total	102
<u>Service School Command, Great Lakes, Ill.</u>	
Screening done	22
No screening done	11
Unknown if screening done	<u>2</u>
Total	35
<u>Service School Command, San Diego, CA</u>	
Screening done	26
No Screening done	5
Unknown if screening done	<u>6</u>
Total	37
<u>Fleet Training Center, Norfolk, VA</u>	
Screening done	28
No Screening done	6
Unknown if screening done	<u>4</u>
Total	38
<u>Naval Air Technical Training Command, Memphis, Tenn.</u>	
Screening done	15
No Screening done	3
Unknown if screening done	<u>0</u>
Total	18

TABLE 20
(continued)

<u>Prior CONUS & Screen</u>	<u>Number</u>
<u>Fleet Training Center,</u> <u>San Diego, CA</u>	
Screening done	15
No screening done	3
Unknown if screening done	<u>0</u>
Total	18
<u>Naval Technical Training</u> <u>Command, Meridian, Miss.</u>	
Screening done	9
No screening done	3
Unknown if screening done	<u>4</u>
Total	16
<u>Naval Air Technical Training</u> <u>Command, Lakehurst, N.J.</u>	
Screening done	8
No screening done	1
Unknown if screening done	<u>0</u>
Total	9
<u>Fleet Antisubmarine Warfare</u> <u>Training Center, Atlantic,</u> <u>Norfolk, VA</u>	
Screening done	5
No screening done	2
Unknown if screening done	<u>0</u>
Total	7
<u>Hawaii (not specified)</u>	
Screening done	2
No screening done	4
Unknown if screening done	<u>1</u>
Total	7

TABLE 20
(continued)

<u>Prior CONUS & Screen</u>	<u>Number</u>
<u>Naval Construction Training Center, Gulfport, Miss.</u>	
Screening done	3
No screening done	0
Unknown if screening done	0
Total	<u>3</u>
<u>May Port, Fla. (not specified)</u>	
Screening done	3
No screening done	0
Unknown if screening done	0
Total	<u>3</u>
<u>Commands Listed Less Than 4 Times - Less Than 1%</u>	
Screening done	71
No screening done	19
Unknown if screening done	10
Total	<u>100</u>

3.3 MARGINAL PERFORMERS

In addition to those 393 people who were returned to CONUS commands prior to completing their overseas tours, 100 people were identified as marginal performers. While not returned to CONUS commands prematurely, these individuals were screened out of further overseas billets at the end of their current overseas tours. This group could therefore not be counted among those 393 who were lost to the overseas Navy, but they were definitely performing only marginally since they were screened as unsuitable for a second tour.

These marginal performers were in many cases similar demographically to those individuals returned early. However, some notable differences emerged. Results presented above showed that individuals who were returned were of low paygrades, while this group of marginal performers were mostly in the middle enlisted paygrades. Also, this group was more likely to have problems with dependents.

SECTION 4 - OVERSEAS SCREENING AT THE FLEET TRAINING CENTER IN NORFOLK, VA

4.1 RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS

Results presented in Table 18 showed that the prior command of the largest number of overseas assignment failures was the Fleet Training Center (FTC) at Norfolk. The situation at Norfolk came to the attention of the study team during the course of the project, and special attention was given to it. A visit was made to the FTC at Norfolk, and interviews were conducted with the personnel in charge of training operations.

The FTC conducts training programs in support of overseas homeported ships. Enlisted personnel assigned to overseas homeported ships attend the training just prior to overseas departure. For those of E4 paygrade and below, this training consists of three days of damage control and two days of shipboard fire fighting (except for those assigned to the USS ALBANY and the USS LASALLE who receive aircraft fire fighting).

People in paygrades E5 and above receive about three weeks of instruction that includes: (a) leadership, management, and education; (b) damage control; (c) 3-M management; and (d) shipboard fire fighting. Also, because of the tremendous needs for information about overseas assignment and specific overseas areas, the FTC personnel have developed a special three - and - one - half hour Overseas Diplomacy course. This is conducted after hours by staff volunteers.

