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# An Overview of the Soviet Threat

Frederick M. Sallagar

A Project AIR FORCE report  
prepared for the  
United States Air Force

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PREFACE

One of the objectives of the Project AIR FORCE-sponsored study entitled "Strategic Policy for Long-Term Competition" is to provide "a critique of contemporary strategic theories and concepts." Current U.S. strategic concepts for a major war are based on the assumption that such a war would arise from a Soviet military attack on the United States or its European allies. The purpose of the present study has been to examine the validity of that assumption. This report is intended to assist Air Force planners in their periodic re-evaluation of the Soviet threat.

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SUMMARY

The Soviet military buildup over the past fifteen years appears to be evidence of their warlike intentions. But the buildup could have been undertaken for other reasons. If the Soviets ever had an incentive for launching a war with the United States, which is questionable, their success in changing the military balance may have provided them with other, less risky ways of reaching their goal. The mere possession of superior forces could make their actual use unnecessary.

An analysis of the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" suggests that its major aim is to undermine the strategic position of the United States by means short of war. Among the effects of the policy has been to disrupt global stability, and to encourage or allow local troublemakers to create situations that may sooner or later require American intervention in a critical area. This could precipitate a military confrontation with Soviet or Soviet-supported forces, and thus become a more likely source of war between the superpowers than a direct Soviet attack on the United States.

The present U.S. strategic concepts and force posture are not designed, and may prove ill-suited, for a conflict that would pose problems entirely different from those envisaged in current plans for a Soviet-initiated war. To prepare for an alternative source of war, however, would require changes in some of the basic assumptions that have long governed U.S. defense policy.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Rand colleagues Victor G. Jackson, William E. Simons, George K. Tanham, and Thomas W. Wolfe, whose detailed comments on an earlier draft have helped me greatly in preparing the present report.

Like any author concerned with Soviet policy, I am indebted to many scholars in this field whose contributions to my own thinking have been too numerous to acknowledge. If I single out my former colleague, Leon Gouré, for special mention, it is because his seminal study of peaceful coexistence inspired this attempt to carry his work a step further.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The prevailing view of the major threat facing the United States is reflected in the rationale for our force posture. As Defense Secretary Harold Brown summed it up, "In the interest of deterrence, we maintain enough strength to repel any attack on the United States or its allies." He defined the potential threats as: "a full-scale surprise attack on the United States"; "nuclear attacks on our allies, on other nations the security of which is deemed essential to the United States, or on our forces overseas"; and "nonnuclear attacks--particularly large-scale conventional attacks on NATO and our Asian allies."\*

These contingencies underlie the design of our forces and the strategic concepts that govern their use. Further, they reflect the assumption that has dominated U.S. strategic planning since the cold war: Any major conflict involving the United States will be initiated through a Soviet attack. They also serve as the yardstick for testing the adequacy of the military balance, especially of what is usually called the "strategic" balance between the superpowers.\*\* Hence, changes in that balance are viewed as affecting both the likelihood and the outcome of possible Soviet attacks.

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\* Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1979, pp. 45 and 55. This annual report is hereafter cited as the "Posture Statement."

\*\* In Pentagon parlance, the term "strategic" balance is generally used in the narrow sense, as referring to the long-range nuclear capabilities of the two sides. The overall military balance, however, is a better index of their respective potential. The term "strategic balance" will be used in this paper in the broad sense, as the rough equivalent of what the Soviets call the "correlation of forces". It covers not only the strategic nuclear forces, but also the overall military balance, as well as the political, economic, and social trends that affect the strategic position of the two sides.

## II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGED MILITARY BALANCE

By whatever measure the military balance is assessed, the changes in it over the past 15 years have been substantial. They represent the cumulative effect of the great and prolonged disparity between the United States and the Soviet Union in military expenditures on R&D as well as on forces in being. The official estimate is that total Soviet military spending now exceeds our own by 25 to 45 percent, without allowing for the substantial difference in personnel costs. The former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency stated that Soviet expenditures for military procurement and R&D may be as much as 75 percent greater than ours.\*

The current state of the military balance has been widely publicized during the debates over the SALT II agreement. The Soviet Union is now quantitatively superior to the United States in the most important categories of forces and is rapidly closing the gap in many areas in which it is still qualitatively inferior.

Administration officials see the present situation as still providing a condition of "essential equivalence" that will assure a military standoff between the superpowers. The situation would change, however, if the margin the Soviets now have were allowed to increase even further in the future, when "the problems created by the military buildup of the Soviet Union...could become critical--and if they do, we would regret not having started the buildup of our own military capability now."\*\*

Yet in the coming years the military balance will almost certainly continue to be strongly affected by the continuing military buildup of the Soviet Union. Lacking the American concept of "sufficiency," the Soviets are likely to continue their military buildup, subject only to the modest limitations imposed by SALT agreements and by economic stringency. The momentum of their past

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\* Fred Iklé, "What It Means To Be Number Two," Fortune, November 20, 1978.

\*\* Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1980, p. 59.

investment in R&D and plant capacity alone would be sufficient to carry them further along the road they have chosen. Nor can they be unaware of the political advantages that have already accrued to them from the continuing buildup in their capabilities.

The Congress seems disposed at present to demand substantial improvements in the American force posture as a condition for ratifying the SALT treaty. But even if the funds were voted and the Administration were willing to carry out the Congressional mandate, it would take years to correct the present imbalance, let alone what it is likely to be by that time. We are facing what an article in the Economist called "The Seven Lean Years" in which the Soviets will enjoy a growing military advantage.\* What are the implications for U.S. strategic concepts?

Our hopes for stability in the contest between the superpowers have long rested on the concept of mutual strategic deterrence, meaning that both sides would be deterred from attempting a knockout blow if neither could destroy the opponent's retaliatory forces. In line with this concept, the United States optimized its nuclear strike forces for the primary mission of assured destruction, and until recently played down counterforce capabilities as too destabilizing (although some counterforce potential is inherent in most nuclear systems).

The Soviet Union has never shared the American preoccupation with assured destruction. It has stressed the need for weapons capable of attacking a varied set of targets, including especially the opponent's military forces. This emphasis on counterforce capabilities is reflected in the constant improvements in Soviet weapon accuracy (CEP) and in the development of heavyweight missiles such as the SS-9 and SS-18. The United States possesses no counterpart to these formidable weapons.

