

LEW

11

18 September 1971

ACN 17792

6

PERSONNEL OFFENSIVE (PHASE II)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

12 337

DDC
RECEIVED
OCT 25 1971
SERIAL 11

UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AGENCY



THIS FILE COPY

PERSONNEL AND LOGISTICS SYSTEMS GROUP

PERSONNEL SYSTEMS GROUP
Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

390 209

DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

/



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

ARI FIELD UNIT, BENNING

U S ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
PO BOX 2086, FORT BENNING, GEORGIA 31905

PERI-1J

8 August 1979

SUBJECT: Shipment of Documents

Defense Documentation Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314
ATTN: Selection & Cataloging

The Documents in these shipments are approved for public release. The distribution is unlimited.

FOR THE CHIEF:

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Alexander Nicolini".

ALXANDER NICOLINI
Major, Infantry
R&D Coordinator

FOREWARD

This unclassified Executive Summary has been prepared in order to present the significant features of the Personnel Offensive (Phase I) Study, a sub-study of the Department of the Army study "The American Soldier in the 70's," sponsored by Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters, Department of the Army. A review of each chapter of the main report is presented in summary form. The reader is invited and urged to refer to the Main Report for a complete discussion of each area of interest.

Accession icr	
NTIS G.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DDC TAB	
Unannounced	
Justification	
By _____	
Distribution/	
Availability Center	
Dist.	Avail and/or special
A	

CONTENTS

	Page
FOREWORD.....	ii
SUMMARY OF EACH CHAPTER	
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction	1
CHAPTER 2 - Factors Influencing Individual Performance in Combat	2
CHAPTER 3 - Personal and Social Characteristics....	3
CHAPTER 4 - Fundamental Problems in Converting Incoming Personnel to Effective Combat Soldiers	4
CHAPTER 5 - Impact of Changing Characteristics of Youth on the Army of the 70's.....	5
CHAPTER 6 - Functional Area Problems/Approaches	8
CHAPTER 7 - Conclusions/Recommendations	28

SUMMARY OF EACH CHAPTER

Chapter 1.

1. Introduction.

a. Chief of Staff Memorandum 71-9, dated 12 January 1971, directed the conduct of a study to provide alternative Army personnel policies and doctrine required to develop the capabilities of American soldiers in the 1970's. The study, "Personnel Offensive (Phase I)" is one of three sub-studies which comprise the Headquarters, Department of the Army Priority Study, "American Soldier in the 70's." The other two sub-studies, which were developed by the Research Analysis Corporation, are entitled: "Value Conflicts Between Civil Society and Military Institutions" and "Future Impact of Dissident Elements Within the Army on the Enforcement of Discipline, Law and Order."

b. An assumption was made that incoming personnel during the 1970's will differ in social and personal characteristics from persons who entered the Army in earlier decades. It was further assumed that because of the differences in entering personnel, it would be necessary to modify Army policy and doctrine regarding personnel management and administration

c. The objectives of ^{the} study are to:

(1) Describe the changing characteristics of incoming military personnel during the 1970's.

(2) Determine the effects of the changing characteristics of incoming personnel in the 1970's upon Army personnel policy and doctrine.

(3) Propose alternative Army leadership techniques, personnel policies, and doctrine regarding troop leadership, personnel management and administration.

(4) To identify areas where sufficient information is lacking and describe the requirements for Army studies or research in these areas.

d. The scope of the study included tasks which aggregated and summarized the available research findings in two areas:

(1) The factors influencing individual performance in combat.

(2) The probable personal and social characteristics of incoming personnel during the 1970's.

e. A subsequent task of the study required an analysis phase which compared the results of (1) and (2) to determine what fundamental problems may develop in converting incoming personnel into effective combat soldiers.

f. The final task of the study was concerned with a review of personnel management policies and personnel and administrative systems to determine the probable impact of changing personal and social characteristics of incoming personnel upon them.

g. The guidelines within which the research was conducted limited the study effort to an analysis of secondary research material and data. As a consequence, data on certain of the areas inherent in the study presented a narrow frame of reference. This was considered to be a limitation of the study.

Chapter 2.

2. Factors influencing individual performance in combat.

a. Identifying the factors which influence the effective performance of individual soldiers in combat establishes a base for determining where conflict situations may develop between individuals' characteristics and military behavioral requirements essential to a high state of discipline, law, and order. Leadership, discipline, and training, normally considered as the predominant factors influencing combat effectiveness, are not sufficiently definitive to identify all potential conflict areas.

b. Preliminary research provided the basis for a listing and definition of twenty-nine factors which were felt to encompass all of the factors which would influence the effective performance of individuals in combat. Based on this listing, a survey questionnaire was developed to solicit comments of selected general officers, senior combat commanders, and command sergeants major of combat units and training centers. The purpose of this effort was to confirm the identification of the factors derived from research and insure these factors were valid based on the combat experiences of the respondents.

c. Analysis of the responses to the survey dictated the addition of nine factors and the combination of seven factors with others already listed. No attempt was made to evaluate or analyze the relative merit, degree of applicability, or relative weight of each factor. Rather, it was reasoned that each factor could, based on the situation and individual, influence combat effectiveness. The factors were divided into three functional areas: motivational, stress, and support.

d. The following are the thirty-one factors identified as having an influence on individual performance in combat.

MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS

- | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| (1) Discipline | (8) Recognition |
| (2) Training | (9) Religious Attitudes and Beliefs |
| (3) Belief in Cause | (10) Pride |
| (4) Group Solidarity | (11) Initiative and Desire to Win |
| (5) Leadership | (12) Social Environment |
| (6) Mission | (13) Public Support |
| (7) Military Peer Group | |

STRESS FACTORS

- | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
| (1) Fear and Survival | (6) Boredom and Inactivity |
| (2) Moral Code | (7) Family Influence |
| (3) Intelligence | (8) Weather and Terrain |
| (4) Constraints | (9) Health-Physical Fitness |
| (5) Drugs and Alcohol | (10) Fatigue |

SUPPORT FACTORS

- | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------|
| (1) Weapons | (5) Living and Working Conditions |
| (2) Equipment | (6) Food |
| (3) Supplies | (7) Medical Support |
| (4) Reinforcement | (8) Administration |

Chapter 3.

3. Personal and social characteristics.

a. Research of personal and social characteristics of military

entrants was designed to construct a composite image of youth in the 70's and to provide a basis for subsequent analysis of problems to be encountered in converting such entrants into effective combat soldiers.

b. Through analysis of research material, nineteen personal and social characteristics of incoming personnel during the 1970's were identified. It is recognized that not every individual will possess each of these characteristics to the same extent, however, the following do represent a general overview of the youth group of the 70's.

Peer Group Oriented	Mass Educated
Liberal	Mobile
Individualistic	Challenging
Industrious	Socially Aware
Value Sustaining	Functionally Oriented
Idealistic	Accustomed to Affluence
Suspicious	Urban Oriented
Self-Expressive	Self-Centered
Unpretentious	Disenchanted
Attuned to Democratic Process	

Chapter 4.

4. Fundamental problems in converting incoming personnel to effective combat soldiers.

a. The scope of the study required a comparison of the factors influencing effective individual performance in combat with the personal and social characteristics of incoming personnel during the 1970's. As substantiating evidence to modify and/or support the fundamental problems of the individual and the Army, additional analysis was conducted to present fundamental problems currently existing between society and the military institution.

b. The objectives in the analysis to determine the fundamental problems between the individual and the Army were to ascertain what was necessary in order to:

- (1) Satisfy an adequate number of factors influencing effective performance in combat in order to achieve an effective unit.
- (2) Satisfy an adequate number of personal and social

characteristics of the individual in order to achieve a satisfied and effective soldier.

c. The final step in the analysis was to summarize and present as the fundamental problems the effects of the youth characteristics upon each appropriate factor influencing individual performance in combat.

d. The task of converting military entrants into effective combat soldiers, which faces the Army in the decade ahead, will not be an easy one. Social change, as it has occurred and is occurring, perceives a new role for the military institution of the 70's. The attitudes and feelings of the youth of the 70's will embrace the philosophies of the changing society and they will manifest their feelings with a negativism toward the military establishment. *

e. The perceived lack of an immediate threat together with the avowed national purpose of no more war, will obviate in the minds of the youth the need for and motivation toward combat training and effectiveness. The purpose and goal of the military institution as a peace keeping and deterrent force may appear to be incongruent with present methods and procedures of training and maintaining a combat ready force.

f. The ideological mix of the youth of the 70's will require commanders at all levels to rely upon styles of leadership that do not derive discipline from fear and punishment. The highest form of professionalism within the leadership ranks will be necessary to recognize conflict situations and/or resolve the diverse demands and expectations of the young soldier of the 70's. The true challenge to leadership will be to keep the mission and the well-being of the troops in balance. The leadership style must embrace new techniques that will allow the commander the latitude necessary to assure the welfare of his men while at the same time enabling him to accomplish the mission that is required.

Chapter 5.

5. Impact of changing characteristics of youth on the Army of the 70's.

a. An assessment of the fundamental problem areas, outlined in chapter 4, led to the determination that there must be a bridge on which to span the differences associated with the changing characteristics of youth and the institutional practices of the Army. It was apparent that the Army possesses, within its policies affecting personnel, the

building blocks needed to construct a meaningful and enduring bridge.

b. The blocks which can construct the bridge are personnel management and administration, leadership and training. Through these areas the Army can express its fundamental philosophy, objectives, and major policies. When functioning properly in unison, the functional areas of personnel management and administration, leadership, and training will interact to foster positive and reduce negative impact, thereby promoting the discipline necessary in developing an effective and highly motivated soldier. The personnel and administration area was determined to be too broad and complex to be handled as a single area, therefore it was decided to divide the area into two parts: classification, assignment and utilization; and incentives, rewards and punishment.

c. The analysis to determine the youth impact upon the Army of the 70's included an examination of the areas previously listed. In order to project the requirements of the future in the areas of personnel management, leadership and training it was necessary to determine the impact of youth on the present doctrine, policies, procedures and practices. It was reasoned that any weaknesses identified in the Army today could, if uncorrected, prove to be a source of greater discontent in the future time frame.