The problem faced by the FTC staff is that more than half of the trainees they receive are not properly screened for overseas assignment by their commands. Also, these people are not prepared for departure overseas. Many have no passports, no birth certificates, and no port calls. Because these people are supposed to depart for their new overseas command upon completion of their training, the burden for completion of these unfinished tasks that falls upon the FTC staff adds some 31% to their workload. The FTC staff is organized and manned to conduct training, not to conduct overseas screening and make preparations on a "crash" basis for the overseas departure of hundreds of people.

According to the FTC staff, the Recruit Training Command and the Service

School Command (SSC) of the Naval Training Center (NTC) at Orlando, Florida, are the sources of most of their problems. This perception is consistent with the findings of the 1974 baseline study where it was found that not one of the 26 early return cases that had come from RTC Orlando had been screened, and only 3 of the 8 from SSC Orlando had been screened. The NTCs at San Diego and Great Lakes were also mentioned as not being in compliance with the Enlisted Transfer Manual procedures for overseas screening and preparation.

4.2 DISCUSSION

The situation at NTC Norfolk, therefore, represents a serious gap in the overseas screening system. As mentioned in the Introduction to this report, a great deal of time and effort was spent reviewing alternatives for strengthening the overseas screening system, including the development and conduct of a short training course for personnel who do the screening. An on-site review of the new system at several locations showed it to be in place and working well. Unfortunately, NTC Orlando was not included in the training and was not one of the sites visited to check out the new system.

Given the very positive findings of this study in terms of the reduced number of overseas failures, it seems clear that one of the few remaining tasks is to assist the personnel at Orlando with full implementation of their responsibilities in overseas screening and preparation. A specific recommendation to this effect is presented in the next section of this report.

SECTION 5 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The results of this study are very positive, indicating a vast improvement in the Navy overseas screening and selection system in reducing the number of overseas failures. The comparatively higher number of those found unsuitable for overseas assignment and screened out also showed a positive trend, indicating an increased compliance with the new overseas screening procedures. Even when the method differences between this study and the 1974 baseline study are considered, the magnitude of the improvement figures outweigh any error effects.

It must be concluded from these results that efforts of the Navy over the past seven years to improve the overseas screening system have worked, at least in terms of compliance with screening procedures and a reduction in overseas failures. The finding that there were still nearly two million dollars being lost through replacement of early returns for reasons that could have been detected may be disturbing to some. However, it may simply not be possible to gain significant improvement over the figure of 1.11% of these detailed overseas being returned early.

There are several areas in the screening and selection system that require attention, however, in order for the system to operate more effectively. It was found that about 43% of those processed for overseas duty are still not being screened according to the required procedures. Each of the areas in need of attention is addressed in the recommendations presented below.

5.2 RECOMMENDATION ONE

It is apparent that the overseas screening and selection procedures contained in the Enlisted Transfer Manual are being applied unevenly across the many commands responsible for assignment of overseas personnel. An effective strategy for improving this situation would be for all those responsible for screening to attend a short (one-day) training course on overseas screening. This type of course was designed, developed, and implemented very

successfully for the Training Commands at Great Lakes, San Diego, and Millington. This course was a one-time implementation, however, and it is doubtful that any of those who were trained are still doing overseas screening. The training course should be institutionalized through the Navy Education and Training Command (NETC) procedures, so that all Personnelmen are required to attend the one-day course as a normal part of their training pipeline. This recommendation is stated as follows:

- The training course for overseas screening and selection developed in 1976 under contract #N00600-73-D-0780, Task Order #76/78, should be reviewed, revised, and incorporated into the NETC system and made a requirement for all Personnelmen involved in the overseas assignment process.

5.3 RECOMMENDATION TWO

The problems associated with overseas screening and preparation at the Fleet Training Center (FTC) at Norfolk and the Naval Training Center at Orlando indicate that there is a gap at these locations in an otherwise fairly well functioning system for overseas screening. The NTC at Orlando and the Enlisted Personnel Manpower Center (EPMC) at New Orleans were never directly involved in the various improvement efforts carried out over the past several years. It is therefore recommended that:

- A special team should be tasked to visit EPMC, NTC Orlando, and the FTC at Norfolk to review the situation and examine the overseas screening problems. Assistance strategies to be performed by the team should be to provide detailed briefings on the overseas screening process and to conduct a one-day training course for all those responsible for overseas screening at NTC Orlando.

