Internal Social and Political Developments:
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia

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Upon Hegel's remark that "all great, world-historical facts and personages occur, as it were, twice," Marx once commented: "He has forgotten to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce." Marx was comparing the French revolution of 1848 with that of 1789 and Louis Napoleon with his uncle. In independent North Africa the personages remain the same, so that their dramatic encores can seem even more absurd. Bourguiba consolidated power twice. The first time one of his ministers editorialized: "Because [personal power] develops pride and disdain in him who possesses it, and docility and servility in others, it is in itself a menace to the moral health of a country." The second time (after firing that particular minister for the third time), Bourguiba made himself president for life. So also in Morocco, King Hassan managed in 1974 as in 1963 to rally the support of opposition parties he had just repressed. While a border war with Algeria was the occasion for the first show of national unity, a campaign in the United Nations sufficed for the second. Only in Algeria are personal encores missing: the need to "rebuild" the party is recognized each year, but the state bureaucracy grows virtually unchecked.

In fact as Marx observed of Louis Napoleon's regime, bureaucracy is the principal political development of all three North African regimes. Its growth is measured in the following table, which
compares total government and public sector expenditure as a percentage of GDP for each country shortly after independence with that of 1972. The Moroccan estimate for 1972 is undoubtedly low because it does not include most public enterprises (such as the Sherifian Office of Phosphates), much less the estates of the royal family or related enterprises. In its extended sense

*Total Government and Public Sector Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1972</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>25%a</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
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aData are for 1963


each regime has been the principal growth industry of its respective economy. Such development may, as the Egyptian Marxist, Samir Amin, has argued, be principally in the interests of a weak bourgeoisie which, as in nineteenth century France, feeds on the State. The question to be raised in this paper is whether such development can continue to satisfy enough demands to keep the regimes in power as they are presently constituted. Is their structure tied to decolonization, which satisfied most aspiring elites with jobs, lands, and enterprises once held by Europeans? Possibly these benefits distracted North Africans
from engaging in more vigorous political activity. But if so, what happens when there are no more colonial goods to expropriate?

One immediate answer is that spectacular increases in the price of crude petroleum, natural gas, phosphates, and olive oil during 1973-74 may serve each regime as a functional substitute for the colonial resources they have already consumed. Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Morocco and Tunisia are receiving windfall export earnings as a result of the price increases. If the relative surpluses can be converted into more public jobs and services, bureaucratic growth may continue to satisfy demands, distract elites, and keep the respective regimes in power. Indeed, on this view, Algeria may have the greatest chances for political stability, for public resources can be expected to expand the most with the export of natural gas in the 1980s. But this view ignores the internal political tensions building up within each of the three regimes and the qualitative differences among them. The revenues serve particular policies and political strategies of the respective system. To reduce the strategies to "bourgeois" or "petit bourgeois" interests is to miss significant differences which may foreshadow variations in political change.

**Algeria**

Algeria is the most in need of windfall export earnings because the regime's design calls for massive industrialization which is capital intensive and which does not, in the short run, provide substantial numbers of new jobs. Indeed, though hardly "immobilist" in an economic sense, the regime seems more vulnerable than that of Morocco or Tunisia in at least two respects. Its
unemployment rates have been the highest in the Maghrib, and the recent decline in emigration to France may signal the erosion of a principal safety valve against mass unrest. Secondly and more seriously, the regime continues to do without any national political infrastructure other than a quiescent, fragmented, and bureaucratized official party. If at the communal and departmental levels elected bodies are permitted some say in local and regional affairs, there is no comparable national body. The coopted and decimated Council of the Revolution is no substitute for a representative body that might deliberate on public matters. To a greater extent than in Tunisia or Morocco, political choices are taken secretly by the president and a close group of advisors, together with public sector technocrats. Algeria tends to get a better international press than either of its neighbors, but the coverage is almost always on economic matters because there continues to be a political vacuum—no "politics" upon which journalists, however well informed, can report.

Educated Moroccans and Tunisians get absorbed, usually as counter-elites, into their respective political cultures, but in Algeria there are no comparable political spectacles or points of orientation. Though the opposition seems to be negligible, and for the most part in exile, the very absence of a visible politics carries with it two direct costs. On the one hand the regime's political design gets translated into a discrete series of economic goals which may in the end acquire a life of their own that undermines the design. Thus in the absence of political articulation, preferably through a well organized party, socialism...
may become fossilized in a series of iron and steel complexes. Secondly, the functional substitute for politics, at least among certain petit bourgeois strata, seems to be the search for cultural "authenticity," or a renewal of Arab-Islamic values. Now this search is as much a Moroccan and Tunisian as an Algerian problem, but its peculiar salience in Algeria seems both cause and effect of the relatively underdeveloped quality of politics in the latter country.

