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This study analysed the relationship between the endorsement of values judged to characterize the army organizational environment and the preferences expressed for leadership and power options by officers in supervisory settings. The subjects were 99 active army majors and lieutenant colonels in a resident Command and General Staff College (CGSC) class at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Operational definitions limit leadership to actions designed to gain the willing cooperation of one's subordinates and power, conversely, to actions that can force the subordinates' compliance in spite of their opposition. The organizational environment is defined in terms of structure, authority, regulations, and leadership training and shown to be typical of closed (as opposed to open) organizational systems. A questionnaire was then developed that assessed one's preference for leadership or power on one part, and one's endorsement of organizational values on another. The hypothesized negative relationship between preferences for leadership and endorsement of these organizational values was shown to exist ($r = -.44, a = .001$). The main conclusions are that few officers realize the military environment may be inhibiting their use of leadership, that the environment does not reward leadership as defined herein and therefore does not encourage its development outside of the classroom, and that leadership doctrine is in conflict with the environment.
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND PREFERENCES FOR LEADERSHIP AND POWER IN THE OFFICER CORPS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

This study analyzed the relationship between the endorsement of values judged to characterize the army organizational environment and the preferences expressed for leadership and power options by officers in supervisory settings. The subjects were 99 active army majors and lieutenant colonels in a resident Command and General Staff College (CGSC) class at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Operational definitions of leadership and power are derived from the literature that limit leadership to actions designed to gain the willing cooperation of one's subordinates and power, conversely, to actions that can force the subordinates' compliance in spite of their opposition. The organizational environment is defined in terms of four variables: structure, authority, regulations, and leadership training. Each is demonstrated to have a potentially negative impact on the use and development of leadership.

A questionnaire was then developed that assessed one's preference for leadership or power on one part, and one's endorsement of organizational values on another. The organizational values consisted of a series of statements descriptive of the army environment that the respondent was required to rank on six item Likert scales ranging from definitely bad to definitely good. Leadership and power preferences were assessed with multiple choice responses.
to descriptions of supervisory problems calling for action. It was hypothesized that a negative relationship existed between one's preference for leadership actions and one's endorsement of these organizational values (referred to as institutional socialization). Additional relationships based on career field, source of commission, command experience, length of commissioned service, and age were explored. The only significant finding (α=.001) was an overall correlation of −.44 between the leadership and institutional socialization scores as hypothesized. The main conclusions are that few officers realize the military environment may be inhibiting their use of leadership, that the environment does not reward leadership as defined herein and therefore does not encourage its development outside of the classroom, and that doctrine, with respect to leadership, is poorly understood and in conflict with the environment.
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Organizational Environment and Preferences for Leadership and Power in the Officer Corps

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the focus of this study concerns the use of power and leadership in an organizational setting, it is important to discuss the concepts at some length.

Power

Power can be considered very broadly as a successful influence attempt, or more narrowly, as the ability to force another's behavior in spite of his opposition. Furthermore, philosophical debate over the right to power, in any context exists. Rice and Bishoprick (1971) have illustrated the problem by contrasting the "divine right" theory of kingship, wherein supreme power over all is vested in one individual (actually the office), with John Locke's beliefs that among the natural rights of man, was the complete freedom from any superior power. This seventeenth century conflict can be seen today, if in somewhat more secular terms, in ideological conflicts between autocracy and anarchy in political theory, mechanistic versus egalitarian models in organizational theory (Rice
and Bishoprick, 1971), and authoritarian versus permissive styles in leadership theory (Swaney, 1971).

Power is not merely the overt imposition of one’s will upon another. Were such the case, it would be easily recognizable and its use could easily judged. However, power can be very subtle and difficult to detect. Further, it can operate without either the wielder or the object being aware of it. Consider the classifications put forth by French and Raven (1959). In their analysis, the power an individual held was largely defined by the value his subordinates placed on five aspects of his position and personal skills. A supervisor could possess the ability to reward for compliance (reward power) or to punish for non-compliance (coercive power). Additionally, he could be perceived as an astute or knowledgeable individual (expert power) and gain influence to the degree that a subordinate sought the same goals and believed the supervisor’s methods were best. As a referent figure that subordinates would desire to emulate (referent power), a supervisor could be very influential. Last, there is legitimate power, which is usually related to the organizational positions held by the individuals in question. The subordinate complies because he believes in the “right” of the superior to direct him; this power is generally limited to those functions related to the job.

There are three important aspects of this model. First, the types of power are interrelated. For example,
the distinction between withholding a reward and inflicting punishment, while discernable, is probably not significant. Second, in every case, the actual degree of power one holds is determined, finally, by the subordinates' perceptions. In other words, if the rewards and punishments a supervisor controls, and his charisma, qualifications, and personality do not daunt the subordinate, then little power exists. The threat of being fired will not necessarily motivate a subordinate who is willing to accept the loss of his job.

Lastly, all can be interpreted as coercive in the final analysis. Reward, coercive, and legitimate power are easily seen in this light. To the degree that people desire a voice in directing their own activities, the continued dominance of an expert could be resented. However, if a subordinate concedes power to his superior, that is, believes the superior's methods really are better, he probably will feel that he has no rational choice but to comply; hence, the power of his superior's perceived ability has coerced him into compliance.

Similarly, even referent power can be coercive. The subordinate desires approval from the referent leader, whom he probably holds in high esteem, as an ideal person. He wants to be near and to interact with such a leader and sees him as someone worth emulating. A superior's approval or disapproval in such a situation is analogous
to reward power, and his ability to chastize the subordinate is related to coercive power directly. A subordinate who objects to such a supervisor's requests, but nonetheless feels he must comply to remain in the good graces of the referent figure, has been effectively coerced by his own feelings and thoughts.

**Power and Decision-making**

Such an analysis of power illustrates the complexity and subtlety of the concept. Using this model, it is evident that supervisors possess and use power, sometimes unknowingly. However, supervisors should not be in the business (directly) of utilizing power for its own sake. They should be, rather, in the business of making decisions. The scope of this study does not include an explanation of all the responsibilities and functions of supervisors. Koontz (1961) in *The Management Theory Jungle* provides an excellent overview of several schools of thought on that subject. The decision-making process however is illustrative of supervisory behavior. As Richards and Nielander (1969, p. 184) point out, "Certainly decision making can be considered as a prime focus of management. Whether he plans, controls, organizes, or performs any managerial function, the manager is deciding upon plans, structure, or controls." Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958) have provided a continuum describing the range of leadership behavior in terms of decision-making.
At one extreme, the manager defines the problem, devises possible solutions, selects one, and notifies his subordinates of the decision. This style of leadership is almost totally authoritarian. No input is sought from subordinates and while some consideration of their reactions may take place, it is not necessary.

At the opposite end of the continuum, the manager sets parameters and allows the subordinate to function freely. Figure 1 graphically explains the model (Tannenbaum, Weschler and Massarik, 1961, p. 69). Each step along the continuum reflects a decrease (or increase) in supervisory control over decision-making. Tannenbaum does not state that a preferred degree of control exists but rather states that it will depend on the personality and style of the superior, the subordinates themselves, and the characteristics of the general situation. He refers to the model as reflecting patterns of leadership, based upon the degree of authority utilized by the manager.

This approach to leadership is quite popular. Vroom and Yetton (1973) devised a taxonomy of leader behaviors based on decision making also. In an effort to give credit to those who influenced them, to compare various similar models, or to distinguish theirs from others, they illustrated other decision models by Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939), Maier (1955), Likert (1967),
Figure 1
Continuum of Leadership Behavior

Boss-centered leadership ———— Subordinate-centered leadership

Use of authority by manager

Manager makes decision and announces it.
Manager "sells" decision.
Manager presents ideas and invites questions.
Manager presents tentative decision subject to change.
Manager presents problem, gets suggestions, makes decision.
Manager defines limits; asks group to make decision.
Manager permits subordinates to function within limits defined by superior.

Area of freedom for subordinates
Heller (1971) and Tannenbaum and Schmidt. Although variabilities in terminology exist, all are essentially the same in that they distinguish leader behavior in terms of decision-making and provide a continuum of options from relatively autocratic (authoritarian, unilateral) to relatively democratic (participative, permissive) modes. The distinctions are no doubt significant but to the present study they represent essentially similar lines of reasoning.

**Power and Authority**

Tannenbaum (1950), Barnard (1938) and Simon (1947), among others, would agree that authority is essentially determined by the consensus of one's subordinates. In the end, they choose to accept or reject the superior's decisions. Among the reasons subordinates comply are the obvious sanctions, negative and positive, controlled by superiors and peers. These sanctions can be related to the bases of power described earlier by French and Raven. Authority itself is rather difficult to distinguish from legitimate power and the literature on both tends to overlap. For example, Peabody (1964) conceptualized four types of authority in a manner that sounds much like French and Raven discussing power. His "authority of position" describes the powers of the supervisor to hire, fire, promote, etc. the subordinates. His definition parallels reward and coercive power quite well.
Additionally, Raven (1964), in a revision of the original taxonomy, lumped coercive and reward power together under the label "public-dependent influence".

Leavitt's (1964) discussion of power and authority makes them virtually synonymous; i.e. authority is delegated power. Additionally, how well one uses authority seems to define leadership in his perspective. A starting point for separating the two concepts lies in Barnard's "zone of indifference" or Simon's "zone of acceptance". Authority, per se, is not resented or resisted. In fact, a large area of routine direction by superiors is expected by subordinates and all recognize that the positions of each require this to be so for the organization to function. This very acceptance legitimizes the authority. However, when the zone is breached, and the subordinate is complying in consideration of the sanctions controlled by the superior, it is difficult to consider it a matter of legitimacy based on subordinate views of the duties inherent with each position. Outside the zone of acceptance, resistance is implicit. When resistance enters the picture, a possible line between power and authority begins to appear.

Barnard (p. 183) clearly states that yielding to power is not synonymous with yielding to authority. In his words, "Authority lies always with him to whom it applies. Coercion creates a contrary illusion; but the
use of force, ipso facto, destroys the authority postulated." If using force is considered outside the bounds of authority, then a concept of power that excludes authority should be distinguished. Dahl's (1957) definition is characteristic of authors taking this approach. He states (p. 202) that, "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do." In other words, power can go beyond what is perceived as legitimate by subordinates and include coercion. One may argue that power does not have to be coercive, but it is difficult to state that it is excluded. Therefore, power can be coercive, authority cannot. Schein (1963, p. 11) expands,

Authority is not the same thing as pure power. Pure power implies that by the manipulation of rewards or the exercise of naked strength you can force someone else to do something against his will. Authority, by contrast, implies the willingness on the part of a "subordinate" to obey because he consents, he grants to the person in authority or to the law the right to dictate to him.

Although this paper deals with formal organizations, it is worthwhile to note that authority is not necessarily based on position alone but, as Weber (1947) pointed out, can be based on traditions, rational-legal principles or charisma.

Leadership

Is leadership, as suggested by numerous authors above, a reflection of how one makes decisions and/or utilizes power and authority; is it, as Leavitt said,
a job, or a function, not a relationship between individuals (this is not to imply that other authors cited above totally discounted the relationship)? On the other hand, Fiedler (1967, p. 29), based on numerous experiments, concluded that "... the leader-member relationship seems nonetheless to be the most important single element in determining the leader's influence."

In formal organizations, leaders are managers, supervisors, foremen, executives, etc. Generally speaking, they are appointed (as opposed to elected) to their positions. Since this is so, the subordinates have little input in the selection of leaders. However, since leaders whose subordinates refuse to work, or do so poorly, will probably not long remain leaders (by formal position), it can be said that subordinates' actions are a significant indicator of one's leadership abilities. Additionally, as demonstrated above, one's authority and power are also largely a matter of subordinate perspectives on the superior's actions. Bass (1960) discusses leadership as a subset of power. Essentially he states that persuasion characterizes the style of one with ability and coercion characterizes the style of one who has power. He defines power as being able to control whatever subordinates want. The stronger their desire for the outcomes the superior controls, the greater his power. Here, power is purely coercive. Bass refers to the
exercise of such power as successful coercive leadership. Although not highly definitive, he is saying that leadership can be coercive if it is based on power or it can be persuasive if it is based on ability. Although "ability" is not directly defined, the tone of his writing implies that an able leader does not have to resort to power.