The growing asymmetry in counterforce capabilities, combined with the widening disparity in total nuclear strength, may seem irrelevant in the popular view--merely a difference in "overkill" potential. But it alarms U.S. strategic planners who fear that the Soviets will soon

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\*"Seven Lean Years," The Economist, December 30, 1978.

have, and already may have, the theoretical capability to destroy the bulk of our ICBM forces, together with a portion of the non-alert SLBMs and bombers, and to disrupt or even paralyze our command and control system--all while retaining enough land- and sea-based missiles to deter the United States from engaging in an all-out exchange using the few surviving elements of the TRIAD.

It has long been accepted as axiomatic that the Soviets have been deterred from military aggression only by the retaliatory power of our strategic forces. If that power can be checkmated as the result of further deterioration in the military balance, what is to prevent the Soviets from using their new-found military might in any way they choose?

Even if the Soviets were so inclined, an attack on the United States would hardly be a rational course for them to choose. The military outcome would be uncertain at best. Apart from the consequences if the attack were unsuccessful, the large-scale use of nuclear weapons could have unpredictable effects on the attacker as well as on the victim and might do incalculable damage to the global environment.

In the case of a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe, however, the Soviets probably would feel confident that their superiority in theater forces could assure military success. Their major uncertainty in the past would have been that the United States might resort to nuclear weapons and thus bring on the kind of war the Soviets wish to avoid. If they had been concerned on this score during the period of American strategic superiority, the changes in the nuclear balance since then must have made it far less credible to them that the United States would risk nuclear devastation in defense of NATO. In the present situation the United States could ill afford to disregard President Brezhnev's veiled warning to Senator Edward Kennedy in October 1978 that "even one nuclear bomb dropped by one side or the other would lead to global nuclear war."

If a Soviet decision to launch a major attack depended solely on the strength of the American deterrent, an attack on the United States still might look too risky to undertake, but the Soviets might not be

restrained from attacking in Western Europe or elsewhere. It would be a mistake, however, to look at the problem in this fashion. The adequacy of a deterrent cannot be judged independently of the incentives it seeks to counteract. Whether the deterioration of our military balance with the Soviet Union makes a direct attack more likely, as many Westerners fear, largely depends on Soviet objectives and intentions. They will be examined in the following sections.

The possibility of a major war, in whatever form it may come about, is not the only reason for being concerned about the state of the military balance. It also plays an important role in the peacetime contest between East and West. Perceptions of the military balance, right or wrong, affect the behavior of the superpowers as well as the attitudes of their allies and of other nations throughout the world. As the previously cited Economist article pointed out:

The allies of the United States have got into the habit of measuring its ability to protect them against Russia by totting up the units of American nuclear power. If that power is seen to be getting smaller...public opinion in these allies will grow more nervous about the value of American protection; and nervousness could crack the alliance.

Such simplistic assessments of power have undoubtedly contributed to the confidence, or lack of confidence, displayed by the two sides since they began to realize how much the Soviet military buildup had changed the nuclear balance. In recent years, the Soviets and their clients have engaged in actions they might have considered too risky a decade ago, yet the West either has not reacted at all, or has responded with only mild verbal protest.

Arguments for improving the U.S. force posture are usually based on the military, not the political, consequences of a deteriorating military balance. Yet it is the latter that have played a part in the decline of our strategic position, increasing the likelihood of a military conflict with the Soviet Union. This alone may justify the cost of redressing the military balance, apart from the more obvious reasons for doing so.

### III. A PERSPECTIVE ON SOVIET LONG RANGE OBJECTIVES

Administration officials have always used the threat of a Soviet military attack to justify their defense budgets. They concede that the probability of this happening may be low, though not as low as some of their critics like to think. But since it is considered axiomatic that we can not possibly fathom Soviet intentions, the planners feel it incumbent upon them to prepare for the worst, and to rely on Soviet military capabilities as the only tangible guide to U.S. defense requirements. Secretary Brown restated a long-standing truism in defense circles:

A number of hypotheses have been advanced to explain the objectives and motives of the current Soviet leadership. However, owing to the traditional secrecy of the Kremlin... we face great uncertainty as to the intentions of this [collective] leadership. Winston Churchill, in 1939, characterized Russia as 'a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma'. As far as can be judged, we are not much more enlightened today.\*

This profession of ignorance puts many members of Congress into a difficult position. They have had to reconcile two conflicting views: (1) The Russians are genuinely interested in détente and will not attack us; (2) The Soviet military buildup is clear evidence that the leopard has not changed its spots, that the Soviets continue their aggressive designs. Faced with this choice, it is understandable that Congressional approval of U.S. defense programs has been half-hearted, often reflecting an unsatisfactory compromise between opposing beliefs.

Yet one must wonder why so many government executives and legislators have been reluctant to avail themselves of the information that Western scholars have accumulated about the Soviet Union.\*\*

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\* Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1979, p. 33.

\*\* One of the notable exceptions is Senator Henry Jackson who invited a number of international experts to testify on Soviet policy and doctrine at a series of committee hearings held under his chairmanship in the early seventies.

Despite admitted uncertainties, there is substantial agreement among scholars on the major aspects of Soviet policy that are pertinent to U.S. strategic planning. Contrast Secretary Brown's pessimistic statement with the conclusions of a distinguished scholar who has made a lifetime study of the Soviet Union:

Looking back on more than a quarter of a century of American-Soviet relations, the great riddle is not what Soviet policy is, but rather why so little progress has been made in understanding it. It simply is not true that we know very little about the Soviet Union. On the contrary, a solid body of knowledge has been amassed over the years. The key to the riddle is psychological: People all over the world tend to interpret events by their own values and experiences. If the political system and the cultural environment happen to be as different as the American and Soviet are, the difficulties of understanding seem insurmountable....\*

The Western image of the warlike intentions of the Soviet Union is based at least partly on a misunderstanding of Soviet objectives. It is popularly assumed that the Soviet desire to create a Communist world under Moscow's rule is ideologically inspired--something akin to the expansion of Islam in the early middle ages. A crusade of this sort may have been in the minds of the early Bolsheviks, before it became apparent that the world proletariat was not as eager to embrace the new creed as had been believed. Leon Trotsky and his followers continued to advocate world revolution, but after their defeat the idea was denounced as a "left deviationist" fallacy, and "socialism in one country" was proclaimed as the new Party line.