d. The changing characteristics of the youth of the 70's will have a significant impact on Army personnel management, administration, leadership, and training. The Army -- traditionally rigid in its policies and practices, and reluctant to change -- has not previously been faced with the problem of deriving its manpower from a society which is so concerned with the rights and needs of individuals, as opposed to institutional requirements. The Army is adapting to the changing social environment in a number of ways, however, the changes are being made slowly. Army leadership is cognizant of the challenge that faces the Army and has taken the first steps in recognizing that institutional concepts and policies must appreciate and heed the requirements of its most significant and prized asset, its people.

e. Within the constraints dictated by institutional necessity, classification, assignment, and utilization concepts will have to be made more flexible to allow for greater individual participation. Procurement activities will initially feel the impact and must have professionally competent personnel who can capitalize on a system sufficiently flexible to appeal to the youth of the 70's. Contractual obligations are perceived as

benefiting the Army only and must be altered to better facilitate the accomplishment of the Army's mission, as well as attracting sufficient qualified entrants. Personnel management and administrative policies and procedures must consider the military members' desire to have a significant role in his future. The requirement for personnel movement and the subsequent turbulence will not be acceptable to incoming youth and must be changed.

f. Leadership is a functional area which will certainly feel the impact of youth and conversely is the area through which the Army can exert a definite and positive influence. The leaders must have the professional acumen and integrity required to legitimize their roles as leaders of the young soldier of the 1970's. Additionally, the personnel management and military justice systems must provide commanders with a real and viable role in order that they may foster positive impact and counter negative impact of the members of their command.

g. Training, like leadership, is a functional area that can provide the environment to accentuate the positive characteristics of youth, reducing or eliminating the negative aspects. Initial training must be based on high standards and provide a real challenge for the trainee. Group solidarity, pride, and high morale must be fostered through unit identification. Combat arms training must be made more relevant and meaningful in order to attract the highly motivated individual. The Army should provide training which will be a basis upon which an individual leaving the service can transition into a civilian occupation. Training personnel must be of the highest caliber and professionally qualified in order to cope with the youth of the 70's.

h. Incentives, rewards, and punishment are extremely important in establishing the correct motivational climate for the soldier of the 70's. Procurement and retention of highly qualified personnel are dependent on the Army's ability to improve pay, educational opportunities, job satisfaction, housing and other benefits to bear a reasonable relationship to that of the civilian society. The military justice system needs reform to provide the commander with a highly important tool in establishing and maintaining discipline. Usual awards and decorations may be inadequate as a motivational force and the many administrative and "red-tape" constraints reduce the effectiveness of this program.

i. Outdated philosophies and practices, which are repugnant to and may well be rejected by the military entrant of the 70's, must be updated to provide the motivational environment conducive to a professional and volunteer Army.

Chapter 6.

6. Functional area problem/approaches.

a. The approach adopted for the final solution process is a unique departure from convention. This approach is based on the knowledge that the nature of many of the problems surfaced is not necessarily new. Some of the specifics of the problems have changed slightly, but the fundamental problems still exist. It was reasoned, on the basis of our research, that if the previous approaches to solving many of the Army problems over the past decade were unsuccessful, then a new approach should be attempted. This approach addresses the nature of the problems and their interaction in terms of the total context of their separate functional identities. By this method the gist of many deficiencies and fragments of negative conditions (problems) can be expressed in the form of questions, which challenge the status quo for each functional area involved and require positive objective responses.

b. The identification of these negative conditions (problems) within the major functional areas was accomplished through the analysis of the impact of youth characteristics upon each of the four major functional areas and supported by existing studies, opinion polls, attitude surveys, and other source documents. The alternative approaches developed in response to the functional area questions were then analyzed and cross-tabulated to the four major study areas.

c. The Personnel Offensive (Phase I) Workshop was conceived as a means to achieve depth and range in analyzing the tentatively identified functional area problems and approaches. The workshop was divided into four committees to correspond with the four study areas. Each committee report was reviewed and analyzed in an effort to expand or otherwise clarify the functional area problems and alternative solutions recommended.

d. As a final effort in assessing the unique approach adopted for the study, a group of academic consultants were invited to review and comment upon the material that had been developed. Their comments were extremely favorable.

e. It must be recognized that the alternative approaches or answers to many of the questions posed represent a departure from some of the basic assumptions underlying the Army's philosophical foundation. In

order to effect change necessitated by many of the suggested solutions it will be necessary for the leadership at the highest levels to create the impetus for a change. This transition may present a difficult challenge since many of the policies, programs, and procedures have evidently served the Army well in the past eras.

f. A listing of the questions, with abbreviated alternative approaches, are provided for illustrative purposes. Alternatives are stated without supporting argument or rationale. Readers should, therefore, refer to chapter 6 of the main report prior to accepting or rejecting these proposals. It is realized that some of the questions are not new and that some of the proposed alternatives are already under consideration. Others, however, are new and even radical approaches to Army problems.

(1) How can the Army attract the quality of personnel necessary to build and maintain a professional and modern volunteer Army?

(a) Promote better quality and dedication in those selected for and associated with recruiting duty.

1 Branches must continue to take all necessary action to include recruiting duty as a priority assignment. The ultimate would be to establish a career branch for officers for recruiting.

2 There should be no maximum tour length for successful recruiters, with every attempt made to procure individuals for recruiting positions who desire extended stabilization.

3 Allow only the recruiting station to which the individual volunteers for assignment to conduct the interview for that individual.

4 Discontinue the practice of encouraging "volunteers" among the enlisted ranks by promising relief from a current unsatisfactory assignment in exchange for a "volunteer" application for recruiting duty.

