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
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# A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR 1965-1972

Editor: Thomas C. Thayer

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**Volume 6**

**REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM  
ARMED FORCES (I)**

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This twelve volume set includes every article printed in the fifty issue series of the <u>Southeast Asia Analysis Report</u> . The SEA Analysis Report represented a month-by-month analysis of Vietnam War activity including forces and manpower, VC/NV operations, Allied ground, naval and air operations, RVNAF, casualties and losses, population security, war costs and inflation and construction and port operations in South Vietnam.		

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REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF)

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INTRODUCTION

This volume, plus the other eleven volumes in the series, contains every article ever printed in the Southeast Asia Analysis Report (a few additional papers not printed in the report are occasionally included, too.).

Fifty issues of the Southeast Asia Analysis Report were published from January 1967 through January 1972 by the Southeast Asia office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). The Report had two purposes. First, it served as a vehicle to distribute the analyses produced by Systems Analysis on Southeast Asia. It thus provided other agencies an opportunity to tell us if we were wrong and to help prevent research duplications. We solicited and received frequent rebuttals or comments on our analyses which sharpened our studies and stimulated better analysis by other agencies. Second, it was a useful management tool for getting more good work from our staff -- they knew they must regularly produce studies which would be read critically throughout the Executive Branch.

The first page of the Report stated that it "is not an official publication of the Department of Defense, and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), or comparable officials." The intent was solely to improve the quality of analysis on Southeast Asia problems -- and to stimulate further thought and discussion. The report was successful in doing precisely this.

We distributed about 350 copies of the Report each month to OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), the Military Departments, CINCPAC, and Saigon, and to other interested agencies such as the Paris Delegation, AID, State Department, CIA and the White House Staff. Most copies circulated outside OSD were in response to specific requests from the individual person or agency. Our readership included many of the key commanders, staff officers, and analysts in Washington and in the field. Their comments were almost always generous and complimentary, even when they disagreed with our conclusions. Some excerpts appear below:

"I believe the 'SEA Analysis Report' serves a useful purpose, and I would like to see its present distribution continued." (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 31 May 1966)

"We used a highly interesting item in your May Analysis Report as the basis for a note to the Secretary, which I've attached." (State Department, 28 June 1967)

"We were all most impressed with your first monthly Southeast Asia Analysis Report. Not only do we wish to continue to receive it, but we would appreciate it if we could receive 4 (four) copies from now on." (White House, 9 February 1967)

"Ambassador \_\_\_\_\_ has asked me to tell you that he has much appreciated and benefited from the studies and analyses of this publication." (State Department/White House, 24 January 1969)

"Congratulations on your January issue. The 'Situation in South Vietnam' article was especially interesting and provoking." (State Department, 24 January 1969)

"I let Ambassador \_\_\_\_\_ take a swing at the paper. He made several comments which may be of interest to you. Many thanks for putting us back on distribution for your report. Also, despite the return volley, I hope you will continue sending your products." (MACV-CORDS, 17 June 1968)

"As an avid reader (and user) of the SEA Analysis Report, I see a need for more rounded analyses in the pacification field and fewer simplistic constructs." (MACV-DEPCORDS, 17 April 1968)

"The SEA Programs Division is to be commended for its perceptive analysis of topics that hold the continuing concern of this headquarters... The approach was thoughtfully objective throughout and it was particularly pleasing to note a more incisive recognition of factors that defy quantified expression." (Commander, US Army Vietnam-USARV, 29 November 1967)

"In general, I think it is becoming the best analytical periodical I've seen yet on Vietnam (though there's not much competition)." (MACV-DEPCORDS, 21 April 1967)

"Statistical extrapolations of this type serve an extremely useful purpose in many facets of our daily work." (CIA, 6 February 1967)

"One of the most useful Systems Analysis products we have seen is the monthly Southeast Asia Progress Report.... Indeed it strikes many of us as perhaps the most searching and stimulating periodic analysis put out on Vietnam." (President of The Rand Corporation, 22 October 1969)

In November 1968, 55 addressees answered a questionnaire about the Report: 52 said the report was useful, 2 said it was not, and 1 said, "The report does not meet an essential need of this headquarters;" nonetheless, it desired "to remain on distribution" for 7 copies. From 48 questionnaires with complete responses, we found that an average 4.8 people read each copy -- a projected readership of 500-950, depending on whether we assumed 1 or 2.4 readers of copies for which no questionnaire was returned.

Readers responding to the questionnaire reported using the Report for the following purposes:

Information	42%
Analysis	31%
Policy Making	11%
Briefings	7%
Other	9%
	<hr/>
	100%

In addition, readers reported about equal interest in each of the seven subject areas normally covered in the Report.

VC/NVA	18%
Air Operations	20%
RVNAF	17%
Pacification	13%
Friendly Forces	12%
Deployments	12%
Logistics/Construction	8%
	<u>100%</u>

There was some negative reaction to the Report. Concern was expressed about "the distorted impressions" the Report left with the reader and its wide dissemination which "implies its acceptance by the Secretary of Defense, giving the document increased credibility."

Given the way in which the Southeast Asia Analysis Report was used, the important responsibilities of many of its readers, and the controversial aspects of the report, I decided to include in these twelve volumes every article ever published in a Southeast Asia Analysis Report. This will allow the users of these volumes to arrive at their own conclusions.

Thomas C. Thayer  
February 18, 1975

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ARVN EFFECTIVENESS ON SEARCH AND DESTROY TYPE OPERATIONS <sup>a/</sup>

US and ARVN forces have surprisingly equal effectiveness per battalion day on search and destroy operations when the relative strengths of the battalions are taken into account. Table 1 provides the raw data comparison of ARVN and US operations for August 1966 - January 1967. The US inflicted casualties are 1.72 per battalion day to the ARVN 1.15 per battalion day. Weapons captured are similarly .41 US to .28 ARVN. However, the manpower in ARVN and US units differs substantially. Adjustment #1 adjusts this difference based solely on the authorized strength of the forces. The adjusted figures indicates an ARVN KIA per battalion day of 1.53 to a US 1.72.

Adjustment #2 adjusts this difference based on present-for-duty strengths. Using this adjustment ARVN KIA per battalion day is 1.95, exceeding the US 1.72. Weapons captured by ARVN also are greater than US.

TABLE 1

VC/NVA LOSSES PER BATTALION DAY OF  
US AND ARVN SEARCH AND DESTROY TYPE OPERATIONS

	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Aug - Jan Total</u>
<u>US FORCES</u>							
Bn Days	927	822	1191	1508	1424	1685	7557
VC/NVA KIA & Capt/ Bn Day	1.86	2.33	2.28	2.01	1.21	1.10	1.72
Weapons Captured/ Bn Day	.35	.31	.40	.59	.46	.28	.41
<u>ARVN FORCES</u>							
<u>Unadjusted Data:</u>							
Bn Days	1531	1092	1431	1218	1957	1935	9164
VC/NVA KIA & Capt/ Bn Day	1.11	1.27	2.30	.98	.77	.75	1.15
Weapons Captured/ Bn Day	.37	.55	.36	.18	.18	.16	.28
<u>Authorized Strength <sup>a/</sup></u>							
Bn Days	1531	1092	1431	1218	1957	1935	9164
Adj Bn Days	1148	819	1073	914	1468	1451	6873
VC/NVA KIA & Capt/ Adj Bn Days	1.48	1.70	3.07	1.31	1.03	1.00	1.53
Weapons Captured/ Adj Bn Days	.50	.73	.48	.24	.24	.21	.37

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TABLE 1 (Continued)

<u>Present for Duty Strength</u>	<u>b/</u>						
Bn Days	1531	1092	1431	1218	1957	1935	9164
Adj Bn Days	903	644	844	719	1156	1142	5408
VC/NVA KIA & Capt/ Adj Bn Days	1.89	2.16	3.90	1.66	1.31	1.28	1.95
Weapons Captured/ Adj Bn Days	.64	.93	.61	.30	.30	.26	.47

Source: GUAVA File NMCS.

a/ Adj Bn Days based on ARVN Bn. authorized strength 623 which is 75% of a US Army Bn. authorized strength 830.

b/ ARVN Authorized Strength 623 75% Present for Duty = 467 = .59  
US Authorized Strength 830 95% Present for Duty = 789 = 1.00

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RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS

The discrepancies in effectiveness of the RVNAF in I, II, and III Corps are much greater than those of the U.S. in the same Corps. The better performance of the RVNAF in I CTZ than in II and III Corps supports the contention that the Marines are doing a better job of supporting and encouraging the RVNAF than is the Army, although there may be other reasons.

Search and Destroy Operations. RVNAF (ARVN, RF, PF and CIDG) effectiveness per battalion day on search and destroy operations during August 1966 through March 1967 was less than U.S. effectiveness, but only about 25% less when weighted by relative strengths. Table 1 also shows that RVNAF effectiveness is much higher in IV Corps and I Corps than in II and III Corps: e.g., enemy killed per battalion day of operation in I and IV Corps are 7 times better than III Corps and 3 times better than II Corps.

TABLE 1<sup>a/</sup>

SEARCH AND DESTROY EFFECTIVENESS

	<u>Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ)</u>				<u>Countrywide</u>
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	
<u>RVNAF</u>					
VC/NVA KIA per Bn Day	2.42	.69	.34	2.40	1.27
Weapons Captured per Bn Day	.45	.25	.16	1.27	.48
VC/NVA KIA per RVNAF KIA	5.65	6.43	4.52	10.85	6.93
<u>U.S.</u>					
VC/NVA KIA per Bn Day	2.02	1.56	1.62	-	1.69
Weapons Captured per Bn Day	.29	.50	.55	-	.47
VC/NVA KIA per US KIA	8.30	8.39	7.76	-	8.13

a/ Battalion days of operation are calculated by MACV on company days. The present-for-duty strength of a standard U.S. Army company is 263, of a standard U.S. Marine company 297, and a standard ARVN company 156. Using the U.S. Army company as the standard, the weighting factors used to develop Table 1 are 1.00, 1.13, and .59 respectively.

Small Unit Actions. RVNAF effectiveness in small unit actions also varies among the CTZ. Table 2 shows that RVNAF does the best in IV Corps. Unfortunately, the data available for the U.S. in the three northern CTZs are insufficient for comparison.

TABLE 2

RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS ON SMALL UNIT ACTIONS

	<u>Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ)</u>				<u>Countrywide</u>
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	
Contacts per 1000 Small Unit Actions	1.27	2.05	1.59	2.23	2.00
VC/NVA KIA per Contact	3.61	2.34	3.36	4.78	3.73

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Corps Ranking. Table 3 ranks the Corps on the basis of Tables 1 and 2. Assigning points to each rank (low score is best) shows that the RVNAF is most effective in IV Corps followed by I, II, and III Corps. The U.S. is equally effective in all three Corps. (These measures, however, ignore RVNAF and U.S. effectiveness in the pacification effort.)

TABLE 3

	Rank				Overall Rankings
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	
<u>RVNAF Corps</u>					
VC/NVA KIA per Bn Day	I	IV	II	III	IV Corps - 6 points
Weapons Captured per Bn Day	IV	I	II	III	I Corps -11 points
VC/NVA KIA per RVNAF KIA	IV	II	I	III	II Corps -14 points
Contacts per 1000 Small Unit Action	IV	II	I	III	III Corps -19 points
VC/NVA KIA per Contact	IV	I	III	II	
<u>U.S. Corps</u>					
VC/NVA KIA per Bn Day	I	III	II		I Corps -6 points
Weapons Captured per Bn Day	III	II	I		II Corps -6 points
VC/NVA KIA per U.S. KIA	II	I	III		III Corps -6 points

June 1967

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RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS - A REBUTTAL

Comments have been received in rebuttal to the May 1967 Southeast Asia Analysis report item (Page 22), which stated that the better performance of the RVNAF in I CTZ than in II and III CTZ supports the contention that the Marines are doing a better job of supporting and encouraging the RVNAF than is the Army, although there may be other reasons. The criteria used for evaluating RVNAF effectiveness in the May Report were: VC/NVA KIA Per Battalion Day, Weapons Captured Per Battalion Day, VC/NVA KIA Per RVNAF KIA, Contacts Per Thousand Small Unit Actions, and VC/NVA KIA Per Small Unit Contact.

Comments received are as follows:

"The Combined Campaign Plan, 1967, provides the overall concept for military operations in the Republic of Vietnam during Calendar Year 1967. The main thrust concerning the utilization of friendly land forces, as outlined in the concept, is to have RVNAF provide direct support to Revolutionary Development (RD) programs as a primary mission, while US/FWMAF conduct offensive operations against VC/NVA main forces and their base areas. This, of course, does not mean that there is a clear cut division of responsibility. As an example, in IV CTZ, where the US/Free World Forces are still minimal, the RVNAF must divide its efforts between the defensive attitude of direct support to RD and the offensive operations against the VC/NVA main forces and their base areas. At the same time, US/FWMAF directly support RD in the vicinity of their base areas."

"Through the conduct of operations in consonance with the overall concept described above, the US Army forces in II and III CTZs have been able to thwart the enemy's strategy, invade his base areas, and keep his main forces from successfully conducting large scale attacks which would destroy ongoing RD activity in the National Priority Areas. This, in turn, enables the RVNAF to devote its priority of effort toward the direct support of RD."

"In light of these accomplishments, it would seem prudent to conclude that RVNAF in II and III CTZs kill less VC/NVA, capture less weapons, and make less small unit contacts since enemy main forces avoid combat due to previous defeats inflicted by US/Free World operations. Hopefully, all search and destroy operations eventually will result in less and less VC/NVA KIA due to an ever increasing security of the area. The data on page 22 of the May Report support this conclusion by recording that IV CTZ, with only one recently deployed US Army Brigade, has the highest rates of enemy KIA, weapons captured, and small unit contacts."

"If one were to accept the assertion of your report based on the supporting data, one might even assert that RVNAF units would perform better if no US forces were employed in the country. Although the activities of US forces certainly influence the performance of RVNAF units, the primary responsibility for support and assistance to RVNAF rests with the MACV advisory effort."

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The comments also suggest that the factors used in the report are not sufficient to make a comprehensive evaluation of RVNAF performance and suggest that a more complete analysis can be made if the following additional factors are considered: the missions assigned to US/FWMAF and various agencies of RVNAF (ARVN, VNAF, VNN, RF, PF, CIDG), characteristics of the area in each CTZ, the enemy situation in each CTZ, the availability of forces in each CTZ, the impact of friendly tactics and concepts on the enemy in each CTZ, progress in securing the population, and progress in controlling surface lines of communications.

We believe that a great deal more analysis of RVNAF effectiveness is necessary, particularly in view of the critical role of the RVNAF now and in the future. We are attempting to gather data for an extensive study of RVNAF effectiveness which will take into account the comments set forth above. We would appreciate receiving readers' views on the performance of the RVNAF and comments on future articles.

*June 1967*

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GVN REGULAR FORCE EFFECTIVENESS

ARVN and VMMC forces total 163 battalions (excluding palace guard battalions which are anti-coup insurance and not a fighting force). In 1966, 10 of the battalions accounted for 38% of the ineffective and marginal MACV ratings, 6 of these battalions were in III Corps. The main reason for these low MACV ratings was inadequate leadership and training.

Effectiveness of ARVN Infantry Divisions

The following table shows the decline in VC/NVA killed by ARVN infantry divisions. In 1966, I Corps was the center of the Buddhist "Struggle Movement" and the drop is explainable. III Corps had the most significant decline in enemy KIA by ARVN divisions (-41%). Country-wide the ARVN divisions killed 23% less VC/NVA in 1966 than in 1965, in spite of a 56% increase in VC/NVA KIA by all forces (35,500 to 55,500), and a 16% increase in ARVN strength.

	<u>Kill Ratio</u> <sup>a/</sup>		<u>Won Loss Ratio</u> <sup>a/</sup>		<u>Mo. Desertion Rate/1000</u>	
	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1965 b/</u>	<u>1966</u>
<u>ARVN</u>						
ARVN Infantry Divs.	3.3	3.1	n/a	2.2	n/a	n/a
Airborne Div.	n/a	4.2	n/a	26.9	n/a	37.3
Armor Units	n/a	12.5	n/a	12.1	n/a	9.4
Rangers	n/a	3.1	n/a	9.0	n/a	25.5
<u>VMMC</u>	n/a	5.5	n/a	90.5	n/a	27.4
Over-all ARVN/VMMC	3.6	3.7 c/	n/a	n/a	n/a	18.0
Regional Forces	4.0	3.7	.90	1.4	11.5	9.2
Popular Forces	2.0	1.7	.37	.64	28.2	22.3

a/ VC/NVA loss per GVN loss.

b/ July - Dec 1965.

c/ Probably due to better combat support - air, artillery, etc.

Disparities in Unit Effectiveness

A large disparity exists among the ARVN infantry divisions, the ARVN airborne division, armor units, the Ranger Command and the VMMC.

VC/NVA KIA BY ARVN INFANTRY DIVISIONS

<u>Corps</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>% Change</u>
I	7,319	4,822	-34
II	3,189	2,624	-18
III	3,661	2,156	-41
IV	6,783	5,526	-19
TOTAL	20,952	16,119 a/	-23

a/ Sum of CTZ is 15,128; the difference in total cannot be reconciled.

The drop of 4800 in VC/NVA KIA in 1966 by ARVN infantry divisions indicates their reluctance to engage the enemy. A further decline can be expected in 1967 as the Combined Campaign Plan envisions a more static role for the ARVN - direct support of Revolutionary Development.