The change did not mean that the Communists had adopted a live-and-let-live attitude toward the free world. They remained faithful to the Marxist doctrine of the international class struggle that is dictated by the irreconcilable conflict between the rival systems. For there could be no ultimate security for the Soviet Union

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\*Walter Laqueur, "The Cool War," The New York Times Magazine, September 17, 1972. Emphasis added. Professor Laqueur was one of the experts who testified before Senator Jackson's subcommittee.

until capitalism had ceased to exist. This belief was enshrined in Lenin's famous dictum that: "... the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable."

The Communist dogma that there will have to be a final showdown with the West in order to assure the triumph of socialism was interpreted to mean that the Soviets would seek such a showdown as soon as they had acquired the necessary power. Hence the assumption that has pervaded much of Western thinking ever since, that it is only the American deterrent that has prevented the Soviets from launching a war "to make the world safe for Communism."

Whether this had ever been the Soviet objective is an academic question, for until recently the possibility of matching Western strength must have seemed too remote to speculate on. This may be the reason why the dogma also asserted that the showdown, when it did come, would be initiated by the other side as it sought to avert the inescapable doom of capitalism through a last ditch attempt to destroy its opponent.

If socialism were to triumph it would assure the security of the Soviet Union in the long run. But Lenin and his successors, being pragmatic rather than goal oriented, were more concerned with security in the short run. The overriding requirement during the period of Soviet inferiority, therefore, was to avoid war with the West at any cost. The price that Lenin insisted must be paid was the policy of what he called "cohabitation" with the West--a policy that has been followed ever since under the name of "peaceful coexistence" and, later, détente. Its purpose was not only to reduce the danger of an imperialist attack, but also to provide access to Western technology and capital for help in transforming Russia into a modern industrial power.

Lest the policy be mistaken at home for the genuine article, the Party had to be continually reminded that there was to be no relaxation of the struggle against capitalism. Because peaceful

coexistence was a tactic designed to prevent an imperialist attack, the struggle must be waged in a cautious fashion that would not provoke the West into taking forceful action. But as Lenin warned his followers, the tactics in the struggle must remain flexible so as to take advantage of changes in the correlation of forces and of opportunities that might arise from unforeseen developments in the world. This precept has guided Soviet actions ever since. As one Western observer aptly remarked, the policy of peaceful coexistence allows "all mischief short of war."

The policy owes much of its success to the fact that public opinion in the West is confused about its meaning and divided on how to interpret it. Many Westerners like to think that the Soviets use the term "peaceful coexistence" to mean what we do; namely, that they have renounced hostile actions against the West and would not force their ideology on other nations. Signs of a more cooperative attitude are seen in the growth of commercial, scientific, and cultural exchanges between East and West, in the Soviet willingness to engage in arms control discussions, and, above all, in the fact that until the Afghanistan invasion the Soviets have refrained from the use of their own military forces except to police the unruly satellites.

Even the optimists cannot ignore that the Soviet leaders are still extremely difficult to deal with, and that their disruptive activities in many parts of the world have stirred up international unrest and created serious crises for the West. But the tendency has been to minimize these troubles, and to explain them as symptoms of an internal conflict within the Politburo between doctrinaire hardliners and the more conservative leaders who are interested in genuine détente. Soviet aggressiveness is expected to decline as the influx of democratic ideas gradually brings about a "convergence" between the rival systems.

This favorable, and what some regard as naive, interpretation of peaceful coexistence is no longer as widely accepted as it was at the height of the American euphoria over détente. It was never shared by those who have always found it difficult to reconcile the Kremlin's reassuring statements with its provocative actions.

These observers note that while the Soviets were proclaiming their peaceful intentions to the outside world, they kept up a hate campaign at home and continued to wage political warfare against the West by means that raise serious questions about their definition of "peaceful". And although they have so far stopped short of the use of their own military forces, they seem to have been constantly edging closer to it. Their earlier efforts to undermine the cohesion and internal stability of the Western democracies were gradually supplemented by more aggressive methods, as they progressed from instigating proxy wars to the overt support of "wars of national liberation," to the arming of radical factions in developing countries, and finally to the use of Cuban mercenaries armed and supplied with modern Soviet equipment, and directed by Soviet and East German military and civilian "advisors." The next step might well be direct aggression with their own military forces.\*

The tremendous Soviet military buildup over the past two decades has made this step more feasible. Now that the Soviets have acquired a degree of power probably unimaginable in Lenin's time, the reason why Lenin had ruled out the use of military force in the struggle against capitalism no longer applies. Current Soviet military strength already is far greater than would be needed to deter an imperialist attack. The buildup is still continuing apace, and at a cost to the regime that would argue against it being merely the result of bureaucratic inertia or pressure from a "military-industrial complex." Hence American planners would seem to be justified in their belief that the Soviets may be only waiting for the right opportunity to bring about the defeat of capitalism by first attacking its European bastion and eventually seeking a final showdown with a then-isolated leader of the free world.

But this view of Soviet intentions assumes that when Communists refer to the defeat of capitalism they mean the military defeat of the democratic powers. This was undoubtedly what Lenin had in mind when he predicted "frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states." One can surmise, however, that the Soviet

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\*This has now occurred, of course, in Afghanistan.

leaders have changed their ideas on what would constitute the "triumph of socialism" and how it could be achieved.

#### IV. VICTORY WITHOUT WAR

Soviet thinking on war and the class struggle did not evolve in a straight line. New ideas must contend with old habits of thought that are the more difficult to eradicate when they have become enshrined in ideology. And even authoritarian rulers are not exempt from internal pressures that force them to vacillate between different policies. No attempt can be made here to trace the tortuous paths by which the Kremlin rulers arrived at their present position. The object of this brief and necessarily oversimplified account is to identify certain turning points that seem to have had a lasting impact on Soviet policy.

