SOME EFFECTS OF KOREAN SERVICE AND
SPECIAL TRAINING ON
KOREAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

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Research Memorandums are informal reports on technical research problems. Limited distribution is made, primarily to personnel engaged in research for the Army Research Institute.
OBJECTIVE

The research described here was designed to find out whether the training in Korean-American relations, given at entry for duty in Korea, had impact on the amount and quality of soldier relations with Korean civilians.

SUMMARY

At two camps where a three-day training program in Korean-American relations (Project Rainbow) had been conducted from September 1973 through November 1974, 382 enlisted men were surveyed. Of these, 97 had received the Project Rainbow training, and had since averaged six months experience in Korea. The survey data were tabulated in broad categories representing differences in enlisted grade, Korean service, and cultural identity. To measure the impact of Project Rainbow, the reported number of Korean civilian acquaintances and the quality of the relationships were compared between trained and untrained men. Percentages of trained and untrained men were compared within the broad categories, a method sensitive only to differences of at least ten percentage points.

The training had approximately the same impact on the white majority and the minorities. Differences in grade were highly associated with length of Korean service. Men who had served an earlier tour in Korea or extended their tour beyond 12 months showed no large differences with or without training but scored substantially higher than men on their first Korean tour in reported quantity and quality of relationships with Korean civilians. Among men on their first Korean tours, trained men reported many more Korean acquaintances than untrained men, but there was no large difference in the rated quality of relationships. Results confirmed the positive impact of training among men new to Korea.

This research was made possible by the support of US Army Garrison Camp Humphreys, Korea, through the Chief of Equal Opportunity/Race Relations, Gerald D. Marlowe, CPT, Infantry. SSG James A. Garren, Senior Human Relations Instructor, wrote the SOP for data collection and supervised data collection. SSG Roger Steakley assisted with data from Camp Ames. These Staff Sergeants also provided records to positively identify men who had been trained in Korean-American relations. The support of the Camp Humphreys command has included consulting and review of this manuscript, but the responsibility for design, analysis and opinions expressed rests with the author. Nothing in this report is to be considered an official viewpoint or statement by the Department of the Army or by any Eighth US Army command.
BACKGROUND

Korean-American relations training was given on an experimental basis in the Eighth U.S. Army from September 1973 through November 1974. The program was named Project Rainbow to suggest the desired harmony among the different cultural groups within the Army and in their relations with Koreans. Project Rainbow required three days of guided group discussion. A simple theory of social differences, common human values and interdependence was used to stimulate men to examine their roles as American soldiers in a foreign land. Men were led to see how differences might arise between cultures and were encouraged to react more rationally and less emotionally to such differences.

The program had been developed and monitored through several years of research in Korea, Okinawa and Thailand. The objective in Korea during the 1974 fiscal year was to prepare a training program as well as a set of manuals which could be used by the Army to run the program. The following year the program would be evaluated when it was being managed by the Army.

However, from the beginning Project Rainbow was in competition for training time and manpower. Specifically, the goals of the mandatory Equal Opportunity/Race Relations program, also amounting to three days training, clearly overlapped with Project Rainbow. More generally, commanders were everywhere confronted with the short-tour-area problem of getting the most useful service from men who come and go in twelve months. Project Rainbow seemed to many commanders just three more days "lost" to some one else's program when they were waiting to begin training men on the job. By June 1974, Eighth Army had decided to make Project Rainbow optional. By November 1974, Project Rainbow had generally been absorbed by the Equal Opportunity/Race Relations training programs or taken some other form.

Although Project Rainbow vanished as a training program, the need to orient new men to Korea and the problems of Korean-American relations remain. Or do they? And if they do, what have we lost by eliminating Project Rainbow? Indeed, parts of the project have been adapted and incorporated in human relations training because the continued need for Korean-American relations training seems obvious.

DEVELOPING CRITERIA OF TRAINING IMPACT

Yet another problem with programs like Project Rainbow is the question of consequences in behavior. Does this specific training yield improved behavior? Beyond the question of how long that behavior lasts, how much improvement is enough? What kind of behavior do we want when we train men? Answers to these questions are by their nature relative. Better behavior is the goal. But such an objective leaves us with an infinite series and endless research, not to mention endless leadership problems.
Continual improvement may be a suitable goal, but in a short assignment, it may be worthwhile to consider a finite solution. Here, this amounts to asking what kinds of behavior represent appropriate or reasonable goals for training. To get off of the treadmill of continually trying to improve something that can be improved only so much in the available time, research might try to develop a criterion measure not only of relative improvement but of the point of diminishing returns.