Historically the "return to the sources" advocated by Ben Badis had greater political resonance in Algeria than counterpart Muslim reformist movements in the other two countries because the French, with greater stakes in Algeria, clamped down more effectively on other nationalist movements than in Morocco or Tunisia. Algerian elites acquired neither cohesion, a sense of identity, nor organized mass followings in opposition to the colonizer, and anti-colonial struggle in the end took a violent and anti-political form. No period of gestation and political organization preceded the outbreak of the 1954 Revolution, and hence the FLN broke up as independence was achieved. Today, as in the 1930's "authenticity" is accorded a legitimacy disproportionate to the political weight of its proponents because political alternatives are not articulated.

The two consequences of Algerian depoliticization, economism and the search for authenticity, in turn seem antithetical, one obvious source of tension within the regime. It is not that Arab-Islamic values need be antithetical to iron and steel complexes— to the contrary, there may even be some elective affinity
between Muslim puritanism and economic zealously—but rather
that the proponents of authenticity may, with Boumedienne's
backing, force the pace of Arabization to a point which will
undercut the authority of Algeria's Gallicized managerial class,
without offering an alternative set of cadres capable of managing
the economy. Already the administrators of Algeria's public
sector companies must, like regular government functionaries,
pass exams in Arabic proficiency. If the exams were rigorously
designed to weed out personnel, Algeria's small number of highly
qualified technocrats would probably be decimated. If, as is
likely, they are pro forma exercises, the managerial class may
grow unchecked—the secular captains of Algerian industry juxta-
posed in an uneasy balance to growing numbers of less specialized,
but Arabized, graduates who will staff traditional government
administrations. But is such a de facto "church-state" solution
really in accord with either Muslim reformist or unitary
nationalist values?^4

How does the regime, as presently constituted, realize its
economic design without consolidating a ruling class of techno-
crats? In 1967, the year Boumedienne eliminated the principal
threats to his regime, he opted clearly for the technocrats. But
once French petroleum interests were nationalized, he immediately
embarked in 1972 upon an agrarian reform which he justified as
preventive action against the formation of a new class. "Either
it will succeed or it will fail and we will end up with a new
bourgeoisie which will perhaps be more vile and tough than the
colonial bourgeoisie which used to exploit us."^5 Independent
Algeria, indeed, had inherited a structure of native landownership which was even less equitable than that of Morocco. 8,500 landowners owned one-quarter of the land which was not in settler hands. Presumably a disproportionate number of top officials (including the late minister of the interior) are connected by birth or marriage with leading landowning families. It is thus understandable that, in the end, at most 286,000 hectares out of a possible million or so of large private holdings were actually nationalized in the recent reform. It was, after all, an administration influenced by landowners which carried out the reform, not the party or the students mobilized during summer vacations. Short of further nationalizations, which seems unlikely, the new class of technocrats backed by an older rural bourgeoisie will probably increase its hold over the Algerian state. The regime's concentration on heavy industry virtually rules out any alternative strategy, such as a return to industrial self-management and a gradual deconcentration of state power, which might neutralize the new class' instruments of power. To be sure, workers' participation, like agrarian reform, is presently emphasized in the regime's rhetoric, but is it too cynical to suggest that the participation is to ensure industrial discipline just as the reform is to keep peasants away from the overcrowded cities?

Petroleum royalties and taxes, which probably increased by some $2.5 billion last year--or 40 per cent of the total budget for 1974--have made it possible for Algeria to double its 1974-77 investment program. Even more than in Tunisia or Morocco, the
regime is able to subsidize rising food prices and engage in other social expenditures, even while maintaining a massive rhythm of investment in industry. The new revenues earmarked for social expenditures and the development of impoverished regions, coupled with agricultural resettlement programs, may buy time for the regime until the massive industrial infrastructure is in place. In this sense these windfall earnings from petroleum are indeed a functional substitute for the fruits of decolonization, and they may filter across wider segments of Algerian society. But time also allows a new class to consolidate itself at the top of the pyramid, even as the pyramid extends downward to open up more jobs for Arabized clerical strata produced by the expanding educational system. In the continued absence of national channels for political articulation, resentment among the clerks, workers, and peasants is likely to increase; on the other hand, the regime may be able to keep buying off potential opposition as long as the economy keeps expanding.