(b) Deemphasize the measurement standards based upon quotas in the EER and OER for the recruiting NCO's and officers.

(c) Recruit for (and assign to) specific jobs to insure suitability, job satisfaction and better performance.

1 Broaden both the comprehensiveness of entrance examinations and the scope of military options available for the recruiter to offer the individual.

2 The Army should design a more responsive and sophisticated system of projecting its input requirements for the recruiting main stations.

(2) What changes are necessary in the entrance standards to achieve better utilization of personnel?

(a) Review existing mental and physical standards for entry on active duty in conjunction with a realistic assessment of actual job requirements. For certain jobs in different environments, different standards should be applied.

(b) The use of the urine analysis for identification of habitual drug users should be instituted immediately for all service physicals, to include those who are first entering the service. The Army must categorically deny service entrance to all hard drug users.

(c) Standardize entrance requirements for both sexes.

(3) How can the Army increase utilization of female personnel?

(a) Eliminate Section 3215, Title 10, U. S. Code which restricts women to two percent of the Armed Forces.

(b) Include women on interview boards for selection of recruiters.

(c) Expand course of instruction for recruiters' course to incorporate the role of women in the Army.

(d) Update literature on options for and responsibilities of women in the Army.

(e) Eliminate inequities between mental requirements for males and females.

(f) Eliminate inequities in age requirements for initial entry of women.

(g) Eliminate inequities in application of marital status requirement for women.

(h) Integrate WAC personnel in all branches except combat arms.

(i) Designate all TOE/TDA positions for assignment of female personnel except branch material-combat arms qualifications.

(j) Compile and distribute information to all commanders regarding use of women in Armed Forces.

(4) How can the Army improve classification and assignment procedures to insure continued success in getting the right man in the right job?

(a) Review, evaluate and revise, where necessary, the Army screening tests and measurements program to effectively evaluate the whole man to include his personality, psychological, aptitude, vocational interests and leadership potential.

(b) Professional interviewing techniques with better qualified interviewers must be used in the initial classification process.

(c) Deemphasize the importance of rapid processing of new recruits through reception stations and emphasize more efficient and effective selection and classification.

(d) Establish additional test procedures and prerequisites for speciality MOS to allow for an expanded lateral entry program to include other technical as well as non-technical MOS in the program.

(e) Review and analyze job requirements for all TOE/TDA positions to determine where and how space and skill requirements may be reduced.

(f) Decrease the emphasis on requirements for high quality personnel in jobs requiring only minimum talents.

(g) Review and revise the existing MOS structure to obtain a more precise differentiation of occupational areas.

(h) Develop more sophisticated discrimination in classification tests to better determine individual qualifications.

(5) What measures can be taken to decrease malutilization of personnel?

(a) Use the existing surplus reporting system as it was intended. Current procedures and policies provide for commanders at all levels to report for reassignment those individuals who cannot be properly utilized in accordance with AR 600-200 and AR 614-200. If these regulations are followed to the letter and intent, better utilization of Army personnel must result.

(b) Establish strict policies and procedures to insure that replacements are assigned to the unit for which requisitioned. Siphoning off of personnel at each succeeding layer of command continues to be a problem and adds to improper utilization of personnel.

(c) Place more emphasis on training for secondary MOS skills to alleviate potential MOS imbalances in CONUS and overseas. A thorough review of the MOS structure together with actual job requirements must be undertaken to determine imbalances caused by the uniqueness of each area.

(d) In those instances where an MOS is required in CONUS but not in an overseas area, study should be undertaken to determine the feasibility of CONUS tours only for individuals possessing those particular MOS.

(e) Include in the POIs of branch service schools, C&GSC and Senior Service Colleges a course in the MOS structure and proper maintenance of the MOS system. All potential Army leaders must be made aware of the impact that MOS balance/imbalance has on the overall Army operation.

(6) How can the Army reduce personnel turbulence?

(a) Establish a two-year PCS restriction for other than short-tour areas. This step may be drastic but initially this is necessary in order to stop much of the assignment/reassignment actions currently taking place.

(b) Reevaluate the merits and shortcomings of homesteading. There is ample evidence available to support the fact that an individual can certainly be more effective in a job when he fully understands everything about that job and is satisfied in doing that particular job.

(c) Eliminate or drastically reduce unaccompanied tours overseas.

(d) Utilize the unit move concept wherever possible.

(e) Expand command tour policy to include officers and NCOs down to and including platoon levels. Command tours should be considered as one of the utmost priority assignment programs in the Army and, as such, should receive close Department of the Army monitorship.

(f) Liberalize and expand the policy for tour stabilization. Each specified tour should be reviewed with the objective of lengthening the period of stabilization wherever possible. Other geographic areas as well as specific job positions should be examined for inclusion in the stabilization policy.

(g) Expand the present enlistment options for stabilized tours.

(h) Require all branches to review requirements to determine if normal tour lengths can be expanded. This review would have to be conducted in conjunction with the review of stabilization policies.

(7) How can the Army facilitate elimination of undesirable personnel?

(a) Institute a one-year trial enlistment option to be terminated at the discretion of either party.

(b) Simplify procedures designed to discourage reenlistment of unqualified, nonproductive personnel.

