THE '73 WAR: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. ARMY FORCES IN NATO

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College as partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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The 1973 War: Implications for U.S. Army Forces

Final Report: June 78

Student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

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Yom Kippur War; The October War; Israeli Force Development; Development of Armor Doctrine in the Middle East; Force Composition of the Israeli Defense Forces.

See Reverse
This thesis examines the origins of the 1973 Middle East War from a military perspective. It traces the development of the Israeli Defense Force doctrine and organization through the wars preceding that of 1973. The effects of certain political and military decisions on the ability of Israeli Forces to successfully meet an Arab attack are evaluated. The central region of NATO is then compared to the conditions surrounding the 1973 War in an attempt to identify any areas of similarity.

It concludes that Israeli Forces were unprepared for the attack launched in October 1973 due to faulty assumptions regarding the conditions necessary for an Arab attack. Due to the numerous fundamental differences between the Middle East and Central Europe, any attempts to apply tactical lessons learned from a war in one region to the other must be done with caution. The major finding is that U.S. Forces must prepare for a Warsaw Pact attack based on the enemy's capabilities, without regard to preconceived ideas as to the enemy's intentions.
The '73 War: Implications for U. S. Army Forces in NATO

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the origins of the 1973 Middle East War from a military perspective. It traces the development of the Israeli Defense Force doctrine and organization through the wars preceding that of 1973. The effects of certain political and military decisions on the ability of Israeli Forces to successfully meet an Arab attack are evaluated. The central region of NATO is then compared to the conditions surrounding the 1973 War in an attempt to identify any areas of similarity.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis could not have been completed without the assistance and patient support of a great many people, chief among them my family and my Research Advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Grenier. To all the many other members of the Faculty of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College who have also helped in so many ways, I extend my thanks as well.

Any errors or inadequacies remaining in this thesis are to be attributed to myself solely.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION AND THE PROBLEM

The War of 1973 between Israel and her Arab neighbors was the fourth war between these nations in twenty-five years. As in the past wars, Israel faced forces that outnumbered her in both men and major weapons systems. Also, as in past wars, Israel is generally conceded to have won, or at least, not lost.

However, the '73 War differed from the previous conflicts in many significant ways. First, hostilities were initiated by the Arab forces in a simultaneously coordinated attack on two fronts. Second, the stated, if not actual, goal of the Arab forces was not the destruction of the State of Israel, but the forcing of a political settlement upon Israel regarding the territory occupied by her as a result of the 1967 War. Third, this war was not preceded by the steadily rising level of political and military confrontation that had characterized the previous wars. Fourth, the war broke out before Israel had her reserves fully mobilized and thus severely limited Israel's ability to bring her full military force to bear in the first days of the war. Fifth, this war saw the use of weapons systems that are presently in use in both NATO and Warsaw Pact armies as opposed to the primarily World War II weapons used as late as the 1967 war. Sixth, this war involved an intensity of battle so great that Israel was very low on ammunition at the end of one week of fighting. These latter two points
have been of particular interest to the U.S. Military.

Both Israel and Syria had very high losses in the first few days of the '73 War. By the beginning of the second week of the War, Egypt also began suffering great losses. The number of tanks involved in the War approached one third of those estimated to be available to NATO, including those of France.

This War also saw the first use in battle of several Soviet weapons systems, notably the T62 tank, the SA6 surface to air missile (SAM) and antitank guided missiles (ATGM) code named Sagger and Snapper. The lethality of the systems employed and the magnitude of the losses suffered gave rise to the term "the lethality of the modern battlefield". U.S. Army manuals, such as Field Manual 100-5, operations, address in detail the technological advances that have led to this increased lethality. Certainly, this demonstrated increased intensity of conflict is of tremendous interest to the U.S. Army. But of more interest should be the why and how of Israel's not having had her forces mobilized and deployed to meet the attack.

Since the convincing victory by Israel in 1967 over Syria, Egypt and Jordan, it was fashionable to deride the ability of the Arab forces to wage war. Arnaud de Bourchgrave, who interviewed Egyptian President Anwar Sadat early in 1973, said in an article published two weeks after his interview appeared, "If Sadat carries out his threats, it is probable that Israel will reduce Egypt to complete impotence in a matter of hours while the Western world secretly
whistles in "admiration". The expulsion of many Soviet advisors by President Sadat the year before had done much to reinforce this theory, as it was generally supposed that the Egyptians could not operate the sophisticated equipment given them by the Soviets without assistance. As will be shown, the continuing underestimation of Egyptian capabilities by both U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies contributed much to the lack of preparation by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) on 6 October.

The weapons and tactics employed during the '73 War have been the subject of numerous books and studies. It is not my intent to explore these areas in detail in this study. Rather, I will examine the development of the force and the strategy of their employment from the end of the 1967 War to the end of the '73 War. My purpose in doing this will be partly historical and partly analytical.

In 1973, the IDF faced Syrian and Egyptian forces trained and equipped by the Soviet Union. The IDF consisted of regular forces which were to be augmented by reserves in time of crisis. Their equipment was mostly of Western origin with the preponderance having come from the United States. A central part of IDF planning was the mobilization of reserve forces prior to the initiation of hostilities. IDF planning assumed that sufficient time, between 48-72 hours, would be available between the receipt of information indicating an impending attack and the attack itself. This time would be sufficient to mobilize and deploy reserve forces to meet any attack. Indications of such an impending attack had been received in both January and May of 1973.
In May, the reserves had been mobilized but no attack came. Again in September, and the first days of October, came more indications of an impending attack. However, the decision to mobilize was postponed until less than six hours before shells started falling on Israeli positions.

U.S. Forces in West Germany also face forces trained and equipped by the Soviet Union. Warsaw Pact forces outnumber U.S. Forces in both men and major weapon systems. Contingency plans throughout NATO, of which U.S. Forces are a part, assume that sufficient time will be available prior to an attack by Warsaw Pact forces to begin mobilizing and deploying NATO forces. But will NATO have the time to make these preparations? The experience of Israel in 1973 has raised many doubts in this area.

Following a visit to NATO, Senator Sam A. Nunn, subcommittee chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, published an article in July 1977 that contained these observations:

The success of "flexible response" depends to a high degree upon how much warning time NATO forces will have in the event of a Soviet attack. NATO planners have generally supposed that easily observable movements of Soviet troops and equipment would necessarily precede an attack, thus giving them two to three weeks' warning. Troops would then be airlifted from the United States and Britain, while French, Dutch and Belgian units would move eastward to appointed areas along with rear elements of the West German army and USAREUR. This assumption is no longer valid. Indeed, one of the basic goals of Soviet military planning is the achievement of shock and surprise through "concealed mobilization" carried out over a long period of time, even years, and accompanied by extraordinary secrecy and elaborate efforts to mislead the enemy."7

General Alexander M. Haig, Supreme Commander of NATO forces, is more cautious in his appraisal. In an interview published in January 1977,
he stated that:

As a military commander, I prefer not to speculate—indeed cannot afford to speculate—about Soviet intentions. My concern is with Soviet capabilities. And by any objective criteria, the totality of those capabilities exceeds what is required for purely defensive purposes.

In the same interview, General Haig outlined NATO's strategy. He said:

Our primary mission is not to fight a war, but to prevent its outbreak in the first place. In order to insure credible deterrence, we rely on a flexible-response strategy whose structure is uncertainty. This uncertainty is founded in a balanced structure of conventional and nuclear forces whose interdependence denies a potential aggressor the ability reliably to forecast our response to aggression, and thus the ability confidently to discount his ultimate risk.

But Soviet actions have increased on the periphery of NATO. Asked about Soviet actions in the Scandinavian area, General Haig said:

If you look at the current situation of strategic parity, it is evident that we are not going to be faced with a short-term onslaught across the Eastern frontiers. We are going to be plagued by those ambiguous situations on the flanks.

Very similar optimistic thoughts were expressed by Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan in July 1973. Asked by Time editor Jerrold Schecter for his views on the Middle East, Dayan was quoted thusly:

"The next ten years, he (Dayan) predicted, will see the borders frozen along present lines—but there will not be a major war." ¹⁰

The '73 War was at that time less than three months away.

The experience of Israel in 1973 is clearly on the mind of some NATO officials. A Danish officer has been quoted as saying, "There has been a vast erosion of our warning time in case of attack." ¹¹

And Danes speak of the "Yom Kippur War Syndrome." ¹² Such remarks refer
to the maneuvers conducted by Egypt each year along the Suez Canal until such maneuvers were accepted by Israel as routine training exercises. A top Danish official observed that "We must be careful that we do not accept repetition of the unusual as normal".  

Could NATO be surprised by a sudden Warsaw Pact attack? And, if it could, is the '73 War indicative of how it could happen? In attempting to answer the latter question, I hope to give the reader a better basis upon which to base his own answer to the former.

In approaching a solution to this question, the definition of the word surprise is crucial. I will consider surprise to be defined as a condition under which a nation's military forces do not have sufficient time to mobilize and deploy prior to an opposing forces's crossing the line separating the two forces. Surprise by this definition then is primarily strategic in nature and subject to a political decision regarding mobilization. Because of the possibility of provocation or an escalation of hostilities through mobilization, it remains a political decision rather than a military decision in both Israel and NATO. By definition then, tactical surprise will not be considered to be a political problem but rather a military one, requiring a military decision independent of a specific political decision. This is not to imply that tactical military decisions are reached independently of political processes, but that they are generally reached within general political guidelines rather than requiring specific political decisions in each case. The determination of surprise requires the analysis of a political re-
response to a military threat. Surprise is then possible either because the political decision makers do not have enough intelligence upon which to base a decision or because the political decision makers act improperly upon the intelligence available. The recognition of a threat in time to make a proper decision, that is, a decision to mobilize, and a conscious political decision not to mobilize, for whatever reason, will not be considered surprise. The question then is, was Israel surprised by the Arab attack on 6 October 1973?

On the first day of the '73 War, Israeli leaders sought to reassure the population that they had not been surprised. Prime Minister Golda Meir stated in a radio address that first day that:

The enemy has suffered serious losses, . . . they hoped to surprise the citizens of Israel on the Day of Atonement while many were praying in the synagogues, . . . but we were not surprised. . . .
a few days ago the Israeli intelligence service learned that the armies of Egypt and Syria were deployed for a coordinated attack. . . . our forces were deployed to meet the danger."14

However, Israeli forces were not deployed to "meet the danger."

While an alert had been in effect for several days, front line troops were neither warned nor deployed to repulse a large scale attack. On the Golan Heights, tanks were not in their firing positions.15

In the Sinai, the troops had not even been ordered to wear flak jackets or don steel helmets.16 Even the mobilization ordered earlier that day was seen by Defense Minister Dayan as being too great. In his words, "I won't resign if you decide to mobilize more, but I think that some 30,000 men is enough."17

In a paper presented to an international symposium in October 1975, the IDF Chief of Staff from 1972 to 1974, Lieutenant General
David Elazar admitted that Israel had been surprised. In his words, not due to lack of intelligence, but "because of a lack of evaluation and correct interpretation; not realizing the enemy's intention and—worse— not interpreting it correctly, were the major factors." The timing and force of the attack were not the last surprise in store for the IDF. Israel lost a good number of both tanks and planes to missiles in the first days of the War. As will be shown in Chapter 4, Arab capabilities as well as intentions had been sorely misjudged.

Of course, determining the applicability of the '73 War to NATO planning involves much more than defining terms. In seeking to identify force development lessons, I will confine my conclusions to the U.S. Army. In seeking to identify strategic lessons, I will consider Israel and NATO as equals while recognizing that NATO is a multinational body. The problems of such a multinational body functioning as a nation-state will be dealt with in chapter 5.

My approach will be essentially historical. The development of the IDF and the strategy of Israel will be examined to determine their interrelationship. Both economic and political factors will be considered in analyzing the decision making process. Statistical data will be incorporated to support observations. Specific conclusions will then be drawn based on an analysis of the evidence presented.

Sources used to develop the evidence will be limited to those generally available to the public. These include books, interviews, public statements and the results of the official inquiries by the
State of Israel into the War. Such sources will be evaluated as to their validity in the light of facts and conditions known at the time of their disclosure or publication. While vital facts may be protected by security classification, I feel that sufficient evidence is available to prevent a deliberate distortion of facts.

In order to trace the development of the IDF, chapter 2 will trace the history of Israel and her Arab opponents to the end of the 1967 War. This chapter will also show how the strategy of Israel has developed in response to her perceived threats.

Chapter 5 traces the history of NATO, its forces and strategy. In the Chapter 6, those lessons that appear to apply to U.S. Ar force structuring and NATO defense planning will be identified an their implications discussed. The last chapter suggests some areas deserving further research and study.
Notes to Chapter 1


3. Ibid., p. 47.


6. Ibid., p. 342.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


16. Ibid., p. 43.

17. Ibid., p. 41.

Chapter 2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PALESTINE

If one were to ask where Israel is located, the most common answer received would probably be the "Middle East". But what or where is the Middle East? A term first coined by the British at the beginning of this century, it meant to them an area between the Far East (India) and the Near East (the Balkans). Today, the term is usually not thought of in such far reaching terms. It is normally used to describe the area from Turkey to Egypt and east of Iran. Ever that definition is hardly precise, for it is often much easier to define what the Middle East is not, rather than what it is.

The lack of precise geographical terms for the area we call the Middle East is not a new phenomenon. Names such as the Holy Land, Syria, Samaria, Judea and Galilee among others have been used to describe the territory of modern day Israel and her neighbors. By any name, this area had been one of the bloodiest crossroads on earth.

Forming a bridge between the civilizations of the Tigris—Euphrates valley and that of the Nile, the Middle East became a natural theater of conflict and combat. Long before recorded history, rule of the land was determined by superior force of arms, a situation that has not changed materially to the present day.

An appreciation of the history of the region is vital in try-
To understand the current issues, claims and counter-claims stretch back to the time of David, about 970 B.C., if not before. A list of the rulers of that area of principal interest at the moment, that is, modern day Israel, occupied Palestine and the western part of Jordan would appear approximately as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DATE OF RULE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canaanites</td>
<td>? First settlers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyksos</td>
<td>1710-1480 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1480-1350 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hittite</td>
<td>1350-1290 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1290-1154 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local tribes (Canaanites, Philistines and Jews)</td>
<td>1154-1000 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews (amount of territory varies widely)</td>
<td>1000-586 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babylonia</td>
<td>586-538 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia</td>
<td>538-330 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>330-323 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptians (Ptolemies)</td>
<td>332-200 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seleucids (Syria)</td>
<td>200-142 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews (partial only)</td>
<td>142-70 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seleucids (Tryphon, partial only)</td>
<td>142-70 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>70-63 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome (western and eastern empires)</td>
<td>63 B.C.-614 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia</td>
<td>614-628 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>628-638 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab (Moslem)</td>
<td>638-1085 A.D.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Such a sterile procession of figures does little more than underscore the conflict that has plagued this area. It is necessary to go behind the dates to the personalities and motivations of the rulers in order to gain a better understanding of how the area has changed.

The earliest traces so far found have been remains of Neanderthal Man and Homo Sapiens. Much of the early development is speculation. Most authorities agree that the original inhabitants were of Semitic origin (the Canaanites). Later peoples came and went with the tides of battle, each leaving some trace of their culture with their passing.

The Bible traces the coming of the ancestor of Jews and Arabs in Genesis. Abram is said to have journeyed from the Ur of the Chaldeans to Canaan. While there, Abram was promised by God that his descendants would be given "this land." Childless at that time, Abram had a son by an "Egyptian maid." This son was called Ishmael. Later, Abram had another son by his wife. This son was named Isaac.
Bible records that when Abram's wife made him drive off Ishmael and his mother, Abram was told that his descendents would be named through Isaac. Ishmael's mother was promised that her son would also be the first of a great nation. Based on this account, the Jews trace their ancestry through Isaac while the Arabs trace theirs through Ishmael.

The land promised to Abraham's (his name had been changed from Abram to signify a covenant with God) descendents was to stretch "from the River of Egypt to the great river, the river Euphrates, the land of the Kenites, the Kenizzites, the Kadmonites, the Hittites, the Perizzites, the Rephaim, the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Girgashites and the Jebusites". No Jewish nation had yet fulfilled that promise.

The Bible also records that God told Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac to God. At the last moment, God allowed Abraham to substitute a ram instead. The rock upon which Abraham sacrificed the ram is the same rock which is the third most Holy spot in Islam. It is of course, also sacred to Christians. The stone is the focus of the Dome of the Rock or Omar's Mosque on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. The Temple Mount is also known as Mount Zion, a term that resulted in the choice of the word Zionism to symbolize the movement of the Jewish people to return to the area around Jerusalem.

The Bible also records the movement to Egypt of some portions of the Jewish People. There is considerable disagreement as to the date of the later emigration or "Exodus" of Joseph's tribe from Egypt.
under the leadership of Moses. It would appear that Jewish tribes began to return about 1200 B.C. to the area around Jerusalem. About 1170 B.C., the Philistines began to enter Canaan. Some 1300 years later their name would be translated as Palestina, the origin of the term Palestine. As the Philistines expanded inland, they pushed the Jewish tribes before them. Eventually, David began to unite the tribes against the invaders. He established Jerusalem as his capital in order to provide a central rallying point for the tribes. It was under David that a Jewish kingdom reached its greatest limits, stretching from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Euphrates, or all of modern day Israel, occupied Palestine, Syria and most of Jordan. With the death of David's successor, the kingdom was split in two. In 587 B.C., Jerusalem was captured by the Babylonians. All but the very poorest Jews were exiled to Babylon. In 539 B.C., the Persians conquered Babylon and allowed the exiled Jews to return. In approximately 440 B.C., Jewish laws became the law of Judea, a small part of David's kingdom.

The Persians gave way to the Macedonians with the coming of Alexander the Great in 332 B.C. Following Alexander's death, Ptolemy in Egypt won control of the area and retained it until 198 B.C. In that year, the Seleucid won control of the area to about Beersheba. Local revolts around 160 B.C. saw some areas governed by Jews from 142 B.C. to about 63 B.C. By that date, the Roman Empire conquered the entire region.

In 66 A.D., the Jewish population rose up in protest against
the Roman administration. The Roman armies began pushing the rebels back and by 70 A.D., had captured Jerusalem. The last resistance ended with the mass suicide at Massada in 73 A.D. Another revolt took place in 135 when the Roman Emperor decided to build a temple to Jupiter in Jerusalem. By 135, the rebellion had been crushed. The name Judea was abolished and Syria palaestina substituted. Jews were forbidden to reside in Jerusalem or to teach Jewish law. However, these strict laws applied only to Jews in Palestine, not to all Jews throughout the Roman empire. 18

The coming to power of Constantine in 324 did not improve the Jews' lot. He declared that Jews were a sect, not a nation, and allowed them to visit Jerusalem only once a year. 19 Off and on for the next 60 years, a law linking tenants permanently to the land they tilled was enforced. By limiting their freedom, it caused more and more Jews to convert to Christianity. This caused many Jews to fight on the side of the Persians in 614. The defeat of the Persians in 628 resulted in the Romans' returning to power and their turning on the Jews, killing many and driving others out of the country. 20

Jerusalem fell again in 638, this time to the nation of Islam. Until the coming of the crusaders some 400 years later, the entire region was under Moslem rule. The Arab Moslem rulers discouraged conversion to Islam. Although this policy was changed on rare occasion, it stemmed not so much from religious tolerance as from economic need. Those of Islam who believed in religions other than Moslem were subject to taxation, while "true believers" were not. Therefore, conversion would have the effect of reducing the tax base. The Jews found the Arabs preferable to the
Romans and welcomed their coming. This welcome quickly cooled with the imposition of restrictions on Jewish worship on Mount Zion.

The victories of the crusaders again placed part of the region under Christian rule. With the capture of Jerusalem in 1099, the crusaders at last realized their goal of recapturing the holy places. They found the Jews in the city a convenient target for the frustrations of their long, bloody campaigns. It was not until Jerusalem was captured by the Egyptian Sultan Saladin in 1187 that Jews were again welcome in Jerusalem. 21

This return of the Jews to their holy city was short lived however; the destruction of the city by the Tartars in 1260 erased the Jewish presence there for a time. It was only with the establishment of the Ottoman Empire in 1517 that Jewish communities in Palestine began to revive. Until that time, those Jews who remained in the land were few in number and for the most part, very poor.

The Ottomans came to power with their defeat of the Persians in 1516 and the Mamluks of Egypt in 1517. The Ottoman Empire was also Islamic. As such, the laws of Islam applied to all who believed in it. Those of other religious beliefs were subject to their own religious laws. To the Moslems who saw religion as the chief characteristic of a nation, this made perfect sense. Thus, Arabs and Turks, although of different ethnic extraction, still were of the same nation, that of Islam. The Ottomans had fought the Persians and Mamluks to establish their empire, 22 thus they were not seen by the Arabs as conquerors, but as the new leaders of
Within this nation, the Jews enjoyed a special position. Since they were for the most part educated, this trait earned them the admiration of the Moslems. More important however was the historical connection of the Jews in the evolution of the Muslim religion. The Jews were in a very real sense the forerunners of the Moslems. In recognition of their unique role in the development of Islam, the Jews became in a way wards of the state. Referred to as the 'People of the Book', they were allowed to retain a large degree of autonomy. Even so, this privileged position would continue only as long as the authorities allowed it.²⁴

Within this special relationship, which was shared by the Christians, Jewish culture flourished. They were subject to their own laws which were administered by Jewish judges. They were literally a nation within a nation.

The era of Muslim rule under both the Arabs and the Ottomans was not totally serene. Battles between rival tribes and periodic raids by the Bedouins and the Druzes saw entire villages razed.²⁵ These raids were not a manifestation of any organized effort to expel the Jews, or anyone else from the land. The motivation for such attacks was primarily economic with the people of the desert taking from the more settled people of villages. That such raids continued was a reflection of the indifference of local administrators towards what they saw as essentially local issues in which they should not become involved.
By the eighteenth century, the power and prestige of the Ottoman Empire had begun to decline. The rulers had found it expedient to confine the heir to the throne in some obscure palace room to reduce the odds of a coup. Unfortunately, this practice meant that when the throne changed hands due to the death of a ruler, his successor was largely unaware of the realities of government. Without a strong personality, these rulers were often overshadowed by others who became the real power in government.

In 1740, France obtained the Treaty of Capitulations. This treaty served not only to reafirm previous trade advantages which had been granted France, it also gave France sweeping powers on Ottoman soil. By means of this treaty, only the French ambassador and the French consuls were recognized as having full jurisdiction over Frenchmen throughout the empire. This treaty also provided that all Roman Catholics as well as many Foreigners whose governments had no representation at the Ottoman court would be treated as Frenchmen. Probably the most important aspect of this treaty was that it allowed parties subject to this and similar treaties to sell trading privileges to Ottoman subjects. This had the effect of removing much foreign commerce from government control.