To follow an approach to leadership that defines it as a form of power is to blur the distinction between the terms. The preceding discussion included authors who have defined leadership as the exercise of authority and power, the function of a position, an interpersonal relationship, and a form of power or persuasion. Putting oneself in the subordinate's position (as it has been shown that authority, power and leadership are based largely on subordinate perceptions), one can classify the range of responses to superior influence attempts into three general categories. The subordinate complies because:

a. He believes he has no rational choice but to comply.

b. He believes he should comply.

c. He wants to comply.

If he is responding to a above, he is responding to the power of the superior. When he considers the alternatives and the sanctions controlled by his superior,
he is left without a reasonable option. If he is responding
due to b, he is willfully granting his superior the
authority to direct him. These concepts of power and
authority however do not well explain category c.

One explanation would simply be that such responses
are coincidental in the sense that the superior has happened
to make a request that the subordinate had wanted (or
would want) to perform. This approach is too simple.
After all, if superiors could confine their activities
to only requesting that subordinates do that which they
truly desire to do, the situation would be one where
organizational goals and individual goals were 100 percent
congruent and concepts of power, authority and leadership
would hardly be needed. The author suggests that when
the subordinate responds to c above, he is responding
to leadership. Bass has called it persuasive leadership.
Herein lies the problem, for he would also define responses
to a as leadership, albeit coercive. If one takes that
approach, then leadership is indeed a form of power.

Military Leadership

At this point the concept of military leadership
must be introduced. The definitions clearly account for
response set c and perhaps sound idealistic. However,
in light of the fact that the military leader may be in
the position of asking for the supreme sacrifice (or the
apparent danger of it) from his subordinates, the concepts
are certainly desirable.

Leadership - . . . the personal relationship . . . the ability of a commander to use his personality to directly influence his subordinates to accomplish a mission. Ideally, the process of leadership would get the willing cooperation of subordinates through persuasion. (FM 22-100, Military Leadership, 1973, p. 1-3)

Leadership - . . . is the act and exercise of influence to direct men in such a way as to obtain their willing obedience, confidence, respect, and loyal cooperation. (RB 22-1, Leadership, 1973)

It can be seen that military leadership clearly excludes resorting to any form of coercion. Coercion, on the other hand, is one aspect of power. The definition of military leadership therefore completes the analysis.

By way of summary, the analysis of power, and the context in which it will be used throughout the remainder of this work, is summed up in the following definition by Jacobs (1971, p. 216).

Power - The essence of power . . . is the capacity to withhold . . . benefits (or inflict punishment) if compliance is not forthcoming and is essentially coercive in nature. . . . in the final analysis it implies the capability of one person to cause behavior in another despite his opposition.

To be specifically related to the army officer corps (and, hence, this thesis), the definitions of leadership were selected from current manuals reflecting military doctrine.

For the purposes of this study, the precise wording of the definitions is not important. It is important to accept the general thrust of each as underlined in the definition. Power is essentially coercive and succeeds
despite opposition. In contrast, leadership, in some fashion, succeeds by gaining the willing cooperation of the subordinate. Further, both definitions are based on the perception of the subordinate; that is, if the subordinate feels he is being coerced, power is operative. If he does not sense coercion, but believes he has, in some manner, a choice and wants to do what the superordinate desires, then leadership is operative. In this sense, leadership and power are opposite ends of a continuum. Each influence attempt by the superordinate, consciously or unconsciously, may be viewed as an attempt at leadership or an attempt at power by the subordinate. There may be many exchanges based on authority that are not perceived to be displays of leadership or power.

In a broad sense, and in accordance with the definitions just discussed, there are two methods of influencing subordinates' behaviors. If one has the means, their actions can be demanded or forced. Without such means, or as an alternative, one can strive to gain their willing cooperation. If one in fact has power, that is, subordinates who feel compelled to comply, then power can be exercised relatively unilaterally without consideration for the subordinates' views. This is not to suggest that supervisors do not in fact consider subordinates' reactions when they consciously use power but rather that it isn't necessary if power exists and that a supervisor may use power without being aware of it.
To use leadership in carrying out supervisory functions is obviously more time consuming and more difficult than resorting to power. The use of power, on the other hand, may be expedient, relatively easy to employ, and, as some research has shown, psychologically rewarding for the supervisor.

Given the resources expended on selection, training, and education, it is apparent that the service strives to develop and maintain an officer corps skilled in the exercise of leadership. One cannot, however, exercise leadership abstractly. The leader, the situation he finds himself in, and the subordinates he is to lead must be considered. In a broad sense, the situation for the officer is the army itself; that is, the organization in terms of its regulations, customs, structure, etc.

Organizational Environment

With respect to the army officer corps, one can describe certain variables in the organizational environment as relative constants in the following manner. First, the environment has an organizational structure that can be described as hierarchical, or line and staff, for example. Based on the chain-of-command, with each leader reporting to a higher one who has an ever larger organization to control, the salient descriptor is hierarchical. Second, within this structure, the individual leader operates under two sets of rules, one formal and one
informal. The formal ones are Department of Defense (Uniform Code of Military Justice, in particular) and Army level regulations, policies, directives, etc., and the informal ones are customs and traditions. In addition to these rules, the officer is granted certain statutory authority over his subordinates ranging from such things as determining work assignments and duty hours to the administration of military justice. Last, all officers receive leadership training to prepare them for their roles. These four factors, structure, rules, authority, and leadership training constitute the organizational environment that the individual leader operates in. Of course, there are countless variables that impact on a given individual's environment, from his own personality to the type of unit and mission he is given. However, all officers are somewhere in the army structure, being governed by the same regulations, possessing similar authority depending on rank and position, and having all received somewhat similar leadership training. These factors, therefore, describe a common framework that underlies the behaviors of all army officers.

The following discussion explains the potentially negative impact that each factor has on leadership development. One recognizes that they may have positive characteristics as well and no attempt is being made to evaluate the overall contributions of each toward leadership
development. The discussion herein is provided to demonstrate that negative aspects may in fact be present in the organizational environment. An evaluation of the net impact this has on the officer corps will be addressed in succeeding chapters.

Structure. The shape or structure of formal organizations has long been recognized as a variable affecting employee performance. One of the first, and probably the largest and most widely known study, was Worthy's (1950) examination of Sears Roebuck. Some of his conclusions sound as if he were describing a large modern army. He stated that large, tall organizations are generally characterized by several hierarchical layers of management. Subsequently, this structure promotes the centralization of power and administrative authority in the organization. In so doing, it reduces the freedom of action of lower level managers and tends to create specialization of jobs. This organizational description is certainly representative of today's army; it has always been characterized by centralized authority in the chain-of-command and it is becoming increasingly specialized in the number and types of officer job descriptions. These two factors, of themselves, are not significant. However, Worthy maintained that they bring about a climate where productivity and performance are relatively low, decision-making skills and
initiative are discouraged, and managerial talent is not well developed. Additionally, with authority centralized in higher positions, there is little flexibility or autonomy at the lower levels and, as a result of all factors, morale tends to suffer.

More recently, Ivancevich and Donnelly (1975), studying trade salesmen, found that personnel in flat organizations perceived significantly more satisfaction with their degree of autonomy and self-actualization as well as significantly less anxiety-stress than members of taller organizations. Further, significantly greater efficiency was found in the flatter structure.

These findings tend to support Worthy's. Although beyond the scope of this work, it should be noted that numerous studies question the superiority of flat organizations over tall ones and there appears to be advantages and disadvantages to each.¹

In addition to these factors, many researchers have found that the upward flow of communication is often

¹For a discussion of measures of flat, medium and tall organizations see Berry and Sadler (1967). Their formula, $C = r\eta/(\eta-1)(\eta-2)$, expresses a ratio of peer relationships, where $r$ is the number of relationships with individuals at the same organizational level reporting to the same supervisor and $\eta$ is the number of relationships possible. This expression compares the degree of hierarchical control in organizational structures (the fewer the number of peer relationships, the greater the degree of hierarchical control and the "taller" the structure).
hampered and distorted in large hierarchical organizations. Susanman (1974) reports that Kelley, Cohen, Read, Maldigen, and Katz and Kahn among others have come to consistent findings supporting this contention. There are many negative effects that can result from poor upward communications. For example, it is not difficult to see how limited or distorted information would prevent a leader from making timely decisions, exercising good judgment, or remaining knowledgeable of key information. Of course one may consider that a leader could attempt to prevent such a situation and actively seek information by encouraging subordinates to be open and unafraid of expressing honest opinion. While this may help, the basis of most work in this area is not dependent on the supervisor's personality. Communication distortion appears to be a result of the subordinate's desire, consciously or otherwise, to protect himself and/or his supervisors from damaging information in addition to an effort to increase his own apparent worth and lessen that of his competitors. While this can happen in any organization, it is more characteristic of taller ones.

Further, and perhaps more importantly, distortion is also a function of the number of communication nodes that information must pass through. Each level of organization may act as a filter on information going both ways.
Sussman argues that leaders were once followers, are therefore aware of such distortions, and weigh information accordingly. Even if he is correct and this process militates against the negative effects of inaccurate upward communications, the existence of distortion certainly does not make the supervisor's task any easier. Further knowing that information is distorted does not, per se, provide one with a determination of the accurate information. Beyond distortion, the degree to which one initiates upward communication is in part a function of the rewards and costs associated with the effort. Each successive layer of management represents a hurdle that an idea must broach, in a form recognizable by its initiator, to reach the ultimate decision-maker(s). As the probability of this event decreases, so does the reward (change, acceptance, cash, etc.) that the initiator is likely to realize. As this occurs, subordinate initiated upward communication decreases. The significance of the overall problem is highlighted by Clement and Ayres (1976, p. 15). "One of the more critical dimensions--if not the most critical--of the leadership and management process is the ability to communicate."

Another salient descriptor of formal organizations is the degree to which their climate is open or closed. The following description of open versus closed organizational climates was provided by Schwartz, et al (1975, p. 301).
Open

1. Freedom to fail
2. Opportunities for personal experimentation for all personnel
3. Involvement of individuals in the making of decisions which affect them at all levels
4. Subordinate critiques of superiors' performance
5. Openness and candor in superior-subordinate relationships
6. Emergent leadership based on situational demands and experience of personnel
7. Group or team management practices
8. Minimal pressures from immediate superiors

Closed

1. Tight, well thought out job description for each individual member of the organization
2. Strong, decisive, self-asserting leadership
3. Close supervision and attention to task details
4. Tight organizational structure with clear-cut lines of authority
5. Conformity to established procedures and precedents
6. Strong budgetary controls on management and employees

From the above descriptions it is easy to place the army in the closed category. On the other hand, a great deal of research in recent (and not so recent) years has indicated that job satisfaction and performance or output may be higher in open organizational environments. In the work by Schwartz, et al, mentioned above, managerial personnel were shown to have a significant preference for open organizations.

In summary, the organizational structure of the army may detract from the exercise of leadership in several ways. It may contribute to low productivity and performance, discourage initiative and the development of decision-making skills, dampen morale, reduce job satisfaction,
increase anxiety/stress and hinder upward communications. Since these conditions hinder the use of leadership, they encourage the superior to resort to power in task accomplishment. Use of power may then exacerbate the conditions and the problem becomes rather circular. In such an environment it is academic to ponder which comes first, power or poor conditions.

**Formal and informal rules.** The formal rules are the regulations and policies of all levels of the organization. They provide guidance, direction and a foundation for all actions directly or indirectly. The distinguishing feature of army regulations that sets them apart from similar policy or operating directives in civilian organizations is that non-compliance or violation is a criminal offense. This is due to the fact that they are published by successive headquarters in one's chain-of-command and carry the power of lawful orders from the originating commander. The author suggests that this arrangement provides a powerful coercive effect on subordinates to comply and does nothing to encourage a commander to attempt influence through leadership since his policies immediately become law. The point is, the most brilliant and enlightened leader, possessed of an idea that will surely benefit the organization and all its members, may simply implement it with a new policy statement. Granted this description is hyperbolic; nonetheless, such actions, however desirable,
are far more related to the unilateral use of power than to the exercise of leadership. Additionally, as discussed later under authority, the sheer volume of regulations may well limit the opportunities to display leadership.

The informal rules are difficult to specify. All that is tradition and custom, and not yet law within the organization, can be considered. For sociologists, informal rules can be thought of as organizational mores. The difficulty in being precise is that not only does the violation of such rules generally bring the disapproval or consternation of one's peers, subordinates and/or superiors, but in the military such a violation may well be legally punishable. For example, officers are supposed to conduct themselves in a gentlemanly manner. Not doing so would likely result in disapproval from one's military associates at least. However, conduct unbecoming of an officer, although not spelled out in detail (an impossibility), is a legally punishable offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Similarly, most breaches of custom or tradition may be punishable so the distinction between formal and informal rules of conduct becomes vague.