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Leadership appears the critical factor in unit effectiveness. This is the most logical explanation for the wide disparity between various RVNAF units. Some examples are:

1. Every ARVN infantry division in III CTZ had kill ratios below the country-wide average.
2. The combined kills for two of the Airborne battalions was greater than one of the ARVN divisions. However, three other airborne battalions killed less than 100 enemy each during 1966.
3. The ARVN Armored Cavalry Regiments had mixed results:

<u>Number of Regiments</u>	<u>VC/NVA KIA in 1966</u>
1	1
1	12
1	23
7	150-1100 each

4. The combined kills for 2 of the VN Marine battalions were greater than two of the ARVN divisions. The VNMC had no MIA during 1966.
5. In examining ARVN search-and-destroy operations for the period August 1966 through March 1967, I and IV Corps stand out from II and III Corps.

ARVN - SEARCH & DESTROY OPERATIONS

	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>Country-wide</u>
VC/NVA KIA per Bn. Day	2.42	.69	.34	2.40	1.27

6. ARVN Infantry Division kill ratios are best in I and IV Corps areas with kill ratios for all divisions in excess of 2.5. III Corps had no ARVN divisions with a kill ratio over 2.5.

	<u>ARVN DIV OR COMMAND KILL RATIOS - 1966</u>			Div. or Commands
	0-2.5	2.5-5.0	5.0+	
I	-	2	1	3
II	1	1	1	3
III	3	-	-	3
IV	-	2	1	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	4	5	3	12

August 1967

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RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS

Per man, Vietnamese forces were about half as effective as U.S. forces in killing VC/NVA during the eleven months (Aug 66 through June 67) for which detailed data are available. Effectiveness differs widely among Vietnamese units of the same type and between units in different parts of the country. Poor leadership is the key reason for inefficiency in most cases. Actions are underway to cure this and other problems. Slow, gradual improvement in the RVNAF is expected.

Countrywide Comparison

Table 1 indicates that the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) including Regular, Regional and Popular Forces, have been about 45% as effective as U.S. forces during the eleven month period of August 1966 - June 1967 for which detailed data is available. The table also shows that, with the renewed intensity of combat during 1967, the RVNAF comparative effectiveness in killing VC per 1000 friendly troops dropped from 54% to 42%.

TABLE 1

VC/NVA KILLED PER THOUSAND FRIENDLY STRENGTH  
(By RVNAF and US Forces in Offensive Actions)

	1966		1967		11 Mo. Avg By Qtr
	Aug Sep	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	
<u>RVNAF</u>					
VC/NVA Killed	4105	6090	7405	8135	6435
Average Strength (000)	536	619	609	608	611
VC/NVA KIA per 1000 Strength	7	10	12	13	11
<u>U.S.</u>					
VC/NVA Killed	3965	6870	12565	13465	9215
Average Strength (000)	305	361	412	438	379
VC/NVA KIA per 1000 Strength	13	19	30	31	24
Effectiveness of RVNAF (%)	54	53	40	42	45

CORPS (CTZ) Comparison

Table 2 shows that RVNAF performance varies considerably among the 4 Corps areas of South Vietnam. During the period, RVNAF forces were 58% as effective as US forces in I Corps and, per man, had a higher VC/NVA kill rate in I Corps than US forces had in II and III Corps. RVNAF forces in II and III Corps operated at 32% and 27% of the US effectiveness levels in those Corps. In IV Corps RVNAF performed at a rate of 62% of the countrywide US performance.

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The high VC/NVA kill rates by both US and RVNAF forces in I Corps reflect, in part, the intensity of the combat there and the enemy's willingness to fight. In II and III Corps the enemy is reportedly less willing to fight. Also, RVNAF troops reportedly operate from dispersed positions in II Corps and are less able to concentrate forces against the enemy. On the other hand, US advisors' ratings show that the most ineffective RVNAF units are in II and III Corps. Also, US kills of VC/NVA in large operations ran at about 203 per week in II Corps and 202 per week in III Corps, (compared to 210 per week in I Corps), and this indicates enemy willingness to fight large engagements in II and III Corps.

TABLE 2

VC/NVA KILLED PER THOUSAND FRIENDLY STRENGTH

(RVNAF and US Forces in Offensive Actions By Corps)

	<u>CORPS Tactical Zones (CTZ)</u>				
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>RVNAF</u>					
VC/NVA Killed	8820	3240	3620	9840	25520
Strength (000) <sup>a/</sup>	93	137	208	171	609
VC/NVA Killed per 1000 Strength	95	24	17	58	42
<u>US</u>					
VC/NVA Killed	15950	9740	9970	-	35660
Average Strength (000)	98	131	156	-	385
VC/NVA Killed per 1000 Strength	163	74	64	-	93
Effectiveness of RVNAF %	58	32	27	-	45

<sup>a/</sup> As of 30 June 1967

Source: NMCS Computer File - GUAVA

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Battalion and Larger Operations

The findings set forth above are based on total strength figures. To check the results, table 3 shows VC/NVA killed in large scale operations per friendly maneuver battalion adjusted for actual strengths (instead of overall strength). The same result is produced; ARVN maneuver battalions (weighted) were 45% as effective as US maneuver battalions.

TABLE 3

VC/NVA KILLED IN BATTALION SIZED AND LARGER OPERATIONS  
(By ARVN, US, and Free World Maneuver Battalion Equivalents)

	CY 1966		CY 1967		11
	Aug-Sep	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	Mo. Avg.
Enemy KIA by ARVN <sup>a/</sup>	2445	3675	5060	5470	4165
AVG Maneuver Battalion (Adjusted) <sup>b/</sup>	100	100	98	98	99
KIA/Maneuver Battalion	24	37	52	56	42
Enemy KIA by US <sup>a/</sup>	3415	6160	10640	10080	7575
AVG Maneuver Battalions <sup>b/</sup>	69	80	89	91	82
KIA/Maneuver Battalion	49	77	120	111	92
<u>EFFECTIVENESS %</u>	49	48	43	50	45

<sup>a/</sup> NMCS Computer File - GUAVA

<sup>b/</sup> Source: JCS-J3. Present for duty strength of an ARVN battalion is .6 the strength of a US Army battalion; figures shown represent .6 of ARVN maneuver battalions available. (MACV factor is .33) Conversely, USMC Maneuver battalions are one third larger than US Army battalions and are therefore counted as 1.33 USA battalion equivalents

Table 4 shows trends in large unit operations initiated by US and Vietnamese forces. It shows that:

1. ARVN operations are shorter than U.S. operations (8 bn days versus 39 bn days) and have declined 28%.
2. ARVN total VC/NVA kills rose about half as much as U.S. kills rose during the period. (ARVN kills in II and III Corps actually declined but increased performance in I and IV Corps more than made up the difference).
3. The ARVN and US kill ratios were fairly comparable with the US 15% above of ARVN, on the average.
4. US days of contact increased throughout the period and averaged twice the ARVN rate, but ARVN kills per day of contact equalled the U.S. rate. This indicates that much of ARVN's ineffectiveness is not due to

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inability to fight, but its reluctance to make contact. (The average ARVN maneuver battalion contacts the enemy only 27% as often as the average US maneuver battalion). This reflects bad leadership.

TABLE 4

TRENDS IN LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS  
(Weekly Averages)

	1966		1967		11 Month Average
	Aug- Sep	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	
<u>Nr. of Operations</u>					
ARVN	74	68	65	53	65
U.S.	11	9	9	10	10
<u>Bn. Days of Operations</u>					
ARVN	402	458	637	639	534
U.S.	232	312	463	511	380
<u>Days of Contact</u>					
ARVN	45	46	45	47	46
U.S.	66	69	89	96	80
<u>VC/NVA KIA</u>					
By ARVN	282	283	389	421	344
By U.S.	394	474	818	776	616
<u>Kill Ratio (En/Fr)</u>					
ARVN	6.4	6.0	6.4	6.3	6.3
U.S.	7.4	8.1	8.7	5.9	7.3
<u>VC/NVA KIA Per Day of Contact</u>					
ARVN	6.2	6.2	8.7	8.9	7.5
U.S.	6.0	6.9	9.2	8.1	7.7
<u>VC/NVA Weapons Losses</u>					
To ARVN	138	85	136	90	112
To U.S.	71	156	227	347	200

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Table 5 again shows that, in large operations, RVNAF performance in II and III Corps falls behind its performance in the other two Corps. The total VC/NVA KIA rate in I and IV Corps is 3.5 times the weekly rate in II and III Corps. Moreover, the kills per day of contact are 2.8 times as high.

TABLE 5

### LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS (Weekly Average)

	<u>Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ)</u>				
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>Countrywide</u>
<u>RVNAF</u>					
Bn Days of Contact	11	10	10	15	46
VC/NVA KIA	144	43	33	124	344
Kill Ratio (Fr/En)	5.7	5.8	3.7	10	6.3
VC/NVA KIA per day of Contact	13.2	4.3	3.3	7.8	7.5
Weapons Captured	30	13	13	56	112
<u>US</u>					
Bn Days of Contact	27	25	28	-	80
VC/NVA KIA	210	204	202	-	616
Kill Ratio (En/Fr)	7.5	8.0	6.2	-	7.3
VC/NVA KIA per Contact day	8.1	8.5	7.5	-	7.7
Weapons Captured	38	62	100	-	200

### Small Unit Actions

All Vietnamese forces participate in small unit actions, and the bulk of Regional Force and Popular Force operations are of this type. Comparison of US and RVNAF small unit actions is difficult for two reasons. Ninety percent of all small unit actions reported by US forces occur in I Corps. Conversely, RVNAF reports practically everything as a small unit action (bridge guards, check points, routine patrols, etc., are all counted). Nevertheless, Table 6 indicates that, per 1000 RVNAF, the Vietnamese killed VC/NVA at a rate comparable to the US. The US has been improving, however, and (the US has a higher kill ratio and more contacts per 1000 actions.)

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TABLE 6

VC/NVA KILLED IN SMALL UNIT ACTIONS  
(Weekly Average)

	1966		1967		11 mo. Avg by Qtr
	Aug- Sep	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	
<u>RVNAF</u>					
VC/NVA KIA	1660	2415	2345	2665	2270
AVG Strength (000)	606	619	609	608	611
VC/NVA KIA per 1000 Fr. Strength	3	4	4	4	4
<u>US</u>					
VC/NVA KIA	550	710	1925	3385	1640
AVG Strength (000)	305	361	412	438	379
VC/NVA KIA per 1000 Fr. Strength	2	2	5	8	4

Source: JCS - GUAVA Computer File.

Variations Among RVNAF Units

In addition to the wide corps variations in effectiveness, the performance among regular units varies widely, as does the effectiveness of the Regional Forces and Popular Forces - in comparison with each other and with regular units. During CY 1966 for example:

1. The ARVN divisions had a favorable kill ratio of 3.1 to 1. The III Corps divisions were lowest. Recently, MACV rated two divisions as exceptional, six as satisfactory and two (18th and 25th) as marginal; both marginal divisions are in III Corps.
2. The airborne division had a favorable kill ratio of 4.2 to 1, but three of its battalions killed less than 100 enemy each during the year, indicating underemployment or ineffectiveness. Moreover, the airborne division, trained as a fast reaction force, was often misused for routine, static missions.
3. Armor units had the most favorable kill ratio of all ARVN forces at 12.5 to 1, but three of the ten regiments killed only 36 enemy among them. Two were in the III Corps area and the other was in II Corps.
4. Ranger units had a favorable kill ratio of 3.1 to 1 (same as ARVN divisions). Of the 20 battalions, at least 7 were underemployed, killing less than 50 enemy each during 1966. Ranger units, trained to perform as a fast moving reconnaissance screen to keep the enemy off balance, have also been misused for static security missions. More important, their treatment of the Vietnamese peasant is so bad that it adversely affects pacification progress in areas where they operate.

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5. The Vietnamese Marine Corps established an excellent kill ratio of 5.5 to 1 during 1966 and appears to be a consistently effective fighting force.

6. The total RF kill ratio for CY 1966 was 3.7 to 1, (equal to the total ARVN ratio for CY 1966) which means that the RF probably killed about 15% of the total VC/NVA killed in CY 1966. The PF kill ratio was 1.7 in CY 1966, but many provinces were below the 1 to 1 ratio and only in I and IV Corps were most provinces above it. The PF probably accounted for about 10% of the VC/NVA killed during CY 1966.

### Reasons for RVNAF Ineffectiveness

Several factors have inhibited the effectiveness of RVNAF forces. The regular forces underwent a rapid buildup at the same time they assumed many civil functions of government. The most serious result was a dilution of leadership, which remains the most pressing problem today. In addition, the rapid force expansion diluted the strength of combat units as conscripts flowed in and more deserters flowed out. Further, the expansion diluted the existing support structure and, even today, artillery, helicopter, medical and other types of support are not adequate to support mobile ARVN operations

without US assistance. Finally, units are not getting adequate training and retraining.

The primary problems of the RF and PF are their low priority in getting proper weapons, supplies, training and other support. Both the RF and PF are short of barrier and construction materials needed for their outposts, yet they are the prime enemy targets. Most VC/NVA attacks occur against PF outposts, accounting for the high PF killed rate and unfavorable weapons loss ratio (.64 to 1). In view of the critical role the RF and PF should play in maintaining security for pacification, prompt improvement is needed. The newly approved program of RF/PF advisors may be exactly what is required.

Extensive programs to improve RVNAF forces include the successful effort to curb desertions, leadership training, more promotions on merit, pay increases, better housing, integrated operations with US units and a variety of other measures. Deficiencies in RF and PF support have been identified and action is underway to correct them.

As a result, some improvement in overall Vietnamese performance is visible. Desertions are down sharply, some units are beginning to fight very well, missing in action figures are down sharply, kill ratios are up, and Vietnamese units are responding well to the enemy challenge in I Corps. Continued gradual improvement is likely.

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### RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS

The August SEA Analysis Report contained a detailed analysis (pg 26) of RVNAF effectiveness. Some comments on the article have been generated by the Army staff (ODCSOPS) and from within the SEAPRO staff. The article compared total U.S. ground forces with the entire RVNAF (the ARVN, Marines, RF, PF, etc.) using the criteria of relative VC/NVA KIA rates and large unit operations' length and contacts. These criteria have been questioned and other significant issues raised. These are discussed below.

While most of the criticisms are valid, it should not reflect adversely on the quality of the August analysis. The author was well aware of these considerations. Unfortunately, detailed, systematic data on the RVNAF is so sparse that a sophisticated analysis simply cannot be performed.

#### 1. The Roles and Missions Problems

The RVNAF effectiveness article does not account for differences in force roles and missions. The ODCSOPS comments focused on this question:

"friendly forces in RVN are conducting three general types of operations: containment, pacification and security, and offensive. In executing these operations the forces perform eight major tasks: contain the enemy at the borders, locate and destroy VC/NVA forces, neutralize enemy base areas, provide direct support to Revolutionary Development, open and secure LOCs, interdict enemy LOCs, secure key installations, and emphasize psychological operations. These tasks are translated into missions for the various forces, and it is against the accomplishment of an assigned mission that the effectiveness of a unit (regardless of its size) must be measured. As an example, the effectiveness of a Vietnamese PF platoon, with the mission of providing security for a hamlet against guerrilla harassment, can be measured by determining how well that platoon performs its mission. Its effectiveness cannot be ascertained by comparing the number of enemy killed by the PF platoon with the enemy killed by a U.S. Army platoon that is part of a large force engaged in an operation against enemy main forces in their base area."

The changing role of the ARVN also should be considered; about one-third of the maneuver battalions are in direct support of Revolutionary Development activities. These battalions should not be compared to U.S. units combating the VC/NVA main force.

#### 2. The Criteria Question

VC/NVA killed in action may reflect VC/NVA success - for like Pyrrhus at Asculum the friendlies may not be able to absorb the casualties of their victory. On the other hand, the lack of enemy killed may reflect friendly success because the area may be secure or the enemy may choose not to fight against select forces (the ROK forces in SVN have this reputation). To

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evaluate effectiveness properly a multiple criteria of population security, incident rates, friendly and enemy casualties, weapons losses, land area, LOC control, VC/NVA strategy, etc. should be used.

Using large unit operations (either length or contacts) also is dangerous as the large share of the ARVN maneuver battalions being committed to RD support can be expected to act as a drag on overall RVNAF performance.

Weapon losses and gains must also be used carefully. Table 4 in the August article included the following data:

<u>VC/NVA Weapons losses<sup>a/</sup></u>	1966	1967		
	<u>Aug - Sept</u>	<u>4thQ</u>	<u>1stQ</u>	<u>2ndQ</u>
To ARVN	138	85	136	90
To U.S.	71	156	227	347

a/ Weekly averages

The conclusion is that ARVN weapon gains are unchanged while U.S. gains are increasing sharply. Four significant factors are not considered.

a. VC/NVA weapons losses are probably closely correlated with the force engaged and its size i.e., the NVA are better armed and are met more frequently by U.S. forces in conventional sized engagements than by RVNAF. Also the VC/NVA main force units are better supplied and are probably under less pressure to police the battlefield, therefore, the U.S. should capture more weapons.

b. Gains should be considered in conjunction with losses. We know what ARVN weapons losses are (they are declining) but we don't know what U.S. weapons losses are. They are undoubtedly significant and may be increasing as rapidly as our capture of VC/NVA weapons.

c. Discovery of large weapons caches significantly affects weapons captured data. US units operating in enemy base camps are most likely to find such caches.

d. ARVN maneuver force levels remained relatively stable during the period examined while US maneuver elements rose sharply.

