ROTC IN TRANSITION
A NEW POTENTIAL FOR LEADERSHIP

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USAWC ESSAY

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ABSTRACT

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In the face of lost incentives related to Vietnam, Army ROTC has been struggling for health, with some success, in the volunteer environment. Army requirements for 10,000 newly commissioned officers annually demand that ROTC units meet increased production goals in the Eighties. However, in light of realities on campus, it is not likely that the Army ROTC program will produce the required numbers of new officers, unless significant changes are made in the organizational environment. This conclusion is based on the results of two analytical methods for evaluating enrollment and commissioning data and a study of the environment as reflected in surveys and factual information relative to the attitudes and behavior of students, faculty, administrators, higher headquarters and the Congress. If Army ROTC is to meet the requirements of the active and reserve forces a range of initiatives must be taken by Congress, the States, Departments of Defense and the Army, and the institutions with Army ROTC on campus. These new actions should include: some form of national service, reimbursement of institutions for support of ROTC, state assistance for ROTC cadets bound for the National Guard, Defense and Army advocacy for the dual (production of active and reserve officers) ROTC mission, and active institutional support in counseling and advising potential cadets.
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PERSPECTIVE AND SCOPE

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the height of the anti-ROTC controversy that raged on college campuses during the Vietnam War. During the Vietnam period enrollment in the Army's Senior ROTC programs dropped from a high of 182,000 in 1966 to a low of 35,000 in 1973. But in recent years, the number of college students taking Army ROTC has increased: fall enrollment for the 1977-78 school year reached 60,000 cadets. What accounts in part for the upswing is the more relaxed approach found on campuses today; namely, new and more flexible curriculums, relaxed uniform regulation, diminished drill requirements, adventure activities and liberal haircut policies. These concessions have contributed to Army ROTC's "new look" and are important, but they are essentially cosmetic incentives devised to offset the effects of substantive changes that occurred a decade earlier.

Up until 1968 ROTC programs at many colleges throughout the United States were mandatory. All male freshmen and sophomores were required to take the Basic Course, and from this group a few cadets were selected for participation in the Advanced Course during their junior and senior years. Completion of advanced study and graduation led to a commission in the Regular Army or Reserves. In schools where ROTC was voluntary, students were motivated to participate in the program because of the draft. In other instances ROTC provided many young men a means of avoiding service until their college education was completed.

Today on most campuses ROTC is no longer mandatory and there is no draft; consequently, with the loss of these previously powerful incentives, ROTC at many institutions is considered an extracurricular activity – similar to intercollegiate or intramural athletics, language clubs and debating societies.
Considering the loss of such motivating factors as the draft and mandatory enrollment, and with only the aid of some cosmetic initiatives, the enrollment upswing is encouraging; it appears that the Army's Senior HOTC has "weathered the storm." However, the crucial requirement to produce sufficient qualified officers for the Army's active and reserve forces remains as a constant challenge. A closer look at enrollment trends suggest that the sizable advances achieved by ROTC units are approaching a limit and there is a need for new initiatives at the National, state, Army and institutional levels if officer production goals are to be met in the 1980's.

After making some assumptions and outlining certain facts, the requirements for ROTC officers, the environment and the realities of ROTC operations are examined and finally, some recommended initiatives are identified, to increase growth in the quality and quantity of ROTC commissioned officers.

Because of time and space limits this discussion does not address specific actions to be taken by ROTC detachments to increase operational effectiveness. The management practices of detachments would make a suitable topic for another important essay. This omission should not be interpreted as suggesting that the role of ROTC units in production is unimportant; on the contrary it is vital and positive moves by detachments complement measures initiated at higher levels.

ASSUMPTIONS AND FACTS: OFFICER PROCUREMENT AND ROTC

This discussion assumes that a college-based officer recruiting program is necessary and desirable. Precedence for this may be found in reports of the Haines Board and Gates Commission; both believed the bulk of new officers would continue to be provided by ROTC; General DePuy, on the eve of his departure from Training and Doctrine Command, indicated that the Army would continue to rely on ROTC as the primary source of commissioned officers.
Table 1 shows Army officer requirements from ROTC by component for a six year period. By 1981 the total requirement for commissioned officers from ROTC will exceed 10,000; slightly over half of the commissionees are needed for the reserve components, and those demands will remain constant during the Eighties. After 1980 one out of every two ROTC graduates will serve their obligation in the Army Reserve or National Guard; the mission of Army ROTC units will be truly dual.

The mission of Army ROTC is: first, to develop a strong professional force by attracting outstanding college students for service in the Active Army and second, to attract equally outstanding individuals for duty with the reserve components. Each part of this mission is important, although the needs of the Active Army take precedence over the Reserve components. However, if the "One Army" concept is to be successful then ROTC must meet demands for both active and reserve officers. An assessment of the ROTC program's capability to meet growing requirements is a key part of this evaluation.