Another example might be the hand salute. This is supposed to represent a mutual exchange of courtesy. However, the subordinate typically is required to initiate the "courtesy" and his failure to do so may have negative consequences for him. Is it really mutual courtesy?
Is it not more an act of deference by a subordinate required to acknowledge the higher status of the superordinate? Given that officers are supposed to be gentlemen, should not they be the ones charged with the responsibility to initiate courtesies with the soldier.

The remarks above are not meant to argue for a reversal in saluting protocol. They are only intended to demonstrate that such customs do not necessarily convey to all the meaning apparently intended and thereby may detract from the development of good leadership. Military personnel are familiar with command letters that lament the lack of military courtesy. These translate to directives for junior officers and non-commissioned officers to start "correcting" each soldier that fails to salute promptly and smartly. Whether courteous relationships or the development of leadership is served is highly doubtful.

Another tradition concerns officers "fraternizing" with enlisted men. While fraternization is frowned upon, officers are encouraged to "know your men" (leadership principle, FM 22-100). How well should one know his men? Can he play volleyball with them at the company party? Probably. Can he play volleyball or Monopoly with them in off-duty hours? Maybe. Fraternization is ill-defined. Perhaps it means that an officer's friends or "buddies" are not to be enlisted men. Regardless, does not the custom of non-fraternization promote the appearance of classism, of
officers somehow possessing more social status than enlisted men? Even if this is true, one may well argue that it does not discourage good leadership. Many a trait theorist has stated that prestige and higher social status are assets of the leader. Nonetheless, the author suggests that the tradition, at a minimum, discourages the officer from attempting to get to know his men well. It is not a matter of becoming "buddies" with subordinates. "Know your men" undoubtably means to know their strengths, weaknesses, aspirations, problems, etc. However, putting social distance between people is not likely to foster conditions that will make this task easy.

Authority. Although legitimized by the subordinate's perceptions as previously discussed, authority is also viewed from above as correlated with responsibility. One charged with responsibility for some action(s) is provided sufficient authority to accomplish it. This is largely a matter of control of organizational sanctions. The authority lies in the position one holds within an organization. This approach seems reasonable but does present problems. The most pressing would seem to be that actions required of a superior are generally stated in broad terms; e.g., exercise supervision over the subordinates and accomplish organizational goals. Specific actions, directions and orders given to subordinates obviously cannot be detailed. Whether a given action, directive, etc. is a
legitimate exercise of authority is a matter of perspective. If the beliefs of one's seniors, and the organizational regulations, are not contradicted, one may be acting legitimately. On the other hand, the subordinate affected may not view the superordinate's actions as within the bounds of authority.

Since published procedures and job descriptions often explain the general prerogatives of all members, such conflicts may not arise in large civilian organizations when work becomes routinized for most employees and the limits of organizational authority are often as detailed as union representatives can define them. A contract between the union and the organization attempts to cover all aspects of the working relationships deemed important by the employees.

It is important to note that while this may appear positive and desirable, it limits the opportunity for management to display leadership. This is based on simple arithmetic. The more contracts, rules, and regulations govern behavior, that is, legitimize increasing ranges of behavior, the wider the range of subordinate responses based on authority. In other words, since all responses are based on power, authority, or leadership, an increase in one causes a decrease in the others. Although unions may well aim at reducing organizational power, the impact on leadership is concomitant.
How is supervisory authority defined or limited in the army? Simply stated, all members agree, via oath, that they will obey the lawful orders of their superiors. Disobeying an officer's lawful order is in fact a criminal offense. This simple requirement, and the author believes it to be quite necessary, for subordinates to obey the orders of their superiors under penalty of law gives the officer rather unlimited authority. If one thinks the order given may not be lawful, he has a difficult decision to make. If he disobeys he may be charged with disobedience and subject to court-martial. If the order is judged to have been legal, he would be convicted. If his choice is vindicated and the matter dropped prior to trial (or the order is judged unlawful in trial), he likely is faced with a superior he will not enjoy working for at the least. Now, in actuality, the situation just described is uncommon in the sense that routinely one does not encounter difficulty in perceiving what is lawful and what is not. However, two aspects of this situation are noteworthy in a discussion of leadership. First, short of an obviously criminal order, e.g. an order to steal, almost no reasonably stated request from a military supervisor would be judged unlawful and, furthermore, soldiers are indoctrinated to obey, not to question, orders.

In such an environment, it follows that all an officer need do (having determined what, how, when, etc.) to accomplish a task is to order that it be done. This is
not to say that officers do not consider the impact and content of their orders, or that they do not consider their legality and the motivation and capabilities of their subordinates in the decision-making process. In most situations, the subordinates comply for at least two good reasons. Specifically, they will probably perceive that the order is legitimate (authority) and non-compliance is criminal (power). In other words, routinely speaking, soldiers are not in the habit of disobeying orders. Out of this comes the second point. Officers, by virtue of their authority and power, are not used to having their orders questioned or feeling a need to justify their decisions to subordinates. The authority relationship therefore aids in producing a climate that simultaneously discourages subordinates from questioning supervisors and discourages supervisors from consulting subordinates. It should be apparent that this authority relationship encourages supervision and decision-making in a manner far more related to power than to leadership.

Leadership training. The last item to be considered is leadership training. Regardless of an officer's particular field of endeavor within the service, all receive instruction on leadership. While this instruction varies somewhat, one aspect at least is a relative constant. That aspect is stress on mission accomplishment. It may or may not be appropriate to any organization but certainly few would
argue that if an army cannot accomplish its mission, take the hill or win the war, it is not of much use.

It is true that a very close second to accomplishing the mission is the concept of taking care of one's men. Nonetheless, should the welfare of the men and the accomplishment of the mission conflict, the mission comes first. Although one may argue against the position, certainly a good case exists for the preeminent necessity of accomplishing the mission over all other costs. Nonetheless, there are aspects of this doctrine that need to be discussed. First, relatively speaking, an army spends a small portion of its time in war. Even in a protracted war such as the one in Southeast Asia, the number of career soldiers who spent over two years in Vietnam throughout the period of U. S. involvement is relatively small. Further, depending on how one calculates, armies have at least fifty percent and probably much more of their forces supporting (non-combatants) the fighting units. Too, combat units, infantry companies for example, spend far more time digging and searching than fighting (however, if the next war is as short and violent as many suggest, one fight may be all the war that many soldiers experience). The point is, in peace or war, most decisions, even in combat units, are not made in the "heat of battle" and are not of life and death versus the success of mission. The truth is that in the routine of day-to-day supervision,
a great many decisions have no real impact in terms of jeopardizing success. They are matters of choice between reasonable alternatives and tend to change the pace, direction, and methodology, but not the outcome significantly. One is considering such things as working late or finishing the project tomorrow, giving a subordinate the afternoon off, changing administrative procedures, etc.

What is wrong with stressing mission accomplishment? Nothing. However, to the degree that such an emphasis causes a supervisor to discount the negative impact of a decision on a subordinate, or operates to produce an intolerance for occasional mistakes or failure, or produces a determination to succeed at all costs, it functions against leadership development. That such actions have indeed come to pass is amply demonstrated by the Army War College's Study on Military Professionalism (1970).

Interrelationships. The factors discussed above are not discrete, but each is affected by the others in rather obvious ways. The formal rules, in the final analysis, determine not only the conduct and functions of the personnel, but the organizational structure and the authority vested in various positions as well. When a leader acts, regardless of the specific situation he is in, he is influenced to some degree by the factors discussed above. They represent a common background, the organizational environment, that is relatively independent of situational
variables. It is important to note that the observed preference a given individual displays for the use of leadership or power in a given situation is based on many interacting variables that are not herein discussed.

Statement of the Problem

Based on the above discussion, three hypotheses were generated to determine the actual impact the organizational environment has on the attitudes of the officer corps. It is hypothesized that:

1. Endorsement of closed system values will be negatively associated with preference for leadership in the army.

2. Preference for leadership is related positively to months of actual experience.

3. Preference for leadership will vary widely among career fields.

The first hypothesis sums up the preceding discussion and states the author's view that the net effect of the organizational environment is negative with respect to the development of leadership. Hypothesis number two is somewhat intuitive. It is based on the notion that people respond better to leadership than to power. If this is true, then supervisors should learn through experience, perhaps unconsciously, that they get better results with leadership. Since officers are rated on the performance of their subordinates, they have a strong desire for getting maximum results and should therefore develop more of a preference for leadership. The organizational
environment and one's actual leadership experience should produce a conflict that, with increasing levels of experience, is resolved in favor of leadership because one is rewarded for performance.

The third hypothesis implies a recognition that the situation may differ among career fields. The artillery officer and the quartermaster officer work often in vastly different environments, with different missions, means, personnel and training. Therefore, among groups with different experiences and in jobs requiring different degrees of professionalism one would expect differing results.

**Scope, Design and Limitations**

Ideally, to demonstrate a causal relationship between one's preferences for leadership and power and the organizational environment a longitudinal study would be conducted with newly commissioned officers and a control group of non-military individuals selected from the same population (peer group). Further, their actual behaviors would be observed, recorded and analyzed over time. Such a study is presently beyond the means of the author. Accordingly, this study is limited to psychological testing of attitudes and preferences from which one may infer behaviors. The hypotheses can be tested by measuring an individual's preference for the use of power or leadership and then determining if the preference is related to his endorsement of the organizational environment.
This second step is accomplished by first determining one's acceptance of the values associated with negative aspects of the organizational environment. These responses are then correlated with those measuring preferences for leadership and power. Statistically speaking, Pearson Product Moment correlations are conducted. The questionnaire itself is discussed in chapter three.

The subjects are army officers attending the United States Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. As such, they can be considered representative of successful middle level managers in the army.

Other studies have, of course, attempted the measurement of attitudes regarding leadership in the army. However, the author is unaware of any similar undertakings attempting to assess the degree to which leadership attitudes are shaped by the institution itself. The findings should be of interest to service schools and all army activities or agencies concerned with behavioral studies in general and the assessment of leadership in particular.
Chapter 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Organizational Climate

As a result of the Continental Army Command (CONARC) report, *Leadership for Professionals* (1971), and the United States Army War College (USAWC) study, *Leadership for the 1970's* (1971), a tremendous data base has been collected for the analysis of leadership in the army. Both groups used essentially the same instruments, interview teams and questionnaires, to determine views on army leadership at all levels. Over 32,000 personnel were involved altogether. Both works collected information on how leaders view themselves, how they are viewed by their superordinates, and how they are viewed by their subordinates. The data include input from privates as well as generals and consider a large number of variables such as age, sex, education and race. Among the findings of both reports is that many of the problems of leadership in the army are directly attributable to poor interpersonal communications at all grade levels. Further, the USAWC study states that improving communications has been a principal recommendation of several studies of personnel problems in the army. Three more findings, although apparently not recognized for
their joint impact, are highly relevant here. First, the USAWC report states that leadership instruction was notably out-of-date in 1971 and had failed to take advantage of the vast work done in the civilian community the past three decades. Second, the lack of communication and "inattention to human needs" were cited as significant defects in the professional climate. These defects were attributed to careerism by officers who were interested in getting ahead regardless of the expense to their subordinates. Again the report states that this finding is corroborated by other pertinent studies of the military organization. The third finding of interest here is that "... extensive research shows conclusively that the attitudes and values of those at the upper level permeate the entire organization" (USAWC, 1971, p. 34). Upper level is defined as 0-6 and above. Unfortunately, if this last finding is indeed conclusive, one cannot expect the climate to have changed much since the study was completed as it implies that the climate is in fact a reflection of the values and attitudes of the upper level and six years is not a long time in terms of changing values. In any event, both studies provide strong evidence that the organizational climate affects the leadership at all levels and that the effect, with respect to communication and consideration of subordinates, is largely negative. This conclusion is further supported by the USAWC Study on Military Professionalism.
which was extremely critical of the professional climate and emphasized the finding that middle and senior level officers who were self-oriented were a major cause of the problems. Before continuing, it should be pointed out that the CONARC report and UAWG leadership study both contain a preponderance of evidence that demonstrates army leadership is quite good overall and most soldiers are well satisfied with it. The relevant information extracted for this work, negative in character, is not representative of most findings. Additionally, as shown in the following case study, all officers are not insensitive to the needs of their subordinates.