There certainly do not seem to be any obvious relationships between democracy and economic development. Regimes which do not permit different social actors and groups to express themselves, however, usually seek legitimacy in other ways. In contemporary Algeria legitimacy seems to be derived from the regime's success in implementing two goals, industrialization and Arabization. As development proceeds, however, the potential conflict between these goals may become more manifest, the "church-state" dualism increasingly tenuous. The question remains whether the regime risk developing the national political institutions that might
mediate the conflict and bring the captains of industry under political control. The attempt at agrarian reform, the effort each year to "restructure" the party, and occasional hints that a national parliament may be elected are good indications that Boumedienne is trying to formulate an answer, but his problem seems like that of squaring a circle.

Morocco

Morocco, by contrast to Algeria, does not lack political infrastructure. Though meaningful national elections were held for the first and last time more than a decade ago, the political game established in the early sixties has survived two spectacular attempts to assassinate the gamekeeper, and its players cannot be any more disillusioned than they already were by 1965. Indeed, the very futility of the game in the eyes of most of its players helps to perpetuate it. For who else beside the king could keep the disparate forces at play and at bay, now unifying against arbitrary monarchical power, now bickering among themselves over the proper tactics and strategies of opposition, and then rallying to the monarch against foreign aggression or imperialism? "Even those most hostile to the regime fear its collapse," concludes one of its more incisive academic critics—especially after General Oufkir's coup almost succeeded.8

Boumedienne, too, has narrowly escaped assassination, yet outside observers tend to view Algeria as politically stable, Morocco is at the verge of revolution or at least another coup. The decaying bases of the political parties, the widening gulf between youth and students on the one hand, and the regime on
the other, and the questionable loyalty of key officers, can all be cited as good reasons for concern about Morocco's political health, but they are almost equally applicable to Algeria. The adverse judgment against Morocco tends instead to hinge on matters of economic growth and distribution. The Algerian economy seems dynamic, that of Morocco stagnant or "underdeveloping" unless the weather is good; the bigger Algerian budget offers a more effective redistribution of wealth than is possible in Morocco. Distribution in Morocco, furthermore, is conditioned by the class basis of support for the monarchy and by the rampant corruption of its top officials. And perhaps the clinching argument is that the Algerian regime has a coherent economic design whereas the monarchy just struggles to survive, reaping whatever benefits it can from private foreign investment.

These arguments might have passed muster, had the Skhirat or Boeing affair turned out differently. But ever since Mohammed V's unexpected death in 1961, academics have been giving the monarchy six months by similar reasoning. Are we then just to conclude, with some Moroccans, that the king has baraka? Or might there be a flaw to the argument? Why, for all its defects, has the political game endured, and with what consequences for possible change in its groundrules?

More deliberately and systematically than in either Algeria or Tunisia, the monarchy can be seen in retrospect to have exploited the processes of decolonization for its own ends. The process, which is not quite terminated even today, took far longer than in the other countries and hence was the most amenable
to political management. Compare, for instance, the treatment of settler lands in three countries. In Algeria they utterly escaped the control of party or state; autogestion in 1963 simply ratified a fait accompli. In Tunisia, producer cooperatives were hardly designed to put new life into the old party machine. Only in Morocco were the lands systematically and illegally sold to the regime's favorite clients, and their clients, to provide a structure of interests binding influential personalities to the regime. What was illicit could always be made explicit: hence, the monarch's ultimate control over the system. The principle also applies to most other sectors of economic activity in Morocco, as John Waterbury has beautifully demonstrated. 9

Thus, largely under the cover of private enterprise, the Moroccan regime probably exercises more direct political control over the economy than do either of the other North African regimes. Symptomatically, even public corporations like the Sherifian Office of Phosphates do not get included in the state budget as do their Algerian and Tunisian counterparts. Some of the public profits can therefore presumably be funneled into the monarch's private patronage system. The system may be economically less efficient than either one of legitimate private enterprise or state ownership, but it is probably politically more efficient in managing elite aspirations. In this sense Morocco's $1 billion windfall in phosphate earnings may go further than Algeria's $2.5 billion in additional petroleum revenues. The latter may create new jobs and increases in per capita income in the long run, but the former meanwhile services and extends political
patronage networks.