All Soviet leaders from Lenin to Brezhnev have stated explicitly that the policy of peaceful coexistence excludes war or the use of Soviet military forces as a means to be employed in the struggle against capitalism. The struggle must be waged by other means. As an authoritative Pravda editorial warned, "The peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems...does not mean the cessation of the class struggle between the two systems but only a renunciation of the use of military methods in this struggle."\*

We know why Lenin had ruled out such methods. His main purpose in adopting the policy of cohabitation with the West had been to avoid a military showdown during the period of Russian inferiority. He naturally visualized the showdown as the only kind of war with which he was familiar, a war in which the stronger side could achieve victory in a meaningful sense and survive without irreparable damage. Until the advent of the nuclear era, the prospect that the Soviet Union would have to engage in a war to the finish could still be contemplated.

The first breach in Lenin's doctrine on the inevitability of war occurred in the fifties, after Stalin's death, when Soviet progress in nuclear technology had given the leaders a better understanding of the

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\* Editorial, "Pressing Tasks of Ideological Work," Pravda, July 8, 1972.

awesome power of these weapons. Premier Malenkov's statement in March 1954 that another world holocaust "with the existence of the modern means of destruction would mean the destruction of world civilization" implied that there could be no winners in a nuclear war because both sides would be destroyed. This heretical idea challenged the standard Communist thesis that capitalism would seek to save itself by unleashing a war with the Soviet Union.

To allow this heresy to stand would have had far-reaching implications. Communist dogma was not the only reason the Soviets could not afford to admit that in the nuclear era war was no longer a rational course of action for either side. They had to maintain the image of external enemies bent on destruction of the fatherland in order to keep up the morale of the armed forces and to justify the sacrifices imposed upon the civilian population.

Malenkov's statement was repudiated by the Khrushchev faction of the Party. The new version was that only the capitalist system would be destroyed if the imperialists persisted in their aggressive policy and turned the cold war into a hot war in which both sides were able to use nuclear weapons. The peace-loving Soviet Union would never start such a war, but its armed forces must be prepared to wage and win it. This has been the Soviet position ever since.

Nevertheless, the realization of what a nuclear war would mean must have begun to sink in. Whereas Lenin's concern had been to postpone the inevitable showdown until the Soviet Union acquired the necessary strength, the new leaders seemed to be asking themselves whether the showdown could be allowed to occur at all.

Although Malenkov's formulation had been rejected, Khrushchev voiced similarly heretical ideas when he reported to the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 that war was no longer "fatalistically inevitable" because new "social and political forces" might restrain the imperialists from starting one. He asserted that nuclear weapons had "changed the old notions about war" and that there was now less likelihood of wars between bourgeois states, wars to be exploited by Marxists to advance their cause in the struggle against capitalism. The Soviets must adapt themselves to the new era in which even local

wars had to be prevented since they could escalate into thermonuclear holocaust.

Khrushchev defended his controversial views as a correct interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology, but met opposition from within the Party and was bitterly attacked by the Chinese Communists for his "revisionist" position. He refused to yield on his principal points. But, to patch up the growing rift with Mao's China, he modified his stand against local wars by declaring that it was not meant to rule out "just wars of national liberation."

We do not know whether Khrushchev really shared the traditional Communist belief that the imperialist warmongers were bent on destruction of the Soviet Union, as some of his statements seem to imply. But he did think that the growing nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union would give them pause, and was determined to strengthen these capabilities even at the expense of conventional forces. His attempts to deceive the West about Soviet strength during the "bomber gap" and "missile gap" episodes were stop-gap measures intended to deter the enemy before actual Soviet capabilities had reached the level needed to provide real deterrence. His abortive Cuban venture would have served the same purpose.

If the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides lessened the likelihood of an imperialist attack and gave the Soviets a greater sense of security in the short run, it also eliminated war as a feasible means for bringing about the downfall of capitalism on which Soviet security depended in the long run. Yet the struggle against capitalism had to be fought to a successful conclusion, and not only to assure the survival of Communism. Hostility to the capitalist enemy--personified by the United States--was deeply embedded in Marxist-Leninist ideology and was nourished by the Kremlin leaders as a useful prop for their authoritarian rule.

The wish may have been father to the thought, when Khrushchev announced that war not only had become undesirable but also unnecessary as a means of achieving the basic Soviet objective. He pointed out that the correlation of forces was shifting in favor of the socialist camp and that the worldwide triumph of socialism could

therefore come about through peaceful transition. Khrushchev did not visualize that triumph in the old Bolshevik sense of world revolution, as requiring that democratic governments everywhere be replaced with Communist regimes. He gave his blessing to what he called "national democracies"--nations that were sufficiently anti-Western, and especially anti-American, in their orientation to qualify as candidates for the socialist camp, though still ranking a step below the "people's democracies" of Eastern Europe. Likely recruits were to be found throughout the third world, where the political vacuum left by the break-up of the colonial empires offered the Soviets opportunities to extend their influence and make trouble for the West. Khrushchev introduced an element of globalism into Soviet foreign policy which heretofore had been dominated by Stalin's narrow regionalism.

Peaceful coexistence played a key role in that policy. Originally conceived as a temporary expedient for staving off a premature war, it was elevated under the Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes from a defensive tactic into an offensive strategy that could bring victory "without the use of military methods."\*

Peaceful coexistence proved successful in deceiving the West about Soviet intentions, in encouraging wishful thinking, and in keeping the United States from using its "positions of strength" to respond forcefully to Soviet challenges. Because it paid lip service to the West's desire for international peace and stability, it also prompted the democracies to show their good faith by making their advanced technology available to the Soviets on easy credit terms.

Under the shield of peaceful coexistence, reinforced by their growing military strength, the Soviets could assist the "historical forces" to bring about the downfall of capitalism without having to

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\* I am indebted for this thought to the study by Foy D. Kohler, Mose L. Harvey, Leon Gouré, and Richard Sohl, Soviet Strategy for the Seventies--From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1973. This thoroughly documented study provided other valuable insights of which I availed myself in this and the preceding section of this report. It is also the source for the quotations cited in the footnotes on pp. 12 and 16.

wait until its "internal contradictions" caused it to collapse of its own weight, as predicted by Communist dogma. While still having to be cautious in their choice of methods, they need not attack the strong center, but could undermine the Western strategic position by extending the struggle into the global arena wherever indigenous unrest and hostility to the West could be exploited to gain a foothold for the Soviet Union and to show up the impotence of the free world.

