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AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE

by

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While the Labor and Liberal Party governments may view differently national security policy and concomitant foreign policy, they agree that an alliance system (ANZAM, ANZUS) with a great and powerful ally is the only logical and utterly necessary way to secure Australian national security.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Australian defense historically has depended on a "great and powerful friend". Prior to World War II there was little need for Australian interest in defense matters, since defense efforts in Australia would only duplicate British defense of its colonial interests in Southeast and East Asia. The collapse of Singapore and Malaysia quickly changed the Australian antipathy for defense matters. The United States, with interests of its own in the Southwest Pacific, rescued Australia from probable Japanese occupation and replaced Great Britain as the "great and powerful friend". Australian efforts to insure its security grew into the "Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America ('ANZUS' Treaty)". Since it was ratified in 1952, it has formed the cornerstone of Australian defense.

As a result of the British decision to withdraw from East of Suez, and the expectation of the United States that nations in the Pacific do more for themselves militarily (Guam or Nixon Doctrine), Australia's strategic environment has changed substantially. The changes in British and American policies have been paralleled by changes in Australian policy. While Britain and the United States were in Southeast Asia, Australia was there also because of its "Forward Defense" policy. While the major powers were containing Communism, Australia was attempting to meet the enemy as far away from the continent as possible. When Britain and the United States left the area, Australia's defense policy shrank in scope to one of continental defense.

As the powerful friend's policies toward the Far East changed,

Australia's policies toward its "Near North" also changed. As the British and American presence in the area departed and declined respectively, Australia had to cope with the problems of defending its security in the South Pacific/Indian Ocean. Attempting to come to grips with its position in the new balance of power in the region, Australia has used several catch-word identifiers to describe its defense policy. These identifiers not only have not always defined the real force structure but have generated arguments as to whether Australia has ever made an actual strategic assessment and then developed a strategy based on this assessment.

The colonial attitude, of allowing the "great and powerful friend" to direct defense matters, has been difficult to shed. Australia does not have an abundance of strategic thinkers but, as a regional leader, has been forced to develop a defense strategy that is equivalent to its perceived position in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia power calculus. Australia is a nation the size of the United States and has a population comparable to the New York metropolitan area, and must therefore develop a defense policy that can be supported by its limited financial and technological bases. My thesis is that Australia has developed a defense policy capable of realization.

When considering Australian defense, three premises must be considered. First, Australia is a vast, underpopulated and underdeveloped continent with a coastline of nearly 12,000 miles. Defending Australia against attack would be difficult, if not impossible, and very costly. Second, nearby there are countries of dense population and resource requirements that understand the potentialities of Australia. Lastly, Australia is still a young nation and must avoid overtaxing itself to provide defense.



This paper will comprise an investigation of Australian attempts to direct security strategies during World War II, its efforts to develop collective security for post-war Southeast Asia, its period of forward defense and relationship to ANZUS, SEATO, and the Five Power Arrangement, and its current attempts to establish a realistic corps-force. The methodology of investigation will be broad and descriptive. Since the time span will be nearly forty years, no attempt will be made to deal with individual governments, with the exception of the Labor Government from 1972-1975. This government will be singled out because of the effect it had on the defense structure and the strategic debate. The thesis will view the thrust of Australian defense policy and how it has met perceived defensive needs.

II. THE COLONIAL APPROACH

As a part of the British Empire, the defense of Australia was largely a concern of the British Government.¹ Australia became a Commonwealth on January 1, 1901 and in the years that followed it continued to look to Whitehall for its security.

In 1921, Imperial Far Eastern strategy was based on a battle fleet operating from Singapore. This strategy was confirmed at the 1923 Imperial Conference but no joint plans for the defense of Singapore were made and the "Australian armed services were not developed according to this strategy concept."²

Between 1923 and December 1941 Australian public opinion, and to a lesser extent official opinion, believed that their security rested mainly on British naval strength. Since Australian security depended on a powerful British fleet that would steam to Singapore in an emergency, it naturally followed that Australia's contribution to the strategy would be naval forces. In 1936, the minister for defense stated that "The objectives of the Government's defence policy are the maintenance of the R.A.N. [Royal Australian Navy] at a strength which is effective and fair contribution to Imperial naval defense and local defence against invasion and raids."³ "The Government's policy [was] that the Navy is to be Australia's first line of defence."⁴

In the five years preceding 1939 the Australian defense budget was seventeen million pounds.⁵ The Army and Air Force budget was seven million pounds each leaving only three million for the RAN budget.⁶ This defense expenditure made sense only if the British fleet arrived

at Singapore when an emergency occurred because the RAN was equipped to be only an augmentee force. If the RAN had no British fleet to augment, the Singapore strategy would cease to be viable.⁷

The major flaw in the strategy was that it did not consider that Great Britain might become involved in a two-front war and would be unable to send a battle fleet to Singapore, which was essential to Australia since its fleet was designed as an augmentation force. When Australian officials questioned the viability of the Singapore strategy, they were normally lulled into a false sense of security based on British promises to develop Singapore to accommodate the British Main Fleet. Since the success of the Singapore strategy was vital to Australian security, they tended to accept at face value the claim that the transfer of British naval power would be almost automatic.⁸

Great Britain felt that Singapore's geography was its main defense and its development was therefore slow. It was felt that a lot would have to happen before Singapore was seriously threatened. When war became imminent in Europe, it became obvious that British interests in Europe and the Middle East would come before Singapore and that Britain's Navy would be unable to operate both east and west of Suez.⁹

A major power will aid an ally only so long as it is in its best interest to do so. When Australia looked to Great Britain to make the Singapore strategy function, Great Britain needed all its resources to defend Europe and the Middle East. Australia might have realized what would happen to Singapore when threatened by the Japanese because, in May 1939, the Admiralty had sent an officer to the U.S. War Plans Division to inform the United States that "owing to the necessity of watching the Mediterranean, it would be impossible to send a battle force to Singapore."¹⁰

In 1941, at the Arcadia Conference held in Washington, the United States and Great Britain agreed on a strategy for the war. The conferees noted that "much had happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow."¹¹ It was agreed "that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theaters should be diverted from operations against Germany."¹²

At the same conference, the proposal to establish a unified command in the Southwest Pacific was adopted. Australian Minister of External Affairs H.V. Evatt saw the need to create an Allied command in the Pacific theater so that efficient allocation of resources and the quick decisions could be made.¹³ Australia believed that each of the Allied countries should have some sort of impact on decisions, but Australia was not a conferee and, therefore, had little impact on the decision to create the Allied command.

The Conference set up the Australian-British-Dutch-American (ABDA) Command. The Australians had wanted an American commander for ABDA but the command was given to Lt. Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of Great Britain. The U.S. did not want the command because it considered the ABDA area unsalvageable and didn't want the responsibility.¹⁴ The ABDACOM directive to the Supreme Commander dated January 3, 1942 from the Arcadia Conference stated:

"The basic concept of ABDA Governments for the conduct of the war in your Area is not only in the immediate future to maintain as many key positions as possible, but to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all out offensive against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority

at the earliest possible moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized. Your operations should be conducted as to further preparations for the offensive."¹⁵

This step was taken by the United States and Great Britain without consulting either Australia or the Netherlands. To the conferees the action would also be in the interest of Australia and the Netherlands and therefore consultation was not important.

The Government of Prime Minister Curtin had been active in both Washington and London trying to get reinforcements and to raise the Pacific priority. The American and British responses were viewed as most unsatisfactory. Neither were able or willing to deploy naval forces to the Pacific to ensure that Singapore be retained.¹⁶ Prime Minister Curtin instructed Ambassador Casey, Australian Ambassador to the United States:

"Please understand that the stage of gentle suggestion has now passed...this is the gravest type of emergency and everything will depend upon a Churchill-Roosevelt decision to meet it in the broadest way."¹⁷

The following day Prime Minister Curtin appealed publicly to the United States for immediate military assistance. It had become obvious that none would be coming from Great Britain. His controversial statement symbolized Australia's determination to act independently of Britain to protect its security interests. Curtin's appeal read, in part:

"We look for a solid and impregnable barrier of the Democracies against the three Axis powers, and we refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a subordinate segment of the general conflict. By that it is not meant that any one of the other theaters of war is of less importance than the Pacific, but that Australia asks for a concerted plan involving all the greatest strength at the Democracies' disposal, determined upon hurling Japan back.

"The Australian Government therefore regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction on the Democracies fighting plan.

"Without any inhibition of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional link or kinship with the United Kingdom.

"We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We know the constant threat of invasion. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength. But we know too that Australia can go, and Britain can still hold on."¹⁸

Curtin's statement was an unprecedented public assertion of Dominion autonomy and was aimed primarily at promoting immediate and substantial American assistance. Australia realized that its defense policy had been built around a strategy that required British participation and that Britain did not at this time see it as imperative to participate.

As the ABDA Command took form the need for American assistance became obvious. ABDA had to reconsider its programs immediately because of the swift Japanese victories in insular Southeast Asia.¹⁹ The apparent British disinterest in Southeast Asia brought an indignant cable to Churchill from Curtin on January 23, 1942. The evacuation of Singapore, he argued, would be regarded in Australia as an "inexcusable betrayal". "We understood," he stressed, "that it [Singapore] was to be made impregnable, and in any event capable of holding out for a prolonged period until the arrival of the main fleet."²⁰ The main fleet did not arrive and the ABDA Command was dissolved shortly after it was established, after the area it had been formed to defend had fallen to the Japanese (Gen. Wavell flew to Colombo on February 25, 1942 and ABDA Command ceased to exist).

On February 15, 1942, Singapore fell to the Japanese and the Singapore strategy that had formed the backbone of Australian defense was broken. Threatened by a Japanese invasion of their country, the Labor government imposed universal conscription. Lt. General Vernon Sturdee, Chief of the Australian General Staff, recommended that the forces in the

Middle East be recalled to defend Australia. As he saw it, Australia was now the only satisfactory strategic base to organize an offensive against Japan and must be kept secure.²¹

With the imminent fall of the Philippines, the Pacific required a base from which to carry out successful military operations against the Japanese. The greater its own manpower, industrial capacity, and raw material resources, the less vulnerable it would be to enemy attempts to interrupt its lines of communication. Australian lines of communication are so located that a major fleet action would be required to interdict them.²² If the allies were to have mastery of the Pacific, Australia was a necessity. For these reasons the United States began to rapidly build up its forces in Australia.

A. WORLD WAR II

When the fall of the Philippines became imminent, Washington began to think about where to put General MacArthur. Under the existing circumstances, a new command was needed and President Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to Australia, which had become to the Pacific what Great Britain was to Europe for mounting a counteroffensive.²³ Australia now enjoyed new stature in the American Pacific strategy, and replacement of the British defense system in the Far East was begun.

The outward appearance of the help coming from the United States gave the Australians the feeling that the Americans would rescue them from their apparent peril. Actually, Lt. Gen. Sturdee had accurately foreseen that Australia was the only satisfactory base in the Pacific and the Americans were coming to ensure its security.²⁴ Even after the United States realized that Australia must be secured in order to defeat

the Japanese, Australia could not communicate directly with the United States concerning policies or strategies for the Pacific. Prime Minister Curtin was unaware that General MacArthur was coming to Australia or that a new command would be established in Australia.²⁵

On March 6, 1942, General Marshall informed Lt. Gen. George Brett, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), that:

"It appears probable that General MacArthur will land in Australia on March 17. Until that time you are to keep this entire matter one of profound secrecy."

"The following instructions to you from the President. General MacArthur has been instructed to telegraph you at Melbourne immediately upon landing in Australia. Within the hour you will call upon the Prime Minister or other appropriate governmental official of Australia, stating that your call is made by the direction of the President. You are to notify the Prime Minister that General MacArthur has landed in Australia and has assumed command of all U.S. Army forces therein. You will propose that the Australian government nominate General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific area, and will recommend that the nomination be submitted as soon as possible to London and Washington simultaneously."²⁶

By moving General MacArthur to Australia, the U.S. had presented Great Britain with a fait accompli. No one the British might send to Australia could rank a man of MacArthur's stature, and he would obviously require a large theater to command. By the "Australian invitation", General MacArthur became the Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific area and the United States assumed sole responsibility for the war in the Pacific.²⁷

Australia, attempting to get a larger voice in Pacific strategies and policies, felt they had more leverage now that their nation was the foundation of the Pacific counteroffensive. The United States viewed Great Britain as its principal ally and accepted Churchill as the legitimate spokesman for all Commonwealth countries. Dr. H.V. Evatt went to Washington to pressure the United States into forming a Pacific War

Council in Washington. Dr. Evatt's successful campaign made Australia feel it would have a more direct voice in the direction of the Pacific War.

The Council began weekly meetings in April 1942, but these were less than the Australians had hoped for since they were only advisory and had no part in deciding strategy. It did give the Australian and New Zealand members contact with President Roosevelt each week and the opportunity to learn what he was thinking, and perhaps influence him.²⁸ The council did offer a direct communication line with Washington that replaced the previous route through London.

Despite occasional pronouncements to the contrary, the Australian government was never satisfied with the Pacific War Council. In September 1942, Dr. Evatt tried to defend it by telling Parliament that "important matters on the political side and to some extent on the military side are finalized at the Council".²⁹ In the absence of a satisfying Pacific War Council, Australia continued to press for expanded representation on top level military staffs, but experienced little success.

B. THE AUSTRALIAN-NEW ZEALAND AGREEMENT

Since the 1930's, when Australia foresaw Great Britain's inability to provide an effective defense for the Commonwealth in the Pacific, it had courted the United States as a possible replacement to provide security. Out of strategic necessity, Australia and the United States established a direct military relationship. It was reminiscent of Australia's relationship with Great Britain, in that the major power would deploy Australian forces but would not give the Australian

government a voice in their utilization. This had been acceptable when security arrangements were not something about which the Dominions should worry.

The frustrations of World War II brought a change in attitude. Now Australia demanded a voice in the decisions that might determine its fate. As the tide turned against the Japanese, the Australians began to look less and less at military questions and by late 1943 the occupation of Japan, control of Pacific territories, and postwar security began to dominate relations between Australia and the United States.

Historically, Australia was an element of the British Commonwealth security system, but World War II provided a rude awakening to the merits of that system. They now realized that specific regional interests did not necessarily coincide with the broader aspects of Great Britain. After turning to the United States to fill the security vacuum that Great Britain left in the Pacific, Australia also discovered regional differences with the United States.

The Australian government learned that Great Britain could not adequately protect the interests of the Pacific Dominions. This occurred because the interests of the European and Pacific theaters were often contradictory and also because British policy was often subject to modification during negotiations with the United States. The U.S. policy was normally one of self-interest and the Pacific Dominions did not belong to her.

The exclusion of Australia from a series of inter-allied strategic conferences during the war, culminating in its omission from the vital Cairo conference in November 1943, was perhaps the impetus that caused the Labor government to act as an independent sovereign, taking steps

to ensure Australia's future security and political independence.