**Individual Assessment Studies**

Fry (1974) relates a case study concerning a lieutenant colonel who assumed command of a battalion following a tour as a leadership instructor at West Point. The man held a master's degree in psychology and had completed all work for a doctorate in sociology except the dissertation. With that background he undertook to apply in practice the concepts he had taught. His techniques can be described as very person-oriented. He used contingency management practices, i.e., motivate with incentives, and participative leadership. He avoided punishment when possible and attempted to include his subordinates in the decision-making process to a large degree. For the reader who is unfamiliar with these techniques, such
actions do not require a lessening of discipline or indecisiveness on the part of the leader. His results were quite positive. The battalion was simultaneously noted for its high morale (best on post) and its outstanding ability to accomplish any mission according to the group commander and operations officer. Additionally, the officers and men who served under him regarded his leadership as outstanding. Four of the officers stated that their decisions to make a career of the army were based on the experience of serving under him. This account, in sharp contrast to what one might expect based on the preceding studies, demonstrates that all officers are not career minded at the expense of their subordinates, and should not be so stereotyped. Additionally, Fry's interviews revealed a noteworthy fact for the present study. The battalion commander's perceptions of the intentions of his subordinate officers, and their perceptions of his, were completely accurate. In other words, clarity of communication was 100 percent. This could indicate that person-oriented leader behaviors are conducive to improving communications between organizational levels.

This case study demonstrated one type of leadership style that can be successful. The degree that it typifies army leadership can be gauged somewhat by two related studies by Holmes (1972). Using assessment center techniques
at the Center for Creative Leadership in Greensboro, North Carolina, he attempted to profile the typical battalion commander and, later, the typical brigadier general designee. In both studies, subjects underwent three weeks of intensive observation, interviewing, role and game-playing, and psychological testing. The focus of each study was to determine those dimensions of personality that are exhibited by leaders in formal hierarchies. Civilian executives were also studied as have been numerous other groups.

There are many similar findings that indicate a degree of homogeneity within the officer corps. Overall, it can be said that as a group the men evaluated effectively carried out the leadership tasks required of them and were highly efficient. On various psychological measures, they were shown to be very bright, have a high degree of motivation and desire to achieve, and possess energy, drive and personality (ego) strength. However, both groups exhibited several other traits that are not necessarily positive in nature and are more directly related to the hypothesis put forth in the preceding chapter. Foremost, they exhibited a marked (70th percentile) preference for initiating structure over consideration in dealings with subordinates. This finding is based primarily on scores from the Leadership Opinion Questionnaire but was substantiated by other measures. The finding indicates a
concern for directing, planning and careful defining of the roles of each member (including oneself) in task accomplishment which is stronger than the concern for building relationships characterized by mutual trust, rapport, respect, warmth, and good two-way communication. It is instructive to note that this may be a reflection of institutional socialization since the civilian executives exhibited a preference for consideration over initiating structure.

Another area where the military men were significantly differentiated from their civilian counterparts concerned social insight. Based on the Chapin Social Insight Test, and related scales from other tests as well as the observations of the assessment personnel, the civilians were rated substantially higher. They concluded the data suggest that the officers had difficulty relating to people, creating warmth, maintaining relationships and raising morale when compared to the civilian executives.

Other related findings include strong needs for dominance and control of others as well as a marked lack of creativity and flexibility in dealing with others. Both groups emphasized immediate mission accomplishment over consideration for subordinates and the brigadier-general designees had a strong preference for aggression (attacking opposing points of view and criticizing others). Two other findings are noteworthy. Both groups exhibited
strong needs for deference (following instructions, accepting leadership of others, avoiding the unconventional, doing what's expected) and an orderly environment, which may be a reflection of military training. Lastly, as one might expect, both group scored very high (98th percentile) on the scale measuring military interests from the Strong Vocational Interest Blank (SVIB). This could be interpreted as a validation of the SVIB or a demonstration of significant organizational socialization.

Taken as a whole, these findings are not indicative of leadership. To say that the subjects were production-oriented more than people-oriented in the sense that Blake and Mouton (1971) use the terms is understatement. Their difficulty in relating to people and creating warmth, coupled with a lack of social insight and a preference for initiating structure over consideration, suggests a coldness and disinterest in people at best and a disparaging attitude toward them at worst. Such attitudes indicate an avoidance of the personal relationship that is a requisite for leadership and a preference for unilateral actions that are indicative of an orientation toward the use of power as discussed in chapter one.

To the degree that assessment center techniques yield unusually reliable information, due to the multiplicity of means used in evaluation, these reports are quite significant. Conversely, since such methods invariably
dictate rather small sample populations, eleven lieutenant
colonels and twelve brigadier general designees in these
studies, the subjects must be carefully considered if
generalizations are to be made.

Studies of Preferred Leadership Style

As opposed to the characteristics actually displayed
by leaders, Lackey, Olmstead and Christensen (1972) sought
to determine what type actions should be displayed and if
such actions were level dependent. Specifically, they
were concerned with task-centralized versus task-decen-
tralized action with centralization reflecting the degree
of leader control.

Their subjects were infantry officers, faculty
and students at the United States Army Infantry School,
Fort Benning, Georgia. The students were captains and
majors, all ex-company commanders, and the faculty members
were lieutenant colonels and colonels who had commanded
battalions. Each group was administered the same instrument,
a questionnaire, which elicited their opinions on appropriate
leader actions for company commanders and battalion
commanders. The results show distinct differences of
opinion between subject groups. First, the senior officers
did not feel that the leader actions should vary with
position. Their ratings were essentially the same for
company and battalion commanders and reflected a slight
preference for task decentralized behavior. The student
group also preferred task decentralized behavior for both levels, however, they did so to a significantly greater degree. Further, the students believed that at battalion level the need for decentralized action was considerably greater than at company level.

Lackey et al. suggests that since the student group had had more recent command experience at, obviously, a lower level with troops, the results are logical. Another interpretation is certainly possible. Specifically, the student officers were indicating that as recent commanders at company level, they desired the greatest possible freedom of action, latitude in decision-making, and autonomy from their own superiors, battalion commanders; therefore, they stated their preference for highly decentralized leader actions at battalion level. The net result is to increase their own sense of worth, prestige and power at company level. On the other hand, they did not feel a need to give away their own prerogatives to a similar degree and again the results reflect this. In other words, if one accepts the idea that a commander may enjoy commanding and the responsibilities that go with the job, and that he may seek additional responsibility and/or authority to act on his own, these results are logical. The battalion level commander, on the other hand, was not asked to state how he felt his superior should lead but only how battalion and company level officers should lead.
Lackey's conclusion that the findings indicate that as one rises in years of service from company level to senior field grade ranks, a marked decrease in preference for decentralized leader actions takes place, is not well supported in view of the preceding interpretation. Further, the findings were subsequently called into question when DiGregorio (1973) came to conflicting results the following year with a much larger, if somewhat more homogeneous, sample. His population consisted of 100 United States Army Command and General Staff College students. Like Lackey et al., he found an overall preference for task decentralized actions; however, there was no shift toward centralization between captains and lieutenant colonels. Possible explanations include that all subjects were not ex-commanders of companies or battalions, all were not infantry officers, and all had been recently exposed to concepts of leadership in classroom instruction.

A study by Halvorson (1975), using the Hackman Job Satisfaction Schedule seems to add substance to these findings. Using student officers at the United States Army Command and General Staff College for subjects he sought to determine those factors that bear on motivation and job satisfaction among army officers. Halvorson found that above all else, the military leader desired autonomy. He preferred mission statements from his superior and a free hand to be able to accomplish the job in his fashion with minimal supervision from above.
That such an arrangement leads to satisfaction is quite consistent with the above findings relating to preferences for task-decentralized leader actions. In all, Halvorson identified three factors that significantly distinguished the military officer from civilian middle level managers (based on normative data in the test manual). In addition to the finding on autonomy, the officer placed greater importance on receiving praise for work accomplished and on being promoted. Taken together, these three findings could reflect either the type of individual who becomes a career soldier or the effects of institutional socialization on the officer corps.

In a related study, dealing only with infantrymen, as did Lackey et al., Weigand’s (1976) findings seem to support and contradict, in various aspects, the preceding studies. His research focused on identifying differences in leadership styles among officers, officer candidates and non-commissioned officers utilizing Sweney's (1971) Response to Power Model (RPM). Weigand classified the subjects' preferences into three styles of leadership using a thirty-item, forced choice questionnaire (the Supervisor Ability Scale - SAS) that requires the subject to rank order his preferences for leader actions on each item. The three choices for each item reflect three different styles of leadership and the results reflect the degree of preference for each.
Sweney's leaders are classified as authoritarian, equalitarian, and permissive. The authoritarian needs no explanation. Equalitarian leaders are essentially democratic, participative, theory Y (McGregor, 1960) leaders with a relatively balanced view of the needs of the organization and those of their subordinates. They are far more people oriented than authoritarian leaders. Permissive leaders are indulgent, kind, indecisive, conflict avoiders who fear being perceived as authoritarian to such a degree that pleasing one's subordinates becomes the essential thrust of the leaders' activities even to the detriment of accomplishing the mission (Sweney, 1972). Equalitarian leadership, in Sweney's view, is the most desirable form.

Weigand was interested in determining if differences in style existed at various levels and he found many. His findings are closely related to the present work. First, among all tested groups (N=1107), the mean preference for the authoritarian style was highest, and the permissive style was lowest. This consistency seems to indicate that the authoritarian leadership style is preferred regardless of one's rank in the infantry. Weigand did in fact find several significant differences in the degree of preferences among his groups. Most notable was the significantly higher preference for equalitarian leadership expressed by the 115 officer respondents from the Command and General Staff College.
These findings seem to contradict those of the previously mentioned studies that indicated all levels preferred decentralized leader actions and Lackey's suggestion that the differences in grade are such that the lower ranking officers endorse decentralized behaviors more strongly than more senior officers. However, the SAS requires the respondent to indicate what he would do and the questionnaire used by Lackey and DiGregorio seeks to determine what others should do. Viewed as a result of the respondents' orientation toward power, no contradictions need exist. Specifically, if one seeks to limit the power of others over him, DiGregorio's findings would be expected. Similarly, since such actions (limiting others' power) tend to increase one's own autonomy and ability to act unilaterally, which is characteristic of the authoritarian leader, Weigand's findings are consistent. The desire for and use of power is consistent with a desire to avoid or abrogate the power of others.

The findings may also reflect the ideal versus the pragmatic and represent a conflict only in terms of values. In other words, one may do what is expedient even if it is in conflict with what one believes should be done. Given the opportunity to decide what others should do, one states the ideal; when asked how one personally would do something, one states the pragmatic.
In addition to the general preference for the authoritarian style, some of the differences Weigand found are noteworthy. First, among student officers at CGSC, he found that as months of staff time increase, so does one's preference for authoritarianism. Second, months of command is positively and significantly related to both equalitarian and permissive styles of leadership among CGSC officers (N=61) from the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). Among the entire CGSC sample (N=115) a positive, though weak, correlation was found on this item. Weigand suggests that this finding is quite important for the following reasons. First, since officers are rated on the performance of their units when in command, through experience they come to be equalitarian because it gets better results. Second, an officer's career record indirectly reflects his leadership style because it is based on his unit's performance which is a reflection of his style. Since selection for CGSC is competitive, it follows that officers who are equalitarian are more successful. This may indeed be true; however, there are at least two cautions that one should consider regarding this interpretation. First, the stress on the greater preference for equalitarianism in the CGSC class tends to overshadow the fact that the CGSC group still preferred the authoritarian style overall. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Weigand's subjects do not
include officers who are relative peers of the CGSC sample who were not selected for the course. Therefore, it may be that all officers of that general experience level are more equalitarian than younger ones. If this is so, one cannot conclude that selection for CGSC, as a measure of success, is based on leadership style.

In chapter one it was suggested that the authority relationship between officers and enlisted men tended to produce leaders who were power oriented, partly due to the fact that subordinates are not likely to question orders. Since power and authority are perceptual, that is, based on the subordinates' perspectives, it follows that a supervisor's action will be in part determined by his subordinates. Due to psychological screening for intelligence and aptitudes it happens that a typical infantry company will generally be composed of less well educated individuals than the army as a whole. Correlationally, such soldiers come from lower socio-economic backgrounds than the average.