For how long? Skhirat was at least in part a response to corruption which became too visible. The king subsequently had to crack down on a few of the system's clients and even take his distance from his brother. But it can be argued that a slightly less "top-heavy" distribution of patronage may be politically more efficient. A royal miscalculation of the sort that inspired General Medboh to stop the game at Skhirat might reoccur, but, to paraphrase Marx, the outcome could just as well be comedy as tragedy. Existing generations of political actors seem well "socialized" into the system. A decade of political immobilism and personal profit-making has conditioned most of them into obeying the unofficial groundrules. Prevailing cynicism and disillusionment with efforts to effect political change further ensure that perpetual movement within the system leads nowhere. Some old faces have acquired new enthusiasm for the game. Thus the leader of Morocco's Communist Party, newly reintegrated under a different name, was the first to rally behind, and perhaps even to suggest, the king's campaign to "liberate" the Spanish Sahara last year. Only the "tame" UNFP-UNIT was not so cynical as to join in building this latest mirage of national unity.

To the argument that since the system leads nowhere, the youth are disaffected and will refuse to play the roles of their elders, it may be suggested that the student leaders are too cynical to envision a future for their country for which to fight. The very inadequacies of the Moroccan educational system may
further contribute to a relatively pliable youth. Though student leaders, being in the political opposition, have not, as in Tunisia, been directly promoted to the regime's political payroll, neither have they subsequently sustained any grassroots counterorganization.

In fact it is often pointed out that, since the parties and trade unions seem to have less members and fewer activities than at independence, the regime is becoming less stable. Its "safety valves" are no longer as strong as they used to be. Such an observation would be pertinent if Morocco were a western pluralist political system. But, as in Lebanon, the strength of parties seems inversely proportional to that of patronage networks, and the latter, not the former, seem to be the monarchy's principal "safety valves." These were strengthened as the parties were weakened. Conversely, the cacophony of party rhetoric, as each seeks to outbid the other, probably helps the monarchy by confusing the public.

The regime, based on what we and many Moroccans would consider corruption and blackamul, is not legitimate in any conventional sense. But it perpetuates in secular form the classic tension Clifford Geertz has discovered in Moroccan Islam "between holy man and strong man which, at every level from sultan to sheikh, and often within the life of a single individual, continues to plague Moroccan society." The formal political infrastructure presupposes a western-style pluralist system in which groups are allowed to act corporately and autonomously in pursuit of their interests. This is the heaven which the parties currently imagine
to be reality in order to act as parties, even while their leaders and influential members also play a more terrestrial politics. If the regime is illegitimate, so also was the Moroccan imamate which preceded French colonial rule. Indeed, a de facto "church-state" dualism, in this secular sense, may be more viable in Morocco than the uneasy balance between clerks and technocrats that seems to be developing in Algeria.

It is precisely because the monarchy has no economic design that it is less vulnerable to economic failure than the Algerian regime. The only necessary conditions for survival appear to be that the parties keep entangling themselves in their phantom cobwebs while the economy produces a surplus sufficient to keep servicing and extending the royal patronage networks. Barring another accident, Hassan, like Napoleon III, may survive unless he antagonizes another Bismarck. Meanwhile his army's participation in the October War gained him respectability in the concert of Arab states while ridding him of fractious officers.

Tunisia

Tunisia's single-party system, by contrast, has virtually collapsed, and the regime is undergoing a quiet, but probably decisive, transformation, amid the apparent continuity of Bourguiba's leadership. In certain respects the presidential monarchy is beginning to resemble Hassan's. Personal power has in both cases eroded political infrastructure, and Destour Socialism has been reinterpreted to mean a liberalization of the economy. But comparisons with Morocco are misleading because the Destour Socialist Party, itself reducible to personal networks of some of
Bourguiba's principal clients, can no longer fulfill the legitimating functions of the Moroccan party system. The Tunisian political heaven is exposed as an ordinary machine.

In making his political comeback after 1969, Bourguiba has once and for all destroyed the party as a living infrastructure which might accommodate the various factions persisting in the national political arena. To be sure, there were many earlier purges, yet the party survived. But whereas in 1955, 1959, or 1964, the party could be given new tasks to compensate for its losses in personnel or autonomy, new missions can no longer be plausibly fabricated, other than the final one of quite literally burying Bourguiba. The party meanwhile continues, as usual, to orchestrate the adulation of the president, but this is as routine as the recollections of his nationalist struggle he periodically evokes.