5.4 RECOMMENDATION THREE

There was a great deal of improvement apparent in the data systems available during this study as compared with the 1974 study. One of the recommendations made at that time was to systematize and streamline the information regarding

overseas assignment so that a study such as this could be completed more quickly and easily. Also, it was suggested that a feedback mechanism be developed within NMPC so that overseas screening compliance checks could be made and overseas failure rates could be routinely determined. Although the data was much more complete and easier to obtain for this than for the earlier study, data collection still required many months for completion and a great deal of footwork and cross-checking. It is recommended that:

- The systematic improvements, including computerization, made by NMPC in the overseas screening, selection, and tracking process should be continued. A system should be developed within NMPC - 40 that consolidates overseas personnel disposition data maintained at NMPC - 83 and 84, as well as data for Naval personnel at ASMRO. This system should allow the present type of study to be completed more quickly and easily and the data to be periodically fed back throughout the system.

Most importantly, the payoff to the Navy would be that (1) an in-house study could be done, and (2) this system would serve as an automatic quality control indicator.

5.5 RECOMMENDATION FOUR

It was mentioned in the introduction to this report that a Navy Overseas Assignment Inventory (NOAI) had been developed as a predictor instrument for use in the overseas screening process, but that it had not been incorporated into the system. It is now recommended that:

- A final decision should be made regarding use of the NOAI as a part of the overseas screening process. Given the results of this study, the Navy may not consider it to be cost-effective to fully employ the instrument throughout the system. However, several of the key overseas adjustment scales contained in the NOAI should be incorporated into the screening interview and therefore made a part of the training course for those who do the screening.

5.6 ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The personnel interviewed at NTC Norfolk set forth several specific recommendations for improvement of the overseas screening system. They are listed below for consideration:

- Controls should be maintained to insure that personnel ranking no lower than Chief Petty Officer First Class should conduct overseas screening. Also, controls should insure that Commanding Officers or their designees sign the required overseas screening documents.
- The orders issued for lower ranking personnel assigned overseas from the Recruit Training Centers should clearly state the unaccompanied status of the assignment. The nature and consequences of this status should also be clearly explained to these personnel prior to departure from the Recruit Training Centers.
- NMPC and EPMC should not issue orders for overseas assignment until evidence of overseas screening has been received by them. Compliance with overseas screening directives is now required and is to be received within ten days of notice, but there are many cases of overseas orders issued with no screening being done.
- All those involved in the overseas screening process should attend a training course developed specifically for assisting them in carrying out their duties.
- The criteria for use and possession of marijuana as a disqualifying factor for overseas assignment contained in the Enlisted Transfer Manual should be reviewed and clarified.

APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

REFERENCES

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APPENDIX B

1974 BASELINE STUDY

OVERVIEW SUMMARY*

Effective performance of personnel stationed overseas has always been a prime concern of the Navy, but it has gained prominence in recent years through new emphasis on the Overseas Diplomacy Mission Element and overseas homeporting operations. Commanding officers of overseas units have demanded tighter screening and selection of personnel detailed to their commands, and much discussion has centered on the nature and severity of the problem in terms of Navy personnel and their dependents who do not succeed in the overseas environment.

This project was undertaken in order to provide some answers to the following basic questions involved in this issue. How many enlisted personnel fail to complete their overseas tour of duty each year? How many of these could have been screened out in the first place? What is the percentage, or "failure ratio", of those who do not succeed overseas as a function of all those screened, selected, and detailed overseas each year? What are the primary reasons for overseas unsuitability? What is the annual dollar loss to the Navy resulting from this problem?