This is not a biased image of Soviet intentions. It is how the Soviet leaders themselves explain the policy of peaceful coexistence in internal communications to the Party apparatus. In one of many similar pronouncements on the subject, they stated that "peaceful coexistence between states with differing social systems presupposes an acute political, economic, and ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism, between the working class and the bourgeoisie."\*

The Soviet policy was well summed up by Edward Crankshaw in his introduction to Khrushchev's memoirs: "He saw the necessity for a lasting détente between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A., if only to avoid an atomic holocaust; but he still believed that it was a reasonable thing to work for the collapse of the capitalist world while expecting that world to behave in a neutral manner toward the Soviet empire."

The Soviet mind does not seem to balk at holding such incompatible positions. But it adds to the Western confusion and causes many to wonder whether the Soviets could possibly mean what they seem to be saying. We find it difficult to grasp that they do not share our sharp distinction between peace and war. If their concept of "peaceful relations between states" is flexible enough to allow for all forms of political, economic, and ideological warfare, it also could be stretched to include methods that we would consider "real" warfare. The Soviet tendency to use military terminology in referring to the class struggle further adds to Western confusion.

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\*Theses of the Communist Party Central Committee, published in Pravda, December 23, 1969. Emphasis added.

The evidence that is popularly regarded as the most suspicious indication of warlike intentions is, of course, the Soviet buildup of strategic nuclear weapons that began under Khrushchev and went into high gear under his successor. But the buildup can be explained on grounds other than the desire to launch a war against the West. As with most major decisions, there were undoubtedly multiple reasons for it. We know that all Soviet leaders have been preoccupied with the fear of an imperialist attack, however groundless, and that Khrushchev's emphasis on the development of the Strategic Rocket Forces was at least initially motivated by the imagined need to deter such an attack. As for the major buildup that began in the sixties, most Western authorities agree that the Cuban fiasco played an important role in that decision. The Kremlin was determined to correct the disparity in nuclear strength that was blamed for this humiliating retreat. Another motive probably was the long-standing Soviet aspiration to superpower status which had come to be symbolized by nuclear parity with the United States. Yet none of these reasons explains why the buildup has been continuing long after passing the level needed to deter an attack on the Soviet Union, and even after "parity" with the United States had been attained.

American believers in détente still see no reason for concern. They rationalize the Soviet accumulation of military power as a defensive reaction to our own "excessive" arms expenditures. That the Soviets went further than their legitimate needs for deterrence and parity required, could have been (in this view) the result of bureaucratic inertia or pressure from their own military-industrial complex.

Another explanation may be closer to the mark, since it does not rely on the American mirror image of Soviet society; namely, the Kremlin rulers lack our concept of sufficiency. In the Western view, the accumulation of military power is inherently evil and can be justified only to meet a specific, legitimate defense requirement. American SALT negotiators were surprised to learn that this concept is entirely foreign to their Soviet counterparts. In the apt phrase of one Western scholar, the Soviets believe in "banking" power, not with

any preconceived use in mind, but simply to have it available in case an unforeseen need for it arises. The more there is in the bank, the greater the freedom of action.

Most U.S. military leaders find a more compelling reason for the Kremlin's willingness to bear the enormous cost of the military buildup. They see the Soviets aiming for the kind of strategic superiority that the United States had enjoyed in the first two decades of the nuclear era. If strategic superiority were to pass from a "status quo" nation like the United States to a Soviet Union bent on revolutionary change, the Soviets might feel tempted to attack the only power capable of opposing their drive for world domination.

But the change in military balance could have a different result; the Soviets may become less, rather than more, likely to resort to military aggression. The possession of superior military power may make its use unnecessary. The Soviets may have decided to continue their military buildup because they found that the fears it inspired in the West were creating a political climate in which the policy of all mischief short of war, masquerading as peaceful coexistence, could be turned into a winning strategy.

Even the false reports of Soviet offensive capabilities during the Khrushchev regime had paid political dividends, in that the specter of bilateral nuclear war stimulated worldwide demands for peace at any price with the Soviet Union. The "better red than dead" attitude began to spread in Europe, "ban the bomb" activists protested against efforts to strengthen NATO defenses, and American policy in the cold war came under increasing attack at home and abroad. But it was not until the nuclear balance really started to change in the late sixties, and as it approached what American officials now euphemistically describe as "parity" or "essential equivalence", that Western governments convinced themselves that their interpretation of peaceful coexistence was shared by the Kremlin, and that it had become safe, as well as necessary, to act on that assumption.

The United States made no numerical increase in its strategic forces during the period of the major buildup in Soviet offensive capabilities, and even depleted its European theater forces for use in

Vietnam. The Atlantic alliance, already weakened by loss of confidence in the American deterrent, was further strained as its members sought a separate political accommodation with the Soviet Union. France continued to pursue the independent course laid down by DeGaulle when he withdrew from the military covenants of the NATO Pact and expelled allied forces and facilities from French soil. West Germany adopted a new "Ostpolitik" aimed at closer diplomatic, political, and economic relations with its wartime foe. The Kremlin achieved a long-term goal when the territorial division of Europe that had resulted from Soviet wartime conquests was formally sanctioned in the Helsinki accords of the multination Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Politically as well as militarily, the Soviet Union was reaching the status of a superpower. Its troublemaking activities in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa were no longer seriously challenged by the only power capable of doing so. Even if the United States had been willing to act, it was handicapped by its preoccupation with the war in Vietnam and by the domestic turmoil that followed in its wake. But it was the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence that enabled the American Administration to convince itself that there was no need to act.

If fear and hope are the parents of wishful thinking, the fear was provided by the increase in Soviet military power, and the hope by peaceful coexistence. Believing, or wishing to believe, that détente had ended the "era of confrontation," American leaders did not think that the deterioration in our strategic position was critical so long as the Soviet Union seemed peacefully inclined.