3. Relative RVNAF Effectiveness by Corps Area

There is little doubt the RVNAF in II and III Corps compare badly with their compatriots in I and IV Corps based on conventional criteria. But, the disparity may have been overestimated. One factor may be the differing proportions of RF, PF, CIDG, and ARVN in the RVNAF in the Corps areas. For example:

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<u>GVN Force (000)</u>	<u>As of May 31, 1967</u>	
	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>
Regular	53.3 (56%)	133.6* (68%)
RF&PF	42.6 (44%)	62.1 (32%)
	<u>95.9</u>	<u>195.7</u>

\* Some portion of the force is the General Reserve.

As the roles and missions section pointed out, the different mixes would have a significant impact on the measured effectiveness when the KIA and large unit operations criteria are used. In addition, there are fewer enemy main force units available for combat in II and III Corps and more US forces available to strike lucrative enemy targets.

4. Conclusions

In spite of the above, we believe the article in the August Report was one of the best studies published on this critical topic. The comments point out how far we still have to go and expose the limitations on analysis that will persist until we get more and better data on the RVNAF.

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RVNAF Effectiveness -- A Rebuttal

MACV staff kindly answered our questionnaire with some valid specific comments on some of our analytical weaknesses and a rebuttal to the August article on RVNAF effectiveness. The article's key points (underlined) and the staff responses are shown below.

1. Per man Vietnamese forces were about half as effective as US forces in killing VC/NVA during Aug 66-Jun 67. A straight comparison of VC/NVA per 1,000 friendly force between RVNAF and US forces is a distortion and presents an exaggerated reflection on RVNAF effectiveness. The following are a few of the reasons why this comparison is invalid:

(a) It is generally accepted that US maneuver battalions have a combat effectiveness ratio of about 3:1 to RVNAF maneuver battalions due to their greater unit firepower and depth of combat support/combat service support forces; RVNAF also lacks the mobility assets available to US units.

(b) Approximately one-third of the RVNAF maneuver battalions are committed to direct support of Revolutionary Development, a mission which constrains the overall potential to find, fix, and fight the enemy forces. In this analysis an RVNAF unit that is 45 percent as effective as US units which have three times the RVNAF combat effectiveness would appear to be doing very well. In fact, anything over 33 percent would reflect superior performance.

2. US advisors' ratings show that the most ineffective RVNAF units are in II and III Corps. Though there are probably no positive measures that can be taken to completely obviate bias in advisors' ratings, one thing is apparent. In II and III Corps where the enemy is less willing to fight, there are more ineffective RVNAF units. There is a probable correlation here. In II and III Corps the advisor is rating his unit based upon much less empirical data and must therefore rely upon a higher degree of subjective judgments. In I Corps, on the other hand, the advisor has empirical data and can rate his unit on a "proof of the pudding is in the eating" basis.

3. ARVN maneuver battalions (weighted for strength) were 45% as effective as US maneuver battalions in killing VC/NVA. Strength equivalency is not a reasonable measure of combat power, e.g., one thousand men armed with spears can't equal half their number armed with M-16 rifles. The MACV factor of .33 is more logical and has been based on a reasonable combat power equivalency.

4. ARVN kills of VC/NVA per battalion day of contact equalled US results. This indicates that much of ARVN's ineffectiveness is not due to inability to fight, but its reluctance to make contact. This reflects bad leadership. Admittedly, there is a problem regarding RVNAF leadership, but such a conclusion cannot be drawn from statistics of this nature, it may be implied, but not positively asserted. The nature of the employment of US forces as opposed to RVNAF forces, the inherent mobility of the two forces and their capability for sustained support are critical factors, as well as leadership.

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### SEAPRO Comment

The sparsity of decent systematic data on RVNAF locations, performance, and combat support helps to limit the credibility of any analysis we can do now on the RVNAF. We appreciate the weakness of the August article, and the attempt by MACV staff to improve our understanding.

Nonetheless, we remain puzzled. If we understand points one, three and four correctly, the RVNAF is doing better than we have a right to expect based on their firepower and support. The obvious reaction is for the US to provide more firepower and support for the RVNAF so that they can do an even better job. Why do we not do it?

Similarly, point two says that advisor ratings are not giving us the proper picture - that poor ratings in II and III Corps simply reflect lack of fighting opportunities. If so, why do we require the advisors to waste time making the ratings? Furthermore, while the argument may be right, what evidence is there to support it?

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RVNAF STATUS - CY 1967

This article updates (to the end of CY 1967) a series of statistics on RVNAF effectiveness first introduced in our August report. We have added an additional table which presents items which MACV and other authorities have cited as indicators of improved RVNAF effectiveness. We stress that these measures must not be taken to indicate RVNAF effectiveness now because the impact of the VC/NVA Tet attacks requires a complete re-evaluation of RVNAF status.

The appraisal below is incomplete because it measures RVNAF effectiveness only in terms of VC/NVA killed per 1000 friendly troops, and compares it with US effectiveness on the same count. We recognize that other factors, such as the roles and missions of various forces and enemy willingness to fight, should be considered, but we have no systematic data on the other factors. A more sophisticated analysis is not possible at this stage. For more complete comments on the inadequacies of our approach, we suggest you review the articles beginning on page 57 of our Special Supplement: Selected Articles From 1967 SEA Analysis Reports, published February 6, 1968.

Countryside Comparison

Table 1 indicates that the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) including Regular, Regional and Popular Forces have been about 44% as effective as US forces during the 17-month period (August 1966 - December 1967) for which detailed data is available. The table shows an 8% drop (from 52% to 44%) in 1967 of RVNAF comparative effectiveness in killing VC per 1000 friendly troops. Improved US performance accounts for the comparative decline.

TABLE 1

VC/NVA KILLED PER THOUSAND FRIENDLY STRENGTH  
(By RVNAF and US Forces in Offensive Actions)

	1966		1967				17 Mo Avg By Qtr
	Aug Sep	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	
<u>RVNAF</u>							
VC/NVA Killed a/	4129	6158	7323	8179	6751	7592	7082
Average Strength (000) b/	606	619	509	608	612	630	614
VC/NVA KIA Per 1000 Str	7	10	12	13	11	12	12
<u>US</u>							
VC/NVA Killed a/	3984	6921	12477	13666	11024	12370	10666
Average Strength (000) b/	305	361	412	438	459	472	408
VC/NVA KIA Per 1000 Str	13	19	30	31	24	26	26
Effectiveness of RVNAF Compared to US (%)	52	52	40	43	46	46	44

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA Computer File, based on OPREP-5.

b/ Based on figures in Table 1 of OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary.

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Corps (CTZ) Comparison

Table 2 shows that RVNAF performance varies considerably among the four corps areas of South Vietnam. During the period, RVNAF forces per man were 62% as effective as US forces in I Corps and had a higher VC/NVA kill rate in I Corps than US forces had in II, III and IV Corps. RVNAF forces in II and III Corps operated at 37% and 27% of the US effectiveness levels in those Corps. In IV Corps, RVNAF killed 29% more VC/NVA per man than newly committed US units there. The high VC/NVA kill rates per man by both US and RVNAF forces in I Corps reflect the intensity of combat there, the enemy's willingness to fight and extensive use of small unit operations.

TABLE 2

VC/NVA KILLED PER THOUSAND FRIENDLY STRENGTH  
(RVNAF and US Forces in Offensive Actions by Corps)

	<u>CORPS TACTICAL ZONES (CTZ)</u>				<u>Total</u>
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	
<u>RVNAF</u>					
VC/NVA Killed (Aug 66 - Dec 67) <u>a/</u>	14354	5801	5018	14959	40132
Average Strength (000) <u>b/</u>	96	140	205	173	614
VC/NVA Killed Per 1000 Strength	150	41	24	86	65
<u>US</u>					
VC/NVA Killed (Aug 66 - Dec 67) <u>a/</u>	28659	15423	15621	739	60442
Average Strength (000) <u>b/</u>	118	139	172	11	440
VC/NVA Killed Per 1000 Strength	243	111	91	67	137
Effectiveness of RVNAF Compared to US (%)	62	37	27	129	48 <sup>c/</sup>

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA Computer File, based on OPREP-5.

b/ Source: OSD(C) Statistical Summary, Table 106. These are average strengths for the 11 month period of January - November 1967, the only period for which CTZ data are readily available. The total US strength differs from Table 1 US strength, which is the average for the 17 month period August 1966 - December 1967.

c/ The difference in comparative effectiveness ratings between Table 2 and Table 1 is caused by the differing average strengths described in footnote b above.

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Battalion and Larger Operations.

The findings set forth above are based on total strength figures. To check the results, Table 3 shows VC/NVA killed in large scale operations per friendly maneuver battalion adjusted for actual strengths. The same result is produced: ARVN maneuver battalions (weighted) were 47% as effective as US maneuver battalions. MACV's rule of thumb is that ARVN battalions are 33% as effective as US battalions. The 47% result here may indicate that ARVN units are more effective in killing VC than we recognize.

TABLE 3

VC/NVA KILLED IN BATTALION SIZED AND LARGER OPERATIONS  
(By ARVN and US Maneuver Battalion Equivalents)

	CY 66		CY 67				Quarterly Average (17 Months)
	Aug Sep	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	
Enemy KIA by ARVN <sup>a/</sup>	2459	3719	5005	5496	4689	4990	4651
Avg Maneuver Battalions (Adjusted) <sup>b/</sup>	100	100	98	98	98	98	99
KIA/Maneuver Battalion	25	37	51	56	48	51	47
Enemy KIA by US <sup>a/</sup>	3430	6204	10571	10283	8718	10501	8772
Avg Maneuver Battalions <sup>b/</sup>	69	80	89	91	94	98	87
KIA/Maneuver Battalion	50	78	49	113	93	107	101
Effectiveness of RVNAF Compared to US (%)	49	48	43	50	52	48	47

<sup>a/</sup> Source: JCS-GUAVA based on OPREP-5.

<sup>b/</sup> Source: JCS-J3. Average present for duty strength of an ARVN battalion is .6 the strength of a US Army battalion; figures shown represent .6 of ARVN maneuver battalions available. Conversely, USMC maneuver battalions are one-third larger than US Army battalions and are therefore counted as 1.3 USA battalion equivalents.

Table 4 shows trends in large unit operations initiated by US and Vietnamese forces. It shows that:

1. ARVN operations are shorter than US operations (9 bn days versus 46 bn days). The number declined 15% in 1967 but the bn days increased 49%.

2. US and ARVN forces both increased their average VC/NVA killed per battalion by about 40% (US 41.4%; ARVN 42.8%) in 1967.

3. The ARVN and US kill ratios were fairly comparable with the US 16% above ARVN on average.

4. US days of contact throughout the period averaged twice the ARVN

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rate, but ARVN kills per day of contact equalled the US rate. This indicates that much of ARVN's ineffectiveness is not due to inability to fight, but inability to make contact.

TABLE 4  
TRENDS IN LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS a/  
(Weekly Averages)

	1966		1967				17 Month Average
	Aug Sep	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	
<u>Number of Operations</u>							
ARVN	76	68	64	51	64	66	64
US	11	9	9	9	11	10	10
<u>Bn Days of Operation</u>							
ARVN	402	464	637	680	680	589	585
US	232	343	458	511	537	654	469
<u>Operational Days of Contact c/</u>							
ARVN	46	46	44	48	51	49	47
US	66	70	87	97	97	107	88
<u>VC/NVA KIA</u>							
By ARVN	282	286	385	423	361	384	358
By US	394	477	813	791	671	808	674
<u>Kill Ratio (En/Fr)</u>							
ARVN	6.4	6.0	6.4	6.3	6.3	5.9	6.2
US	7.3	8.1	8.0	5.9	7.3	6.3 b/	7.2
<u>VC/NVA KIA Per Day of Contact</u>							
ARVN	6.1	6.2	8.8	8.8	7.1	7.8	7.6
US	6.0	6.8	9.3	8.2	6.9	7.6	7.6
<u>VC/NVA Weapons Losses</u>							
To ARVN	138	87	135	92	120	160	121
To US	71	157	225	348	188	263	217

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA file, based on OPREP-5.

b/ Includes an estimated figure for US deaths in Search and Destroy Provincial operations in III CTZ in October 1967

c/ A contact is an action which results in the application of firepower by either VC or friendly forces. An operational day of contact for a large unit operation is credited for each 24 hour period in which contact during that operation has been made.

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Table 5 again shows that in large operations, RVNAF performance in II and III Corps falls behind its performance in the other two corps. Taken together, total VC/NVA KIA rate in I and IV Corps is 3.5 times the weekly rate in II and III Corps. Moreover, the kills per day of contact are 2.5 times as high.

TABLE 5

LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS a/  
(Weekly Average)

	<u>CORPS TACTICAL ZONES (CTZ)</u>				
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>Countrywide</u>
<u>RVNAF</u>					
Operational Days of Contact c/	11	10	9	17	47
VC/NVA KIA	146	51	29	132	358
Kill Ratio (Fr/En)	6.2	4.7	3.2	8.9	6.2
VC/NVA KIA Per Day of Contact	12.8	4.9	3.2	7.8	7.6
Weapons Captured	33	16	16	56	121
<u>US</u>					
Operational Days of Contact c/	28	23	35	2	88
VC/NVA KIA	257	209	198	10	674
Kill Ratio (En/Fr)	6.7	7.7	6.6 b/	8.3	7.2
VC/NVA KIA Per Contact Day	9.2	8.9	5.6	5.3	7.6
Weapons Captured	51	63	102	1	217

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA file, based on OPREP-5.

b/ Includes an estimate of US KIA in search and destroy provincial operations in III CTZ in October 1967.

c/ A contact is an action which results in the application of firepower by either VC or friendly forces. An operational day of contact for a large unit operation is credited for each 24 hour period in which contact during that operation has been made.

Small Unit Actions

All Vietnamese forces participate in small unit actions, and the bulk of Regional and Popular Forces operations are of this type. Comparison of US and RVNAF small unit actions is difficult for two reasons. First, 90% of all small unit actions reported by US forces occur in I Corps. Conversely, RVNAF reports practically everything as a small unit action (bridge guards,

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check points, routine patrols, etc.). Nevertheless, Table 6 indicates that in terms of countrywide performance per man, the Vietnamese killed VC/NVA at a rate comparable to the US in small unit actions. But the results are quite different if we compare US kills of VC/NVA per 1000 friendly strength in I Corps with GVN countrywide performance. During the 17 month period US forces in I Corps have killed 9699 VC/NVA in small unit actions. The resulting quarterly average of 14.5 VC/NVA KIA per 1000 US strength indicates that US forces which emphasize small unit actions were 3.7 times more effective than the GVN countrywide.

TABLE 6

VC/NVA KILLED IN SMALL UNIT ACTIONS

	CY 66		1967				17 Month Quarterly Average
	Aug Sep	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	
<u>RVNAF</u>							
VC/NVA KIA a/	1670	2439	2318	2683	2062	2602	2434
Avg Strength (000) b/	606	619	609	608	612	630	614
VC/NVA KIA Per 1000 Strength	3	4	4	4	3	4	4
<u>US</u>							
VC/NVA KIA a/	554	717	1906	3383	2306	1869	1897
Avg Strength (000) b/	305	361	412	438	459	472	408
VC/NVA KIA Per 1000 Strength	2	2	5	8	5	4	5

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA.

b/ Source: OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary, Table 1.

Table 7 presents the best data available to us about several items which have recently been used to cite improvements in RVNAF effectiveness. It shows:

(1) The RVNAF desertion rate dropped to about half its previous rate during the last 6 months of 1966 as a result of: a redefinition of desertion, a new law providing harsh penalties, and greater prosecution of deserters. But there is no continuing downward trend; it was a one time drop. The severity of the desertion problem warrants additional investigation and new measures may be called for.

(2) RVNAF MIA have decreased about 25% (from 3100 in 1966 to 2341 in 1967).

(3) Available data (1967 only) on weapons captured by RVNAF versus weapons lost indicates that RVNAF captures 1.6 weapons for every one it loses. No favorable upward trend is evident during 1967.

(4) Through November, the average RVNAF KIA per quarter for 1967 is slightly less than the 1966 average.

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TABLE 7

RVNAF DESERTIONS, MIA AND WPNS CAPTURED/LOST

	<u>1965</u>		<u>1966</u>				<u>1967</u>				<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
	<u>3rd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>4th</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>3rd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>4th</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>3rd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>4th</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>Avg</u> <u>Per</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>Avg</u> <u>Per</u> <u>Qtr</u>
RVNAF Desertion Rate/1000	18	17	21	21	13	11	12	11	11	11	16.5	11.3
RVNAF MIA	1199	2165	1206	507	627	760	788	422	358	773	775	585
WPNS Captured/WPNS Lost							2	1	2	1.5		1.6
RVNAF KIA <u>a/</u>	2623	3234	3407	3091	2723	2732	3092	3222	2834	2365 <sup>b/</sup>	2988	2878

a/ Source: MACV J1.

b/ Includes Oct, Nov only.

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THE STATUS OF RVNAF (AS OF 29 FEB 68)

Summary

Available data shows that the brunt of the enemy Tet offensive fell on the Vietnamese regular forces. The RVNAF reportedly killed more enemy during the period than US/FW forces. RF/PF performance was good in I and II CTZ during Tet but poor in III and IV Corps. RVNAF cannot protect the cities and the pacification program against another such enemy attack in the near future. If new enemy attacks do not hit RVNAF hard, MACV estimates that the RVNAF should recover to its pre-Tet status by August.