The regime is no longer Tunisia's principal growth industry. From 1970 to 1972 total public expenditure fell from 41 to 38 per cent of the GDP, and Prime Minister Hedi Nouira has been systematically practicing what the Egyptians preach, an "opening up" of the economy to private enterprise. Nouira's version of planning is not exactly liberal, for he argues that "any planning which accepted important degrees of indeterminacy would not be real planning. It would sooner or later take away the state's essential means of organizing and assuring the economic security of the nation." But his plans rely heavily on foreign private investment. In the past two years Tunisia has been extraordinarily successful in attracting new investment in manufacturing for
European markets. Almost twice as many new jobs were created in these labor-intensive industries as had been planned, and the trend is likely to continue. Consequently Tunisia's unemployment rates, which are not as steep as its neighbors', may be alleviated without recourse to vast government investment.

Meanwhile Tunisia's windfall export earnings from phosphates, petroleum, and olive oil provide a cushion for the regime, much as decolonization once did. Indeed, though there is probably no direct relationship between Bourguiba's recent reconsolidation of power and a buoyant economy, the regime's apparent economic successes may have facilitated the dismissal of party "liberals" (Ahmed Mestiri, Hassib Ben Ammar) from political life. Future convergence, as in 1972, between student and labor protest cannot be ruled out, but any student hopes of reenacting a "revolution" along the lines of the French one of 1968 seem misplaced for the time being. Barring a military coup--which would probably be in defense of the liberals, not leftist students or labor--the regime may survive as long as its leader. He has become a sort of political museum piece, but Hugh Thomas' description of Franco's last years could equally apply to Bourguiba, that his "trick...was to play on the fact of his mortality and thus inhibit the political life of the country."16

Since Ben Salah's fall the regime seems to have lost direction, apart from Nouira's economic stewardship. The logical alternative to too much state socialism would have been to broaden the party's base by allowing freer discussion and developing democratic procedures within the party. The "liberal" alternative won the
day at the first Monastir Congress, held in October 1971, but Bourguiba, having used the liberals to gain time, promptly got rid of them. He fell back instead on younger syncophants, while briefly using UGTT trade-unionists against the liberals. The second Monastir Congress, held in September 1974, marked his total triumph over the party which he then capped by disgracing though not dismissing the political functionary who had organized the triumph. Meanwhile the UGTT has taken its distances from the regime, and the liberals speculate about the possibilities of forming an opposition party. Regional cleavages, between Bourguiba's Sahel and other regions, notably Tunis, and within the party between Bourguiba's Monastir and other Sahel villages, are increasingly evident. In exile and in fear of political assassination, Ben Salah is probably the only Tunisian leader radical students respect.

Yet political life is not stalemated as in Morocco; it simply awaits the presidency of Hedi Nouira for the full transformation to become visible. There are three possibilities: 1) Nouira makes up with the liberals, with whom he is on relatively good terms, and they institutionalize the single-party system; 2) Nouira rules an administrative state with the help of rising technocrats (who, after flirting with the liberals, rallied to the regime), and the party continues to wither away; or 3) Tunisia turns into a multi-party system.

The longer Bourguiba remains president, the less viable the first alternative appears to be; indeed, the party seems already to have lost the sort of moral authority that made
internal liberalization plausible as late as 1970-71. Meanwhile Nouira's economic policies are undercutting the second, or "Algerian", alternative. A purely administrative system of the sort Boumedienne seems to be developing presupposes substantial and continuous public investment. As state expenditure relative to GDP increases, so also perhaps does the bureaucracy's ability to absorb or contain popular demands--either by satisfying them or coopting the opposition or depriving it of an economic base. But in Tunisia the reverse is happening. The dynamic economic sectors are increasingly in the hands of private Tunisian and foreign entrepreneurs. Even some of the state lands which once belonged to settlers are now being auctioned off to private bidders. Dismantling certain inefficient public enterprises, notably in commerce and foreign trade, has also encouraged the expansion of private Tunisian enterprise. The new bourgeoisie remains heavily dependent upon public favors, and the alleged corruption of public officials (though it does not appear to have reached Moroccan proportions) further blurs the boundaries between public and private sectors. But however dependent the new entrepreneurs may be on their friends in high places, it seems only a matter of time before their increasing economic autonomy will be translated into political autonomy. For the regime lacks not only a political design that might contain them but also a centralized patronage system.