The Kremlin was careful to help the democracies maintain the illusions that protected them from the need to take unpalatable and risky actions. By refraining from the overt use of their own military forces, the Soviets made sure that the traditional casus belli would not arise. Their concept of "peaceful relations between states" obviously differed from ours, but so long as it did not allow for what we would consider warlike acts, their disruptive activities in the third world could be explained as the decisions of a vanishing group

of Communist hardliners in the Politburo. Optimists saw the emergence of more conservative elements in such signs as a moderation of the vituperative language formerly employed by the Kremlin, and its evident desire for economic, scientific, and cultural exchanges with the West. The Soviet willingness to participate in arms control negotiations may have done more than any other single factor to convince the American public of Soviet sincerity in the commitment to peaceful coexistence--in our sense of the term. The SALT I agreement was hailed by the Administration as tangible proof that the Soviets had abandoned their warlike intentions and no longer were out "to bury us." Their acceptance of the ABM restrictions was taken to mean that the Soviets had come to share the American concept of mutual assured destruction.

This ex post facto reconstruction of the Soviet strategy is not meant to imply that it was designed in this fashion. As discussed earlier, the key elements of the strategy--the policy of peaceful coexistence, and the military buildup--were decided upon for different and unconnected reasons. What is suggested here is this: when the combination of these measures produced results that could not have been anticipated, the Soviet leaders saw the causal connection between the two, and realized that they found a strategy through which they could achieve their ultimate objective at little risk to themselves. Because success feeds upon itself, it seems unlikely that the Soviets will be satisfied with the gains achieved so far, or that they will voluntarily abandon a winning strategy until victory is assured.

V. PROLOGUE TO THE FUTURE

When Khrushchev made the risky decision to emplace Soviet missiles on America's doorstep, he had misjudged the American reaction, for he was well aware that Soviet strategic inferiority at the time imposed a need for caution and restraint in the struggle against capitalism. The changes that have occurred since then, however, appear to have convinced the Brezhnev regime that the "objective realities" now favor the socialist camp and offer the Soviet Union new opportunities to weaken the West.

The transformation of the military balance is of course partly responsible. But the Soviet leaders probably attach greater weight to the total changes in the correlation of forces, including the intangibles that are usually ignored in Western assessments of the strategic balance.

As the Soviets look at the world situation, it must seem to them that the capitalist powers are in a state of decline, and lack the strength or will to resist the rising tide of opposition from the emerging nations. Most democratic governments are weak and appear unable to cope with the social unrest created by the "internal contradictions" of capitalist society. Their inter-dependent economies are hampered by nationalistic trade barriers, and are vulnerable to disruption of their external sources of oil and other essential raw materials. The military alliances forged by the United States during the cold war have disintegrated or lost their former cohesion. Despite their common bonds, the democratic powers have failed to concert their policy toward the Soviet Union.

What the Kremlin undoubtedly views as one of the most significant factors is what it must regard as a weakening of American resolve. In line with the Nixon doctrine, the Administration thinned out its military presence abroad, disengaged itself from the war in Vietnam, and gave other indications that it was determined to play a less active role in foreign affairs. The post-Vietnam disenchantment with American intervention, the anti-establishment revolt of the late

sixties with its strong pacifist and leftist overtones, and the political upheaval caused by the Watergate revelations all combined to give the picture of a nation torn by internal dissension and too preoccupied with its own problems to exercise its former leadership of the free world. Its eagerness to grasp at détente and to make important concessions to the Soviets in the SALT I agreements would have been interpreted as further indications that the United States was no longer willing, or able, to offer effective opposition to Soviet designs.

True to Communist doctrine, the Soviet leaders have always taken advantage of any sign of weakness or indecision on the capitalist side to seize opportunities for advancing their cause. But they have proceeded with caution in situations in which they thought, rightly or wrongly, that there might be a risk of military confrontation with the United States. At the time when that risk must have appeared to them much greater than it does today they therefore adopted the indirect tactics that have remained their preferred methods ever since.

The Soviets like to time their advances so that they can exploit indigenous developments in a local area without themselves appearing as the instigator of the crisis. Their intervention is generally masked as response to a request for help from an oppressed nation or movement that is trying to throw off the imperialist yoke. They prefer to confine themselves to covert support through military "advisors" and to supplying arms and economic assistance. While their usual aim is to inflate a crisis until maximum damage has been done to Western, especially American, interests, they also seek to keep it from getting out of control by appearing in a conciliatory guise as the peacemakers in a settlement that may bring additional benefits to their side.

These tactics allow considerable room for maneuver and have enabled the Soviets to step up their offensive against the West, when the time was ripe, without exceeding their self-imposed limitations. American policy in the last fifteen years must have signaled to them that the risk of a military confrontation had become minimal, so long as they refrained from the kind of direct challenge for which they had

no incentive at the outset. At the same time, they were presented with more opportunities for troublemaking in the increasingly strife-torn third world. The Brezhnev regime was encouraged by these developments to adopt more aggressive moves in its campaign, while retaining the indirect tactics that allow the West to cling to its optimistic image of Soviet intentions. How successful this strategy has been can be seen in the progressive deterioration of the West's strategic position.

Massive support from the Soviet Union, with additional help from the Chinese Communists, enabled the North Vietnamese to drain American strength in a war whose bruising effect on U.S. policy and domestic unity will be felt for years to come. Soviet military assistance to Egypt--stopping barely short of direct military participation--made possible the last two Arab-Israeli wars. And those wars led to the oil boycott, which demonstrated how easily the economy of the industrialized nations could be disrupted. Radical regimes and revolutionary movements, whatever their political orientation so long as they declared themselves enemies of the United States and its allies, could count at least on political support from the Soviet bloc, and often received more concrete assistance in the form of arms and training for guerrilla leaders. The Soviets even made common cause with anti-American regimes as hostile to Communism as the regimes of Libya and present Iran.

As the Soviet forces acquired global mobility, they were used to support clients in distant areas formerly beyond the reach of their limited airlift and sealift capabilities. This permitted the Kremlin to make better use of the Cuban mercenaries who provided the Brezhnev regime with a new means for intensifying the struggle without having to expose its own military forces. The intervention of Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia, armed and supported by the Soviet Union, could be portrayed as fraternal assistance to members of the anti-imperialist camp who are engaged in wars of national liberation. Thus it did not elicit the counter-intervention that Secretary Kissinger had advocated. And having gained a foothold on the Horn of Africa and in South Yemen, and augmented their naval presence in the

Indian Ocean, the Soviets are now in a position to support radical factions who could threaten the oil tanker traffic or attack the conservative Arab regimes in that region.

