Soviet Power in Latin America: Success or Failure?
SOVIET POWER IN LATIN AMERICA:
SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

by

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13 June 1980
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Composition of this memorandum was accomplished by Mrs. Pat Bonneau.
FOREWORD

This memorandum evolved from the Military Policy Symposium on "The Soviet Union in the Third World: Success and Failure," which was hosted by the Strategic Studies Institute in the Fall of 1979. During the Symposium, academic and government experts discussed a number of issues concerning this area which will have a continuing impact on US strategy. This memorandum considers one of these issues.

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SOVIET POWER IN LATIN AMERICA: SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

Soviet policy in Latin America, at least from American perspectives, is deceptively easy to analyze. Moscow's power appears increasingly to extend to previous North American spheres of influence—or threatens to do so. This apparent transition began with Cuba's turn to Marxism-Leninism in 1961, became less pronounced in the early 1970's, then spread anew with Moscow's Caribbean and Mexican ties from the mid-1970's onward. By the summer and fall of 1979—with the victory of Marxist-led pro-Cuban revolutionaries over Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, the ruckus over 3,000 Soviet troops in Cuba, and Fidel Castro's blatant attempt to move the sixth summit meeting of nonaligned countries toward open support of Moscow—Soviet presence in Latin America had reached crisis proportions in the minds of many influential observers, most notably in the US Congress.¹

The 1979 perception of escalated Soviet power in the Caribbean and Latin America in turn shaped American foreign policy. It prompted Washington to demand a change in the status quo of Havana-based Soviet "combat" troops and produced the
consequent image of a president not precisely in control of Caribbean foreign policy. The threatening Soviet power image meanwhile adversely affected Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), shaped growing negative moods about detente and the Russians in general, and added momentum toward increased military spending. As a result of these events—locked into US media coverage, congressional politics, executive-congressional relations, and public opinion surrounding Soviet and Cuban policies during the summer and fall of 1979—how easy it is to assess Kremlin power in Latin America as distinctly on the rise.

Admittedly, the idea of expanding Soviet power in Latin America is a compelling image. Cuba's "surrogate" or "proxy" role under Soviet leadership is central to the case. In the context of Soviet-Cuban military cooperation in Africa since 1975, any Cuban initiatives in the Caribbean or support for revolutionary leaders in Nicaragua and Central America naturally produce the assumption of Soviet conniving. Congressional responses to the Nicaraguan civil war in 1979 demonstrate this type of logic. More overt Soviet influence appears in expanded diplomatic and economic ties in Latin America since the early 1960's, the sale of SU-22 fighter-bombers to Peru in 1977, and Caribbean-Mexican links with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) in the late 1970's—all of which denote Moscow's keen attention to Washington's "strategic rear" in the Caribbean. Meanwhile the Soviet Union continues to nourish its links with the Latin American Communist parties through multiple channels. To all appearances, this record surely suggests increased Soviet power over Latin America's internal, regional and global affairs.

Looking at conditions and trends in the Caribbean and Latin America, one side of the current Soviet debate about the region argues that it is characterized by a "mounting anti-imperialist struggle for democracy and social justice," and a positive "present upsurge in the Latin American countries' struggle for economic independence." The Caribbean is of special attention in this debate, with its proximity to revolutionary Cuba which has stirred "profound progressive changes in this region and raised the people's anti-imperialist struggle to a new level." This "progressive" interpretation coincides with a wider belief frequently asserted by Soviet analysts that the world "correlation of forces" now is running in favor of socialism, and that the forces
of capitalism, imperialism and neocolonialism, led by the United States, have entered a "protracted phase of profound difficulties."10

On the basis of this type of argument a number of Soviet writers naturally insist on the encouraging Latin America's economic nationalism and its regional organizations, such as the Economic System of Latin America (SELA, which includes Cuba), in an effort to weaken Washington's power. Other trends can be identified in Latin America that seem to support this interpretation that events there currently serve to strengthen the position of Moscow and the world socialist system. The quest for more control by Latin Americans over their natural resources and their territory, the expropriation of foreign multinational operations, and the spread of national liberation movements like the Sandinistas in Nicaragua or the Independistas of Puerto Rico are cases in point. From this specific Soviet point of view, then, Moscow's power is increasing in Latin America insofar as events weaken the United States and contribute to a positive correlation of socialist forces worldwide.

Easy conclusions can be drawn from this assumption of growing Soviet power in Latin America. One might conclude, for example, that a "Soviet threat" lurks behind indigenous revolutionary events or leftist civil disturbances, especially those close to home in the Caribbean and Central America where Moscow's "proxy," Cuba, operates. The conclusion naturally leads to the demand for military responses—as occurred in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and as was advocated in Nicaragua in 1979.11 This type of military response argument rests upon the assumption that Soviet-backed Cuban action in Africa will likely be replicated in Latin America and the Caribbean, thus largely conditioning events there to the detriment of US interests, or at least that Soviet and Cuban military strength is capable of projection into Latin America and the Caribbean.

Aside from the possibility of a Soviet-backed Cuban military thrust, there is the prospect that Marxism-Leninism will spread through the Communist parties of the region, strengthened through continued Soviet and Cuban ties with these parties. Delegations of Latin American Communist parties continue to circulate through Moscow, and Havana convened major meetings of Latin American Communist parties in 1975 and in 1977. This type of analysis would stress, moreover, that despite the setback to continental
communism in Chile after 1973, Mexican Communist Party membership grew from 5,000 in 1973 to approximately 60,000 in 1977, with the Mexican Communist Party in 1978 becoming fully legal and capable of participating in elections. Communist party membership also registered growth in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela from 1972 to 1977. In the Caribbean it could be argued, the full impact of Soviet and Cuban ties has not yet been felt, but the 1977 return from Cuba of a Jamaican youth construction brigade, determined to organize itself into a movement along Marxist-Leninist lines, is ominous.