Australia felt that its right to be heard in foreign affairs should be based on its efforts and wartime contributions. In World War II through August 1944, Australia had had 83,000 casualties and about 12.4 percent of its population was in the armed forces. The RAN had fought from Murmansk to New Guinea. The RAAF had air squadrons in Great Britain, and had served notably in North Africa and the Middle East. Australians comprised the bulk of the land forces in the New Guinea campaign of 1942-1943.³⁰ At the Cairo conference, the conferees (United States, Great Britain, and China) agreed that all territory seized by Japan after World War I would be permanently removed from her control. This decision, which directly affected Australia's postwar security interests in the Pacific, only served to heighten the growing belief that the United States was determined to dictate postwar arrangements for the Pacific area.

It is against this backdrop that actions taken by Australia for its future security must be viewed. Having been left out of all the major decisions, Australia and New Zealand began to feel uneasy about American desires for the postwar Pacific. In January 1944 members of the Australian and New Zealand governments met at Canberra to formulate resolutions on their basic objectives.

The resolutions of this conference, The Australian-New Zealand Agreement, grew out of the war experiences of the Anzac nations. Certain features had their origins in the pre-war period, but these were given real form after the Pacific war had demonstrated the tenuous quality of the assumptions underlying Australian security. W. Macmahon Ball noted that the agreement developed in response to the following

propositions:

- "1. That the British fleet and its Singapore base were no longer effective guarantors of Australian security.
2. That the United States now constituted the greatest single force in the Pacific.
3. That the security of Australia was inextricably linked with the security of all Southeast Asia.
4. That Australia and New Zealand must act together in all matters of common concern.
5. That Australia, by virtue of its wartime contributions and achievements, had newly acquired rights and obligations, among which was the right to a full and active role in planning the peace."³¹

The driving force behind the conference was Dr. Herbert V. Evatt. He had been the principal voice for Australian interests in Washington during 1942-1943. His style of international relations had legalistic overtones due to his background as a lawyer and as a justice on the Australian High Court. After the conference began, Dr. Evatt suggested that the resolutions should be drafted in the form of a treaty. The New Zealand representatives were unsure of the legality of dominions signing a treaty. Research by Australian officers found no obstacles to a treaty signed between two dominions.³² The importance of this treaty was that two dominions had made "independent decisions on matters of major political and international importance in which Britain and other dominions were vitally concerned and 'formally took a position vis-a-vis the United Kingdom and other dominions as well'".³³

The signatories agreed to a "maximum degree of unity" through continuous consultations on common issues. Clauses 7 through 12 were directed at Great Britain and the United States and clearly showed Australia's total dissatisfaction with its relationships with the major

powers. The clauses declared, in part, that the interests of Australia and New Zealand "should be protected by the representation at the highest level on all armistice planning and executive bodies." They expressed the desire to "participate in any Armistice Commission to be set up." These provisions signalled a determination to foster a regional stability and cooperation and thereby limit possible area domination by any of the great powers.

The agreement was a regional pact and was worded so that it could fit into any international charter drawn after the war. The two states agreed that "...within the framework of a general system of world security, a regional zone of defense comprising the Southwest and South Pacific area North East of Australia to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands" would be established. This clause defined what in the postwar years was to become the area that comprised the forward defense strategy that would meet any threat before it could reach the shores of Australia or New Zealand. Also of significance was clause 16, which recognized that the "principle of international practice that the construction and use, in time of war, of naval or air installations, in any territory under sovereignty or control of another Power, does not, in itself, afford any basis for territorial claims...after the conclusion of hostilities".

United States Naval authorities, and some congressmen, interpreted the agreement as a blatant attempt to deny America's postwar use of South Pacific bases, including Manus Island where expensive base facilities had been established after 1941. A congressional subcommittee, established in 1944 to investigate America's postwar base needs, was in part a reaction to the agreement.³⁴

C. MANUS ISLAND CONFRONTATION

As the war drew down, the United States reviewed its defense plans in the Pacific. Its strategy was designed around a line running through the Hawaiian Islands, Micronesia and the Philippines.³⁵ The Navy would protect this line of communication from main fleet bases to the north, and main and secondary fleet bases to the south of the line. Bases guarding the southern flank were of the utmost importance because they provided protection for not only the southern flank but also for Australia and New Zealand.

The Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives saw Manus Island as important in the postwar strategy because of its strategic geography, excellent harbor facilities, and size (it was large enough to be defended by land forces).³⁶ At the time of the Committee's hearing on Pacific bases, the United States had at least \$71,000,000 invested in Manus.³⁷ The figure however eventually reached \$156,000,000. The problem with this strategic prize was that it was an Australian mandate.

Since Manus belonged to Australia, and the United States wanted to use it as a main fleet base, Australia attempted to make the United States participate in a broad regional security agreement, or at least a tripartite defense arrangement, in accordance with Clauses 26 and 27 of the 1944 Australian-New Zealand Agreement. America's participation in such an agreement would be a quid pro quo for long term base rights on Manus. The United States insisted on bilateral negotiations on Manus. The first terms proposed to the Australian government were, in John Dedman's (minister for Defense, 1946-1949) words a "little short of outrageous" and "savored of the kind of 'suggestion' that one might

expect the USSR to make to one of its satellites."³⁸

The proposal was basically that Australia would maintain the existing facilities on Manus at her own expense and utilization of her own manpower. The United States would give Australia a 99 year lease to its installations built there, subject to four conditions:

1) The United States would be given joint-user rights, but not be committed to maintain any forces on Manus.

2) The United States had the right to deny the use of the facility to third parties which included British Commonwealth countries.

3) The United States could at any time during the 99 years, assume complete control of the installations for as long as she felt it necessary.

4) The United States could prevent, if she wished to do so, the establishment of any other bases in the mandated territory.³⁹

To accept this proposal would have denied Australia any flexibility in its defense policy. The first condition would have required Australia to maintain the caretaker force and to pay the bills involved. This would require either higher taxation on a small population or else a reduction in the defense appropriations being spent on other naval items, or both. Even if Australia bore the entire cost, it could not develop other facilities in its mandated territory without U.S. approval. If Australia were to engage in a war with Indonesia, New Zealand could not operate from Manus to help Australia without U.S. consent. An even worse option would be for Commonwealth countries to be involved in hostilities in which the U.S. was not a belligerent. Under such circumstances the U.S. could keep all but Australian forces from using the island.

The U.S. conditions would, in effect, make the U.S. instead of Australia the sovereign on Manus. Rather than summarily dismiss the U.S. proposal, Dr. Evatt attempted to turn an infringement of Australian sovereignty into a proposal that would increase Australia's security. The Australian-New Zealand Agreement blocked Australia from ceding any territory to the United States for use as military bases, but Dr. Evatt told the National Press Club that Australia "would be willing to grant the use of bases if the country that occupied them would accept responsibility for the security that those bases protected." He also stated that the Australian Navy and Air Force should be entitled to use U.S. bases as a reciprocal agreement.⁴⁰ Australia felt that the reciprocal use of bases should be done in conjunction with a regional defense arrangement for the Pacific. Dr. Evatt was attempting to use the U.S. question of postwar use of Pacific bases as a back door entry to his regional defense issue.⁴¹

The United States eventually was willing to concede a reciprocal base utilization with Guam being mentioned, but was not interested in a regional defense pact for that part of the world.⁴² For the 'FY 1947 budget, President Truman cut \$650 million from the Navy's budget and dismantling of American bases in the Pacific began. A large portion of the material at Pacific bases was sold to the Nationalist Chinese.⁴³ As a result of these actions, there was nothing for the two nations to discuss.

There are two schools of thought about the postwar status of Manus Island. One is that Dr. Evatt pushed his idea too hard and as a result the U.S. Naval budget was reduced to cut South Pacific expenditures. The other is that Dr. Evatt had nothing to do with the budget cut.

With Australia secure, the United States area of interest shifted to the North where the problems of Communism were taking on greater importance; then President Truman cut the Naval budget because the U.S. simply could not afford the strategy originally planned for that part of the world. Either way, the budget cut excised the issue on which Dr. Evatt might have been able to capitalize and integrate the United States into a regional defense pact.

D. TRANSITION TO PEACE

The abrasive disagreement between the United States and Australia over Allied strategic priorities and consultation arrangements remained unabated over the counteroffensive in the Pacific and the peace settlement with Japan. If Australian criticism was muted during 1942 and 1943, it was because Australia was a small power and could not risk undermining the relationship with its principal ally. However, Australia's criticism of the United States became sharper when the war in the Pacific went better for the Allies.

The Labor government was determined to emerge from the war as a regional leader and this would be accomplished by its participation in the counteroffensive and the occupation of Japan. There was a problem in that the United States was a Pacific regional power also. Australia welcomed United States influence in the postwar Pacific, but wanted the collaboration of Allied states that contributed to Japan's defeat. Through this, Australia hoped to influence the terms of the Japanese surrender. After 1944 the United States' perspective of the Pacific was shaped by broader considerations.

The war years sapped Great Britain's military and economic strength but developed those of the Soviet Union. The principal consequence of

the change in the distribution of power among the Big Three would be an emergence of Soviet influence in Europe and Asia. "In estimating Russia's probable course as regards to Japan", the U.S. Military Staff advised the Secretary of State:

"we must balance against assurances as we have received from Russia, the fact that whether or not she enters the war, the fall of Japan will leave Russia in a dominant position on continental Northeast Asia, and, in so far as military power is concerned, able to impose her will in all that region."⁴⁴

The decline in British influence in the Pacific gave impetus to the increase in Australian political and military initiatives. Since Australia could not promote regional interests or influence U.S. policy for the Pacific while acting independently, it sought to sustain British Commonwealth authority and influence Commonwealth policy for the Pacific. In this manner, Australia could promote specific political objectives during future peace negotiations.

The Truman administration was anxious to restrict Soviet influence in the Far East and to avert Soviet-American friction in the occupation of Japan, so it held to its unilateral domination of operations in the Pacific. The United States had to hold fast to this unilateral domination or concede that the Commonwealth countries played a significant enough role to be principals in the peace settlement. To do this would have restricted the United States' ability to pursue its strategic objective with Japan. In July 1944, the U.S. Military Staff warned:

"After the defeat of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union will be the only military powers of the first magnitude...While the U.S. can project its military power into many areas overseas, it is nevertheless true that the relative strength and geographic position of these two powers preclude the military defeat of one of these powers by the other, even if that power were allied with the British Empire."⁴⁵

The United States would, therefore, have to look to China and Japan to counterbalance Soviet influence. Having Japan as a counterbalance would require rebuilding her as rapidly as possible, which was in total opposition to Australian desires.

Throughout the transition to peace, Australia's largest fear was the possibility of a resurgence of Japanese expansionism. This fear was consistent with the traditional white Australian concerns and security. Australia viewed Japan as a principal enemy and not as a potential ally against possible Communist expansion in Asia. Australia was quite unconcerned about the possibility of Soviet postwar expansion and even sided with the Soviets against the U.S. on some of the peace settlement issues.

E. ARMISTICE AND ANZUS

The first articles of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement to be tested by big power politics were those relating to armistice negotiations. The two governments had agreed that "their interests should be protected by representations at the highest level on all armistice planning" and should "actively participate in any armistice commission to be set up" (articles 7 and 10). When European armistices were negotiated these claims went unheeded. The texts of the Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Finnish armistices show that the three Allied powers (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and the United Kingdom) acted "in the interests of" and "on behalf of" all the United Nations.⁴⁶ Dr. Evatt spoke out bitterly about the European armistice negotiations saying that "The major powers purported to act 'in the interests of' all other belligerents even though they did not have the authority so to act."⁴⁷

In the Allied Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, each signatory state pledged itself not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.⁴⁸ Dr. Evatt believed that "this declaration was clearly broken whenever armistices were signed by the major Allied powers without the express authority of the Allied powers at war with that particular Axis country."⁴⁹ Australia and New Zealand were almost completely excluded from the Japanese settlement as they had been in Europe. The United States continued its wartime leadership monopoly in the Pacific by determining the form and content of the Japanese surrender terms.

The Potsdam Declaration, which set the terms for the Japanese surrender, was announced without consultation with Australia. Dr. Evatt argued that the Declaration "was of fundamental importance to Australia, yet our first knowledge both of its terms and its publication came from the Press."⁵⁰ The Declaration did not call for the surrender of the Japanese government and emperor, but rather requested that the government "proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces."⁵¹ In light of its contributions to the war as well a near neighbor of Japan, Australia felt it should have been considered a principal in the settlement, and bristled for not having been so considered. To placate Australia it was allowed to participate as an independent at Japan's surrender in Tokyo Bay.⁵²

While the Allies were discussing control policy for the occupation, the Truman administration published its "Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan", prepared jointly by the State, War and Navy Departments. It said in part:

"Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and control of Japan which will satisfy the

principal Allied powers, in the event of differences of opinion among them, the policies of the U.S. will govern."⁵³

Australia initially intended to send a force to participate in the occupation, but Dr. Evatt was able to convince Prime Minister Chiefly (Chiefly replaced Prime Minister Curtin when the latter died in 1945) that a Commonwealth force commanded by an Australian would be better for Australian interests since this could be done, whereas an all-Australian force probably would not have been approved by the U.S. (in terms of the total Allied Pacific effort). The commonwealth efforts were sufficient to justify Commonwealth participation in the occupation of Japan.⁵⁴

From the beginning of the war, Australia tried to formulate a defense policy for its security. After the fall of Singapore, Australian forces were recalled from the Middle East to defend its territorial integrity, then coming under great stress. It realized that Great Britain's national interest lay in defeating "Hitler first", not helping Australia. As the Japanese swept toward Australia, the U.S. sent aid because it was necessary that Australia be secure.

The United States sent some troops to Australia because of Australia's insistence on help in defending its territory. This was in strict compliance with the "safeguarding of vital interests" policy of the Arcadia conference. The U.S. was not so much aiding Australia as protecting its own vital interests in the Pacific. When it became evident that Australia would be the base for the counteroffensive, the Australian government pressed harder for a voice in defense policy. It could press only so hard because Australia was so dependent on U.S. military power. Due to its dependency on U.S. power more times than not, Australia would accept terms that were totally unsatisfactory to its perceived interests in the Pacific.

Australia did make gains with the U.S. throughout the war but they never really amounted to very much unless the Australian and the U.S. goals were identical. The Labor government, looking to a postwar security plan, promoted the Australian-New Zealand Agreement of January 1944 to show the world that Australia was an independent nation with regional aspirations that should be integrated into a general framework for peace.

Australia had done its utmost to influence the Japanese surrender agreement because Japan was considered the threat of the future. With the U.S. unilaterally directing the occupation, Australia was again relegated to the role of making the best of the situation and being critical of U.S. policies when necessary. Because Australia could not secure any postwar security guarantees, the Labor government sought help where it could find it.

It continued to push for a Pacific Pact and meanwhile make the ANZAM agreement with New Zealand and Malaya. This quickly lost its significance for Australian security when Great Britain was preoccupied with its postwar economic problems, weakened influence over the Suez Canal, and evacuation of the sub-continent.⁵⁵ Gradually the fear of Japan was replaced by the threat of Communism.