The declining power of the Ottoman rulers allowed the Mamluks to again rise to power in Egypt and declare it independent. Even though put down temporarily by the Turks, the Mamluks remained troublesome. In 1798, Napoleon landed in Egypt under the pretext of putting down the Mamluks. Although his fleet was destroyed by the British three weeks later, Napoleon not only remained, but even turned his army eastward toward Turkey. His motives for doing this have never been fully explained. He advanced as far east as Acre, capturing Gaza and Jaffa enroute. Foiled in
his assault on Acre, Napoleon eventually abandoned his army and returned to France. With the final departure of all European forces from Egypt in 1803, a former Ottoman officer named Muhammad Ali rose to rule that country.

The uprisings in Greece in the 1820's led the Ottoman ruler to seek military help in putting them down. He asked his nominal subject, Muhammad Ali, to provide military assistance in return for authority in some Ottoman lands. Muhammad Ali carried out his part of the bargain, but was not compensated to his satisfaction. Since he had been promised some reward in Syria among other lands, he decided to claim his due. By 1833, he had marched almost to the borders of modern Turkey. The Ottoman Empire secured help from Russia in return for allowing Russia to specify what ships could sail through the straits. The treaty reached between the Ottoman Empire and Muhammad Ali allowed the latter to govern the lands he had conquered in return for paying a tribute to the Ottomans.

When Muhammad Ali attempted to maintain his army through conscription, another conflict broke out between him and the Ottoman Empire. When it appeared as though Muhammad Ali might win, the great powers intervened. Forced back to Egypt by a combined British-Austrian force, he nevertheless was recognized as the hereditary ruler of Egypt in 1841.

In 1869, Muhammad Ali's successors saw the Suez Canal completed. The extravagance of the Egyptian ruler at the time, Ismail, caused him to have to sell his shares which were purchased by Great Britain. The
government under Ismail continued to suffer economic decline and Ismail was deposed in 1879. Turmoil continued, and France and Great Britain decided to intervene jointly. A change in the French government caused that country to withdraw her support, and Great Britain acted unilaterally. Her forces landed in the summer of 1882 and were in control of the country by September. The presence of English troops allowed her to wield great influence over Egyptian affairs until 1914. When the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of Germany that year, Great Britain established a protectorate over Egypt.

The various struggles which had been waged by Egypt prior to 1882 were not really nationalistic in character. While the Wahhabi revolt in the Arabian peninsula in 1806 could be considered nationalistic in tone, it arose largely as a Muslim movement directed against the laxity of the Ottoman government. The Wahhabis were put down by Muhammad Ali between 1810 and 1817, but they continued to grow until they could again exert their power in 1924.30

The roots of modern Arab nationalism can most properly be traced to a short lived secret society which existed for a time in Beirut. It began about 1875, publishing anonymous placards agitating against the Ottoman government. The members appear to have been mostly Christian elitists who wanted to reach an equal footing in society with the Arabs. This society was disbanded about 1882.31

The withdrawal of Muhammad Ali in 1840 had caused a realignment in the administration of Syria to evolve. A civil war in 1860
caused Mount Lebanon to be detached from Syria and ruled as a separate Sanjāk. In 1887, Jerusalem was also designated a separate Sanjāk. In 1888, a new subdivision called the Vilayet of Beirut was formed. This encompassed an area which included the Sanjaks of Tripoli, Acre and Nablus. "Thus, from 1888 onwards, the province of Syria was divided into three Vilayets (Aleppo, Shām [Damascus] and Beirut) and two detached Sanjaks (Lebanon and Jerusalem)." The organization of these various governments and their relation to one another was to lead to bitter disputes between England and the Arabs some thirty years later.

About this same time, the beginnings of Jewish nationalism were also starting. The first organization began in Russia with the formation of the Hovevei-Zion (Lovers of Zion) (also spelled Choveve Zion). Even this movement was predated by the efforts of Sir Moses Montefiore to secure a Jewish settlement in Palestine in 1838. Before his efforts could be realized, Muhammad (Mehemet) Ali had been forced to relinquish control of the area. Another organization formed in 1860, the Alliance Israelite Universelle, was primarily a philanthropic agency which was composed primarily of wealthy and influential Jews, particularly those of France.

The concept of Zionism was first published in a pamphlet entitled Auto-Emancipation. Written in 1881 by a Russian Jew named Doctor Leo Pinsker, it advocated self emancipation as a solution to the Jewish problem. Pinsker's view was that assimilation, that is, the integration of Jews into other societies, had not worked because they were a nation without a homeland.
It was the publication of Theodor Herzl's *Der Judenstaat* in 1896 that led to the establishment of a formal Zionist organization. Herzl was a Jewish Journalist who lived in Vienna. Little versed in current Zionist thinking, Herzl seems to have been profoundly influenced by the handling of the Dreyfus case in France. Though at that time ignorant of Pinsker's work, Herzl agreed with Pinsker that assimilation was not working.

What Herzl proposed was a Jewish territory, not an independent Jewish state. In his words;

I did not propose *einen Judischen Staat* (a Jewish state). Had I wanted a state like all other states of the world, I would have labelled it as *'in Judischer Staat',* but I did not dream of making it like any other state. I was thinking of a Jewish territory, well protected, well organized, and run by a modern company.

The chief Rabbi of the time was of the view that the chief bond of Jews was religion, not race. In 1878 he wrote;

When we dwelt in the Holy Land we had a political organization of our own: We had judges and kings to rule over us. But ever since the conquest of Palestine by the Romans, we have ceased to be a body politic. We are citizens of the country in which we dwell. We are simply Englishmen, or Frenchmen, or Germans, as the case may be, certainly holding particular theological tenets and practicing special religious ordinances; but we stand in the same relation to our countrymen as any other religious sect, having the same stake in the national welfare and the same claim on the privileges and duties of citizens.

However, this was certainly not the way Jews in Eastern Europe or Russia felt. Confined to ghettos and subject to recurring repression and persecution, they rejected the doctrine of assimilation. Accordingly, the first Zionist congress in 1897 set forth these goals:
The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. The congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end:

1. The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.

2. The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.

3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.

4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism.  

The methods to be used to achieve these aims differed among the three main factions of Zionism:

To the cultural Zionist, the main purpose was to establish the spiritual center of world Jewry in the Holy Land. To this group, political self-government was relatively unimportant.

The 'Political Zionists', led by Herzl, sought guarantees from the Ottoman empire for a Jewish home in Palestine.

The 'Practical Zionists' sought to settle as many Jews in Palestine as possible while working towards autonomy.

The reluctance of the Ottoman Sultan to grant political recognition to a Jewish homeland in Palestine caused the political Zionists to consider other locations. South America was suggested by some, and Great Britain offered land in East Africa. Herzl considered the latter,
but this alternative was bitterly opposed by the sixth Zionist congress in 1903. Following Herzl's death in 1904, the practical Zionists assumed control of the movement.

The support of Great Britain for a Jewish state began to wane somewhat, but two influential Englishmen of the time were staunch supporters of a Jewish state in Palestine. In 1908, Winston Churchill stated of Jewish territorial aspirations:

Jerusalem must be the only ultimate goal. When it will be achieved, it is vain to prophesy; but that it will some day be achieved is one of the few certainties of the future. The establishment of a strong, free Jewish state astride the bridge between Europe and Africa, flanking the land roads to the east, would not only be an immense advantage to the British Empire, but a notable step towards a harmonious disposition of the world among its peoples.

Another British politician, A.J. Balfour, declared that he had become convinced in 1906 that Palestine was the only place to be considered for a Jewish homeland.

During this same period, Arab nationalism began to blossom. The Wahhabis under Ibn Sa'ud began gaining power in the Arabian peninsula in 1901. By 1909, the so called Young Turks had embarked on a strongly Turkish nationalistic program. At first, the Arabs had welcomed the Young Turks victory over the Sultan. However, the harshness of the Young Turks' policies quickly turned the Arabs against them.

Several Arab secret societies were formed and an Arab congress held in Paris in 1913. These movements towards nationalism all failed, at least in some degree, because of the high regard with which Muslims...
held the Sultan as the religious leader of Islam. The Arab movements had found their motivation in overthrowing the Turkish rulers in direct contradiction to their religious beliefs. In 1913 the religious beliefs prevailed.

By the following year, the Sultan's religious power had waned. When the Ottoman empire declared war on the Allies, the Sultan proclaimed a "Jihad" or Holy War. This call was not answered by two prominent Arab leaders, Ibn Sa'ud and Sharif Husain (Hussein) of Mecca. The latter promised passive support, but stated he feared attacks from the British Navy in the Red Sea. In fact, Sharif Hussain had been entertaining thoughts of leading a united Arab empire at least since 1911 when 35 Arab deputies to the Ottoman parliament sent him the following declaration.

We, Arab deputies in parliament, entrust to Husain Pasha the government of Mecca, and, personally and in the name of the countries we represent, recognise him alone as the religious head of all the Arab countries.

Certainly, not all Arabs wanted an independent state in the western sense any more than all Jews wanted an independent Jewish state. For the Arabs, Islam was a nation. Most still had not reconciled their beliefs with the concept of breaking away from Ottoman rule. In the case of the Jews, the rise to power of practical Zionists had alienated the cultural Zionists. The latter joined with Orthodox Jews in seeing Zionism as a secular threat to the Jewish religion. As World War I drew near, a search for national identity grew stronger among the inhabitants of the Middle East.
With the outbreak of World War I, England established a protectorate over Egypt. Up to that time, England had sought to avoid partition of the Ottoman Empire. In 1913, the British Foreign Secretary quoted his conversation with the Italian Ambassador:

I said that we ourselves had no designs in Asia Minor. All that we desired was the maintenance of a satisfactory status quo which would secure the Persian Gulf and its littoral against disturbance.  46

Shortly after the beginning of the war however, British papers began speaking of Turkey's pronouncing her own death sentence.

England now began to sound out the Arabs as allies against the Ottomans. Although England had turned down a request for arms from the son of Sharif Husain in April 1914, October 1914 showed a complete reversal of British thinking. On 31 October, the British high commissioner for Egypt cabled Sharif Husain's son that "if Arab nation assists England in this war...England will guarantee that no internal intervention takes place in Arabia and will give Arabs every assistance against external foreign aggression." 47 In December 1914, Sir Henry McMahon was appointed British High Commissioner for Egypt. The following July, McMahon and Sharif Husain began an exchange of notes offering to trade Arab military assistance to England for English recognition of Arab independence.

McMahon specified the conditions under which Great Britain would recognize Arab independence in the note dated 24 October, 1915. (The first four notes in the McMahon-Husain correspondence are at Appendix I.) McMahon addressed only those areas "in which Great Britain is
free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France. . .

Great Britain is prepared to recognise and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca. . .” The note specifically excluded “the districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, since they cannot be said to be purely Arab, and must on that account be excepted from the proposed delimitation”. (note number 1, Appendix I) The proposed boundaries of the territories had been set forth in Sharif Husain’s note of 14 July, 1915.

McMahon’s note of 24 October, 1915, was later interpreted by Great Britain in an attempt to show that McMahon had not meant for Palestine to be included as part of an Arab country. For the most part, these interpretations involved lengthy discourses upon the boundaries of various Ottoman political units such as the Vilayet of Syria. Whatever McMahon may have meant, a comparison of Sharif Husain’s boundaries as set forth in note 1 and McMahon’s response in note 4 must lead one to believe that Husain perceived Palestine to be included among the Arab territories. Certainly, Husain was motivated in large part by these British assurances when he began actively opposing the Central Powers the following spring.

Even as Husain was preparing to lead his forces against the Central Powers, France and England were negotiating over the future of the Ottoman Empire. An agreement was reached in consultation with Russia during April and May 1916. Popularly known as the Sykes-
Picot agreement, it specified both French and British spheres of influence in the Middle East with an area comprising roughly the northern half of modern Israel to have an international administration. The Sykes-Picot agreement was a compromise in every sense of the word and was later to become an acute embarrassment to England. At the time however, the exigencies of war were paramount to the niceties of conscience.

The beginning of World War I had split the Zionist movement for a time. The executive, headquartered in Berlin, was forced to move to neutral Denmark. Before the end of 1914, two members of the Zionist Executive arrived in England to continue efforts to secure a Jewish home in Palestine. Of the two, only one, Nahum Sokolow, stayed long. He, together with the vice president of the English Zionist Federation, Doctor Chaim Weizmann, began to press the Zionist case to high British officials.

Their influence was significantly increased when Doctor Weizmann presented the British government with a chemical process which made the production of explosives much cheaper. This together with a perception of growing Jewish influence in America and the sympathy of several members of the British government led to an attempt by anti-Zionist Jews to pre-empt a declaration supporting a Jewish state in Palestine. Basing their opposition on the potential danger to Jews who preferred assimilation, they prepared a declaration which proposed that "the Jewish population [in Palestine] will be served in the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty, equal political rights
with the rest of the population, reasonable facilities for immigration
and colonization, and such municipal privileges in the towns and colo-
nies inhabited by them as may be shown to be necessary." Proposed
in March 1916, this formula was reiterated in an open letter published
in the London Times a year later. By then however, the Zionists had
won. Doctor Weizmann, in an address to the English Zionist Federation
on 20 May 1917, stated:

That while a creation of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine
is our final ideal—an ideal for which the whole of the Zionist
organization is working—the way to achieve it lies through a
series of intermediary stages...I am entitled to state in this
assembly that His Majesty's government is ready to support our
plans.50

In June, Lord Rothschild, a prominent financier, and Doctor
Weizmann approached the British Foreign Secretary regarding a state-
ment about Zionist aims. The Foreign Secretary, Mr. Balfour, invited
them to submit a draft declaration. This draft declared that Palestine
be reconstituted as the Jewish national home and recognized the Zionist
organization.51 Opposition in the British cabinet, principally by the
Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, required several compro-
mises. Montagu, a prominent Jew, opposed Hebrew nationalism and fear-
ed Moslem reaction in India to such a declaration. Also, consideration
had to be given to President Wilson's advocacy of the right to self de-
termination. The final statement contained clauses to protect both
Zionist Jews and the local inhabitants in Palestine. Addressed to Lord
Rothschild, the declaration read as follows:

Foreign Office
November 2nd, 1917.

Dear Lord Rothschild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

"His majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country'.

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

(signed)

A. Balfour

The principles put forth by this document were either indorsed or supported by the rest of the Allies during 1918.

Although this declaration did not call for the establishment of Palestine as an independent Jewish state, many Zionists saw it as a very large first step towards that end.

The publication of the Sykes-Picot agreement by the Bolsheviks and the release of the Balfour declaration required the British Government to reiterate its pledges to the Arabs. In February 1918, a message to King Husain read in part: "His Majesty's Government re-affirm their pledge in regard to the liberation of the Arab peoples".52

At the time of this message, British forces had conquered Jerusalem. By October, British and Arab forces entered Damascus. The end of the war forced the problem of the future of Palestine squarely on the victorious Allies.
An Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey was formed to deal with the problem. However, only the United States sent representatives to assess the situation first hand. The two Americans, Henry C. King and Charles R. Crane, set about sampling public opinion in the area. They found the people strongly concerned with three issues; a united Syria (which included most of Palestine), independence and rejection of Zionist aims; a distant fourth, with 60% opposed, was the prospect of France as a mandatory power.

The King-Crane commission recommended that Amir Faisal, son of Sharif Husain of Mecca, be named head of a united Syrian state. The commission also recommended "serious modification of the extreme Zionist Programme for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish state."

This report was contrary to what Great Britain and France desired and was largely rejected, President Wilson was too ill to protest and France and Great Britain proceeded to carve up the region in keeping with the Sykes-Picot agreement.

The question of oil caused Great Britain and France to renegotiate several aspects of the treaty. The treaty of San Remo, announced 5 May 1920, violated almost every wish and hope of the majority of the inhabitants in Syria. Under the provisions of the treaty, Lebanon and Syria were to become French Mandates, Palestine a British Mandate and Iraq undivided. However, the general Syrian congress had, on 8 March, declared Syria including Lebanon and Palestine, a sovereign
state with Amir Faisal as King.

The superior might of France and England quickly prevailed. Faisal was driven from Syria and installed on the throne of a restive Iraq by England. His brother, Abdullah, was given the throne of a newly created country, Transjordan, in return for not fighting to return Faisal to Damascus. The rest of Palestine (less that part which formed western Transjordan) became a British Mandate. The hopes for a united Arab nation evaporated with the formation of the mandates.

While Arab dreams were shattered, the Zionist cause got more official recognition with the almost verbatim inclusion of the Balfour declaration in the Mandate for Palestine. The third paragraph of the Mandate even speaks of "...the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country..." The Arabs bitterly opposed the Mandate, particularly because it was based upon the Balfour declaration.

However, the issuance of the so called Churchill White Paper of 1922 quickly quenched Zionist enthusiasm. Dated some three weeks before approval of the Mandate, the White Paper sought to clarify Great Britain's position towards Palestine. This document read in part:

"Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become "as Jewish as England is English." His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated...the disappearance of the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact..."
that the terms of the (Balfour) Declaration...do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine...

When it is asked what is meant by the development of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that they may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection.55

This paper went on to specify that Jewish immigration should be limited by "the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals", and also guarantee "the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment".56 While the White Paper was difficult for the Zionists to accept, it did help defeat a motion in the British Parliament to reject the Mandate because it violated the McMahon promise.57

The man selected to be the first High Commissioner of Palestine was a British Jew, Sir Herbert Samuel. Viewed with suspicion by the Arabs because of his Zionist leanings, he won some measure of respect due to "his natural desire to show impartiality, to protect Arab interests, and to suppress the more extreme evidences of Zionism..."58 He was in fact a blend of political and cultural Zionist59 and as such could clearly state British policy to be:

It is the clear duty of the mandatory power to promote the well-being of the Arab population, in the same way as a British administration would regard it as its duty to promote the welfare of the local population in any part of our empire. The measures to foster the well-being of the Arabs should be precisely those which we should adopt in Palestine if there were no Zionist question and if there had been no Balfour Declaration.60
All the policy declarations and other espousals for shared political power between Jews and Arabs in Palestine was overshadowed by one inescapable fact—the Zionists were determined to form an independent Jewish state as soon as possible. As the Zionists lost faith in British help in achieving that end, they began to look to increased immigration as the only solution. Approximately 55,000 Jews resided in Palestine in 1918. Immigration exceeded that in 1924 and 1925 combined. By 1929, the Jewish population was estimated to be 154,330, or more than 16% of the total population. While the Jewish influx was not as great as had been feared by the Arabs, the Jewish policy of displacing Arab tenants from land purchased by Jews caused local friction and resentment.

An incident at the Wailing Wall on the Day of Atonement in 1928 festered into large-scale riots in August 1929. The deaths of many Orthodox Jews in the violence was blamed in large part on ineffective British military intervention which failed to stop rampaging Arab demonstrators. A White Paper issued by the British Government the following year sought to limit Jewish immigration and severely restricted the areas where Jewish settlements could be started. Intense political pressure in Britain effectively undermined this paper.

The uneasy atmosphere following the 1929 disturbances was becoming more charged as Jewish immigration increased sharply. The spreading anti-Semitism in Europe helped account for nearly 137,000 Jewish immigrants during the three years, 1933 to 1935. By 1936, Jews were estimated to comprise about 28% of the population. At such a rate, they
would constitute a majority within the next decade.

Arab frustrations culminated with a strike in 1936. This resulted in the appointment of the Peel Commission that summer to investigate the Arab grievances. In July 1937, this commission advocated dividing the Mandate into a Jewish state, an Arab state and some areas to remain under British supervision. This solution was rejected by both Jews and Arabs. Eventually, the British Government discovered "that the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish states inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable."62

In 1939, another British White Paper sought to limit Jewish immigration until 1944, after which date the British Government will "not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish national home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population."63 The Arabs did not feel this policy went far enough while Ben Gurion's remark that "we will fight the war as if there were no Paper and the Paper as if there were no war" summed up Jewish sentiment.

During the war, the violence and terrorism which had characterized Palestine since 1936 subsided somewhat. The British rigidly enforced the immigration quotas, turning back ships loaded with Jews seeking to land in Palestine.

The decade 1931 to 1941 had seen a growth in Arab nationalism
in all Arab countries except Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In 1922, Egypt had been declared independent although Great Britain still maintained a contingent of forces to protect British interests. In October 1932, Iraq entered the League of Nations as an ostensibly independent state.

Arab views were declared by the December 1931 Pan Arab congress to be:

The Arab lands are a complete and indivisible whole, and the divisions of whatever nature to which they have been subjected are not approved or recognized by the Arab nation...since colonization is, in all its forms and manifestations, wholly incompatible with the dignity and highest aims of the Arab nation, the Arab nation rejects it and will combat it with all its forces.6

The fall of France and subsequent use of Syria as a base for German aircraft brought about an invasion by British forces from Palestine and TransJordan. Though the free French administrators were reluctant to yield control, the United States and the U.S.S.R. recognized Syria and Lebanon as independent countries in 1944.

During World War II, the Arab states had banded together out of a common fear of Great Power ambitions. In March 1945, the Arab League was formed to foster co-operation in economic, cultural and social affairs but not collective security. The original members were Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, TransJordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

In 1946, the League agreed to oppose the Zionist claims to Palestine by diplomatic, and if required, economic action. Jealousy among the members prevented much decisive action, however.
The level of violence rose sharply in Palestine following the end of the war. The Biltmore program put forth in 1942 had called for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in all of Palestine. The British Government however refused to change the policy of the 1939 White Paper. Pressure by President Truman on the British Government to grant 100,000 immigration certificates for Jews led the British Government to ask the United States to help maintain the security of Palestine in return for granting the certificates. The United States refused, and no certificates were issued.

The Jewish Agency under David Ben-Gurion meantime sought to establish a Jewish majority by bringing in as many refugees as possible. The Jewish Agency, stymied by British immigration policy, finally resorted to violence. During October, November and December 1945, Jewish commandos repeatedly attacked British military installations. Even the appointment of an Anglo-American committee of inquiry into immigration failed to placate those striving for a Jewish state. "Since Jewish leaders in Palestine believed British temporizing was based on fear of Arab revolt, they reasoned that outrages would obtain concessions from a fearful England." As the cost to Britain in lives and maintenance costs rose, she at last turned to the United Nations in search of a solution.

On November 29, 1947, the U.N. released its partition plan for Palestine. Great Britain announced that she would relinquish the Mandate on 15 May 1948. With that, Palestine became a virtual battlefield. Advance units of some Arab armies, radical Moslem organisations
and Jewish commando units clashed repeatedly. In December 1947, religious leaders in Cairo requested that a Holy War be declared. With the withdrawal of British troops in May, armies of the Arab league entered the war.

For the most, the Arab forces were ineffective. Lebanon for example, suffered a total of 30 casualties. Syria also limited her participation, not anxious to install either King Abdallah of Transjordan or Faruk of Egypt in Palestine. Egypt meanwhile preferred to see her rivals in Iraq and Transjordan spend themselves against the Jews. Only in the fighting although Iraqi troops had success in some sectors. Egyptian forces were thrown back, her disgrace setting the stage for a revolution four years later.  

The victory of the Jewish forces was nevertheless a great accomplishment. From the area of 5,500 square miles allotted by the U.N. partition plan, Israel expanded to 7,100 square miles by 1949. Israel continued to add territory until it consisted of 8,048 square miles by 1955. The cease fire arranged by the United Nations in February of 1949 halted the fighting, but did not resolve the basic problems of the partition of Palestine. One of the most significant of these problems, that of the refugees, now began to make itself felt.