Another possible conclusion from this prognosis of expanding Marxism-Leninism is that the underlying problem in Latin America is strictly economic, demanding more US economic aid. The conclusion rests upon the deterioration in many Latin American and Caribbean economies juxtaposed against the precipitous decline in US-Latin American relations during the 1970's caused by conflicts over international economic matters. The latter is mirrored in the sharpening identification of Latin American leaders with the Third World drive for a New International Economic Order, in Venezuela and Ecuadorian participation in oil increases through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) since 1973, and in the post-1975 operation of SELA. These events, which Moscow cites as evidence of deteriorating US power in Latin America, drive home the Latin American focus on economic development and dissatisfaction with Washington's legendary treatment of the region as of secondary importance in global affairs except in times of violent crisis.

These types of conclusions, resting upon the notion of expanded Soviet power in the Caribbean and Latin America, merit closer attention if we are to separate illusion from reality in the search for appropriate US policy responses. Is Soviet policy in Latin America as influential as it may at first appear? Is the record of Soviet diplomacy in the region one of unconditioned "success"? These questions are explored in this paper as we identify the discernible features of recent Soviet-Latin American relations, while suggesting some of the less perceptible underlying aspects of the relationship. The paper is divided into three sections: Soviet objectives; instruments of Soviet policy; and, implications for the United States.
SOVIET OBJECTIVES

Moscow’s objectives in Latin America, as best we can determine from available data, are a product of the recent escalated importance of Third World affairs in Soviet perspective. Especially since 1975, when Angola opened the path to increased Soviet involvement in Africa, the Third World has become a major setting of Soviet policy initiative. Some of its regions are imperative to Soviet security (the periphery countries), while others offer Moscow the opportunity to play an interventionist superpower role in behalf of strengthening the world socialist system (Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam). The Third World, in short, has come to play an enormous part in Soviet international relations perceptions, for as Soviet writers see it, “these countries have an ever-growing influence in world politics and economics” and “the identity of anti-imperialist aspirations within the national liberation struggle is the cornerstone of the Soviet Union’s cooperation with the developing countries.”

But what of specific Soviet objectives in Latin America? Here we enter murky terrain. For Soviet analysts now seem engaged in a major debate over Latin American conditions and trends. One school of thought, as suggested above, adopts the line that “progressive forces” are on the ascendancy. A second line of argument, in contrast, depicts the area as essentially one of “dependent capitalism” where the growth of foreign control and US multinational corporate interests predominate. The first view of Latin America is optimistic regarding Soviet ability to ride with the tide of economic nationalism and to help in a variety of ways to encourage the weakening of US economic power south of the Rio Grande. The second image is pessimistic about Moscow’s ability to influence economic development along socialist lines in Latin America and about any short term emergence of economic independence within the region.

Measuring these two arguments against the recent pattern of Soviet diplomatic, economic, technical, and trade relations with Latin America, a portrait of traditional power politics emerges. It is one where the Soviets envision limited opportunities to erode US and Western influence, but where the region remains of a lower priority than Africa and Asia. The possibility of an imminent transition to socialism and communism through expanded state
sector economic development does not seem large in Soviet perspectives, and in this measure the era is distinctly different than the early days of the Cuban revolution and the exuberant optimism of Nikita Khruschev.

One key area of opportunity for the Soviet Union, if we examine the amount of Soviet writing on the subject, lies in the arena of raw materials. Moscow analysts appear encouraged by nationalization of foreign concerns in the region, such as Kaiser Reynolds and Alcoa Aluminum in Jamaica, and by any moves toward formation of regional raw materials organizations, e.g. the International Bauxite Association that includes Guyana, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. While Latin American control over strategic raw materials by no means implies that the Soviet Union will somehow be able to encourage these countries to deny them to the United States, it does open the door for increased access on Moscow's part. Any redirection of raw materials trade of this type during the last quarter of the 20th century, in the context of shrinking global supplies of raw materials and increasing world demands, helps the Soviets in the game of power politics and great power status. Here it should be noted that Latin America indeed possesses valuable raw materials—oil in Ecuador, Mexico, Trinidad/Tobago and Venezuela, with lesser quantities in other countries and potentially substantial quantities in the Caribbean; coal in Brazil; iron ore in Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela; uranium in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Recent Soviet aid and trade patterns show a trend toward highlighting energy products in Latin America, especially hydroelectric projects—a trend which suggests that Moscow wants to keep its doors open to Latin American resources by aiding those countries in need of energy-producing assistance. This aim is underscored by the Soviet Union's courtship of countries which are military-ruled (Argentina, Brazil, and Peru for example), do not especially promote the lot of local Communist organizations, are permeated by the transnational corporations of western capitalism and 'imperialism' (Peru excepted), but whose territories contain commodities and raw materials strategically important to the Soviet Union as well as to the United States.

The Soviet Union, in another dimension of its pragmatic approach to Latin America, is keen on keeping its solid relationship with Cuba intact. So long as Cuba's foreign policy continued to sail in directions familiar on the Soviet charts—broad fronts of nonmilitary struggle in the Americas, support of nationalism in its
diverse anti-imperialist economic and political forms, care in continuing an anti-Chinese profile, adherence to recognized diplomatic state-to-state relations—Moscow's leverage in Latin America and the Caribbean can be strengthened. For not only can Cuba conduct military policies in Africa that a Russian superpower cannot risk, Havana similarly can act as a leading edge in Soviet-supported projects in Latin America, such as diplomatic support for Puerto Rican independence, overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, or strengthening the economic development of Caribbean states along expanded state-sector profiles, as in Guyana and especially (lately) Jamaica. This is due simply to Cuba's greater acceptance generally in that region as a legitimate member of the "Latin American family," defined in cultural, ethnic, historic, and national terms. Cuba is also a key maritime strategic piece on Moscow's global chessboard, as well as a port of call for merchant marine fishing fleet operations, trade activities, and oceanographic work. In this context should be noted Cuba's spectacular growth in merchant marine operations, as well as the Soviet Union's own merchant marine development since World War II, compared to that of the United States. Not surprisingly, then, many a Soviet pronouncement on Latin American affairs cites Cuba's importance in the international relations of the region.