Project Rainbow was sensitive to these broad questions. One recent addition, the Action Program, was a direct effort to get men out into the Korean community and to practice new attitudes. Greater social contact with Koreans became one criterion of improvement. Improved quality of the contact was the other criterion.

These criteria were selected for good reason. Negative behavior such as fights or crimes are easier to describe, but occur too infrequently from a statistical viewpoint to often serve as practical criteria. Therefore, defining positive behavior and finding ways to measure it become the core problems in the present research, particularly the Project Rainbow Action Program.

The research reported here attempts to define how much is enough in the area of Korean-American relations. Our questionnaire represents our working definition. A portion of the questionnaire central to this effort is shown as Figure 1; at the risk of being too colloquial in a formal report, we suggest you should read it now. If it does not approximately fit your concept of a reasonable minimum standard of behavior for U.S. soldiers in Korea, then there is little for you in the results of this research. Note that we are not talking now about actual observed behavior. We hope that the questionnaire is simple enough and sufficiently unintrusive to make later studies of observed behavior possible.

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2 We are indebted to the Rainbow Staff for many ideas and research-based discussions of this problem. We are also indebted to the Eighth Army people who have reviewed our research instruments and shared their experiences in Korean-American relations.
YOU AND THE CULTURAL MIX IN KOREA

INSTRUCTIONS: This questionnaire is about your experience with Koreans, as civilians and as KATUSAs, and with black, Spanish-American and white soldiers in the U.S. Army in Korea. There is one page for each of these cultural groups. First, you are asked to identify some people you know to think about in describing your experience. If you do not know anyone you would identify in one of these cultural groups, then you need not respond to that page of the questionnaire.

The questions and experience statements are similar from page to page. All of the statements are meant to be constructive and reasonable to American soldiers in Korea. If you find that any one of the statements is unreasonable to you, please do not respond to that statement. If there is something more you would like to say about your experience, please use the margins or the back of any page.

YOUR IDENTIFICATION: This information is needed for research purposes, but your right to withhold it is recognized. If you are doubtful about supplying identification, please complete the questionnaire and then consider supplying the information requested below.

Last Name ___________________ Rank ___________ SSN ___________
Unit ___________________________________ APO ___________
How long have you been in Korea? _______ Months Total
Which is your cultural group: (Check one)

Black ____ Spanish-American ____ White ____ Other (Specify) _______

If "Other," do you think you are seen and treated as Black ______

Spanish-American ____ White ____ or independently ____? (Check one)

Figure 1. Representative portion of questionnaire.
YOU AND KOREAN CIVILIANS

A. Who are the Korean civilians you know in Korea? Think of the Korean civilians who are important in your experience here in Korea. Fill in the blanks below for as many as three Korean civilians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name or Initials Only</th>
<th>How long known? (Months)</th>
<th>Where/When do you meet? (Check one or both)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ________________________</td>
<td>______ Months</td>
<td>On Duty ______ Off Duty ______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ________________________</td>
<td>______ Months</td>
<td>On Duty ______ Off Duty ______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ________________________</td>
<td>______ Months</td>
<td>On Duty ______ Off Duty ______</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Roughly, how many Korean civilians do you know to talk to fairly often? Circle one number below.

100 plus 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 5 3 1 0

B. Read the experience statements below. The statements on the left are about your view of Korean civilians; those on the right are about their view of you. For each statement, circle ONE percentage that best fits or roughly matches your experience. Think of your recent experience with Korean civilians in Korea.