It is suggested that as a group, infantry soldiers are therefore less compliant and more confrontive than typical soldiers working within any staff agency because they will place a lesser value on the negative sanctions controlled by the supervisor. In other words, the possibility of a less-than-honorable discharge, imprisonment or less severe forms of punishment are not as
threatening to the soldier from such a background. Additionally, he may react more negatively to authority figures. It follows then that his actions will not reinforce authoritarian influence attempts. Hence, the infantry commander becomes less authoritarian with increasing experience and the staff officer, dealing with a more compliant subordinate becomes increasingly authoritarian. Such an analysis is well supported by Weigand's study.

A final item of note is that graduates of West Point were the most authoritarian, significantly so in the CGSC sample. Whether this is related to the selection process or socialization at the academy is speculative.

Summary

All of the studies cited in this chapter were selected for their relevance based largely on content that contrasted leader behavior or attitudes with respect to the use of power and leadership in interpersonal interactions. Additionally, many permit inferences about the impact the military organization has on its members. In spite of the growth of organizational psychology and of studies on the effects of organizational climate, there is a relative lack of literature dealing with the military.

That which exists is inconclusive. The evidence examined does not permit one to confidently state the
preferred, or actual, leader behaviors in the army officer corps, or to identify a trend in the preferences of members as their experience increases.

Nonetheless, the doctrinal preference is clear. Not only do the manuals on leadership define its nature away from the use of power, Army Regulation 600-20, *Army Command Policy and Procedure* (Change 3, 1973, p. 5-3) states clearly, "Commanders should not rely on coercion when persuasive measures can effect the desired end". With that in mind, the methods described in the succeeding chapter represent an attempt to discover if the organizational environment in the army is supportive of that goal.
Chapter 3

METHODOLOGY

The essential characteristic of this study involves the collection of data through the use of a questionnaire designed specifically to provide information required to test the hypotheses previously stated.

Subjects

The subjects are 99 officer students at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. As such, they represent a cross section of successful middle level army managers from all career fields. Although the precise selection criteria vary each year, it is generally accepted that the students are representative of the upper fifty percent of the selection base.

Development of the Questionnaire

In order to reach as many students as possible, the questionnaire was designed to be self administered, easily understood and simply completed. The questionnaires were administered over a three week period in January and early February 1977.

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Three distinct types of information were required and the questionnaire is subdivided to address each. A copy is included in the appendix. The first part seeks background information such as age, career field, months of service, rank, and months of command experience. These items serve as background and control variables and provide data for detailed analysis of variance. The second part consists of twenty paragraphs, each describing a situation that calls for a response from a superior. Respondents have four courses of action and are required to rank order their preferences. The courses of action are so constructed that two of them represent an attempt at leadership and two of them represent an attempt at power.

The initial questionnaire was developed by the author in collaboration with two assistants. The paragraphical items were then scored for social desirability, leadership and power by three research psychologists from the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral Sciences (ARI). Each one rated all three factors using five-item Likert scales. The revised instrument was then rated by six officers from the intended population for social desirability and, again, for leadership and power by the ARI psychologists. Final revisions were made from those results.
The last part of the questionnaire seeks to determine the individual's endorsement of the organizational environment. It is hypothesized that a negative correlation exists between endorsement of the organizational values and a preference for using leadership in interpersonal relations.

This segment of the questionnaire consists of thirty statements descriptive of possible characteristics of a hypothetical organization. The respondent is required to rate the desirability of each feature using a Likert type scale. For example:

Rate the following statement as an organizational characteristic by circling one of the responses below.

Well defined job descriptions.


The statements are mixed but represent clusters of items seeking the degree to which the respondent endorses characteristics representative of the four factors in the author's model of the organizational environment; specifically, the structure, rules, authority and leadership training affecting the supervisor. In fact, all items, except 15 and 16, are descriptive of a closed organizational system (i.e., the army environment).

Scoring

Scoring is simply a matter of totaling preferred
leadership responses (L score). There is a possible maximum score of forty if the respondent ranks the leadership items one and two in all twenty cases. An absolute preference for power, conversely, would be a score of zero if the respondent ranked power options one and two on every item. In other words, each leadership option ranked one or two is worth one point. It follows that a total score in the zero to twenty range represents an overall preference for power and a total score range of twenty-one to forty represents an overall preference for leadership. This score is then correlated with an institutional socialization score derived from the overall mean score on part three. Institutional socialization (I score) was the term selected to describe one's degree of endorsement of closed system values from the organizational characteristics listed.

Reliability and Validity

Content validity for the paragraphal items was achieved through the process described above under "Development of the Questionnaire". The statements of organizational characteristics are patently descriptive of a closed organizational environment as described in chapter one. All items are paraphrases of the statements used by Swartz to describe open and closed organizations. However, it was difficult to categorize items for the purpose of scale development, as many of them are interrelated. For
example, one could easily argue that "Well defined job
descriptions", as an item, is related to rules, authority,
and even structure.

Given the interrelated nature of the environment
this is expected. Nonetheless, as well as possible, the
items were arranged in four a priori scales. The reliability of these scales, and the overall institutional
socialization score derived from them, was tested a
posteriori using Cronbach's alpha (Specht, 1976).²

This type of measure, dealing with internal
consistency and based on analysis of variance is appro-
priate to the survey instrument. One seeks to know the
relationship of the items with a scale as a measure of
its stability. Alpha appears to be the measure of choice
among many authors; for example, "Coefficient alpha is the
basic formula for determining the reliability based on
internal consistency. It . . . should be applied to all
According to Specht, in his description of the reliability
measures used in SPSS programs, alpha is the most com-
monly used coefficient of reliability. Table 1 summarizes
the reliability of the scales.

²The alpha formula used in the SPSS program is
\[ a = \frac{K}{K-1}(1 - \frac{S^2}{S^2_T}) \]
where \( a = \) alpha, \( K = \) number of items,
\( S^2 = \) average item variance and \( S^2_T = \) variance of the
sum over \( K \) items.
It is not surprising that the sub-scales, structure (S), rules (R), authority (A), and leader training (LT), have less reliability than the overall institutional socialization (I) scale. This reflects both the difficulty of item classification and the derivation of coefficient alpha, which is affected by the number of items within a scale.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Reliability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Socialization</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Training</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Scale</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings reflect that while I is a reasonably consistent scale, the subscales range from a tolerable LT (.75) to a poor A (.44). The author concludes that the I scale is a useful tool for measuring endorsement of values associated with a closed organization. However, the conceptualized factors that under I, as represented by the subscales, A, S, R, and LT, cannot be reliably determined from the instrument. Therefore, further analysis
of their relationships to L is not merited. Similarly, the L scale reliability is not surprising.

Leadership, even when defined narrowly, is a many faceted concept. For a given action to have meaning in terms of leadership (or power) it must remain in context with the situation that generated it. In other words, what may be leadership in one situation, may not be in another (nor in the abstract). Therefore, one cannot expect the scale derived from twenty distinct situations to be internally consistent, however desirable it may be. For such a scale, coefficient alpha is not the most appropriate measure of reliability. Test-retest reliability would be far superior to alpha; however, the test environment did not permit retesting. Alpha is provided as the only available measure (excepting similar concepts which would do no better).

Statistics

The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 6000 Version 6.5) programmed on a Control Data Corporation (CDC) 6000 computer was used for the calculations (Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner, Bent, 1975 and Tully, 1976).

A Pearson correlation was used to test the main hypothesis with additional partial correlations to control for the effects of age, length of commissioned service and command experience.
The second hypothesis, that one's leadership score is positively related to actual experience, was tested by following the same procedure outlined above correlating $L$ and months of command experience as well as months of commissioned service, and age. Variation among career fields, the third hypothesis, was accomplished with an analysis of variance comparing combat arms, combat support, and combat service support arms with $L$, preference for leadership. Additional tests were performed utilizing the same technique to assess the effects of all background variables. In all tests, an alpha level of .05 was considered significant.

Three background variables are conspicuously absent from this study: race, sex, and education. While each may contribute to the analysis their inclusion was deemed impractical or inappropriate. Regarding race and sex, the minority representation in the available population is not large enough for analysis in a sample $N$ of 99. Education was not included because of the difficulty of classifying the sample. Approximately 52 percent of the class began the year with master's degrees and the remainder held baccalaureates. However, many of those students are enrolled in civilian graduate programs presently. Further, the CGSC itself is an accredited graduate level institution, hence all students are graduate students. Therefore, much of the population ranges from
those who have long held graduate degrees, through those who have earned them in recent and very recent years to those who are in graduate school and about to receive them. To further complicate matters, the military training of the class varies widely and much of it is directly comparable to civilian education. For these reasons the analysis of one's educational level, as a control variable in this study, could be quite misleading.
Chapter 4

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Findings

Subject profile. Pertinent information in this chapter is presented in tabular form. In addition to those tables dealing with the hypothesized relationships, a subject profile is presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4. These deal with general background information, their sources of commission, and their career fields. Although some of the information can be found elsewhere in the paper, it is summarized here for the convenience of the reader.

The tables reflect a general picture of the field grade officer structure with a few exceptions to be expected at CGSC. The large proportion of ROTC officers, similar numbers of USMA and OCS officers and a few directly commissioned officers is typical of the army in general. However, the selection process insured that the CGSC class would have far more majors than lieutenant colonels and that there would be a large number of combat arms officers. The only item that might be regarded by the reader as unexpected is the rather high Table 3 entry showing an average of 28.1 months of command experience in the sample.
Table 2
Source of Commission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States Military Academy</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Candidate School</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Direct)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3
Subject Background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majors</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonels</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>36.5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned Service</td>
<td>13.0 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Experience</td>
<td>28.1 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4
Career Field

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career Field</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat Arms</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Support</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This occurred because, for the purposes of this study, command experience was interpreted to include not just official "commands" such as companies, troops and battalions, but platoons, sections, detachments and similar organizations.

Hypothesized relationships. The primary hypothesis was that "Endorsement of closed system values will be negatively associated with preference for leadership in the army". This was tested by computing Pearson product-moment correlations between I scores, representing the degree of endorsement of closed system values, and L scores, representing the degree of preference for leadership, for each subject. These correlations are shown in Table 5. As can be seen from examination of the table, there is a moderate negative relationship (-.44), which achieves significance at the .001 level. This correlation is in the predicted direction and reflects a substantial percentage (19%) of common variance. Hypothesis one is clearly supported.

Additionally, it can be seen that this relationship, although varying considerably, is consistently negative across all career fields, and it appears to be considerably stronger among the combat arms subsample. Similarly, one's source of commission does not alter the negative direction of the relationship. However, the OCS subsample reflects a conspicuously stronger correlation. Except for the combat support and USMA subsamples, all
relationships achieve significance greater than the .05 level. Further, even these two subsamples vary in the hypothesized direction.

Table 5
Correlations Between L and I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Sig</th>
<th>*Controlled</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>-.41</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com Arms</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-.51</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.58</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com Sup</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Com Ser Sup</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.43</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.200</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-.68</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.75</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Controlling, with partial correlations, for months of commissioned service, command experience and age.

The effects of command experience, length of commissioned service and age were controlled for by computing partial correlations to delete their impact from the L and I relationship. As can be seen, the controlled and uncontrolled relationships are generally quite similar. However, the importance of controlling for their effects is reflected in the USMA subsample where elimination of the effect of the control variables increased the relationship from -.23 to -.47, and greatly increased the significance.
The second hypothesis was that "Preference for leadership is related positively to months of actual experience". Experience was measured by three variables, months of commissioned service, command experience, and age. The hypothesis was tested by correlating these three variables with L, preference for leadership. The results are shown in Table 6. As can be seen, the data do not support the hypothesis.

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>*r</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L, Command Experience</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L, Commissioned Service</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L, Age</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Each variable is correlated with L while controlling with partial correlations for the effects of the other two variables.

The only significant correlation (p = .035, one-tailed test) was that between L and months of commissioned service. However, this represents only weak support for hypothesis two in that the percentage of common variance is quite low (.19^2 = 3.6%). The remaining correlations in the table provide no support for the second hypothesis in that both failed to reach significance at the .05 level and the correlation between L and command experience was actually
in the opposite direction from that predicted. It can therefore be concluded that hypothesis two is essentially unsupported by the data.