REQUIREMENTS AND COMMISSION POTENTIAL

The scope of this study does not permit a detailed analysis of Army ROTC's production capacity. Nevertheless, this brief examination approaches commissioning potential from two points of view and finds that in each case the system's capacity is limited. Officer production capabilities are considered in aggregate and by detachment.
AGGREGATE METHOD

This analysis depends on identifying the relationship between several factors and the determination of required results in three cases based on assumptions relative to the behavior of specific factors. The factors used include: annual figures for total undergraduate enrollment at all four year institutions, total ROTC enrollment, ROTC enrollment as a percent of total college enrollment, actual and forecast officer production and officer production as a percent of ROTC enrollment.

College enrollment increased from 4.9 million in the 74-75 school year to 5.2 million in 76-77. Cadet enrollment for the period increased from 41 to 56 thousand, while officer production climbed from 4500 to 5000. From this data, by calculation, ROTC enrollment has been running between .8 and 1.1 percent of college enrollment and officer production has varied between 9 and 11 percent of the total ROTC enrollment. This information provides the bases for the aggregate analysis.

Case 1: If the ROTC enrollment rate remains constant at 1.1 percent of the total college enrollment, then ROTC enrollment will drop from 60 thousand in 1981 to 55 thousand in 1986, because college enrollments will decline in the Eighties. To meet the officer production requirements shown in Table 1, the commissioning rate must be raised from 11 percent in 1978 to 18 percent in 1986. A seven percent increase in commissioning rate is sizable and would be difficult to achieve. It represents more than a 60 percent increase in officer production and is considerably higher than the rates for normal years.

Case 2: If the rate of commissioning remains constant at 11 percent, then to meet officer requirements ROTC enrollment must increase from 60 thousand cadets in 1978 to 72.6 in 1979 and stabilize at 91 thousand by 1981.
This would require an ROTC enrollment increase of 21 percent in 1979 declining to 11 percent in 1981. In light of past performances the 1979 enrollment increase would be monumental. For example in 1975 ROTC enrollment was raised 17 percent over the previous year but since that time, although the number of cadets in the program has continued to rise the rate of ROTC enrollment has decreased about five percent per year.

**Case 3:** If campus recruiting is 50 percent more effective than in Case 1, then enrollment would increase from 60 thousand cadets in 1978 to 73 thousand by 1986; to meet officer production goals would require an increase in commission rates from 11 to 14 percent in 1986. These increases are modest but the three percent increase in commission rate would require more than a 25 percent rise in officer production. The best commission rate ever achieved was 13 percent in 1969.

The foregoing analysis suggests that under present conditions ROTC detachments may not be capable of producing the required 10,000 officers during the 1980's. The aggregate analysis has limitations. For example, each of the 273 schools and their ROTC programs are different; some units have better officer production; various programs are more attractive, making recruiting easier; administrations and faculties give better support at some institutions; and certain cadre are more effective in both recruiting and commissioning. This list is not exhaustive but serves to identify the elements contributing to the diversity of ROTC organizations. These factors make an aggregate analysis suspect and suggest that an alternate method should be used to verify the results. The alternate approach, detachment method, will take into account the differences between units referred to above and will also reflect the importance of the advanced course as a step toward commissioning.
DETACHMENT METHOD

This analysis depends upon the following: First, there is a definite relationship between the number of freshmen, MS I, and junior, MS III, cadets. Second, ROTC detachment size governs to some degree the number of cadets that transition from basic to advanced courses. Third, the fact that officer requirements will double from 5,000 to 10,000 in the Eighties.

Consider initially the use of MS I enrollment data as a means of identifying interest in military service. Altman and Barro, in a special study for the Gates Commission used MS I enrollment of male freshmen at colleges where ROTC participation was voluntary because it provided a variable free of demand constraints and permitted an investigation of the importance of factors affecting the supply of volunteers.\(^{18}\) They also note that Fechter used freshman ROTC data in his study on the supply of first-term military officers.\(^{19}\) This appears to provide justification for the use of MS I data as a means of projecting the number of MS III cadets.

To quantify the relationship between the basic and advanced course enrollments schools within the First ROTC Region were studied at the University of Delaware. The "Delaware Group" tabulated MS I and MS III enrollments in each detachment for three year groups and from this data by means of regression analysis developed a "retention curve" for each class. The curves shows the relationship between "MS I Class Size" and the "Percentage of Retention to MS III."\(^{20}\) The curves for each year group are similar, although retention rates vary from three to six percent between groups for MS I class sizes from 50 to 350 cadets. The curve for "Class 79" was used in this analysis after the "Percentage of Retention to MS III" variable was converted to "MS III Class Size." Use of this data requires a qualification. Information used by the Delaware Group was limited to the 103 ROTC detachments in the First ROTC
Region. It is assumed that the data from these schools, all located on the east coast, is representative of retention rates at the other 170 units in the United States. This appears to be a reasonable assumption because of the large number of detachments on the east coast and the diversity of the institutions involved. Although there may be some regional differences, it is anticipated that these differences would be slight.