1. I get along well with Koreans I meet on post.
   100% 90 75 50 25 10 0%

2. The Koreans on post treat me very well.
   100% 90 75 50 25 10 0%

3. I trust Koreans in the ville as much as I would anyone in business near an Army post.
   100% 90 75 50 25 10 0%

4. The Koreans in the ville try as hard as any one doing business with soldiers to give me a fair value.
   100% 90 75 50 25 10 0%

5. I do not hesitate to go shopping or sightseeing among Koreans off post and outside of the ville.
   100% 90 75 50 25 10 0%

6. Koreans off post and outside of the ville treat me kindly as a visitor.
   100% 90 75 50 25 10 0%

7. Despite differences in language and culture, Korean people do not offend me or "turn me off."
   100% 90 75 50 25 10 0%

8. Korean people seem to accept my different ways very well.
   100% 90 75 50 25 10 0%

9. I let Koreans know that I want to understand and appreciate them.
   100% 90 75 50 25 10 0%

10. Some Koreans have done a great deal to make me happy here.
    100% 90 75 50 25 10 0%

Figure 1. Continued.
METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Military grade, months of experience in Korea, and cultural group identification were used as control variables to develop comparable samples of trained and untrained men. Each variable was broken down into two broad categories. Cross-tabulations of variables were prepared and analyzed for gross percentage differences. Only those percentage differences which would occur less than 5% of the time by chance were accepted as statistically significant. This method of gross percentage analysis is not sensitive to small differences. With the available sample sizes and sample breakdowns, the observed differences often needed to be greater than ten percentage points to be dependable. Hence, a conclusion of "no difference" in this kind of analysis must be understood to mean no big difference.

DATA COLLECTION

The research questionnaires were administered between December 1974 and February 1975 to groups of men at Camp Humphreys and Camp Ames. The letter announcing the data collection, instructions given to the men surveyed, and the questionnaires are given in the Appendix.

The sample is not representative of the enlisted strength at these camps. However, it is assumed to represent the kinds of men who might be assigned to Rainbow training on the basis of availability.

Officers and men associated with Rainbow or EOT/RK training programs were excluded from the sample for analysis.

SAMPLE DESCRIPTION

The sample for which complete data were available was 382 men, broken down as follows:

Grade - 40% E-5 and above, 60% E-4 and below

Experience - 67% First tour in Korea, 33% Returnees (19%)/Extendees (14%)

Cultural identity - 68% white, 32% minorities (21% Black, 11% Spanish/Other)

Training - 25% Rainbow trained, 75% not Rainbow trained

The smaller percentages shown in parenthesis were combined for analysis so that each variable could be handled as two classes adding up to 100%. These combinations do not mean there were no differences among the subgroups; the combinations mean merely that the numbers were too small to study.
CONTROL VARIABLES AND TRAINING

The first step in analysis was to see if the trained and untrained groups differed in grade, experience and cultural identity. There was, in fact, a major relation between grade and experience: 47% of the men in Grade 5 or higher were Returnees/Extendees, compared to 24% of the men in Grade E-4 or below. However, this relation did not throw the trained and untrained groups out of balance.

Over the whole sample, this grade-experience relationship was the only simple, two-way relationship with differences large enough to be significant. The observable differences associated with grade and training, grade and culture, culture and training were well within the variations possible by chance.

However, comparing two variables while ignoring others can mask more complicated relationships. Therefore, we systematically examined the two-way relationships with respect to each of the other variables to determine whether the two-way relationships were the same over the levels of the other variables. Out of the resulting three-way comparisons, only one significant difference emerged, that involving culture, grade and training. Among the white majority, the percentages of men trained within grade were statistically comparable, but among minorities, 37% of the E-5 or higher group had received training compared to only 11% of the E-4 or lower group. This difference within the minorities was almost exactly counterbalancing so it was possible to ignore that difference when data were combined over grade levels.

This three-way difference suggests that assignment to Rainbow training was equitable among whites, but discriminatory toward lower ranking minorities. However, no firm conclusion can be made. The difference could be the result of disparity between the number of higher ranking whites and minorities reporting for the survey.

CRITERION MEASUREMENT

Our questionnaire (Figure 1) demonstrates how we have defined ordinary social experience and how we have attempted to focus the respondent's attention on his experience with specific Korean civilians during his time in Korea.

The preliminary instructions are intended to establish an attitude set somewhat different from the usual attitude survey. We wanted people to consider present and recent experience with particular Korean civilians instead of their general past experience. People were specifically instructed not to respond if they did not know any Korean civilians well enough to respond. This instruction cost us about 12% of the sample of 437 men, mostly in the untrained group. The number of men in this category
was too small to break down over the control variables, and we were unprepared to lump them into the low contact or low quality of relations groups. Instead, we chose to treat this group as unknown as far as the criterion measures are concerned. When more data are available we plan to examine this group separately.