Hypothesis three, "Preference for leadership will vary widely among career fields" was tested with a one-way analysis of variance between L (preference for leadership) and career field. Career fields were classified as combat arms (infantry, armor, field artillery and air defense artillery), combat support (engineer, military police, signal corps and military intelligence) and combat service support (includes all others). In the normal fashion, L was assumed to be the dependent variable and career field was considered independent. The results are presented in Table 7. The career field entry represents the variance between fields and the residual entry represents the variance within fields (error variance for this purpose). As can be seen, it is the classic formula wherein total variance, as represented by the sum of squares (SS), is equal to the sum of squares between categories (SSb) plus the sum of squares within categories (SSw) (Nie, et al, 1975). In the resulting F-test, F = 1.198 (17.022/14.208) and is not significant at the .05 level. Hypothesis three is unsupportable with these data.

In addition to those findings directly concerning the hypothesized relationship, the background variables
indicate another noteworthy difference in the sample. An analysis of variance between sources of commission and L, preference for leadership, yields a significant relationship based on the F-test, as shown in Table 8.

Table 7
Analysis of Variance for Career Field and L Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Career Field</td>
<td>34.044</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17.022</td>
<td>1.198</td>
<td>.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>1363.956</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>14.208</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1398.000</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>14.265</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Career Field N Deviation from Grand Mean (19.67)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Career Field</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat Arms</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Support</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Serv Support</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In attempting to determine the cause of this finding, further examination showed that the direct commission sub-sample had a mean L score that deviated much farther from the grand mean (mean of the entire sample) than did the others.

Since the other sources of commission did not appear to have greatly differing mean L scores (based on the deviations from the grand mean shown in Table 8), another analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted excluding the
### Table 8
Analysis of Variance for All Sources of Commission and L Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source of Commission</td>
<td>124.696</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41.565</td>
<td>3.101</td>
<td>.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>1273.304</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>13.403</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1398.000</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>14.265</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Deviation from Grand Mean (19.67)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>- .07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 9
Analysis of Variance for Selected Sources of Commission and L Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source of Commission</td>
<td>25.813</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.906</td>
<td>.942</td>
<td>.394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>1247.304</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>13.707</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1273.117</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>13.689</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Deviation from Grand Mean (19.44)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
direct commission subsample. The results are presented in Table 9. As can be seen, the F-test based on this ANOVA shows the relationship to be quite insignificant. It is concluded, therefore, that direct commissionees appear to have significantly different preferences for leadership than individuals commissioned through other means. One considers this finding cautiously as five is a rather small sample.

Discussion

In the findings above, it can be seen that the essential relationship hypothesized was found to be supported by the data. Specifically, the endorsement of closed value systems is negatively related to preferences for leadership. Conversely, the additional hypothesized relationships between preferences for leadership, and experience and career field, were not supported. Relatedly, it was noted that direct commissionees appear to have significantly different preferences for leadership than individuals commissioned through other means, and that combat arms officers and officers commissioned through the OCS program produce a considerably stronger relationship between L and I. There appear to be reasonable explanations for these findings.

Hypothesis one. First, the results reflected a moderate (-.44) correlation between L and I supporting hypothesis one, that a negative relationship exists between preferences
for leadership and endorsement of closed system values. It is suggested that this is not only appropriate, but that greatly larger or smaller correlations could be suspect.

One reason that leadership, however conceptualized, is difficult to measure, consists of many factors, and is based on numerous variables. Therefore, it is probable that the questionnaire, although carefully designed, does not measure all aspects of leadership and, hence, one's L score is not a complete measure of leadership. Additionally, even assuming a perfectly valid and reliable L, one does not expect that a given individual's preference for leadership actions is solely based on or related to one's degree of institutional socialization. One's own personality and perspectives, based on a lifetime of unique experiences will certainly contribute much. Too, the organization in question is so large and varied that its impact on individuals will vary greatly beyond the hypothesized factors in the environment. In attempting to identify only the common variables in the military environment, the author's model necessarily excludes effects based upon such important aspects as the personalities of one's commanders and unit missions.

Given then, that leadership is based upon much more than just institutional socialization, what relationship can one logically expect to find? The 19 percent
finding is probably very reasonable. Were it to be much greater one may suspect that the measuring instrument is not assessing different factors but rather one factor with differing formats. Conversely, a much smaller relationship would approach insignificance as an element of leadership.

**Hypothesis two.** The findings did not support hypothesis two, that there would be a positive relationship between preference for leadership and actual experience. There are at least two explanations for this outcome. The first is that experience, as measured by these three variables does not actually influence preference for leadership as measured by L. While possible, this explanation is unappealing to anyone who posits that people learn through experience. (Of course, the measured variables may be inappropriate indicators of experience.) The second possible explanation for the findings is, that while experience may well affect preference for leadership, it does so only to a point beyond which increasing experience has relatively little effect on L. While this plateau of learning effects would probably be achieved at different times by different individuals, all would presumably achieve it eventually. Since the present population consisted of officers with over ten years of commissioned service, it could well be that learning experience plateaus (for preference for leadership)
have in fact been reached by all. Given this, there would be no demonstrable differential variance among the members of the sample attributable to experience. Instead, such variance would be associated with those factors assessed by other measures, such as degree of endorsement of closed organizational values. Such an interpretation permits the assumption that experience does indeed affect leadership even though the relationship was not significant within the sample. This interpretation is in consonance with the findings supporting the first hypothesis, which clearly indicated the importance of organizational socialization, and is related to earlier studies.

One recalls from chapter two that Weigand (1976) attempted to measure the relationship between leadership styles and command experience. The results were fairly similar in view of the different instruments used to assess leadership. His measures of the authoritarian leadership style and the equalitarian leadership style are closely related to power and leadership, respectively, in this study. This is to say that the equalitarian items on the Supervisor Ability Scale (SAS) generally represent actions that could be classified as examples of leadership in this study. One of Weigand's subsamples consisted of 114 infantry officers in a resident CGSC class. He too found a weak and insignificant relationship between command experience and leadership (equalitarian style) overall.
As discussed in chapter one, he did, however, find a positive relationship between these items, in a further subsample consisting of 61 ROTC officers, that was significant at the .05 level. Notwithstanding infantry ROTC officers, and the differences in the questionnaires and methodology utilized, Weigand's study supports the conclusion that command experience is not closely associated with preferences for leadership among field grade officers.

**Hypothesis three.** The third hypothesis, that preferences for leadership would vary widely among career fields, was not supported. Again, since logic suggests that one would expect variation, there are at least two interpretations of this finding. The first, quite simply, is that the measuring instrument and/or the sample size are/is not adequate to discriminate the differences to a significant degree.

Another explanation is equally apparent. If the finding is literally correct, that L scores do not vary significantly across career fields, it indicates a similar degree of variation in L scores within fields. That such variation exists is demonstrated by the significance of the correlation between L and I discussed earlier. Such variation must be attributable to some other factor(s).

Although the author believes the first interpretation to be more likely, this second analysis argues
strongly that institutional socialization is indeed at work and produces similar leaders regardless of career field. This suggests that some common variables in the military experience, either the four posited by the author or perhaps others, are more important determinants of one's preference for leadership than those variables associated with specific career fields.

Additional relationships. The analysis of background variables produced three findings of note. First, it appears that one's source of commission does not produce measurable differences in L scores except for direct commissionees.

The question becomes, why, if after over ten years of service the effects related to source of commission are undistinguishable with respect to L for all other officers, should such effects be so strong for direct commissionees? One factor that is obviously different is the lack of pre-commission training in the direct commission group. However, such an explanation assumes that pre-commission training has an effect that is measurable after ten plus years of service. On the other hand, when the ANOVA was performed without the direct commission group, it was insignificant. This suggests that differences produced by the source of pre-commission training, i.e. OCS, ROTC or USMA, are not
significant in the long run. If this interpretation is correct, one is encouraged to look beyond source of commission, per se, for an explanation.

An examination of the direct commissionees shows that three were in the medical field, one was a chaplain, and one was in military intelligence. Admittedly, five is not a large sample to work with. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that of only four medical respondees in the sample, three were direct commission as was the only chaplain in the sample. An examination shows that the fourth medical field officer also had an L score higher than the mean. It could be then, that the military environment in these two fields is such that it has a measurably different effect on its officers. The effect, to the degree that it is measured by the questionnaire, is to produce a higher L score than average (all were above the mean).

This is not unreasonable because the work of chaplains and medical personnel concerns helping people directly with personal problems (physical, mental, emotional). Such a day's activities are quite different than those of a typical officer in other fields who is striving to accomplish an organizational mission and whose subordinates are essentially resources for that purpose. Additionally, the expertise of medical officers and chaplains is not usually questioned by supervisors in
other fields. Note that their careers are managed apart from the officer personnel management system. As a group, their environment appears to be quite different than the mainstream.

Another finding was that the combat arms subsample produced a much higher correlation between L and I scores (-.58) than other career fields. This means that greater variation in the L and/or I scores probably occurred in this field. Analyses of variance verifies this conclusion. Significant variation was found on I scores across branches in the combat arms field as well as across the branches in combat support arms. However, significant variation was not found in L. Across the three career fields, combat arms, combat support, and combat service support, I did not vary significantly.

These findings suggest that additional factors are present. Examining the leadership and power items on the questionnaire (see appendix), one notes that many of them reflect a choice between seeking additional information (L) and acting on information immediately available (P). Therefore, one would expect L scores to vary with this factor, which can be called information seeking strategy. On the other hand, since I varies significantly among the branches of the combat arms subsample, a systematic factor that bears on the endorsement of closed system values is probably present. It
is suggested that group cohesiveness may be the factor. This could explain the findings.

As cohesiveness increases, as a factor of relative risk in combat for example, one would expect adherence to group values to increase. In other words, as risk increases, cohesiveness increases, and as cohesiveness increases, so does adherence to group values. Since I measures values, this accounts for systematic variation per se. This variation was reflected by infantry and armor I scores that were higher than those in artillery branches. This is related to information seeking and based on technology.

As technology increases, supervisors are increasingly likely to depend on subordinate input for technical advice. Therefore, one expects the higher technology branches (artillery) to have lower I scores, as closed system values discourage seeking subordinate input. This occurred. To the extent that L is measuring information seeking strategies, it would produce a negative relationship with I. As mentioned above, L did not vary significantly; however, it did vary in the expected direction. A Pearson correlation revealed a -0.52 (27%) correlation between branch mean scores on L and I. Therefore, one concludes that the -0.58 (33%) correlation between L and I in the combat arms subsample is largely a result of explainable differences in branch scores that artificially
inflate the overall $L$, $I$ relationship in the combat arms field.

One admits that this explanation is none too parsimonious; however, alternate explanations appear to be untestable with the available data and sample size.

Similarly, in Table 5, one notes the large correlation (-.75) between $L$ and $I$ among officers commissioned through the OCS program. Given earlier discussion on the limited effects of source of commission, one looks for another factor to explain the probable increased variation in scores. An examination of the raw data shows that of the 15 officers commissioned through OCS, 12 are combat arms officers representing all four combat branches. It is suggested therefore, that this correlation is inflated owing to the increased variation in $I$ among combat arms officers as posited in the preceding discussion.

Taken as a whole, the findings are consistent with the literature. As discussed in chapter one, Worthy (1950) noted that large, tall organizations tend to create specialization of jobs and centralization of power and administrative authority. Such organizational characteristics have come to typify what Schwartz et al (1975) refer to as a closed organizational environment. Since such organizational structures centralize power, it follows that one who would endorse closed organizational characteristics (a value judgement) would probably prefer
the use of power over leadership as defined herein. That is to say, the use of leadership, if not in conflict with such values, is certainly not promoted by them.

Similarly, all three army studies related to organizational climate cited in Chapter two tend to support the present findings. The two Holmes (1972) studies indicated that army leaders exhibited a marked preference for initiating structure over consideration and exhibited strong needs for dominance and control of others. Such findings are in consonance with those presented here and are consistent also with Halvorson's (1975) finding that the military supervisor desired significantly greater autonomy than his civilian counterparts.