Some of the questions which need to be answered to assess the capability of the RVNAF to participate effectively in the allied combined strategy during the first half of CY 68 are: What are its strength, state of equipment and posture? How will these things change over the next three months? Where is RVNAF deployed? What are its missions?

This article has been prepared from data in the MACV Report "Assessment of RVNAF Status (As of 29 Feb 68)", the GUAVA computer file and General Wheeler's trip memorandum. These sources do not provide comprehensive data on RVNAF location or performance.

There are also large gaps in strength data (29 February assigned strengths total only 407,000 men). The reported strengths before and after Tet seldom balance numerically with MACV gains and losses.

RVNAF Performance

Table 1 presents RVNAF performance in terms of killing VC/NVA. Countrywide, RVNAF killed over 24,000 enemy compared to 22,000 for the US/FWMAF during the 28 Jan - 2 Mar fighting. This dramatic shift in relative enemy KIA results from the enemy shift from border warfare to attack of towns during the Tet offensive. Relative to US performance, RVNAF did best in II Corps. The brunt of the fighting in III Corps was clearly borne by US forces. The poor III Corps RVNAF performance, combined with the high pre-Tet combat ineffective rating (14 of 49 ARVN battalions), and a high loss rate (discussed in detail under both regular forces and RF/PF) indicates that a major improvement is needed with RVNAF in III Corps.

Regular Forces

a. Strength

We have pieced together enough strength data to assess the effect of the enemy Tet offensive on the regular forces, to identify problem units and to understand the rebuilding job to be done. Table 2

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shows that the "present for duty" strength in Army combat was 78% of authorized strength on 29 February 1968, compared to 85% on 31 December 1967. Table 3 shows that the present for duty strength for the ten infantry divisions hit a reported low of 68% on 10 February 1968 and increased by about 11,000 troops (10%) during the remainder of February. This strength increase resulted from arrival of replacements and the return of many troops on leave or AWOL.

There was great personnel turbulence in the ARVN in February. Five of the ten infantry divisions had losses of at least 10% (counting casualties and AWOL/desertion) (Table 2). The Airborne division lost 15% of its 31 January assigned strength during February, and the MACV Report states that "35% of the EM in the airborne battalions are replacements that were assigned during the VC/NVA Tet offensive without unit training." The turbulence will continue as missing personnel are officially listed as deserters and as units are brought up to previous levels of present-for-duty. Such a short term turnover results in decreased unit efficiency. Table 2 shows that the 1st, 5th and 18th Divisions all need rapid increases in manning, and then will require unit refresher training. MACV estimates that losses can be replaced by May in I CTZ and by August in the remaining three CTZs. This assumes no further interruption in recruiting and training and no excessive personnel losses.

b. Equipment

RVNAF equipment losses were not severe. MACV reported that equipment losses from 1 through 23 February for RVNAF were:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Severely Damaged*</u>
Crew Served Weapons	101	-
Armored Personnel Carriers	24	11
M41 Tanks	11	10
V-100 Commando Cars	8	-
2-1/2 Ton Trucks	96	67
3/4 Ton Trucks	41	62
1/4 Ton Trucks	50	39

\* MACV estimates 50% are repairable

MACV estimates that some 2 - 3 months will be required for re-equipping. More importantly, modernization for RVNAF is already under way and the first increment will be complete on 1 July. As of 1 March, MACV had delivered the following critical items to RVNAF: M16 rifles - 33,288; PRC 25 radios - 564; M602 2-1/2 ton trucks - 190; M79 grenade launchers - 2073; M60 machine guns - 802; M29 mortars - 17; M113 APC - 25.

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### c. Deployment

JGS accomplished a redeployment during the offensive which is of great interest. Table 4 shows that 7 US battalions were added to I Corps in late January and February to meet the threat of the enemy buildup at Khe Sanh. During the same period, JGS drew 4 battalions from II CTZ and 3 from IV CTZ to reinforce III Corps with 7 battalions. This troop move to III Corps probably reflected JGS anticipation of and concern about the poor III Corps showing noted earlier. Within all corps, some 18 ARVN battalions withdrew from direct support of RD to protect towns. Detailed information about the future mission and present location of these battalions is unavailable.

### Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF)

Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) do not appear to have suffered as severe losses as the regular forces, although reporting is still spotty. Further, recruits can replace losses relatively easily because less training is required for RF/PF operations.

The MACV Report provides data permitting deeper insight into RF/PF effectiveness. Table 5 shows that RF performance in I and II Corps was good in terms of kill ratio and enemy KIA per 1000 RF troops present for duty; poor in III Corps; and mediocre in IV Corps. RF killed the most enemy in the Pleiku and Kontum areas of II CTZ.

PF performance (Table 6) matches RF performance by CTZ, except that I CTZ is better than II CTZ due to the extraordinary performance of PF units associated with the USMC Combined Action Platoon (CAP) Program. In I CTZ, PF units killed 45 VC per 1000 PF; III CTZ killed only 14 per 1000.

RF/PF weapons loss ratios were not favorable. Over-all, RF/PF lost 5100 weapons while capturing only 2400 (see Table 7). In IV Corps, RF/PF lost nearly four weapons for each one captured.

### SEAPRO Assessment

#### Can RVNAF perform its assigned missions?

An estimate of RVNAF status requires evaluation of its ability to perform its assigned missions. We understand that the primary mission of RVNAF is to restore security in the cities and towns and to restore security in the heavily populated areas of the countryside.

RVNAF was unable to protect the cities during Tet and required massive US help to eject the enemy. About 13 US battalions (10 in Saigon

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and 3 in Hue) were committed to city security in the middle of February. The RVNAF was dependent on US help as long as the VC/NVA remained deployed to threaten the cities. Another attack on the cities would probably require the US to again protect them. Protection of the heavily populated rural areas may require extensive use of combined US/ARVN operations; for the next few months ARVN alone is unlikely to be able to aggressively do this job.

How soon can RVNAF regain its pre-Tet combat effectiveness posture?

The ARVN took about the same casualties (8421) as did RF/PF (8244). Regular units taking more than 10% casualties were the Marines, 1st ARVN division, the 51st Regiment, the airborne division, the armor force, and some ranger units. These are essentially the units needed to provide an effective regional and central reserve. Although the Marines, airborne and Rangers received personnel replacements, they did need time to train key NCOs and officers. The 1st, 5th and 18th division also will need attention.

Enemy action may determine how rapidly ARVN recovers. MACV estimates that the regular force can return to pre-Tet efficiency by August if the VC/NVA do not recycle attacks on the cities or on RVNAF. If the VC did attack either of these targets completion of RVNAF rehabilitation would be delayed further.

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TABLE 1

ENEMY KIA

	<u>Dec a/</u>	<u>Jan a/</u>	<u>Jan 28- 3 Feb b/</u>	<u>Feb 4-10</u>	<u>Feb 11-17</u>	<u>Feb 18-24</u>	<u>Feb Mar</u>
<b>I Corps</b>							
Enemy KIA by:							
US/FWF	1863	4736	2634	3393	1581	1144	160
RVNAF	1016	3470	3092	2198	1126	1023	50
Total	2879	8206	5726	5591	2707	2167	210
<b>II Corps</b>							
Enemy KIA by:							
US/FWF	1200	1296	1106	714	235	107	2
RVNAF	555	1841	2074	2046	147	508	2
Total	1755	3137	3180	2760	382	615	6
<b>III Corps</b>							
Enemy KIA by:							
US/FWF	1227	3379	2763	2271	1275	1437	6
RVNAF	385	1472	2065	1298	1211	771	3
Total	1612	4851	4828	3569	2486	2208	10
<b>IV Corps</b>							
Enemy KIA by:							
US/FWF	146	255	285	126	37	132	3
RVNAF	1547	2011	1990	1072	1362	647	3
Total	1693	2266	2275	1198	1399	779	6
<b>Countrywide</b>							
Enemy KIA by:							
US/FWF	4436	9666	6788	6504	3128	2820	20
RVNAF	3503	8794	9221	6614	3816	2949	11
Total	7939	18460	16009	13118	6974	5769	41

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA File.

b/ Source: OPREP 5.

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	25- 2	Mar 3-9	Mar 10-16	Mar 17-23	Total Jan 28- Mar 2	Total Mar 3-23
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7	1658	1109	612	18389	3379
5	348	714	244	7964	1306
2	2006	1823	856	18353	4685

4	442	123	195	2516	760
9	778	372	79	5024	1229
3	1220	495	274	7540	1789

4	734	596	352	8430	1682
9	637	259	33	5704	1229
3	1371	855	85	14134	2911

8	57	109	105	888	271
7	514	360	303	5418	1177
5	571	469	408	6306	1448

3	2891	1937	1264	22223	6092
0	2277	1705	959	24110	4941
3	5168	3642	2223	46333	11033

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TABLE 2

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RVNAF Personnel Authorized and Assigned  
31 Dec 67-29 Feb 68

	Authorized	Assigned						Losses <sup>e/</sup>	
		31 Dec		31 Jan		29 Feb		31 Jan-29 Feb	
		No.	% of Auth.	No.	% Auth.	No.	% Auth.	No.	d/
Army									
1st Div	14,249	12,466	87	11,817	83	13,344	94	1,203	10
2nd Div	11,334	11,013	97	10,684	94	10,803	95	775	7
5th Div	11,334	10,227	90	9,926	88	8,441	74	900	9
7th Div	11,518	11,378	99	11,302	98	10,778	94	1,242	11
9th Div	10,879	9,996	92	10,488	96	10,149	93	1,593	15
18th Div	10,240	9,390	92	9,040	88	8,416	82	694	8
21st Div	11,518	10,615	92	11,521	100	10,063	87	1,537	13
22nd Div	11,242	10,864	97	10,652	95	11,187	100	296	3
23rd Div	8,603	9,042	105	8,803	102	6,892	80	554	6
25th Div	11,518	10,245	89	10,414	90	9,874	86	1,099	11
42nd Regt	2,276	2,035	89	2,119	93	2,305	101	171	8
51st Regt	2,823	2,535	90	2,361	84	2,214	78	243	10
Airborne Div	9,713	7,927	82	9,207	95	8,761	90	1,426	15
Armo-	6,964	7,290	105	7,213	104	6,241	90	552	8
Rangers	14,775	12,880	87	12,877	87	13,507	91	910	7
Special Forces	3,101	2,912	94	2,893	93	2,497	81	65	2
subtotal	152,057	140,815	93	141,317	93	135,472	89	13,265	9
Other Army	149,381	162,022		a/		a/			
total Army	301,438	302,837							
Air Force	16,448	16,161	98	16,377	100	16,218	99	283	2
Navy	16,003	15,968	100	16,421	103	16,386	102	192	1
Marine	7,321	7,985	109	7,561	103	7,531	103	992	13
total Reg.	34,772	34,114		b/		b/			
Regional Force	183,546	151,376		102,182		97,601		3,817	4
Popular Force	160,953	148,789		137,095c/		133,919c/		7,558	6
Total RVNAF	685,739	643,116							

a/ Unknown; will require 30 more days to determine.

b/ Not comparable with authorized or 31 Dec totals; excludes Hq and administrative units and some rifle companies.

c/ Excludes some platoons.

d/ % of 31 Jan 68 Assigned Strength.

e/ Casualties, AWOL and Deserters; Casualties = Army, 8421; RF 3,000; PF 5,244; Other 983  
AWOL & Deserters = Army, 4844; RF 871; PF 2,314; Other 484

f/ Calculated from RF company strengths by CTZ.

g/ 90.8% of 31 Dec authorized strength, based on data given in General Wheeler's report.

h/ Calculated from PF platoon strengths by CTZ.

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placements Jan-29 Feb	Present for Duty		% Present of Authorized	
	31 Dec 67	29 Feb	31 Dec 67	29 Feb
2,040	11,718	10,134	82	71
499	10,242	9,728	90	86
754	9,511	7,320	84	65
556	10,331 g/	9,334	90	81
797	9,076 g/	8,484	83	78
879	8,733	7,511	85	73
1,117	9,638 g/	9,207	84	80
587	9,886	10,728	88	95
495	8,210 g/	6,604	95	77
611	9,302 g/	8,920	81	77
402	1,848 g/	2,130	81	94
368	2,302 g/	2,032	82	72
1,639	7,198 g/	7,107	74	73
0	6,619 g/	5,302	95	76
0	11,695 g/	12,104	79	82
0	2,644 g/	2,351	85	76
14,021	128,953	118,996	85	78
Unk		14,724		90
Unk		15,948		100
407		5,799		79
Unk	91,558f/	86,290		
Unk	127,447h/	123,055		

Total 17,648  
Total 8,513

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TABLE 3

STRENGTH OF TEN  
ARVN INFANTRY DIVISIONS

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>PFD</u> <sup>a/</sup>	<u>PFD PER CENT</u> <u>OF AUTHORIZED</u>
31 DEC 1967 <sup>b/</sup>	112,435	96,667	86
10 FEB 1968 <sup>b/</sup>	112,435	77,000	68
15 FEB 1968 <sup>b/</sup>	112,435	83,935	75
29 FEB 1968	112,435	87,970	78

<sup>a/</sup> Present for duty.

<sup>b/</sup> Source: General Wheeler's Report.

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TABLE 4

US/RVN/FWMAF DEPLOYMENT RESPONSE BY MANEUVER  
BATTALION TO THE ENEMY TET OFFENSIVE

	USA <sup>a/</sup>	USMCA <sup>a/</sup>	ARVN <sup>b/</sup>	FWF <sup>a/</sup>	TOTAL
I Corps					
Pre Tet	24	23	33	4	84
Post Tet	28	26	34	4	92
II Corps					
Pre	17	-	30	18	65
Post t	17	-	26	18	61
III Corps					
Pre Tet	33	-	49	4	86
Post Tet	31	-	56	4	91
IV Corps					
Pre Tet	5	-	42	-	47
Post Tet	6	-	39	-	45
CW					
Pre Tet	79	23	154	26	282
Post Tet	82	26	155	26	289

a/ Pre Tet data as of 12 Jan.  
Post Tet data as of 29 Feb.

b/ Pre Tet data as of 31 Dec 67.  
Post Tet data as of 19 Feb 68.

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TABLE 5

RF EFFECTIVENESS DURING TET

CORPS	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
RF Kill Ratio (En/Fr)	3.75	6.36	.97	1.16	2.68
Enemy KIA	935	4132	543	1291	6901
Present for Duty (31 Jan)	20183	22124	20078	20072	91339
KIA/1000 RF	46.3	186.9	27.0	44.6	75.6

TABLE 6

PF EFFECTIVENESS DURING TET

CORPS	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
PF Kill Ratio (En/Fr)	1.45	1.10	.36	.64	.81
Enemy KIA	1043	747	297	1221	3308
Present for Duty (31 Jan)	23370	28334	21685	51767	125156
KIA/1000 PF	44.6	23.4	13.7	23.6	26.4

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TABLE 7

RF/PF PERFORMANCE 31 Jan - 29 Feb

	<u>RF</u>	<u>PF</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>I CORPS</u>			
Friendly - Losses	249	719	968
Enemy - Losses	935	1043	1978
Ratio En KIA/Fr KIA	3.75	1.45	2.04:1
Weapons Captured	-	-	812
Weapons Lost	-	-	1009
Ratio Wpns Captured/Lost	-	-	.8:1
Operations Conducted	4006	5476	9482
Operations w/Contact	312	369	681
Per Cent Contact	7.7	6.7	7.2
<u>II CORPS</u>			
Friendly - Losses	650	679	1329
Enemy - Losses	4132	747	4879
Ratio En KIA/Fr KIA	6.36	1.10	3.67:1
Weapons Captured			595
Weapons Lost			1118
Ratio Wpns Captured/Lost			.53:1
Operations Conducted	6203	12733	18936
Operations w/Contact	272	344	616
Per Cent Contact	4.4	2.7	3.3
<u>III CORPS</u>			
Friendly KIA	562	815	1377
Enemy KIA	543	297	840
Ratio En/Fr KIA	.97	.36	.61:1
Weapons Captured			322
Weapons Lost			634
Ratio Wpns Captured/Lost			.51:1
Operations Conducted	6277	7084	13361
Operations w/Contact	325	175	500
Per Cent Contact	5.2	2.5	3.7

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	<u>RF</u>	<u>PF</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>IV CORPS</u>			
Friendly KIA	1115	1894	3009
Enemy KIA	1291	1221	2512
Ratio En/Fr KIA	1.16	.64	.83:1
Weapons Captured			663
Weapons Lost			2324
Ratio Wpns Captured/Lost			.28:1
Operations Conducted	6540	13380	19920
Operations w/Contact	617	606	1223
% Operations w/Contact	9.4	4.5	6.1
<u>COUNTRYWIDE</u>			
Friendly KIA	2576	4107	6683
Enemy KIA	6901	3308	10209
Ratio En/Fr KIA	2.68	.81	1.53
Weapons Captured			2392
Weapons Lost			5085
Ratio Wpns Captured/Lost			.47:1
Operations Conducted	23026	38673	61699
Operations w/Contact	1526	1494	3020
Per Cent Contact	6.6	.9	4.9

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### RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS: AN UPDATE

#### Summary

In the first 8 months of 1968 RVNAF killed enemy at three times the 1967 monthly rate while US forces increased their kill rate 2.2 times. Eliminating the effects of Tet, ARVN battalions since March have been 56% as effective as US battalions in killing the enemy versus 48% last year. (RVNAF forces consistently perform above the MACV calculated 31% equivalency rating.) This better performance by ARVN is equivalent to getting the output of an additional 16 US battalions against the enemy. Stated another way, improved RVNAF performance and increased RVNAF size have added the equivalent of almost 200,000 Americans between 31 Dec 67 and 31 Aug 68.