A significant feature of the "retention curve" is the fact that as MS I class size increases the percentage of freshmen cadets who transition to MS III decreases.\textsuperscript{21} The data in Table 2 reflects this phenomenon which shows the effect of doubling MS I class size. Depending on freshman ROTC class size, doubling MS I enrollment will only increase MS III class size by 26 to 37 percent. Note also that detachments with relatively large MS I enrollments, 100 or more cadets, do not add significant numbers of Advanced Course students by doubling their enrollments. Additionally, as a practical matter, detachments with high MS I enrollments probably have efficient recruiting programs and may find it difficult, if not impossible, to double their MS I classes.

The final point to be considered is the fact that 85 percent of the detachments have MS I classes of less than 100 cadets.\textsuperscript{23} If the optimistic assumption is made that doubling MS I enrollment will result in all detachments increasing their MS III class size by 10 cadets, then the total increase in junior cadets would be 2730. This figure is far short of the 5500 MS III
cadets needed to produce the added 5000 commissioned officers for the 1980's.\textsuperscript{24}

This analysis suggests that meeting officer requirements will be even more difficult than anticipated in the aggregate examination. Additionally, the notion that units are approaching a limit of effectiveness under present operating conditions is implicit in this examination.

\textbf{COMMISSION POTENTIAL CONCLUSION}

The analyses appear to be limited to the four-year ROTC program and critics may argue that failure to consider the effect of the two-year program and the flexibility afforded by multiple entry points invalidates the results.\textsuperscript{25} These options do provide the opportunity for a number of students to enter Army ROTC after the first semester of their freshman year. The choices are included in both the aggregate and detachment analysis; no effort has been made to confine the examination to four-year cadets.

It is concluded that without major changes Army ROTC detachments will experience difficulty in achieving production goals. Indeed, it is more likely that there will be a sizable "short-fall," which will affect the reserve forces. Reflection on the ROTC environment will help define the obstacles encountered in recruitment and officer production and identify areas where new initiatives may be taken.

\textbf{THE ENVIRONMENT AND ROTC REALITIES ON CAMPUS}

This section deals with the ROTC detachment as an organization and identifies some of the forces that impact upon units and affect their performance. The ROTC organization, as an open system, has entry and exit points by which outsiders may become members and progress within the structure or leave.\textsuperscript{26} It has multiple memberships, which means that its members may have loyalties
to outside groups. The detachment exchanges resources by receiving inputs and delivering commissioned officers as outputs. Finally, it is affected by the actual or reciprocal influence of those inside and outside the system. As an organization it is not able to limit or control with any degree of effectiveness the interchange that the above factors have upon it. Thus, it is surrounded by a complex array of people, units, organizations and opinions that influence its performance. Gross has described this complex as the immediate environment and has sub-divided it into groups which he identifies as: publics with opinions, clients, suppliers, advisors, controllers and adversaries.

Before continuing this discussion three points relative to these elements of the environment are made. First, although the titles used are common terms, the clusters are delineated precisely; definitions are given for the groups considered. Second, the detachments interface with these various circles in multiple ways; however, the ROTC recruiting activity is particularly dependent on the several roles played by groups and their members. Finally, because recruiting is the "keystone" of the ROTC officer production system, the remainder of this paper focuses on recruiting and the groups which exert considerable influence on the detachments in this area. These particularly forceful agents are: publics with opinions, clients, adversaries and controllers; each is addressed in detail.

PUBLICS WITH OPINIONS

This group represents the value system of society. Gross suggests that there are two types of publics. First, there are those groups and organizations who at present are not playing any of the roles listed above, but who might become clients at some time in the future. Second, there are those who are not now playing any of the roles and who are not members of organizations
who may play a relevant role in the future. Reference will be made to the former as the "alert public" and the latter as the "apathetic public."

A strong bias against a large peacetime military force is traditional in the United States. This public feeling manifests itself in the beliefs that the Nation's defense rests with the citizen-soldier and that the military profession is for the relatively small numbers of military academy graduates. These beliefs are expressed by publics of students and non-students and reflect a generally low opinion of military life.

In 1966, on the eve of major dissent over policies in Southeast Asia, a national poll found that 62 percent of the people questioned expressed confidence in the Nation's military leadership. In 1977 a Harris survey reported that 27 percent of the individuals interviewed approved of the services' leadership. In a University of Michigan survey, 344 college students with access to ROTC out of 390, indicated they would not join the program because of non-interest in military life. Another study reported that 21 percent of the students questioned believed military officers were frequently incompetent. The same investigation found that many non-ROTC students believe the image of cadets on campus was unfavorable.