Information relating to these and other questions was derived through study of all data available at the Bureau of Navy personnel and the Armed Services Medical Regulating Office in Washington, D.C. In all, five different categories of personnel were studied through data available in various offices. These were:

- Personnel screened out and not selected for overseas assignment by commanding officers in the U.S. according to the screening procedures for suitability found in BUPERS INSTRUCTION 1300.26E.
- Personnel found unsuitable for overseas duty by commanding officers of overseas units and reassigned according to unsuitability criteria listed in BUPERS INSTRUCTION 1300.26E.
- Personnel who were medically evacuated from overseas duty.

*This Appendix contains the complete Overview Summary for an Assessment of the Screening Problem for Overseas Assignment by Michael F. Tucker and John E. Schiller for the Bureau of Naval Personnel (PERS-62), Washington, D.C., May, 1975.

- Personnel who were incarcerated overseas in foreign or military prisons and then returned to the United States.
- Personnel who were administratively discharged from the Navy while serving overseas.

The results of this study concerning personnel in the latter four categories listed above, who returned early from overseas duty, are summarized as follows:

- For calendar year 1974, the total number of enlisted Navy personnel returned to CONUS prior to completion of their tour was estimated at 1,665. All of these personnel were found unsuitable for reasons that might have been detected before being detailed overseas through more effective screening procedures.
- This figure (1,665) represented an estimated 6.05% of all enlisted personnel annually detailed overseas (1,665 divided by 27,505).
- An extremely conservative estimate of the annual dollar loss to the Navy of these personnel who did not complete their tour was \$6,154,000. This represented an individual early return cost estimated at \$3,700, which included movement overseas, detailing, processing, and loss resulting from an open billet.
- Males comprised 97% of the total group of early returnees, while females comprised 3%.
- The total group was comprised of: 59% who were rated, compared to 41% who were not; the largest rated group was Administrative and Clerical (32%), followed by Engineering and Hull specialists (18%), Aviation (16%), and Construction (12%), the largest non-rated group was the Seaman (55%), followed by Fireman (26%), and Airman (14%); the paygrade with the largest number of returnees was E-3 (33%), followed by E-2 (18%), E-1 (14%), E-4 (13%), and E-5 (10%), and the E-6 through E-9 paygrades made up 12% of the total.
- Although a long list of specific reasons for unsuitability was given, nearly half of the early returnees were unable to complete their overseas tour of duty because of disciplinary problems (25%) or drug abuse (23%). Other major reasons were mental disorders (12%), alcoholism (12%), and medical problems (9%).
- Early returnees came from 198 separate overseas commands, but the four commands having the highest number were the U.S.S. Midway at Yokosuka, Japan (38%), the U.S.S. Little Rock at Gaeta, Italy (23%), the Naval Station on Midway Island (23%), and the U.S.S. Canopus at Holy Loch, Scotland (22%).

- The average overseas tour length of early returnees was 11 months and 6 days; 29% had been overseas 6 months or less; 58%, 1 year or less; 75%, 18 months or less; and 83%, 2 years or less.
- Some 73% of early returnees were on their first tour of overseas duty. There were 20% who had spent at least one complete tour overseas.
- Early returnees had come from 220 separate CONUS commands prior to overseas assignment, but the six prior commands having the highest number were the Naval Air Technical Training Center in Tennessee (61); the Service School Command of the Naval Training Center at San Diego, California (51); the Service School Command of the Naval Training Center at Great Lakes, Illinois (48); the Recruit Training Command of the Naval Training Center at San Diego (30); the Recruit Training Command of the Naval Training Center at Orlando, Florida (26); and the Recruit Training Command at Great Lakes (19).
- The personnel jackets of 74% of the early returnees contained no evidence of overseas screening by prior commands, which is required according to BUPERS INSTRUCTION 1300.26E. An overseas suitability interview form or administrative note stating that the member had been screened was found for 9% of the cases. Personnel jackets were unobtainable for the remaining 17% of returnees.