In 1949 the Free World faced startling accessions of Communist parties. East Europe fell to Communist governments, a Nationalist-Communist movement was waging war against France in Vietnam, the Communists assumed power in mainland China, and Malaya shared a Communist insurrection. It was against this threat of Communism that prompt action was required because it would be years before Japan could rearm.⁵⁶

The Labor party was confronted by a dilemma in the 1949 national elections: they sympathized with the revolutionary socialist movements of Asia but it was these movements that appeared to threaten the security of the area. The Liberal-Country coalition party came to power in December 1949 on a platform that included anti-Communism. The new Liberal-Country government, like its predecessor, sought a regional security arrangement but, in the absence of one, began to take action to defend Australia. In 1950 Australia began compulsory military service. The new military members received training in either the Navy or the Army and then became a part of the Citizens Force or reserves for four years. To avoid a volatile political issue, however, conscripts were not to serve outside Australian borders.⁵⁷

Australia had long sought a Pacific Pact with a major power to provide its security. The British Dominion connection had always been a sort of all-purpose alliance. The U.S. viewed its alliance structure as being erected against the threat of Communist expansion and its aim would be to confine that threat.⁵⁸ While ANZUS made the Japanese peace settlement a little more palatable because it would protect Australia and New Zealand from a resurgence of Japanese expansionism, it also was congruous with the Dulles containment philosophy. In 1950, Australia and New Zealand had followed the United States' lead and not recognized the People's Republic of China, a deviation from British policy. This was a dramatic step, aligning Dominion policy with the U.S. rather than with Britain.⁵⁹

On April 23, 1951, John Foster Dulles told the U.N. Association of Japan that the U.S. "does not intend to abandon Asia and is taking positive steps to build a multipower security arrangement."⁶⁰ Mr. H.P. Breen,

one-time Permanent Head of Department of Defense Production, in arguing for a developed defense policy, said that Australians "feel that since they are of the West, they will be saved by that association, in any circumstance."⁶¹ It was argued that ANZUS might not be necessary because the U.S. would always help Australia if help were needed.⁶²

The Liberal-Country government differed from the Labor government in that the former saw the menace of East Asia as Communist China, not Japan. It was also more attuned to the U.S. desire to allow Japan to regain its industrial power. It, like Labor, feared a resurgent Japan.⁶³ The ANZUS Treaty facilitated Australia's acceptance of the Japanese peace settlement which displeased Australian politicians and diplomats. The ANZUS Treaty was created to "strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area."

The first comprehensive foreign policy statement of the Liberal-Country government was made by Mr. Percy Spender, Minister for External Affairs, to the Australian House of Representatives. He stated:

"I have emphasized how essential it is for Australia to maintain the closest links with the United States of America for vital security reasons. But, our relations with the United States go further than that. We have a common heritage and tradition and way of life. During the war we built up a firm comradeship with our American friends. This friendship must, however, never be taken for granted. We propose actively to maintain the official and personal contacts and interchanges which resulted from the urgent needs of a common military effort.

"Indeed, so far as possible, it is our objective to build up with the United States somewhat the same relationship as exists with the British Commonwealth...That is to say, we desire a full exchange of information and experience on all important matters, conceive our interests to diverge from those of the United States and consultation on questions of mutual interest."⁶⁴

FCOTNOTES
SECTION II

¹For a discussion of early Australian defense concerns see Henry S. Albinsky, "Early Security Problems in Asia and the Pacific," in Australia's Search for Regional Security in South-East Asia (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1958), pp. 1-46.

²John Mc Carthy, "Singapore and Australian Defence 1921-1942," in Australian Outlook vol. 25 no. 2 (August 1971): 167. For a discussion of the 1901-World War II relationship between Australia and Great Britain see also Thomas B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1978) pp. 69-89.

³Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), vol. 151, 69. (hereafter referred to as CPD).

⁴CPD, vol. 151, p. 710.

⁵In December 1971, Australia changed its currency from the British pound sterling to the Australian dollar indicating the shift in economic ties from Great Britain to the United States.

⁶John J. Dedman, "Defence Policy Decisions before Pearl Harbour," in The Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 13 no. 3 (December 1967): 331.

⁷Throughout the period 1921-1941, several military and government officials had serious reservations about the viability of the Singapore strategy. As early as 1921, Rear Admiral Grant, the Chief of Naval Staff, had argued that Singapore was not the ideal place from which to defend Australia by the use of sea power.

⁸John McCarthy, "Singapore and Australia Defence," 175.

⁹For a discussion on how the Singapore strategy worked and the pros and cons of the strategic credibility, see John McCarthy, "Australia and Imperial Defense: Co-operation and Conflict 1921-1939," The Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 57 no. 1 (April 1971): 19-32.

¹⁰Samuel Eliot Morison, History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. III: The Rising Sun in the Pacific (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), p. 49.

¹¹Lewis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962), p. 158.

¹²Ibid., p. 159.

¹³Sir Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 39. (Hereafter referred to as Evolution).

¹⁴Maurice Matloff and Edwin Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942 (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), p. 123.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Great Britain's contribution to the Singapore strategy in December 1941 consisted of two battle cruisers, REPULSE and PRINCE OF WALES, sunk by the Japanese in the Gulf of Thailand within 48 hours of Pearl Harbor.

¹⁷Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1941-1945 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1970), p. 23.

¹⁸The Melbourne Herald, December 27, 1941 cited in Normal Harper, Australia and the United States (Adelaide: Griffen Press, 1971), p. 137.

¹⁹Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 126.

²⁰Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. IV: The Hinge of Fate (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1950), p. 57.

²¹Watt, Evolution, p. 56.

²²George F. Eliot, "Australia, Keystone of Far East Strategy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 20 no. 3 (April 1942): 403.

²³Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 126.

²⁴Hartley C. Grattan, The United States and the Southwest Pacific (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 165.

²⁵Ibid. p. 183.

²⁶Alfred Chandler, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower Volume I: The War Years (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950) p. 179.

²⁷Ibid. p. 232.

²⁸Watt, Evolution, pp. 65-66. A secret message from General Eisenhower to General Marshall while he was visiting Great Britain to discuss with Churchill the plans for the cross-Channel attack, read in part, "With respect to the Australian proposals on control in the Pacific the following must be said: The Australian government representatives must unquestionably have a definite voice in the higher direction of operations in that area. This is also true of the representatives of New Zealand, the Netherlands, Free France, and China...since it is impossible to conduct military operations through such a large group, the executive power for the conduct of operations should rest with the

United States Chiefs of Staff, under the President as Commander in Chief. Proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff, made to the President as Commander in Chief, are subject to review by him from the standpoint of high political considerations and to reference by him to the Pacific War Council whenever necessary." Chandler, Eisenhower Papers, pp. 232-233.

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³⁴U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Naval Affairs, Study of Pacific Bases. A Report by the Subcommittee on Pacific Bases. 79th Cong. 1st Sess., 1945, p. 1009.

³⁵Ibid, p. 1011.

³⁶Ibid, p. 1916.

³⁷Ibid, p. 1036.

³⁸John J. Dedman, "Encounter over Manus," Australian Outlook, vol. 20 no. 2, (August 1966): 144.

³⁹Ibid, p. 145. See also Roger J. Bell, Unequal Allies, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1977, p. 159-172.

⁴⁰New York Times, November 17, 1945, p. 3.

⁴¹Richard N. Rosecrance, Australian Diplomacy and Japan 1945-1951, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1962, p. 61.

⁴²Dedman, "Encounter over Manus," p. 147.

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⁴⁴Maurice Matloff and Edwin H. Snell. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944 (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953) p. 523.

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61H.P. Breen, "Make Our Defense the Keystone of all Policy," Australian Quarterly vol. 31 no. 4 (December 1959): 23.

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III. THE FORWARD DEFENSE STRATEGY

A. MILITARY ALLIANCES

Beginning with World War II, Australia began to involve itself more in Asian affairs, particularly in Southeast Asia. At the first postwar meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Australia obtained the co-operation of Great Britain and New Zealand to promote a regional security pact for the Pacific area.¹ Early in 1947, Dr. Evatt delivered a postwar statement of Australian foreign policy and listed as the fourth objective "the development of a system of regional security in co-operation with the United States and other nations."² The establishment of NATO increased Australian desire for a regional pact encompassing the Southeast Asian and Pacific areas.

ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand and Malaya) was the first postwar security arrangement to protect a strategic area. The Malayan area contained the South-East Asian approaches to Australia and New Zealand and, after the war, the two dominions knew they could not leave its defense in the sole hands of Britain.

The ANZAM arrangement was not a treaty and had no treaty commitments. Sir Alan Watt stated that ANZAM was "At one stage...a more-or-less classified word never mentioned in public by officials."³ It was, however, an arrangement between Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand that aimed at the insurance of British Commonwealth security in South-East Asia.⁴ In 1956 the Royal Institute of International Affairs stated that the three nations

"...agreed to co-ordinate defence planning in an area known as the ANZAM region, which includes the Australian and New Zealand homelands

and the British territories in Malaya and Borneo, together with the adjacent sea areas. ANZAM planning was at first limited to the defence of sea and air communications in the region, while co-ordination was conducted at Service level and did not involve firm commitments by the Governments concerned."⁵

Even though ANZAM served regional security interests, Australia wanted more - the inclusion of the United States in a security arrangement.

The United States was reluctant to enter into a Pacific regional commitment until that reluctance was modified by the Communist revolution in China and the Communist threats to the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia. In April 1951, President Truman announced that the United States was willing to negotiate a security arrangement with Australia and New Zealand pursuant to Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter.⁶ The outcome of these negotiations was the security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. commonly called ANZUS.

Australia had hoped for a security arrangement along the same lines as NATO, but there is a fundamental difference between NATO and ANZUS.

Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty reads:

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attached by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such actions as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area..."⁷

This article caused problems for the U.S. administration during the Senate ratification process. As a result of the NATO ratification problem, the ANZUS Treaty was reworded to read:

"Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."⁸

It is important to note that the ANZUS Treaty is military in nature and Great Britain was not included. Had Great Britain been included in a Pacific Pact, France and the Netherlands would also have had to be included.⁹ Since Australia and New Zealand desired a more inclusive security structure in the Pacific, they stated in the preamble to ANZUS that they were "to coordinate their efforts for collective defenses for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area."¹⁰

The "more comprehensive system of regional security" seemed to be out of reach in the early 1950's. Australian Foreign Minister Casey, in September 1953, stated that:

"We do not know how much a wider system of security will come into being. For the present, the essential political conditions for such a system do not appear to exist. I do not find that there is as yet the community of interest and readiness to assume in advance far-reaching and precise military obligations on which a treaty of alliance like NATO is based."¹¹

In early 1954, the situation in the Far East had changed substantially.¹² The imminent Communist victory in Indochina generated a joint communique issued on April 14 by the U.K. and U.S. governments, stating that they were:

"ready to take part with the other countries principally concerned in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense within the Charter of the United Nations Organization to assure the peace, security, and freedom of South-East Asia and the Western Pacific."¹³

Based on statements by Secretary of State Dulles, Australia felt that the United States was looking for a threat of armed intervention against the Communists to stop the Communist advance in Indochina. This posed a dilemma for Australia. On the one hand, were Australia to take part in an armed intervention in Vietnam, it would lose much of the Asian goodwill built up since World War II.

Foreign Minister Casey felt that Vietnam had deteriorated to the point that outside intervention could not help the French. Mr. Casey's general view of the Southeast Asia crisis was expressed as follows:

"Talk of intervention - particularly in the air - in order to save the situation, was being widely canvassed at that time. Our Australian view was that such intervention would be wrong for the following reasons: it would not have the backing of the United Nations; it would put us in the wrong with world opinion, particularly in Asia; it would probably embroil us with Communist China; it would wreck the Geneva Conference; and it was most unlikely to stop the fall of Dien Bien Phu. These were the views that I expressed on behalf of the Australian Government to Mr. Dulles, Mr. Eden and other leaders at Geneva."¹⁴

Before Australia could make a decision on policy for Indochina, Dien Bien Phu fell to the Vietminh. The issue now became one of achieving the best possible negotiated settlement in Indochina, carrying international guaranties. One guaranty was the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty Organization which became known as SEATO.

SEATO probably was not all that each of the participants wanted in a defense treaty but it was the best that could be negotiated. Professor T.B. Millar, one time director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, stated that the Australian reason for adhering to the treaty was that "SEATO replaced the French colonial power in containing the aggressive policies of international communism in Southeast Asia."¹⁵

The Australians saw SEATO as a complement to ANZUS. The Minister of Defence, Sir Philip McBride, stated after the Geneva settlement for Indochina, that Australia now needed a defense strategy against an enemy "whose nearest springboard was South China but has now become North Vietnam." Australia must now be prepared "to hold the Communists at the farthest point advantageous to us, and we must consolidate our strength as quickly as possible."¹⁶ Again, Professor Millar stated:

"SEATO thus committed the United States (so far as constitutional processes' would allow) to the defence of mainland South-East Asia. For Australia, it meant an assurance that the United States would hold the outer ring of defence, and not merely come to Australia's help if she were attacked. It interposed American force between the Communist Tide and Malaya...Singapore...and Indonesia...It remedied the defect of ANZUS by bringing Britain and the United States into joint planning."¹⁷

In 1950 Percy Spender, Minister for External Affairs, stated what would become the "domino theory" when he said, "Should the forces of Communism prevail and Vietnam come under the heel of Communist China, Malaya is in danger of being outflanked and it, together with Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia, will become the next direct object of further Communist activities."¹⁸

In order to protect itself from this threat of the "near north", Australia sought to establish defensive alliances that included Great Britain and the United States. Through the ANZAM agreement, ANZUS, and SEATO, Australia developed military alliances that would counter the threat of aggressive Communism.

B. FORWARD DEFENSE ACTIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Action in support of a forward defense strategy started as early as 1950. Percy Spender, the Minister for External Affairs, said in April 1950 that Malaya was "of vital concern to the security of Australia."¹⁹ Because of Australia's concern for Malaya (at this time a British possession), a bomber squadron to be used in antibandit operations and a transport squadron were sent to Singapore.²⁰

In 1955, Australia was under increasing pressure from Great Britain to contribute more to its counterinsurgency operation in Malaya. On April 1, 1955, Prime Minister Menzies announced that Australian troops would be sent to Malaya to be included in the Commonwealth Strategic Reserves and for possible use under SEATO.²¹

The forces deployed to Malaya were from all the services. The naval forces included two destroyers or two fast frigates, an aircraft carrier on an annual visit, and additional ships in an emergency. The Army supplied an infantry battalion, with reinforcements in Australia. The Air Force provided a bomber wing of one squadron, an airfield construction squadron, and two fighter squadrons earmarked for deployment after 1956.²²

This deployment was a major departure from previous Australian policy in that it marked the first time that ground troops had been deployed in peacetime. Prime Minister Menzies defended the necessity as follows:

"There was a time when we permitted ourselves to think that we were remote from the dangers of the world, and that any great war would be thousands of miles away from us. But that day has gone...I call upon all Australians to realise the basic truth...that if there is to be war for our existence, it should be carried on by us as far from our soil as possible."

He went on to say that it would be unbelievable for any responsible Australian to think that

"we could be effectively defended either by our own efforts within our own borders or by resolutions of the United Nations rendered impotent by the Communist veto. The simple English of this matter is that with our vast territory and our small population we cannot survive a surging Communist challenge from abroad except by the co-operation of powerful friends, including in particular the United Kingdom and the United States...we cannot accept the collaboration of our friends and allies in a comprehensive defence against aggressive Communism unless we as a nation are prepared to take our share of the responsibilities."²³

Australia's war time experience had shown that in order to have a larger voice in security planning it would have to shed its former role of follower and supporter. Prime Minister Menzies was now taking the initiative of making Australia a full-time player in the area security calculus.

The Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia quoted the Government's Defence Policy announcement of June 4, 1947 as:

"Our Forces [are] to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, including regional agreements in the Pacific;

The Forces [are] to be maintained under arrangements for co-operation in British Commonwealth Defence, and

The Forces are to be maintained to provide for the inherent right of individual self-defense."²⁴

In 1956, when Australia took an active role in regional defense, the official governmental policy was that defense would be transformed "from preparedness by a critical date, to the capacity to maintain it at a level that can reasonably be sustained for a long haul."²⁵ The bottom line of the defense structure in 1955 was still that Australian forces would continue to act in concert with her "powerful friends." The defense policy also called for Australia "to be committed as a member of the British Commonwealth, and in accordance with the provisions of the ANZUS Treaty, the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, and the charter of the United Nations, to co-operate in collective security."²⁶

These deployments left Australia short of manpower on the continent. Professor Millar said that the force deployed to Malaya "was as big a force as Australia could have sent anywhere, and maintained, in 1955. If, therefore, she wished to satisfy (or appease?) both her 'powerful friends' with more than a token of force, this was probably the best way to do so."²⁷

In 1955, when Australia sent additional troops to Malaya, the area was still under British rule. In 1957 Malaya achieved independence and signed an agreement on external defense and mutual assistance with the U. K. This defense agreement afforded Great Britain the "right to maintain in the Federation such naval, land and air forces including a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve."²⁸

Since Australia was not a signatory to the Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement, there was some ambiguity as to whether her forces in Malaya were a part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. Australia became associated with the treaty provisions relating to reserve through an exchange of letters in March and April 1959.²⁹

In 1963, Britain attempted to decolonize the Malayan area in an orderly manner by establishing the Federation of Malaysia. The Federation included Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo (Sabah), and Sarawak. Indonesia and the Philippines protested the Federation as being neo-imperialistic but the Federation came into existence on 16 September 1963 after a United Nation's commission found in favor of the incorporation.³⁰ To express its displeasure, Indonesia began a period of "Confrontation" against the Federation.

When Malaysia was formed the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement was extended to include all of the Federated territories. Australia, as in 1959, exchanged letters with the new Malaysian government to provide the legal basis for continuing the deployment of Australian forces as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. Professor Millar pointed out that Australia did not associate herself with the treaty to defend Malaysia. Australia only "associated herself by exchange of letters with that part of the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement which afforded Britain the right to maintain in the federation a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve with an unspecified role."³¹

Australia was not a party to the Malaysian confrontation and therefore tried to keep its troops out of the conflict. Australia sought to resolve the problem through negotiation to preserve good relations with Indonesia. As the situation deteriorated and Indonesia stepped up

guerrilla attacks against Borneo, Great Britain declared that it would defend the independence of Malaysia.

This declaration placed Australia in a position it had tried to avoid through a negotiated settlement. It now had to choose whether or not to provide military assistance. On 25 September 1963, Prime Minister Menzies gave Australia's unqualified pledge of military assistance:

"...if, in the circumstances that now exist, and which may continue for a long time, there occurs, in relation to Malaysia or any of its constituent States, armed invasion or subversive activity - supported or directed or inspired from outside Malaysia - we shall to the best of our powers and by such means as shall be agreed upon with the Government of Malaysia, add our military assistance to the efforts of Malaysia and the United Kingdom in the defence of Malaysia's territorial integrity and political independence."³²

After this statement Australia sent additional ships and a squadron of army engineers. Until October 29, Australian troops were operating near the Thai border against Communist insurgents. Australian troops were used for the first time against Indonesian raiders on 29 October. Australia finally committed infantrymen and paratroopers to the Borneo states on 3 February 1965.³³

In 1965 Indonesia experienced internal political problems and confrontation eased until it ended in 1966. Meanwhile, Great Britain was considering a reduction of its military commitments in Asia because the cost was becoming prohibitive.

In July 1967, Great Britain announced a timetable of withdrawal from bases in both Malaysia and Singapore. In a White Report the government noted "We intend to withdraw altogether from our bases in Singapore and Malaysia in the middle 1970's."³⁴ In March 1970, in the debate on the annual Defense White Paper in the House of Commons, Mr. Denis Healy clearly stated Britain's reasons for withdrawal:

"...operations even against external subversion and infiltration are very expensive in troops and very difficult to control...We have a commitment now in the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement...the Agreement in its present form involves an automatic commitment. It gives to the other signatory of the Agreement a blank cheque to call on British troops. It is a commitment which applies to Britain alone. It does not apply to the Australian and New Zealand Governments, and there is no chance that they would accept a commitment of this type. Therefore this commitment would provide no basis for the presence of their forces once we have gone. This is why the Government is seeking release from the commitment...and we are seeking a new form of political framework."³⁵

In January 1968, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, George Thomson, visited Australia to tell the Australian government that the British withdrawal from Southeast Asia would be accelerated. The Australian government expressed its obvious concern that security questions are global questions and British withdrawal could damage the security system of Southeast Asia.³⁶

The basic problem with the British withdrawal was not solely military. The British presence had acted as a unifier for the area to Australia's north and a withdrawal presented the possibility of regional fragmentation. Australia saw the need for a military credibility in the area and it had historically not had a military credibility. Peter Robinson stated at a seminar on British withdrawal that Australian "Defence policy, at least until very recently, had been based entirely on the concept of Australian forces as adjuncts to much bigger forces provided by powerful allies."³⁷

In 1968 the Australian government was being criticized for not presenting Australia's role in the region after British withdrawal. The public favored a continued presence in the region and, in November 1968, the government announced that Australian forces would remain there through 1972.³⁸

On 25 February 1969, Prime Minister Gorton announced that Australia would maintain its military forces in the area to help provide stability. He stated that

"...Our own starting point was and is that we are a part of and are situated in the region. Hence security, stability and progress for other nations in the region must also contribute to the security of Australia. We cannot fail to be affected by what happens in our neighbors countries. What affects their security affects our security... We could not turn our backs on our neighbors, refuse to help provide forces for their security, and wash our hands of possible consequences to them and to ourselves."³⁹

This announcement was a major departure from previous policies in that it marked the first time that Australian forces had been deployed outside Australia without accompanying British or American troops.

On October 31, 1971, the Anglo-Malaya Defense Agreement lapsed. It was replaced on November 1st by the newly negotiated Five Power Defense Arrangements. This new arrangement included Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore. The Five Power Defense arrangement was not a treaty but an agreement that:

"in the event of any form of armed attack externally organized or supported or the threat of such attack against Malaysia or Singapore, their Governments would immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in relation to such attack or threat."⁴⁰

C. FORWARD DEFENSE ACTIONS IN INDOCHINA

Australia's involvement in Vietnam began in May 1962 when it announced it would send 30 military advisors to Vietnam. This began "the most controversial aspect of her foreign policy in the post-1945 period, if not in her history."⁴¹ Many Australians have justified their military involvement in terms of its obligations under SEATO.⁴²

During March 1962 Vietnam twice approached Australia concerning military assistance. The first was the Republic of Vietnam's Assistant

Defense Minister asking the Australian Ambassador in Saigon if Australian instructors in Malaya could instruct Vietnamese (training would be in Malaya). The second was a letter from President Diem to Prime Minister Menzies stating the Republic of Vietnam's case against Communism and how his government needed assistance from the Free World.⁴³ In neither case, however, was military assistance directly requested.

At the ANZUS council meeting on 9 May 1962 Prime Minister Menzies told Admiral H.D. Felt, CINCPAC, "that Australia was willing to supply instructors...provided that a request was received from the Republic of Vietnam."⁴⁴ On 24 May 1962 Australia announced that military instructors were being provided "at the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam."⁴⁵

On 2 April 1963, the United States sent a request for a Dakota squadron and 16 pilots. The formal refusal to honor the request was given as the replacement of the Dakota's with the Caribou. The probable real reason was that it would have necessitated a change from a non-combatant to a combatant role and the government was not prepared to explain this to the Australian public.⁴⁶

At the 1964 Council meeting, the SEATO members decided that they should be prepared to support the Republic of Vietnam if it became necessary. On 6 May 1964 the American Embassy in Canberra notified the Department of External Affairs that President Johnson thought more free world countries should "show their flags" in South Vietnam. A few days later the United States Embassy in Canberra delivered a more detailed list of items specifically requested from Australia."⁴⁷

The American request was favorably considered because it was felt that "South Vietnam was a key strategic area and that if it fell the

West would be unlikely to hold Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, this would in turn make the future of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines very uncertain...it would (also) influence the obligation which the United States might feel to Australia in an emergency."⁴⁸

In January 1965 Australian military authorities concluded that the prospects of a victory in Vietnam had become remote "without strong and stable leadership or without the introduction of a new factor such as counter action by the United States or other nations."⁴⁹ As a result of this feeling, instructions were sent to Washington that Australia "would give full public and diplomatic support if the United States were to initiate air strikes against North Vietnam's infiltration system."⁵⁰ The Australian Minister for Defense, while visiting Washington in February, asked McGeorge Bundy the possibility of a SEATO operation in Vietnam. Bundy pointed out that for "SEATO to operate, South Vietnam would have to appeal for help and he doubted that this was wise for fear of refusal by some members."⁵¹

In the House of Representatives on 29 April 1965, Prime Minister Menzies announced that Australia would contribute an infantry battalion to Vietnam. In making this commitment Sir Robert Menzies stated that:

"We have decided - and this has been after close consultation with the Government of the United States - to provide an infantry battalion for service in South Vietnam. In case there is any misunderstanding, I think I should say that we decided in principle sometime ago - weeks and weeks ago - that we would be willing to do this if we received the necessary collaboration with the United States."⁵²

The decision by the government was condemned by the leader of the opposition, Mr. Arthur Calwell, when he stated that "by sending one quarter of our pitifully small effective military strength to distant Vietnam, this Government dangerously denudes Australia and its immediate strategic environs of effective defence power."⁵³

Since the Prime Minister stated that Australian troops would be sent "if we received the necessary request from the Government of South Vietnam", the request requires consideration. On 9 April 1965, the Australian government acceded to an informal request from the United States for an infantry battalion. On 13 April the Australian Ambassador in Washington made the offer to the Secretary of State.⁵⁴

The Australian Ambassador in Saigon wanted to make the offer of troops to Dr. Quat, the Premier of the Republic of Vietnam, with General Taylor, the American Ambassador in Saigon. On 24 April the offer was presented to Dr. Quat by General Taylor. The Australian Ambassador did not see Dr. Quat until 28 April. On 29 April the Australian Ambassador reported that Dr. Quat had agreed verbally to the Australian offer.⁵⁵

Also on 29 April, a letter was dispatched confirming Australia's offer and Vietnam's acceptance. It was on the basis of this dispatch that Prime Minister Menzies made his announcement. Evidence supports the notion that the Vietnamese request honored by Australia was actually arranged by the United States and Australia.

As the war in Vietnam became larger, Australia increased troop levels in August 1965, March 1966, December 1966, and October 1967. These increases were logical extensions of the 29 April 1965 decision which was made as a projection of the forward defense policy. This policy was based on the necessity of committing the power of the United States to the Asian area. Since Australia considered the Asian area as a "key strategic area" for its security, it had to depend on the United States for any success against the spread of Communism in this politically unstable area. Australia was therefore prepared "to ensure that the United States did not waver in its commitment to South East Asia and to support the American

presence politically, diplomatically and if necessary militarily."⁵⁶

D. THE FORWARD DEFENSE DEBATE

There are several points of view on the issue of forward defense. Probably the most important, since it is the one normally used in justifying the forward defense, is the alliance-based argument. Australia has always portrayed itself as a small-to-middle power in an unstable area and therefore needed to associate itself with "great and powerful friends." An alliance would require an Australian contribution to allied security efforts in order to keep its "great friends" committed to the area. Without "great friend" help, no Australian effort would be sufficient to meet a threat. This argument obviously presupposes a perceived threat, for without a threat there is no need for an alliance.

Bruce Grant, foreign affairs editor of The Age, advanced the view that "The value of ANZUS is in many ways dependent on American forces themselves being interposed between Australia and the aggressor, so that the American forces themselves receive the first thrust of the attack."⁵⁷ This is a way of saying that Australia, by keeping the United States involved in the area, assured itself not only that any threat would be met but also that it best assured its own ultimate defense.

The strategy has often been criticized because the "great friend" is more apt to become involved in an action that Australia would prefer to avoid but is coerced into supporting in order to "pay its dues" for the alliance. It is also argued that the alliance would necessarily involve them "in a number of dangers, e.g. being a nuclear hostage or being attacked in a course of a general war in which we have taken sides."⁵⁸

A second argument for forward defense would be the threat-based argument. Australia has historically worried over real or perceived

threats because they were a white, Western culture in an Asian area. Indeed, this was the main reason for ANZUS, ANZAM, and SEATO. External Affairs Minister R.G. Casey, after a trip through Southeast Asia in 1951, spoke of what was to become known as the "domino theory":

"The third main conclusion which I reached is that of the great importance of Indo-China and Burma to the security of Malaya - indeed of South East Asia as a whole. I believe that the realisation of this particular point was probably the most important single result of my trip. If Indo-China and Burma were lost to the Communists - indeed, if either of them were lost -- Thailand would be immediately out-flanked, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, for Thailand successfully to resist heavy Communist pressure unless very substantial help were afforded her from without...It seems to me only logical that Australia must pay greater attention to developments in areas to the north of Malaya on which the security of Malaya may well substantially depend."⁵⁹

Fear of what Communist expansion might do to Australian security prompted successive governments to support the opposition to this movement in Malaysia and Vietnam.

In the late 1960's the strategic environment began to change and this brought more criticism of the forward-defense strategy. Advocates of armed neutrality, like Dr. Max Teichman, argued that;

"There are no substantial military threats to Australia now, nor will there be for many years to come. Insistence that we are threatened is rooted in our cultural history, i.e. is part of the Australian way of life, rather than a conclusion drawn from an examination of the capacities, intentions and foreign policy priorities of our neighbors."⁶⁰

By 1969, Great Britain had announced its withdrawal from East of Suez, the Malayan-Indonesian confrontation had ended, and the United States had announced the Guam Doctrine. Fighting was still going on in Vietnam, but it was doubted that Vietnam would have a major effect on Malaysia and Indonesia. In February 1969, Mr. Gough Whitlam said that

"in practical terms 'forward defense' was merely a euphemism for a policy aimed at keeping powerful allies, namely the United States and Britain, militarily involved on the mainland of Asia. The reality of the decade about to begin is that these powers, for a whole variety of reasons--economic, political and military--are no longer willing

to accept that involvement. Therefore, the whole premise on which the forward defence fraud was based has crashed."⁶¹

By 1970, Australia's attention was drawn to its immediate area of strategic interest - the near north and the surrounding Indian and Pacific waters. It saw the United States calling "on the countries of the region to do more themselves to provide for their own security," and the Soviet Union giving "notice of its expanding maritime power and its interest in exerting influence upon many countries surrounding the Indian Ocean."⁶² Australia saw Japan, as the third industrial nation in the world, also playing a major role within the region.