The interaction among students and non-students is also of interest. The influence of parents and personal contacts on career selection was noted by Montgomery when the students surveyed ranked the desirability of a career as an Army officer 10 of 11. The strength of outside influence was also indicated by a study which found that students tended to respond affirmatively to the statement, "Someone close to me (girlfriend/boyfriend, spouse, parent) would not like my being in ROTC."

The concept of a military obligation has also been explored. One study reported that almost 25 percent of the male students questioned indicated they would not serve in the military even if called. Over 13 percent said
they had given no thought to military service; only slightly over 10 percent believed they had a duty to serve in the Armed Forces. An earlier investigation found that 23 percent of a non-ROTC survey group at an Ivy League university were favorably disposed toward required military service while the remainder did not favor a military obligation.

The accessibility and desirability of students in the alert public is also important. One study classified students into these two plus three other categories. Of the college enrollees interviewed, only 68 percent met the accessible-desirable classification. This suggests that the pool of potential ROTC cadets is much smaller than the total freshmen and sophomore population on campuses with Army ROTC. The same study found that the accessible-desirable student tends to listen to their parents' ideas when it comes to selecting a career. If the parent has an anti-military bias, as many of them do, then many accessible-desirable students may be influenced against ROTC and the pool is further reduced.

CLIENTS

Clients are the receivers of ROTC's benefits; cadets receive commissions and the Army obtains leaders. Society is a benefactor but is a less visible client. Indeed this latter circle, especially during periods of peace, generally excludes itself from a client role and becomes part of the apathetic public. The number of clients depends upon the opportunity for initiative and maneuver; the importance of which is suggested in the discussion below.

A group of cadets were asked: "What is the best thing about ROTC?" Responses to this inquiry included leadership training, money, the people in ROTC, experience, comradeship, self-discipline, job security, career opportunities, and commission after college. This is an impressive list and provides some indication of the diversity of interest among cadets. It also
suggests that each cadet has taken the initiative to participate in ROTC because of some perceived benefit. It follows that students who are not taking ROTC either don't know of the benefits or the benefits listed are not of sufficient strength to warrant a decision favorable to ROTC.

Early in 1977 an ROTC Cadet Commander Conference included students from 27 schools. The cadets debated the merits of a structured and rigid ROTC program versus the liberal and flexible. Those present believed that too many highly qualified MS I and II cadets were disillusioned and bored by the lack of military training and discipline within liberal units. This feeling is common among highly motivated cadets. The students attending the meeting all ranked high in their Corps and probably possessed more than passing interest in the military; nevertheless, their comments are important because they reflect the fact that not all students want to minimize the military aspects of ROTC. Thus actions designed to attract students may "backlash" and cause cadets to leave the program.

Of the client related problems the "career myth" is one of the most perplexing. It has become almost axiomatic that participation in ROTC leads to a military career. It has been argued often that the primary purpose of Army ROTC is to provide professional officers. It is recognized that large numbers of career officers are commissioned through the ROTC but the career commitment is not as great among ROTC graduates (58 percent), as it is with Military Academy and Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates (76 and 93 percent respectively). In accepting a commission and active duty, an individual is not obligated to an Army career. More important is the fact that an ROTC officer is not required to serve an Active Army tour. An advanced course cadet may contract to serve his obligation in either the Army Reserve or National Guard. Should the ROTC cadet elect to serve an active duty tour he or she is still not committed to a military career. The service
decision, like many other decisions in life, is reversible.  

ADVERSARIES

Adversaries prejudice the operation of the ROTC detachment. This group is made up of competitors, rivals, opponents and enemies. The chief competitors are business, industry, the professions and public service agencies who compete for talented students. The Air Force and Navy ROTC and service recruiters are obvious rivals. Opponents include apathetic students, faculty and administrators; enemies are anti-military factions. Rivals and opponents have considerable impact on recruiting.

Army ROTC's chief rival is industry. The Haines Board attributed this to intense recruiting on campuses by business and industry. Lyons and Masland believed that a young officer could expect to exceed the levels of responsibility his contemporaries could achieve in private industry. Nevertheless, industry outstrips the services in offering the "illusion" of important assignments. Salaries offered to many college graduates, especially those in engineering fields, exceed the pay received by new lieutenants.