The results of this study concerning personnel who were screened out and not selected for overseas assignment during calendar year 1974 are summarized as follows:

- There was a total of 274 members screened out and not selected for overseas assignment. This represented 1.71% (274 divided by 16,030) of all enlisted personnel who were actually processed for overseas assignment through BUPERS in calendar year 1974.
- Males comprised 95% of the personnel not selected for overseas duty, while females comprised 5%.
- The total group was comprised of 65% who were rated, compared to 35% who were not. The largest rated group was Administrative and Clerical (33%), followed by Aviation (18%), Engineering and Hull specialists (17%), and Construction (12%). The largest non-rated group was the Seaman (53%), followed by Fireman (24%), and Airman (14%). The paygrade with the largest number of deselectees was E-2 (31%), followed by E-1 (19%), E-3 (18%), E-4 (15%), and E-5 (9%). The E-6 through E-8 paygrades made up 8% of the total, and there were no E-9 personnel deselected.
- Although there were some 13 reasons given for unsuitability screening, the three most significant were disciplinary violations, (31%), drug abuse (21%), and dependent problems (15%).

- These personnel were being screened for 110 different intended overseas commands. Of the total not selected, 18 were bound for the Naval Station at Keflavik, Iceland; 13 for the U.S.S. LaSalle at Bahrain; 10 for the U.S.S. Little Rock at Gaeta, Italy; and 10 for the U.S.S. Canopus at Holy Loch, Scotland. These were the four intended overseas commands with the highest number of personnel who were screened out.
- These personnel were screened out by 126 separate CONUS commands. The four commands screening out the most members were the Naval Administration Command of the Naval Training Center at Great Lakes, Illinois (34); the Service School Command of the Naval Training Center at San Diego, California (17); the Naval Construction School at Port Hueneme, California (15); and the Naval Air Technical Training Center in Tennessee (14).
- As a check on whether compliance with the screening procedures contained in BUPERS INSTRUCTION 1300.26E was increasing over time, the number of personnel screened out was plotted over a 13-month period -- December, 1973 through December, 1974. The plot showed no evidence of increasing compliance, with a low of 7 in February of 1974, a high of 38 in May, and again dropping to 9 in September.

These results are surprising and disturbing, not only to the CRE project staff, but we think to the Navy in general and to those directly involved in this issue in particular. The size of the problem both in terms of numbers of personnel who do not complete their overseas tour and the percentage this represents of those detailed each year, is much larger than we believed at the outset of the project. It was estimated by the Navy at that time that 1/2 of 1% of overseas assignments were resulting in an unsuitability declaration, and that the situation was improving!

The dollar cost resulting from the problem is considerable, although the estimate given was extremely conservative. The nature of the problem is also surprising. It would appear that the type of personnel, the CONUS commands from which they were sent overseas, and the reasons for unsuitability were such that significant improvement in the situation would not be overly difficult. Results regarding present screening procedures were disappointing because they indicate poor compliance with established procedures that were instituted four years ago.

It must be concluded from these results (which were based on very conservative estimates) that the overseas screening problem in the Navy is indeed severe and costly, and that the situation should and could be dramatically improved. Recommendations for how this might be accomplished must begin with those made nearly a year ago (Final Report on Task Order 73/28, Screening and Selection of Overseas Assignment: Assessment and Recommendations to the U.S. Navy, July 1974). Recommendations for immediate implementation made at that time, with elaborations from the present study, are summarized below.

Recommendation #1

Enforce the utilization of the Report of Suitability for Overseas Assignment for all personnel sent overseas, and the Report of Unsuitability for Overseas Assignment for all personnel who are returned early from overseas duty.

There was ample evidence in this study that established overseas screening procedures were not being followed very well. When evidence of screening was contained in service records, it was usually in the form of administrative messages, rather than the more informative, structured report provided in BUPERS INSTRUCTION 1300.26E. Also, there was little evidence that a serious, in-depth interview had taken place for those who were screened. More vigorous attempts should be made to achieve compliance with these procedures, especially at the service schools and training commands, from which came a large percentage of overseas failures.

As with the Suitability Report, evidence contained in service records that a member had been returned to CONUS for unsuitability was in the form of administrative messages, rather than the more informative Unsuitability Report form. Surprisingly, prior to the study, persons who were medically evacuated, imprisoned and returned to CONUS, or administratively discharged were not even counted among those who were categorized as "unsuitable for overseas duty". The Unsuitability Report should be filed with PERS 51 for all such personnel.