The Soviet Union appears to be acutely aware of the force of nationalism in Latin America. A composite of national entities, the USSR has survived internal national agitation for years and faces it daily in domestic political affairs, as well as externally in East European states. Any Latin American movement to regain national control over raw materials, economic life, or physical territory thus strikes a sensitive nerve in the Russian psyche. Among the nationalist forces now at work in Latin America are the vocal and persuasive economic nationalisms of energy-producing giants, Mexico and Venezuela, whose resources carry significant weight today in Latin American-US relations and potentially much more weight in the future as energy supplies diminish. And how attractive to Moscow must be the "national liberation movements" in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, and Belize. The Caribbean, meanwhile is aflame with its own forms of leftist nationalism—in Guyana, Jamaica, and now, Grenada, where the New Jewel Movement led by Prime Minister Maurice Bishop staged a leftist coup in March 1979. Nationalism is alive and kicking in
Latin America and the Caribbean. It takes distinct forms, but always carries the seed of independence from US domination—a point not missed by Soviet officials.

In its overall approach to Latin America, Moscow continues to promote the values of Marxism-Leninism, principally through the pro-Soviet “broad peaceful front” Communist parties of Latin America. These parties in some respects reflect favorable trends for Moscow, despite the setback in Chile for Communist party membership after September 1973, and it is not unusual to find continued Soviet emphasis on the role of Communist parties. Where only four Communist parties were legal in 1972 (Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela), ten were either legal or tolerated by 1977. A number of parties boosted their membership substantially by late 1977, as in the cases of Cuba (125,000 in 1972 to 204,000 in 1977), Mexico (5,000 in 1972 to 60,000 in 1977), and Venezuela (8,000 in 1972 to 10,000 in 1977).

Yet it would be erroneous to identify direct promotion of communism in Latin America as extraordinarily high on the Soviet agenda—as high, say, as support of Latin American nationalism through legitimate state-to-state relations. Despite the Soviet willingness to welcome delegates from the pro-Soviet Latin American Communist parties to the capital, the Kremlin continues to pursue active diplomatic, trade, and technical assistance programs in countries where Communist parties are proscribed (Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay), where the government makes life difficult for Marxists associated with guerrilla movements (as in Argentina in the mid 1970’s), and where transnational corporations strongly link the Latin American countries with western capitalism. A distinct pragmatism, then, underscores Soviet objectives—an inclination to ride with Latin American nationalist aspirations rather than trying to force-feed doctrinaire Marxism-Leninism to unwilling subjects. Here it should be stressed that apart from Fidel Castro, Latin America simply has not produced the rash of new Communist leaders found in Africa and Asia, where seven pro-Soviet Communist parties have seized power or territory with armed force since 1975 (Vietnam, Laos, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Cambodia). Moscow faces a different set of realities and opportunities in the western hemisphere compared to those in Africa and the periphery countries.
The Soviets are conscious of a Chinese challenge to their Latin American presence, and they seek to check it when and where possible. As the Soviets interpret the situation, the Chinese thrust in Latin America is essentially “anti-Soviet” in nature and, moreover, helps to consolidate US “imperialism” in the region.2 Moscow worries—at least in available published literature—about Peking’s propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union in Latin America, which began to gather steam in the early 1970’s.9 Since then Peking’s diplomatic, trade, economic, and military delegations to Latin America increased in what Soviet writers describe as the “intensive Chinese drive in Latin America.”3 Here it should be noted that the PRC established diplomatic relations in Chile in 1970, and it gave diplomatic recognition to the new conservative military government of Augusto Pinochet in 1973. This followed with diplomatic ties to Peru in 1971; Argentina, Guyana, Mexico, and Jamaica in 1972; Brazil, Venezuela, and Trinidad/Tobago in 1974; Surinam in 1976; and Barbados in 1977. And the Caribbean region began to receive special PRC attention in 1978, with a trade delegation travelling to Jamaica, Trinidad/Tobago, Guyana, and Mexico.12 These relations provided the Chinese with the opportunity to make life unpleasant for the Soviets. “Anti-Soviet” and “Anti-Cuban” statements were published during these forays, which accused the Soviet Union and Cuba of “jeopardizing the international balance of forces by their actions in Africa,” and charged that Cubans were in effect the “Trojan horse of Soviet claims to hegemony in the Caribbean area.”6 China also began to make trade inroads in Latin America, as new trade ties with Brazil indicated. These links augmented previous trade relations with Argentina and Chile. Brazil’s trade with mainland China in fact is expected to reach $200 million in 1979.14 The Soviet Union, in short, clearly perceives the PRC as a diplomatic and trade challenge, not only with the strategically located and large Latin American countries, but also in the Caribbean.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN PERSPECTIVE

This overview of Soviet objectives establishes a point of departure for analyzing more deeply the nuances of Moscow’s power in the Latin American setting. First, Moscow’s policies in
the region strike one as essentially those of a great power in quest of traditional great power concerns. These include at minimum the search for influence to guarantee territorial security in the long run, access to markets and resources so necessary for economic prosperity—increasingly so as global demand and lesser supply pressures mount—and a generally cautious and pragmatic assessment of opportunities. Although Moscow's objectives turn in part upon ideological considerations, reflected in the continued support of Latin American Communist parties and of state-controlled economic enterprises rather than those in the private sector, Soviet national interests appear to be defined primarily in terms of economic and political power. This is not to say that Marxist-Leninist ideology does not condition Soviet conceptions of power; quite the contrary. But it does suggest that the direct promotion of communism in Latin America is overshadowed by the interests of Moscow as an evolving great power with traditional world requirements—particularly in terms of its ideologically and territorially perceived adversaries, the United States and mainland China.