Faculty members that stand as obstacles to ROTC generally do so because of a conviction that the values of the academic community and the military profession are incompatible. This group cites the fact that ROTC courses emphasize authority, which conflicts with the spirit of free inquiry. They see elements of indoctrination in ROTC and they believe cadre attempt to convert students to "service oriented" points of view. They also suggest that the quality of ROTC instruction in academic subjects such as history and political science is inferior because they perceive classes in these subjects are conducted at a lower intellectual level. All of these views tend to impede the enrollment process. As Lyons and Masland point out, it is the teaching faculties that have the major impact and control the intellectual and
emotional tenor of colleges and universities.48

A survey, conducted by the Pittsburgh Senior ROTC Instructor Group (PSRIG), found that 19 or 28 ROTC detachments classified their administrations and faculties as apathetic or passive. The data collected by the PSRIG also implied that active assistance aids recruiting while apathetic or passive academics have little affect on enrollment. Finally, the Professor of Military Science (PMS) surveyed rated their faculty and administrators fourth and fifth respectively in recruiting effectiveness out of 13 alternative choices.49

CONTROLLERS

Controllers exercise authority over the program both directly and indirectly. Heading the list in this group are the Congress, Department of Defense (DoD), Department of the Army (DA), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the ROTC Regions. The institutions are non-governmental agencies that control the ROTC organization.

It is common knowledge that the higher levels take many actions that assist subordinate elements in accomplishing their mission. It is also true that top administrators sometimes engage in counter productive activities; this section focuses on activities of the latter type.

Early in 1977 the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported to Congress a concern that the Army was not deactivating unproductive ROTC units.50 The issue was considered during the debate over the Defense Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1978. A provision was written into the legislation which prohibits the funding of ROTC detachments with less than 17 MS III cadets on the roles as of 30 September 1977 and that have not met this standard in the previous four years.51 The economic argument makes sense but the Congressional action may be a case of "treating the symptom rather than the cause."

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In his report for FY 78, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld indicated that DoD was again proposing legislation to lower compensation for cadets and midshipmen. The new levels of pay would also apply to ROTC cadets attending summer training. The pay reduction, if approved, would hurt many ROTC cadets who depend on summer income to assist in meeting educational costs. ROTC recruiters refer to this compensation as an incentive when interviewing prospective cadets.

In 1972, because Army officer requirements were reduced, 2,133 ROTC graduates were involuntarily given an active duty for training (ADT) status. This DA action created a morale problem among cadets and a recruiting problem for the cadre. Similar action was required for the "Class of 77" and the results were similar. The difficulty with the 72 and 77 actions is that when students entered the ROTC program they were assured active duty (AD) rather than ADT. This type of incident has no winner; the individual may suffer financially and psychologically, the veracity of the ROTC recruiter is made suspect and the image of the Army is tarnished.

Actions of the type cited above cause frustration among ROTC cadre by suggesting that the higher levels do not understand the recruiting problem. This discontentment was summarized precisely by a cadre member when he wrote:

> Generalizations such as "recruit more," "work harder," and "fight for your rights" plus "we'll help you" that emanate from higher headquarters to embattled ROTC detachments only increase the frustration level and contribute nothing.

**SUMMARIZED REALITIES OF THE ENVIRONMENT**

The preceding consideration of the environment and the roles played by key groups provides the opportunity to make several pertinent observations. First, the image of the military among publics with opinions is poor. Second, alert publics, as potential clients are susceptible to taking advantage
of opportunities that provide initiative and maneuver. It appears, however, that at present many students see little advantage to an ROTC association. Third, the competition for talent is keen and there are a great many more forces in the form of adversaries and controllees working against rather than for the favorable ROTC decision.

This discussion of the ROTC environment suggests the magnitude of the officer production problem. To produce the cadre must remain dedicated, flexible, innovative and enthusiastic, however, the detachment needs help.

A central thesis of this paper is that the ROTC environment must be changed to meet officer requirements in the Eighties. In 1959 Lyons and Masland came to a similar conclusion; they expressed doubt that the military services would be able to attract young men of intelligence and education without special inducements. When this evaluation was made, there was a draft. New incentives were added to the program with the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964. However, these measures do not appear to be sufficient to realistically meet the Army's future requirements. If the Army ROTC program is to produce the quality and quantity of officers required then actions to energize the program are indispensable.

TO ENERGIZE ARMY ROTC

There is a range of actions that can make significant changes in the ROTC environment. To this end, the objective of each action should be to provide the opportunity for students and/or academics to seriously consider exercising the initiative and maneuver gained by becoming clients. The initiatives discussed will be confined to measures and issues that have not had high visibility or for which actions are not pending at this time. Thus, since attention is being given to increasing the number of national ROTC scholarships, raising the monthly cadet stipend, assigning a greater number of cadre to ROTC
duty and authorizing more units, these initiatives are not discussed. It is emphasized, however, that all of these actions are important and they should continue to be pursued vigorously.