(c) Decrease the emphasis on the statistical significance of achieving reenlistment quotas.

(d) Delegate authority for bar to reenlistment to:

1 Commanders with special court-martial jurisdiction where the bar involves individuals with less than 18 years service.

2 Commanders with general court-martial jurisdiction where the bar involves individuals with over 18 years service.

(e) Stringent requirements associated with elimination procedures must be attenuated.

(f) Authorize commanders with special court-martial authority to waive the counselling and rehabilitation required by AR 635-212.

(g) Study the existing discharge procedures with a view toward simplification.

(h) Incorporate all administrative discharges into the category of honorable and treat all others as punitive.

(i) Establish a more flexible contractual obligation to allow for freer entry to and exit from the service.

(j) Adoption of an indefinite career status for enlisted personnel.

(8) How can the Army improve policies and procedures to strengthen the key role played by commanders in the function of personnel management?

(a) Study the feasibility of the delegation of authority for all administrative eliminations and separations to commanders with special courts-martial authority.

(b) Pending the results of subparagraph a above, command emphasis, to include definite time constraints, should be imposed upon all headquarters to promote expeditious processing of all separation actions.

(c) Eliminate unnecessary red tape through direct processing of personnel actions from initial to final approving authority.

(d) Lower the approving authority for Army Commendation Medal to the grade of O-6.

(e) Institute a medal to be given with the certificate of achievement.

(f) Revise certain enlisted promotion procedures:

1 Authorize commanders at all levels to promote up to and including grade E-4 without regard to quota, vacancy or time-in-grade.

2 Authorize commanders at posts, camps, and stations to request promotion allocations through grade E-6 for special merit cases.

(g) Sensitize superiors at all command levels to the impact of centralization and impress upon them the need for giving the soldier the feeling of personalization.

(h) Place more emphasis on strict adherence to the chain of command and eliminate those "rap" sessions which may serve to undermine the intermediate commanders and NCOs by-passed in the process.

(i) Establish an administrative position, either NCO or WO grade, at company level to provide the company commander with technical proficiency in the personnel and administrative fields.

(j) Require each branch to provide current career management policies to all commanders down to and including battalion level in order to assist them in their job of counselling.

(9) How can the Army improve professionalism of the non-commissioned officer corps?

(a) Establish a school system for NCOs comparable with that already established for officers. The system should provide for a basic course, an advanced course and a senior course.

(b) Expanded civilian education should be provided for selected NCOs to insure continued academic and professional development.

(c) Until an NCO school system and civilian education can be expanded, NCO academies should be utilized to train the young NCOs.

(d) Presently CONARC has seminar teams traveling throughout the world conducting leadership seminars. It is imperative that this action receive command emphasis and not be stifled or simply paid "lip service."

(e) A formal and recognized apprentice training program should be introduced for senior NCOs, to facilitate on-the-job training. This is particularly applicable for first sergeants.

(f) Reevaluate the role of senior NCOs, specifically that of the command sergeant major, to provide more meaningful assignments which will capitalize on this valuable manpower resource.

(g) Maintain the present promotion system for enlisted men without further centralization.

(h) Career counseling must be provided the junior, as well as the senior NCO, to inform him of the opportunities available to him.

(i) Provide for a release program for NCOs who no longer desire to remain in the service. These individuals should be authorized to resign, by the same criteria as officers, without fulfilling a specific enlistment period.

(j) Commanders must be emphatically reminded that the NCO is an important link in the chain of command. He must be used as a leader of men and not a figure-head or by-stander.

(10) How can the integrity required in a professional Army be fostered?

(a) Statistical Reporting.

1 Continued emphasis must be placed on accurate and realistic statistical reporting to reduce the impact of generalizations that result from successive summarizations.

2 Officer Career Courses should provide instruction on universal reports and those unique to that particular branch. The instruction should provide the reasoning behind the report and the ultimate use of the data provided.

3 Command and General Staff College and the Army War College should provide instruction on those universal reports utilized by higher headquarters. The instruction should include, not only the preparation of the reports, but the rationale and analytical requirements necessary to fully utilize and evaluate them.

4 Commanders, at all echelons, must be ingrained with the necessity for honest reporting, and, perhaps even more important, the acceptance of an honest report.

5 Realistic measures of performance for both units and individuals must be developed.

(b) Ticket Punching.

1 Publication of the specific requirements considered for promotion.

2 Standardize policies and criteria for the selection processes and order of merit listings used by career branches of OPO. The criteria for the order of merit should be published and each individual should, upon request, be provided his ranking on the list.

3 Career counseling by the OPO branch, upon request of the individual, is a must.

4 Continuation and strict adherence to the "command stabilization" policy to insure that these "tickets" are a true indication of an individual's ability to serve as a commander over a prolonged period, rather than just an entry on a record.

5 Stabilization of assignments, such as duty with a high level staff, joint staff, or instructor at a service school, which provides valuable experience necessary to accept added responsibility is essential to preclude entry on the record without the successful completion of a meaningful tour.

6 An education program at Officer and Senior NCO schools should be initiated to clarify the order of merit listings and the requirements for a successful career.

7 Adopt a system of subordinate and peer ratings, to supplement the present efficiency rating system.

(c) Overcommitment.

1 Establishment of realistic priorities, at all levels of the Army, to insure that those tasks undertaken are the most important and that the resources are available to accomplish them.