Moscow's pragmatic approach to Latin American affairs is explained in part by different types of data that can be found “between the lines” of the identifiable objectives spelled out above. The economic ledger reveals that Soviet and East European credits extended to Latin American countries concentrate on trading heavy industrial machinery and equipment for natural resources, e.g., alumina from Jamaica (the Soviets may be running out of alumina), sugar from Cuba, grain and meat from Argentina—plus an interest in Mexican and Venezuelan oil. The data also indicates that Moscow does not wish to become overburdened with aid programs in Latin America, undoubtedly due to the Soviet Union's own internal economic difficulties, the overt pessimism in some quarters over Moscow's ability to alter the “dependent capitalism” of Latin America, and already high cost of the Cuban game. Moscow meanwhile is running a heavy trade imbalance with Latin American countries, who prefer traditional Western goods and who drew only $525 million of the $2.4 billion of Communist credits extended between 1959 and 1977. It is perhaps no surprise that Soviet economic credits to Latin America appear to have fallen off sharply by 1977—a pattern consistent with general Soviet-Third World aid, where new commitments fell
more than 50 percent from 1976, and 60 percent below the average for the 5 previous years.37

Political data equally suggest caution in Soviet-Latin American affairs. Moscow certainly continues to send its CPSU delegations to visit Latin American Communist leaders, and the latter are still welcomed in the Soviet Union.38 And the Kremlin is not short on media support of "national liberation movements," such as in Nicaragua, where Soviet media coverage escalated sharply from January 1978 onwards.39 The United Nations decision to declare Puerto Rico a "colony" of the United States—a position long advocated in the United Nations Decolonization Committee by Cuba—also received strong coverage from the USSR.40 Yet on the whole, the political posture is one of formal state-to-state relations with established governments, trade and aid even with conservative military regimes (Argentina and Brazil), a low-key approach to certain crisis events in the backyard of the United States (Nicaragua and Panama), and even tacit support for a Cuban-US rapprochement.41

In the military sphere, the situation in Latin America contrasts sharply with Soviet policy in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, where overt military support of Marxist movements is clear. The only military aid agreement in Latin America (outside of Cuba) is with Peru, while no direct military involvement with Nicaraguan Sandinistas or Puerto Rican Independistas can be identified. It must be said, however, that Cuba plays an indirect supportive role in these two cases.42 The Soviet Union, then, is clearly unwilling to risk open confrontation in a geographical region where sensitive US interests abound.

STRATEGIC CONCERNS

In pursuing great power interests in Latin America, the Soviet Union is conscious of countries and regions that are strategically important to Moscow's own interests or to the United States. By the late 1970's, Soviet ties were markedly emphasized with Argentina (traditionally independent in US-Latin American affairs), Brazil (where President Jimmy Carter's statements on human rights and nuclear energy had strained US-Brazilian ties), Mexico (with clear problems over issues of natural gas sales and emigration to the United States), and Venezuela (under an oil-conscious Third World leader, Carlos Andres Perez). The
Caribbean area in particular rated increased Soviet attention, especially Guyana and Jamaica, which moved more closely to Moscow and Havana through diplomatic, economic, and trade relations from the mid-1970's onwards.

A number of key developments in the late 1970's bear out this observation. The Argentine government announced in November 1978 that Moscow had been awarded a 2-year contract to work on the Parana Medio hydroelectric project, which paved the way for more lucrative contracts for turbines and generators worth about $2.5 billion. The visit to Moscow of the Mexican President, Jose Lopez Portillo, in May 1978 resulted in a new scientific and technical cooperation project for 1978-79, along with cultural, sports, educational, and social sciences agreements. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana visited the Soviet Union in April 1978, followed by Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica in April 1979. Guyana's efforts led to a Soviet agreement to expand its fishing fleet and to help expand alumina production, while the Jamaican trip led to new agreements in sports, broadcasting, cultural affairs, and air service. Moscow's ties with Cuba, meanwhile, remained stronger than ever. The Soviets thus appeared to be casting their nets in the most likely fishing spots, reaching toward key Caribbean and Latin American countries.

Soviet pragmatism, again, must be defined in terms of pronounced awareness of just how tenacious is private foreign capital, led by the United States, in the Latin American setting. One Soviet writer noted that:

...direct private investments, which, despite the rather wide measures to nationalize foreign property in a number of Latin American countries, continued to grow. At present they are assessed at approximately $40 billion."

Later in the same article, he commented upon the new "joint companies" of Latin America that give host countries more control:

As a rule, foreign capital...continues to control the joint companies where it has only minority participation...This has placed the Latin American countries in a position of extreme technological dependence on the imperialist states...Latin America has in fact become meshed in a neo-colonial system of financial dependence, according to figures for the end of 1977 fiscal year, its foreign debt exceeded $100 billion."
This theme of American capital's strong position in Latin America indicates how Soviet theorists think in power categories, which in this case finds the United States in a still dominant position.