NEW LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE

Congress should initiate a number of measures to strengthen ROTC programs. Each action will cost federal dollars, however, if the National Defense is important, if the military requires young leaders, and if there is a valid requirement for the Active and Reserve Forces than the increased funding that these proposed actions require should be justified.

The most effective measure and perhaps the least costly, but the most controversial, would be the initiation of a new form of national service. The purpose of the program would be to establish a service obligation of some type for the Nation's youth. King has identified five methods for performing national service, which include both military and non-military possibilities. The "draft" is a type of national service; the advantage of this alternative to Army ROTC is obvious. Just as obvious is the difficulty in believing Congress will enact new legislation which would obligate young Americans to military training. However, "compulsory" or "alternative" national service may find support among legislators. Under compulsory service all youth would be required to serve in either a military or non-military capacity; alternative service would require a military obligation but individuals choosing non-military service would be exempt from military duty. Either of these programs would force college students to consider the ROTC option. As King suggests even a "minimally coercive" program, which required registration and evaluation but no service commitment, would make a greater number of youth cognizant of military life. A national service law would require students in the alert public to evaluate the initiative and maneuver
offered by ROTC.

It has been noted that some groups within institutions of higher education play an adversary role. To many in academic communities it appears that schools are giving more than they are receiving. To argue, as the services do, that the government is providing cadre, supplies, advertising and equipment at no charge and the institution benefits from ROTC scholarships and the existence of the program on campus, although true, does not carry much weight. Adversaries counter that institutions also provide services which are at a premium. In allocating resources college administrators must invest in activities that provide a favorable return; in present circumstances many colleges and universities are not receiving tangible benefits from ROTC. In this situation it appears that the Congress should give serious consideration to providing compensation to ROTC host institutions in two areas. First, the institutions should be compensated for the officers they graduate. Second, institutions should be reimbursed for the use of campus facilities.

The Haines Board recommended that the DoD seek federal reimbursement to institutions for each ROTC graduate, and an additional amount for each ROTC officer commissioned in the Regular Army. The DoD ROTC Advisory Committee recommended that assistance to institutions should be given priority over an increase in financial support to students. Dr. Slaar referred to the heavy strain ROTC programs have placed on institutional facilities, when shortages of academic space were acute. The situation has not improved; space on campuses is still at a premium. The President, University of Arizona, noted the shortage of space and commented that DoD has never given real support to institutional recommendations which favor Congressional appropriations to cover the cost of facilities used by ROTC. An Ohio State University study group made similar findings and recommendations. Reimbursement of host institutions for support of ROTC would provide some leverage to assist in
moving academics from apathetic to active roles.

STATE ACTIONS

State governments have not been concerned with ROTC except indirectly in the funding of state affiliated institutions. With a growing requirement for officers in the National Guard this situation should change. Many National Guard units are short of junior officers; there are two actions states can take to fill these officer vacancies.

First, states may provide tuition assistance to ROTC cadets if those receiving these special grants agree to serve in the National Guard upon graduation. The Ohio National Guard and Ohio University are testing this new concept. If successful, the special tuition assistance program may be initiated on a national basis.

Second, states may provide full or partial scholarships, two-year or four year, at state institutions to students who agree to serve in the National Guard after graduation. Both of these initiatives would serve to attract high caliber students to the Guard and ROTC.

DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND ARMY

A key action to be taken by DA with DoD support is the conduct of a campaign to de-emphasize the career association of ROTC. Greater attention must be given to the Reserve and National Guard opportunities that ROTC provides. This campaign should turn the citizen-soldier idea to its advantage. Additionally, DoD and DA must make every effort to avoid counter-productive activities.

General DePuy stated that the ROTC program "may not be protected as well within the Army family as its importance demands." He noted that every effort
was being made by ROTC personnel to meet the requirement of 10,000 officers, and expressed the belief that the program was moving in the appropriate direction, but that "it just is not going to get there all by itself without some tender loving care." These remarks by the Army's "number one trainer" point out the need for active high level support of the Army ROTC program.

**INSTITUTIONAL ASSISTANCE**

Institutions must actively support their ROTC programs; dissemination of appropriate information is a vital element of endorsement. The DoD Special ROTC Committee recognized the importance of information when they stated,

"The unique nature of the ROTC program obligates the host institutions to make a special effort to insure that students have access to information about the program."

This access needs to be more than display stands and ROTC brochures stuffed into admissions mailings. It must include actions which demonstrate that ROTC is part of the university family. Publicity for cadet activities, cadre participation in orientation programs, appropriate information in catalogues, knowledge of the program on the part of advisors and open counseling and advisement procedures are all measures which will make students aware of the ROTC option.

Counseling and advisement are most important. The Ohio State study group believed this to be the case when they recommended:

**Recruitment of Students.** Advice to students concerning the opportunities for public service with the military departments, both on career and service basis, should become part of the counseling and placement work of the colleges and universities. Consideration should be given to joint civilian-military faculty efforts to acquaint new students with the officer education program. The idea of military service within the wider concept of public responsibility and service should be emphasized.