2 Manpower requirements for units should be based on the real world of an eight hour day, five day work week, rather than an unrealistic twelve hour day, seven day week. The Army should reduce the number of its units to insure that these units have the personnel necessary to accomplish their missions.

3 The Army should institute a policy which encourages the use of impact statements by commanders at all levels in the chain of command.

4 Reevaluate the space allocations to post, camps and stations to eliminate the necessity for tenant mission-oriented TOE/TDA unit participation in post support activities.

5 The Army should include in the TOE of all company sized units a position for a personnel/administrative Warrant Officer or NCO to assist the commander and first sergeant in providing the much needed expertise in the administrative and personnel services fields.

(11) How should company commanders be trained to better prepare them to lead men in the 1970s?

(a) All Army Promotion List officers should serve in an enlisted status for a specified period (6 months or longer) before being commissioned to create greater empathy and understanding of the feelings and problems of his troops.

(b) All officer basic courses should devote a much greater amount of time to unit administrative procedures and techniques, personnel management policies and techniques, counseling, personal problem solving, basic human differences and group dynamics.

(c) Develop a handbook for company commanders to present, in easy to understand form, the most likely problems which he may

To have to make the best of it

encounter and actions he should take to assist in solving soldiers' problems.

(d) All newly commissioned lieutenants, on their initial permanent assignment, should be assigned, for at least one year, to a company-sized organization as a platoon leader or equivalent.

(e) No officer should command a company without prior service in a company as a lieutenant.

(f) Command of companies should not be limited to individuals in the grade of captain or below. Company commanders should be authorized in the grades commensurate to the experience and expertise required to command and lead the company.

(g) A short company commander's course should be established within each branch.

(h) Company commanders must be stabilized so that they can know their men, become proficient through extended experience, and be permitted to solve their own problems and make their own mistakes.

(i) The advance courses at service schools, comprised principally of captains and many former company commanders, should also contain much more curriculum time for unit administration, personnel counseling and management.

(j) As a matter of policy, all battalion and/or brigade commanders should be required to hold a "commanders' problem meeting" on a periodic basis but not less than once a month.

(k) The C&GSC and AWC should have courses of instruction in the current problems facing the young company commander and how the battalion or brigade commander can assist the company commander in solving these problems.

(12) How can the Army instill within the trainee the sense of confidence, pride and esprit required of a combat-effective soldier?

(a) Adopt a program to inform the trainee at the earliest possible time where he will take his initial advanced individual training (AIT) and where his subsequent assignment will be.

(b) Teach soldiers only that basic combat training (BCT) which all soldiers need to present a military bearing, defend themselves and prepare for advanced individual training. Have any further training needed for each occupation taught as a part of the respective career oriented AIT courses.

(c) Validate the knowledge and skill possessed by the trainee upon entry to active duty to determine the need for providing basic combat training. Eliminate training in which the trainee has demonstrated proficiency and thus accelerate his progress through BCT or its equivalent.

(d) Substantiate the knowledge and skills of the service entrant to identify advanced individual training needed for his initial assignment.

(e) Organize an AIT training unit in each division so that combat arms personnel can take their advanced individual training with the organization to which they will be assigned.

(f) Establish a parent unit identity for division and non-division support and service support personnel who are in their initial AIT by identifying them with the organization to which they will be assigned after they complete the AIT.

(g) Develop a "unit rotation" system which includes various geographical locations overseas with one "home" or CONUS location.

(h) Redesignate training center units to the Combat Arms Regimental System.

(i) Design military construction to separate the working and the living environments.

(j) Inform the trainee about the relationship between specific military training courses and later civilian jobs; specifically, how many and what types of civilian jobs utilize skills that can be acquired from a particular training course.

(k) Solicit the cooperation of union apprenticeship programs and employers to determine if minor modifications in military course curriculum could achieve greater transferability to later civilian jobs.

(13) How may the Army physical fitness program be changed to make it more appropriate for the youth of the 70s?

(a) Stress tough and challenging physical fitness training for combat soldiers

(b) Establish physical fitness training programs commensurate with requirements.

(c) Develop especially interesting approaches for accomplishing the physical fitness requirements during peacetime, such as hiking, boating, swimming, mountain climbing, etc.

(d) Reconsider the Army physical fitness program requirements which are essential in peacetime as well as in war for each type of occupation and tailor the program to individual needs; age, job, geographical location. Individual training should be considered to accomplish part of the requirement with scheduled tests to insure that all service members remain physically fit for their particular job

(14) How can the Army improve the quality and effectiveness of Army trainers and instructors?

(a) Develop a program to test potential qualifications of selected personnel as instructors prior to assignment.

(b) Establish a career field for qualified and interested instructor personnel which allows progression through basic, advanced courses, PMS&T, C&GS, and senior service colleges, interspersed with preparatory duty assignments to provide practical experience.

(c) Establish mobile cellular instructor teams requiring a high order of specialization in such areas as race relations, drug addiction, group dynamics and human relations to conduct Army-wide instruction and seminars in these areas.

(d) Delegate to the drill instructor, drill sergeant, and OJT trainers more authority to reduce the present delays encountered for minor nonjudicial punishment.

(e) Make better use of peer group members as trainers.