Many Arabs had left their land in what had become Israel for many reasons. Some were fearful of the Jews, others thought that the Arab armies would be victorious and left just to avoid the fighting. Others were forcibly evicted by the Jews. Those who fled beyond the
borders of Israel found that they were not allowed to return. Others within Israel found in some cases that they were not allowed to re-occupy their land. The policy of the Israeli government was set forth in a memorandum from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs which stated: "The individual return of Arab refugees to their former places of residence is an impossible thing."69

Without notifying the State Department, President Truman dramatically reversed the course of U.S. diplomacy towards the partition plan when he extended de facto recognition to the state of Israel within minutes of its having declared its independence.70 This reversal stemmed at least as much from Truman's recognition of Jewish political power as any other factor.71 The Soviet Union recognized Israel de jure three days later. The U.S. recognized Israel de jure in 1949, the day after Great Britain did so. In May of that same year, Israel was admitted to the United Nations, just over half a century after the first Zionist congress.

The boundaries of the new state had purposefully been left vague---in fact, Beersheba was not captured and incorporated until after independence had been declared. With the establishment of the final ceasefire lines, the largest Jewish state since the time of David became a reality.

To the Arabs, Israel represented an unwanted imposition of Western values and standards upon their land. Viewed as a colony of the West, Israel was a thorn in the amorphous body of a greater Arab entity. Splitting the Arab nations, Israel's continued existence served to remind all Arabs of how the Western powers had continually sought their own ends at
the expense of Arab nationalism.

Between 1949 and 1956, Egypt denied Israeli-bound shipping the use of the Suez Canal or passage through the Straits of Tiran. Also during this time, terrorists began attacking Israel from bases inside both military positions in the countries from which the raids had been launched.

As a nation, Jordan was only two months older than Israel. As Transjordan, she had negotiated a series of treaties with Great Britain which led to almost total sovereignty in March 1948. The United States recognized Transjordan on January 31, 1949, one day before recognition was accorded Israel. In April 1949, King Abdullah changed the name to Jordan. The following year, he annexed that part of the Palestine Mandate not occupied by Israel, an area commonly called the West Bank.

King Abdullah was assassinated in 1951. Following the abdication of Abdullah's son Talal in 1953, King Hussein assumed the throne and has ruled since. In 1955, Jordan was admitted to the United Nations.

In Egypt, an undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the government, building since the poor showing in the 1948 War, led to great political unrest. Following almost six months of public disorder in the first half of 1952, a group known as the Free Officers staged a coup. Led by LTC Gamal Abdul Nasser, these officers seized control of the government in July, exiling King Faruk. Ardent nationalists, these officers, especially Nasser, sought to eliminate the influence of the Western nations from Arab affairs.
Even so, Egypt still was dependent upon foreign financing. With the sudden withdrawal of American help in financing the Aswan High Dam in 1956, Nasser seized the foreign-owned Suez Canal and nationalized it. A few months later, Israel, in conjunction with France and England, invaded Egypt. Although they gained control of the Canal, these forces pulled back in the face of intense political pressure from the U.N., the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Israeli forces eventually withdrew to the ceasefire lines after a United Nations Emergency Force was formed to form a buffer force between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai.

By allying herself with Western colonial powers, Israel confirmed herself in Arab eyes as an extension of Western imperialism. As such and also due to gradual acquisition of more and more territory, Israel was viewed as having expansionist goals.

With the rise of Arab nationalism and the concurrent decline in influence of the Western powers, the Soviet Union began to gain influence in Egypt and Syria. By providing financing and arms with which the Arab dream of driving Israel into the sea might be realised, the Soviet Union gained some measure of power in the region, even though most Arab governments were openly anti-communist. The hand of the Soviet Union would continue to muddy the waters of the entire region right through to 1973.
Notes to Chapter 2

2. Ibid., p. 29.
5. Genesis 16:1-16.
11. Isaiah 10:12.
15. Ibid., p. 67.
16. Ibid., pp. 118-120.
17. Ibid., p. 124.
18. Ibid., pp. 166-167.
19. Ibid., p. 185.
20. Ibid., p. 194-199.
23. Ibid., p. 8.
27. Ibid., pp. 248-250.
37. Ibid., p. 29.
38. Sokolow, pp. 268-269.
40. Ibid., p. 9, see also Sokolow, pp. 296-297.
41. Friedman, p. 7.
42. Sokolow, p.xlix.
44. Ibid., p. 7.
45. Halpern, p. 17.
48. For example, see Hanna, pp. 22-24.
49. Hanna, p. 33.
55. Hanna, p. 82.
56. Halpern, p. 311.
57. Hanna, p. 82.
58. Ibid., p. 71.
60. League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission Minutes as cited in Halpern, pp. 325-326.


62. Hanna, p. 139.

63. Ibid., p. 148.

64. Degaury, p. 12.


66. Ibid., p. 644.

67. Ibid., pp. 598-652.


69. Beatty, p. 8, n. 2.

70. Halpern, p. 375.

71. John Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote and the Creation of Israel, (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), pp. 73-88.
Chapter 3

JUNE 1967 TO OCTOBER 1973

Any analysis of the '73 War must proceed from a general knowledge of the 1967 War. This is because the 1967 War and its aftermath led directly to the '73 War. There are some who have suggested that the '73 War was a continuation of the 1967 War. In a very general sense, that is true, but primarily only from the Israeli point of view. The link between the 1967 War and the '73 War lies partly in the issues that caused the former, but the causes are more directly related to the strategy adopted following the war of 1967 than the war itself.

The period following the 1956 war had seen continued incidents between Israel and her Arab neighbors. The Palestine Liberation Organization was founded in May 1964 by Arab refugees to "recover their usurped homes". Other Arab nationalistic groups such as El Fatah began to engage in terrorist attacks. These led to Israeli retaliatory strikes against Syria and Jordan and a continuing escalation of tension in the area.

In February, 1966, extreme leftwing military dissidents of the Ba'ath party overthrew the moderate Ba'ath government in Syria. Following a series of incidents including an Israeli attack on works in Syria intended to divert water from Israel, a resolution was introduced in the U.N. Security Council condemning Israeli air attacks. On
3 August 1966, this measure failed to pass but was supported by the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Nigeria and Uganda. On 13 November 1966, Israel launched a raid into Jordan in retaliation for terrorist attacks. On 15 November 1966 Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol addressed the Knesset. In this speech, he asserted that Israel had "reliable information" that Syria "encourages, maintains, organizes and trains saboteurs for operations in Israeli territory whether they come from Syria or via other countries."

Prime Minister Eshkol also warned Syria not to "imagine that it is safe in the shelter of a big power." This was a reference to Soviet support of the censure of Israel for the raid into Jordan.

In the meantime, anti-government demonstrations in Jordan led King Hussein to authorize on November 26 the immediate conscription of all Jordanians between 18 and 40. On November 29, King Hussein warned of the consequences of communist or pro-communist governments' coming to power in the Middle East. He also charged that there was 'sufficient evidence' of a new Soviet plan for this area, the result of setbacks the communists have suffered at several points around the world, in Asia and Africa.

On 3 November 1966, Egypt and Syria re-established diplomatic relations for the first time since 1961. A defense agreement signed the next day called for mutual assistance if either was attacked by a third country. The Egyptian Chief of Staff would command the forces in the event of joint military operations.
Israeli and Syrian forces continued to clash in January 1967. Both accused the other of initiating the incidents. A report from the head of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization to the U.N. Secretary General stated that both sides had moved heavy arms and troops into the demilitarized areas. A series of meetings of the mixed armistice commission between Israeli and Syrian representatives failed to resolve anything. However, the Israeli-Syrian area remained relatively calm from mid-February until April.

On April 7, sharp ground and air exchanges took place between Syrian and Israeli forces. The Israelis claimed to have shot down six Syrian MiG's, three over Syria and three over Jordan. Syria claimed five Israeli planes shot down and extensive damage to Israeli settlements from Syrian artillery fire. In a note to the U.N. Security Council on May 11, the Israeli delegate warned that unless Syria altered its "un-realistic and aggressive policy," Israel "regards itself as fully entitled to act in self-defense." 4

The situation then began to deteriorate rapidly. Egypt had been under pressure from other Arab countries for her lack of support of terrorist activity against Israel. Also, the presence of United Nations Emergency Force troops on Egyptian territory had become a source of embarrassment to her. On May 10, the IDF Chief of Staff suggested that Israeli forces might seek to topple the Syrian government. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union told Cairo of large Israeli troop concentrations on the Syrian border. This was denied by U.N. observers on May 19. 5
By that time, Israel, Syria and Egypt had begun deploying troops along the borders. On May 19, Egypt requested the withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force. On May 21, Israel announced a partial mobilization of reserves. On May 23, Egypt closed the Gulf of Aqaba to ships bound for Israel. On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol warned that the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba constituted "an act of aggression against Israel."  

While British and U.S. statements criticised the blockade, the Soviet Union supported it. A Soviet announcement on May 23 accused Israel of having received encouragement from "imperialist circles which seek to restore colonial oppression to the Arab lands." It went on to praise Arab states which had aligned themselves with "the courageous struggle of Syrian people who are upholding their independence." This statement also promised Soviet support of Arab nations against any nation that "would venture to unleash aggression" against them. Such support was justified on the grounds that since the region borders the Soviet Union, the "maintenance of peace and security accords with the vital interests" of the Soviet Union.  

On May 26, Egyptian President Nasser warned that an Israeli attack would result in all-out war, the main goal of which would be "the destruction of Israel." Following talks between the president of Syria and Soviet officials in Moscow May 29-30, Damascus radio said that Syria had received pledges of full Soviet support. On May 30, Jordan signed a mutual defense pact with Egypt.

Israeli efforts to secure U.S. and British backing for open-
ing the Gulf of Aqaba proven fruitless. The signing of the defense pact between Jordan and Egypt threatened Israel at a point where the country was only a few miles wide. Continued mobilization would ruin the economy of Israel. Israel clearly felt that her national survival was at stake.

It appears that the Israeli government decided that war was inevitable after the Jordan-Egypt defense pact was signed. After much political infighting, Moshe Dayan was brought in as the Israeli Minister of Defense on 1 June. Dayan convinced the cabinet that the Air Force could in fact prevent Egyptian bombers from attacking Israeli cities. While finalizing last minute preparations for an Israeli attack, Dayan sought to downplay the chances of war. He was quoted as saying on 3 June that "it was too late for a spontaneous military reaction to Egypt's blockade of the Tiran Straits—and still too early to draw any conclusions of the possible outcome of diplomatic action." Pictures of Israeli soldiers on leave were circulated amid a feeling that Israel had missed her opportunity to strike. Meanwhile, Israel prepared to catch the Arab forces at their most vulnerable time.

At 0745 hours 5 June (Israeli time), the IDF attacked nine Egyptian airfields and a tenth a few minutes later. This time (0845 Egyptian time) had been carefully chosen and the aircraft takeoffs staged so that all planes arrived over their targets simultaneously. Egyptian air patrols returned to their bases at this time and would be caught on the ground. This time also allowed for the morning mist to clear over the target area, and caught Air Force personnel on their way to
A change in communication procedures between Jordanian and Egyptian military staffs just three days before prevented a report from Jordanian radar stations, warning of the Israeli strike, from reaching Egypt. The planes were caught on the ground and eighty percent of the Egyptian Air Force was destroyed in less than three hours. By the end of the second day, 416 Arab planes had been destroyed at a cost to Israel of 26 aircraft.

On the ground, Egyptian troops were caught as they moved from their defensive positions towards the border. Egyptian President Nasser had ordered this move rather than have the troops hold defensive positions inside Egypt in what he termed a policy of "voluntary surrender" of territory. The Cairo paper for the two weeks before the beginning of the war had quoted Egyptian President Nasser's willingness to fight. "The Jews threaten war, we tell them you are welcome, we are ready for war" (May 22, 1967). A week later another article boasted "we are now ready to confront Israel" (May 29, 1967).

There is some evidence indicating that President Nasser knew the approximate date of and priorities for the Israeli strike. If he did, his forces were ill prepared. There is little doubt that President Nasser knew that closing the Straits of Tiran would bring on war. The Israeli Government had stated this fact on many previous occasions. While the fear of an Israeli attack's toppling the Soviet-backed government in Syria may have caused the Soviets to issue misleading statements about Israeli troop dispositions, President Nasser must have recognized that war was inevitable once he closed the Straits of Tiran.
The decision to launch an "anticipatory counter-attack" was predicated on the fact that Israel's survival depended upon her not being the victim of a surprise attack herself. It seems apparent that the Arabs recognized this and felt that a first strike by Israel would isolate her in the world while justifying a combined Arab response to destroy Israel as a state.

The initial Israeli ground assaults caught the Egyptian forces unprepared. The Egyptian forces found themselves attacked from the rear and flanks in the type of "indirect attack" advocated by Liddell Hart. Israeli armored forces drove on despite heavy losses, disrupting Egyptian lines of communication and inflicting severe casualties.

Reportedly, the Egyptian Commander in Chief, Field Marshal Abdel Amer panicked and ordered a withdrawal after only 286 casualties had been reported. This may have some validity, as on Thursday, June 8, General Sharon discovered an abandoned brigade of Egyptian tanks. When the brigade commander was captured, he stated that he had been ordered only to withdraw, not to destroy his tanks. A subsequent Egyptian commission of inquiry decided that the Egyptian forces should have been able to hold out for several days. Field Marshal Amer committed suicide in September, 1967.

Less than two weeks before the war, the Egyptian Air Force commander had estimated he would lose 20% of his Air Force to an Israeli first strike. In fact, not only was the Air Force destroyed, but the Egyptian Army as well. Estimates of Egyptian losses range
up to 16,000 men killed and 80% of the army's equipment lost or captured. The Israeli forces enjoyed similar success against Syria and Jordan. In less than 100 hours, they had driven to the Suez Canal in the west, the Jordan River in the east and captured the Golan Heights in the north. Unaided, they had defeated three Arab armies and recaptured the Wailing Wall. The euphoria was to last until October 1973.

At this point, it is enlightening to examine how Egyptians and Israelis viewed the war. General Ismail, appointed commander of the Suez front and later Egyptian Minister of War during the '73 War remarked, "There was no front, there was no army either." This view was to have a profound influence in the planning of the '73 War. While the Arab licked the wounds, both to their armies and their pride, the Israelis had quite a different outlook.

A former head of Israeli military intelligence was quoted as saying:

"The crucially important factor in the Arab defeat must be sought in the weakness of the social link which joins Arab to Arab. Because of this defect in the social fabric, each Arab soldier, in the critical moments of combat, finds himself fighting not as a member of a team, but as an abandoned individual. Consequently, each individual tends primarily to look after himself, and the unit disintegrates." 25

Another explanation offered that Arabs could not handle their sophisticated equipment. "There was simply too much of everything for the mentality of their fighters to cope with...the Missiles, electronic equipment, mechanical gadgets and conveniences were never used, not because there was no knowledge of them but primarily because men were too scared, too panicky or too indifferent to make the effort." 26
Israeli soldiers were by contrast seen to be made of firmer stuff, tempered by adversity and forged by the will to win. Israeli armored troops manned their guns to the last second, "firing from immobilized tanks was maintained right up to the moment when ammunition would start exploding. On the other hand, Egyptian tank crews were not prepared to go to such lengths. Dozens of tanks, heavy guns and rocket emplacements were abandoned at the first opportunity."27

This perception of the Arabs as lacking initiative and morals, and unable to exploit sophisticated weapons became a linchpin of Israeli strategy. It was believed that the more motivated Israeli forces could offset Arab quantity with higher quality. That is not to say that Israel thought it could defeat superior Arab forces on the Arab homeland. Rather, it felt that an Arab attack could be repulsed by the IDF, even though the Arab forces were numerically much stronger. The accepted ratio of attacker to defender on the ground in which the defender would be successful was three to one. In light of this philosophy, the IDF remained a small active force capable of expansion through quick mobilization.

The IDF had good reason to feel comfortable behind the cease fire lines. The Golan Heights afforded a commanding view of the plain of Damascus. The Jordan River formed a defensible border with Jordan and the expanse of the Sinai greatly increased the flying time, and thus warning time, from Egyptian air fields to Israeli cities. Additionally, the Suez Canal was seen as a perfect anti-tank ditch. The cease-fire lines also reduced the length of Israel's borders from 350 miles...
to 185 miles, a critical difference when deploying troops. No wonder General Sharon could remark:

"We managed to finish it all and after our success this time, I am very much afraid that by the next war we are all going to be too old, and the next generation will have to take care of it, because we have now completed everything in such a way that the enemy is not going to be able to fight for many, many years to come."28

The Egyptians in particular had no intention of waiting "many, many years". Immediately after the war, President Nasser began studying the reasons for the success of the IDF, even to the extent of listening to the broadcasts of victorious Israeli generals.29 Meantime, the Soviet Union began efforts to rebuild the Egyptian Army. The Soviet Chief of Staff, Marshal Zakharov, arrived in Egypt with Soviet President Podgorny in late June. While President Podgorny refused to take responsibility for Egyptian air defense, he did agree to reconstruct and re-equip Egyptian forces. This resupply was so rapid that an Egyptian army of about the same size as that on 5 June faced Israeli forces by the end of 1968.30

On 22 November 1967, the United Nations Security Council adopted unanimously Resolution 242. This resolution called for a just and Lasting peace based on the following:

1. Withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in recent conflict and;

2. Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundar-
ies free from threats or acts of force.

This resolution also recognized the necessity for:

1. Guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

2. Achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

3. Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones.

The U.N. Secretary General was asked to appoint a special representative to act as a mediator to "promote agreement" in the Middle East. Doctor Gunnar Jarring of Sweden was appointed that same day to the post of special representative of the U.N. Secretary General.

While conceived with lofty ideals, Doctor Jarring's mission was doomed almost from the start. Syria announced on December 12 that it would not work with Doctor Jarring if the talks were limited to the framework of Resolution 242. Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon agreed to discussions but each stipulated different conditions. Israel demanded direct negotiations between herself and the Arab states leading to a peace treaty before withdrawing her forces. Egypt and Jordan insisted on Israel's withdrawal to pre-1967 lines before indirect negotiations were begun to formulate a peace agreement. While both sides made some slight concessions, the key difference was in interpreting U.N. resolution 242.

The Arab states felt that the term withdrawal from "territor-
ies occupied in the recent conflict" meant that Israel was required to withdraw to her borders prior to the 1967 War, Israel, however, felt that a total withdrawal was not required. Security was uppermost in the mind of the Israelis. Starting in April 1969, the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France attempted to reach a common understanding of what U.N. Resolution 242 called for. These talks continued until 1971 with no agreement. In June 1969, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir stated Israel's position regarding international guarantees:

"I cannot imagine that Israel would again consent to any deal under which we would have to depend for our security on others. We are more intelligent than that. One does not have to be very sophisticated to come to the conclusion, after the bitter experience of twenty years, that the only people we can depend on for our security are ourselves."[32]

During the diplomatic maneuvering, Egypt had begun massing Soviet supplied artillery along the Suez Canal. Totaling 500 by the end of 1967, the guns were eventually increased to 1000.[33] In November 1968, Egypt launched a major artillery attack against Israeli forces on the east bank of the Canal. The relatively unprotected Israelis took numerous casualties during artillery bombardments. In retaliation, the Israelis launched a commando raid against Egyptian power stations in the Nile Valley. The demonstrated vulnerability of Egypt to such attacks caused Nasser to stop the artillery attacks for several months.[34] The SAM-2 anti aircraft missiles supplied by the Soviet Union appear to have been largely ineffective in deterring Israeli retaliatory strikes through late 1968.[35]

The Egyptian artillery attacks led to the Israeli decision to
establish fortifications along the east edge of the Canal. This system of fortified positions along with a series of supporting positions and roads farther to the east became known as the Bar-Lev line after the IDF Chief of Staff at the time, LTG. Chaim Bar-Lev. In further discussion, reference to the Bar-Lev line will refer only to the series of fortified positions directly on the east bank of the Suez Canal.

It is important to understand how the Bar-Lev fortifications came to be built as well as how each side viewed their construction. A series of fortifications on the bank of the Canal was originally conceived by MG. Yeshayahu Gavish, General Officer Commanding in the Sinai during and after the 1967 War. The concept of fixed fortifications was opposed by MG. Sharon and MG. Tal. They advocated controlling the Canal with mobile armored forces. General Bar-Lev decided in favor of building fixed fortifications and charged MG. Avraham Adan with the construction. The construction was finished on 15 March 1969.  

The construction of the Bar-Lev line may well have been seen by the Egyptians as an attempt by Israel to establish a de facto border. Heavy Egyptian artillery bombardments of the positions began in mid-March. Israel replied with artillery fire against Egyptian military and industrial targets. This was the beginning of the so called War of Attrition.

In mid-April, both sides began mounting commando raids. On May 1, President Nasser declared that 60% of the Bar-Lev line had been destroyed. While this was an exaggeration, Israeli casualties had been heavy: 113 killed and 330 wounded along the Bar-Lev line.
The heavy losses caused Israel to begin bombing the artillery positions along the canal and the SAM-2 sites defending them. The arrival of the first F-4 Phantom aircraft in Israel in September 1969, increased the ability of the Israeli Air Force to attack deep Egyptian targets. The F-4 was not only faster than previous Israeli aircraft, it also carried more effective electronic countermeasures (ECM). Egyptian pilots were no match for the Israelis while the SAM-2s were not only proving ineffective, but their sites were rapidly being destroyed.

In March 1970, approximately 1500 Soviet advisors and more advanced SAM-3 missiles were sent to Egypt in response to requests from Egyptian President Nasser. The next month, Soviet pilots began flying MiG-21s in defense of Egypt. Not wanting to confront the Soviet pilots, Israel stopped launching deep penetration raids into Egypt that same month. Released from air defense duties, Egyptian pilots now began attacking Israeli positions along the Bar-Lev line. Meanwhile, Israeli aircraft continued to attack Egyptian positions along the Canal while keeping well clear of Soviet manned aircraft. These strikes constituted what came to be called the "electronic summer".

On 30 June 1969, two Israeli F-4s were shot down by an improved version of the SAM-2. While Soviet manned SAM-3s were used to protect Egyptian cities, the improved SAM-2s became more effective in protecting the front-line artillery. The United States provided Israel with better ECM pods to counter the improved SAM-2s, and the electronic summer continued. The War of Attrition was finally terminated by a cease-fire implemented on 7 August 1970. The provisions of the cease-fire were almost immediately violated by Egypt moving anti-aircraft missiles into the
"standstill zone", an area along the canal in which no military improvements were to be made. The Israelis also took advantage of the lull in fighting to improve their positions.

By this time, MG Sharon had assumed command of the IDF forces in the Sinai. He directed that extensive construction to be carried out to the east of the canal as well as the building up of a thick sand wall on the east bank of the canal. The sand wall was designed to prevent the passage of Egyptian armor while the other construction improved command and control facilities. MG Tal meanwhile continued his opposition to the whole concept of a fortified line along the canal. He was overruled by the Chief of Staff who maintained that a physical presence on the canal was necessary to prevent Egyptian forces from creeping eastward from the canal.