Australian defense was no longer underwritten by Great Britain or the United States. Australia now needed to help insure her security through regional co-operation. The posture of regional military co-operation was set forth by Defense Minister Malcolm Fraser:

"Australia's defence planning and preparations flow from a decision for continuing close involvement in South East Asian affairs notwithstanding the changing strategic circumstances and future uncertainties. They rest on the premise that as events unfold in the region to which our security is permanently linked, we must ourselves be able to influence the course they are taking more independently, less as a supporter of the commitments of major powers and more as a partner with other regional countries."⁶³

As the 1970's began, Australia's "great and powerful friends" had signalled an end to the "containment" period and Australia was faced with the necessity of reappraising its defence position and national interests.

FOOTNOTES
SECTION III

¹CPD (H of R), vol. 202, p. 293.

²CPD (H of R), vol. 191, p. 1170 see also vol. 186, pp. 187-206.

³Alan Watt, Evolution, p. 164.

⁴In October 1957 after Malaya had become independent, Great Britain approved the Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement. Since there was some question about Australian forces in the Commonwealth Strategic Reserves in Malaya, Australia and Malaya exchanged letters in 1959 associating Australia with the Strategic Reserve mentioned in the treaty provisions. See T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1978), p. 242. (Hereafter cited as Peace and War).

⁵Royal Institute of International Affairs, Collective Defence in South-East Asia, (London, 1956), p. 20, cited in Watt, Evolution, p. 164.

⁶New York Times, 19 April 1951, p. 5.

⁷Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. XI, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 613.

⁸Ibid., vol. XIII, p. 263.

⁹For a discussion of the exclusion of Great Britain and other nations in ANZUS as charter members [or as an expansion of participation], see J.G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965), pp. 41-43 and pp. 206-207. See also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 10-17, 1953, p. 12677.

¹⁰Dennett and Turner, Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. XIII, p. 264.

¹¹Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. XXIV (Nov. 1953), p. 656. (Hereafter referred to as Current Notes).

¹²In March 1954, General Paul Ely, then French chief of staff and later commander in Indochina told the U.S. that intervention would avert Communist victory in Indochina. A few days later Mr. Dulles called for "united action" to deal with the crisis. See N.S. Palmer, "Organising for Peace in Asia," Western Political Quarterly, vol. VIII (1955): 22.

¹³New York Times, April 14, 1954, p. 6.

¹⁴Current Notes, vol. XXV (Aug 1954): 576.

¹⁵T.B. Millar, "Australian Defence, 1945-1965," Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper (eds), Australia in World Affairs 1961-1965, (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1968), p. 269. (Hereafter cited as "Australian Defence 1945-1965.")

¹⁶CPD, vol. (H of R), p. 1630 (28 Sep 1954).

¹⁷T.B. Millar, "Australian Defence 1945-1965," p. 270.

¹⁸Sir Percy Spender statement of 9 March 1950 cited in Millar, Peace and War, p. 239.

¹⁹Statement by Percy Spender, 20 April 1950, cited in *ibid*, p. 238.

²⁰Extracts from speech in Parliament by the Minister for Defence, 29th September 1955, p. 3.

²¹T.B. Millar, "Australian Defence, 1945-1965," p. 272.

²²Extracts from speech in Parliament by the Minister for Defence, 29th September 1955, p. 3.

²³Current Notes, vol. XXVI (1955), pp. 278-279 cited in Watt, Evolution, p. 168.

²⁴Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, no. 37 1946-1947, (Canberra: L.F. Johnston, Commonwealth Government Printer), p. 1143. (Hereafter cited as Official Yearbook).

²⁵Official Yearbook no. 41 (1955), p. 986.

²⁶*Ibid*.

²⁷T.B. Millar, "Australian Defence 1945-1965," p. 272.

²⁸Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement Art III.

²⁹T.B. Millar, Peace and War, p. 242.

³⁰The United Nations Commission published its findings on 14 September 1963. U. Thant stated that "It is my conclusion that the majority of the peoples of the two territories...wish to engage, with the peoples of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, in an enlarged Federation of Malaysia through which they can strive together to realize the fulfillment of their destiny." Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. XIV, 1963-1964, p. 19719 cited in Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper (eds), Australia in World Affairs 1961-1965, (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1968), p. 99.

³¹T.B. Millar, Peace and War, p. 231.

³²CPD (H of R) vol. 40, p. 1339 cited in Greenwood and Harper, Australia in World Affairs 1961-1965, p. 100.

³³T.B. Millar, Australia's Defence, p. 62.

³⁴T.B. Millar (ed.), Britains Withdrawal from Asia: Its Implications for Australia, (Canberra: Strategic Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 1967), p. 8.

³⁵H.G. Gelber (ed), Problems of Australian Defence, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 72-73.

³⁶Current Notes, vol. 39 no. 1, January, 1968, pp. 29-30.

³⁷T.B. Millar, Britain's Withdrawal from Asia, p. 90. Mr. Robinson at the time of the seminar was the Associate Editor of The Australian Financial Review.

³⁸Greenwood and Harper, Australia in World Affairs 1966-1970, p. 245.

³⁹Statement to the House of Representatives on defense by Prime Minister, John Gorton, CPD, vol. H of R 62, p. 34 cited in Gordon Greenwood, Approaches to Asia: Australia Post-war Policies and Attitudes, (Sydney: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974), p. 531.

⁴⁰Current Notes, vol. 42, no. 4, April 1971 pp. 184-185.

⁴¹Greenwood and Harper, Australia in World Affairs 1966-1970, p. 288.

⁴²It should be noted that the SEATO Treaty states that "Each Party recognises that aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty Area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety" (Article IV). In March 1962, the Secretary of State issued the Rusk-Thant Communique which stated that "this obligation of the United States does not depend upon the prior agreement of all other parties to the treaty, since this treaty obligation is individual as well as collective." The Australian response by Sir Garfield Barwick, Minister of External Affairs, was that Australia "welcomes the declarations contained in the joint United States-Thai statement." He went on to say that "It is therefore plain, as the Secretary of State said, that the treaty obligation is individual as well as collective." U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. 91st Congress, 1st Sess., 1970, pp. 676 and 691.

⁴³"Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam" - Paper tabled in the Australian House of Representatives, 13 May 1975, p. 6.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵T.B. Millar, "Australian Defence, 1945-1965" p. 285. Unless the approaches of the Republic of Vietnam in March are considered a sufficient invitation of Vietnam, Australia's entry into the conflict is a matter of interpretation.

⁴⁶"Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam," p. 8.

⁴⁷Ibid. p. 9.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid. p. 13.

⁵⁰Ibid. p. 14.

⁵¹Ibid. p. 15.

⁵²Current Notes, vol. 36 no. 4, April 1965, pp. 178.

⁵³CPD, H of R vol. 46, p. 1102. Australia had also deployed forces to Malaysia during this period.

⁵⁴When this offer was made the Ambassador pointed out that "this would disperse Australian forces further and would limit the Government's military capacity elsewhere in South East Asia and New Guinea." ("Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam," p. 16.).

⁵⁵For a more detailed account of the events between 9 April and 29 April leading to the announcement of an Australian infantry battalion being committed to South Vietnam, see "Australia Military Commitment to Vietnam", pp. 17-19.

⁵⁶Ibid. p. 13.

⁵⁷Bruce Grant, "Australia's Defence Policy," Quadrant (January-February, 1969): 38.

⁵⁸Max Teichmann (ed.), New Directions in Australian Foreign Policy: Ally, Satellite or Neutral, (Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc, 1969, p. 159.

⁵⁹Current Notes, vol. XXII (1951), p. 514.

⁶⁰Max Teichman, New Directions in Australian Foreign Policy, p. 159.

⁶¹CPD (H of R) Feb. 27, 1969, p. 269.

⁶²Department of Defence, Defence Report 1970, (Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1970), p. 4.

⁶³Ibid.

IV. THE SEARCH FOR A SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE

A. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

The early 1970's introduced a new posture in Australian defense. In order to build a more self-reliant defense force, serious fundamental questions concerning the objectives to guide Australian policies in the strategic field and the structure of the defense forces to realize these objectives had to be determined.

The government began dealing with these questions in 1970 by making policy changes toward achieving a policy "of broad ranging participation and co-operation in regional affairs."¹ The defense forces, therefore, had to be not only organized, trained, and equipped for the defense of the continent but also ready for "effective employment in the region of which Australia is a part."² To facilitate this, some major defense administration changes were made.

The intelligence organization had to provide the best political, strategic, and tactical information available so the intelligence organization was one of the first to be radically changed. In 1970 the Joint Intelligence Organization (JIO) came into existence. It was only an analysis and information agency and did not collect intelligence. It was "to provide expert technical analysis and the best kind of judgment on kinds of security problems that might arise."³

The JIO brought sections of the Service Intelligence Directorates and the former Joint Intelligence Bureau of the Defense Department together with External Affairs participation. Its first director was a senior member of the Department of External Affairs. This ensured

that political aspects were not neglected even though the JIO charter detailed its function of intelligence assessments "on military, economic, scientific, and technical matters affecting Australia's defence."⁴

Superimposed on the JIO was the National Intelligence Committee (NIC), whose membership comprised the three heads of the civil and military elements of the JIO with the chairman being the director of the JIO. These intelligence organizations contributed materially to the decisions about the size and shape of Australia's forces and the weaponry that would be required.


One big reason for restructuring the intelligence organization was a change in the procedure for long range planning. Australian defense planning had been based on Three Year Defense Programs until 1970. Then, the government introduced the Five Year Rolling Program, and Defense Minister Malcolm Fraser pointed out weaknesses in the Three Year Defense Program:

"First, the process was one of stops and starts with the forward look shrinking from three years at the outset to zero at the end of the period. Second, the financial implications of the new proposals were not projected sufficiently far into the future to allow the decision-makers to properly weigh their choices. Third, related components of a proposal were not always brought together into a single coherent submission...Fourth, the proposals, when submitted to Defence, tended to be firmly set and to specify a particular equipment. There was little or no opportunity for Defence to conduct, well in advance, systematic study of the economic and other implications of proposals before a specific solution had been selected."⁵

The Five Year Rolling Program was aimed at identification of the major objectives of the defense forces and assignment of associated costs for these objectives over a period long enough to measure full resource needs. It was, basically, the planning-programming-budgeting systems approach to management. The sequence and relationship of the processes are explained below (see Figure 1).

FIGURE 1

**DIAGRAM SHOWING SEQUENCE AND RELATIONSHIP
OF PROCESSES IN THE FIVE YEAR ROLLING PROGRAMME
(FIRST CYCLE)**



Source: Department of Defence, Defence Report 1970, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1970), p. 8.

Strategic guidance was the starting point, where the JIO and NIC interfaced with the process. Their information provided the basis for the formulation of the force structure.

The projection of existing commitments required the services to project expenditures for the next five years assuming that no new major equipment would be purchased and commitments would not change.

The preparation of major new proposals required the services to project which capabilities would need replacing in the five year period and what new equipment should be purchased.


Analysis of new proposals was done by the Department of Defence. It analyzed both the cost and effectiveness of proposed equipment. The only equipment requiring final decisions were those to be purchased in year one.

Once the Five Year Plan has been formulated, it is viewed against the strategic guidance overlay to determine if alternative plans need to be made, based on changes in the strategic environment.

The basic plan and its variations are then screened by the services, which change any details which have changed as a result of changes in price or delivery schedules. While the services make last minute corrections of details, the Department of Defence prepares it for submission to the cabinet. After the cabinet decides on the plan, the whole process moves forward one year and the cycle begins anew.

To parallel the changes going on in the defense community, the Defence Ministry called for a general review of Australian defense. Its purpose was "to inform the public generally of the nature and extent of Australia's defence capabilities, of the foreseeable or contingent roles of our forces, of the environments in which these must be envisaged and of the resources involved in sustaining them."⁶

FIGURE 2



Source: Department of Defence, Australian Defence Review, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1972), p. 4.


The defense review pointed out that Australia had historically been protected by its geographical remoteness but that this very protection was now a vulnerability. Maritime power was now more widely shared and long range missile technology and undetected movement by sea had developed substantially.

Australia's economic strength comes from its commerce with trading partners in the archipelagoes to the North, and East and West across the Pacific and Indian Oceans. These long communication lines could now be fairly easily blocked (see Figure 2).

Australia saw the continental shelf with its valuable fishing areas and resource rich sea-beds as an area for protection and future negotiation (see Figure 3). Australia had already reached agreement with Indonesia in delineating sea-bed boundaries in a substantial part of the Arafura Sea.⁷ As modern technology made the shelf's resources more accessible, more competition for these resources would result. This competition had the potential for creating tension among the principal competitors.

Australia's strategic interests were closely related to the oceans and the Southeast Asian archipelagoes. It was correctly analyzed that "By no stretch of the imagination could Australia assume in the foreseeable future a capability to control...the vast areas of the ocean which give access to the coasts of our continent and our dependencies - though in selected areas we need to be able to do this."⁸ The Defence Department thought that Australian maritime interests would be best served by denying to others the measure of control they would need in order to threaten Australia.

FIGURE 3



Source: Australian Defence Review, p. 7.

The Defence Review saw the objective of a defense policy as one involving more than Australian territory alone. Some Australian defense interests, such as great power equilibrium in the adjoining oceans, could not be guaranteed by its own efforts. Its role in this interest was viewed as being capable of giving military support to the United States which, by extension, projected U.S. military strength beyond its shores.⁹

Other Australian defense interests were closer to home and more easily influenced. These included:

- "the security of our neighbors in South East Asia and the South West Pacific;
- the security of our peacetime and wartime lines of communication through these areas;
- the security of our offshore resources;
- the security of the ocean areas generally from which direct threats to the security of Australia could be brought to bear in the longer term."¹⁰

When it lost the 1972 general election, the government had taken pains to assess Australia's strategic calculus and reorganize portions of the Department of Defence in order to build a more self-reliant defense policy and force. For the first time in 23 years, the Liberal-Country party was the opposition and not the government.

B. DEFENCE UNDER LABOR

In December 1972 E. Gough Whitlam became the first Australian Labor Party (ALP) Prime Minister since 1949. He set the tone for his government shortly after he was sworn in when he stated:

"the general direction of my thinking is towards a more independent Australian stance in international affairs and towards an Australia which will be less militarily oriented and not open to suggestion of racism; an Australia which will enjoy a growing standing as a distinctive, tolerant, co-operative and well regarded nation not only in the Asian and Pacific region but in the world at large."¹¹

1. Relationships With Other Nations

Since the Australian-American relationship began, Labor had always been somewhat skeptical of the manner in which the Liberal government had nourished the link between the two nations. Labor had expressed reservations about both ANZUS and SEATO and was extremely outspoken on Vietnam and U.S. installations in Australia. The "more independent Australian stance in international affairs" was therefore a cue meaning more independent of the United States in particular.