To the extent that Soviet objectives in Latin America operate around power concepts, conditioned by Marxist-Leninist ideological modes of thought, there appear complexities in analyzing Soviet foreign policy in this region of the world. The "Soviet threat," for example, appears somewhat less urgent than a superficial look at the record suggests. The Soviets appear careful about where and how they become involved and under what conditions. They seem to be aware of limitations and constraints to their power in Latin America. And the limits to Soviet power are there. Moscow's presence, moreover, does not result in a unilinear equation with influence—economic credits have been extended, but few are accepted. Trade imbalances with Latin American countries run against the USSR, and Latin American countries strongly prefer Western goods. Meanwhile, the Soviets must compete for Latin American markets and materials not only with the United States, but also with West European countries and with Japan. The objective of spreading communism is in fact seen to be of lesser priority than riding with nationalist aspirations—and this could become a useful lesson for American policymakers.

All of this is not to say that American policy can drift because the Soviet ship is caught in the doldrums, for it is not. Given Latin American history and traditional power structures, the Soviet Union has in fact remarkably expanded its relations in the area. And from the Soviets' view, this certainly opens up the number of options compared to pre-Castro days. Future opportunities can be created for Moscow by a variety of conditions, not least being an ineffective US policy toward the region.

INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET POLICY

The Soviet Union, like the United States, has a number of policy instruments that can be orchestrated in pursuit of its objectives. Economic aid, trade, propaganda, diplomatic ties, cultural exchanges, and technical assistance are the typical instruments utilized by Moscow in its Latin American relations. Beyond these identifiable policy forms, the Soviet Union enjoys a special instrument of power in Latin America that is not available to the
United States—a client state whose domestic policies in many cases parallel the objectives of other modernizing political groups in the region. Here the role of Cuba, as well as of Latin America's local Communist parties, must be assessed in terms of Soviet instruments of power-seeking in the region.

When we move into the realm of evaluating the effectiveness of these instruments of power, however, a special set of questions must be addressed. For the degree to which these policy instruments in fact produce a Soviet influence over Latin American events does not turn upon the mere presence of an extended number of economic credits from Moscow, the signing of a scientific and technical cooperation agreement, or the distribution of Marxist-Leninist literature by a local Communist party. We need to probe to what extent Latin American events might have gone (or will go) in specific directions, whether or not the Soviets were present." This essential proposition leads to several key questions.

These questions suggest just how difficult it is to make judgements about the impact of Moscow's activities in other countries. To what degree do the Soviets actually control political and economic outcomes in Latin America? How sensitive and vulnerable is a given Latin American country to Soviet influence-seeking? What capacity does Moscow have to deliver what a Latin American country may want? And how entangled has Moscow become in the globally interdependent system which limits all states in their pursuit of power?" Moscow, for example, is in domestic economic difficulty, relies upon external capital goods and food for continued development, and faces increasing energy demands internally and from its external clients (East European states) under an increasingly cloudy supply future. What effect do these trends have on Soviet policy?

It is not easy, then, to produce a simple assessment of Soviet "successes" or "failures" in terms of how effective its instruments of power operate to produce influence for Moscow over Latin American events. But it must be stressed that power increasingly is not a one-way direct route of one country over another. What appears to be Soviet influence may in fact be a reverse situation of a Latin American country gaining the leverage over outcomes favorable to its own self-perceived objectives, as illustrated by the imbalance in Soviet trade in favor of the Latin American countries. Cuba illustrates this too in its ability to receive over $9 million per
day in assistance from Moscow and support for an African policy
favorable to its own foreign policy posture. The failure of Moscow
to support strongly the Salvador Allende government between
1970-73, the substantial number of undrawn economic credits and
continued favoring of Western over Soviet goods by the Latin
American countries, and the economic drain on Moscow produced
by Cuba—which limits aid programs elsewhere—all these events
portray an image of less Soviet capacity to deliver what the Latin
Americans want than at first meets the eye. 10

We face also the difficulty of defining "success". If we do so in
terms of direct Soviet influence in weakening the United States in
Latin America, in strengthening the state sectors of Latin American
economies, in forging Latin American nationalism, or in spawning
communism, we run into various types of analytical problems. For
where indeed is the correlation between what Moscow does with its
policy instruments and what happens in Latin America? In fact,
when we shift the kaleidoscope of analytic variables from Soviet-
Latin American to US-Latin American relations, or to internal
Latin American forces, we perceive different systematic
relationships.

It can well be argued that Washington's weakened position is
principally a consequence of US responses to Latin American
demands. By this is meant essentially the absence of effective aid,
diplomatic, and trade policies to deal with Latin America's growing
economic nationalism, and growing grass roots rebellions against
conservative ruling elites. 11 It is not that Washington had no
policy—President Carter's human rights posture shows the
contrary—but the economic options either were not effectively
played, (as in the natural gas debate with Mexico only recently
partly resolved), or were blocked by Congress, as is continually the
case with favorable tariffs and higher aid. Latin America's
economic nationalism is not produced by Moscow but from the
unique internal conditions of each Latin American country, and
one doubts seriously the ability of Moscow to control the winds of
nationalism in Latin America once they begin to blow. 12 Latin
American communism, meanwhile, beats with a distinct national
impulse, a point certainly underscored by events in Cuba and
Mexico, and by Allende when he became the first Communist
elected to power. Just how much the Soviet Union can influence the
nature and scope of Latin America's national Communists is a
subject ripe for debate.
The special case of Cuba as an instrument of Soviet policy in Latin America bears examination. Certainly it is true that Cuba can advocate and pursue policies favorable to Moscow, such as strengthening "national liberation movements" (as in Nicaragua and Puerto Rico) while supporting left leaning governments (as in Guyana and Jamaica). Havana also serves as an outspoken Latin American critic of the United States—once a more or less lone voice in the region, but now joined by a number of other regional compatriots. Havana, moreover, is a visible regional supporter of pro-Soviet Communist parties, through its hosting of regional Communist party meetings. It also plays a vital role in the nonaligned movement, drawing Latin American countries into common alliances against the developed world, led by the United States, as in its role of host to the September 1979 meeting of nonaligned countries in Havana. And it must be said that as a small nonthreatening Caribbean island with unique experiments in economic, educational, and cultural modernization—poised against the North American Goliath—the island has a certain attraction (and hence influence) for other Caribbean leftists. As a model to be emulated in certain respects, Cuba may carry more direct weight in the Caribbean than does the Soviet Union.