Establishing and maintaining contact with students is one of the most difficult tasks faced by cadre. If initial contact can be made through non-
military faculty this problem will be eased and the ROTC program enhanced because of the support of non-uniformed advisors and counselors.

It is recognized that many institutions see little purpose or advantage in devoting the time and resources necessary to include ROTC in their activities. For this reason it is important to stress again that Congressional action on financial reimbursement is vital and could be especially effective in light of the "money crunch" being experienced by many colleges and universities.

CONCLUSION

Army ROTC has passed through the crises of the early Seventies but in light of increasing officer requirements for the Army Reserve and National Guard it faces new crises in the Eighties. Under current operating conditions ROTC detachments are not likely to meet projected officer production goals and they need outside help if this situation is to be reversed. Major effort must be made to change the ROTC environment: Congress should start by passing a new legislative package designed to energize the Senior ROTC program and state legislators should follow suit by developing programs to attract college students into ROTC and the National Guard. DoD and DA should refrain from taking counter productive actions and institutions with ROTC programs must find ways to support their cadre in making wider and more positive contact with potential ROTC cadets.

In addition to these initiatives, the concept of the citizen-soldier should be removed from storage and the career myth destroyed: so that young men and women understand the dual nature of our military system and the possibility for a rewarding avocation as an officer in the Army Reserve Forces.

As the Nation and the military establishment adjusts to the realities
of an all volunteer force, positive actions must be taken from Congress down to detachment to insure that Army ROTC is provided a reasonable opportunity to produce young leaders of quality in the numbers required.

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FOOTNOTES


2. US Department of the Army, Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools, Vols. 1, p. 28. The "Haines Board" (1966) limited their forecast for ROTC graduates to a 10-year period. The need, however, is still valid because no other programs have been developed to take the place of ROTC. Although Officers Candidate School (OCS) and a Platoon Leader Course patterned after instruction used to train Marine officers have been discussed from time to time by the Congress, GAO, and the Department of Defense to date, these alternatives have been rejected. President's Commission, The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, "Gates Commission", p. 1.


4. Interview with Peter Krafinski, Jr., CPT, US Department of the Army, Office Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPEP), Wheeling, West Virginia, 10 October 1977. Interviewee was the official representative for Richard Sweet, BG, Deputy Director of Military Personnel Management (ODCSPEP). Table 1 was presented in slide form during briefing.

5. Ibid.


10. For example for School Year 74-75 make the following calculations: .041 (ROTC enrollment in millions) * 4.9 (College enrollment in millions) = .008 or .8 percent of college students participate in ROTC. To find officer production as percent of ROTC: 4.5 (officer production in thousands) / 41 (ROTC enrollment in thousands) = .11 or an 11 percent officer production rate.


12. Frinkel and Harrison, Projections Education Statistics, p. 18. For
example to find projected ROTC enrollment in 1986 make the following calculation: \(0.011\) (ROTC as percent of total college enrollment) \(\times\) 4995 (Projected enrollment in thousands all 4-Year colleges in 1986) = 55 thousands cadets. To find required commissioning rate in 1986 make the following computation: 10 (officer requirements in thousands) \(\times\) 55 (ROTC enrollment in thousands) = .18 or 18 percent commissioning rate.

13. Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics. TRADOC, Semiannual Historical Report 1973. The best year for commissioning was 1969 with a 15 percent rate. Between 1970 and 74 rates varied from a low of 17 to a high of 23 percent but these figures are distorted because of the post Vietnam drop in ROTC enrollment and draft motivated cadets under contract who were obligated to accept commissions.

14. For example in School Year 78-79 make the following calculations. 8.0 (Officer requirements in thousands) \(\times\) .11 (Commissioning rate) = 73 (Required Cadet enrollment). The previous School Year enrollment was 58 thousand cadets. 58 + 73 = .79; to find required percent increase: 100-79-21 percent.

15. Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics. ROTC enrollment rate computed from data contained in reference.

16. The ROTC enrollment figures used in the discussion under this assumption represent the mid-point between the cadet populations under the first and second assumptions.


21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., The data in this table was calculated from information contained in Annex C for the "Class of 79".


24. The additional 500 MS III cadets arc required because of a 10 percent attrition rate from MS III to commission. This rate for the most part depends upon summer camp failures, school drop-outs, school failures, physical problems and lack of motivation and demonstrated leadership on the part of the cadet.
25. The two-year program and multiple entry points provide a variety of ways for students to enter ROTC through the beginning of their junior year. Both methods require the students to make-up course work missed in the basic course. Make-up may be accomplished by attendance at basic camp, summer school, prior service and previous ROTC instruction, (either junior or senior). Each case is evaluated on its merits.