Labor felt that the Liberal governments had allowed defense considerations to dictate foreign policy. As Labor had a general aversion for military solutions to international problems, they renounced the "forward defense" policy and set a course for their concept of self-reliance. The ALP did not intend to ignore defense, and called for the defense to be "so effective as to demonstrate beyond all doubt Australia's intention to defend itself and her vital interests."¹²

Since the inception of United States facilities in Australia, the left wing of the ALP claimed that they violated Australia's sovereignty and made Australia a nuclear target. The ALP left wing argued that facilities such as the U.S. Naval Communication Station "Harold E. Holt" at North West Cape might unnecessarily draw Australia into Soviet targeting, since U.S. submarines would receive strike orders through this facility. The installation was commissioned in 1967 and is one of the most important links in the United States communications network.¹³ To counter the pressure from the left, Defense Minister Lance Barnard visited the United States in early 1974 to negotiate an agreement concerning the communication station.

Mr. Barnard met with the U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and expressed to him the Australian government's concern "that the continued operation of the station be consistent with the national [Australian] interest and that Australia participate in its operation and management."¹⁴ The ministers agreed that "Australian servicemen would participate in the management and operation of the station" and that the Australians would be placed in key positions and establish a substantial Australian contribution to the management and operation of the station."¹⁵ Even though the 1974 agreement was more congruent with Australian interests, it failed to satisfy the left wing of the ALP. Senator Gietzelt stated the left wing position when he said "It is very important that part of Australian sovereignty has been won back. But I am one of those who would like to see all foreign bases out of Australia."¹⁶

Two other United States' facilities that created considerable consternation in Australian nationalist ranks were Pine Gap and Nurrunga. These sites are ground stations for American satellites. Pine Gap is a highly sensitive site operated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency with National Security Agency participation. It monitors Soviet and Chinese military communications and radar transmissions.¹⁷

Nurrunga is a portion of the American satellite early warning system. It provides a "real-time data link between North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the National Military Command System."¹⁸ The agreements covering these installations ran until 1976 and 1978 respectively. In each case a year's formal notice could be given for termination. Though the Labor government was not in favor of these installations, Mr. Whitlam stated in April 1974

that the existing agreements would be continued but would not be extended upon expiration.¹⁹ These concessions do not satisfy those who have opposed the American installations and they indicate that the ALP will assume as large a role as possible in their operation without placing a significant strain on the Australian - United States relationship.

Significant changes were also made in relationships with other nations when Labor came into power. The last Liberal-Country Party government had withdrawn all Australian combat troops from Vietnam before the 1972 election. Upon coming to office, Labor immediately withdrew all remaining Australian troops and terminated the defense aid programs to South Vietnam and Cambodia.²⁰

The new government had its own views of the Five Power Arrangement, and these were implemented shortly after coming to office. Labor decided that Australian forces were not needed in Singapore. It announced that the 6th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment and the 106 Field Battery would return to Australia by February 1974. Australian forces would then be further reduced to about 150 personnel, the number required to implement the government's technical assistance and aid programs.²¹

Papua New Guinea (PNG) also received attention from the new government. PNG was under Australian trusteeship in accordance with the United Nations Charter, but that trusteeship presented the government with the possibility of having to deploy Australian military forces to meet a threat. For this reason, Labor developed a policy of moving PNG to independence as rapidly as possible. In 1972 and 1973, the PNG leadership was increasingly involved in aspects of its own defense. In January 1973 the PNG Joint Force was redesignated the PNG Defence Force, showing the step toward an independent defense structure.²²

In March 1975, Australia transferred the defense power to Papua New Guinea in advance of its independence, which came that November. Australia retained the responsibility for PNG defense but PNG had control of its own military forces. Mr. Robert O'Neill, head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, suggests that Labor was afraid that a regional disturbance within PNG would require the Australian government to act to sustain the authority of the new PNG government. By transferring the defense power to the new government, PNG ability to control internal challenges would be strengthened.²³

Accompanying the shrinkage of Australian overseas commitments was a re-examination of Australian defense policies. Its findings were:

"that there was a very strong trend away from the prospect of renewed global conflict. The ability of the two super powers to destroy each other by nuclear exchange placed substantial restraint on direct military confrontation and had moved those two powers towards detente and co-operation in handling situations that could lead to critical confrontation...that present trends generally pointed to a prospect of relative stability in global order...Fighting continued in Indo-China, but it was for the peoples of that region themselves to reach the political settlements necessary to bring an end to this."²⁴

This perception of low threat allowed Australia to assume a new approach to defense. Forward defense had given way to continental defense, as the former was unappealing because of the feared effect on Australia's relations with Asian states and the implication of Australian colonialism.

2. Defense Structure and Expenditure

In the campaign for the 1972 election, Labor committed itself to abolishing the National Service Act (conscription), a major defense reorganization, and a defense expenditure of 3.5% of the Gross National Product (GNP). On coming to office, Labor immediately terminated the National Service Act. Once the act was abolished, the number of personnel in the defense forces decreased dramatically. Labor came to office

with about 80,900 troops in the Permanent Defense Forces of which about 12,000 were conscripts. The following year, 1973, Australia had a Permanent Defense Force of about 73,900 of whom 2800 were conscripts. The defense forces bottomed in 1974 with a force of 67,500, with 38 conscripts. In 1975 the defense force strength increased to 69,000, but this fell short of the 73,000 estimate of the government.²⁵

Labor had made good its promise to abolish conscription but defense was left with manpower problems. The R.A.N. and the R.A.A.F. were not affected because most conscripts served in the army. The Liberal-Country Party argued that the army should be kept at a strength of about 40,000 but Labor saw a need for the army's strength to be only 34,000.²⁶ The army's strength stabilized at about 31,500 with the operational units being reorganized into six understrength battalions. The reorganization of army operational units was by no means the extent of Labor reorganization.

On December 1972, Minister for Defence Barnard announced that a reorganization of the Defence Group of Departments would take place in stages. The first stage, beginning that day, would be the Department of Defence assuming a "greater authority in its direction of the execution of defence policy and approved defence objectives by each of the three Service Boards."²⁷ The second stage, which was to begin before the end of 1973, would be "to merge into the Department of Defence the three Service Departments, and to reorganize the place in the defence system of the procurement and production activities and the Australian Defence Scientific Service now in Supply."²⁸

The proposed changes were criticized in that they dealt with higher policy making bodies within the Department of Defence and the

civilian - military balance within its groups. They were also criticized for taking power from the military and transferring it to public civil servants. The most important criticism was that the reorganization did not address the issue of assigning specific tasks to the services as a part of an integrated and co-ordinated national defense strategy. Mr. Robert O'Neill stated that:

"Australian policy is still to await an emergency and then to shape a force to meet it, thereby heightening the importance of warning times and the tensions which would follow any decision to commence shaping a special force."²⁹

Labor instigated a most important reorganization of the Citizen Military Forces (Reserves). The investigation into what should be done with the CMF was chaired by Dr. T.B. Millar of the Australian National University.³⁰ The Millar Committee saw the necessity of retaining the CMF but found that many units were below the strength necessary for effective functioning.

The CMF was to be renamed the Army Reserve and would include trained and partially trained personnel who, in time of war or defense emergency, could be readily engaged for military employment. The importance of the role of the CMF can be seen in the stated defense policy that "the basic concept for the force structure is a core force in being of sufficient skills and capabilities to allow timely expansion should there be unfavorable developments in the strategic situation."³¹

The Liberal-Country Party government in its last year in office spent 3.3 percent, of the GNP on defense. In 1972-1973, defense expenditure fell to 3.1 percent, and Labor in its first full year in office reduced defense spending to 2.8 percent of GNP. In dollar terms, defense expenditures rose under Labor. In 1973-1974, it was up \$127 million from the year before, which amounted to a 10.4 percent increase but this

was still only 2.8 percent of GNP. The years 1974-1975 showed a further \$384 million increase for a 27.3 percent increase in defense expenditure but again a large increase was only 3.0 percent of GNP.³² These increases should also be viewed from the perspective that Australia's inflation rate was about 17 percent at this time.

Defense spending can be also very misleading when trying to relate the amount of money spent with military capabilities. Because of the rapid reduction of manpower after Labor came to office, service pay and amenities were increased rapidly and generously. Thus, manpower costs increased from 52.1 percent of total defense expenditure for 1972-1973 to 60.7 percent for 1973-1974. For the same periods outlays for new capital equipment for the armed services went from 10.9 percent to 6.5 percent of total defense expenditures. New capital equipment was even further reduced to 4.8 percent during 1974-1975.³³

Some of the decline in defense spending can be attributed to the reduction and later withdrawal of Australian participation in Indochina and Singapore. The continued decline in capital equipment is not consistent, however, when viewed in the context of achieving a more independent military force. The government, in its effort to make defense salaries competitive with the private sector, failed to achieve a balance between the number of servicemen and the quality and quantity of material for their use.

The equipment procurement policy in particular was attacked by the L-CP. Mr. Killen, the L-CP shadow Defence Minister maintained that "Australia's defence equipment situation was not critical, not grave, it was 'plainly desperate.'"³⁴ The government attempted to pursue a policy of local production as well as purchasing from overseas.

Australia was forced to purchase modern technological equipment from overseas because it lacked the production capability. Labor wanted to take advantage of the current situation of "no apparent threats" to "look critically at the industrial sector of our economy and to aim selectively at strengthening and developing those areas which are seen as vital to our future defence capability."³⁵

Labor's policy of simultaneously enhancing Australia's military production capability and cutting back on defense expenditures for new capital equipment contains basic contradictions. In order to put the money into increased local production, Australia had to increase capital equipment expenditures. Dr. O'Neill, summarized the problem:

"If no major assistance is given to Australia's defence industries, in the near future, particularly by way of ordering new equipment, then one of the essential means for reducing Australia's defence dependence upon great powers will atrophy."³⁶

Labor was in office for three years and made major changes in Australian defense. During its tenure the "no threat" issue dominated the strategic debate and directed the public away from the issue of a coherent strategic doctrine that would have given the necessary guidance for developing and equipping a defense force.

Mr. Whitlam's policy of "a more independent Australian stance in international affairs" that would dictate defense policy was partially successful. Australia developed a more independent stance in international relations that even carried into future L-CP governments. Labor's defense policies were not nearly as successful. It failed to design a clearly defined defense policy. Defense was left with organizational changes still projected, manpower problems in attaining a balance between military and civilian manning, and serious equipment problems, in that it was pursuing a policy of great power dependency rather than self-reliance.

FOOTNOTES

SECTION IV

¹Department of Defence, Defence Report 1970, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1970), p. 4.

²Ibid., p. 6.

³Arthur Tange, "Formulation of Defence Policy," United Service vol. 26 no. 2 (October, 1972): 13.

⁴Defence Report 1970, p. 7.

⁵Malcolm Fraser, address to the City of Sydney special branch of the Liberal Party, 10 September 1970, official text, p. 13 cited in Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper, Australia in World Affairs 1966-1970, (Melbourne: Cheshire Publishing Pty Ltd, 1974), p. 258.

⁶Department of Defence, Australian Defence Review, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1972), p. 1.

⁷Ibid., p. 3.

⁸Ibid., p. 21.

⁹Ibid., p. 37.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Current Notes, vol. 43, no. 12, December 1972, p. 619.

¹²Article XX of the 1972 ALP platform cited in Henry S. Albinski, Australian External Policy Under Labor; (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), p. 255.

¹³For the text of the "Agreement Between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the United States of America Relating to the Establishment of a United States Naval Communication Station in Australia (9 May 1963)" see T.B. Millar, Australia in Peace and War, pp. 471-475.

¹⁴For the text of the "Schlesinger-Barnard Agreement" see Millar, Australia In Peace and War, pp. 478-479.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 479.

¹⁶The Australian, 11 January 1974, cited in B. Chakravorty, Australia's Military Alliances, (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt, Ltd.: 1977), p. 69.

¹⁷Desmond Ball, "American Bases: Implications for Australian Security" The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, July 1978, p. 6. This article has been published in Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 55, no. 5, (October 1978): 4-14.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁹B. Chakravorty, Australia's Military Alliances, p. 70.

²⁰Defence Report 1973, p. 5.

²¹Ibid., p. 8.

²²Ibid., p. 9.

²³Robert O'Neill, "Australian Defence Policy 1971-1975," unpublished paper, p. 25.

²⁴Defence Report 1973, p. 5.

²⁵Defence Report 1978, p. 49.

²⁶Albinski, Australian External Policy Under Labor, p. 232.

²⁷Australian Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 44, no. 1, (January 1973): 36-37. (Hereafter referred to as AFAR - previous issues published as Current Notes on International Affairs).

²⁸Ibid., p. 37.

²⁹O'Neill, "Australian Defence Policy 1971-1975," p. 29.

³⁰Defence Report 1973, p. 18. See also the Report of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1974).

³¹Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, no. 60, 1975, (Canberra: L. F. Johnston, Commonwealth Government Printer, 1976), p. 76.

³²Defence Report 1977, p. 44.

³³Ibid., p. 45.

³⁴Albinski, Australian External Affairs Under Labor, p. 234.

³⁵Defence Report 1973, p. 25.

³⁶O'Neill, "Australian Defence Policy 1971-1975", p. 40.

V. THE STRATEGIC DEBATE

In 1976 Australian defense became an item of grave concern in defense and academic circles. The Australian National University and the University of Western Australia sponsored conferences on Australian defence and the government published a White Report, the second in two decades. The increased dialogues on the issue showed a growing concern about guidelines to direct defense policy and the defense force structure.

An overriding problem of Australian defense has been that "Despite the major changes in Australia's circumstances in the last thirty years, she has been free from threat of military attack since the end of World War II."¹ Its recent history, coupled with the present estimate that "Strategic pressure or direct military threat against Australia, its territories, maritime resources zone, or lines of communication are at present not estimated as probable,"² has left Australia to develop a defense policy that must respond to a number of uncertainties that may resolve themselves unfavorably for Australia. This peaceful period, however, affords Australia a valuable opportunity to re-think the fundamental concepts which will guide its military forces in support of national objectives.

A. MORE ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES FOR BETTER DECISION-MAKING

Legislation passed by the Commonwealth Parliament in September 1975, which came into effect on 9 February 1976, created a Chief of the Defence Force Staff (CDFS). Until then, the command of Australia's defense was distributed between the three Service Boards, the Chiefs of Staff

individually and the Chiefs of Staff Committee corporately. The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee exercised no power of command by virtue of his position. The CDFS heads a single organization dedicated to Australian defense. The Services are now being developed, trained, and commanded as one national Defence Force.

Under the Defence Re-organization Act, the Minister for Defence is charged with the administration of the Defence Force. The CDFS commands the Defence Force and is the principal military advisor to the Minister. The CDFS and the three Chiefs of Staff make up the Chiefs of Staff Committee which becomes the center of military planning and collective professional advice for the Minister. The three Service Boards were abolished and their powers have been redistributed to the Minister, the CDFS, the Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defence.

The Secretary of Defence is the principal civilian advisor to the Minister, and is currently Sir Arthur Tange who has held the position since its creation in 1970. The Secretary is responsible for the administration and control of expenditure. (See Figure 4). The top structure of the defense organization is a diarchy with the CDFS controlling the military and working in tandem with the Secretary who controls the civilian defense employees.