(f) Do not hold trainers responsible for training that they personally do not conduct or do not have any authority to improve.

(15) How can the Army improve on-the-job training?

(a) Use trained peers to instruct on-the-job enlistees when practicable.

(b) Use nonresident training materials of service schools for weekly training sessions at post, camp and station level to satisfy OJT voids at lower levels.

(c) Standardize minimum OJT requirements for MOS award based on criteria established by appropriate branch service school.

(d) Employ job aids for on-the-job training. Expand the nonresident training mission to provide training aids and/or guides such as checklists and decision trees on subject area training to be used by field units in the conduct of OJT.

(16) How can the Army reduce overtraining and underemployment?

(a) Establish minimum essential requirements to satisfy fundamentals of highly diversified MOS job requirements commensurate to the grade level responsibilities of the trainee. Provide only that training which is required at each particular phase in a service member's career.

(b) Review and reevaluate the policy which states that successful experience at all levels is a desirable goal for all officers and that it is particularly important for career officers, who will eventually influence the course of the Army as senior colonels or general officers.

(c) Minimize training for the first year of service or develop an abbreviated training program to coincide with an initial one year voluntary (temporary) enlistment. Then if the service member is interested in an Army career and the Army is interested in the service member, a more elaborate training program can be conducted to coincide with his particular career occupation.

(d) Reduce emphasis on school selections merely to comply with quotas unrelated to operations/needs of unit.

(e) Discourage applications for attendance at schools for the purpose of "ticket punching."

(f) Establish a program of probationary MOS for grades E1 through E6 pending certification of satisfactory performance on the job by unit of assignment. This OJT produced MOS could be supported with programmed instructional materials and/or job aids.

(17) What incentives can the Army offer that will appeal to the youth of the 1970's?

(a) Pay.

1 The first step of the volunteer-incentive program must be added pay which approaches civilian standards.

2 Pay should be related to performance and skill. Further study should be undertaken to determine new pay approaches that would (in part or wholly) shift the pay thrust away from longevity and rank.

3 To make all young men as well-informed as possible about military compensation and benefits, the Army public information program should clarify these misconceptions regarding military service.

4 Study and test the feasibility of "negative payment," decreasing pay because of sub-standard performance of duty, being late for work, or unexplained absences.

(b) Education. The Army should: 1) offer entrants the opportunity to complete two or more years of college or technical training while serving a "first tour." 2) offer a post-service discharge guarantee of either a job or transition training.

(c) Work Week. The Army work week should be comparable to that in civilian life. To accomplish this objective, firm DA policy guidance and continued senior command emphasis is required.

(d) Fringe Benefits.

1 Annual leave policy should be changed to allow unlimited accrual. Further, week-ends should not be counted as leave.

2 Reimburse military personnel for moving and travel (TDY/PCS) expenses at the same rates that are paid to civilians.

3 Retirement benefits should be given for graduated career lengths such as 10, 15 or 20 year periods.

(18) What actions can the Army take to make awards and decorations more meaningful?

(a) Simplify the present system as regards the clerical/administrative procedure.

(b) Commanders, personally, should take action on recommended awards/decorations. The use of the committee approaches, except for the highest valor awards, should be discouraged.

(c) Use command emphasis to enforce Department of the Army guidelines and regulations, and specifically limit local command interpretation.

(d) Prohibit, by regulations, the granting of awards and decorations on a basis of rank or duty position.

(e) Design a medal to be given with the certificate of achievement.

(f) Prohibit the indiscriminate dispensing of awards and decorations by roster approach.

(g) Use command emphasis to discourage the comparison of numbers of awards and decorations issued as a statistical tool in measuring unit or commander effectiveness.

(h) Study the feasibility of adopting new incentives to reward performance or valor in the form of cash bonuses, accelerated retirement service credit, and special administrative privileges.

(19) How can the Army help young soldiers in providing for personal and family welfare?

(a) Housing.

1 Use of mobile homes may provide temporary improvement and provide time for adequate housing to be constructed.

2 When on-post housing is clearly inadequate, the rental allowance should be adjusted to a fair and reasonable rate.

3 Post housing personnel should be rated on service to the soldier and not rental and occupancy quotas.

4 Review and expand the governmental leasing program when local quarters are clearly in short supply or inadequate.

(b) Rate of travel and family separation.

1 Authorize dependent travel regardless of rank or time in service.

2 Limit PCS movement to once each 24 month period, except for short-tours.

3 Raise military compensation for first term enlisted and officers to levels that are competitive with civilian wages.

(c) Way of life.

1 During the current draw-down phase, close isolated, unpopular, ineffective, or inefficient military posts based upon human considerations such as lack of adequate housing and facilities, cost of living, and climate.

2 Develop a block of instruction for inclusion in basic officer courses on counseling, personal problem solving and basic human behavior.

3 Develop a unit commander's guide that will provide guidance in looking after a soldier's personal and family welfare. This guide would emphasize to the commander his responsibility in assisting in the solution of personal problems and further, make clear that the chain of command is to be used for personal and family welfare.

(20) How can the Army interest more quality personnel to train for combat arm?

(a) Change the existing negative approach toward retention in the combat arms to a positive one. The revised approach would have the man ask to get out rather than the Army ask him to stay.