#### The Analytical Approach

This updates our earlier approach\* to evaluating RVNAF effectiveness by comparing Vietnamese operational achievement to that of US forces. We recognize that this appraisal is incomplete because it fails to measure performance of the different types of missions assigned to the various forces (e.g., provision of territorial security, protection of a key installation, etc.). Data presently available do not support a more comprehensive evaluation.

We also recognize that our method does not relate RVNAF performance to a standard which we can expect them to attain. Rather, we are comparing RVNAF performance to their capability, as estimated by MACV. Since determining military capability is at best inexact and highly theoretical, we expect our results to be subject to several qualifications.

#### Capability Estimate

A recent MACV study\*\* assessed the relative capability of US and ARVN battalions with respect to the following five

\* August 1967 & February 1968 SEA Analysis Report articles on RVNAF Status.

\*\* MACEVAL Study No. 2-68, "Capability Study of US and ARVN Infantry Battalions" (C).

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TABLE 1

VC/NVA KILLED PER THOUSAND FRIENDLY STRENGTH a/

	1967				1967 Avg	1968	
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr		1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
<u>RVNAF</u>							
VC/NVA Killed a/	7323	8179	6751	7592	7461	34366	16319
Avg Strength (000) b/	609	608	612	630	615	654	725
VC/NVA KIA Per 1000 Str	12	13	11	12	12	55	23
<u>US</u>							
VC/NVA Killed c/	12477	13665	11024	12370	12384	37094	28438
Avg Strength (000) b/	412	438	459	472	445	500	526
VC/NVA KIA Per 1000 Str	30	31	24	26	28	74	54
Effectiveness of RVNAF Compared to US (%)	40	43	46	46	43	72	43

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA Computer File, based on OPREP-5. 1966 and 1967 data are VC/NVA killed in friendly offensive actions, whereas 1968 data are total VC/NVA killed.

b/ Based on figures in Table 2 of OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary.

c/ Estimated using July and August data.

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3rd Qtr	1968
Qtr	AVG

5531	22072
189	723
20	31

5613	27382
537	521
31	53

65	58
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TABLE 2

VC/NVA KILLED IN BATTALION SIZED AND LARGER OPERATIONS  
(By ARVN and US Maneuver Battalion Equivalents)

	CY 67					CY 68			1968 Avg <sup>e/</sup>
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1967 AVG	1st <sup>c/</sup> Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd <sup>d/</sup> Qtr	
Enemy KIA by ARVN <sup>a/</sup>	5005	5496	4689	4990	5045		11932	9314	10623
Avg Maneuver Bn (Adjusted) <sup>b/</sup>	9 <sup>a</sup>	98	98	98	98	99	101	103	102
KIA/Maneuver Bn	51	56	48	51	51		118	90	104
Enemy KIA by US <sup>a/</sup>	10571	10237	8718	10501	10018	27989	28522	16682	22602
Avg Maneuver Bns <sup>b/</sup>	89	91	94	98	93	113	120	124	122
KIA/Maneuver Bn	119	13	93	107	108	248	238	135	185
Effectiveness of RVNAF Compared to US (%)	43	50	52	48	48		50	67	56

<sup>a/</sup> Source: JCS-GUAVA based on OPREP-5.

<sup>b/</sup> Source: JCS-J3. Average present for duty strength of an ARVN battalion is .6 the strength of a US Army battalion; figures shown represent .6 of ARVN maneuver battalions available. Conversely, USMC maneuver battalions are one-third larger than US Army battalions and are therefore counted as 1.33 USA battalion equivalents.

<sup>c/</sup> ARVN results are not completely reported in GUAVA for the 1st Qtr; there is a known underreporting of total enemy KIA of 50% for the quarter in the portion of the file from which we derived this figure.

<sup>d/</sup> Estimated using July and August KIA data and end of July maneuver battalion data.

<sup>e/</sup> Calculated as a 2nd and 3rd Qtr average only.

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functions of land warfare: firepower, mobility, command and control, intelligence and service support. MACV measured the capability of US and ARVN organizations in different environments (each Vietnamese CTZ) and in the type of operation relevant to each corps. MACV found that the relative capability of a US infantry battalion is 3.2 times that of an ARVN battalion. The MACV model indicated that we achieve greatest improvement in RVNAF capability by increasing organic firepower. The modernization program is designed to do precisely this.

### US-RVNAF Operational Indicator Comparison

We do not have the data to compare ARVN battalions directly with US battalions; we are limited to comparing overall RVNAF performance to US performance.\* Table 1 shows that RVNAF relative effectiveness per 1000 men rose from an average of 44% in 1967 to a peak of 72% during the quarter in which the Tet offensive occurred. The number of enemy killed by US forces tripled while those killed by RVNAF increased to almost four times the 1967 averages. During the 2nd and 3rd quarters the number of enemy killed by both US forces and RVNAF fell, but the RVNAF rate remained at double the 1967 average. US performance dropped slowly in the 2nd quarter so that RVNAF relative effectiveness fell to 43% in the 2nd quarter, but rose to 67% in the 3rd quarter as the number of enemy killed by US forces declined more sharply than the number killed by the RVNAF.

### Battalion and Larger Operations

Data on VC/NVA combat deaths in the ground operations computer file is incomplete for the first quarter of 1968 as RVNAF reporting was incomplete during the Tet period. Consequently, we cannot calculate the relative effectiveness of Vietnamese battalions to US for this period. For 1967 (see Table 2), we find the weighted average of 48% effectiveness for regular Vietnamese battalions consistent with the 43% overall RVNAF effectiveness figure and we find the 1968 2nd quarter and 3rd quarter large unit results consistent with those for the overall force.

\* Given the large number of RF/PF with lower military capability than ARVN, this technique should understate Vietnamese battalion performance.

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Table 3 shows trends in large unit operations initiated by US and Vietnamese forces:

1. ARVN operations decreased from an average of 11 battalion days per operation in 1967 to 5 battalion days in 1968. US operations increased from an average 55 battalion days per operation in 1967 to 105 in 1968. In 1968, the number of ARVN operations has increased 89% while battalion days have decreased 3%. The trend we noted in 1967 toward longer US operations and shorter ARVN operations was accentuated during 1968.

2. ARVN operational days of contact increased 42% in 1968 while US days of contact increased only 22%. Thus, US days of contact are only 72% more than ARVN in 1968 versus double them in 1967. a/ ARVN operational contact days increased each quarter in 1968 which indicates that ARVN is finding the enemy better this year.

3. ARVN captured 131% more enemy weapons in 1968 than in 1967, while US forces captured 187% more.

We previously reported that RVNAF performance in II and III Corps falls behind its performance in the other two corps. Table 4 shows that RVNAF performance picked up sharply in III CTZ during the first half of 1968, due to the Tet and May offensives, but reverted to low levels in July and August. The number of VC/NVA killed by ARVN in II CTZ remained low throughout the period, but performance in terms of kill ratios and kills per day of contact were quite good for an area in which little enemy activity was occurring.

### Small Unit Actions

The enemy KIA rate in RVNAF small unit actions dropped from a quarterly average of 2440 in 1967 to 314 in 1968 (Table 5). The 1968 US rate drops by a factor of two after the first quarter. RVNAF ceased to kill the enemy in small unit actions at a rate comparable to US forces in the first two quarters of 1968. The reasons for the precipitous drop in RVNAF and US small unit performance are unknown.

- a/ Conduct of only one operation Toan Thang (Resolved to Win) in III CTZ has led to low US reporting of this indicator.  
b/ See our article, "RVNAF Status - CY 67", in the February 1968 SEA Analysis Report, p. 20.

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TABLE 3  
TRENDS IN LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS <sup>a/</sup>  
(Weekly Averages)

	1967					1968			
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	Wkly Avg	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr <sup>e/</sup>	Wkly Avg
<u>Number of Operations</u>									
ARVN	64	51	64	66	61	72	127	147	115
US	9	9	11	10	10	12	10	7	10
<u>Bn Days of Operation</u>									
ARVN	637	680	680	589	647	561	568	761	630
US	458	511	557	654	540	823	1155	1073	1017
<u>Bn Days Per Operation</u>									
ARVN	10	13	11	9	11	8	4	5	5
US	51	57	49	65	54	69	116	153	102
<u>Operational Days of Contact <sup>c/</sup></u>									
ARVN	44	48	51	49	48	52	71	82	68
US	87	97	97	107	97	123	118	112	118
<u>VC/NVA KIA</u>									
By ARVN	385	423	361	384	388	657 <sup>d/</sup>	918	701	759
By US	813	791	671	808	771	2153	2194	1255	1867
<u>Kill Ratio (En/Fr)</u>									
ARVN	6.4	6.3	6.3	5.9	6.2	6.7 <sup>d/</sup>	6.0	6.7	6.4
US	8.0	5.9	7.3	6.3 <sup>d/</sup>	6.8	10.3	8.8	9.5	9.5
<u>VC/NVA KIA Per Day of Contact</u>									
ARVN	8.8	8.8	7.1	7.8	8.1	12.6	12.9	8.5	11.2
US	9.3	8.2	6.9	7.6	7.9	17.5	18.6	11.2	15.8
<u>VC/NVA Weapons Losses</u>									
To ARVN	135	92	120	160	127	268	359	251	293
To US	225	348	188	263	256	553	1167	482	734

<sup>a/</sup> Source: JCS GUAVA file, based on CPREP-5.

<sup>b/</sup> Includes an estimated figure for US deaths in Search and Destroy Provincial operations in III CTZ in October 1967.

<sup>c/</sup> A contact is an action which results in the application of firepower by either VC or friendly forces. An operational day of contact for a large unit operation is credited for each 24 hour period in which contact during that operation has been made.

<sup>d/</sup> The ARVN figure for the 1st Qtr is underreported by as much as 50%.

<sup>e/</sup> Estimated using July and August data.

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TABLE 4  
LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS IN 1968 a/  
 (Weekly Average)

	I Corps	II Corps	III Corps	IV Corps	Countrywide
<u>Operational Days of Contact</u>					
<u>ARVN</u>					
1st Qtr	10	6	13	23	52
2nd Qtr	11	4	18	37	70
3rd Qtr <u>b/</u>	12	8	17	45	82
<u>US</u>					
1st Qtr	49	20	43	11	123
2nd Qtr	71	22	11c/	14	118
3rd Qtr <u>b/</u>	68	27	7c/	11	113
<u>VC/NVA KIA</u>					
<u>ARVN</u>					
1st Qtr	176	58	211	202	657
2nd Qtr	330	22	282	284	918
3rd Qtr <u>b/</u>	272	72	59	298	701
<u>US</u>					
1st Qtr	986	299	760	108	2153
2nd Qtr	1226	155	717	96	2194
3rd Qtr <u>b/</u>	726	56	411	63	1256
<u>Kill Ratio (En/Fr)</u>					
<u>ARVN</u>					
1st Qtr	8.6	6.6	6.7	5.7	6.7
2nd Qtr	7.3	2.1	6.6	5.1	6.0
3rd Qtr <u>b/</u>	6.9	6.9	4.6	7.2	6.7
<u>US</u>					
1st Qtr	9.6	12.1	10.7	9.3	10.3
2nd Qtr	7.8	6.8	11.7	9.9	8.8
3rd Qtr <u>b/</u>	10.8	4.4	8.8	17.0	9.6
<u>VC/NVA KIA Per Day of Contact</u>					
<u>ARVN</u>					
1st Qtr	17.4	12.4	15.8	8.7	12.6
2nd Qtr	28.8	5.3	15.9	7.6	13.0
3rd Qtr <u>b/</u>	16.4	9.1	3.5	6.6	8.5
<u>US</u>					
1st Qtr	20.3	14.8	17.5	10.0	17.5
2nd Qtr	17.2	7.1	64.7	7.1	18.7
3rd Qtr <u>b/</u>	10.8	2.1	59.6	5.5	11.2

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TABLE 4  
(Continued)  
LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS IN 1968 a/  
(Weekly Average)

	I Corps	II Corps	III Corps	IV Corps	Countrywide
<u>Weapons Captured</u>					
<u>ARVN</u>					
1st Qtr	55	27	83	103	268
2nd Qtr	83	6	115	155	359
3rd Qtr	79	14	29	130	253
<u>US</u>					
1st Qtr	178	68	284	23	553
2nd Qtr	745	101	298	23	1167
3rd Qtr	294	27	152	9	482

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA File based on OPREP 5.

b/ Estimated from Jul-Aug 68 data.

c/ Low because only one operation is reported for US.

TABLE 5

VC/NVA KILLED IN SMALL UNIT ACTIONS

	1967					1968			1968 AVE
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1967 Avg	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	
<u>RVNAF</u>									
VC/NVA KIA a/	2313	2683	2062	2602	2416	860	803	780	814
Avg Strength (000) b/	609	608	612	630	615	654	725	789	723
VC/NVA KIA Per 1000 Strength	4	4	3	4	4	1	1	1	1
<u>US</u>									
VC/NVA KIA a/	1906	3383	2306	1869	2366	3824	1793	1036	2218
Avg Strength (000) b/	412	438	459	472	445	500	526	537	521
VC/NVA KIA Per 1000 Strength	5	8	5	4	5	8	3	2	4

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA.

b/ Source: OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary, Table 2.

c/ Estimated by using July and August data.

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Table 6 presents other data which were cited in the past to show improvements in RVNAF. It shows:

1. A 24% increase in the net desertion rate for the first eight months of CY 68 to 11.8 desertions per month per 1000 men versus a 9.5 rate in 1967. The July/August average of 15 is the highest since the redefinition and crack-down on desertions in mid-1966.

2. A 26% increase in the number of RVNAF missing in action from 585 per quarter in 1967 to 740 in 1968. However, Tet accounted for the increase. The 2nd quarter was back at near prior year levels.

### Conclusions

We have consistently found that RVNAF effectiveness, measured in enemy KIA per 1000 RVNAF, better than 40% of US forces. In 1968, ARVN battalions\* kill 56% as many VC as do US battalions. This is consistently better than we should expect them to do measured on the basis of the MACEVAL capability rating.

Table 7 shows that this improvement in ARVN battalion effectiveness in large unit operations is equivalent to adding 16 US Army maneuver battalions. Measured another way, the RVNAF expansion and better performance in 1968 are equivalent to the results which 194,000 more Americans would contribute. RVNAF has contributed 77% of the US troop equivalents and 50% of the US Army battalion equivalents to the total force increase between 31 December and 31 August 1968.

We are delighted by the 35% increase in RVNAF effectiveness, the 17% improvement in ARVN large unit operations, and by the trend of increasing ARVN operational days of contact. RVNAF better performance in 1968 puts nearly as much additional ground force pressure on the enemy as US forces did. Nevertheless, we feel the decline in enemy KIA in small unit operations and great increase in RVNAF net desertions require immediate command attention.

\* Adjusted for strength differences from US battalions.

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TABLE 6

RVNAF DESERTIONS, MIA AND WPNS CAPTURED/LOST

	1966				1967				1968	
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
RVNAF Desertion Rate/1000 <u>a/</u>	21	21	13	11	10	10	10	8	8	11
RVNAF MIA	1206	507	627	760	788	422	358	773	1455	491
WPNS Captured/WPNS Lost					2	1	2	1.5	NA	NA

a/ Gross desertion rate for 1966. Net desertion rate for 1967 and 1968. Desertion

b/ Estimated by using July and preliminary August data.

TABLE 7

STRENGTH STATED IN  
US EQUIVALENTS

	31 Dec 67		31 Aug 68		% Chan
	Troops	Bns <u>a/</u>	Troops	Bns <u>a/</u>	
US	485.6	110	538.3	124	+10.9
RVNAF <u>b/</u>	276.5	53	471.0	69	+70.3
FW <u>c/</u>	59.4	26	65.5	28	+10.3
Total	821.5	189	1074.8	221	+30.8

a/ Basic battalion is the US Army battalion, US Marine battalions are treated as 1.33 USA battalions based on manpower differences.

b/ Strengths computed on effectiveness data derived in Tables 1 and 2.

c/ FW troops assumed equal to US and FW battalions are treated as equal to one US Army battalion.

3rd <sup>b</sup> / Qtr	1966	1967	1968
	Avg Per Qtr	Avg Per Qtr	Avg Per Qtr
15	16.5	9.5	12.0
264	775	585	737
NA		1.6	

ons per month.

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+30.2

+ 7.7

+16.9

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ARMY COMMENTS ON SEPTEMBER 1968 ARTICLES

We received the following comments on 3 September Analysis Report articles from the Army Staff:

"The September issue of your Southeast Asia Analysis Report contains a number of interesting and useful articles. The value of these articles lies in the presentation of potentially useful data and the fresh look given to many old problems. I find, however, that three of the articles appear to warrant comment in order to prevent misunderstanding on the part of interested readers.