The Secretary, the CDFS, and the Chiefs of Staff are members of the three principal committees directing policy and administration. They are:

- 1) The Defence Committee, which includes the Secretaries of the Departments of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury and Foreign Affairs (with others invited as necessary), is the most senior decision-making committee. Its function is to advise the Minister for Defence on

"the defence policy as a whole; the co-ordination of military, strategic, economic, financial and external affairs aspects of the defence policy; matters of policy or principle and important questions having a joint Service or inter-departmental defence aspect; and such other matters having a defence aspect as are referred to the Committee by or on the behalf of the Minister."³

2) The Defence Force Development Committee (DFDC) is among the pre-eminent committees in Australian defense decision-making. Its function is

"to advise the Minister for Defence, in the context of strategic assessments and the most efficient use of resources, on the development of the Defence Force as a whole; and the inclusion in the Five Year Rolling Programme of major weapons and equipment capabilities."⁴

3) The Defence (Administration) Committee, which had been in decline, has been replaced in importance by the DFDC and deals with the Defence Budget within the financial dimensions and structure of the FYDP.⁵

General A.L. MacDonald, the second CDFS, stated that the effectiveness of the Defence Force was enhanced through these improvements to the infrastructure. He claims that "the methods by which decisions are reached...have been refined in recent years" and the new force which is developing possesses "a greater degree of flexibility and adaptability than ever before and that difficult choices are based on the best information available."⁶ Some people have begun to question the "best information available" or the strategic guidance necessary for effective decision-making.

Dr. Desmond Ball of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University sees five inadequacies in the quality of strategic guidance:⁷

1) The Strategic Basis, the principal relevant document, is too vague, makes too many qualifications, and glosses over contradictions in strategic assessments.

- 2) The Strategic Basis has in recent years been published every two years and is valid for too short a period to base complex force structure and equipment purchase decisions.
- 3) The Strategic Basis' are too narrow in scope and do not deal effectively with contingencies outside low levels of threat.
- 4) Strategic guidance does not deal with fundamental questions of an optimal defense posture.
- 5) Strategic guidance has become too political. The 1975 strategic assessment had been completed and was awaiting governmental approval when the government was thrown out of office by the governor-general. Upon returning to power, the L-CP called for a total rewrite.

When considering the "best information available" there is an additional factor in the equation. Australia receives much of its intelligence from the United States. The U.S. can therefore influence Australian defense policy-making through the quality and variety of information provided Australia. The flow of American intelligence creates even further problems because of security classifications. Much of the intelligence that comes to Australia is covered by extremely tight security agreements. Even though a great deal of the information finds its way into the public record in the United States, it is still cloaked in secrecy in Australia. Because of this secrecy within the Defence Department decision-making apparatus, there is no large informed public in Australia on the subject of defense policy.

B. THE NEW DEFENCE FORCE

Australia's defense infrastructure had always supported the policy that each of Australia's services would support its sister service

of the major ally. The Defence Re-Organization Act now joined the Army, RAN, and RAAF into an integrated force. Acknowledging the need for a consolidation, General MacDonald, the CDFS, stated that "Unity of Command - one force, one commander" if you like - is acknowledged as basic to the successful conduct of military operations and its validity continues to be demonstrated throughout the Services at all levels and in all matters."⁸ With the implementation of the Defence Re-Organization Act, Australia's future military operations would be conducted as joint operations of the three services and not as in the past. To do this, Australia had to re-evaluate its basic defense capabilities.

1. Threats To Australian Security

Australia has no foreseeable threat in the near future and this fact compounds the existing problems of the defense planners. Admiral A.M. Synnot, the recently appointed CDFS, maintains that "At a time of low or indeterminate threat, strategic guidance cannot be expected to be sufficiently specific to enable us to determine the force structure; if there were a clear threat this problem would of course be much easier."⁹ Australia does, however, face threats.

Basically, Australia has three types of threats:

- 1) threats to Australian sovereignty such as infringements of her territorial waters in the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ),
- 2) a threat to its continental integrity, such as a landing of small forces in the north, or 3) a threat to its survival, such as cutting the sea lines of communication or major invasion.

The third type of threat would be considered a threat to Australia's fundamental security. The Australian government has confidence that "in the event of a fundamental threat to Australia's security, U.S.

military support would be forthcoming."¹⁰ The highly secret document entitled "The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, 1975" calculated that "The United States could not afford to fail to support Australia in the event of major assault without seriously undermining its strategic position in the Pacific and Indian Oceans."¹¹

The first type of threat is one that can be planned for as it occurs constantly. Foreign fishermen are fishing in Australian waters, particularly now with the 200NM EEZ. Smuggling would also fall into this category. This type of threat is an extremely low-level threat, but it points out the ease with which a threat of type two could be mounted.

The second type of threat is the most serious. The area north of a line running west from Brisbane is sparsely populated and the internal transportation systems are poor. With little or no warning, a group of 500 to 1,000 insurgents could lodge themselves in north or northwest Australia. This area is the most likely to be invaded because of its sparse population and its closeness to the Indonesian archipelago. For a group to stage an invasion in areas other than the north would require near-superpower blue-water capabilities.

Because of the numerous possibilities of infringement on Australian sovereignty and security included in the first and second types of threat, Australia has evolved a defense philosophy termed the "core-force." Admiral Synnot maintains that

"This core force is one which must be able to understand peacetime tasks; a force sufficiently versatile to deal with a range of the more credible low-level contingencies; a force with the necessary core of equipment, at a technological and numerical level, with which we can train and develop the military skills necessary as a basis for expansion which may be required to deter or meet a developing situation."¹²

2. The Core Force

The core force concept for security may appear proper because of Australia's small population. This would allow the permanent forces to act as a reservoir of defense capabilities while Australia's attention is directed more toward matters of economic growth, but this philosophy suffers from conceptual problems.

Since the Labor government of 1972-1975 ended conscription, any military expansion of manpower must have popular support. If the public felt that a government assessment calling for a buildup in forces was not accurate, the government would not have available manpower without changing the laws. Even if manpower were readily available, there would be a lag between mobilization and combat readiness.

Dr. Ross Babbage of the Australian National University stated that "between 2½ - 5 years active preparation time would be required in order to expand the present 32,000 man regular army with its 20,000 man poorly trained reserve to a well trained 150,000 manned army."¹³ This mobilization would begin only when the government had perceived a specific threat and ordered a mobilization in response. Dr. Babbage found in his research that in only one instance was defense preparation time for conflict in excess of sixteen months.¹⁴

The expansion philosophy requires a very precise and timely threat assessment. This a difficult proposition even for a superpower with a large intelligence collection and analysis complex, as evidenced in the United States' perception of Iran. Even if Australia's intelligence were precise and timely and it could begin an early mobilization to meet the perceived threat at some future date, Dr. Babbage argues that "such an early mobilization could well act as a serious destabilizing influence in a delicate diplomatic situation."¹⁵

In terms of threat, the core force concept seems to be a paradox. Dr. Ball calls the concept "one of the most reactive planning mechanisms imaginable." He goes on to say:

"It depends for its efficiency on superior knowledge of threats and threat lead-times. Yet it is precisely because of the current methodological inability to deal with the perceived threat environment that the concept has prevailed within the Australian defence establishment."¹⁶

Another aspect of the core force is its equipment, to be maintained "at a technological and numerical level, with which we can train and develop the military skills necessary as a basis for expansion."¹⁷ The apparent equipment purchasing policy of the government is another area for concern when viewed in terms of a core-force.

Many have criticized the government for having an "equipment syndrome" whereby defense worth is assessed on the amount and condition of defense equipment. The desire to have state-of-the-art equipment is often rationalized by the necessity of technological superiority of the countries that could be potential threats to Australia.

Sometimes the perceived need for state-of-the-art equipment is actually an unnecessary expenditure of valuable resources. Australia recently bought 104 German made Leopard tanks to replace the aging Centurions. This tank is immobile in a large part of the tropical North and Northeast area. Furthermore, Australia has no capability to transport the weapon from theater to theater.

In 1978-79, Australia took delivery on 12 C-130H aircraft which replaced the aging C-130A.¹⁸ This aircraft is a larger C-130 but still can not transport the Leopard tank. Had Australia waited on the purchase of a transport, it might have been able to buy the YC-14 or YC-15 which are capable of airlifting Leopard tanks. The YC-14 and YC-15 are currently competing for a production contract in the United States.

Whereas Australia may appear to have made a major purchase too hastily in one instance, it often takes a long time in other major purchases. On March 2, 1973, Mr. Lance Barnard, the Minister for Defence, announced that "a joint technical mission would leave Australia that day to evaluate proposals for a technical fighter aircraft to replace the Mirage III0 aircraft."¹⁹ Australia has been dealing with the replacement of the Mirage for nearly 10 years, and the list of possible choices has been added to and subtracted from during the entire time. In November, 1979, Australia narrowed the list to two aircraft and the decision as to which one to purchase may not be made until 1981.

Australia has probably delayed making a decision on the Tactical Fighter Force because it will cost one and one-half billion dollars for 75 airplanes. This purchase will not only shape the RAAF but may shape the defence force for the next decade because of funding. In purchasing a state-of-the-art aircraft, Australia will spend 1.5 billion dollars on one weapon system after it has spent only 1.17 billion dollars on new capital equipment over the last five years.²⁰

Although Australia continues to attempt to provide its defence force with the latest equipment available, there is nothing in logic or in common sense that makes clear they will always be deterred or defeated by weapons from higher levels of technology. The United States experience in Korea and Vietnam clearly illustrate that high technology is not always the answer. The worst aspect of the desire for state-of-the-art armament is its impact on Australian defense production.

C. THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY AS AN ASPECT OF SELF-RELIANCE

A broad statement of the function, main features and performance of a system required by the Defence Department is known as a Staff

Requirement. Normally industry, particularly overseas industry, has advance knowledge of the need for a system before the Staff Requirement is issued. Australian industry testified before the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence that the

"Staff Requirement becomes influenced by the characteristics of equipment known to be available overseas and that, because existing equipment can thus be acquired within a relatively short timescale, not only is the possibility of local development ruled out but also the nature of local participation tends to be circumscribed."²¹

Australia is in the delicate position of wanting to enlarge local defense industry but buying overseas because it is cheaper and faster.

In the last five years, Australia has spent the greater portion of capital equipment expenditures overseas. The actual defense expenditure on capital equipment, the actual expenditure overseas and the overseas expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure for the last five years are as follows:²²

	ACTUAL EXPENDITURE (\$M)	EXPENDITURE OVERSEAS (\$M)	PERCENTAGE
1974-75	86.18	57.59	66.8
1975-76	138.24	104.67	75.7
1976-77	267.29	217.23	81.3
1977-78	295.34	224.72	76.1
1978-79	383.41	288.12	75.1

The Committee noted from the evidence it received that "the practice in defence procurement appears to be first to look overseas for equipment before giving attention to the possibility of obtaining it locally."²³ Because of this philosophy, the Defence Department is creating large gaps in Australian industrial capability. Even though Australia is one

of the strongest industrial nations in its region, defense and industry have gone their separate ways and "Australia is as much a slave of the overseas defence equipment suppliers as any underdeveloped country."²⁴ Brian Powell, director of the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, argues that "defence planners seem dazzled by the state-of-the-art equipment that they think they can buy only from overseas while, on the other hand, Australian manufacturers relegate defence tenders to their too-hard trays."²⁵

In recent years, the government has required Australian industry participation in overseas purchases through either a licence or co-production arrangement. Currently foreign suppliers must provide Australian industry with a target level of 30 percent of the contract price.²⁶ It must be pointed out, however, that Australian industry must bid for this work and Australian participation has averaged below the 30 percent requirement because of local disinterest, as there are no long term incentives for the industry.

If Australia expects to create a self-reliant core-force that is capable of expanding to meet threats, it must also create a defence industry that is capable of expansion. The trend of Australian defense industry appears to be in the opposite direction. The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence called for better co-ordination and communication between industry and defense when it noted

"work which should be done in Australia and which would contribute to the technology base is being lost because the extent, nature, and phasing of Australian participation is being determined without the benefit of an industry input. A further concern of industry is that by itself it is unable to identify the capabilities and resources that are needed for defence purposes and hence sensibly to forward plan its structure and facilities."²⁷

In most literature dealing with defense, it is noted that Australia's geographic location with reference to its developing neighbors must always be remembered. Australia shares a tropical climate with geographically convenient potential customers for defense equipment. Australia has the intermediate technology level that is appropriate for developing nations. Were Australia to become a defense equipment supplier for its region, industry would have the long term interest in developing defense industries.²⁸

D. DETERRENCE

The 1978 Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia stated that "Australia owes it to herself to be able to mount a national defence effort that would maximise the risks and costs to any aggressor."²⁹

Although 'deterrence' is not addressed per se, this concept is one of deterrence. Glen Snyder maintains that

"The object of military deterrence is to reduce the probability of enemy military attacks, by posing for the enemy a sufficient likely prospect that he will suffer a net loss as a result of the attack, or at least a higher net loss or lower net gain than would follow from his not attacking."³⁰

Although deterrence is not a new concept, it is new within the context of the Australian Defence Force.

The Chief of Defence Force Staff, Admiral Synnot, stated as recently as June 1979 that "there is no particular threat in our region which has sufficient credibility to determine the shape and size of our defence force."³¹ What would determine the shape and size of the Australian defense force is the disproportionate response aspect of deterrence.

Disproportionate response makes aggression very expensive to the aggressor. It requires a progressive increase in military capabilities

which, in turn, requires an aggressor to respond disproportionately in terms of cost in order to achieve an advantage. Since Australia's neighbors are relatively poor, Australia could build a versatile defense force that would require its neighbors to spend above the level of which they are capable in order to gain an advantage.³²

Much literature on Australian defense indicates that this is basically what Australia is attempting in its commitment to purchasing state-of-the-art weapon systems. In equipping itself with high technology weaponry, Australia must not lose sight of the fact that its defense force must be balanced if it is to become and remain credible. This is to say that sophistication of the order of the F-18 or F-16, at 1.5 billion dollars for a fleet of 75 aircraft, may be more than necessary to require any threat to respond disproportionately. If the F-18 or F-16 is purchased at the expense of equipment required for the Army and Navy to be a credible force, then a threat directed against a weak area in the Army or Navy may require Australia to respond disproportionately.

Australia's current policy of having an expandable core-force requires long lead time in order to be viable. One aspect of disproportionate response is that Australia would force a potential aggressor into substantial lead time for the acquisition and development of capabilities required to infringe on Australia's sovereignty. Not only would the lead time be substantial but much of the capability would have to be purchased, which in turn would provide the Australian government a clear threat for which to plan and expand forces if necessary.

The force structure that will provide adequate deterrence is a major question in Australian defense today. It is argued that Australia's primary defense is its surrounding oceans. If Australia can develop a

force that can protect its shores out to 600 NM, then any force attempting to land in Australia would require aircraft and long range warships which employ the most expensive and sophisticated technology. How Australia can be defended 600 NM away from the coast is one of the major questions facing defense planners today.

HMAS Melbourne, the Australian aircraft carrier, is due to be retired in 1985. With the loss of this ship Australia will lose a very versatile portion of its defense force. The decision as to whether or not Melbourne will be replaced has not been made. There are several options available for a replacement: 1) a through deck cruiser costing \$700-800 million with aircraft, 2) a Harrier Carrier costing \$400-500 million with aircraft, or 3) a "Woolworth" carrier costing \$300-400 million with aircraft.³³ Defence planners are now faced with determining which purchase will give Australia a credible balanced force. If \$1.5 billion dollars are spent on the TFF, the carrier capability may be retired in 1985.