The first part of the questionnaire, calling for names or initials, has not yet been analyzed; it was designed to center attention and prepare respondents for the numerical estimate of the number of Korean civilians known "well enough to talk to." These estimates are not intended to be literally accurate, but rough and relative estimates.

The full range of the "number known" scale was used by respondents, thus allowing us to establish a "high-low" cutting point of "20 or more" which was very close to the median for the entire sample. In fact 49% of the estimates fell at or above this point. We used this breakdown throughout the remaining analysis. Because, as already noted, the low group excludes men reporting no acquaintanceship, we labeled the two categories "few" and "many." "Few" means an estimate from one to 10; "many" means an estimate from 20 to 100 or more.

The quality of relationships score became the sum of the experience ratings for the left and right columns of responses. The left column was intended to gauge what the respondent experienced as his part of the relationship, whereas the right sought to learn the respondent's conception of the Korean civilians' contributions to the relationship. There was a definite tendency to say that "I," the soldier contributed more than "they" the Koreans, but the difference was considered a constant in the analysis. In fact, the correlation between the two columns was so high the scores were combined into one.

The correlation between columns was taken as an estimate of the reliability of the sum. The combined self and other scores (column scores) produced a wide normal distribution. We selected a cutting score near the median, thus dividing the sample into high and low groups. Using this score reliability was so high that no more than 10% of those classified as high or low would be expected to change positions were they to complete the questionnaire a second time in a short interval. The accuracy of classification was 90% or better.

It is important to note that the low-high classification is not equivalent to good-bad; it is relative. The cutting point was well within the range of satisfactory relations if one interprets the rating scale at face value. In fact, the median rating said, in effect, good ordinary relations were experienced more than 75% of the time. Most of the men below the median said their relations were positive around 50% of the time. Again, these ratings were not literal, but they roughly represent the quality of experience as the men in this sample were willing and able to describe it. One cannot conclude on this basis that relations were good or bad in an absolute sense.
The content of these rating scales was oriented toward minimum levels of ordinary social relations. We did not ask troops to evaluate Korean character, morals, and working habits or to make comparisons between Korean culture and their own. Our heavy bias toward positive behavior, and away from generalizations and value judgments, reflects our professional fear that attitude measurements may encourage or suggest that such judgments are reasonable in themselves. In short, we believe we should not lend "scientific" dignity to generalized viewpoints lest we encourage prejudice.

CONTROL VARIABLES AND CRITERIA

Statistical comparisons of the control variables with the criterion variables were undertaken to see which, if any, control variable had greatest impact. In these analyses, relations with numbers of civilians known or the "few-many" categories were examined first. In the sample as a whole, the relationship between numbers of Korean civilians known and the rated quality of social contact was significant. However, when the sample was broken down into experience, grade or culture group, this relation was reduced to insignificance. No dependable relationship appeared between amount of Korean contact and quality of that contact within similar groups of soldiers.

Length of Korean service made a substantial difference in the amount of contact. Among first tour men, 43% reported knowing many Korean civilians, whereas among returnees and extendees, 61% made this claim. Conversely, differences broken down by grade were insignificant. No significant differences appeared between the majority whites and the combined minorities on either criterion variable in any of the comparisons. Percentage analysis of a small sample is by definition insensitive to differences even when they might prove stable through larger samples. We cannot conclude there are no differences between the majority whites and the minorities. However, we can conclude that differences were too small to be consequential in this analysis.

These analyses of the control variables with respect to the criterion variables indicated that length of Korean service made the big difference. Therefore, we proceeded to compare trained and untrained groups within Korean service groups.
IMPACT OF RAINBOW TRAINING

The identification of trained and untrained men requires some attention before discussing these results. The third questionnaire in our research package asked about Race Relations Training, Korean-American Relations Training and other cross-cultural experiences. For the purposes of this report, we made very little effective use of the information yielded by this questionnaire. The trained men in this analysis were those identified by matching with Project Rainbow records of training at Camp Humphreys and at Camp Ames. We did look at the reported training experience, of course, and we found a substantial overlap between self reports and records. Even so, only the records were taken as final.

The self-reports were used to estimate the time since training. The average was a little over six months from training to month of survey. The elapsed time distribution ranged from one month to 14 months with most men between 4 and 8 months. Tables 1 and 2 show our results.