But more recent developments indicate that this phase seems to be coming to an end, and that the Soviets may no longer confine themselves to the indirect tactics on which they have relied in the past. The first indication that they had entered a new and more dangerous stage in their campaign was the decision to station a brigade of their own combat forces in Cuba. Conclusive proof was provided by the recent full-scale invasion of neighboring Afghanistan--a country which, unlike Czechoslovakia, had never been a member of the Soviet bloc.

Should we interpret these moves to mean that the Soviet leaders have become so certain of the decline in American resolve that they can now cast all restraint aside, with the sole exception of direct military attack on the United States or its closest allies?

Although they may have lost their fear of the American deterrent, other considerations may still limit Soviet freedom of action, apart from innate caution. The Kremlin knows that the Soviet Union is vulnerable to retaliation by nonmilitary means. Russia is, and for a long time will remain, dependent on imports of foodstuffs from hard-currency countries, and could ill afford to lose access to Western capital and technology. The unequal benefits she now derives from commercial and scientific exchanges with the West might be denied to her if public opinion in the free world were aroused to the point of demanding retaliatory action. The improvement in the strategic position of the Soviet Union owed much to the West's willingness to accept the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence at face value. If the Kremlin were to forfeit such acceptance, it would lose one of the mainstays of its successful strategy for victory without war.

However, there is no guarantee that these self-restraints will remain in effect under Brezhnev's successors, or that they always will prove sufficient to prevent a crisis that could compel the United States to intervene in one form or another. The Soviet leaders may not intentionally cross what they regard as the threshold of American

tolerance. But they cannot be counted upon to understand the Western mentality well enough to know where that threshold lies, or to be able to retreat when they have gone too far. The danger is that past American acquiescence may encourage them to extend their activities to more and more sensitive areas, and by more and more provocative means, until they reach a point where vital American interests are at stake that the United States is forced to protect. They could overreach themselves, as Khrushchev did in precipitating the Cuban missile crisis.

Another important factor to consider is that other circumstances, not just what the Soviets themselves may decide to do in the future, may provoke an international crisis. Soviet allies and clients are no longer content merely to do their sponsor's bidding, and have begun to act independently in promoting their separate interests. The list of these potential troublemakers includes nations that have nothing more in common with the Soviet Union than a dictatorial regime and hatred of the West.

The rise to power of irresponsible governments in much of the third world after the collapse of the colonial regimes cannot be laid at the Kremlin's doorstep. But what gives these nations the freedom to engage in lawless behavior is at least partly the encouragement and concrete support of the Soviet Union. They also benefit from the breakdown of the international order that the Western allies tried to establish after World War II and that the Soviets have done their best to undermine. We can take no comfort in the fact that the Soviets have only themselves to blame for having helped their clients obtain power that can now be used to defy their sponsor's wishes.

Vietnam is wholly dependent on the Soviet Union for arms, equipment, and economic support, and yet seems to have acted on its own when it invaded Cambodia and antagonized the free world by its inhuman treatment of the boat people. The Soviets evidently could not dissuade South Yemen and their former client Somalia from launching unauthorized attacks against their neighbors. Some of the other radical regimes in Africa and the Middle East have not waited for permission before using their Soviet-supplied arms for their own ends.

The Kremlin may come to regret the support it has given to the Palestine Liberation Organization and to other Arab extremists in the hope of causing trouble for the United States. Any violent upheaval in that area, whether directed against Israel or against the conservative rulers of the Gulf states, could easily escalate until it involved the Soviet Union and the United States as well. Before too long the Soviets may also depend on an uninterrupted supply of Middle Eastern oil.

Whether a future crisis is precipitated by the Soviet Union or by the junior troublemakers she has nurtured, the potential for conflict is inherent in the state of international anarchy which the Kremlin has done so much to promote. But the West bears its own share of the blame for having allowed conditions to deteriorate to a point that no longer allows room for complacency. Former Secretary Kissinger summed up his gloomy picture of the future in the recent Senate Hearings on the SALT treaty:

*If the present trends continue, we face the chilling prospect of a world sliding gradually out of control, with our relative military power declining, with our economic lifeline vulnerable to blackmail, with hostile forces growing more rapidly than our ability to deal with them, and with fewer and fewer nations friendly to us surviving.\**

Perhaps these trends could have been arrested if the United States and its allies had been willing to use their diplomatic, political, and economic leverage in time, when it might have induced the Soviets to moderate their course. Even now it may not be too late to resort to the means of pressure still available to the West. Unfortunately, the traditional reluctance of democratic governments to act until a situation has got out of hand is inherent in the system, and hence unlikely to change. And the kind of leverage that might have been effective in preventing conditions from reaching the crisis

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\*Partial transcript of Mr. Kissinger's testimony in The New York Times, August 1, 1979.

stage, is rarely sufficient to deal with the crisis once it has happened and passions are aroused.

We must therefore expect that, sooner or later, some act by the Soviet Union or her partners is likely to create a situation in which the United States feels compelled to intervene militarily, after having exhausted other means of pressure. There is no indication that the possible consequences have been adequately explored or planned for.

## VI. PLANNING FOR AN ALTERNATIVE THREAT

Among the possibilities to be considered is that American intervention in a local area could escalate into a military showdown with the Soviet Union. The fact that both sides are, and presumably will remain, opposed to such a showdown is no guarantee that it can not happen. Once events have been set in motion, neither side will be fully in control, least of all when third parties are involved on both sides.

The chain of events that could lead to such a calamity is not as improbable as many would like to believe. How a future crisis might arise was discussed in the preceding section. But how likely is it that the next link--American military intervention--would follow?

In view of the post-Vietnam opposition to any use of American forces abroad, there is little reason to assume that the United States would intervene merely to prevent the further deterioration of our strategic position. Only a major crisis that is clearly recognized as posing an immediate threat to the security or well-being of the American people could create the emotional climate in which military action might be undertaken.

Distasteful as the prospect may be, recent events in the Middle East have finally caused Administration and Congressional leaders to acknowledge the possibility that such a crisis could indeed arise. The Pentagon has initiated planning for a Rapid Deployment Force that could be used to protect vital American interests in the third world. A specific situation envisaged by the planners is a violent upheaval in the Persian Gulf area that would threaten the supply of Middle Eastern oil. Next to a direct military threat to the United States itself or to its personnel overseas, few events would be as likely to galvanize American public opinion in favor of strong action. The 1973 Arab oil embargo and the gasoline shortage in the United States after the Iranian revolution showed what a drastic effect the cut-off of oil would have upon the economy and life-style of the industrial

democracies. The plight of the American hostages in Iran also might have stimulated military action if the means had been available.