In summary, if the findings are correct, there is an explicit dichotomy between doctrinal leadership actions and those actions encouraged by the organizational environment. In a formal sense, army manuals and regulations promote the use of leadership as defined herein, but in practice, an individual is not encouraged by the military environment to use it. Further, this condition appears to be prevalent in nearly all career fields and is relatively unaffected by increasing levels of experience as measured by length of commissioned service, command experience and/or age.
Chapter 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

The focus of this thesis concerns a relationship between the military environment and the types of actions preferred by army middle level managers with respect to their use of power and leadership. The study begins with an analysis of power, authority and leadership to develop distinct meanings for analytical purposes. A military definition of leadership is then accepted. As so defined, the essence of leadership is the ability to gain the willing cooperation of one's subordinates. Power, conversely, is defined as the ability to cause behavior in another person despite his opposition. In both cases, the determination of the classification of influence as leadership or power rests with the subordinate. It is his perception that matters. As such, one can think of the distinction as a matter of choice. If the subordinate feels he has no rational choice but to comply, power is operative; if he perceives a choice and wants to comply, leadership is operative.
The organizational environment is then discussed in terms of its structure and regulations, the authority vested in its officers, and the leadership training they receive. Each aspect is shown to have potentially negative effects on the use of leadership and the overall environment is shown to be typical of a closed organization. Based on this discussion, three hypotheses are generated for testing.

1. Endorsement of closed system values will be negatively associated with preference for leadership in the army.

2. Preference for leadership is related positively to months of actual experience.

3. Preference for leadership will vary widely among career fields.

Awareness of the environmental impact on preferences for leadership actions should be important to military educators in the field.

The second chapter reviews literature related to the study with an emphasis on those studies/reports dealing with leadership and the army environment in the 1970's. The literature surveyed does not reflect any clear picture of leader behaviors in terms of preferred or actual use of leadership or power except to note that officially speaking, AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and Procedure states that "Commanders should not rely on coercion when persuasive measures can effect the desired end." which seems to indicate an official endorsement of leadership.
The methodology employed involved the development of a questionnaire designed to measure preferences for leadership or power on one part, and endorsement of organizational values on another. Scores from one's endorsement of the organizational values, referred to as institutional socialization, or I, are then correlated with one's overall preference for leadership. Reliability and validity of the questionnaire are discussed.

Ninety-nine active army students in the resident CGSC class at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, completed the questionnaire in January 1977. The first hypothesis was supported with a -0.44 correlation between the overall L and I scores that was significant at the a = .001 level controlling (with partial correlations) for age, command experience and length of commissioned service. The second and third hypotheses were not supported. All the findings are discussed and found plausible. In addition to the three hypothesized relationships, other findings relating to background variables such as source of commission are discussed.

Conclusions

The results of this study indicate an odd dichotomy. While army regulation and doctrine clearly endorse leadership as the means to accomplish tasks, the army environment, in substantial measure seems to discourage it. Since the
environment is, or ought to be, a reflection of doctrine (or vice-versus) how can such findings occur?

Several possibilities exist. First, it could be that doctrine and regulation simply are not well understood or known. Excepting the school environment, manuals are likely not read as often as they should be. Nonetheless, assuming real concern at regulation and doctrine establishing levels with the army, this should not be a problem. From the Department of the Army command information program to a unit officer's call, there are many forums to spread the word. One is not discussing getting the word to the last recalcitrant soldier, but rather the professional education of the officer corps.

Is one then to assume that "real concern" does not exist at the aforementioned level? No. One cannot doubt the sincerity of top management when the stated ideal is an officer corps capable of winning the willing cooperation of its charges (leadership). The problem more likely is rather subtle. First, few recognize that such a problem exists. Ask any officer if he uses leadership and the answer is predictable. True, many confuse power and leadership, and they may enjoy wielding such power as they may have, but most successful "leaders" probably believe that they have the ability to win the loyal support and following of their subordinates. If
they find themselves ruling with an iron hand, they may
take some pride in their ability to be tough when necessary.
Few would realize that the business of demanding discipline
and making the troops perform represents a failure of their
own leadership, in the sense that one who successfully
utilizes leadership has no cause to use power. It is far
too easy to believe that one is merely being firm when in
reality it is the tool of recourse for one who is unable
or uninterested in taking the trouble to use leadership.

There is yet another side to the awareness problem.
In addition to a failure to perceive leadership as intended
by doctrine, probably few officers attribute leadership
problems to the army itself. By that, it is meant that
career officers presumably remain in the service because
to a reasonable degree they enjoy their work. It is not
likely therefore that they will perceive that there are
subtle aspects of the environment that operate to make
their jobs more difficult. The negative environmental
aspects discussed in chapter one are very subtle. To
explain, is it not reasonable to assume that most officers
probably view their rank and authority as assets to accom-
plish any assigned task? For example, would a company
commander, with a difficult mission, feel that being the
commander (position authority) and being the captain
(outranking everyone else) is detrimental or helpful to
his cause? Of course it's helpful. However, as discussed
in chapter one, rank and authority can also be great barriers to accurate communication from subordinates and, further, discourage the use of leadership by eliminating the need to account for one's action to subordinates. In sum, the negative environmental impacts are probably not perceived. Therefore, officers do not notice the conflict between the doctrinal teachings and the organizational environment and the problem is not recognized.

Relatedly, one is not suggesting that officers should be powerless, or that the use of power, per se, is necessarily undesirable. The point is, its use should be carefully considered and skillfully applied as a tool of the commander, and it should not be confused with leadership just because it is utilized by the appointed "leader". Indeed, when the situation demands, skillful application of power may enhance one's esteem in the eyes of his subordinates. For example, using one's rank or position to correct an individual who is disrupting or harassing one's group may earn a supervisor praise from his subordinates. Leaders use both tools. Balancing the two is largely a matter of working to develop leadership and becoming aware of one's power so as not to abuse it subconsciously or otherwise.

By itself, that conclusion doesn't go far enough. It doesn't explain why the doctrinal approach to leadership, which is generally taught in precommission training and
officer schooling at all levels, does not effectively shape the environment and therefore eliminate the conflict. Using the previous example, if officers attempt to gain the willing cooperation of their subordinates (routinely) they will not think of their rank as an asset but rather as a potential source of power that should not be used if possible. If such thinking were indeed widespread, then the authority vested in officers would not contribute to a negative environment (but would have a negative potential, which is probably unavoidable and therefore acceptable). In other words, such attitudes would eliminate the unconscious abuse of authority or power. Why then, hasn't this occurred?

One explanation is that while leadership is taught, it is not rewarded. Officers are expected to perform successfully and they are rewarded for success. A commander who achieves is "paid" for the achievement, that is, the "end", not the "means". Consequently, to use Fiedler's terms (1967), officers value initiating structure over consideration. Subordinates, conversely, generally value a supervisor whose consideration enhances their (subordinates) sense of worth (Jacobs, 1971). This emphasis on results is not a military idea but is a dominating American ethic. Business executives are paid to succeed, military men must win the battles; sports competition, etc., in spite of lofty talk about teamwork.
and integrity, is largely a win at any cost proposition. The late Vince Lombardi's words "Winning isn't everything, it's the only thing" are used euphemistically to justify what would have been considered unsportsmanlike conduct in an earlier age.

Military men change jobs frequently, and their efficiency reports are written annually at a minimum. The short run nature of such reports merely increases the emphasis on results as they are not based on how one went about accomplishing his mission but rather on how well it was done. That sounds all right, but it can and does cause an unhealthy competition for immediate results among commanders. The point is, commanders are going to have to look deeper than just the short run if they are concerned with leadership. It may well be that the use of power is quite effective, especially if skillfully controlled. For example, the commander who makes it known that he will not tolerate mistakes on an upcoming event might have his unit perform flawlessly. However, if "not tolerating any mistakes" is perceived as a threat (e.g. to their careers) by the immediate subordinates then several negative events may take place. First, the subordinates are likely to oversupervise their own subordinates, or usurp their duties altogether, in order to insure perfection. In other words, their subordinates' development will be hindered. Further, their subordinates
will likely sense that they are not trusted nor considered capable. They consequently will behave in accordance with those expectations. Therefore, such a commander, in the long run, will not develop a well trained unit nor loyal subordinates. However, he may nonetheless be quite successful. As officers rise in rank, it becomes increasingly easier to be intolerant (and demand success) because more and more professional, career subordinates are serving under them. At company level, the lieutenant who is serving under such a commander may simply decide to not worry about it and return to civilian life. The captain or major on the battalion staff is probably bound to his career and hence the battalion commander wields much greater power over him.

This being the situation, such commanders may well get better results than the individual who is allowing all subordinates to do their own jobs and learn from their mistakes. The author submits that the tolerant commander just described is contributing more to the overall state of army readiness than the intolerant perfectionist who is concerned with "looking good" on the training event at hand. In sum, leadership is a process, not a product. Until senior commanders start being concerned with the process as well as the product, leadership will remain a classroom subject instead of a conscious striving methodology of every officer.
Another interesting conclusion is that the army's best leaders (as defined by L score) are likely to be least satisfied with the status quo. This simple idea is derived directly from the primary hypothesis. As one's L score increases, his I score decreases reflecting less acceptance of organizational values. This is a very positive finding. It follows that institutions, practically by definition, resist change. Further technological change is taking place at ever increasing rates which demands continual modification and updating of institutions if they are to remain viable and relevant.

For the army, or any institution, members who perceive the need for change will be less satisfied with the structure at any point in time. That officers' L scores increase in proportion to their dissatisfaction as measured by I is indeed positive. Lest the term "dissatisfaction" sound overwhelming, it should be noted that all respondents endorsed the environment overall. It is a matter of degree with endorsements becoming weaker as L increases.

Given the inherent nature of the military hierarchy, and the increasing reliance on technology, conflict may be unavoidable with the current structure. As the army becomes ever more professional, in the sense of specialization of jobs as described by Bennis (1966), subordinates become more important in the decision process because they become the only experts on their part of the system. In
other words, supervisors must trust and depend upon sub-
ordinates for technical input. The subordinates do not
vote on matters, but they do decide matters, de facto,
by their input. This situation calls for a supervisor
who is democratic in the sense that he seeks subordinate
input. However, as Rice and Bishoprick (1971) explained,
democratic leadership is at odds with a hierarchal,
authoritarian organizational structure. The subordinates
are well aware that their participation (to the degree that
it exists) in the decision process is permitted (and can
be denied) by the superior. Therefore subordinates feel
less responsible, and superiors more responsible, for the
outcomes. In sum, the organizational model calls for
decision-making by the supervisor, but in an increasingly
professional organization, such a model becomes inap-
propriate.

Three final conclusions are rather obvious. First,
leadership training should include a measure of infor-
mation on the potentially negative aspects of the military
environment. Being alert to such dangers is the best
insurance against them. Second, an attempt to identify
and eliminate negative environmental influences should
be made. And last, in spite of whatever shortcomings
this study may include, from the unsupported philosophizing
by the author to technical problems with the questionnaire’s
development and interpretation, the findings are too
significant to attribute to chance and therefore merit further investigation.

Recommendations

In view of the results and conclusions discussed above, the following specific recommendations are offered.

1. Studies be undertaken to:
   a. Validate these findings with more sophisticated measures of leadership and environment.
   b. Determine the nature of the military environment.
   c. Determine the contribution of the environment to organizational effectiveness.
   d. Determine the ideal military environment.
   e. Determine how organizational environment shapes the conduct of supervisory personnel.
   f. Determine the best course of action to move towards the ideal military environment.

2. Leadership instruction at all levels should be modified to incorporate knowledge of environmental effects on supervisory personnel.

3. Field unit commanders must place as much emphasis on the leadership process as on the final result in training.

   One fully recognizes that in combat the final result is of paramount concern. Nonetheless, by emphasizing the leadership process in training, and in so doing developing leaders who are indeed capable of gaining
the willing cooperation of their soldiers, the final results will be positive.
APPENDIX

On the following pages is the questionnaire utilized in this study exactly as it was except that copies were mimeographed back to back to save on cost, excepting the cover letter. One-hundred-seventy-nine questionnaires were distributed and one-hundred-eleven returned or sixty-two percent. Of these, ninety-nine were complete enough to be used in the analysis. The variability in results, particularly in the leadership and power scores, indicate that the respondents did not possess relevant common characteristics that would bias the results.

The leadership score is the sum of the number of times the following items are preferred as a first or second choice: 1a,c; 2c,d; 3a,d; 4b,d; 5b,c; 6a,b; 7a,d; 8a,d; 9b,d; 10c,d; 11a,b; 12a,c; 13a,d; 14b,c; 15a,b; 16c,d; 17b,c; 18c,d; 19a,b; 20b,d. Power, not used analytically, is the summation of the remaining items.

The institutional socialization score was derived by calculating the mean score from circled numerical responses and multiplying it by ten. The mean was used for statistical ease in including incomplete cases (cases with not more than one missing response were accepted) and multiplied by ten to spread out the scores again.