While the immediate influence of Cuba since the early 1970's cannot be discounted, its longer run effectiveness in support of pro-Soviet positions should be examined. Havana's dependence on Soviet aid reduces its capacity to extend enormous economic support in the Caribbean. This point is underlined by Havana's own acknowledged economic difficulties, which may be resolved partially through new trade relations with the United States at some future date. Cuba's African interventions also have raised problems in the nonaligned movement, which could spill over into Latin American and Caribbean politics. Third, Cuba's national communism is acceptable to the USSR today, but what of tomorrow? The island has its own perceived role to play in Caribbean relations, and what will happen if and when Washington and Havana restore full diplomatic and economic ties?

This brief overview of Soviet instruments of power on the whole indicates that Moscow is substantially constrained in the actual influence that it exerts in Latin America. Limits arise in part from the multiple channels open to Latin American nationalists in pursuit of their development-oriented objectives, so pronounced.
since World War II. These channels reduce western hemispheric vulnerability and sensitivity to Soviet policies. Latin American governments now trade with and receive technical assistance from Western European countries, as well as from Japan and mainland China—and this diversified trade pattern includes Cuba. They also listen to Western and US radio broadcasts, see US movies, and read books and literature printed in the United States—as countervailing pressures to the Soviet radio broadcasts in Spanish, Soviet movies and local pro-Soviet Communist party literature.\textsuperscript{17} Constraints to Moscow's influence arise, moreover, from the continued economic appeal and capacity of western capital, despite Moscow's attempts to discredit these channels, a point clearly recognized by those Soviet analysts stressing Moscow's "dependent capitalism" profile.\textsuperscript{18}

Soviet instruments of power in Latin America are conditioned by Moscow's evolving global interdependence and consequent vulnerability to outside world pressures. Moscow faces future energy shortages measured against client state demands, raw materials depletion in light of Soviet domestic needs, and the economic costs at home and abroad of weapons production versus nonmilitary capital investment demands for sustaining economic development.\textsuperscript{17} If Washington's leaders find Latin American issues difficult to comprehend after living in close proximity for all these years, the Soviet leaders may find them unfathomable, to the detriment of effective policy. This is due in part to their cultural and geographic distance from Latin America. In light of the costs and benefits of getting too deeply involved in Latin America, especially in the context of global interdependence and the geographical proximity of other Third World regions which offer greater opportunities for Soviet influence, the Kremlin undoubtedly is all the less inclined to go much beyond Cuba in large measure.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Soviet policy in Latin America, while of limited influence on regional events, provides a helpful analytic medium for development of appropriate US policy guidelines. It suggests, for example, that the region is going through a volatile period of change, where economic and political nationalism take distinct forms replete with opportunities and pitfalls for the United States.
It also highlights the nature of global interdependence, of which the United States is a part, whereby all states are becoming increasingly sensitive and vulnerable to each other's foreign policy actions. This phenomenon is especially (but not exclusively) true of the areas of energy and raw materials supply and demand. Moscow's search for energy, raw materials and trade markets in Latin America illustrates the region's role in the interdependent great power game—a game from which the United States cannot isolate itself.

The nature of the Soviet threat is not indirect military action or expansionist Marxism-Leninism. It is more through the encouragement of other events detrimental to US interests: a decrease in available energy and natural resource exports through nationalization of US and other western private foreign holdings; the forging of alliances between Moscow and potentially important countries of the future—Puerto Rico (if it becomes independent), the Caribbean states (Jamaica and Guyana), Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. As a dynamic region in which Soviet policies accentuate the stakes of the game, Latin America more than ever requires effective US policy responses.

Advocating hasty military action, as occurred on the eve of the overthrow of General Anastasio Somoza Debayle in July 1979, does not seem warranted. Rather than attempting to stop nationalist movements by military efforts, the United States would be wiser to ride with them, as in fact Washington began to do in Nicaragua once the Sandinistas achieved power. Increased economic aid to Latin America is called for, but not in isolation from an effective trade policy. This guideline means increased recognition of Latin American aspirations expressed through support of the New International Economic Order, and a willingness to ride with radical nationalist policies. So much of Soviet activity in Latin America is a result of deteriorating US-Latin American ties; to improve those relations in the economic realm is to weaken Soviet options.

In gearing US policy to the economic and political nationalism which guides much of the Soviet-Latin American patterns, certain countries are especially critical. Restoring economic and full diplomatic ties with Cuba, rather than using the promise of ties as leverage for an African retreat, makes sense for the United States. To strengthen Cuba's economic development program is to fortify
internal historic nationalist roots, to improve Havana’s negotiating strength with the USSR, and perhaps even to weaken Cuba’s perception of North America as leader of the “imperialist camp.” Mexico is another case in point. Without belaboring the obvious, US-Mexican interdependence is notorious—a mixture of US energy needs, Mexico’s need for emigration and employment outlets into the United States, and other issues which bring the two countries close together.60

To leave these issues unattended in Cuba and Mexico—not to mention similar economic development issues in Central America in view of the Sandinista victory—is bad policy. Inattention also invites Cuban and Soviet overtures which in turn distort the realities of Soviet influence, setting the scene for inappropriate policy responses to a perceived “Soviet threat.” Better to act in ways that minimize the Latin American attraction toward ties with the USSR in the first place, thus helping to keep the horizons clear for rational policy debates in the US Congress and public.49 Would not more economic attention to Puerto Rico, for example, serve as a showplace for improved US-Latin American ties?