As the quiet of the cease-fire became routine, the high cost of maintaining the Bar-Lev line came under attack. Even General Elazar, who had become IDF Chief of Staff in January 1972, was forced to compromise on the fortifications. More than a third were closed, and the manning level of the remaining reduced to twenty soldiers each. This reduction in forces tended to cloud the purpose of maintaining forces on the edge of the canal. Was it to be a defensive line designed to delay attacking Egyptian forces long enough for the country to mobilize, or was it to be only an outpost line, intended only to warn of an Egyptian attack?

The answer to this question had never been totally clear. Even
when all the positions had been open and fully manned, Egyptian patrols had been able to slip across the canal between them. The fortifications could not support each other by fire but each was reinforced so that soldiers manning it would be safe from direct bomb or artillery hits. A system for spreading a fuel mixture on the water in the canal and the high sand wall would delay, if not prevent, an attack. The purpose of the fortifications remained ambiguous.

There is little doubt that President Nasser always intended to launch another attack against Israel. He was however very realistic as to the capabilities of his army. In an address to his commanders in November 1968, he emphasized what was required for success. In his estimation, it would take a miracle for the Egyptian army to launch an offensive in as few as three years; five years would be a more realistic estimate. Shortly after this address, a planning group was established to begin training exercises in establishing bridgeheads across the canal.

Other preparations for war were begun as well. Protective hangars were built to shelter aircraft as well as silos to protect surface to air missiles. More and more university graduates were commissioned to raise the quality of the officer corps. But above all, constant training for crossing the canal was conducted.

President Nasser did not live to see the culmination of his efforts. His death in September 1970, brought Anwar Sadat to the presidency. Sadat had been a member of the Free Officer Movement that had brought about the revolution in 1952. At the time of Nasser’s death, he
was serving as the Vice-President of Egypt. Seen as a weak, pliable leader, Sadat quickly proved himself capable of surviving in the ever shifting climate of Middle East politics. Surprising those who had acquiesced in his selection as president, he quickly consolidated his position as the undisputed leader of the country.

Faced with the frustration of a state of "no peace--no war", he proclaimed 1971 to be the "year of decision" regarding Israel. However, 1971 passed with no decisive moves being made. Israeli forces remained firmly entrenched on Egyptian soil and President Sadat's credibility suffered a sharp drop.

During 1971, Sadat made a number of secret trips to Moscow. In March, he raised the question of the delivery of some planes that had been promised to Nasser. He later said that he had been told that "we are prepared to supply these planes to you on the condition that they will not be used without prior approval from Moscow". Sadat refused these conditions. In May, Sadat moved quickly to squelch a plot to overthrow him. When Sadat arrested the conspirators, one of whom was the leader of the pro-Soviet faction in the government, Moscow relented somewhat. Soviet President Podgorny flew to Cairo shortly after, and he and Sadat signed a fifteen-year treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

During this time, the U.S. had been attempting to bring about a more permanent peace settlement. When these efforts failed, Sadat returned to Moscow in October. During this trip, he was promised arms to be delivered by the Soviet Union before the end of the year. The
Indo-Pakistan war interrupted this schedule. Sadat visited Moscow again in February and March of 1972. Sadat claimed that military action was necessary to initiate political moves towards peace. The Soviet Union stalled, promising military aid after the summit meeting between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. scheduled for May. A joint communique issued by the two super powers after the summit meeting called for a freeze in the Middle East. Clearly, neither side wanted a confrontation with the other sparked by a Middle East war.

Sadat felt betrayed. In June, the Egyptian Prime Minister went to Moscow to ask for more arms. His visit was cut short when he was unsuccessful, and two weeks later, most Soviet advisors were ordered to leave Egypt. Sadat later said he took this action to "give myself complete freedom of maneuver."

Not all Soviet troops were ordered out, but those that left either took their sophisticated equipment with them or rendered it inoperable. This greatly decreased Egypt's military capability, particularly in the area of air defense. This action was followed by a series of meetings which resulted in a resumption of the arms flow from the Soviet Union to Egypt. President Sadat later said that he received more arms between December 1972 and June 1973 than in the preceding two years.

In October 1972, President Sadat replaced both the Minister of War and the Commander in Chief of the Army after they disagreed over the wisdom of an attack on Israel. Also dismissed were the Commander
of the Navy, the Director of Intelligence and Deputy War Minister. General Ismail, a long time supporter of President Sadat was appointed Minister of War. General Shazli was chosen Commander in Chief of the Army.

GEN Ismail had attended the Soviet General Staff Academy where he had been a very diligent student. To him, President Sadat stated the political aim for the coming war, "to prepare the armed forces to secure success in the offensive venture which would break the political stalemate".

Both GEN Ismail and President Sadat recognized that only a war with limited objectives was possible. The ouster of the Soviet advisors had removed the limitations on Israeli retaliation strikes if another war of attrition were begun. A thrust deep into Israeli territory would expose the Egyptian Army to the superiority of Israeli mobility and air-power. Accordingly, the objective of the war was stated to be: "to undertake a limited offensive to establish a bridgehead across the canal". Interviewed after the war, GEN Ismail stated that:

The safety of my forces was my first preoccupation throughout the war. I was aware of the effort which Egypt had exerted for rebuilding its army. I had to reconcile my knowledge of the volume of this effort—which can never be repeated so readily— with the fulfillment of my military objective. I knew what losing our army again would mean. It would mean Egypt's surrender, and for Egypt to surrender would mean its complete destruction in this generation and for generations to come.

An analysis of the 1967 War had convinced the Egyptians that they must strike the first blow by surprise. They also recognized the need for a two front war against Israel. To these ends, an elaborate
deception plan was implemented, and a joint headquarters established with Syria. A coordinating headquarters instead of a command headquarters, it nonetheless brought together a staff of military planners from each country to begin the preparations for the war. Each country was to command its own forces in battle. After this headquarters was established, all military activity on the Golan front, including that of the terrorists, was stopped.

As the Egyptian preparations increased, Israeli military officers became more concerned. In April, an Israeli raid into Lebanon sparked a civil war which threatened to involve Syria. The Israeli Chief of Staff mobilized the army against the advice of the Chief of Intelligence. May was also the 25th anniversary of the State of Israel. Though not mentioned in Israeli works, the mobilization may well have been in part to prepare for the massive military parade staged to commemorate the founding of the state as well as the activation of forces in case the Arabs chose that date to cause trouble and embarrass the Israeli government in the midst of its celebration. GEN Herzog claims that Egypt planned to launch an attack in May. That is highly unlikely in view of the preparations yet to be accomplished by Egypt at that time. In any event, no attack occurred. The mobilization had cost Israel many millions of dollars, but the cost was to go higher yet. In October, the cost of the May mobilization played a large role in delaying a decision to mobilize until almost to the moment of the Arab attack.

In Israel, intelligence officers were well aware of the continuing military preparations. As the only agency with the resources to
do so, the military intelligence branch was charged with the responsibility to prepare the national intelligence estimate. In April, an estimate prepared by the Director of Military Intelligence, MG Elizeira, considered the probability of an Arab attack to be low. That war would come some time was considered inevitable. However, it was predicted to occur in 1975 or 1976, not 1973. This prediction was based in part on the assumption that Egypt would need to acquire bombers capable of reaching Israeli airfields and cities before she could launch an attack. Also, the continued alienation of Jordan by the other Arab countries was seen as proof of Arab military weakness and disunity.54

In March 1973, the Soviet Union agreed to supply Egypt with surface-to-surface missiles. These were to take the place of bombers in attacking targets deep within Israel. Following the failure by the United States in March to force Israel to make some move in the political arena, the acquisition of these missiles enabled Sadat to make the final decision to go to war.55

During the period between the 1967 War and the 1973 War, much of Israel's defense strategy was determined by Moshe Dayan in his capacity as Defense Minister. Dayan had served as the IDF Chief of Staff from 1953 to 1958, gaining fame in the 1956 War. In his book, Diary of the Sinai Campaign, he stated what came to be called the "collapse theory". In essence, this theory held that Egyptian units could be safely bypassed by mobile Israeli units because:

there is no need to fear that Egyptian units who will be bypassed will launch a counterattack or cut our supply lines. We should avoid analogies whereby Egyptian units would be expected to behave as European armies would in similar circumstances.56
Certainly, the performance of the Egyptian Army in the 1967 War had reinforced this concept. Even though this concept had been attacked when it was first advanced, the disposition and composition of Israeli forces in the Sinai still reflected that type of thinking.

In application, this theory foresaw the repulsion of any attempted Egyptian crossing, while it was still in the early stages, by the quick reaction of ground and air forces. This concept had led to a decision to reduce the length of conscript service and to halve the length of time reservists would be required to serve each year. Israelis strategy might then be characterized as "not based on the active defense of the fronts, but rather on deterrence—hence the small size of the garrison units in Sinai and on the Golan."57

The low opinion of the Egyptian forces held by Dayan and others in the Israeli government was encouraged by the Egyptians. Reports were leaked of the low efficiency of the air defense system. The movement of men and equipment to the west bank of the canal was disguised as part of a large training maneuver. Even statements by Sadat alluding to a coming war failed to alarm the Israeli government.

In a speech before the Egyptian Peoples's Assembly in March 1973, President Sadat stated:

The stage of total confrontation had become inevitable, and we are entering into it whether we like it or not. The military situation must be made to move, with all the sacrifices that it entails.58

The April 9 edition of Newsweek carried an article with senior editor Arnaud de Borchgrave and Egyptian President Sadat conducted shortly af-
ter this speech had been made. In response to the question: "I can only conclude from what you say that you believe that hostilities is the only way out?", Sadat replied: "You are quite right. Everything in this country is now being mobilized in earnest for the resumption of the battle—which is now inevitable."

However, the article immediately prior to the interview quoted above stated that de Borchgrave had been told a different story by Sadat’s aides. Their version was that "The Egyptian President was not contemplating anything as suicidal as a full-fledged amphibious attack across the Suez Canal." This article goes on to indicate that the Israelis did not believe that an attack by Egypt, Syria or Jordan was likely because of the retaliatory capability of the Israeli Air Force. Even so, the article concluded that Sadat might be forced to attack because of political pressure.

It seems unlikely that even the combined armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan would have been able to destroy Israel as a nation in 1973. However, what Sadat had in mind was a limited attack that would initiate movement toward a political settlement in the area. To that end, President Sadat got President Assad of Syria to agree that the aim of the war would be “recovering the territories lost in 1967”. Previously, Syria’s avowed goal had been the destruction of the state of Israel. This shift of purpose had the effect of negating much of Israel’s strategy at the time. The war planned by Sadat was one in which Israel’s recognized superiority in mobility and airpower would be countered by forcing her to fight a "meat-grinder" war. This is,
Israeli ground forces would be forced to fight a dug-in enemy who was protected by an umbrella of air defense weapons. The IDF would wear itself out by fighting the type of war which the Arabs were best trained for while the Israeli economy would suffer the strain of a prolonged war with no quick victory in sight.

Not all Israelis were as confident as Dayan. The IDF Chief of Staff, GEN Elazar, recognized that all our war was a possibility.

As he saw it, the Egyptians would be interested in:
1) renewing hostilities in order to break the status quo and to emphasize their unwillingness to accept the situation which had been created
2) causing a maximum loss in life (sic) and property to Israel
3) waging war in such a manner that at its conclusion Egypt would have achieved an advance from a military view, however minimal.

He felt that a few acres gained on the east bank of the Suez Canal or an advance of merely half a mile on the Golan Heights could satisfy the Arab war aims.65

In an economy which saw even reduced defense spending consuming twenty per cent of the GNP and thirty-two per cent of all government spending, the cost of preparing for a war which might not come was high. Partisan politics also was to play a part in the Israeli decision. With elections scheduled for later in the year, a hasty decision on mobilization might have an adverse effect at the polls. Dayan preferred to divert money from maintaining troops into weapons development and production with the long-range goal of making Israel self-sufficient in arms. Meanwhile, "believing the enemy's forces to be essentially fragile, trusting in the ability of the tank forces to defeat Egyptian forces on the ground, Dayan and his associates felt secure with the very thin defense that would itself collapse in October 1973."66
Notes to Chapter 3

2. Ibid., pp. 28-29.
3. Ibid., p. 33.
4. Ibid., p. 40.
7. Ibid., pp. 51-52.
8. Ibid., p. 52.
15. Palit, p. 22.
17. Ibid.
18. Palit, p. 23.
20. Palit, p. 23.
22. Ibid., p. 34.
23. Palit, p. 23.
24. Ibid., p. 38.
25. Luttwak, p. 284.
27. Ibid., p. 67.
32. Ibid., p. 24.
34. Herzog, p. 5.
35. Wakebridge, p. 473.
36. Herzog, pp. 5-7.
38. Herzog, p. 8, also Palit, p. 25.
40. Herzog, p. 11.
41. Ibid., p. 12.
43. Herzog, p. 19.
44. Herzog, pp. 20-21.
45. Kellner, p. 33.
46. Palit, p. 31.
47. Heikal, p. 181.
48. Palit, p. 32.
49. Ibid., p. 40.
51. Ibid., p. 43.
52. Herzog, p. 28.
53. Ibid., p. 29.
54. Ibid., p. 24, 41.
55. Ibid., p. 25.
57. Luttwak, p. 359.
58. Palit, p. 34.
61. Charles Wakebridge, "The Egyptian Staff Solution", Military Review, March 1975, p. 6, Palit puts the date in the late summer, p. 44.
62. Ibid.,
63. Palit, p. 32.
64. Herzog, p. 43.
65. Luttwak, p. 361.
66. Ibid., p. 362.
Chapter 4

EVOLUTION OF THE I.D.F.

Even in hindsight, it is difficult to fault Dayan for his confidence in the I.D.F. He had been associated with Jewish Armed Forces since 1929, except for the period December 1958 to June 1967. He had become a Major General just after his 34th birthday, and had held every major command of ground forces in the I.D.F. The principal architect of the I.D.F. in the '56 War and Minister of Defense during and after the '67 War, Moche Dayan must have felt that no Arab army would dare challenge the might of the I.D.F.

The organization could trace its origins to more than forty years before the founding of the state of Israel. The establishment of the Jewish watchmen’s association, "Hashomer", in 1907, marked the beginning of a modern Jewish Defense Force.1 Formed to protect vulnerable Jewish settlements from marauders, Hashomer was succeeded by the Hagana (defence) (also Haganah) organization after World War I. While some Jewish units had been formed in the British Army during World War I, they had been disbanded shortly after. Some of those who served in the British Army helped to form the Hagana, which extended its protection beyond the settlements to which its members belonged.

The Arab riots of the mid 1930’s served as an impetus to the Hagana. Even so, it was still an underground army, declared illegal
by Great Britain. In her mandatory role, Great Britain sought to reduce violence by suppressing any semblance of local armies within the mandate. However, the British soon found they could not protect all of Palestine.

To help the Jews protect themselves, the British formed the Jewish Settlement Police (JSP). Raised, trained and armed by the British, this unit provided protection for isolated Jewish communities. In addition, some unpaid guards were given authorization to carry arms. Comprised chiefly of Hagana members, the JSP and guards collectively were known as the Notrim.²

In 1937, the Hagana authorized Yithak Sadeh, a former officer in the Red Army to form and train mobile forces from the Notrim. By 1938, this force of Sadeh's was a thousand strong.³ Also in 1938, a British officer who was to have a profound impact on the Hagana came to Palestine.

Orde Charles Wingate became an ardent Zionist shortly after reaching Palestine. Convinced that the Zionists were the People of the Bible returning to their rightful home, he offered his services to the Hagana. Wingate persuaded his superiors to allow the formation of a Jewish counter-guerrilla unit under his command. Known as Special Night Squads (SNS), this unit was made up both of Notrim and Hagana men without legal cover. Though formed to protect the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline from attack, the SNS in fact served as the nucleus of the future IDF. Wingate was transferred from Palestine in 1939, but
had by that time made an indelible impression on the minds of the Hagana leaders. His advocacy of aggressive action and proficiency in night fighting would characterize the IDF for the next thirty years.

During this period, the Hagana worked under the auspices of the National Labor Federation (Histadrut). A disident group, known as Hagana B or Irgun, had broken away in 1931. A non-socialist force, it was smaller and more poorly equipped than the Hagana. The British White Paper of 1939 created another split in the Hagana; composed of those who "...advocated only one goal—the ousting of the foreign powers from Palestine..." Named after their principal spokesman, Araham Stern, the so called Stern Gang's activities were directed almost exclusively against the British.

With the outbreak of World War II, the leaders of the Zionist movement sought to form an all-Jewish unit in the British Army. At first, this effort failed, but the Hagana encouraged enlistment in the allied armies. Approximately 30,000 Jews received military training in this way. In 1944, a Jewish brigade was formed which fought in Europe.

The number of Jews fighting abroad created little concern until Rommel's offensive in May 1941. This threat resulted in the creation of an elite unit to protect the Jews left in Palestine. Called the Palmach, it "was designed as an elite and professional corps of Haganah and not as a sectarian Kibbutz military structure." Some units of the Palmach worked closely with the British forces, acquiring training in commando operations which they passed along to others.
The threat to Palestine caused the Hagana to plan for its defense while the Palmach acquired the skills to carry out such plans.  

The Palmach undertook to develop an Air Force and Navy as well as ground forces. Under the guise of sports clubs, some soldiers learned to fly Piper Cubs; many more were trained as sailors, both to help bring in illegal immigrants as well as to form a fighting navy. The Palmach also established a reserve system which served as the basis for that of the IDF a few years later. By the end of the Second World War, the Palmach consisted of four well trained battalions while many other Hagana units were ready to be mobilized if necessary.

Following the end of World War Two, the Jewish Agency and the Hagana sought to extend Jewish settlements, including bringing in as many illegal immigrants as possible. Active resistance by both Jews and Arabs as well as economic considerations caused Great Britain to announce in February 1947 that she would refer the matter of Palestine to the United Nations. The vote to partition Palestine in November 1947 greatly increased the level of violence in the area.

David Ben Gurion saw the need to weld the Irgun, the Stern Gang and the Hagana into one defense organization. This he did shortly after Israel was declared a state, although there was a brief spate of fighting between Irgun and Hagana forces. The new defense establishment was designated the Israeli Defense Force, known in Hebrew as Zahal.

Poorly armed at first, Zahal began receiving arms its agents
had been collecting abroad. During the first cease fire, 10 June to 8 Junly 1948, the IDF aquired guns, armored vehicles and other arms. Conscription orders were issued and the armed forces rose from 49,000 to 60,000.11

By the end of 1948, the Israeli Air Force had cleared the skies and the ground forces had expanded out in almost all directions. With the cease fire in 1949, the IDF began to take stock of itself.

The Palmach headquarters was dissolved. In general, those who had served in the Hagana went on to command units while those who had experience in the Jewish Brigade went into technical services. The Palmach idea did survive to a certain extent in the fighting youth movement (Nahal). This consisted of members of the Army who were stationed in border Kibbutzim. They both worked and did military training while insuring better protected border settlements.

Ben Gurion had served as Defense Minister since 1947, a post he was to hold until 1963 with only one interruption of 15 months. He was very much aware of the problems politics had caused the Hagana. He sought not only to keep politics but also religion from becoming a divisive element in the IDF. To that end, Israel adopted the "most comprehensive and stringent draft and reserve duty law in the world."12

Literally everyone is called for the draft. There is no exemption based on age or sex. Some are exempted on very strict religious grounds, otherwise only physical reasons will keep a person out of the IDF. While women do not serve in combat units, their service gives even
families without sons a feeling of contributing to the national defense. While Arabs and Christians can volunteer for the army, Jews cannot. In fact, "No one (Jewish) can voluntarily join the regular army at any age, unless he has served as a draftee."  

The concept of universal conscription is considered so important that rather than not call everyone, periods of national service have been reduced so all can serve while keeping the IDF relatively small. This has caused a great identification with, and affection for the military. 

"...in Israel, to be rejected for military service, especially if there is no visible reason for it, is to be rejected from and by society itself, to be excommunicated, as it were, from your friends and peer-group."  

Traditions form an important part of each recruit's training. Not only is the Bible often used as a reference, each branch administers the oath of service at an important site: The women before some vehicles burned out on the way to Jerusalem in 1948, the paratroopers in front of the Wailing Wall and the tank corps on Masada. 

The IDF is unusual in that draftees go not only into an arm but also a branch the day they are sworn in. The very best are selected for pilot training. Others will spend three years in the artillery or infantry. Actually, there are three types of infantry. The tank corps includes mechanized infantry that fights primarily from APCs. The paratroopers form a light, elite branch while ground infantry forms the third.
The entire defense ministry is also unique. It controls not only the military forces, but also the companies that manufacture arms. The ministry also administers the occupied territories and is thus responsible for security as well as political administration.

The military is headed by the Chief of Staff. He in turn has a General Staff which supervises the Air Force and Navy. No Army chief as such exists apart from the Chief of Staff. Israel is divided into three ground commands; north, central, and south. There are, in addition, Chiefs of Branches, each responsible for training, acquisition of weapons system and ammunition within his branch. In war, the commander of Armor Branch and the Commander of Training Branch each assume operational commands.

In this system, the Defense Minister is primarily responsible for policymaking while the Chief of Staff is responsible for maintaining and training the fighting forces. As will be shown, this dividing line can become ambiguous.

After serving as commander of both the Northern Command and Central Command, Moshe Dayan became the Chief of G Branch (operations) of the General Staff in December 1952, in effect, the second ranking officer in the IDF after the Chief of Staff. It was in this capacity that he first began to have an effect on the entire IDF.

Between 1951 and 1953, the IDF carried out several reprisal raids that were unmitigated disasters. In particular, a small raid in January
1953 that failed became the watch word of Dayan’s crusade to reform the IDF. He decreed that no force could turn back unless it had suffered at least fifty per cent casualties. To a nation as small and sensitive to human life as is Israel, such a dictum was a shock.

To Dayan’s way of thinking, the IDF needed a shock. He considered that in 1948, the valor of soldiers derived chiefly from the fact that they were often defending their homes. Ben Gurion and the Chief of Staff had decided that any future war would have to be carried to Arab territory as quickly as possible. "When Dayan became Chief of G Branch, Zahal was incapable of carrying out even minor attacks across the border. It was he who first trained Zahal to follow the cardinal rule of Israel’s security; defense through attack." In doing this, Dayan advocated the use of a frontal attack as a last resort to accomplish a mission. Prior to Dayan, the casualties likely to result from such an attack had ruled it out from Jewish tactics. Dayan’s emphasis on success at almost any cost changed this view and this change gradually began to permeate Zahal.

In mid-1953, a young reserve major named Ariel Sharon carried out a reprisal raid with a unit composed solely of civilians. Impressed, the Chief of Staff sought Dayan’s thoughts on creating a special commando unit to conduct future raids. Dayan objected, fearful that such a unit would deprive Zahal of the spirit and experience of conducting raids. Nevertheless, the unit was established and Major Sharon was recalled to the regular army to command it.
Designated Unit 101, this organization proved highly successful. Shortly after becoming Chief of Staff in December 1953, Dayan merged the paratroops and Unit 101, with Sharon in command. For two years, this combined unit was given all combat actions. Officers were rotated among this unit and others, gradually raising the level of proficiency throughout the ground forces. All officers of the IDF were also required to take airborne training.