The a priori classification of items is as follows: structure = 1, 5, 10, 11, 12, 27; rules = 4, 7, 21, 22
28, 29, 30; authority = 2, 6, 8, 9, 13, 18, 23; leadership training = 3, 14, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26.

As one can see in the cover letter, the intended interpretation of the information was unknown to the respondents. Additionally, the items concerned with leadership place the respondent in many organizational settings instead of purely military. The intent of those aspects of design was to help eliminate biasing the responses. Nonetheless, if one considers whether or not the subordinate(s) has input or choice in the supervisor's decision, the leadership and power responses are fairly transparent. Therefore, the design called for all responses to be as equally desirable (or undesirable) as possible (see chapter three).
The attached questionnaire is part of a research project designed to determine the attitudes of C&GSC students toward specific organizational characteristics and the kinds of actions they might demonstrate in varying organizational settings. Your responses are completely confidential and your anonymity is assured. However, if you are interested in the results of this project, indicate your section and box number in the space provided. The questionnaire takes about 20 minutes to complete. Your cooperation is certainly appreciated. Please complete it as soon as possible, and drop it in the message box.

Garrett T Cowser
Major, Infantry
Section 13
Please provide the following information for comparison and analysis. It is not intended for, and will not be used in an attempt to identify you.

1. Date of Birth ____________  ____________  Month  Year

2. Career Branch ____________________

3. If branch transferred, indicate years in each:

__________________________  ____________

4. Source of Commission ____________________

5. Months of Commissioned Service ____________________

6. Rank ____________________

7. Command experience (include detachments, platoons, companies, battalions, and equivalent units)

__________________________  Months

8. Section and Box Number ______/_______ (Optional)

Read the following paragraphs and assume you can only execute one of the listed actions. Place a "1" in the space in front of your first preference and then rank the remaining choices in order of preference, 2 through 4. Remember that you are ranking your preferences for separate choices, not sequential activities.

1. Two employees begin to take longer than the one-hour lunch they are entitled. They are not delaying anyone else. As their supervisor, you would:

   __ A. Ask them to explain why.

   __ B. Suggest that if they take the longer lunch they forego one or both of their coffee breaks.

   __ C. In a section meeting, state that you feel it is important that workers return on time.

   __ D. Remind them directly that lunch hour is only an hour.
2. You have just received an important mission from your supervisor that will take much skill, and judgment to accomplish and must be completed soon (but you have adequate time). You would:

   A. Stress to your subordinates that they must explore all options in detail due to the unusual importance of the mission.

   B. Personally direct your subordinates' efforts in accomplishing the mission.

   C. Give it to your subordinates, but remind them of the suspense date and the important nature of the project.

   D. Discuss the mission with your subordinates and ask for suggestions.

3. In drawing up guidelines for your department (retail sales), you would:

   A. Have your employees determine a policy of using first names or surnames when dealing with customers.

   B. Have employees introduce themselves by their first names when contacting customers as this establishes warmth.

   C. Have employees use surnames as this will appear more professional to customers.

   D. Ask that each employee use the name he or she is most comfortable with.

4. Several employees have started to take what amounts to an extra break by gathering at the coffee machine. Lately these have begun to get rather boisterous. You would:

   A. Remind those guilty that only two coffee breaks a day are allowed.

   B. Solicit the opinions of your employees regarding the adequacy of present policy concerning breaks.

   C. Publish a staggered schedule for coffee breaks.

   D. In a routine office meeting, ask that everyone attempt to keep the noise level down in the office, especially around the coffee machine.
5. It has come to your attention indirectly that a subordinate of yours "bent the rules" rather far to handle a difficult problem. No harm resulted; however, continued actions of a similar kind would definitely result in real problems for you. You would:

   A. In a meeting of all employees emphasize the importance of doing this in accordance with proper procedures.
   B. Ask all subordinates to review existing procedures and recommend changes to you.
   C. Suggest to the employee that he draft new procedures to handle problems of a similar nature.
   D. Make it clear to the subordinate that if such actions appear to be necessary he must bring the matters to you for decision.

6. You are a battalion commander. You have just returned from a week's emergency leave and you find that the instructions you left with the staff concerning important training were not carried out, the unit performed poorly, and the brigade commander has just finished informing you that your absence hardly justified the poor results. You would:

   A. Ask your staff to analyze the results of the training to find out where the problems are.
   B. Ask your staff to recommend SOP changes to prevent a recurrence.
   C. Try to determine who thwarted your instructions.
   D. Call in your executive officer, who was in charge in your absence, and demand a full accounting of what happened.

7. It has become acceptable to celebrate each person's birthday with a cake in the office. These celebrations have become far too prolonged and disruptive. Something must be done. You would:

   A. Ask your subordinates to consider the probable decrease in productivity resulting from those celebrations.
   B. Put a time limit on the celebrations.
C. Tell them that these celebrations should be held after business hours.

D. Ask them to hold a meeting to discuss the problem.

8. Your firm has a WATS line which covers the entire U.S. It is to be used for business calls only; however, one employee uses it once a week to call a friend who lives in another state. You would:

A. In a routine office meeting, mention you appreciate the fact that most of the personnel do not abuse the WATS facility.

B. At the next opportunity, privately tell him to stop using the phone for personal business.

C. Inform him that use of the WATS line for personal calls must be paid for.

D. Circulate a memorandum that outlines authorized use of the telephone.

9. An employee states he has a suggestion for a new procedure to replace one which has proved, over the years, to be extremely efficient. If you were a very busy supervisor, pressed for time, you would:

A. Tell him to explain it to you.

B. Ask him if he would like to arrange a comprehensive demonstration for you.

C. Tell him to submit his idea through the "suggestion program" and assure him you will consider it.

D. Ask him if he could prepare a detailed briefing on his idea for you.

10. In a given firm, each supervisor sets policy for his own section. The length of the working day has become a question in yours. You would:

A. Direct your key subordinates to study the problem.

B. Make your decision after soliciting employee suggestions.

C. Let the workers determine a standard day.
D. Allow each employee to work whenever he chooses as long as his work is completed.

11. A position (that of your assistant) comes open in your section which involves no pay raise but is deemed a promotion by the employees. All are well qualified. You would:

   A. Consult with key subordinates on your choice to insure its correctness.

   B. Ask your key subordinates to provide recommendations of those members best qualified in their opinion.

   C. Promote the person with whom you work best owing to similar outlooks.

   D. Promote the person whom you believe is best at gaining the cooperation of the others.

12. As a high school principal, a parent complains to you about a teacher who is using an unorthodox curriculum in class; the parent demands action to correct it. You would:

   A. Have discussions with students to determine how they react to the material.

   B. Sit in on a few classes and judge the content for yourself.

   C. Ask the parent if he or she would like to examine the material and/or discuss it with the teacher.

   D. Examine the curriculum and insure it is within the guidelines of the board of education.

13. It is your policy that a person must work for your firm one year before he is eligible for a two-week paid vacation; however, a valuable employee asks for a vacation after only six months. There do seem to be extenuating circumstances. You would:

   A. Explain the firm's policy, and possible consequences of making such exceptions.

   B. Since the workload permits, give him the time off, but without pay.

   C. Give him a one-week vacation since he has been there six months.
D. Time permitting, have the employee council review the policy and recommend changes as appropriate (to handle unusual cases).

14. Two employees are not getting along, and while it does not interfere with their work, it is creating an unpleasant atmosphere. As the supervisor, you would:

___ A. Transfer one of them to another section.
___ B. Suggest that they consider discussions with the company's counselor.
___ C. Ask if they would like to discuss their differences with you acting as a moderator.
___ D. Privately tell them that their differences are being noticed, and that you would like them to strive for better relations.

15. A high school student is accused by a teacher of making an obscene gesture. The student denies the allegation. As the principal, you would:

___ A. Ask the instructor if he would like to discuss his student-relations with you.
___ B. Ask the student if he would like to discuss faculty-student relations with you.
___ C. Discipline the student.
___ D. Dismiss the matter.

16. You are the battalion commander of a unit due for an annual inspection. Unlike many units, yours has not been burdened with excessive "training distractors" such as post details; morale is high and you believe your unit is in fact well prepared. You would:

___ A. Since you have time, plan a pre-inspection of your own to insure things are as good as they appear.
___ B. Prepare and disseminate a planning directive that emphasizes your personal guidance and includes areas of particular concern.
___ C. Ask each subordinate element to conduct a good unit analysis and notify your staff of specifics that require support.
D. Tell your subordinate commanders to keep up the good work and get prepared.

17. An employee feels he is disliked by most of the other employees, and it is beginning to affect his work. You would:

   A. Since you know his feeling is correct, transfer him to another section where he can get a fresh start.

   B. Ask him if he would like you to arrange a discussion with the company counselor.

   C. Ask him if he would like you to discuss it with a few others to determine the cause.

   D. Privately, tell a number of other key employees that you expect them to make an effort to get along with him.

18. Several people express interest in seeing an event on TV which is of some import. It will mean, however, a disruption in the work at a particularly busy time of the year. You decide to:

   A. Deny the request explaining the importance of maintaining productivity at this time.

   B. Let them watch but tell them the lost time must be made up.

   C. Tell them that if extra effort puts the section ahead of schedule, they can watch.

   D. Ask them for ideas to offset the time loss.

19. Your firm has a strict dress code, but one employee occasionally comes to work in something that does not conform to it. You would:

   A. Suggest to him that if he is dissatisfied he can suggest a loosening of the dress code by working through the proper channels (suggestion box, employee council, etc.).

   B. In an office meeting, tell the group that you consider appearance important.

   C. The next time it happens, privately call him aside and ask him to explain his dress.

   D. Inform him that such infractions must stop.
20. You are a new battalion commander. One of your company commanders who has a high AWOL rate has come to you and requested that you discipline a soldier with an article 15 for an AWOL offense; he explains that the individual has been punished twice previously for the same offense. You would:

A. Discipline the soldier.

B. Defer any punishment and suggest that he do an in-depth case study on this AWOL to see what can be learned.

C. Inform the company commander that you will have to discuss it with the soldier before making a decision.

D. Defer any action until you can consult with the staff and determine if perhaps the company commander himself (his policies) is to blame for the high AWOL rate.

The following list of statements represent possible characteristics of any formal organization (e.g. business, military). Indicate your feeling for the desirability of each item by circling the appropriate number under each in accordance with the following scale:

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1. A clear-cut hierarchy that makes lines of authority quite explicit.

   1   2   3   4   5   6

2. A strong emphasis on efficiency.

   1   2   3   4   5   6

3. Enough supervisors to provide for continuing, in-depth supervision.

   1   2   3   4   5   6

4. Detailed SOP that visualize almost all operating contingencies.

   1   2   3   4   5   6

5. A clear understanding of the decision-making authority of all members.

   1   2   3   4   5   6
6. The opportunity for superiors to select subordinate leaders from among those they trust.

7. Leadership that is strongly assertive and decisive.

8. Supervisors capable of establishing absolute control when required.

9. Strong budgetary controls and focus on financial management.

10. Supervisory responsibility to know the jobs of subordinates in detail.

11. Relatively low span of control with more organizational levels.

12. Use of personnel in close agreement to their job descriptions.

13. One top executive in control of all aspects of the total organization.

14. Immediate correction of subordinate errors or deficiencies.

15. A system that permits feedback from subordinates to second-level supervisors concerning leadership of first-level supervisors.

16. A strong emphasis on subordinate input.

17. Superiors who maintain enough pressure on subordinates to insure mission accomplishment.

18. A capacity for filtering information from subordinate echelons.

19. Strict accountability for actions through a chain of command.
20. Clearly stated and understood accountability for errors.
   1 2 3 4 5 6

21. Involvement of the supervisors in the decisions of their subordinate leaders.
   1 2 3 4 5 6

22. Well worked out procedures for each job done by each individual.
   1 2 3 4 5 6

23. Supervisory responsibility to routinely make rapid decisions without additional information from others.
   1 2 3 4 5 6

24. A strong emphasis on productivity.
   1 2 3 4 5 6

25. Work groups with clearly specified leaders.
   1 2 3 4 5 6

26. A clearcut system of penalties for failure to perform.
   1 2 3 4 5 6

27. Well defined job descriptions.
   1 2 3 4 5 6

28. A high degree of conformity to established procedures.
   1 2 3 4 5 6

29. Tightly structured work groups with clearly specified roles.
   1 2 3 4 5 6

30. A degree of formality in supervisor-subordinate relationships.
   1 2 3 4 5 6
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