One final point merits consideration. All too frequently, the American executive branch, the legislature or the media describes events in Latin America in distorted broad terms, e.g., the “red tide,” “Soviet threat,” or “another Cuba” in the making—referring most recently to Central America since the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua.49 The uniqueness of each political setting, the vastly complicated global arena of interdependence to which each Latin American state is linked, and the distinct elements of nationalism in each country are submerged in greatly oversimplified portraits of reality. This simplifying of the Latin American setting is to be seen in the degree to which Washington underestimated the likelihood of a Sandinista victory in Nicaragua (somewhat like the case of Iran earlier), overlooked the weakness of Communism in the Dominican Republic in April 1965, or underestimated the strength of Castro in Cuba in 1961. Nationalism, in short, remains to be fully understood in Latin America as it affects communism in Soviet and US policy.

CONCLUSION

Soviet policy in Latin America, as in other Third World regions, must be assessed in light of regional Latin American conditions.
Study of Moscow's objectives and policy instruments in isolation from the regional and global arena may impute more power to the USSR than in fact exists. Regional and world forces conditioning Soviet performance also help to explain not only the existing constraints on Soviet influence but also the nature of trends that will shape the pattern of future Soviet successes and failures. Finally, the regional and international contours of Soviet foreign policy suggest policy guidelines appropriate for America's foreign posture, provided that a consensus on American national interests emerges from US public, private, and governmental interest groups and bureaucratic agencies. Constraints on Soviet policy in Latin America are built into the global setting in which Moscow finds itself in the last quarter of the 20th century. Perhaps the concept of global "interdependence" best captures this situation. By this term is meant that Moscow is sensitive and vulnerable to outside pressures—as are all countries in the game of modern international politics. These external pressures increasingly include the need for access to energy, food, markets, raw materials, and technology. The politics and economics behind the need for these items, defined in terms of supply and demand, mean that Soviet policy is not a simple formula of calculated objectives and executed procedures which bring forth automatic and total success. The situation is rather a constant trade-off between desired and attained goals, between policies pursued and constraints that check. Interdependence forces us to evaluate the costs and benefits in Soviet policy toward Latin America and other regions, as well as the constraints on a one-way power flow from Moscow into the Latin American region.

Nationalism in Latin America forms a regional force working against Soviet policy as much or more than a current to be guided by external Soviet pressures. Its form and content varies from country to country in Latin America, just as it does in, say, Egypt or Somalia—countries where the Soviets were asked recently to pack their bags. The essential point here is that nationalism, rooted deep in indigenous traditions and ethnic conditions, is a constant barrier to Soviet penetration—the guardian of sui generis domestic conditions and foreign policies in the long run. This point applies to Cuba as well as to Mexico or Nicaragua, and it teaches a lesson that bears far more attention from Washington than has been the case during the recent era in US-Latin American affairs.
ENDNOTES


4. For an argument that Cuba is a "surrogate" force of the USSR, which the Soviets can use to project power, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1978, London, pp. 13-14. By mid-1978 Cuba had 17,000 troops in Ethiopia, 20,000 in Angola, and 3,000 elsewhere in Africa.

5. See the advertisement referred to in note 1.

6. V. Vasilyev, "The United States' 'New Approach' to Latin America," International Affairs, (Moscow), No. 6, June 1971, p. 43.


12. The Mexican Communist Party made its first electoral appearance in the July 1979 congressional elections and won 10 to 15 percent in low-income areas of Mexico City. It received only 1 to 2 percent in each district outside the capital.


20. See L. Klochkovsky, pp. 39-47. Also V. Vasilyev, p. 43; and G. Kim, “The Successes of the National Liberation Movement and World Politics,” International Affairs, February 1979, pp. 84-89; Pravda, March 2, 1978, in FBIS, March 7, 1978 (where the Caribbean is cited as a special region of “profound progressive changes”); and Pravda, April 5, 1978, in FBIS, April 12, 1978 (where the nature of the present epoch in Latin America is described as the “transformation from capitalism to socialism,” led by the “victory of the Cuban revolution.”).


22. Oil exploration is soon due to increase in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The Bahamas are optimistic about oil deposits there, and Jamaica is looking for offshore deposits. See Latin America Economic Report, Vol. VII, No. 24, June 22, 1979, p. 191.

23. Argentina produces valuable food products (wheat, corn, meat), as well as metals such as tungsten, zinc, lead, tin, and silver. Brazil’s resources include manganese, diamonds, lumber, rubber, and foodstuffs.

24. Cuba is repeatedly cited by the USSR as the leading force in the Latin American transition from capitalism to socialism. See, for example, Pravda, April 5, 1978. See also S. Mishin, “Latin America: Two Trends of Development,” International Affairs, June 1976, pp. 64-71.