Dayan also sought to improve the quality of the Army by retiring older officers. By establishing age forty as the upper limit for officers, Dayan caused many top ranking former Hagana officers to retire. By the 1956 War, Dayan had appointed most commanders in Zahal to their current positions.

As plans for the attack through the Sinai were formulated, Dayan envisioned little use of armor. This attitude was almost certainly due to the poor showing the second hand tanks then in the IDF had made in exercises. In a conversation with the Chief of the Armored Corps on 1 September 1956, Dayan expressed the following views:

"We must regard the following as a characteristic formation: infantry battalion, plus tank company, plus artillery support...The armor must be built into formations trained to fight as combat teams that breach the enemy lines and penetrate through to their rear...it must include a minimum of close support...its target will not necessarily be enemy armor."

Dayan's idea at the time was to bring tanks up to the front on tank transporters while the crews followed along in buses. Dayan still thought of tanks as slow and clumsy while considering infantry in half tracks as much more mobile. When asked what the tanks would do, Dayan
answered that tanks "would only encumber (the infantry) and would not make it." In Dayan's view, the objective was "to confound the organization of the Egyptian forces in Sinai and bring about their collapse." In keeping with this theory, as discussed earlier, he thought that "...the enemy's armor will collapse together with the rest of the enemy forces, to the extent that its entire deployment will collapse." 22

A last minute decision by the French government presented the IDF with new French tanks virtually on the eve of battle. Armor quickly proved that while the half track may be more agile, the tank was more mobile under fire. By extension, this argument also caused the IDF to favor heavy tanks (Centurions and Pattons) over lighter tanks (AMX 13).

There was one other consideration favoring the tank. In the words of the former Chief of Armor, MG Avraham Adan:

We had to choose between 4 soldiers each armed with a rifle or machine gun, or 4 soldiers in a tank. We picked the tank. We are a small nation, compared with our neighbors. Tanks give our small forces a higher combat potential per man. Their mobility and firepower let us win with small forces very quickly—and being surrounded on all borders, we have to think in terms of short wars, transferring the battle quickly into enemy territory to gain depth.23

The 1956 War also taught the IDF the necessity of having self-propelled artillery in armored formations. The towed artillery then in service was not able to keep up with the fast moving armor columns, and so contributed little to the battle. As a result, the IDF decided to acquire only self-propelled artillery and mortars in the future.24 This was accomplished primarily by the conversion of Sherman tank...
to carry either French 155mm or American 105mm cannons. Israeli-produced heavy mortars on modified carriers were also introduced.

The 1956 War served to validate the so called "Indirect approach" so often associated with Liddell Hart. Instead of attacking the Egyptian positions head on, the Israeli forces attacked from the flanks, following the concept of "the line of least expectation." The success of these tactics when carried out by armor brought about a distinct shift in the composition of the IDF ground forces.

The composition of armor forces was greatly influenced by MG (then colonel) Tal when he became the armor corps commander in 1964. A former infantry officer, Tal argued for armor doctrine that was directly contrary to conventional thought of the time.

In Tal's view, the open terrain of the Sinai offered little or no cover for dismounted infantry. Therefore, there was no need for an infantry-armor team because the tanks would survive against infantry anti-tank weapons by exploiting mass and speed. His answer to the Soviet supplied anti-tank guns was to raise the standard of tank gunnery in the IDF, enabling tanks to engage anti-tank guns at long ranges. He emphasized that anti-tank weapons were primarily short range and while they may be useful in Europe where visibility is often limited, they constituted little danger in the Sinai. He "refused to sanction the demand for modern armored carriers and devoted the resources of the corps to the tank battalions of the armored brigades."25

While the ground forces had some latitude in choosing types of
weapons systems, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) was much more limited. France was the only western country, which also manufactured jet aircraft, willing to sell arms to Israel. The IAF had gotten some Mysteries just before the 1956 War, and in 1963 began receiving the Mirage III. The latter aircraft was comparable in speed to the MiG-21 which had been supplied to some Arab countries by the Soviet Union.

These planes were designed more for air-to-air combat than closed air support, consequently, they could carry only a small bomb load. If the IAF could not eliminate the Arab air threat in the first few hours, armored columns as well as cities would be vulnerable to air attack. However, the low load carrying capacity of IAF aircraft meant that such a crippling blow could not be delivered in just one strike.

The IAF compensated for this short fall in part by intensive training. Model target sites of Egyptian airfields were set up. Strict priorities of aircraft types were established, with the MiG-21 at the top. Crews practiced servicing the aircraft until turn around times were reduced to less than ten minutes. Special bombs were developed to penetrate runways for maximum damage. The best weapon however, was the pilots themselves.

The IAF took the cream of conscripts and subjected them to intensive testing. Those that were accepted started a grueling program of flight and airborne training designed to wash failures out early. Compared to a seventy-five per cent success rate in U.S. pilot training, the IAF passes only about ten per cent. In the hands of this ten
In the early 1960's the ground forces also began conducting large scale exercises against Egyptian style defenses. The IDF knew that time would be at a premium in case of war. The prediction was a maximum of three days before an imposed ceasefire, "therefore all Israeli mobile formations were equipped with three days' fuel and supplies, each brigade being self-contained with its own supply column following behind. The Israeli forces planned and trained for a three-day period of all-out fighting to be continued day and night. . ." 27 These exercises, conducted in 1965 and 1966, helped to shape the winning tactics of 1967.

As the 1967 War loomed closer, Dayan reviewed the plans to destroy the Arab armies. While he had little hand in shaping them, he did review and approve those employed.

The Egyptian forces in Sinai were arrayed in the Russian designed "sword and shield" defense. This employed stationary forces, behind elaborate belts of minefields and obstacles, constituting the shield. Mobile armored units to the rear constituted the sword. These forces were to be employed in a counter attack role. The gaps between the shield positions rested on "impassable terrain". In what Liddell Hart called "the subtlest and most effective application of the indirect approach in the record of modern warfare", 28 the Israelis outflanked and penetrated the Egyptian positions in less than twenty-four hours.

The Israelis crossed the so called impassable terrain to out-
Flank the fortified Egyptian positions. The sword formation was ambushed with heavy losses as it moved to counter-attack. With air superiority assured, the IDF ground forces drove through the retreating Egyptian Army, set up blocking positions and forced the Egyptians to fight their way west. By the fourth day of the war, the IDF had driven to the canal, even further than Dayan had wanted to go.

The IDF had not expected Jordan to enter the fighting. However, Jordanian troops began firing on Israeli cities on the second day of fighting. For the next three days and nights, the IDF and Jordanian troops fought bitter battles at close quarters. Finally, the IDF cleared the territory up to the Jordan River.

Syria had shelled some border villages starting on the second day of the war. She accepted the U.N. ceasefire on 8 June. Dayan, under heavy political pressure from the left-wing party which relied heavily on the Kibbutzim, finally overcame his hesitation and ordered an attack on the Syrian positions. Dayan was concerned not only over the casualties that would result from attacking the well fortified Syrian positions; he was also fearful of possible Soviet reaction to such an attack.29

The Syrian sword and shield defense was much more formidable than the Egyptian. While the IAF attacked the sword, armored forces thrust against the shield. Shortly before the IDF was to launch an enveloping attack, the Syrian defense collapsed. After thirty hours of fighting another cease fire took effect.
The entire country was understandably euphoric. The modern-day David had slain Goliath. MG Sharon spoke for most when he said three days after the war:

We managed to finish it all, and after our success this time, I am very much afraid that by the (time of the) next war we are all going to be too old, and the next generation will have to take care of it, because we have now completed everything in such a way that the enemy is not going to be able to fight for many, many years to come.30

The period of peace was short lived. The War of Attrition that ended in 1970 resulted in the building of the Bar Lev line. It also further convinced Israel of the capability of the IAF to continue to punish Egyptian positions.

When the French embargoed further arms to Israel after the 1967 War, the U.S. also began supplying equipment to Israel to offset Soviet supplies to Syria and Egypt. Between the 1967 War and the 1973 War, U.S. arms deliveries to Israel totaled just under one billion dollars. The value of Soviet arms to Egypt during that period was nearly double that.31

The American equipment was new and more powerful than the French arms. The heavier M60 tanks were superior to Soviet tanks in both weapon range and ammunition capacity. The F4 and A4 aircraft gave the IAF planes with much heavier payloads than the French Mirages and Mysteres. More important, the F4 was a true multi-mission plane, capable of protecting itself while engaged in deep bombing missions. Coupled with American electronic counter measures ( ECM), these planes had ranged to the outskirts of Cairo during the War of Attrition.
While the F4 was not invulnerable, as proven when several were
downed in 1970, they did give the IAF great confidence in itself. The
acquisition of American anti-radar missiles increased this self-esteem.

In February 1971, an IAF officer told military correspondents:

"We are convinced we have a full answer to missiles. In July
1970, we didn't have it. Now there will be no serious problems.
There will be losses, but smaller than those we sustained on the
eve of (the) cease-fire. This should be proven within the first
two or three hours of war. We will overcome the whole system with-
in two or three days."\(^{32}\)

The IAF certainly had reason to feel confident about facing
Arab aircraft. The IAF pilots consistently shot down Arab planes with
loss ratios of 1 IAF to 10 or more Arab. The Arabs had fewer pilots
than planes while the IAF had just the opposite. Some observers credit-
ed the IAF with about a four to one advantage over the Arabs based on
the former's high sortie rate and pilot-to-plane ratio.\(^ {33}\)

While the IAF was highly visible, the heart of the IDF re-
mained the reserves. Unlike U.S. reserve component forces, those of
the IDF are expected to engage in battle within 48 hours of mobilization.
This is possible because members of the reserves have already spent three
years on active duty. They also train from thirty to sixty days a year,
depending upon the level of tension in the area.

The regular army spends a good deal of time maintaining the
equipment assigned to the reserves. The regular army also consists of
a higher number of technical skills than its numbers would seem to justify.
These personnel and a high percentage of officers form the cadre of units
that are to be fleshed out by the reserves. As Israelis are fond of saying, the reservists are full time soldiers who are on leave eleven months a year. An efficient, often tested, alert system insures that the total IDF can be ready to fight in less than 72 hours.

The force composition of the IDF reflected the experiences of the 1956 and 1967 Wars. Nearly eighty per cent of the defense dollars for several years prior to 1973 had gone for new planes and armor equipment. By 1973, Israel had more than twice the number of tanks she had in 1967. These tanks were also of much higher quality, modified by IDF shops to give them greater range and, for the older tanks, a much more effective main gun.

By 1973 most infantry brigades had been converted to armour, as distinct from at least seventeen brigade-equivalents of armour, there were reportedly only three paratroop and a few first-line infantry brigades, including the Golani, the training brigade of the conscript infantry. Much of the rest of the infantry, 'motorised' with conscripted civilian buses or trucks, was made up of second-line troops.

The IDF also acquired some long range guns to range targets well west of the canal. In keeping with IDF doctrine of using the IAF as 'flying artillery', artillery was thought of more in an offensive role. The artillery commander often rode with the task force commander, his batteries pausing to shoot and then moving again with the column. This was very much in contrast to the Soviet inspired defensive use of artillery by the Arab forces.

After the 1967 War, IDF leaders became immensely popular. Dayan and his generals were sought after, both in and out of Israel.
This popularity made them particularly desirable to politicians as vote getters. Many took advantage of this to pursue careers in politics or government related fields. For example, Bar-Lev entered the cabinet, Rabin became an ambassador and Sharon retired in July 1973 to form his own political coalition.

Whether or not this trend influenced Sayan is difficult to tell. He did break tradition by beginning to include the Chief of Staff and the Director of Intelligence to cabinet meetings and before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. That was a formidable array for anyone to challenge. However, this practice tended to blur "the dividing line between ministerial and military responsibility." By 1973, Dayan had made it a practice to abstain "from direct active intervention in tactical and logistic matters."

The more serious consequence was the ever increasing role played by the director of military intelligence. Even though IDF intelligence had been surprised on a number of occasions, the legacy of the 1967 War left it in a very pre-eminent role. One man, MG Aharon Yariu, headed this division from 1964 and 1972. While not the sole cause of the consolidation, it was primarily during his tenure that military intelligence... 

...Deviated from the pure military aspects. It was only natural for its evaluation to cover the strategic level which necessarily includes political, diplomatic, economic, demographic and scientific aspects of the enemy. While the foreign office research department stagnated, military intelligence developed on its own, catching up with and overhauling the other services, and moving from pure collection not research and evaluation.
The danger was not in what military intelligence was doing, but in the fact that no one else was providing an independent intelligence appraisal to the governmental decision makers. "Within the (Israeli) government, there was no additional body that could double check intelligence branch, with no recourse to expert re-examination. Intelligence research was the exclusive province of the military."41

MG Yariu's replacement was MG Eliahu Zeira, a man of limited intelligence experience more known for his self confidence than for his depth of knowledge of Arab affairs. After some five months in office, MG Zeira granted an interview in which he discussed his job. The following quotes are excerpted from that interview.

The biggest problem Israeli intelligence faces? "to underestimate" what we're up against, Zeira says. "But an equally big risk is that we would overestimate (and thus over-react).

To illustrate, he cites the unpredictability of Arab leadership. "They have their own logic. Thus, we have to look hard for evidence of their real intentions in the field-otherwise, with the Arabs, all you have is rhetoric."

He went on to stress that while big countries stress capabilities, the opposite was the case with Israel. In his words, "Too many Arab leaders have intentions which far exceed their capabilities."

In this same interview, Zeira discounted the likelihood of a conventional attack by Arab forces. He cited the first threat as a "normal war". By this he meant something like the War of Attrition. While he said that such a war would be more effective if launched in cooperation with other Arab countries, such an attack would suffer because of poor Egyptian leadership.42

After apparently having been proven right in May 1973, Zeira had no reason to doubt his analysis of events. In retrospect, it may have been that Sadat may have been continuing his deception plan in raising the level of tension in May. In doing so, he could check his own alert procedures while evaluating the Israel's reaction.43 Meanwhile, Zeira's intelligence estimate stated that the probability of war was remote in
part because ". . . the Egyptians had no answer to an Israeli air attack in depth. . .".

Shortly after the May alert, the IDF chief of Staff was asked about the probability of war. He outlined almost exactly the sequence of events followed in October, saying that "the Egyptians may well foresee preliminary, if restricted, gains. They could think that their opening strike will cause us heavy losses, followed by a freezing of the situation on the ground." When asked about the possibility of a surprise attack by the Arabs he said:

"It's impossible to start a surprise overall offensive from an apparently tranquil situation. The probability is that they will move to almost-public alert. They will open their offensive in stage two. In such a case, an offensive would be difficult to predict. Yes, I guess that their first blow will not be fatal. In our present situation, we don't need a pre-emptive strike." 45

The quiet of the summer was broken twice in September. Early in the month, the IAF shot down 13 Syrian MiGs at the loss of one Israeli aircraft. Towards the end of the month, the terrorist activities in Austria diverted Israel's attention away from her borders. Whether or not this latter activity was part of a master deception plan is unknown. In any event, it could not have served Egypt's purposes better.

IDF intelligence blithely assured one and all that the Syrian divisions on the Golan were in a defensive posture, probably as a response to the dog fight earlier in the month. The Egyptians were still conducting exercises. On 3 October, Zeira described these forces as "reinforced, but not exceeding the accepted strength for exercises, according to past experience." The probability of war was again given
as "low". Forty-eight hours notice of the outbreak of war was guaranteed by intelligence branch. Three days later, Zeira was briefing the Israeli press corps that "war is likely at any minute..." When the Arab offensive began. The promised forty-eight hours warning had dwindled to fewer than twelve.

All this must have been a tremendous shock to those who had read the explanations offered by the Jerusalem Post for the Arab moves. On 2 October, the post military correspondent wrote this:

Informed sources here yesterday stated that they did not expect a Syrian military initiative along the Golan front in the predictable future despite the bolstering of forces in the area. Early in the week several Syrian army units, for the past three years stationed along the Syrian-Jordanian border, were transferred to the Golan front—a move which has been interpreted here as a Syrian gesture of goodwill towards the Jordanians in the wake of the recent detente between the two countries.

This article also made passing reference to the alert, "standard practice during Israel's festive season." The anti-aircraft missile system east of the Syrian cease fire line was characterized as "a serious development." The article further speculated that this system may include SAM 6 missiles.

In an editorial the next day, the Jerusalem Post applauded the fact that Israel did not have to respond to Arab military moves because of "the value of borders which constitute a natural barrier as in the case of the Canal, or which provides a buffer zone of safety as in the Golan." This article also indorsed Zeira's view of the reason for Syrian troop movements.
The apparent schizoid character of Israeli strategy from 1967 to 1973 can be traced in part to the initial policy towards the Sinai. Initially, Israel did not plan to capture the entire east bank of the canal. After its capture, the Israeli government saw it as a potential bargaining chip for use in gaining Egyptian concessions. When this failed, the Canal became desirable in part as the 'ideal tank ditch'.

Following the War of Attrition, the Israeli attitude toward giving up the Sinai hardened. Israel had what it considered safe and secure borders for the first time in its existence. The Israeli view was expressed by Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon when he wrote in 1969 that "defensible borders without peace are preferable to peace without defensible borders." In the spring of 1973, MG. Sharon stated that "maybe the canal is not a line of peace. But the canal is a line on which you can avoid war. The only reasons nations go to war is if you are attacked, or think you can win. On this line, Egypt has no chance to win."

Israel saw herself faced with two military problems, first, the regular armies of the Arab governments who sought the destruction of Israel as a state by military force. Secondly, the attacks by irregular groups of terrorists who fought a predominately psychological war toward the same end. Israel's response to both of these threats was along the lines of the indirect approach.

During the War of Attrition, Israel shelled Egyptian oil fields and staged commando raids to demonstrate Egypt's vulnerability to Israeli retaliation. In the case of terrorists, Israel attacked suspected stag-
ing sites for the raids. This policy had been followed consistently since the early 50's. Unfortunately, the reprisal strikes were sometimes seen as proof of success rather than a warning of greater damage that could come.

While Israel meant reprisal raids to be deterrents to future attacks, it is questionable if they could satisfy the commonly accepted definition of deterrence. For example, Glenn H. Snyder defines the problem as follows:

The central theoretical problem in the field of national security policy is to clarify and distinguish between the two central concepts of deterrence and defense. Essentially, deterrence means discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk which outweighs his prospective gain. Defense means reducing our own prospective costs and risks in the event that deterrence fails. Deterrence works on the enemy's intentions; the deterrent value of military forces is their effect in reducing the likelihood of enemy military moves. Defense reduces the enemy's capability to damage or deprive us; the defense value of military forces is their effect in mitigating the adverse consequences for us of possible enemy moves, whether such consequences are counted as losses of territory or war damage.

These two concepts are not necessarily mutually exclusive in structuring forces when only conventional arms are considered. As Snyder goes on to point out, "A balance of power exists when the defending side has enough forces to defeat the attacker or at least to prevent him from making territorial conquests. Deterrence is the consequence of this capability. . . ." Nonetheless, the intent of deterrence is still to prevent the enemy from making the decision to go to war.

In the Israeli case, the assumption was made that the decision to attack had been made and that it was only a matter of timing, that is,
what year the war would start. That was thought to depend upon when
Egypt would require bombers that could strike Israeli cities. While
some claim that this was satisfied by the supplying of SCUD missiles to
Egypt in March 1973, that argument seems weak. The Israeli model was
built on all-out war to destroy Israel as a state, while Sadat decided
to go to war only after diplomatic efforts to force Israeli withdrawals
failed in March 1973. That SCUD missiles began arriving at the same time
seems more coincidental with than causal of Sadat's decision to go to war.

In keeping with their doctrine that a good offense is the best
defense, the IDF bought primarily tanks and fighter-bombers between 1967
and 1973. It chose not to invest in essentially defensive systems such
as interceptor aircraft, air defense missiles or anti-tank guided
missiles. The IDF saw Arab tank forces as the major threat and Israeli
tanks as the best counter to that threat.

It would seem that the Egyptians learned far more from the 1967
War than did the Israelis. In fact, it appears that the Egyptians analyzed
the Israeli model for success and adapted it to their use.

Mock-ups of Israeli targets in the Sinai were constructed in
Libya where Egyptian pilots practiced for weeks just before the war against
their assigned targets. Also, the Egyptians modified bombs to penetrate
runways and so cause maximum damage. The ground forces likewise practiced
crossing the canal where it flowed through Egypt. Like the Egyptian air
force, mockups were built and battle drills practiced by the Egyptian
army.
The Egyptians also accurately guaged the IDF reaction to an attack. A high sand wall had been built along the west side of the Canal. This served not only to screen preparations from Israeli positions on the west bank, but also to provide a platform for overwatching fires against IDF tanks sent to reinforce the Bar Lev line.

Preparations were also made to receive the IAF. Missiles were set up to counter the high altitude threat, a combination of missiles and guns to counter low level attacks. These latter were concentrated particularly in the valleys favored by IAF pilots.

The decisive step was the decision to send over primarily infantry equipped with anti-tank weapons in the first wave to cross the canal. The IDF had expected any Egyptian crossing to be armor heavy. The plan to repel such a crossing called for IDF tanks to come forward and engage the Egyptian tanks. Consequently, the tanks that were rushed forward shortly after the war began had only anti-tank ammunition. Unable to engage the Egyptian infantry effectively with their main guns, the IDF tanks were quickly caught in a crossfire of anti-tank missiles.

One tank crewman later narrated his experience:

"We were taught that the tank is the problem. An enemy tank is the first objective. Anti-tank guns come next. And then you fire at infantry...I looked around and saw burning fireballs dancing through the air towards our (sic) tanks. I didn't yet grasp what was happening. Only later I understood these were missiles; the infantry were no less dangerous than tanks—which we hadn't seen at all. In armor school I had heard about these missiles, but they were never accorded a high order of priority as weapons. This was a complete surprise for me."
The Egyptian anti-aircraft missiles proved as big a surprise to the IAF as the anti-tank missiles had to the ground forces. In the past, the IAF had been able to destroy Arab anti-aircraft means before attacking ground targets. However, the imminent threat posed by Arab armor required that the IAF be used immediately in a close support role. Forced to fly low and slow into the teeth of an integrated air defense system, the IAF suffered high losses in the first days of the war. The tactics of the War of Attrition were not sufficient to protect the IAF from the new generation of anti-aircraft missiles employed by the Arabs. In the words of LTG Bar Lev:

The surprise by which Israel was caught was full, at all levels—the strategic, operational and tactical. As a result, Israel had to wage a war which was improvised and confused in everything. Not a single operational plan was carried out as planned in advance; not the containment plan nor the use of the air force in a blocking action, not the counter-attack not the crossing of the canal.57

Ground forces striving to rescue the forces trapped along the Bar Lev line were driven back with heavy losses again and again. The incompatibility of seeking to hold a static line with armored forces now caused the IDF heavy casualties. Tank losses in Sinai alone in the first three days have been estimated to approach 400.