Among the returnees/extendees, there was no significant difference between trained and untrained men on either criterion. What small differences did occur could be attributed to chance. However, as previously demonstrated, returnees/extendees were significantly higher on both variables than first tour soldiers.

Among first tour soldiers, in contrast, a significant difference was associated with the reported contact with Korean civilians. Among trained men, 54% reported knowing many Korean civilians as contrasted with only 38% among the untrained men. This result is consistent with a major purpose of Project Rainbow, getting men to move out and into relationships with Koreans. However, there was no significant difference in the quality of relationships between trained and untrained men.

We believe these results show the overriding impact of experience in Korea. Training has apparently moved some new men into more frequent contact with Koreans, but these relationships are of no higher quality than those of untrained men. Length of Korean service makes the big difference in both quantity and quality of relations with Korean civilians. A substantial majority of men with more than a year's experience in Korea were found in the high group on both criteria.

We believe these results also show that our positively oriented questionnaire has validity in that it yields sensible results. We suspect, further, that the quality and quantity of Korean-American relations found for "old Korea hands" may be useful as benchmark in the evaluation of training or other efforts to improve Korean-American relations. In short, we believe that the average level of relations among these men might be taken as a practical standard of how much is enough.
Table 1
Percentages Reporting Many\textsuperscript{a} Acquaintances Among Korean Civilians by Korean Service and Training Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Korean service</th>
<th>Untrained</th>
<th>Trained</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total months all tours</td>
<td>$^{b}$ (N)$^{c}$</td>
<td>$^{b}$ (N)</td>
<td>$^{b}$ (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-12 months, first Korean tour</td>
<td>38.4 (185)</td>
<td>54.3 (70)</td>
<td>42.7 (255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 12 months, returnees/extendees$^{d}$</td>
<td>62.0 (100)</td>
<td>55.6 (27)</td>
<td>60.6 (127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46.7 (285)</td>
<td>54.6 (97)</td>
<td>48.7 (382)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}"Many" means estimating that 20 or more Korean civilians were known "to talk to fairly often."

\textsuperscript{b}Underlined percentages are significantly different at 5% level of confidence or better.

\textsuperscript{c}Parentheses contain the number of persons in the denominator of the percentage. N is the sample size.

\textsuperscript{d}Extendees are soldiers who volunteered to stay beyond the normal 12-month tour. They were 43% of the over 12-month group.
Table 2
Percentages Rating Their Experience with Korean Civilian
Highly\(^a\) by Korean Service and Training Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Korean service</th>
<th>Untrained</th>
<th>Trained</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total months all tours</td>
<td>(\ddagger) (N)(^c)</td>
<td>(\ddagger) (N)</td>
<td>(\ddagger) (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-12 months, first Korean tour</td>
<td>49.2 (185)</td>
<td>42.9 (70)</td>
<td>47.5 (255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 12 months, returnees/extendees(^d)</td>
<td>62.0 (100)</td>
<td>63.0 (27)</td>
<td>62.2 (127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>53.7 (285)</td>
<td>48.5 (97)</td>
<td>48.7 (382)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) "Highly" means an average rating above the approximate median for the total sample. Literally, this level amounts to saying experience has been good more than 75% of the time on all 10 rating scales.

\(^b\) Underlined percentages are significantly different at 5% level of confidence or better.

\(^c\) Parentheses contain the number of persons in the denominator of the percentage. N is the sample size.

\(^d\) Extendees are soldiers who volunteered to stay beyond the normal 12-month tour. They were 43% of the over 12-month group.
Future research efforts may be directed toward the exploration of these possibilities. The most pressing questions from a research viewpoint are how actual behavior is related to these self reports and how fast experience has its impact.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Project Rainbow had a positive impact among men new to Korea on reported number of acquaintances among Korean civilians, but not on the rated quality of these experiences.

2. Among men returning to Korea or extending on their first tour, no large improvement was associated with training, but such men reported markedly better relations than new men.

3. A simple positively oriented questionnaire demonstrated practical levels of reliability and conceptual validity as a potential benchmark for evaluating Korean-American relations training.

Further research is needed to substantiate the possibility that Korean-American relations training should be limited to men who are new in the country. The fact that Korean-American relations training is now given as part of EOT/RR training is the most important reason for further research. Sorting out the several objectives of EOT/RR training is a more complicated research task which will require a much larger sample than is now at hand.