26. Bertram M. Gross, Organizations and Their Managing, pp. 113-35. The discussion in this section draws heavily upon this work.


34. Nona Glazer-Melbir., "The ROTC: Military Service on the College Campus," in Public Opinion and the Military Establishment, ed. by Charles C. Moskos, Jr., p. 76. Percentage computed from data ranging from "most favorable" to "least favorable" for non-ROTC students at an Ivy League University.

35. Montgomery, p. V-2. For example, in the fall 1976 there were 1,164,740 freshmen and sophomore students enrolled at institutions with Army ROTC; of these students only 792,023 could be expected to fall into the accessible/desirable class. During the same period on these campuses 40,973 freshmen and sophomores, or over five percent, were enrolled in Army ROTC. On 101 of these campuses either Navy or Air Force ROTC units were also competing for cadets from the same population. Based on the above, it is estimated that from six to seven percent of the pool was enrolled in ROTC. This is quite high and certainly competitive with other fields of study at universities and colleges.

36. Ibid., p. I+33.

37. Ibid., p. XI-3.


39. Lyons and Masland, pp. 87-98. The authors point out that since World War II the programs have become the primary source of commissioned officers for the active services. Reserve requirements have been met by taking officers into units after the individuals' active duty obligations were completed.
Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower: The Keystone of National Security, p. 214. The Commission focused in on this situation to the degree that it recommended the ROTC programs should be retitled Officer Training Corps to reflect more closely its purpose.


41. This situation has come about because the officer production of the Army ROTC programs is greater than active Army requirements. A similar situation existed in the mid-Fifties and Congress responded by passing the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 which authorized six months of active duty for training (ACDUTRA) for newly commissioned ROTC graduates who were not ordered to active duty. At the end of the six month period these individuals were placed on the reserve rolls. This system was not used in similar circumstances which occurred in 1973 and 1977.

42. Defense Manpower Commission, p. 216. The Commission recommends that the active force should support the commissioning requirements of the National Guard.

43. Pennsylvania State Board of Education, Research and Information on Employment and Training, Proceeding of a Symposium, Stephen J. Franchak, ed., (Hershey, PA, 1976), p. 110. For example out of 3,077 men surveyed nearly two-thirds of them choose their present occupation after completing their college education. Thus, while in college, the majority were not preparing specifically for their present work.


46. Percy Wells Bidwell, Undergraduate Education in Foreign Affairs, pp. 91-92.

47. Ibid., p. 90.

48. Lyons and Masland, p. 25.

49. Pittsburgh Senior ROTC Instructor Group (PSRICG). It is of interest to note that five of the nine active supporters were from institutions with a total student enrollment of less than 2,000. This suggests that on the small campus the ROTC program is more easily absorbed into the academic community. This survey was taken in Wheeling, West Virginia in October, 1977 during a conference for PMS from Areas III and IV, First ROTC Region. The questionnaire consisted of 25 items designed to determine the nature of the ROTC program at the institutions surveyed based on their size, location, and success in producing officers. The results are filed at the Pittsburgh Senior ROTC Instructor Group, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260.

50. US General Accounting Office, Report to Congress, Reserve Officer Training Corps: Management Deficiencies Still to be Corrected, p. 4. The detachments effectiveness is based on the following Department of Defense rule of thumb: "...the minimum MS III enrollment is 17 cadets with an expected annual production of 15 officers."


60. Department of Defense, Report Special Committee ROTC, p. iii.


63. Ohio State University, Mershon National Security Program, Role of Colleges and Universities in ROTC Programs, June 1960. p. 60.

64. LaVern E. Weber, MG. Chief National Guard Bureau, Annual Review: Fiscal Year 1976 and TO, p. 28.

65. There are some exciting possibilities developing in this area. For example a veteran may join the advanced course as a freshman, be commissioned at the end of his sophomore year and be commissioned in the National Guard and draw drill pay his last two years of college. Another possibility exists on the Reserve side; in this situation a student by enlisting in the Reserves at the beginning of his freshman year may make $2500 before joining the advanced program.

66. Depuy.


68. Ohio State University, pp. 59-60.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


   (Although this study is still in the formative stages, when it is completed it could make a significant contribution to the management of ROTC detachments.)


   (A comprehensive study of the management of organizations in which the author establishes a new syntax for management terms to reduce semantic confusion.)


(A brief but excellent discussion of the all-volunteer force based on the authors 1976 report to Congress. The author's discussion of national service was especially helpful.)


(A basic work for anyone studying ROTC problems. Although published in 1959, it is the most comprehensive analysis of the subject in print.)


(An excellent and relatively current study of ROTC attitudes on campuses. It was especially helpful in developing the section on publics with opinions.)