The strategic debate which began in the early 1970's will continue into the 1980's. It has created an awareness of defense, and many needed improvements have been made in the 1970's. The strategic debate has given Australian defense a sense of direction and an understanding that defense is not static.

FOOTNOTES

SECTION V

¹Honorable D.J. Killen, Australian Defence, (A White Paper presented to the Parliament by the Minister for Defence, 4 November 1976), p. 2.

²Ibid., p. 10.

³Desmond J. Ball, "Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and Process," Paper delivered to the Conference of the Section of Military Studies of ISA, Charleston, South Carolina, August 1978, p. 26.

⁴Ibid.

⁵The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, The Defence of Australia, (Tavistock, England, 1977), p. 36.

⁶General A.L. MacDonald, "The Australian Defence Force," The Pacific Defence Reporter vol. III, no. 12, (June 1977).

⁷Ball, "Defence Decision-Making," pp. 34-36.

⁸MacDonald, "The Australian Defence Force," p. 6.

⁹Admiral A. M. Synnot, "The Changing Challenge for our Defence Force," John Firkins (ed) Australia's Defence (Perth: Extension Service, University of Western Australia, 1976), p. 11.

¹⁰Killen, Australian Defence, p. 10.

¹¹Alan Reid, "Top Secret: Our Defence Planning," The Bulletin (June 12, 1976): p. 18.

¹²Synnot, "The Changing Challenge for our Defence Force," p. 13. For an interesting article of threat perception and weapon acquisition, see Ron Huisken, Limitation of Armaments in South-East Asia: A proposal, (Canberra: Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 16, Australian National University, 1977).

¹³Ross Babbage, "Australia's Strategic Re-orientation - Some Important Implications," Robert O'Neill (ed) The Defence of Australia - Fundamental New Aspects. (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1976), p. 11.

¹⁴Ibid. pp. 15-19.

¹⁵Ibid. p. 20.

¹⁶J. O. Langtry and Desmond J. Ball, "Australia's Defence Forces at the Crossroads," RUSI/BRASSEY'S 1980 Defence Yearbook (London: Brassey's Publishers Ltd, forthcoming). Cited by permission of Brassey's Publishers Limited.

- ¹⁷Synnot, "The Changing Challenge for our Defence Force," p. 13.
- ¹⁸Defence Report, 1979. p. 15.
- ¹⁹AFAR, vol. 44 no. 3 (March, 1973); p. 9.
- ²⁰Defence Report 1979, p. 46. See also "Initial Offsets Proposed in Australian Fighter Bid," Aviation Week and Space Technology vol. III no. 24 (December 10, 1979) p. 54.
- ²¹Australia, Parliament, Parliamentary Paper no 225/1977 Industrial support for defence needs and allied matters. Report from the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, October 1977.
- ²²Defence Report 1979, pp. 46, 48.
- ²³Industrial Support for defence needs and allied matters, p. 31.
- ²⁴Brian Powell, "Industry in the Tender Trap," The Bulletin vol. 111 no. 5167, (July 3, 1979): p. 111.
- ²⁵Ibid.
- ²⁶John H. Leard, "Industry Battles Bureaucracy," Ibid. p. 108.
- ²⁷Industrial support for defence needs and allied matters, p. 12.
- ²⁸See "Daedalus," "Australia as a Regional Technology Centre," Pacific Defence Reporter vol. 4 no. 11 (May 1978): pp. 51-52.
- ²⁹Australia, Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, no. 62 1978, (Canberra: L. F. Johnston, Commonwealth Government Printer, 1979), p. 77.
- ³⁰Glen H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security, (Princeton: Princeton University, 1961), p. 12.
- ³¹Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot, "Deterrence Must Be the Basis," The Bulletin vol. 100 no. 5167 (July 3, 1979), p. 76.
- ³²See J. O. Langtry and D. J. Ball, Controlling Australia's Threat Environment, (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1979), pp. 22-33.
- ³³Dr. Robert O'Neill, "The Structure of Australia's Defence Force," Address to the Liberal Party of Australia, Queensland Division, Brisbane, 28 April 1979.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Australian defense historically has been an appendage of the British Commonwealth security interests in Southeast Asia. A member of the Commonwealth, Australia concerned itself with economic development instead of defense until the late 1930's. As World War II approached, Australia became keenly interested in the viability of the concepts that formed the foundation of its security. The quick fall of Singapore and Malaysia to the Japanese brought home to Australia that its security interests must not be entrusted to other nations.

The United States required Australia's strategic position in the South Pacific in order to launch a counter-offensive against the Japanese, and the relationship between the United States and Australia has remained firm since. As the war neared its end, Australia began a systematic attempt to develop a security arrangement that it could help mold for Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Australian attempts at such a security arrangement were not fruitful, but Australia was able to influence the creation of the United Nations through its envoy, H. V. Evatt.

Shortly before the Japanese peace treaty in 1952, Australia entered into a security arrangement with New Zealand and the United States. This arrangement was called ANZUS and it became the foundation of Australian defense policy. Australia also entered into the Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia agreement, which was a security arrangement that included Great Britain.

Great Britain and the United States have long been Australia's "great and powerful friends", the bottom line in Australian security.

Australia fought alongside both nations in World War II, with the United States in Korea and Indo-china, and with Great Britain in Malaysia. Because Australian security was so closely linked to the United States and Great Britain it developed a defense policy known as the "Forward Defence" and structured its military services so that they would be capable of augmenting the forces of the major power.

It was during the period of the "Forward Defence" that Australia was fighting in Southeast Asia with the United States and Great Britain. The "Forward Defence" called for the defeat of a threat to Australian security as far away from the continent as possible. During this period Australia perceived its threat to be Communism that would engulf Indo-china and then sweep down the Malay peninsula to Indonesia and then on to Australia. The ending of the Vietnam War broke this threat perception that had lasted for 20 years.

In the late 1960's, Great Britain announced that it would remove its military capabilities from East of Suez, as it had become too expensive to maintain its power in Southeast Asia. The United States also announced the Guam or Nixon Doctrine which called on the nations of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific to do more for their own security. With this change in the balance of power, Australia was faced with a re-evaluation of its security interests.

Australia has determined that it has no foreseeable threat and this threat perception has created problems for defense planners. Without a threat it is difficult to develop a force structure, as there are no guidelines for force capabilities. The lack of a threat also has made Australians feel that defense matters can be put aside, allowing financial support to go to other interests such as social welfare.

For several years now the leaders of the defense establishment have been saying that "At a time of low or indeterminate threat, strategic guidance cannot be expected to be sufficiently specific to enable us to determine the force structure."¹ Because of this lack of threat, in the last decade Australia has used catch-word identifiers to describe its defense policy.

The "Forward Defence" strategy was followed by "Continental Defence" or "Fortress Australia." The latter two identifiers were not especially good descriptions of Australian defense, as they implied isolationism. Australia was not only not practicing isolationism in the 1970's, it was actively participating in the efforts to provide stability in its "Near North" neighborhood. The "Continental Defence" and "Fortress Australia" were discarded for the force-in-being.

Force-in-being is the term used to denote Australian defense capabilities while it attempts to define and develop the core-force. Australia is pursuing a defense policy based on a core-force which is a small, well-equipped and highly trained force that can meet the spectrum of Australia's low-level threats. The core-force will provide the expertise necessary for expansion should Australia be faced with a serious threat requiring mobilization.

The core-force concept does, however, suffer from conceptual problems. The core-force requires superior knowledge of threats and threat lead-times to be efficient. Yet it is Australia's inability to identify threats that has forced the Australian military into the core-force.

The core-force is to be equipped with state-of-the-art weapon systems. Because Australia has such a small defense budget and, by extension, a smaller budget for capital equipment, defence contracts do not provide

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Australian industry with long term incentives to bid for them. As a result, Australian defense industry is lagging in technological advances. If Australia is to pursue a policy of self-reliance, it is imperative that its defense industries be built up.

If the well-equipped core-force is going to be a credible deterrent force, it must possess a balance of the appropriate forces. Since the early 1970's, when Great Britain and the United States left the area militarily, Australia's manpower distribution among the three services has not changed. The Australian Defence Force (excluding conscripts) strength for the last 15 years is as follows:²

	Navy	Army	Air Force
1965	13428	23534	17720
1966	14633	24583	19358
1967	15764	26721	20130
1968	16294	27152	21564
1969	16758	28044	22712
1970	17089	28305	22642
1971	16997	28701	22539
1972	16890	29326	22720
1973	17215	31151	22717
1974	16141	30197	21119
1975	16094	31514	21546
1976	15993	31430	21351
1977	16390	31988	21703
1978	16298	31883	21689
1979	16582	31813	21803

As Australia changed from an augmentation force to a self-reliant force, one would think that the manpower ratios among the services would change. Such has not been the case.

Australia is an island continent and several Australian strategists agree that an enemy must be met miles off-shore in order to defend the continent. This would be done by a combination of naval and air power. The implication here is that money would be divided among the services to equip them to fulfill this deterrent role. The net outlay on defence equipment and stores for the services are as follows:³

	Naval Construction	A/C & associated initial equipment	Armoured & combat vehicles, artillery
70-71	10.4 (\$M)	50.6 (\$M)	42.7 (\$M)
71-72	14.2	33.7	51.6
72-73	14.5	65.1	31.0
73-74	15.9	27.7	28.7
74-75	11.5	33.2	6.7
75-76	19.9	48.3	22.9
76-77	59.1	89.8	55.1
77-78	56.3	106.3	55.1
78-79	<u>122.9</u>	<u>78.4</u>	<u>38.4</u>
Total	324.7	533.1	332.2

Obviously aviation technology is very expensive but knowing that a threat to Australia would probably be seaborne, it would seem reasonable that the net outlay on equipment would be more equitable between the RAN and the RAAF. If Australia purchases a \$1.5 billion TFF, this expenditure relationship will probably become even more favorable toward aircraft.

There has been a marked increase in defense interest in Australia during the last decade. This is evidenced by the many changes that have been made in the Australian Department of Defence. Australia suffers from not really knowing exactly how to structure its Defence Force, due to the lack of threats. Under the existing circumstances, the core-force concept provides an adequate Defence Force for the existing low-level threats.

Australia is probably correct in the assumption that a fundamental threat to its security would be met with United States forces as set forth in the ANZUS Treaty. In response to the other threats, however, Australia "must sustain a Defence Force which supports [its] diplomacy so that both in combination effectively deter interference with Australia's sovereignty by the military forces of a foreign power."⁴ Australia has developed a defense policy that is capable of realization but many difficult decisions lie ahead if proper allocation of scarce defense resources are to be made.

FOOTNOTES

SECTION VI

¹Admiral A. M. Synnot, "The Changing Challenge for our Defence Force," p. 11.

²Defence Report 1979, p. 52.

³Defence Report 1973 and 1978, pp. 43 and 48 respectively.

⁴Honorable D. J. Killen, Speech to Parliament on 29 March 1979 cited in Defence Report 1979, p. 5.

APPENDIX A

SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW
ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
('ANZUS' TREATY)

1 September 1951

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,

Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

ARTICLE IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VII

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

ARTICLE IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

APPENDIX B

AUSTRALIAN ORDER OF BATTLE

ARMY: Uniformed personnel, 31,813

1 infantry division

3 task force HQ.

1 armed regiment

1 reconnaissance regiment

1 armoured personnel carrier regiment

6 infantry battalions

1 Special Air Service regiment

4 artillery regiments (1 medium, 2 field, 1 air defence)

1 aviation regiment

3 field engineer regiments

1 field survey regiment

2 signals regiments

2 transport regiments

1 air transport support regiment

103 Leopard medium tanks; 791 M-113 armoured personnel carriers; 34 5.5-in guns; 254 105mm howitzers; 66 M-40 106mm recoilless launchers; Redeye, 8 Rapier surface-to-air missiles; 17 Porter, 10 Nomad aircraft; 50 Bell 206B-1 helicopters; 32 watercraft. (On order, 12 Rapier surface-to-air missiles, 10 Blindfire air defence radar.)

Deployment: Egypt (U.N. Emergency Force/U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization): 10; India/Kashmir (UNMOGIP): 6.

Reserves: 21,762 (with training obligation) in combat support, logistic, and training units.

NAVY: Uniformed personnel, 16,582 (including Fleet Air Arm).

6 Oxley (Oberon) submarines.

1 aircraft carrier (carries 8 A-4, 6 S-2, 10 helicopters).

3 Perth anti-submarine warfare destroyers with Tartar surface-to-air missiles, Ikara anti-submarine warfare missiles.

1 modified Daring destroyer.

6 River frigates with Seacat surface-to-air missiles/surface-to-surface missiles, Ikara anti-submarine warfare missiles.

1 training ship.

1 coastal minesweeper.

2 modified British Ton coastal minehunters.

12 Attack patrol boats.

1 Fleet replenishment ship.

1 destroyer tender.

6 landing craft.

(On order: 3 FFG7 frigates, 1 amphibious heavy lift ship, 15 PCF patrol craft.)

Fleet Air Arm: 21 combat aircraft.

1 fighter-bomber squadron with 7 A-4G Skyhawk.

2 anti-submarine warfare squadrons with 3 S-2E, 11 S-2G Tracker (5 in reserve), 2 HS-748 electronic counter-measures training aircraft.

1 anti-submarine warfare/search and rescue helicopter squadron with 6 Sea Kings, 6 Wessex 31B.

1 helicopter squadron with 5 Bell UH-1H, 2 Bell 206B.

1 training squadron with 8 MB-326H, 3TA-4G, 4 A-4G.

2 HS-748 transports.

Bases: Sydney, Jervis Bay, Brisbane, Cairns, Darwin, Cockburn Sound.

Reserves: 1,037 (with training obligations).

AIR FORCE: 21,803 uniformed personnel; 116 combat aircraft.

2 strike/reconnaissance squadrons with 20 F-111C.

3 interceptor/fighter, ground-attack squadrons with 48 Mirage IIIIO.

1 reconnaissance squadron with 13 Canberra B20.

2 maritime reconnaissance squadrons: 1 with 10P-3B Orion; 1 with 10P-3C.

5 training squadrons: 2 with 24C-130E/H; 2 with 22DHC-4; 1 with 2 BAC-111, 2 HS-748, 3 Mystere 20, 2 Boeing 707-338C.

5 transport flights with 16 C-47.

1 Forward Air Controller flight with 6 CA-25.

1 operational conversion unit with 14 Mirage IIIIO/D.

1 helicopter transport squadron with 6 CH-47 Chinook (6 more in reserve).

3 utility helicopter squadrons with 45 UH-1B/H Iroquois.

Trainers including 80MB-326, 8 HS-748T2, 37 CT-4 Airtrainer.

Sidewinder, R.530 air-to-air missiles.

(28 Mirage IIIIO/D in reserve.)

Deployment: Malaysia/Singapore; 2 squadrons with Mirage IIIIO, 1 flight with C-47, UH-1H helicopter; Egypt (UN Emergency Force/UN Truce Supervisory Organization); 1 flight with UH-1H helicopter.

Reserves: 498 (with training obligations) in 5 Citizens Air Force squadrons.

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