33. K. Khachaturov, p. 60.
35. Estimates vary on Soviet aid to Cuba, but rough figures are around $9 million per day on top of the expenses in underwriting the Cuban military presence in Africa. The latter includes over 45 transport missions to Angola in 1975, plus some 50 flights in the first 60 days of airlifts to Ethiopia beginning in November 1977. *Strategic Survey* 1978, p. 13.
37. Ibid., p. 4.
38. A substantial number of Latin American Communist party delegations travelled to Moscow in 1978, e.g. the Argentine delegation in September; the Uruguayan delegation in October (received by Boris Ponomarev, nonvoting member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretary of CPSU Central Committee); the Bolivian CP delegation in December.
40. It was the Cuban resolution to place Puerto Rico on the United Nation’s list of colonies. The vote occurred on September 12, 1978, with 10 in favor (including the Soviet Union and China) and 12 abstentions (including Chile and Trinidad/Tobago). For Moscow coverage, see Radio Broadcast, Moscow Tass in English, September 5, 1978 in *FBIS*, September 7, 1978; *Pravda*, September 25, 1978 in *FBIS*, September 28, 1978.
42. On Cuban involvement in the Sandinista affair, see James Nelson Goodsell’s articles in *Christian Science Monitor*, e.g. “Nicaragua: What’s Behind the Struggle?” June 22, 1979. Cuba meanwhile has long pressed for the independence of Puerto Rico through Cuban radio broadcasts allowing Puerto Rican independistas to be interviewed in Cuba, and strong efforts in the United Nations Decolonization Committee.
47. Ibid., p. 41.
49. Global interdependence theory is helpful in assessing Moscow’s cost/benefit trade-offs in pursuance of a specific Latin American policy and trying to explore the Soviet Union’s long-run capacity to be influential in Third World regions. On global

50. To put the Soviet aid program in a global perspective, note that aid offered by Communist countries during the last 25 years totals less than the overall flow of Western aid in 1977 alone. The Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers noted at their July 1978 Belgrade meeting that aid from the developed Communist states had declined steadily from 1974 and that in 1976 it was less than 0.1 percent of their combined Gross National Product. The Group of 77 Ministerial Meeting in Arusha, February 1979, urged the Communist states to increase their development aid. Soviet aid allocations in 1977 were .03 percent of their GNP, compared with .31 percent for Western industrialized countries.

51. This point is well made by Alan Riding of *The New York Times* staff in an unpublished paper for the Council on Foreign Relations, “Political Trends in Central America,” 1978. The absence of an effective policy seems highlighted in President Carter’s visit to Venezuela and Brazil in March 1978, which produced no firm initiatives, and in the President’s subsequent trip to Mexico in February 1979, which seemed monumentally short on preparation. See also *Latin American Political Report*, Vol. 12, No. 13, April 7, 1978. For the Soviet coverage which hit home the “failure” of these trips, see especially TASS in Russian, March 29, 1978, in FBIS, March 30, 1978; TASS in English, in FBIS, March 31, 1978, and other Moscow radio broadcasts on March 31 - April 7, 1978.

52. Observe here the historic roots of different Latin American national movements predating the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, as in Cuba (1876) and Mexico (1910).


54. At the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries, held in Belgrade on July 25-30, several leading members were displeased with Cuba’s attempts to commit the movement to a tacit alliance with the “socialist countries,” notably the Soviet bloc, with Cuba’s military role in Africa. In fact a majority of the nonaligned countries opposed Cuba’s intervention in Africa and by implication that of the USSR as well. See *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, October 27, 1978, pp. 29281-29562.

55. As a point of interest, the USSR was the second major Communist broadcasting country to Latin America by 1977, with a weekly total of 143 hours, preceded by Cuba with 253 hours weekly and followed by the PRC with 90 hours. The Soviets ceased broadcasting in Guarani (to Paraguay) that year. *Communist International Radio Broadcasting - 1977*, Washington: International Communication Agency, November 20, 1978, p. 8.

56. This point bears added commentary. The Inter-American Development Bank, to which the United States is the largest contributor, extended $792 million in loans to the Latin American countries in 1978, with $657 million going to the least developed and $135 million to the more developed states. This compares to a total Third World net economic aid flow from the Soviet Union of $260 million in 1977. Figures for 1978 are unavailable at the time of this writing. See *Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Report, 1978*, Washington, DC, p. 11. The World Bank is another multilateral lending institution for Latin America, again with the United States as a major contributor. As an indication of its financial capacity, it extended
a $105 million to $688 million to Brazil, and $416 million to Colombia in 1978—to identify only three of the Latin American World Bank loan recipients. See *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Statement of Loans*, Washington, DC, March 31, 1979. The World Bank also approved $43.5 million in two loans to Jamaica in June 1979 and a $20 million loan for education in Trinidad and Tobago in that year. *World Bank News Releases*, No. 79/100, June 4, 1979, and No. 79/105, June 11, 1979. Moscow meanwhile claims that the IBRD ignores Third World needs, especially drawing attention to the mounting debts of Third World countries, the continued trade barriers, low prices for raw materials, and their balance of payments deficit. *TASS* in English, September 28, 1978.

57. This observation is designed to raise the question of tradeoffs in capital formation when so substantial a proportion of Soviet capital goes into military production rather than nonmilitary capital formation. At the same time, when Third World countries allocate major portions of scarce capital into military production, do they not decrease their potential for capital formation and economic development? To the extent that expanded state sector growth is prohibited by military expenditures, the Soviets may be losing one objective while possibly gaining another (potential influence through arms sales).


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1. REPORT NUMBER
ACN 80021

2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Done Entering)
UNCLASSIFIED

3. DATES COVERED

4. TITLE (and Subtitle)
SOVIET POWER IN LATIN AMERICA: SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

5. AUTHOR
Dr. W. Raymond Duncan

6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. INDEX CARD NUMBER

8. PROCUREMENT NUMBER

9. PROJECT NUMBER

10. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(S)

11. REPORT NUMBER

12. ABSTRACT

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16. SECURITY CLASS. (OF THIS REPORT)
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18. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (OF THIS REPORT)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

19. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (OF THE ABSTRACT)

20. LIMITATION ON ABSTRACT

21. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)
Soviet policy; Latin America; Caribbean; Cuba; Chile

22. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)
This memorandum explores the success of Soviet policy in the Caribbean and Latin America. The paper is divided into three sections: Soviet objectives; instruments of Soviet policy; implications for the United States.