"Military Initiative in South Vietnam (page 6)

This article purports to show that it is the VC/NVA who have the military initiative in South Vietnam and bases this conclusion on a study of the opposing forces ability to control casualties. There is a serious doubt that control of casualties is a 'good measure of military initiative'; for example, efforts to conserve casualties may do little to extend control over the combat situation. Said another way, a side which uses its 'military initiative' principally to avoid combat is not trying to dominate the battlefield but only to maintain a presence there; this is not military initiative. I do not believe that the VC/NVA dominate the battlefield in Vietnam nor do I agree that their willingness to stand and fight, or even their decisions to attack, are entirely voluntary. Perhaps a better measure of military initiative could be obtained by examining the relative ability to successfully engage an opponent in decisive combat. This might be done by comparing the rate of casualty fluctuations to fluctuations in opposing initiatives.

"Even assuming that ability to control casualties is a good measure of military initiative, the finding of the article is erroneous in that the analysis is fallacious. The analysis attempts to determine military initiative by comparing fluctuations of opposing military actions with fluctuations in casualties. However, the measure of military activity used is friendly large unit operations (number, number with contact, and battalion days on operations) for friendly forces, and attacks for enemy forces. These representations of military activity are not comparable; this system of measurement, for instance, could give the same weight to an enemy squad-size attack as it does to a three-division friendly operation. Even friendly 'operations with contact' is not a comparable measure of friendly military

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activity because an operation qualifies under this category if it has one or more contacts in a day (it could have had a dozen and be enumerated as one operation with contact). Even comparing battalion days on operations with enemy attacks is not valid, although, as recognized in the article, its correlation with casualties is better. To be comparable an enemy attack, which is an enemy initiated contact, must be compared to a friendly initiated contact.

"In summary, the premise that ability to control casualties is a good measure of military initiative is questionable, and the tests applied to measure relative degrees of 'military initiative' are invalid due to lack of comparability in measurement of the tempo of military operations of opposing forces.

### "Artillery Support for RVNAF (page 19)

This article is premature. It implies that the distribution of artillery support is improper, but admittedly contains no examination of the basis of distribution. As pointed out in the article, a great deal more information is needed in order to arrive at any meaningful conclusion. It might, therefore, have been better to simply state the facts available, drawing no conclusions, or withhold the article until sufficient information to evaluate the situation was available. In addition to examination of raw ammunition expenditures data, a look at missions, organization for combat, firing restrictions, targets, and other fire support means available would add much to a study of the adequacy of artillery support.

### "RVNAF Effectiveness: An Update (page 36)

While it is encouraging to note the improved effectiveness of RVNAF, caution must be exercised to insure that it is not over-rated. This is particularly true when considering the current high level emphasis on developing the RVNAF to take over more of the war from US Forces.

"The evaluation of RVNAF contained in this article bases its primary conclusions on the number of enemy killed; it overlooks friendly losses. The article also points out that the missions assigned to various forces have not been considered, yet this fact has been omitted from the summary and conclusions. Additionally, other indicators such as leadership, morale, training, and aggressiveness which must be included in a full evaluation have not been considered. Based on the facts presented, this

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article can only conclude that RVNAF has killed more enemy recently; this suggests an improved capability to perform the missions assigned during this period. An examination of its demonstrated effectiveness in performing various missions might prove useful as we look to the assumption by RVNAF of greater military responsibility in Vietnam.

"Expressing increased RVNAF strength and effectiveness (based on enemy killed), in terms of US force equivalents, is invalid, and tends to be misleading. As emphasized earlier, to omit consideration of assigned missions and other influencing factors, and without evaluating the capability to perform missions currently assigned to US units, it is inappropriate to rate RVNAF in terms of US equivalency. Equating this improved RVNAF effectiveness to US units suggests that the RVNAF is now able to assume tasks assigned to the stated number of US units -- this is not proven in this article, and is undoubtedly not true at this time.

"In the final analysis, the greater number of enemy killed by the RVNAF, while encouraging, is not a true measure of its overall effectiveness. Other tests must be applied to determine its current and projected capability to perform the complete spectrum of missions which it must assume if US and Free World forces are to be phased down."

### SEAPRO COMMENTS

#### Military Initiative

The treatment of military initiative suggested in the comments fits a conventional limited war such as the one in Korea. There the "relative ability to successfully engage an opponent in decisive combat" did constitute military initiative for either side. But we wonder if the same holds true in the Vietnam war where many of the principles of guerrilla warfare and protracted conflict seem to explain enemy strategy best.

We suspect that the ability to control casualties is an integral part of the overall enemy strategy in Vietnam. His attacks and other activities are designed to have the maximum psychological impact by inflicting heavy allied casualties, projecting an aura of countrywide strength and continual presence, and gradually reducing the US will to continue. This in turn implies that the enemy must expend his resources at a rate low enough for him to hold out longer than the allies. It must be clear to him after his spring offensive that he cannot win by engaging us in short, decisive combat and that he must frame his strategy within the rules of protracted conflict. In such a conflict, control of the casualty rates is critical.

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The comments also suggest that the only comparable measure of operations is enemy initiated contacts and friendly initiated contacts. This reasoning assumes that the "contacts per operation rate" for VC/NVA and friendly forces are identical, but they clearly are not. Most of the time on friendly operations (large or small) is spent looking for the enemy and the resulting contacts per operation rate is low. On the other hand, few VC/NVA operations do not produce contact. The comparison suggested in the comments would overlook the vast amount of friendly operational effort that produces no contact and thus would wash out the value of the comparison.

The fact that the VC/NVA can nearly always find us and we usually can't find him unless he wants us to or our intelligence is exceptionally good, is at the heart of military initiative in Vietnam. The implicit assumption in the comments is that both sides are operating under identical objectives, strategy, and tactics as in a conventional war. Under these conditions, contact per operation rates might be approximately equivalent and the ability to engage in decisive combat would be critical to both sides.

### Artillery Support for RVNAF

Our article contained data which show that the volume and weight of artillery support for RVNAF is much less than that for US forces. We acknowledge that we lack the information necessary for a thorough evaluation of the adequacy of RVNAF artillery support, and of the distribution of fire support between US and RVNAF. Nevertheless, available data strongly suggest that artillery support for RVNAF may not be adequate. Further examination of the problem is required. More data on the artillery support for RVNAF would be most useful.

### RVNAF Effectiveness

The article does not overlook losses; Table 3 (page 41) indicates that the ARVN enemy kill ratio in large operations improved. We have addressed the RVNAF leadership problems in the June and August reports. We agree that an examination of RVNAF's demonstrated effectiveness in performing various missions would prove useful in evaluating RVNAF's ability to assume greater military responsibility in Vietnam. Data for this is sparse at the moment, but should become available as we get information from MACV's new reporting system for RVNAF forces.

We compared the performance of RVNAF ground forces in killing VC/NVA with the US performance in two ways. First, we compared the effectiveness of Vietnamese ground force battalions to US battalions. We found that in 1968 the Vietnamese performance in killing VC/NVA increased more than the US performance, and that it would have taken 16 additional US maneuver battalions to kill the additional VC/NVA, if the RVNAF kill rate had not improved. Second, a comparison of total enemy killed by all RVNAF forces to those killed by all US forces indicated that the improved Vietnamese performance was equivalent to an addition of 194,000 US troops.

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In addition, the article pointed out that RVNAF battalions on average have been consistently killing VC/NVA at a significantly higher rate than the MACV ARVN capability model would lead us to expect. Aside from being unable to undertake long field operations, many Vietnamese battalions presently perform much the same missions that US forces do. The low level of support and fire power provided Vietnamese forces may help account for the greater time their battalions spend on static security and training missions and for their reported lack of aggressiveness. If true, providing better support and fire power to RVNAF forces may enable them to perform missions now entrusted to US forces sooner than we might otherwise expect. We think that attempting to state RVNAF improvement in terms of US force equivalents is a useful way to gain perspective on the rate of improvement as the RVNAF modernization and improvement programs proceed.

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ARVN PERFORMANCE IN COMBINED OPERATIONS

Summary

Combined operations data for the past two years indicate that ARVN generally has kill ratios in combined operations equal to or lower than its kill ratios in separate operations. Conversely, kill ratios for US forces generally go up in combined operations. A smaller proportion of combined operations get air support than do separate operations. The foregoing findings and others below are highly tentative because combined operations are not well reported.

Detailed Analysis 1/

Table 1 shows data over the last two years from 66 operations positively identified as combined by a hand match of operations reports from the JCS GUAVA computer file. These operations cover 344 operational weeks.

The data indicate that ARVN kill ratios did not increase in combined operations, except in the first half of 1967 when the ratio rose from 6:1 in the last quarter of 1966 to 10.5 to 1. Throughout the rest of the 2 year period, the ARVN kill ratios in combined and separate operations were about equal at 6 to 1. US forces, on the other hand, performed about 33% better on average in combined operations (11:1 vs 8:1).

More significant is the proportion of total enemy killed by US forces. In combined operations the US accounted for 69% of the total enemy KIA in 4th quarter 1966, 63% in 1967, and 85% in 1968. In separate operations, the percentage remained at about 64% in 1966-67, rising to 72% in 1968. These results could stem from faulty reporting in which US forces received credit for enemy which ARVN actually killed. To offset such a possibility, we looked at the ARVN and US proportion of friendly KIA in the operations.

Table 1 indicates that the proportion of friendly KIA is lower for ARVN in combined than separate operations. Moreover, the trend is for the ARVN to lose proportionately less than US forces in both types of operations. In separate US and ARVN large scale operations, the ARVN sustained 45% of the total US/ARVN KIA in 4th quarter 1966, 38% in 1967 and 36% in 1968. Combined operations show a sharper downtrend: 47% in 4th quarter 1966, 36% in 1967 and only 2% in 1968.

1/ For the purpose of this analysis, combined operations are those reported in the OPREP-5 reporting system and inserted into the JCS GUAVA computer file. In Table 1, the operations were hand matched to ensure that both ARVN and US reported them as combined and that they occurred in the same location at the same time. In Table 2, the operations were simply reported as combined by either ARVN or US.

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TABLE 1 a/

KILL RATIOS  
COMBINED - SEPARATE OPERATIONS

	COMBINED						SEPARATE					
	US			ARVN			US			ARVN		
	US KIA	VC KIA	Ratio En/US	ARVN KIA	VC KIA	Ratio En/ARVN	US KIA	VC KIA	Ratio En/US	ARVN KIA	VC KIA	Ratio En/ARVN
<u>1966</u>												
4th Qtr	138	1559	11:1	120	715	6:1	611	4883	8:1	597	2830	6:1
% of Total	53	69		47	31		55	63		45	37	
<u>1967</u>												
1st Qtr	125	1135	9:1	89	945	11:1	943	8469	9:1	623	3785	6:1
2nd Qtr	42	362	9:1	5	46	9:1	1383	8695	6:1	821	5183	6:1
3rd Qtr	20	270	13:1	13	75	6:1	1221	8786	7:1	840	5160	6:1
4th Qtr	2	18	9:1	0	2	2:0	1645	10236	6:1	856	4990	6:1
Total	189	1785	9:1	107	1068	10:1	5192	36186	7:1	3140	19118	6:1
% of Total	64	63		36	37		62	65		38	35	
<u>1968</u>												
1st Qtr	DATA NOT AVAILABLE						2696	28040	10:1	1201	7911	7:1
2nd Qtr	251	3277	13:1	69	460	6:1	3112	26156	8:1	1677	9827	6:1
3rd Qtr	118	1209	10:1	57	347	6:1	1579	15520	10:1	1303	8783	7:1
Total	369	4486	12:1	126	807	6:1	7387	69716	9:1	4181	26521	6:1
% of Total	75	85		25	15		64	72		36	28	

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA Computer File.

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The apparent poor results of ARVN in combined operations are not what we expected, and may be attributable to poor reporting of combined operations, or the limited size of our sample. To check the latter, we expanded the size of our sample to include data for all operations marked "combined" in the GUAVA file, including all those which could not be matched. The result is shown in Table 2, which supports some of the findings from Table 1.

In Table 2, ARVN kill ratio performance in combined operations is 30% to 50% below (instead of equal to) their performance in separate operations, except, once again, in the first half of 1967. The pattern for US forces is exactly the reverse, but the Table 1 finding of higher US KIA ratios in combined operations is generally confirmed. The ARVN accounted for a lower proportion of friendly and enemy forces killed in action than did US forces in combined operations in 1967, but for more than US forces in 1968; the ARVN KIA proportion increased dramatically in 1968. For both years, the ARVN proportion was less than US forces in separate operations.

Thus, the Table 2 findings conflict with the Table 1 findings, which showed a decline of friendly and enemy KIA for ARVN. Poor reporting is the most likely explanation for the difference. As far as we can determine, ARVN is reporting all of its III CTZ operations as combined in 1968, while the US is reporting none of its III CTZ operations as combined. The hand matching eliminated these ARVN operations from the first sample. But, since they are marked as combined in the GUAVA file, the second sample picked them up and thus gives a much different picture of ARVN participation in combined operations during 1968.

### Air Support

Data from our first sample indicates that a smaller proportion of combined operations get air support than separate operations. Table 3 shows that about 65% of the separate ARVN operations were supported by air but only about 20% of the combined ARVN operations received air support. The ARVN consistently receive less air support than US forces in both types of operations. It is possible that air support for ARVN is recorded in the US report of the operation, since US forces furnish most of the close air support in SVN. However, the table also shows that only 60-80% of the US combined operations receive air support compared with 100% air support for US separate operations.

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TABLE 2 <sup>a/</sup>

US AND ARVN OPERATIONS

	<u>US</u>			<u>ARVN</u>		
	<u>US</u> <u>KIA</u>	<u>VC</u> <u>KIA</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>ARVN</u> <u>KIA</u>	<u>VC</u> <u>KIA</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
<u>COMBINED</u>						
<u>1967</u>						
Jan - Jun	621	3,189	5:1	95	992	10:1
Jul - Dec	52	502	10:1	32	141	4:1
Total	673	3,691	5:1	127	1,133	9:1
% of KIA	84	77		16	23	
<u>1968</u>						
Jan - Jun	63	1,213	19:1	264	1,261	5:1
% of KIA	19	49		81	51	
<u>SEPARATE</u>						
<u>1967</u>						
Jan - Jun	2,492	18,153	7:1	1,492	8,849	6:1
Jul - Dec	2,788	18,485	7:1	1,029	5,671	6:1
Total	5,280	36,638	7:1	2,521	14,520	6:1
% of KIA	68	72		32	28	
<u>1968</u>						
Jan - Jun	4,785	46,710	10:1	3,308	22,117	7:1
% of KIA	59	68		41	32	

<sup>a/</sup> Source: JCS GUAVA Computer File. Includes data for all operations marked combined, including those that cannot be matched.

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TABLE 3 <sup>a/</sup>

AIR SUPPORT  
COMBINED - SEPARATE OPERATIONS

	US			COMBINED			ARVN	# Opns W/Air Support
	# Opns W/Air Support	Total	% With Air	# Opns W/Air Support	Total	% With Air		
<u>1966</u>								
4th Qtr	83	134	62	13	63	21		5
<u>1967</u>								
1st Qtr	50	66	76	4	34	12		6
2nd Qtr	30	45	67	0	16	0		6
3rd Qtr	41	56	73	1	18	1		9
4th Qtr	8	9	89	0	1	0		9
TOTAL	129	176	73	5	69	1		3,0
<u>1968</u>								
1st Qtr		DATA	NOT	AVAILABLE				9
2nd Qtr	110	132	83	12	26	46		8
3rd Qtr	124	162	77	1	30	0		6
TOTAL <sup>b/</sup>	234	294	80	13	56	23		1,4

<sup>a/</sup> GUAVA, dated 4 December 1968.

<sup>b/</sup> Includes 2nd and 3rd quarters only and excludes III CTZ combined operations because III CT reports all operations as combined, whether both nations participate or not.

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	US		SEPARATE	ARVN		ARVN OPERATIONS LESS THAN 4:1 KILL RATIOS	
	Total	% With Air	# Opns W/Air Support	Total	% With Air	Combined % With Air	Separate % With Air
3	513	100	401	689	58	-	65
5	607	100	354	602	59	0	-
2	614	100	446	695	64	-	63
0	905	99	595	863	69	-	67
3	918	99	636	908	70	0	67
1	3,044	100	2,031	3,068	66	0	
3	948	99	613	832	74		
2	813	100	762	1,140	67		86
1	651	100	1,051	1,511	70		-
0	1,464	100	1,813	2,651	68		86

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RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS: AN UPDATE

*Summary.* In 1968 RVNAF killed enemy at 2.6 times the 1967 monthly rate while US forces increased their kill rate 1.9 times. Eliminating the effects of Tet, ARVN battalions since March 1968 have been 56% as effective as US battalions in killing the enemy versus 47% in 1967. (RVNAF forces consistently perform above the MACV calculated 31% equivalency rating.) This better performance by ARVN (and the increase in ARVN maneuver battalions in 1968) is equivalent to getting the output of an additional 13 US battalions. Stated another way, improved RVNAF performance and increased RVNAF size have added the equivalent of almost 166,000 Americans during 1968.

The Analytical Approach

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This updates our earlier approach<sup>1/</sup> to evaluating RVNAF effectiveness by comparing Vietnamese operational achievement to that of US forces. We recognize that this appraisal is incomplete because it relies solely on measurement of enemy killed and fails to measure performance of the different types of missions assigned to the various forces (e.g., provision of territorial security, protection of a key installation, etc.). Data presently available do not allow a more comprehensive analysis.