The most likely prospect for Tunisia, then, is the third alternative, multi-party politics. The nascent bourgeoisie, even if it knew its own interests and could act coherently, cannot take
over the existing party and rule Tunisia alone. The regime foreclosed this possibility by excluding the "liberals" from the party. But the entrepreneurs will be able to fund alternative parties. The UGTT has also regained some of the financial autonomy Ben Salah took away in 1965 when he "converted" the trade union to his scheme of cooperatives. Unless Nouira, who hardly seems willing to go an authoritarian route, were to convert Tunisia into a nasty little police state, he will have to respond to a variety of frustrated social forces. The response most in keeping with his own political principles is to allow them to organize.

A more hardline response has few advocates, and those who have Bourguiba's favor today lack the political stature to have their way if they outlast him. Serious deterioration in the Tunisian economy might frighten Nouira and the entrepreneurs into taking an authoritarian path, but petroleum revenues, already substantial by Tunisian standards, are likely to increase sufficiently to counterbalance the effects of inclement weather.

In the last analysis, however, the biggest argument for the third alternative is Bourguiba's legacy. The elite, however fragmented it may appear, still seems sufficiently homogeneous, moderate, and politicized to sustain a competitive political process. Its political skills, its gradualist outlook toward change, and its ability to assimilate European modes of thought without any real threat to its own sense of identity, are all in no small part the reflection of an exemplary leadership and experience of nationhood. The end of Bourguibist in its present mechanical sense may therefore also signify its ultimate vindication.
In sum, then, the political development of the three North African states is no longer just petit bourgeois bureaucracy. However *déjà vu* and recycled the contemporary politics of these states may appear, their respective underlying trends appear increasingly to diverge from a common colonial past. If more ultimate explanations of such divergence lie in the respective patterns of anti-colonial struggle, the more immediate explanations lie in the political processes themselves rather than in the recent increases in export revenues which each might have used to keep expanding administrative infrastructure. In a sense, however, there are striking parallels between how Algeria and Morocco used their ex-settler resources and how they may be spending their new revenues. Algeria has kept expanding its public sector while Morocco keeps reconstructing royal patronage networks. Only Tunisia has shifted prevailing allocations between the public and private sector, with interesting implications for its future political development. All three countries—even Morocco—appear relatively stable politically at the present time, but each faces serious challenges, sufficiently obvious to have almost predictable outcomes.

The Moroccan monarchy, still reeling from two almost successful coups, faces the most obvious challenges, yet these are so obvious that I have minimized them on the grounds that any regime which seems so provisional and precarious will probably endure a while longer. It is not so much that the regime has an internal logic, though it has, as that Moroccans cannot agree upon an alternative logic and that consequently the monarch's elimination
would be a strictly fortuitous event that leads me to my perverse conclusion. In Algeria, by contrast, though the challenges are less obvious, Boumedienne himself articulates them both in word and in deed. It is perhaps a credit both to his regime and to the Algerian revolution that ambiguity--gaps between theory and practice--may be less easily tolerated in Algeria than in Morocco. But more politics, or what Marx would call mystification, may be needed to mediate cultural and class tensions. In Tunisia, apart from the radical students who can be dismissed as just a small part of the pluralism to come, the challenges may appear least obvious, the stability and continuity most evident as long as Bourguiba lives. But it may be Nouira's policies which unintentionally provide the greatest challenge of all: the possibility of a political alternative to the authoritarianism that in different forms has been North Africa's lot to date.
Footnotes


4. Ernest Gellner argues by analogy with medieval levantine cities that the uneasy coexistence between technocrats and Arabized clerks ("mamluks" and "bourgeoisie") is in fact viable. See his "The Unknown Apollo of Biskra: The Social Base of Algerian Puritanism," *Government and Opposition*, TX: 3 (summer, 1974), p. 304. While I find the analogy brilliantly suggestive for understanding contemporary Algeria, I question whether such coexistence ever really legitimated government, much less one capable of meeting the strains of industrialization.


12. In a slightly different context, note Geertz's following observation: "In Morocco, the bulk of ordinary life is secular enough to suit the most dedicated rationalist, and religious considerations, for all their intensity, are operative over only a few, fairly well demarcated regions of behavior, so that one gets a ruthlessness in, for example, commercial and political affairs which, at its most egregious, reminds one of the piquant combination of professional brutality and personal piety one finds in some American racketeers." *Ibid.*, pp. 112-113.

14. See Bourguiba's speeches, August 1, 1973, p. 55, and October 5, 1973, p. 21, indicating that the people will be expected to carry his coffin on their shoulders over the hundred miles from Carthage to Monastir, where his mausoleum has been built. (Ministry of Culture Affairs and Information, Tunis).