Recommendation #2

Establish an organizational mechanism within BUPERS to receive the data from these two reports, organize it for analysis, develop an information bank, and systematically feed the results back through the personnel system.

This study was very difficult to conduct because of the lack of a centralized system in the Navy for dealing with screening of overseas personnel and their early return or subsequent disposition. Information had to be gathered from PERS 51, the Enlisted Assignment Division; PERS 84, the Law Enforcement and Corrections Division; PERS 82, the Enlisted Performance Division; the Armed Services Medical Regulating Office; the computerized Enlisted Assignment Document (EAD); and individual service records in order to get a reasonably accurate picture of the situation. There was therefore no accurate data on this issue prior to this study and no reliable feedback of such data through the personnel system. Two very simple new procedures could be of enormous value. One is for all CONUS commands to inform PERS 51 immediately regarding compliance with overseas screening procedures for each appropriate member in their units (followed by the completed and signed report). Such indication would then be placed in a special location on the EAD. This would allow for an immediate check on compliance on a Navy-wide or special area basis at any time.

The second new procedure would also employ the EAD. This would involve all overseas commands, who would inform PERS 51 immediately regarding any member who does not complete his overseas tour for whatever reason (including medical evacuation, incarceration, and administrative discharge). This would also be placed in a special location on the EAD, which would allow for the type of study described in this report to be done almost automatically, much more efficiently, and on a periodic basis.

Recommendation #3

Establish and utilize a systems approach which integrates selection, training, preparation, and follow-up of personnel for overseas assignment.

A systems approach is sorely needed for overseas assignment. This is especially true at the service schools and training commands. A recommendation focusing on these commands that has a high potential for reducing the overseas failure problem is the incorporation of an "assessment center" function at these locations. This study showed that a large percentage of overseas failures came from such commands, were in the E-3 paygrade or below, and were on their first overseas tour of duty. These commands should therefore establish a review board for each overseas assignment candidate, consisting of supervisory personnel capable of assessing the candidate in terms of medical, disciplinary, alcohol and drug use, and psychological suitability for a first tour overseas. If there is reasonable doubt about the candidate regarding these problems, he should be screened out. Nothing negative need be included on the member's performance or service record, and he might well be selected for overseas service later in his Navy career. He would simply be considered not worth the risk at that point in his career for his first overseas tour of duty.

Recommendation #4

Establish a training program for Navy detailers and placement personnel to prepare them for their overseas screening and selection function.

This recommendation was originally set forth with the assumption that Navy detailers working at the Bureau of Personnel, Enlisted Assignment Division, were key personnel in the overseas screening process. However, they apparently have very little to do with actual application of overseas screening criteria, spending only about 20 minutes screening each individual's records! This recommendation should therefore be redirected at commanding officers of CONUS units, where the primary responsibility rests. Detailers could serve a much stronger role in monitoring and checking for compliance with required procedures, and it is recommended that instructions and briefings be prepared and given to them.

Recommendation #5

Develop procedures in screening and selection which include the incorporation of the families of Navy personnel assigned overseas.

This study focused extensively on enlisted personnel, so that no data was reported on the number of dependents who returned to the U.S. due to unsuitability. Presumably, there are a significant number of personnel who remain at their overseas duty station under some duress resulting from separation from their families. Present procedures require the member being screened for overseas duty to certify that his dependents have no "disqualifying abnormalities" and the interviewing command is instructed to determine whether any special educational facilities are required for the member's dependents. There is little evidence that these instructions are being followed. In any event, much more should be done in this area. To every extent possible, spouses and children should be included in the screening process.

In addition to these five recommendations, three areas for promising research were made for improving the overseas screening process in the July 1974 Final Report on Task Order 73/28. These included: (a) the continuing development of overseas suitability predictor instruments designed by the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center; (b) an investigation of the phenomena of ethnocentrism, social distance, and stereotyping for development of overseas screening criteria, and; (c) development of a differential screening, selection, and overseas placement system based on the matching of individual adaptive potential with specific conditions at overseas duty stations. The results of this study provide further justification for undertaking these research effort, and all three areas are again recommended.

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