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We also recognize that our method does not relate RVNAF performance to a standard which we can expect them to attain. Rather, we are comparing RVNAF performance to US performance and to their capability as estimated by MACV. Since determining military capability is at best inexact and highly theoretical, the results are tenuous.

Capability Estimate

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A MACV study<sup>2/</sup> has assessed the relative capability of US and ARVN battalions with respect to the following five functions of land warfare: Firepower, mobility, command and control, intelligence, and service support. MACV measured the capability of US and ARVN organizations in different environments (each Vietnamese CTZ) and in the types of operations relevant to each corps. It found that the relative capability of an ARVN battalion is 31% of a US infantry battalion. The MACV model indicated that the greatest improvement in RVNAF capability would be achieved by increasing organic firepower. The RVNAF modernization program is designed to do precisely this.

US-RVNAF Performance in All Actions

Table 1 shows that RVNAF relative effectiveness per 1000 men rose from an average of 43% of US effectiveness in 1967 to 54% during 1968. The number

1/ August 1967, February 1968, and September 1968 SEA Analysis Report articles on RVNAF status.

H 2/ MACEVAL Study No. 2-68, "Capability Study of US and ARVN Infantry Battalions" (C).

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of enemy killed by US forces doubled in 1968 while those killed by RVNAF increased to 2.6 times the 1967 averages. RVNAF performed best in the 1st and 3rd quarters and poorly in the 4th quarter. This may indicate that much of the RVNAF's improvement in 1968 was due to the high tempo of enemy activity in all but the 4th quarter.

### US-RVNAF Performance in Battalion Size and Larger Operations

An analysis of US and ARVN battalion performance in large operations supports the relative effectiveness figures derived from the total strength calculations above. Table 2 shows a 1967 figure of 47% effectiveness for regular Vietnamese battalions which is comparable to the 43% in Table 1. RVNAF reporting of VC/NVA combat deaths in battalion size and larger operations is incomplete for the first quarter of 1968, so we cannot calculate the relative effectiveness of Vietnamese battalions for all of 1968. The total for the other three quarters is consistent with that for the overall forces, although the ARVN battalions performed better than the total RVNAF forces during the 4th quarter.

Table 3 shows trends in large unit operations initiated by US and Vietnamese forces:

1. ARVN operations decreased from an average of 11 battalion days per operation in 1967 to 6 battalion days in 1968. On the other hand, US operations increased from an average 54 battalion days per operation in 1967 to 124 in 1968. In 1968, the number of ARVN operations increased 115% but battalion days of operation only increased 13%.

2. ARVN operational days of contact increased 58% in 1968 while US days of contact increased only 18%. Thus, US days of contact are only 50% more than ARVN in 1968 versus double them in 1967. <sup>3/</sup>

3. ARVN captured 138% more enemy weapons in 1968 than in 1967, while US forces captured 167% more.

We previously reported that RVNAF performance in II and III Corps <sup>4/</sup> falls behind its performance in the other two corps. Table 4 shows that RVNAF performance picked up sharply in III CTZ during the first half of 1968, due to the Tet and May offensives, but reverted to lower levels in the 3rd and 4th quarters. The number of VC/NVA killed by ARVN in II CTZ remained low throughout the period.

### Small Unit Actions

The enemy KIA rate in RVNAF small unit actions dropped from a quarterly average of 2416 in 1967 to 905 in 1968 (Table 5). RVNAF ceased to kill the

<sup>3/</sup> Conduct of only one operation Toan Thang (Resolved to Win) in III CTZ has led to US under-reporting of this indicator.

<sup>4/</sup> See "RVNAF Status - CY 67," in the February 1968 SEA Analysis Report, p. 20.

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enemy in small unit actions at a rate comparable to US forces in 1968. The reasons for the precipitous drop in RVNAF small unit performance are unknown, and the data bear some further investigation.

### Other Measures

Table 6 presents other data which were cited in the past to show improvements in RVNAF. It shows:

1. A 21% increase in the net desertion rate for 1968, 12.7 desertions per month per 1000 men versus a 10.5 rate in 1967. The 3rd and 4th quarter averages of 15 are the highest since the redefinition and crack-down on desertions in mid-1966.
2. A 5% increase in the number of RVN missing in action from 580 per quarter in 1967 to 608 in 1968. However, Tet accounted for the increase and the trend during 1968 was downward; the 3rd and 4th quarters were lower than any quarter in 1966 or 1967.
3. The RVNAF lost only half as many weapons in 1968 as in 1966-67. The 3rd and 4th quarter 1968 losses were the lowest in the 1966-68 period.

### Conclusions

We have consistently found that RVNAF effectiveness, measured in enemy KIA per 1000 RVNAF, is better than 40% of the US forces effectiveness in killing the enemy. In 1968, ARVN battalions<sup>5/</sup> killed about 50% as many VC as did US battalions. This is consistently better than we would expect on the basis of the MACV 31% capability rating.

Table 7 shows that the 1968 improvement in ARVN battalion effectiveness in large unit operations (and the maneuver battalions added in 1968) is equivalent to adding 13 US Army maneuver battalions. Measured another way, the RVNAF expansion and better performance in 1968 are equivalent to the enemy KIA results which 166,000 more Americans would contribute. In terms of US troop equivalents, RVNAF has contributed 74% of the strength increase and 63% of the battalion increase in allied forces during 1968.

The increase in RVNAF effectiveness, the improvement in ARVN large unit operations, the increasing ARVN operational days of contact and decreased loss of weapons are all encouraging. Nevertheless, the reported decline in enemy KIA in small unit operations and the high RVNAF net desertion rate continue to require attention.

<sup>5/</sup> Adjusted for strength differences from US battalions.

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TABLE 1  
VC/NVA KILLED PER THOUSAND FRIENDLY STRENGTH a/

	1967		1968			
	Qtr Avg	Qtr Avg	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr
<b>RVNAF</b>						
VC/NVA Killed b/	7461	19,24	34366	16319	17586	9424
Avg Strength (000) c/	615	756	657	741	806	821
VC/NVA Killed per 1000 Str	12	27	52	22	22	11
<b>US</b>						
VC/NVA Killed d/	12384	24,135	37094	24825	18748	15874
Avg Strength (000) c/	445	525	500	526	537	535
VC/NVA Killed per 1000 Str	28	47	74	47	35	30
<b>Effectiveness of RVNAF Compared to US</b>						
	43	54	70	47	63	37

- a/ Source: JCS GUAVA computer file. Based on OPREP 5.  
1967 data are VC/NVA killed in friendly offensive actions.
- b/ Source: JCS GUAVA (GU2OR).
- c/ Source: OSD (C) SEA Statistical Summary, Table 2.
- d/ JCS GUAVA, Special Retrieval, US large and small unit operations.

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TABLE 2

VC/NVA KILLED IN BATTALION SIZED AND LARGER OPERATIONS a/  
(By ARVN and US Maneuver Battalion Equivalents)

	1967		1968			
	Qtr Avg	Qtr Avg	1st <sup>a/</sup> Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr
Enemy KIA by ARVN <sup>b/</sup> Avg Maneuver Bn (Adjusted) <sup>c/</sup> KIA/Maneuver Bn.	5045	9509		11932	9835	6762
	98	102	99	101	103	105
	51	93		118	95	64
Enemy KIA by US <sup>d/</sup> Avg Maneuver Bn <sup>c/</sup> YIA/Maneuver Bn	10018	19890	27989	28529	17274	13868
	93	120	113	120	120	120
	108	166	248	238	145	117
Effectiveness of ARVN Compared to US (%)	47	56 <sup>f/</sup>		50	66	55

<sup>a/</sup> Source: JCS GUAVA computer file.

<sup>b/</sup> Source: JCS GUAVA (GU18R).

<sup>c/</sup> Source: OASD(SA) SEA deployment program summary, Table 1.  
Average present for duty strength of ARVN bn is .6 the strength of US Army bn. Conversely USMC maneuver bn is 1.33 larger than US Army bn. Figures shown are adjusted accordingly.

<sup>d/</sup> Source: JCS GUAVA special retrieval, US large and small unit operations.

<sup>e/</sup> Source: ARVN results not reported completely in GUAVA. There is a known under reporting of total enemy KIA of 50% for the quarter in the portion of the file from which we derived these figures.

<sup>f/</sup> Calculated as 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarter avg. only.

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TABLE 3  
TRENDS IN LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS a/  
(Weekly Averages)

	<u>1967</u> Wkly Avg	<u>1968</u> Wkly Avg	<u>1968</u> 1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr
<u>Number of Operations</u>						
ARVN	61	131	72	127	161	162
US	10	9.3	12	10	8	7
<u>Bn Days of Operation</u>						
ARVN	647	729	561	568	849	938
US	540	1157	823	1155	1177	1473
<u>Bn Days Per Operation</u>						
ARVN	11	6	8	4	5	6
US	54	124	69	116	150	162
<u>Operational Days of Contact c/</u>						
ARVN	48	76	52	71	93	87
US	97	114	23	118	121	92
<u>VC/NVA KIA</u>						
By ARVN	388	740	657 <sup>d/</sup>	918	820	564
By US	771	1730	2153	2194	1418	1156
<u>Kill Ratio (En/Fr)</u>						
ARVN	6.2	6.7	6.7 <sup>b/</sup>	6.0	6.4	7.6
US	6.8	10.0	10.3	8.8	9.6	11.2
<u>VC/NVA KIA Per Day of Contact</u>						
ARVN	8.1	10.2	12.6	12.9	8.8	6.5
US	7.9	15.1	17.5	18.6	11.7	12.6
<u>VC/NVA Weapons Losses</u>						
To ARVN	127	302	268	359	308	273
To US	256	684	553	1167	560	456

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA file, based on OPREP-5.

b/ Includes an estimated figure for US deaths in Search and Destroy Program operations in III CTZ in October 1967.

c/ A contact is an action which results in the application of firepower either VC or friendly forces. An operational day of contact for a large operation is credited for each 24 hour period in which contact during operation has been made.

d/ The ARVN figure for the 1st Qtr is underreported by as much as 50%.

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TABLE 4  
LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS IN 1968 a/  
(Weekly Average)

	I Corps	II Corps	III Corps	IV Corps	Countrywide
<u>Operational Days of Contact</u>					
<u>ARVN</u>					
1st Qtr	10	6	13	23	52
2nd Qtr	11	4	18	37	70
3rd Qtr	15	8	17	50	92
4th Qtr	18	7	17	50	92
<u>US</u>					
1st Qtr	49	20	43	11	123
2nd Qtr	71	22	11b/	14	118
3rd Qtr	72	29	8b/	13	122
4th Qtr	48	24	8b/	12	92
<u>VC/NVA KIA</u>					
<u>ARVN</u>					
1st Qtr	176	68	211	202	657
2nd Qtr	330	22	282	284	918
3rd Qtr	320	98	84	317	819
4th Qtr	209	36	65	254	564
<u>US</u>					
1st Qtr	986	299	760	108	2153
2nd Qtr	1226	155	717	96	2194
3rd Qtr	819	67	459	73	1418
4th Qtr	464	53	489	150	1156
<u>Kill Ratio (En/Fr)</u>					
<u>ARVN</u>					
1st Qtr	8.6	6.6	6.7	5.7	6.7
2nd Qtr	7.3	2.1	6.6	5.1	6.0
3rd Qtr	7.0	5.5	4.6	6.9	6.4
4th Qtr	9.9	8.5	3.8	5.1	7.6
<u>US</u>					
1st Qtr	9.6	12.1	10.7	9.3	10.3
2nd Qtr	7.8	6.8	11.7	9.9	8.8
3rd Qtr	11.0	4.2	8.9	14.1	9.5
4th Qtr	12.9	6.7	9.4	21.0	11.2
<u>VC/NVA KIA Per Day of Contact</u>					
<u>ARVN</u>					
1st Qtr	17.4	12.4	15.8	8.7	12.6
2nd Qtr	28.8	5.3	15.9	7.6	13.0
3rd Qtr	21.3	11.2	4.5	6.4	8.9
4th Qtr	15.3	5.1	3.9	5.1	6.1
<u>US</u>					
1st Qtr	20.3	14.8	17.5	10.0	17.5
2nd Qtr	17.2	7.1	64.7	7.1	18.7
3rd Qtr	11.4	2.3	60.5	5.8	11.6
4th Qtr	9.6	2.2	60.5	12.9	12.5

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TABLE 4

LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS IN 1968 a/  
(Weekly Average)  
(Cont'd)

	<u>I</u> Corps	<u>II</u> Corps	<u>III</u> Corps	<u>IV</u> Corps	<u>Countrywide</u>
<u>Weapons Captured</u>					
<u>ARVN</u>					
1st Qtr	55	27	83	103	268
2nd Qtr	83	6	115	155	359
3rd Qtr	100	35	39	132	305
4th Qtr	79	13	77	104	273
<u>US</u>					
1st Qtr	178	68	284	23	553
2nd Qtr	745	101	298	23	1167
3rd Qtr	349	32	169	10	560
4th Qtr	180	20	225	31	456

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA (GU18R).

b/ Low because only one operation is reported for US.

TABLE 5

VC/NVA KILLED IN SMALL UNIT ACTIONS

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th</u>
	<u>AVG</u>	<u>AVG</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>
<u>RVNAF</u>						
VC/NVA KIA a/	2416	905	860	803	841	1116
Avg Strength (000) b/	615	756	657	741	806	821
VC/NVA KIA per 1000 Str	4	1	1	1	1	1
<u>US</u>						
VC/NVA KIA a/	2366	2261	3824	1793	1453	1976
Avg Strength (000) b/	455	525	500	526	537	535
VC/NVA KIA per 1000 Str	5	4	8	3	3	4

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA (GU9R)

b/ Source: OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary, Table 2.

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TABLE 6

RVNAF DESERTIONS, MIA AND WEAPONS LOST

	1966				1967				1968				1966	1967	1968
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	Avg.	Avg.	Avg.
RVNAF															
Desertion Rate/1000 <sup>a/</sup>	21.1	20.6	13.1	10.8	11.6	10.1	10.2	10.2	7.7	12.9	15.2	14.8	16.4	10.5	12.7
RVNAF MIA <sup>b/</sup>	1206	507	627	760	788	402	358	773	1455	491	333	153	775	580	608
Weapons Lost <sup>c/</sup>	2377	1767	1834	2331	2255	2230	1526	2281	1251	1525	975	493	2077	2073	1061

- a/ Source: USMACV. End of month strength. Returned data for RF/FF for period January-August 1967 not available.  
 b/ Source: USMACV Weekly Summary and OPREP-5.  
 c/ Source: USMACV Weekly Summary and OPREP-5.

TABLE 7

STRENGTH STATED IN US EQUIVALENTS a/  
(Troops in 1000s)

	31 Dec 67		31 Dec 68		Change		% Change	
	Troops	Bns	Troops	Bns	Troops	Bns	Troops	Bns
US b/	485.6	110	536.7	120	51.1	10	10.5	9.1
RVNAF c/	276.5	46	442.4	59	165.9	13	60.0	28.3
FW b/	59.4	26	65.6	28	6.2	2	10.4	7.7
TOTAL	821.5	182	1044.7	207	223.2	25	27	45.1

- a/ Basic battalion is US Army battalion, USMC battalions are computed as 1.33 USA battalions based on strengths; RVNAF as .6 USA battalion. FW battalion equal to USA battalion.  
 b/ OASD(C) SEA Statistical Summary, Table 1.  
 c/ Strengths computed on effectiveness data in Tables 1 and 2.

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RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS: AN UPDATE

Summary

In the first quarter of 1969 total RVNAF forces killed the enemy at a rate slightly below the 1968 quarterly average. As of March 31, 1969, ARVN battalions have been killing the enemy at a rate 1.4 times higher than the 1968 average and their effectiveness in relation to US battalions increased substantially (3% as effective as US versus 56% in 1968 and 47% in 1967). Better performance and increased ARVN strength is equivalent to getting the enemy KIA output of an additional 32 US battalions in 1968 and 1969. Stated another way, improved RVNAF performance and increased RVNAF size have added enemy KIA equivalent to that produced by 107,000<sup>1/</sup> Americans during 1968 and 1st quarter 1969.

The Analytical Approach 2/

This updates our earlier approach<sup>2/</sup> to evaluating RVNAF effectiveness by comparing Vietnamese operational achievement to that of US forces. We recognize that this appraisal is incomplete because it relies solely on measurement of enemy killed and fails to measure performance of the different types of missions assigned to the various forces (e.g., provision of territorial security, protection of a key installation, etc.). Data presently available do not allow a more comprehensive analysis.

We also recognize that our method does not relate RVNAF performance to a standard which we can expect them to attain. Rather, we are comparing RVNAF performance to US performance and to their capability as estimated by MACV. Since determining military capability is at best inexact and highly theoretical, the results are tenuous.

Capability Estimate 3/

A MACV study<sup>4/</sup> has assessed the relative capability of US and ARVN battalions with respect to the following five functions of land warfare: Firepower, mobility, command and control, intelligence, and service support. MACV measured the capability of US and ARVN organizations in different environments (each Vietnamese CTZ) and in the types of operations relevant to each corps. It found that the relative capability of an ARVN battalion is 31% of a US infantry battalion. The MACV model indicated that the greatest improvement in RVNAF capability would be achieved by increasing organic firepower. The RVNAF modernization program is designed to do precisely this. (There is some evidence that training and leadership may be at least as critical as organic firepower in improving RVNAF performance.<sup>5/</sup>)

<sup>1/</sup> This figure would be much higher if averaged over the 1968+1969 time period. Also, effectiveness of RVNAF in killing the enemy (per 1000 strength) was diluted by the large RVNAF total strength increase.