That the IDF was able to stop and then push back the Syrian army and later penetrate the Egyptian lines was much more a tribute to the courage and initiative individual soldiers than anything else. They fought at extremely unfavorable odds and were finally successful. The Egyptians also must be credited with success although the Syrians failed. Interviewed in 1975, the Egyptian Minister of War stated that the Egyptian objective "was to shatter Israel's doctrine of security, to defeat the
main enemy troop concentrations in Sinai and inflict the heaviest losses possible to convince Israel that continuing to occupy our lands would entail a heavy price."

Egyptian President Sadat's address, on 16 October 1973, to the Egyptian People's Assembly showed that even while Egyptian forces held the upper hand, he could reveal Egypt's limited objectives publicly. In this address, Sadat stated that the "theory of Israeli security...has been broken and destroyed." He went on to state the objectives of Egypt in beginning the war as: "(a) to restore our territory which was occupied in 1967; and (b) to find ways and means to restore and obtain respect for the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine."

Sadat also addressed some remarks directly to President Nixon in this speech, reiterating that Egyptian aims were in accordance with U.N. resolution 242. By implication, the pre-1967 war lines were thereby recognized as the de facto borders of Israel, at least by Sadat. Granted that the speech was made after the U.S. airlift started and the abortive Egyptian assault of 14 October. Nonetheless, the absence of any rhetoric about the destruction of Israel and repeated reference to the U.N. make it clear that Sadat was presenting the war as a limited action.

It is a moot question whether Sadat chose a limited objective war because that was all Egypt could execute or because his objectives were in fact limited. The first few days of the war proved that the Egyptian army had found a way to counter every tactical advantage possess-
ed by Israel. While later events negated much of the initial gains, we should not lose sight of the fact that the strengths of the IDF were so successfully stymied in the first three days of the war.

As had been shown, Israel saw that her very existence depended upon her armed forces. The national security policy of Israel was predicated in large measure upon striking first if necessary. Yigal Allon referred to Israel's "moral right. . .to launch a pre-emptive counter-offensive. . .when a change in the status quo definitely and verifiedly threatening to Israel's security has occurred." The overall grand strategy of Israel was to fight a short war, transferring the conflict to Arab territory as quickly as possible and striking the first blow if necessary.

The political decision to fortify the 1967 cease fire lines began to undermine that strategy. The duration of Israeli occupation of the east bank of the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights was indeterminate. As the perceived probability of war decreased, forces were thinned out along the front lines. Military risks were taken in order to achieve economic savings. However, the IDF did not adapt new organizations or tactics to maximize the effectiveness of the defensive positions. That this was not done may be explained in part by MG Tal's observation, "We came to regard it as axiomatic that, so long as the Arabs acknowledged our operational and strategic superiority in fire power (the air force), they would not dare to attack us." This view persisted in spite of the IDF's knowledge of Soviet-supplied bridging in Egypt's possession. What became known as "the
concept", the necessity for Egypt to have a deep strike capability before beginning a war, continued to drive all aspects of Israeli military thought. This concept was so pervasive that LTC Yona Bendman, head of the Egyptian section in the research branch of IDF intelligence could write shortly before the '73 War:

Though the actual taking up of emergency positions on the canal appears to contain indications testifying to an offensive initiative, according to our best evaluation no change has occurred in the Egyptian assessment of the balance of power between their forces and the IDF. Therefore, the probability that the Egyptians intend to resume hostilities is low.

The 'concept' and Dayan's collapse theory had combined in a mindset that did not allow any interpretation that did not fit within the framework of these views. The IDF seemed to have disregarded the lessons not only of the '67 War but the War of Attrition as well. In MG Tal's words:

We contented ourselves with looking for technical countermeasures and refused to understand that something basic and essential was in the process of changing--that the air force was losing its capability to provide close tactical support in land battles and that this decline in capability had serious implication for our whole concept regarding the structure and organization of our armed forces and for our combat doctrine.

The mistakes were at almost all levels. Armor was not moved forward in the Sinai to counter what had become a permanent Egyptian state of readiness. No decision was made on the function of the Bar Lev line so it was to become a magnet for Israeli casualties. No plans were made for a no warning attack, so confident was everyone of least 48 hours warning before an Arab attack. Even ammunition and spare parts stocks had been reduced. Neither the nation nor the IDF was prepared for war, least of all, one initiated by an Arab surprise attack.
It is very difficult to assign blame for this general lack of readiness. An inquiry commission was appointed after the war to determine why Israel was so unprepared. Headed by the president of the Israeli Supreme Court, Justice Shimon Agranat, this commission investigated the events leading up to the war as well as the conduct of the war itself. Although only 40 pages of the 1500 page report have been declassified, even that small portion was highly critical of the IDF.

The interim report of this commission, released in April 1974, was exceptionally critical of the Chief of Staff, LG Elazar, MG Zeira and several of his staff as well as the commanding officer in the Sinai, MG Gonen. This report did however absolved Moshe Dayan of ministerial responsibility for IDF failures. LG Elazar immediately resigned with a bitter blast at the commission and Dayan. In the ensuing public outcry, Dayan's popularity fell along with Meir's government.

Israel had been caught in a vicious circle. Spending up to twenty-seven per cent of its GNP on defense from 1969-1972 (the U.S. spent at most twenty-eight per cent during World War Two), Israel needed desperately to economize in defense spending. Faced with a small population, Israel could only afford to fight a short war. Geography demanded that the war be carried to the enemy as quickly as possible. Facing forces superior in numbers required a constant search for quantitative superiority. These were translated into a military structure with both political and military pressures applied. In many cases, these two pressures, if not opposed, at least were somewhat divergent in direction. In MG Tal's words:
From the Six-Day War to the 1973 October War, there was no longer one continuous logic running like a thread through national goals, military and political thinking. Assessments of the military situation, both long and short term, were no longer derived from defined national goals but from conjectures, wishes and hopes. Instead of military strategy being derived from national policy, operational thinking from strategy, and tactics from operational thinking frames of reference became confused and the process was sometimes reversed. 66

Israel is a country which "does not seek the destruction of the Arab states, but merely to frustrate and circumvent their desire to destroy her..." 67 At the same time, she could say that "defensible borders without peace are preferable to peace without defensible borders."

Added to this was the growing isolation of Israel in the world community. The shooting down of a Libyan airliner, the commando raids into Lebanon and the forcing down of another airliner had severely strained relations between Israel and most other nations. With the threat of the "oil weapon", most European countries feared support for Israel would be disastrous to their oil dependent economies. By October 1973, the United States was one of the few countries in the world Israel could turn to for support.

Faced with an impending Arab attack on 6 October, Prime Minister Meir assured the U.S. Ambassador that Israel would not launch a pre-emptive attack. She also asked that U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger notify the Arab governments of Israel's knowledge of their intentions. While some have suggested that this may have caused the Arab governments to speed up the time of attack, it is quite likely that any contact between the U.S. and Egypt occurred less than two hours before the attack started, far too little time for Egypt and
Syria to change their plans.

Much has been made of the decision by Israel not to launch a pre-emptive strike. The original explanation was that Israel wanted it clearly understood that the Arabs were the aggressors. That was considered critical in gaining the sympathy of the American people and was no doubt part of the decision. Another part was the fact that the ground troops could do little to follow up a first strike. An air raid would thus be little more than a spoiling attack. Another factor was LTG. Elazar's assessment "that a pre-emptive strike is very important from the military point of view. It would save us casualties, and would give us a better situation in which to fight this war—but, even if we do not strike first we shall not lose the war." Also, how would Israel be able to justify safe and secure borders in the future if she launched a pre-emptive attack when she had them? LTG Elazar favored the strike while Dayan opposed it. In the end, the strike was vetoed.

The date of the war, because of its religious overtones, has been criticized by many. Original Arab planning had specified two acceptable periods: 7-11 September and 5-10 October. The second block of time was chosen due primarily to planning necessities. The sixth was chosen more for favorable tide and moon conditions than its religious reason, though it did fall on the anniversary of Mohammed's victorious entry into Mecca in 623 A.D. The time of the attack, 1400, was a compromise between the Syrian desire for an early morning attack and the Egyptian desire for the war to start in late afternoon. The fact that the war was to start on the sixth was revealed to the Syrians and Russians.
only on 3 October. This upset the Syrians who had wanted a five
day countdown in order to drain some oil refineries which would be
likely Israeli targets.

MG Asira stated on the morning of 6 October that the attack
would begin at 1800. While that may have been the original time de-
sired by the Egyptians, it was four hours later than the time agreed on
by the Arabs. In the Sinai, the IDF commander, MG Gonen, directed no
forward movement until 1600, two hours before the expected attack.
In an apparent attempt to avoid being accused of provocation, the front
line troops were not alerted. The troops of the reserve Jerusalem brigade
manning the Bar Lev line were totally surprised when the war started.
The world's best anti-tank ditch was supposed to delay the Egyptians
crossing for twenty-four hours—the first troops crossed in seven
minutes.

The IDF, structured for deterrence, not defense, soon dis-
covered it faced a very different Arab soldier from those of 1967. Both
the political and military lessons of the War of Attrition had not been
learned, and therefore, unapplied. This may be due in part to the fact
that Israel has no counterpart to the U.S. National Security Council.
Another contributing factor may be the very high proportion of retired
military officers in the Israeli government, officers who remembered the
easy victories of 1967. These and many other considerations had clouded
the reality of the changing situation between Israel and her Arab neigh-
bor. Even if change had been desired, it would have been difficult to
execute. The entire country was infected with the mood that the status
quo would continue and that the huge costs of defense could at last be reduced with relative safety. Israel's tremendous self confidence was not so much unwarranted as misplaced. The IDF was indeed strong enough to preserve the state; but without being part of a larger strategy that included economic and diplomatic components as well, the IDF was not strong enough to maintain the status quo alone. The '73 War was not proof of the failure of Israel's policy of deterrence, it was proof of Israel's failure to understand, and therefore formulate, a national policy based on deterrence. While the blames for the poor showing of the IDF in the early stages of the War rightly rests with the military planners, the blame for the War occurring rests with their civilian masters.

The national policy of any country must be dynamic and realistic to have any hope of succeeding. It would appear that the national policy of Israel had stagnated since the 1967 War. This stagnation continued to feed on the national mood of complacency. The cost of this false sense of security was to come high, a cost that continues to be borne by many nations beside Israel. Higher oil prices reduced NATO cohesiveness and increased inflation in many nations are just a few manifestations of this.
Notes to Chapter 4


3. Ibid.


5. Luttwak, pp. 9-10.

6. Perlmutter, p. 43.


8. Perlmutter, p. 36.


10. Ibid., pp. 20-21.


13. Rolbant, p. 81.


18. Ibid., p. 209.


20. Ibid., p. 262.

21. Ibid., p. 263.
22. Ibid., pp. 263-264.


25. Luttwak, p. 188.


27. Ibid., p. 41.


29. Ibid., p. 275.

30. Ibid., p. 299.


34. Rolbant, pp. 82-83.

35. All numbers of weapons unless otherwise cited are from The Military Balance, years 1966-1978 inclusive (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies) No claim for accuracy of these figures is made.

36. Luttwak, p. 370.


40. Ibid., pp. 65-6

41. Schiff, p. 35.


44. Herzog, p. 42.

45. Schiff, p. 31.

46. Ben-Porat, p. 29.


48. Ibid.


50. Allon, p. 100.


53. Ibid., p. 108.

54. Herzog, pp. 24 and 41.


56. Ben-Porat, pp. 44-45.


60. Allon, pp. 105-6


64. Tal, p. 28.

66. Tal, p. 34.


72. Ibid., pp. 30-31. See also Palit, pp. 74-76.


75. Schiff, p. 53.
Chapter 5

ORIGIN OF NATO

While the end of World War II found the Zionists working for a permanent home, it also found the western Allies looking forward to bringing their armies home. United States strength in Europe went from 3,100,000 men in 1945 to 391,000 in 1946. Great Britain reduced her forces from 1,321,000 to 488,000 during the same period while Canada withdrew all her forces.¹ The Soviet demobilization was not quite so rapid. Her twenty-nine forward divisions outnumbered British, French, and American divisions by at least three to one.²

The euphoria of the successful conclusion of World War II was quickly replaced in the West by the spectre of expanding Communism. The United Nations was paralysed by disputes between the United States and the Soviet Union. Pressure on Greece by Albania and Bulgaria in 1947 led President Truman to tell the U.S. Congress that "it must be the policy of the United States of America to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities, or by outside pressure."³ The Congress responded by authorising both aid and the dispatch of American personnel to the area. The "Truman Doctrine" had been born.

The continuing lack of cooperation in peace talks by the U.S.S.R. disrupted efforts to establish a framework for the reconstruction of
Europe. The U.S.S.R. also put pressure on both Rumania and Czechoslovakia, helping to bring communist governments to power.

Alarmed by these events, the governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Great Britain signed the Brussels treaty in March of 1948. Two months later, the Soviet Union began the Berlin blockade.

The U.S. Senate passed a resolution in June 1948 which permitted the United States to enter into mutual aid arrangements in time of peace. The following April, the five signatories to the Brussels treaty were joined by Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Canada, Portugal and the United States in the formation of NATO. Framed within the principles of the United Nations, the twelve members avowed their determination "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." 

In the European view, it was essential to tie the U.S. to Europe. The U.S. monopoly on atomic weapons provided a powerful counter-weight to a Soviet Army that still numbered over two million troops. Complacent reliance on this deterrent was short lived.

The exploding of an atomic weapon by the Soviet Union and the invasion in Korea caused a reassessment of NATO's organization. The outgrowth was the establishment of a NATO defense force which included an American contingent.

The approval of these startling and unprecedented measures by the signatories to the alliance made it explicit that, for the
first time in history, forces from Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, would be committed in peace time to manning the defences of Western Europe alongside their continental allies, as a visible deterrent to Soviet territorial ambitions, as an act of faith, and as an acknowledgement of their conviction that "united we stand, divided we fall." 

The approval of the creation of an integrated NATO defense force was an evolution from the original treaty which provided for a supreme political body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NAC established a subordinate military committee. A standing group was formed along with five regional military planning groups.

In September 1950, the NAC faced its first major crisis. In discussing how to cope with an invasion of Central Europe, "the NATO nations unanimously agreed that a forward strategy—a defence as far to the east as possible—should be adopted." The realization that such a strategy would require more than the 14 Allied divisions then in Europe led to the formation of Allied Command Europe (ACE). The headquarters was designated as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), traditionally an American.

Three of the five regional planning group's functions were shifted to ACE in January 1951. These were the forerunners of three of today's ACE subordinate commands: Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) and Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). Planning envisioned goals of 50 divisions and 4000 aircraft for 1952.
These goals were revised downward in 1954 when it became apparent that such force levels could not be supported. Also, Soviet nuclear weapons dictated that NATO's strategy be reviewed. Up to that time, "because of the lack of conventional forces, NATO defence planning relied primarily on massive U.S. nuclear retaliation as a deterrent." This was the era of massive retaliation which was based on U.S. nuclear superiority. As the Soviet Union began to acquire significant stocks of strategic weapons, the need for another strategy was indicated.

In 1957, the North Atlantic Council announced a new strategic concept. This concept recognized the possibility of limited war, but called for the use of nuclear weapons in response to any major aggression. SACEUR, thenceforth, was to base his forward planning on the assumption that a large range of nuclear weapons gradually would be introduced into both NATO and Soviet bloc armories. Accordingly, the heads of government of the NATO nations agreed to the establishment of nuclear warheads in Europe as well as placing intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMS) at SACEUR's disposal.

By that time, three additional nations had joined NATO. Greece and Turkey became members in 1952 and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1955. The acceptance of the FRG caused the establishment of a counter alliance dominated by the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact.

In 1960, ACE acquired another major subordinate command, the ACE Mobile Force (AMF). Composed of units from several NATO nations, "the mission of the AMF is to deter aggression by forcing a potential
aggressor to seriously consider the dangers of attacking NATO territory and thereby involving himself not only with the national forces in the area but also with multinational forces under NATO command.¹¹

The forces assigned to the AMF are for the most part stationed in their home countries. In time of tension, this force can be deployed anywhere in ACE to demonstrate NATO solidarity and resolve in the face of a potential attack.

In 1966, NATO was faced with the withdrawal of French military participation. This move has left the future role of French forces in NATO clouded. Recent statements by French officials seem to indicate that France sees a more predictable and automatic link between an invasion and the use of nuclear weapons than does NATO.¹²

In late 1967, a new defense strategy of flexible response was adopted. The basis of the new concept was:

That NATO should be able to deter, and (if deterrence fails) to counter, military aggression of any kind; and that this can be secured only through a wide range of forces equipped with a well-balanced mixture of conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic nuclear weapons. The purpose of this balance of forces, while retaining the principle of forward defence, is to permit a flexible range of responses combining two main capabilities: To meet any aggression by direct defence at a level judged to be appropriate to defeat the attack, and to be able to 'escalate' at the level, deliberately under political control, if defence at the level first selected is not effective. An aggressor must be convinced of NATO's readiness to use nuclear weapons if necessary, but he must be uncertain regarding the timing or the circumstance in which they would be used.¹³

The strategy of flexible response has drawn much critical comment. The use of nuclear weapons is unthinkable to some and unavoidable
to others. The very premise that the escalation of violence can be controlled has been questioned by many. Others argue for either a primarily nuclear or primarily conventional force. In regard to these latter critics, the current SACEUR's position is clear:

Both positions ignore the central importance to deterrence of uncertainty—the uncertainty which prevents a potential aggressor from calculating with confidence the limits of his risk. And both ignore a central requirement of alliance unity—the assurance that the penalty of aggression will not be visited solely on its victims.

To meet these key imperatives, NATO relies on a continuum of capabilities, in which the deterrent value of each component is magnified by its linkage with the other two. Accordingly, it is clear that these components are not substitutable one for another; nor can deficiencies in one be compensated by improvements in another.\(^\text{14}\)

NATO is essentially a defensive alliance that seeks to deter and then defend in that order. Any defense will, however, take place on European soil. This had led to divergent views of how best to deter.

The chairman of the Defense Committee in the Bundestag has stated:

European strategists have thus basically remained mired in the notion of deterrence through nuclear retaliation ("deterrence by punishment"), whereas strategists in the United States, pondering the implications of the advent of strategic parity between the superpowers, have gravitated toward a conception of deterrence that is based on the idea of denying the enemy the ability to attain his objectives ("deterrence by denial").\(^\text{15}\)

This view is reinforced by the Secretary General of NATO who stated that "the security of Europe rests for the most part on the
deterrence provided by the strategic nuclear power of the United States."16 Meanwhile, the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff states: "There is a recognition that we do not have sufficient conventional forces to stop a Warsaw Pact penetration in Europe with nonnuclear forces . . . the strategy is to fight as long as we can in the nonnuclear sense, then resort to tactical nuclear weapons, then strategic ones, if necessary."17

These quotes can lead to a picture of inevitable nuclear holocaust, if the Warsaw Pact attacks so why would the Warsaw Pact not preempt with nuclear weapons? This question is often asked by those advocating the withdrawal of U.S. forces. This logic also seems to appeal to European nations who would prefer to rely on an American nuclear umbrella, rather than attempting to maintain large conventional forces of their own. The retention of large numbers of U.S. troops in Europe seem to make this linkage more secure by providing a considerable hostage force.

The Western European nations recognise that they cannot now, as they could not in 1952, match the military might of the Soviet Union. In the words of a recent British Chief of Staff:

It is inconceivable, in military, political or financial terms, whatever the theoretical demographic or economic statistics, that Western Europe could provide a defence capability on its own of balancing that of Russia, even without adding her Warsaw Pact satellites into the scales.

If Europe began even to take the first steps in this direction, NATO would quickly disintegrate, America be disillusioned and some Europeans inclined to make tentative feelers eastward."18
So it seems as though we are stuck. Accepting that, how should our forces be structured? The answer is that it depends on the threat. And that is the problem—what is the threat or, perhaps more accurately, how big is it?

First, a bit of history of the Warsaw Pact. As mentioned earlier, the Warsaw Pact came about as a result of the FRG's joining NATO. Specifically it grew out of Moscow's campaign to prevent West German membership in the West European Union (WEU), which was the way Bonn came to participate in NATO.19 Officially put forth as a mirror image of NATO, "... almost at once the Soviet Union offered to disband it [the Warsaw Pact] in return for the abolition of NATO."20

The Pact did more than just provide a chip to bargain for NATO's dissolution. Even though the Soviet Union had many bilateral agreements with the members of the Pact, she would have had to withdraw her troops from Hungary and Rumania under the terms of the Austrian State treaty. The Warsaw Pact provided a vehicle to legitimise the continued presence of Soviet troops in those countries as well as symbolising a buffer between West Germany and the Soviet Union.21

Relatively little is known of the structure of the Warsaw Pact. It almost certainly does not arrive at decisions through consensus as does NATO. It does not seem to have a common foreign or defense policy. Instead of an integrated air defense system as NATO has, it seems that the air defense is part of the Western Soviet Union Command.22 The most significant difference seems to be the purpose of the Pact in war. While
NATO is designed to be an integrated headquarters, the Warsaw Pact is not. Based on the conduct of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, "command in wartime would almost certainly be assumed directly by the Soviet Supreme Headquarters, to which all Soviet and East European forces would be subordinated."23

It is uncertain how reliable the Warsaw Pact units would be if the Warsaw Pact attacked first. Article 4 of the treaty24 stipulates that an attack on one is an attack on all. An argument can be made that they may be called upon to pre-empt an "anticipated" NATO attack. Such a scenario would likely require lengthy political and psychological preparations that would be evident to NATO. The nature of the threat thus varies depending upon the assumptions made about Warsaw Pact cohesiveness and purposes. Even then, comparisons are difficult. The manning levels of NATO and Warsaw Pact divisions vary drastically. So do the number and organization of support troops. Other complicating factors are whether or not air defense units and surface to surface missile units are counted as ground combat forces. The data can be arranged to support virtually any ratio desired.

Perhaps a more accurate, although far from perfect, measure is to compare tanks. In Northern and Central Europe, NATO faces approximately 20,500 Warsaw Pact tanks (13,500 of which belong to Soviet forces). NATO has about 7,000 tanks in the same region.25 Clearly, NATO is outnumbered far beyond what a defensive alliance would need to stop a NATO attack.
This picture is much darker when armored personnel carriers (APCs) are compared. Most NATO countries use the American M113 APC. This vehicle is lightly armored, is armed only with machine guns and does not have the cross-country mobility of a tank. By contrast, the Soviet BMP mounts a 73mm gun, a launcher rail for the Sagger Anti-Tank Guided Missile and has very good cross-country mobility. In many respects, it will present the defender with the fire power threat of a light tank while carrying infantry which can fire from inside the vehicle. It is a very formidable fighting vehicle.

Some analysts attempt to downgrade the significance of these figures by citing superior Western technology. It should be pointed out that modern Soviet tanks and APCs are designed to survive in a nuclear or chemical environment. The new tanks also have detectors which warn of being "painted" with a laser, Western weapons have none of these.