(b) Monetary rewards or added incentives for the combat arms entrant are a necessity. In conjunction with an improved basic pay and allowance scale all combat arms personnel should receive a special combat arms pay of \$100.00 per month while actually serving in the Combat Arms (Infantry-Armor-Artillery).

(c) Enlistment in the U. S. Army Combat Arms should be without a specified enlistment period, but with a commitment to serve a minimum of one year.

(d) A Combat Arms College should be established (the C&GSC for NCOs) and attended by the selected combat arms NCOs when they attain the grade of E-6 or E-7.

(e) The Army must enhance assignments of career combat arms soldiers, particularly in a peacetime environment. Reassignments for these personnel should be based upon high level requirements where their talents can be effectively utilized, and not just movements to fill "number" objectives of various commands.

(f) All assignments in a non-hostile environment for career soldiers with families should be accompanied tours whether in CONUS or an overseas command.

(g) In order for the Army to exercise control in attaining the desirable and most effective age group of personnel serving in combat arms, credit combat arms soldiers with increased service credit for purposes of longevity and to qualify for retirements.

(h) Influence should be exercised to insure that adequate financial support is furnished for persons leaving the service to undergo formal education or occupational training to qualify them to become competitive with their contemporaries for civilian employment.

(i) A "total approach" to the problem is clearly needed, and not just one or two additional isolated incentives.

(21) How can the Army improve the ability of commanders to maintain discipline, law, and order?

(a) In the field of punishment from a punitive standpoint, there should be additional training in military justice.

(b) The current formalized Article 15, which requires a formal written record, should be changed to permit informal record keeping (not subject to inspection) at the company level.

(c) Study the feasibility of separating the Uniform Code of Military Justice into:

1 Criminal cases such as murder, rape, or robbery to be referred to civilian courts for trial.

2 Administrative or disciplinary cases such as failure to repair, late for work, AWOL, ineffectiveness, or insubordination to be retained by the military court.

3 Emergency or war time stand-by procedures to be used when appropriate.

(d) If 3 above is not accepted, allow the accused the opportunity for trial by civilian court in criminal cases.

(e) Grant battalion commanders the authority to confine up to 30 days without resorting to a formal court-martial process.

(f) Unit personnel should receive additional training in the legal area. For example: there is an identified need for a legal clerks school. The Adjutant General School should be considered as the appropriate CONARC institution for development of this approach.

(g) From an administrative standpoint there should be two types of discharges--an honorable discharge and a punitive discharge.

(h) Do not adopt a separate courts-martial command to dispose of a commander's problem soldiers.

(i) Publicity of the fairness of military justice should receive appropriate command attention.

(j) Expand the military law and justice course coverage in service schools.

(k) Use a probation system in conjunction with medical and rehabilitation services.

(l) Reduce the time lag between offense and trial. Administrative time for Article 15's are taking up to 15 days or more.

(m) Establish confinement policies and facilities for women.

(n) Unit commanders should have command authority to institute extra duty and limited restrictions for minor offenses without paper work.

(o) Encourage use of correctional custody.

Chapter 7.

7. Conclusions/recommendations.

a. The purpose of the Personnel Offensive (Phase I) study has been to develop information on the effects of changes in personal and social characteristics of incoming personnel upon the Army during the 1970's, and to propose appropriate alternative policies and doctrine to accommodate these changes and utilize these soldiers effectively. The alternative approaches contained in chapter 6 are designed to alleviate those conflicts which arise in converting today's young men and women into combat effective soldiers and leaders.

b. Continued emphasis on the accomplishment of each alternative approach must be maintained in order to achieve any degree of success. This report in its entirety will, in our judgment, make it possible to increase individual combat effectiveness and the attractiveness of service life without sacrificing discipline or high standards of performance. Resulting improvements will be far reaching and long lasting. Such improvements cannot be achieved by half-measures which adopt the terminology but kill the substance of the alternative approaches. Implementation of the alternative approaches will make effective solutions to the fundamental questions possible.

c. Based on the findings of this study, it is concluded that:

(1) The combat factors listed and described represent those factors that influence an individual's performance in combat.

(2) The personal and social characteristics developed herein represent the probable characteristics of American youth of the 1970's.

(3) The comparison of the individual combat factors and the probable youth characteristics result in fundamental social and personal problems in converting incoming personnel to effective combat soldiers.

(4) The interaction of the probable characteristics of youth with the individual combat factors will create new problems for the Army and tend to accentuate existing ones.

(5) The alternative approaches discussed in chapter 6 should alleviate the conflicts that arise in converting today's youth into combat effective soldiers.

(6) An urgent need exists to capitalize on the results of this study through continuing research and development to identify further improvements in personnel policies, doctrine, and procedures to support retention of quality personnel in the modern volunteer Army.

d. In view of the foregoing, recommend that:

(1) The Personnel Offensive (Phase I) be approved.

(2) The Personnel Offensive (Phase I) Report be distributed as shown in Appendix H, Distribution, Volume I.

(3) The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army task the Commanding General, U. S. Army Combat Developments Command to initiate Phase II of the Personnel Offensive to capitalize on the material developed in Phase I for further improvement in personnel and administrative management policies, doctrine and procedures to support retention of quality personnel in the modern volunteer Army.

PERSONNEL OFFENSIVE (PHASE I),
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Personnel and Administrative
Services Agency, US Army Combat
Developments Command
18 September 1971