Apart from foreseeable contingencies, such as a disruption of oil supplies, an unexpected situation could arise in which the prerequisites for American intervention might be met. The Cuban missile crisis is one example. But we should not assume that so dramatic a challenge would be needed to overcome American reluctance to act. As the Soviet Union and her allies continue their provocative activities, a less grave incident could put the match to the powder.

Perhaps the likeliest way of U.S. involvement would be a step-by-step progression. At first we may seek only to avert a threat to a friendly regime by assisting with military supplies or through a show of force in the area. The possibility of intervening with U.S. military forces may not even be contemplated. But as the crisis escalates and new developments arise--possibly in response to our own action--we may find ourselves compelled to back up our initial commitment until we get drawn in so far that the last step becomes unavoidable.

This is not to suggest that American military intervention necessarily will take place merely because the situation requires it. The political climate in the United States or the temper of its leadership may preclude forceful action under any circumstances. In the kind of crisis envisaged here, however, the penalties for failure to act would be so grave that the decision for or against intervention is likely to be based on how successfully it is expected to turn out.

The danger is that estimates of probable outcome are apt to be confined to the success of the initial operation, without taking account of developments that may follow. If we are fortunate, the conflict may remain localized, and may not induce overt participation by the Soviet Union. This is the optimistic assumption in American planning for the possible use of a mobile force to help defend oil installations in the Persian Gulf area against an attack by radical Arab forces. But the Kremlin can not be expected to sit idly by and allow the United States to gain dominance in a vital region that may

soon become a necessary oil supply source for the Soviet Union, as it has been for the West.

Nor should we count on Soviet restraint in a crisis elsewhere in which the strategic interests of both sides are at stake, and where Soviet prestige has been engaged by their support of those who precipitated the conflict. Confident that the United States, having lost its strategic superiority, could not permit a local conflict to escalate into all-out war, the Soviets might feel free to use their own, or proxy, forces to bail out the local dissidents.

What they would actually do, and how the United States might respond would, of course, depend on the circumstances in each case. The most important factor might well be how far the two sides had allowed themselves to be drawn in before an attempt at withdrawal--too far, and the stage might be set for the kind of direct military confrontation between the superpowers that both have been careful to avoid. And once it has happened, with or without their volition, new elements will enter that may make it no longer possible for the belligerents "to take as much or as little of the war as they will."\*

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One purpose of this overview has been to examine the assumption that the only Soviet threat we must be prepared to meet is that of a military attack on the United States or its allies. If the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence has been correctly interpreted here, it would seem to argue against this assumption. The Soviets would not need to risk a major war for something they expect to gain more safely and more easily by other means.

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\* The author speculated on the escalation potential of such a conflict in an earlier Rand Report (R-465-PR) which was subsequently published in book form. See Frederick M. Sallagar, The Road to Total War, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., New York 1974, pp. 177-178. The quoted phrase was coined by Francis Bacon when England had won command of the sea and hence enjoyed strategic superiority.

It is, of course, always possible that the Kremlin may change its strategy if it ceases to be successful, or if a radically different regime comes to power. The possibility of a Soviet attack cannot be dismissed even though another kind of threat now appears to be more likely. There is no suggestion here that the planning based on the old assumption is unnecessary, or that we do not need forces capable of implementing these plans.

What this inquiry does suggest is that our strategic planning should not be confined to this single threat. The existence of another, more insidious but potentially no less dangerous threat is evidenced in the political warfare conducted by the Soviet Union and her partners. If it led to U.S. intervention in a threatened area, it could become the source of a major war that would differ radically from the assumptions used in the single threat. The novel problems of how to deter or conduct such a war are a difficult and lengthy task which cannot be safely postponed until events force us to improvise a policy on which the security of the United States will depend.

Planning for the alternative threat envisaged here could require major changes in present U.S. strategic doctrine. As in all previous Posture Statements, Secretary Brown's Annual Report for FY 1980 was taken up almost entirely with the problems of deterring or countering the stereotyped threat regarded as the "major contingency" we face. The possibility of U.S. intervention in a third area is treated as a "lesser contingency." The Posture Statement mentions that "a simultaneous lesser contingency...could also be the triggering event for a much larger conflict" but does not deal with the far-reaching implications of that possibility.

The Pentagon does its planning for "lesser contingencies" largely by identifying available forces that are not already earmarked for the familiar major contingency, and preparing operational plans for the movement and support of such forces in various difficult areas.

The planning that has been initiated for a Rapid Deployment Force to be used in the Middle East or elsewhere is likely to suffer from inherent limitations. It probably will be confined to operational problems connected with the initial intervention. Such planning may be a useful training exercise but does not go nearly far enough. The need is for a major effort to identify the broader strategic and political problems likely to arise after the intervention has taken place.

To cite a few examples, would it be possible for the United States to engage in a local conflict with Soviet forces without being "at war" with the Soviet Union elsewhere as well? Where would we draw a distinction between fighting Soviet-supported proxy forces and those of the Soviet Union? How far would the two sides be willing to go to achieve their respective objectives in the area? What escalation thresholds would be observed by either side? What legal, political, and other constraints would be imposed on American conduct of such a war? Would reinforcements for the initial intervention force be withheld in the expectation of a "simultaneous major contingency" elsewhere? Would our allies support the American effort even to the extent of providing bases and overflight privileges? Could a war of this kind be controlled from the White House situation room, without delegating military and political authority to the field command?

Military planners normally do not address questions of this sort without guidance from civilian authority. In this case, however, the guidance is not likely to be forthcoming until the emergency is already upon us. Hence, it may be necessary for the Pentagon to take the initiative by devoting some of the current strategic planning to wars other than one presumed to start with a Soviet attack.

Such planning will not be an easy task for it requires assumptions about Soviet and U.S. behavior that may be at variance with current declaratory policy or with cherished illusions about the future. But it would be the only way to avoid improvident actions in a crisis that has caught us unprepared. Success or failure in an unfamiliar war will be determined not only by our military forces, but even more by our strategic concepts for their employment.