Other analysts have sought to imply that because NATO divisions are in general larger than those of the Soviet Union, they are in a sense worth more in comparison. It should be noted that an 11,000 man Soviet armored division has one more medium tank than a 16,500 man American armored division while a 12,700 man Soviet motorized rifle division has 50 more medium tanks than an American 16,000 man mechanized infantry division.²⁶ This does not include recent artillery additions to Soviet divisions which tip the balance even more in favor of the Soviets. By increasing the quantity and quality of weapons in her divisions, the Soviet Union has raised them to a par in firepower with U.S. divisions. A recent paper credits the 31 divisions in the Groups
of Soviet Forces today with being "equivalent to about 40 '1966-equipped' divisions."27

By this measure, the 27 Soviet divisions in Central Europe (20 (10 tank) in East Germany, 20 tank in Poland, 5 (2 tank) in Czechoslovakia—
4 divisions in Hungary not counted) are a superior force to NATO combat forces stationed in the FRC.28 When Warsaw Pact forces are added, the reason for the pessimism of the Chairman of the JCS is evident. The long term trends portend an ever widening gap.

NATO strategy recognizes the imbalance but foresees mobilization
in the West offsetting some of the quantitative disadvantage. Such mobilization rests upon two imponderables—the length of warning time before an attack and the political cohesiveness of NATO.

NATO is an inter-government body which reaches decisions by consensus. It seems reasonable to assume that not all NATO countries will perceive a threat with the same degree of urgency. Thus, in time of crisis, not all countries may choose to mobilize their forces according to current plans. In that event, SACEUR will be faced with some very difficult decisions.

However, one should not visualise the Warsaw Pact as monolithic bloc waiting to pounce upon a divided and indecisive NATO. The only military use of Warsaw Pact forces since World War II has been against other Warsaw Pact members. The trend towards nationalism in Eastern Europe has become more and more obvious in recent years. In the event
of diversion of Soviet forces elsewhere, Warsaw Pact governments that depend upon external support (Soviet troops) may find themselves faced with overthrow.29

Warsaw Pact forces other than those of the U.S.S.R. are in general organized for defense as opposed to offense. Equipped for the most part with Soviet weapons and with Soviet troops on the territory of the central European members, it is impossible to imagine any offensive action by any member of the Pact occurring without Soviet concurrence.

It can be argued that at least the forces of the FRG and the U.S. are more offensive than defensive in nature. Even so, it is the avowed national policy of those nations as well the rest of NATO not to initiate hostilities. For any nation in NATO to do so without U.S. approval would be to risk losing the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. That in turn would be the equivalent of national suicide.

Since it thus appears that any initiation of hostilities in Europe will require the concurrence of either the U.S. or the Soviet Union, it follows that the question of whether or not the Warsaw Pact can launch a surprise attack against NATO depends on whether or not the Soviet Union can surprise United States' forces in Europe, given that such an attack could have some reasonable purpose.
Notes to Chapter 5

3. NATO--Facts and Figures, p. 17.
8. Ibid., p. 57.
9. Ibid., p. 59.
10. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 123.
24. The Treaty is Reproduced in Remington, pp. 201-206.
26. Ibid., pp. 92-93.
28. The Military Balance, pp. 5-28
Chapter 6

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to evaluate what lesson U.S. forces in NATO should learn from the '73 War, it is first necessary to establish a basis of comparison. This will be done by analyzing the similarities and differences between the '73 War and a possible NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in Central Europe. This attempt is not meant to be all inclusive, but rather, a means by which to judge the validity of this and other analyses of the subject at hand.

On the political level, Israel was free in 1973 to act independently in the sense that she was not bound by treaty or alliance to consult any other nation before deploying her military forces. In reality, Israel found herself a virtual outcast in the world and therefore, more dependent than ever upon the goodwill and support of the United States. Sensitive to the political ramifications of being again branded the aggressor, Israel felt forced to allow the Arabs to gain the initiative in order to insure U.S. support. Although U.S. support was not the only reason an "anticipatory counter-attack was not launched", the fact that Israeli military actions were constrained by "political considerations" is instructive.

The United States does not face a direct threat to its territory as does Israel. The most significant threat to the U.S. proper is
a strategic nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. U.S. defense policy is to deter this by maintaining a strong nuclear force in order to maintain "a condition of mutual deterrence." The U.S. is also committed to the defense of Western Europe where the means of deterrence is modified by treaty agreements. While U.S. ground forces form part of the NATO "triad of deterrence", they are not a component of the U.S. "strategic triad."

As part of NATO, the U.S. subscribes to what may be described as a sliding scale of deterrence. At the low end is "deterrence by denial"; at the high end, "deterrence by punishment." Titled flexible response by NATO, this concept envisions a rational, controlled response "appropriate" to the threat presented. Individual nation's responses are therefore dependent in part on the actions of fourteen other nations.

This response to a threat to Central Europe may well be decided by these nations most directly affected, subject to the approval of the entire council. In a sense, a "kitchen cabinet" as existed in Golda Meir's government would be formed by the European group. Even with a smaller number than fifteen, it is difficult to speculate as to how long it will take a group of sovereign nations to reach a consensus on what action to take against a common threat.

On the level of national security policy or "grand strategy", Israel's concept of deterrence was based on denial. However, Israel's armed forces were not sufficient to discourage an attack even though the Arabs recognized that they could not expect to destroy the state of Israel. This deterrence failed because "Israeli policy makers failed to perceive
the willingness of the Egyptian and Syrian leaders to accept high levels of damage in order to change the political status quo the government of Israel seemed unprepared to alter."\(^2\)

The basis of Israel's deterrence was its air power, expected warning and efficient mobilization system. The deployed forces were expected to hold until reinforced by mobilized units. As Moshe Dayan observed on 9 October 1973: "I had a theory that we had the capacity to stop the Egyptian build-up across the canal, that the Egyptians would need no less than a whole night to build bridges over the canal and that we could prevent them from doing this..."\(^3\) Implicit in this is that Egyptian intentions would be clearly divined in advance.

While NATO espouses a united front on flexible response, North American and European stakes in this strategy are clearly different. Mr. Worner, the Chairman of the Defense Committee in the Bundestag sets forth the differences thus:

The United States is obviously interested, in the event of a breakdown of the deterrent in Europe in containing the military conflict to the continent as long as possible—in keeping it from escalating and prevailing on the battlefield without endangering American territory. By contrast, it is in the European interest that the risk for the aggressor be heightened by the prospect of a relatively quick escalation of the battle and its consequential endowment with new qualitative and geographic dimensions.\(^4\)

Another analyst adds:

In the final analysis, most European strategic analysts cannot accept the primacy of a conventional strategy for NATO because they do not deem such a strategy viable in the face of ever mounting Warsaw Pact capabilities. They are drawn more and more to the conclusion that, as NATO defenses are presently configured, Warsaw Pact forces could smash across substantial parts of the North German plain within a matter of hours or days. And, to the degree that any resort by the alliance (i.e.,
the United States) to a nuclear response is thrown increasing-
ly into doubt, they question glumly the inherent flexibility
of flexible response.

Since tactical and strategic nuclear weapons will be equally
damaging to the Europeans, U.S. involvement lends credence to suffering
on both sides. Simulations of nuclear warfare in Western Europe have led
to estimates of from 1.5 million German deaths upward to as many as 20
million Europeans. Clearly, the Europeans see such damage as prevent-
able only by linking it to "punishment" through a strategic nuclear
exchange between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

The urbanization and general population density is one component
of the terrain differences between the Sinai and Central Europe. The
Sinai offers far less cover and concealment and thereby greater inter-
visibility as well as greater visibility. Vehicles stand in clear con-
trast against the desert sand and are easily silhouetted on the treeless
horizon. Visibility is greater than five kilometers virtually all of
the time. The weather and vegetation of Central Europe are much different.

The rolling hills, trees, fog and dwellings common in Central
Europe combine to greatly reduce the range at which tanks and similar
vehicles might be acquired. A median range of two thousand meters is
likely. Such a range means that targets will be acquired closer in to
defenders with an attendant loss in engagement time. Of course, terrain
features also serve to channel the movement of forces, making routes of
advance somewhat more predictable. Terrain features also serve to impede
lateral movement across the battlefield as well as to cause greater
reliance to be placed upon existing road and rail networks. In contrast
to the broad, open Sinai, Central European terrain dictates less
maneuver and closer engagement ranges than those of the '73 War.

The armed forces faced by Israel and NATO have both been trained
and equipped by the Soviet Union. In Syria and Egypt, at least half the
ground forces except airborne and mountain units are mechanized. These
mechanized forces are not only more mobile than infantry units, the
personnel carrier utilized for infantry transport presents a significant
threat to defending ground forces.

Most observers credit Israel with being outnumbered in tanks by
Syria and Egypt by a ratio of just less than 2:1 although the odds were
much worse at some points on the battlefield. Today, the Warsaw Pact is
given an approximate 3:1 advantage over NATO in tanks. If the BMP is
considered an armored fighting vehicle as is a tank, the ratio becomes
far more unfavorable to NATO.

Since the 1973 War, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have deployed
more sophisticated weapons systems than those employed by Israel, Syria or
Egypt. New Soviet tanks and aircraft as well as more advanced SAM systems
are now in Central Europe. NATO has improved conventional munition (ICM)
rounds for artillery, armed helicopters, and dedicated close air support
aircraft. The most significant difference remains the possession of
tactical nuclear weapons by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The effects
of possible escalation to nuclear warfare have yet to be tested on the
battlefield.
In terms of force composition, the IDF concentrated on the brigade as the basic fighting element. Israel could not afford to fight a prolonged war, so she planned upon commandeered civilian vehicles for logistics supply. While her "tooth to tail ratio" (per cent support units to combat units) was very good, sustainability suffered. Israel felt that she could afford to sacrifice staying power due to the nature of her enemy and the prospect of quick external intervention to stop the fighting. The IDF concentrated on equipment that would provide mobility and shock against a specific enemy.

While NATO is oriented against a specific threat, the U.S. Army is not. While emphasis on European employment grows, U.S. Army divisions must be prepared for deployment throughout the world. This consideration has raised the tooth to tail ratio in U.S. divisions considerably because a division is required to be almost self sufficient. Where the IDF concentrated on shock through armor, the U.S. must plan for prolonged operations in a variety of locations. On a brigade basis, some 60 per cent of the U.S. Army will be armor or mechanized by the end of 1978, the remainder light brigades (infantry, airborne and air mobile); on a division basis, 9 are "heavy" divisions and 7 "light" divisions. The emphasis is shifting to heavy units, as Defense Secretary Brown stated to Congress:

Because Europe continues to be of such vital interest to us, and because the Soviets deploy so much of their conventional military power west of the Urals and in Eastern Europe, we regard an attack on Western Europe as the appropriate major contingency against which to design our conventional forces.

Secretary Brown considers our present force structure inadequate and even with conversion of the 24th division to mechanized infantry in
1979 thinks "... our land forces 'light/heavy' mix will remain too light if our primary orientation is to be a NATO war." Any future conversions will have to be considered in light of other commitments. Clearly, while NATO is focused on the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. Army cannot organize solely against that threat. Unlike the IDF, the U.S. Army may find its enemies world wide, at the end of a long logistics line in unfamiliar terrain and climate.

Certainly one of the sharpest differences between conflict in the Middle East and potential conflict in Europe is in the area of doctrine and tactics. Israeli doctrine is transfer the battle to Arab territory as quickly as possible. Doctrine also stated that the best anti-tank weapon is a tank. Previous successes with this concept had led to mobile armor forces designed for quick, deep penetrations. When assigned a defensive role, these forces were not tailored or adapted to exploit their natural advantages. Their use continued to be seen as defensive along the canal only for a time. There was no basic perception of their use as a primarily defensive weapon system integrated into a territory retention role.

U.S. doctrine and tactics have changed considerably in the last five years. Defensive doctrine has evolved from the position (area) defense and the mobile defense to the "active defense." The active defense is designed to allow U.S. forces to "fight outnumbered and win." This concept, set forth in FM 100-5, Operations, recognizes that U.S. forces will likely face superior forces in a future conflict. To reduce the enemy's numerical advantage, the active defense envisions a heavy "covering force" deployed forward of the "main battle area."
The mission of the covering force is to deceive the enemy as to the location of friendly forces, separate his air defense units from the main body, force the enemy to reveal the direction of his main attack and gain time for the forces in the main battle area. When the battle passes to the main battle area, an elastic defense is maintained. The defense is built around tanks and anti-tank guided missiles. The defense is force-oriented to the extent that the main mission is to destroy enemy targets as quickly as possible. Reserves are small and counter-attacks unlikely. Terms such as "fluid defense" and "the granular battlefield" have been used in trying to describe how the battle may progress.

While it may be argued that the active defense closely approximates a delay, that is not the official view. In the words of Defense Secretary Brown: "We do not accept the view—and still less do our allies—that it is tolerable to trade allied territory for the time in which to mobilize and deploy additional U.S. and allied forces." It should be noted that the emphasis on the "backbone" of this defense rests on high technology items—the tank and ATGM.

It may be helpful at this point to evaluate "lessons learned" from the '73 War as seen from a number of different vantage points. While the level and perspectives differ, general themes are apparent.

The popular press analysis is fairly well captured in an article that appeared in Newsweek two weeks after the end of the war. The lessons set forth were:

1. Don't merely try to judge an enemy's intentions—look at his capabilities.
2. The tank does not rule the battlefield. As a result of rapid technological developments in anti-tank warfare, the classic battle tank has become far more vulnerable than many experts ever thought possible.

3. Air power can be countered from the ground.

4. Static lines of defense are highly vulnerable.

5. Airlift capability is crucial.

This report of a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee saw the lessons as:

1. "... the technical advantage that some systems can provide, such as antitank missiles and accurate air-to-ground missiles, can provide an important edge on the battlefield."

2. "The mix and numbers of less sophisticated Soviet supplied weapons. "It was the vast number of weapons provided the Arabs rather than any exceptional technical capability that took a toll."

3. "The effectiveness of SAMs while the U.S. Air Force concentrates on countermeasures for Soviet SAMs, U.S. ground forces have far less protection than Soviet forces against air attack.

The lessons as seen by the then U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, "confirmed prior judgments about various aspects of modern warfare. The principal points are:

1. The importance of advanced warning and its assessment, and the ready forces available to take advantage of it;

2. The heavy attrition of equipment and supplies that can result from modern, intense conventional conflict;

3. The need for balanced, mutually supporting forces, i.e., not just tanks and aircraft, but infantry, antitank weapons, artillery and ground air defenses as well;

4. The new importance of modern antitank and air defense weapons;

5. The importance of defense suppression weapons, equipment and tactics;
6. The importance of a warm production base, and sufficient reserve stocks of ammunition, spare parts and equipment;

7. The importance of trained manpower;11

These lessons were essentially distilled down as the lethality of the modern battlefield, the importance of training and the necessity for combined arms teams.

The "lessons learned" by Israel come from published portions of the report of the inquiry commission (Agranat report) as well as interviews of top Israeli officials.

On the tactical level, the commander of the IAF, MG. Peled, observed:15

1. The need to shorten the time from target acquisition to attack to 30 minutes.

2. Communications must be capable, quick and secure.

3. Need for good target/weapon warhead match to insure effective attacks.

The former IDF Chief of Staff, LTC Elazar saw these lessons:16

1. Need for accurate interpretation of intelligence.

2. "In modern warfare, when both sides are equipped with sophisticated and powerful weapons, one must interpret the massing of troops, their deployment and their degree of alertness as signs of aggression against which--politically--reaction by force is permissible.

3. "...this war stressed the enormous importance of qualitative superiority over the quantitative advantages of the other side."

4. The need for combined arms.
5. "The air force and armor remain the decisive factors on the battlefield . . . the air force's main role in the support of ground forces (is) interdiction . . . the tank was the backbone of the land forces during this war, and will remain so in the future. All anti-tank measures, from mines to missiles, were aimed at reducing the efficiency of the tanks in the field and at limiting their success. Indeed, all in all they did succeed in one way or another to inflict casualties and slow down the impetus of the tank, but it is not in their power to defeat the armor; that can only be done by an armored confrontation . . . in the October war, it was proved once more that defense is the powerful form of combat; inferior forces, well deployed in defensive positions, are able to stop the advance of superior forces.

The inquiry commission evaluated the performance of the IDF at all levels. Some of its main findings were:

1. "... The IDF possessed no prepared detailed plan in the event of an all-out surprise enemy attack, based on a realistic evaluation of the enemy's forces, deployment and intentions as against the IDF's forces and plans."17

2. "Field intelligence was almost non-existent during the early stages of the containment battles and led to erroneous conceptions of the enemy forces and intentions and consequently inadequate deployments to counter them."18

3. "Lack of clear responsibility for regular Israeli army maintenance of the emergency reserve equipment depots which resulted in a low state of readiness and confusion when reserves were mobilized on October 6 and 7, 1973."19

4. "Serious problems in discipline reaching up to high command levels. . ."20 There were also unconfirmed reports of IAF pilots refusing to fly missions due to heavy losses suffered in the first days of the war.

5. The commission spent a great deal of time investigating the failure of the intelligence service. Three main reasons for this were cited.21

a. "The first was blind belief in the preconception that the Egyptians would not go to war until they were able to stage deep air strikes into Israel, particularly against Israel's major military airfields in order to neutralize Israel's Air Force, and a related belief that Syria would not go to war without Egypt. The commission felt that the purchase of new weapons by the Arab countries "... made the conception obsolescent."
b. . . . "O.C. Intelligence Aluf Zeira had made a firm undertaking to provide the IDF with adequate warning should a war become a certainty, an undertaking on which the IDF based its call-up procedures. The commission ruled that Aluf Zeira was in no way entitled to make such a promise."

c. The IDF intelligence branch "possessed a vast amount of deterrent information which had been supplied both by military field intelligence and other bodies. Because of their refusal to budge from preconceived ideas, the committee stated, O.C. Intelligence and the Head of Research did not appraise this information correctly, and claimed that the military build-up was of a defensive nature in Syria, and that Egyptian forces, amassed in the area of the canal, were holding annual maneuvers."

The inquiry commission recommended a number of changes to provide for several sources of intelligence to be available to the decision makers. The commission also recommended the creation of a separate body to assist the Prime Minister by providing "independent political strategic intelligence assessments . . ."22 Those portions of the report relating to the more specific measures of IDF performance remain classified.

In general terms, it appears that the Soviet Union has seen the '73 War as more of a confirmation of their previous doctrine than a watershed in modern warfare. The Soviets continue to look to World War II as the basis of their doctrinal thinking.23 This is not to suggest that the Soviet Union has disregarded the '73 War.

The ATGMs used in the '73 War were produced by the Soviet Union. The effectiveness of these weapons has caused the Soviet Union to examine how best to reduce their influence on the battlefield. Apparently, artillery, particularly when employed in the direct fire role, is seen
as the best solution. What concerns the Soviets is not so much the effect of ATGMs on tanks as the threat they pose to the BMP personnel carrier.

The Soviet Union saw the '73 War as proof of the need for combined arms. The BMP is designed to accompany tanks in the assault. If the BMP is separated from the tanks, then the tanks become vulnerable to dismounted infantry. Thus, while "Soviet offensive doctrine, built around the tank and envisioning high rates of advance, remains basically unchanged, the Soviets have taken numerous steps to increase the viability of their armored forces and to allow for anticipated losses of armored vehicles." In the Soviet view, the primacy of the tank has, if anything, increased due to the greater relative vulnerability of the BMP.

The reason for both Israel and the Soviet Union's maintaining a high regard for the tank lies in their perception of the tank's role on the battlefield. Both emphasize violent, offensive action, resorting to the defense only temporarily. The tank is crucial to such offensive doctrine. Both recognize that ATGMs represent a threat to armor, but neither sees the role of the tank substantially changed as a result of this threat.

By contrast, the U.S. and her NATO allies see the defense as the initial form of combat they will face. This is not to suggest that the offensive has been abandoned, only that NATO will not attack first. NATO thus concedes the initiative to the Warsaw Pact. NATO, and the U.S. in particular, see ATGMs as a principal means of offsetting the Warsaw Pact advantage in tanks.
Unfortunately, ATGMs suffer from several drawbacks. Current U.S. ATGMs lack night sights and are further hampered by thick smoke, dust and fog. This is due to the requirement for the gunner to keep the target in sight during the flight of the missile. If the target is obscured or the gunner suppressed by fire while the missile is in flight, the probability of a hit drops dramatically. Since current U.S. ATGM platforms provide no protection for the gunner while he is engaging a target, the effect of enemy suppressive fire can fairly be assumed to reduce the effectiveness somewhat.

The chief advantage of ATGMs is the high hit probability at long ranges. Unfortunately, the most common target acquisition range in Central Germany is expected to be relatively short. A recent study found that 90 per cent of the targets would be acquired at 1400 meters or less. That is less than half of the maximum range of the U.S. TOW ATGM and beyond the range of the Dragon ATGM. It is also within the range of Soviet tanks, ATGMs and at the maximum range of the 73mm gun on the BMP. It would appear that expected engagement ranges in Central Europe may find ATGM gunners there less effective than in the more favorable terrain and conditions in the Sinai during the first days of the '73 War.

An area of even more concern than weapon effectiveness is warning time. In order to be effective, a force must be in position to engage the enemy. Whether NATO forces can mobilize in time to meet a Warsaw Pact attack is a question being asked with increasing frequency.

Senator Sam Nunn expressed his concern about this question in a report filed following a trip he made to Central Europe. His report reads in part:
While Soviet forces in Eastern Europe can initiate a conflict from virtually a standing start, NATO forces continue to require warning time of a duration sufficient to permit the alliance to mobilize and deploy to the center of conflict its ultimately greater but typically less ready and poorly deployed forces. As the Warsaw Pact capability to attack from a standing start grows relative to NATO's defensive capacity, so does the likelihood that the Warsaw Pact would already be on the Rhine when the NATO decision is made to use tactical nuclear weapons.28

Both the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense have brought the increased capability of the Warsaw Pact to the attention of the Congress in recent reports. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs observed that:

In 1970, the USSR published a new doctrine for war which calls for a Blitzkrieg type of offensive using massed armor attacks across a wide front. This doctrine calls for the seizure of deep objectives within a few days or weeks at most. The Warsaw Pact current force structure capabilities and logistic base reflect this thinking. In view of this Warsaw Pact capability and the new doctrine, it is clear that the West must also be prepared to repel an attack with little or no warning.29

This same view is shared by the Federal Republic of Germany. In the 1976 White Paper, the possibility was recognized that "a surprise attack could be launched by the Warsaw Pact with practically no preparation and without any build-up . . . "30

The SACEUR is not quite so pessimistic. While conceding that NATO's agreed upon warning time "is around forty-eight hours,"31 he thinks NATO will have much more time. In a 1977 interview, the SACEUR, General Haig, said a recent study had led him to the conclusion that NATO could expect "8–14 days warning."32 General Haig reiterated this in 1980.
recent interview.\textsuperscript{33} This warning estimate is based on "just technical, military factors exclusive of political implications" which could have a "more profound effect."\textsuperscript{34}

How great a "profound effect" depends in part upon how clear the "technical, military factors" are. It has long been recognized that a Warsaw Pact attack might be launched under the guise of training maneuvers. The Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe sought to reduce the possibility of this. Agreements were reached which set conditions under which prior notification of military movements is required. The conference also specified the exchange of military observers as "confidence-building measures."\textsuperscript{35} Other developments have not been quite so encouraging.

In 1975, the Soviet Union rotated troops on an exercise almost totally by air. By doing so, the time required was reduced to one third of that required for similar exercises in 1972.\textsuperscript{36} Perhaps more significant is the change in the composition of Warsaw Pact attack aircraft.

The capacity for air attack has increased by the acquisition of larger numbers of fighter bombers with increased bomb loads. Many of these newer aircraft can fly under NATO ground based radar so that they will be much closer to their targets before being detected. The bases at which these aircraft are based have been hardened, reducing the need to disperse aircraft to increase their survivability. This may have the effect of reducing strategic warnings as well "since massive pact deployment to those \textsuperscript{[dispersal]} bases used to be counted on for warning."\textsuperscript{37}
Even if relatively clear signals are available, how much warning time is necessary? Mr. Worner speculates that should the Soviet Union decide to attack in 72 hours from a prepared "standing start", NATO would get between 24-36 hours warning and would be outnumbered 39 to 18 in divisions on line at the time of attack.

With a ten day "moving start", NATO would get about three days warning and be outnumbered at a ratio of 77 to 25 in deployed divisions.

With three weeks of preparation, the Warsaw Pact could muster 110 divisions, NATO could expect ten to twelve days notice and could muster 32 divisions.38

These figures change from analyst to analyst depending upon the assumptions used. The most significant variable appears to be the manning and readiness of Warsaw Pact divisions.

Warning time as defined herein does not mean troop deployment time. Warning time is the time between which an attack becomes expected and it occurs. If warning time allows a political decision to be made to mobilize and deploy forces and the forces are in position at the time of the attack, surprise has not occurred. Thus surprise can occur under two conditions.

First, total warning time is not sufficient to mobilize and deploy forces.

Second, the political decision making component of warning time does not leave sufficient time for military deployment.
The '73 War was clearly a Condition Two event. Information was available, but the intelligence was erroneous. The reasons for this have been covered, but a model of "hypotheses on misperception" may illustrate how "surprise" could have been avoided had the "safeguards for decision makers been followed."

1. First, and most obvious, decision-makers should be aware that they do not make "unbiased" interpretations of each new bit of incoming information, but rather are inevitably heavily influenced by the theories they expect to be verified.

2. Decision-makers should see if their attitudes contain consistent or supporting beliefs that are not logically linked.

3. Determine before events occur, what evidence would count for and against his theories.

4. Try to prevent individuals and organizations from letting their main task, political future, and identity become tied to specific theories and images of other actors.

5. A willingness to play with material from different angles and in the context of unpopular as well as popular hypotheses is an essential ingredient of a good detective, whether the end is the solution of a crime or an intelligence estimate.

Had the IDF Chief of Intelligence used these safeguards, he may have reached different conclusions. As it was, events were made to fit a preconceived idea. The use of a deception plan by the Arabs which re-inforced the Israeli "conception" was more effective than it perhaps should have been. Given past Israeli retaliatory actions and the diversion with events in Austria, the available warning time ticked away. In the last analysis, the Arabs did not surprise Israel; they helped Israel surprise herself.
The experience of Israel offers lessons at both the tactical and strategic levels. Most tactical lessons have been applied, perhaps too vigorously in some cases. Several strategic lessons seem applicable which may not have been as fully applied.

1. The importance of planning for a short-warning attack.
2. The importance of not evaluating information in accordance with preconceived notions of the enemy's intentions.
3. The importance of ordering simultaneous military preparations while political consultations are being conducted.
4. Giving the enemy credit for what he can do, not what he might or might not do.
5. Being alert for changing conditions which may reduce the effectiveness of current deterrent means.
6. Providing for cross checks of intelligence indicators from all levels.
7. If war is considered inevitable tomorrow, plan for it today.
8. The importance of rapid resupply and the maintenance of war reserve stocks.
9. Evaluate changes in enemy doctrine and national goals.
10. Force structures must complement national strategy.
11. National security policy must recognize economic and diplomatic as well as military components.

Several senior American officials have questioned how well the United States may have learned and applied these and other lessons. For example, Senator Nunn noted:

... current U.S. force planning assumptions as to the prior warning time and likely duration of a future conflict in Europe must be revised ... For example, for planning purposes the Department of Defense continues to project over three weeks warning time followed by a conflict of up to six months. These
assumptions appear to be increasingly unrealistic in the light of the new Soviet threat.  

Both Defense Secretary Brown and General Haig have expressed concern over the draw-down of pre-positioned stocks in Europe, the distance from ammunition storage sites to using units and the "malpositioning" of units relative to their deployment positions. Secretary Brown has also recognized that the Soviet view may have shifted to accept "that a conventional war in Europe need not necessarily lead to a nuclear exchange." General Haig has also stated that if present trends of Soviet buildup continue, NATO's deterrent will disappear soon.

Several recent reports have been critical of force structuring in NATO. Reports by retired General Holingsworth and Senator Nunn have questioned whether the force structure supports the strategy. One analysis has proposed the elimination of most tactical nuclear warheads, freeing the personnel required to support them for combat. Certainly, a force justified by virtue of its excellence in executing the mobile defense should not be accepted unquestioningly.

Some tentative steps have been made in that direction. The division restructuring study has been undertaken "to integrate and optimize the new weapons systems" in order to develop the "optimum size, mix, and organization of U.S. Army divisions for the FY 1980-85 time frame." Such a study should not preclude a critical review of current organizations, however.
Army commanders at every level must use their imagination in order to reduce the effects of possible surprise. The composition of basic loads, task organization and force allocation must be examined with a view to maximizing effects under all conditions. This will be especially critical if infiltrators or agents in place are able to disrupt routine plans.

Meanwhile, the greatest danger to NATO may be changes too subtle to notice. A changing threat evaluated with unchanged perceptions may dangerously waste available warning time. Both political and military decision makers must be alert to both enemy and self deception. Only by accepting the possibility of surprise can steps be taken to reduce its effects.

Israel saw the relative peace following the War of Attrition as proof of the effectiveness of her philosophy of deterrence. As the economic cost of maintaining the deterrent came under increasing pressure in view of a reduced perceived threat, the level of forces was lowered, particularly in the Sinai. Ironically, the IDF was to fail in part because it was so effective.

As economic measures reduced the quality and quantity of available forces, the conditions of deterrence also changed. Any incurred risks were rationalized as slight due to Arab ineptitude, sufficient warning time to mobilize and the foolhardiness of an Arab attack. While questioned by some, these arguments formed much of the basis of IDF force structuring and strategy between 1970 and 1973.
In NATO, much the same type of arguments can be found. Economic pressures continue to emphasize the concept of deterrence at the expense of defense. While the basis of deterrence is different in the case of Israel and NATO, the trends seem unpleasantly similar. In Israel, the reliance on deterrence led to the acceptance of assumptions which made that course of action feasible. But that course of action changed the conditions of deterrence and therefore altered the balance between defense and deterrence required to maintain relative peace. The failure of the IDF to recognize and adapt to those changing conditions led "to a catastrophic miscalculation and not to a subtle error of judgement." The implications of this miscalculation for U.S. Army forces in NATO seem clear. To continue to rely on deterrence at the expense of defense may find the value of both diminished. The balance between deterrence and defense requires constant fine tuning if we are to avoid a similar "catastrophic miscalculation."
Notes to Chapter 6

8. Ibid., p. 81.
9. Ibid., p. 141.
11. Brown, p. 82.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.


32. Ibid.

33. Statement by General Haig in response to a direct question on the amount of warning time NATO could expect while a guest on MEET THE PRESS, NBC Television News Program televised live April 23, 1978.

34. Schemmer, p. 16.


40. Nunn.


42. Brown, pp. 68-69.

43. MEET THE PRESS interview.


45. Nunn.


Attempts to extrapolate the shape and dimensions of the next war based upon the experience of the last are chiefly noted for their consistent inaccuracy. In spite of that, the '73 War raises some questions regarding the force structuring philosophy of the U.S. Army. Since wars are shaped in part by the force structures of the opposing parties, an examination of the philosophy behind force structuring may yield an outline of "the first battle" in Central Europe.

The U.S. Army has generally fielded relatively high-technology, low-density weapons systems in contrast to the general trend of the Soviet Union to field greater numbers of less sophisticated systems. In Central Europe, this philosophy has led to the argument that the U.S. Army can fight outnumbered and win. This theory rests on the proposition that the U.S. weapons have a qualitative value which to some extent balances the quantitative advantage of the Warsaw Pact. Recent Soviet developments would appear to undermine this rationale.

Heavy reliance on precision guided munitions (PGM) generally requires that the target be visible during the terminal phase of the munition's attack. Any interruption of the optical line of sight between the munition (in the case of wire guided or laser guided weapons) will likely result in a miss. Such interruption may come by means of smoke,
the target is masking itself or suppression of personnel guiding the system. Further study on the effectiveness of such weapons under simulated combat conditions in Europe seems warranted.

The active defense generally supports a force allocation of one defender to three attackers in terms of personnel. Such a ratio presumes the defender is in prepared (fortified positions). It would appear that closer study of the engineer support required to provide adequate shelter for U.S. forces is required. If insufficient time is available to provide adequate protection, perhaps the force allocation ratio needs adjusting.

The '73 War pointed up the high consumption rate of resources on the battlefield. Both Israel and Egypt enjoyed relatively secure lines of communication. Considering the growing Warsaw Pact capability to interdict supply lines by air, it would appear that more attention to material stockage levels and the personnel replacement system is required.

The growing Warsaw Pact air capability may also pose a significant threat to forward combat units. Although Soviet doctrine does not envision close air support as the U.S. Army knows it, the continued paucity of U.S. air defense measures at the small-unit level may make such employment attractive in the future. The '73 War demonstrated how an integrated air defense can nullify the capabilities of modern aircraft. The Warsaw Pact has even more anti-aircraft missiles available than did Egypt. By contrast, the U.S. Army has not fielded either the number or the variety of air defense systems that may be required to defeat the growing Warsaw Pact air threat.
This threat is not limited to just high performance fighter bombers. Increasing numbers of armed helicopters have been deployed, equipped with ATGMs which have a range greater than the effective range of current divisional air defense systems. Warsaw Pact forces do not suffer a like disadvantage. First echelon units have both missile and gun systems capable of engaging current U.S. helicopters out to the maximum range of the weapons carried on these helicopters. The failure to develop a system capable of coping with low altitude air attacks would be a failure to learn an important lesson from the results of the '73 War.

While it is important to counter the Warsaw Pact's advantages, it is equally important to identify and exploit its shortcomings. Likely areas for investigation are:

1. The best munitions type/mix to attack armored forces as they mass for the breakthrough.

2. The best means to exploit the relative vulnerability of the BMP compared to tanks in order to strip tanks of their infantry protection.

3. The best tactics to use in attacking the exposed flanks of penetrations.

4. The best means by which to delay reinforcement/replacement of attrited first-echelon units.

The experience of Israel in 1973 illustrated vividly the fleeting nature of technological advantages. Force developers and tacticians must recognize the rapidly changing dynamics of the battlefield. The rapidly changing nature of enemy capabilities must also be of prime concern. Failure to recognize even the most subtle changes in the direction of the
threat may lead to serious underestimates of its capabilities. Israeli intelligence underestimated the capability of the enemy while the tacticians failed to appreciate the changing nature of the threat. Even more serious, both misread enemy intentions. For the U.S. Army to fail to learn from these mistakes and take the proper actions may be no less serious.
A. PRIMARY SOURCES


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B. SECONDARY SOURCES


"Haig: C³ is NATO's Biggest Deficiency," Armed Forces Journal International, April 1978.


Complimentary titles.

Whereas the entire Arab nation without exception is determined to assert its right to live, gain its freedom and administer its own affairs in name and in fact;

And whereas the Arabs believe it to be in Great Britain’s interest to lend them assistance and support in the fulfilment of their steadfast and legitimate aims to the exclusion of all other aims;

And whereas it is similarly to the advantage of the Arabs, in view of their geographical position and their economic interests, and in view of the well-known attitude of the Government of Great Britain,¹ to prefer British assistance to any other;

For these reasons, the Arab nation has decided to approach the Government of Great Britain with a request for the approval, through one of their representatives if they think fit, of the following basic provisions which, as time presses, have not been made to include matters of relatively smaller importance, since such matters can wait until the time comes for their consideration:

1. Great Britain recognises the independence of the Arab countries which are bounded: on the north, by the line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37° N. and thence along the line Birjik-Urfa-Mardin-Midlat-Jazira (Ibn ‘Umar) – Amsad to the Persian frontier; on the east, by the Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf; on the south, by the Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden whose status will remain as at present); on the west, by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin.

2. Great Britain will agree to the proclamation of an Arab Caliphate for Islam.

3. The Sharifian Arab Government undertakes, other things being equal, to grant Great Britain preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries.

4. With a view to ensuring the stability of Arab independence and the efficacy of the promised preference in economic enter-
prises, the two contracting parties undertake, in the event of any foreign state attacking either of them, to come to each other’s

¹ I.e., in view of the overtures made to the Arabs by Lord Kitchener in 1914, as related in Chapter VII.
APPENDICES

assistance with all the resources of their military and naval forces; it being understood that peace will be concluded only when both parties concur.

In the event of one of the two parties embarking upon a war of offence, the other party will adopt an attitude of neutrality, but, if invited to join, will agree to confer with the other party as to the conditions of joint action.

5. Great Britain agrees to the abolition of Capitulations in the Arab countries, and undertakes to assist the Sharifian Government in summoning an international congress to decreed their abolition.

6. Clauses 3 and 4 of the present Agreement are to remain in force for a period of fifteen years. Should either party desire an extension, due notice of one year before the expiry of that period will have to be given.

Therefore, since the entire Arab nation is (God be praised!) united in its resolve to pursue its noble aim to the end, at whatever cost, it requests the Government of Great Britain to return an answer, whether negatively or in the affirmative, within thirty days of the receipt of this message, in default of which it reserves its right to complete freedom of action, just as we will consider ourselves absolved from the letter and the spirit of the declaration which we made earlier through 'Ali Efendi.*

Compliments.

No. 2

Sir Henry McMahon’s First Note to the Sharif Husain

Cairo, August 30, 1913.

Complimentary titles.

We have the honour to tender the gratitude due to you for the sentiments of sincere friendship for England which you display, and it pleases us, moreover, to learn that Your Lordship and your people are at one in believing that Arab interests are in harmony with British interests, and vice-versa.

In earnest of this, we hereby commend to you the declaration of Lord Kitchener as communicated to you through ‘Ali Efendi, in which was manifested our desire for the independence of the Arab

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* i.e., the long-established Conventions by which foreigners in the Ottoman Empire enjoyed financial and juridical privileges.

* The messenger who had carried the secret communications between the British Agency in Cairo and the Amir ‘Abdullah in Mecca. See Chapter VII, Section 2, supra.
THE ARAB AWAKENING

countries and their inhabitants, and our readiness to approve an Arab caliphate upon its proclamation.

We now declare once more that the Government of Great Britain would welcome the reversion of the caliphate to a true Arab born of the blessed stock of the Prophet.

As for the question of frontiers and boundaries, negotiations would appear to be premature and a waste of time on details at this stage, with the War in progress and the Turks in effective occupation of the greater part of those regions. All the more so as a party of Arabs inhabiting those very regions have, to our amazement and sorrow, overlooked and neglected this valuable and incomparable opportunity; and, instead of coming to our aid, have lent their assistance to the Germans and the Turks; to that new despoiler, the German, and to that tyrannical oppressor, the Turk.

Nevertheless, we are fully prepared to despatch to Your Lordship whatever quantities of grain and other charitable gifts may be owed by Egypt to the Holy Land of Arabia and the noble Arabs. These will be forwarded, on a sign from Your Lordship, to whatever locality you may indicate.

We have made the necessary arrangements for facilitating the journeys of your messenger to us.

Compliments.

No. 3

The Sharif Husain’s Second Note to Sir Henry McMahon

Mecca, Shawwal 99, 1333.

(September 9, 1913.)

Complimentary titles.

We received your note of the 19th Shawwal, [August 30,] with gratification, and have given it the fullest consideration, notwithstanding the obscurity and the signs of lukewarmth and hesitancy we described it in regard to our essential clause. We find it necessary to affirm to Your Excellency our sentiments of amity with Great Britain and our readiness to ensure her a favoured place in all circumstances and in every manner, for in that way can the true interests of our co-religionists best be served.

Your Excellency will suffer me to say, in explanation of what I mean by lukewarmth and hesitancy, that your statements in regard to the question of frontiers and boundaries - namely that to discuss them at this stage were unprofitable and could only
APPENDICES

...result in a waste of time since those regions are still occupied by their sovereign government, and so forth — reflect what I might almost describe as reluctance or something akin to reluctance, on one part.

The fact is that the proposed frontiers and boundaries represent the suggestions of one individual whose claim might well await the conclusion of the War, but the demands of our people who believe that those frontiers form the minimum necessary to the establishment of the new order for which they are striving. This they are determined to obtain; and they have decided to discuss the matter, in the first resort, with that Power in whom they place their greatest confidence and reliance, and whom they regard as the pivot of justice, namely Great Britain.

In this, they are moved by considerations of the reciprocity of interests, the requirements of territorial organisation, and the wishes of the populations concerned; and also by their desire to set the foundations of their future life settled beforehand, so as to avoid finding themselves, when their new life is being established and organised, in opposition to or conflict with Great Britain or one of her allies — which God forbid! It should be noted that, in drawing up their proposed delimitation, they have not outstepped the bounds of the regions inhabited by their race.

For our aim, O respected Minister, is to ensure that the conditions which are essential to our future shall be secured on a foundation of reality, and not on highly-decorated phrases and titles. As for the caliphate, God have mercy on its soul and comfort the Moslems for their loss!

I am confident that Your Excellency will realise beyond all doubt that I have had nothing to do with the proposing of those boundaries, which include only populations of our race, and that they were proposed by our people who regard them as being, to put it briefly, vitally and economically essential — as indeed they are.

In conclusion, we believe in all sincerity that your loyalty will prevail, whether you are satisfied with us or displeased; and that you will not wish to seize upon the fact that some of our people are still with the utmost zeal furthering Ottoman designs, as stated in your letter under reference, as an excuse for treating our aspirations with such lukewarmth and hesitancy. I think Your Excellency is above denying that our demands are fundamental, nay, that they are the very substance and essence of our existence, be it from the material, the spiritual or the moral point of view. Up to this very moment, I have been endeavouring, in person and with all my powers, to enforce the prescriptions of our Sacred
The Arab Awakening

Law in my country and in all that concerns me in relation to the rest of the empire, until God issue His decree.

For these reasons, and the better to set your mind at ease, I may state that the people of all those countries, including those of whom you say that they are zealously furthering German and Ottoman designs, are awaiting the result of the present negotiations, which depend solely upon whether you reject or admit the proposed frontiers, and upon whether or not you will help us to secure their spiritual and other rights against evil and danger. Please communicate to us the decision of the British Government on this point, for our guidance as to what suits their policy, and as to what steps it behoves us to take. For the rest, it is God Who decrees the past and the future, He ordains all things, exalted be His Name!

With regard to our request for the despatch of the people's bounty, with the customary purses from the Ministry of Aqafa and all that it is usual to send with the Pilgrimage convoy, I had in view that their despatch would be a means of substantiating the terms of your proclamations to the world, and more particularly the Moslem world, in which you stated that your hostility was solely directed against the usurpers of the caliphate and, hence, of the rights of all Moslems. To say nothing of the fact that the said bounty comes from specific endowments which have nothing to do with politics. If you decide to send them, let the bounty due on account of the past two years be consigned in a special steamer to Jedda as usual in the name of the people, and let the skipper or the special officer who is usually charged year by year with the duty of delivery communicate with the authorities at Jedda on arrival at the port, and ask for the competent official who is to take delivery of the grain against the proper receipt to be signed by the receiving officer. It should be noted that only the signature of that officer may be accepted, and the skipper or special officer should be instructed that if any obstruction is attempted, he should threaten to return with his cargo to the port of departure. The consignment is to be formally received by the committee known as the 'Committee for dealing with the People's Bounty'.

If you should wish to reply to this note, let the reply be sent by the bearer.

Compliments.
Complimentary titles.

I have, with gratification and pleasure, received your note of the 99th Shawwal, 1333, and its tokens of sincere friendship have filled me with satisfaction and contentment.

I regret to find that you inferred from my last note that my attitude towards the question of frontiers and boundaries was one of hesitancy and lukewarmth. Such was in no wise the intention of my note. All I meant was that I considered that the time had not yet come in which that question could be discussed in a conclusive manner.

But, having realised from your last note that you considered the question important, vital and urgent, I hastened to communicate to the Government of Great Britain the purport of your note. It gives me the greatest pleasure to convey to you, on their behalf, the following declarations which, I have no doubt, you will receive with satisfaction and acceptance.

The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and must on that account be excepted from the proposed delimitation.

Subject to that modification, and without prejudice to the treaties concluded between us and certain Arab Chiefs, we accept that delimitation.

As for the regions lying within the proposed frontiers, in which Great Britain is free to — without detriment to the interests of her ally France, I am authorised to give you the following pledges on behalf of the Government of Great Britain, and to reply as follows to your note:

(i) That, subject to the modifications stated above, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca;

(ii) That Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression, and will recognise the obligation of preserving them from aggression;

The part of Mesopotamia in the Vilayet of Adana, and the part of Alexandretta in the Vilayet of Aleppo.

The cities of Damascus, Homs and Hama lay in the Vilayet of Syria, of which Damascus was the capital. Aleppo was the capital of the vilayet of that name.
THE ARAB AWAKENING

(3) That, when circumstances permit, Great Britain will help the Arabs with her advice and assist them in the establishment of governments to suit those diverse regions;

(4) That it is understood that the Arabs have already decided to seek the counsels and advice of Great Britain exclusively; and that such European advisers and officials as may be needed to establish a sound system of administration shall be British;

(5) That, as regards the two vilayets of Baghdad and of Basra, the Arabs recognise that the fact of Great Britain's established position and interests there will call for the setting up of special administrative arrangements1 to protect those regions from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of their inhabitants, and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

I am confident that this declaration will convince you, beyond all doubt, of Great Britain's sympathy with the aspirations of her friends the Arabs; and that it will result in a lasting and solid alliance with them, of which one of the immediate consequences will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the liberation of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke which has weighed on them all these long years.

I have confined myself in this note to vital questions of primary importance. If there are any other matters in your notes, which have been overlooked, we can revert to them at some suitable time in the future.

I have heard with great satisfaction and pleasure that the Sacred Kiswa2 and the charitable gifts which had gone with it, had arrived safely and that, thanks to your wise directions and arrangements, they were landed without trouble or damage in spite of the risks and difficulties created by the present deplorable war. We pray Almighty God that He may bring a lasting peace and freedom to mankind.

I am sending this note with your faithful messenger, Shaikh Muhammad ibn 'Aref ibn 'Uraifan, who will lay before you certain interesting matters which, as they are of secondary importance, I have abstained from mentioning in this note.

Compliments.

1 And not 'special measures of administrative control', as in the version printed in the Report of the Palestine Royal Commission, Cmd. 3479, 1927, p. 19. The Arabic text is: tadghir idariya khana.
2 The embroidered pall which is annually sent to Mecca from Egypt to be used as a covering for the Ka'ba.