<sup>2/</sup> See "RVNAF Effectiveness: An Update", SEA Analysis Report, March 1968, p. 1.

<sup>3/</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4/</sup> MACEVAL Study No. 2-68, "Capability Study of US and ARVN Infantry Bns" (C)

<sup>5/</sup> See "RF/FF Modernization Vs. Combat Performance" on p. 21 of March 1969 SEA Analysis Report and "ARVN/RF/FF Combat Performance & Leadership" elsewhere in this report.

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US-RVNAF Performance in All Actions

Table 1 shows that RVNAF relative effectiveness per 1000 men rose from an average of 43% of US effectiveness in 1967 to a high of 57% in 1968 but declined to 46% in 1st quarter 1969. The number of enemy killed by US forces doubled in 1968 while those killed by RVNAF increased to 2.6 times the 1967 average. In first quarter 1969 US forces killed the enemy at about the same rate as 1968 quarterly average but RVNAF killed the enemy at only 89% of their 1968 rate.

TABLE 1

VC/NVA KILLED PER THOUSAND FRIENDLY STRENGTH a/

	1967	1968	1969
	Qtr	Qtr	1st
	Avg	Avg	Qtr
<b>RVNAF</b>			
VC/NVA Killed b/ Avg Strength (000) c/	7461	19424	17273
VC/NVA Killed per 1000 Str	12	26	21
<b>US</b>			
VC/NVA Killed d/ Avg Strength (000) c/	12384	24135	24587
VC/NVA Killed per 1000 Str	28	46	46
Effectiveness of RVNAF Compared to US	43	57	46

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA computer file. Based on OPREP 5. 1967 data are VC/NVA killed in friendly offensive actions.

b/ Source: JCS GUAVA (GU2OR).

c/ Source: OSD (C) SEA Statistical Summary, Table 2.

d/ JCS GUAVA, Special Retrieval, US large and small unit operations.

US RVNAF Performance in Battalion Size and Larger Operations

Larger Operations. An analysis of US and ARVN battalion performance in large operations supports the relative effectiveness figures derived from the total strength calculation above. Table 2 shows a 1967 figure of 47% of US effectiveness for regular Vietnamese battalions which is comparable to the 43% in Table 1; the 1968 figures were 56% and 57%. However, the figures showed a large disparity in 1st quarter 1969. ARVN battalion effectiveness increased to a record 73% of US effectiveness, but in terms of enemy killed per 1000 friendly strength, RVNAF regressed to 46% of US effectiveness. The

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decline was produced by the combination of an 11% decrease in enemy KIA by RVNAF and a 10% average RVNAF strength increase during 1st quarter 1969.

TABLE 2

VC/NVA KILLED IN BATTALION SIZED AND LARGER OPERATIONS a/  
(By ARVN and US Maneuver Battalion Equivalents)

	1967	1968	1969
	Qtr	Qtr	1st
	Avg	Avg	Qtr
Enemy KIA by ARVN b/	5045	9509	13338
Avg Maneuver Bn (Adjusted) c/	98	102	108
KIA/Maneuver Bn.	51	93	124
Enemy KIA by US d/	10018	19890	20491
Avg Maneuver Bn c/	93	120	120
KIA/Maneuver Bn	108	166	171
Effectiveness of ARVN Compared to US (%)	47	56f/	73

a/ Source: JCS GUAVA computer file.

b/ Source: JCS GUAVA (GUL&R):

c/ Source: OASD(SA) SEA deployment program summary, Table 1.  
Average present for duty strength of ARVN bn is .6 the strength of US Army bn. Conversely USMC maneuver bn is 1.33 larger than US Army bn. Figures shown are adjusted accordingly.

d/ Source: JCS GUAVA special retrieval, US large and small unit operations.

e/ Source: ARVN results not reported completely in GUAVA. There is known under reporting of total enemy KIA of 50% for the quarter in the portion of the file from which we derived these figures.

f/ Calculated as 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarter avg. only.

### Conclusions

We consistently find that RVNAF effectiveness, measured in terms of enemy killed per 100 RVNAF, is better than 40% of US forces effectiveness; in 1st quarter 1969, ARVN battalions killed over one half as many enemy as did US battalions. This is better than we expected on the basis of the MACV 31% capability rating.

Table 3 shows that from December 31, 1967 to March 31, 1969, improvement in ARVN battalion effectiveness in large unit operations (and increases in strength) is equivalent to adding 32 US Army maneuver battalions. Measured

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another way, the RVNAF expansion and better performance are equivalent to enemy KIA results which 107,000 Americans would contribute.

TABLE 3

STRENGTH STATED IN US EQUIVALENTS a/  
(Troops in 1000s)

	<u>31 Dec 67</u>		<u>31 Dec 68</u>		<u>31 Mar 69</u>		<u>Change</u> <u>Dec 67 - Mar 69</u>	
	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Bns</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Bns</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Bns</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Bns</u>
US b/	485.6	110	536.7	120	540.0	120	54.4	--
RVNAF c/	276.5	46	430.9	57	383.6	78	107.1	32
FW b/	59.4	26	65.6	28	65.6	28	--	--

a/ Basic battalion in US Army battalion; USMC battalions are computed as 1.33 USA battalions based on strengths; RVNAF as .6 USA battalion. FW battalion equal to USA battalion.

b/ OASD(C) SEA Statistical Summary, Table 1.

c/ Strengths computed on effectiveness data in Tables 1 and 2.

The increase in RVNAF effectiveness, and the improvement in ARVN unit operations are encouraging signs. Our findings of better RVNAF performance are substantiated by advisors' ratings as reported by MACY. Also, initial desertion figures show a decline in January and February. We are delighted with the continuing increased rate of RVNAF performance.

1/ See article in this issue entitled "US and ARVN Division Performance" Table 3.

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RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS

*Summary.* RVNAF has killed 22% more enemy in 1969 than in the last 9 months of 1968, and total RVNAF effectiveness in terms of enemy KIA per 1000 RVNAF troops improved from 6.6 per month in 1968 to 7.2 in 1969. RVNAF regular force effectiveness in terms of enemy KIA has been about 60% of US effectiveness in 1969. In terms of enemy weapons captured (including caches) RVNAF regular forces have been 92% as effective as US forces this year.

In previous reports we have analyzed RVNAF effectiveness in terms of enemy killed per 1000 friendly troops, using statistics from the JCS GUAVA computer file. This file contains the preliminary results of RVNAF operations. Final enemy KIA totals are now keyed to friendly forces and are reported regularly by MACV in its Monthly Measurement of Progress report. Some of these figures are available from 1968. This analysis of RVNAF effectiveness is based on the MACV data.

Considerable caution must be exercised in using specific measures of performance (i.e., enemy killed) to determine total force effectiveness and capability. The offensive combat mission is only one task of a military unit, particularly in a conflict such as Vietnam. Nevertheless, there are few output or performance measures available to assess force effectiveness. It is anticipated that the MACV SEER reports will enable us to look at a much broader range of force effectiveness measures. Until these more detailed data, recently received from MACV, are ready for analysis, we will have to rely on those limited output measures which can be used to assess the effectiveness of RVNAF.

Table 1 indicates that RVNAF has killed 22% more enemy in 1969 than in the last 9 months of 1968. Total RVNAF effectiveness in terms of enemy KIA per 1000 RVNAF troops has also improved -- from 6.6 per month in 1968 to 7.2 in 1969.

The Regular Forces have increased their monthly rate from 8 enemy KIA per 1000 Regulars to 10.5 in 1969. However, RF/PF performance in these terms has declined from 4.8 to 3.6. Moreover, the monthly average of enemy KIA decreased in 1969, and remained at the new lower levels during the 1st and 2nd quarters. However, given the nature of the RF/PF mission, which is to be primarily a security force rather than a combat force, KIA figures may not be a very good indicator of RF/PF effectiveness.

1/ This official Measurements of Progress data shows far fewer enemy KIA by RF/PF than does the unofficial Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) data elsewhere in this issue ("RF/PF Effectiveness," pp. 13-23). We are attempting to resolve the differences between the two systems.

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TABLE 1 <sup>a/</sup>

VC/NVA KILLED PER THOUSAND FRIENDLY STRENGTH  
(Monthly Average)

	1968 <sup>b/</sup>	1969	
		1Q	2Q
<u>US</u>			
VC/NVA Killed	7116	8961	9926
Avg Str (000) <sup>c/</sup>	525	540	540
VC/NVA Killed Per 1000 Str	13.6	16.6	18.4
<u>RVNAF</u>			
Regular Forces <sup>d/</sup>			
VC/NVA Killed	3423	4483	4800
Avg Str (000) <sup>c/</sup>	427	432	451
VC/NVA Killed Per 1000 Str	8.0	10.4	10.6
RF/PF			
VC/NVA Killed	1573	1475	1451
Avg Str (000) <sup>c/</sup>	329	402	416
VC/NVA Killed Per 1000 Str	4.8	3.7	3.5
Total RVNAF <sup>e/</sup>			
VC/NVA Killed	4996	5958	6251
Avg Str (000) <sup>c/</sup>	756	834	867
VC/NVA Killed Per 1000 Str	6.6	7.1	7.2

<sup>a/</sup> MACV Measurement of Progress Reports.

<sup>b/</sup> Only includes 9 months; Data not available for Jan, Feb and Mar.

<sup>c/</sup> OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary, Table 2.

<sup>d/</sup> Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.

<sup>e/</sup> Includes Regular Forces, Regional and Popular Forces.

Although RVN force effectiveness in killing the enemy has improved since 1968, Table 1 also shows that the rate of improvement was not as rapid as U.S. force improvement in terms of enemy killed per friendly thousand troops or total enemy killed. Thus RVNAF effectiveness in killing the enemy relative to US forces decreased in 1969. Table 2 indicates that total RVNAF effectiveness relative to U.S. forces was 49% in 1968 but dropped in the 1st and 2nd quarters of 1969 to 43% and then 39%. Regular force effectiveness was 59% of U.S. effectiveness in the last 9 months of 1968, rose to 63% in early 1969, and dropped back to 58% in the 2nd quarter. RF/PF effectiveness relative to U.S. forces declined from 36% in 1968 to 19% by 2nd quarter 1969.

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TABLE 2

RVNAF VS. US FORCE EFFECTIVENESS  
(Monthly Average)

	1968	1969	
		1Q	2Q
<u>US</u>			
VC/NVA Killed Per 1000 Str	13.6 <sup>6</sup>	16.6	18.4
<u>RVNAF</u>			
Regular Forces			
VC/NVA Killed Per 1000 Str	8.0	10.4	10.6
Effectiveness Regular Fcs to US	59	63	58
RF/PF			
VC/NVA Killed Per 1000 Str	4.8	3.7	3.5
Effectiveness of RF/PF to US	36	22	19
Total RVNAF			
VC/NVA Killed Per 1000 Str	6.6	7.1	7.2
Effectiveness RVNAF to US (%)	49	43	39

The decreases in RVNAF force effectiveness relative to U.S. forces are partly attributable to: (1) a 15% increase in RVNAF strength from 1968 to second quarter 1969; (2) enemy emphasis on targeting U.S. units in 1969<sup>1/</sup>; and (3) a combination of political and military factors (such as different missions) which influenced the RVNAF force effectiveness.

In summary, RVNAF Regular Forces made steady but slow progress since 1968. It is clear from Table 2 that the regular forces were more effective in killing the enemy in 1969 than in 1968.

Another measure of force effectiveness is weapons captured (considered by some observers to be a more realistic indicator than enemy killed).<sup>2/</sup> Table 3 shows that in 1968 total RVNAF accounted for 2.6 enemy weapons per 1000 strength; while the regular forces accounted for 3.1 and the RF/PF for 2.0. U.S. forces accounted for 4.1. By second quarter 1969, total enemy weapons captured by RVNAF increased to 3.7, and the figure for the regular forces (5.1) almost equaled the U.S. force rate of 5.5. In contrast to the KIA trend for RF/PF, these forces captured more weapons in 2nd quarter 1969 than in the 1st quarter.

- <sup>1/</sup> See article "Enemy Emphasis on Inflicting U.S. Casualties" elsewhere in this issue.  
<sup>2/</sup> Includes enemy weapons captured in caches.

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TABLE 3<sup>a/</sup>

ENEMY WEAPONS CAPTURED PER THOUSAND FRIENDLY STRENGTH  
(Monthly Average)

	<u>1968<sup>b/</sup></u>	<u>1969</u> <u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>
<u>US</u>			
Enemy Weapons Captured	2169	3008	2948
Avg Str (000) <u>c/</u>	525	540	540
Weapons Captured Per 1000 Str	4.1	5.6	5.5
<u>RVNAF</u>			
<u>Regular Forces</u>			
Enemy Weapons Captured	1325	2215	2317
Avg Str (000) <u>c/</u>	427	432	451
Weapons Captured Per 1000 Str	3.1	5.1	5.1
<u>RF/PF</u>			
Enemy Weapons Captured	658	639	872
Avg Strength (000) <u>c/</u>	329	402	416
Weapons Captured Per 1000 Str	2.0	1.6	2.1
<u>Total RVNAF</u>			
Enemy Weapons Captured	1983	2754	3189
Avg Str (000) <u>c/</u>	756	834	867
Weapons Captured Per 1000 Str	2.6	3.4	3.7

a/ MACV Measurement of Progress Reports. Includes caches.

b/ Only includes 6 months, data not available for Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr, May and Sep.

c/ OSD(C) SEA Statistical Summary, Table 2.

In total numbers of weapons captured, RVNAF figures increased from a monthly average of 1983 in 1968 to 3189 by second quarter 1969 ( a 61% increase). The regular force figures increased 75% and the U.S. forces increased 36%. By 2nd quarter 1969 total RVNAF's monthly average of weapons captured (3189) exceeded that of U.S. forces (2948).

Table 4 shows that in 1968 total RVNAF was 63% as effective as U.S. forces in terms of recovering enemy weapons. By the second quarter 1969 their effectiveness increased to 67%. As in the case of enemy killed, regular force effectiveness was higher than total RVNAF. In 1968 it was 76% as effective as U.S.; by second quarter 1969 it had increased to 93%.

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TABLE 4  
RVNAF/US FORCE EFFECTIVENESS  
(ENEMY WEAPONS CAPTURED PER THOUSAND FRIENDLY STR.)  
(Monthly Average)

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u> <u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>
<u>US</u>			
Weapons Captured	4.1	5.6	5.5
<u>RVNAF</u>			
Regular Forces			
Weapons Captured	3.1	5.1	5.1
Effectiveness to US (%)	75	91	93
RF/PF			
Weapons Captured	2.0	1.6	2.1
Effectiveness to US (%)	49	29	38
Total RVNAF			
Weapons Captured	2.6	3.5	3.7
Effectiveness to US (%)	63	63	67

Enemy killed and weapons captured are compared in Table 5. It shows that in 1968-1969 the ratio of enemy killed to weapons captured ranged from 3.0 to 3.4 for U.S. forces and 2.0 to 2.6 for Vietnamese forces. Stated another way, U.S. forces recovered one weapon for about every three enemy killed, while RVN forces recovered one weapon for about every two enemy killed. If the weapons captured statistics are accurate, the RVNAF and the regular forces are performing surprisingly well, and the trend is in the right direction. The low ratio of enemy killed to weapons captured by the RVNAF tends to discount the possibility that their data on enemy killed is inflated relative to U.S. figures.

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TABLE 5

VC/NVA KILLED VERSUS TOTAL WEAPONS CAPTURED  
(Monthly Average)

	1968	1969	
		1Q	2Q
<u>US</u>			
Enemy Killed	7116	8961	9926
Weapons Captured	2169	3008	2948
Ratio	3.3	3.0	3.4
<u>RVNAF</u>			
Regular Forces			
Enemy Killed	3423	4483	4800
Weapons Captured	1325	2215	2317
Ratio	2.6	2.0	2.1
RF/PF			
Enemy Killed	1573	1475	1451
Weapons Captured	658	639	872
Ratio	2.4	2.3	1.7
Total RVNAF			
Enemy Killed	4996	5958	6251
Weapons Captured	1983	2954	3189
Ratio	2.5	2.0	2.0

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### ARVN INFANTRY BATTALION ACTIVITIES--FIRST HALF 1969

Summary. ARVN infantry battalions contacted smaller enemy units in the second quarter of 1969; this supports intelligence reports that some enemy units are being broken down into smaller units for future operations. This, plus the loss of 4,000 officers/NCO's to the RF/PF and other services, may help explain the lack of increased ARVN effectiveness in the second quarter. The number of battalions on full-time pacification missions tripled (11 to 33) between March and June, but the mix of large operations and small operations remained about the same. About 65% of the I and III Corps battalions participated in combined US/ARVN operations during the second quarter, and were 15% more productive, on average, than when they operated by themselves. About 64% of the ARVN battalions reported no unit training at all, and only about 15 had 14 or more consecutive days of training.

Factors Influencing ARVN Effectiveness. Last month we found that total RVNAF effectiveness, in terms of enemy KIA per 1000 friendly troops, improved in the first half of 1969 over 1968, but the improvement tended to level off in the second quarter.<sup>1/</sup> Our preliminary analysis of the ARVN section of the MACV System for the Evaluation of the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER) Report and computer file for 1969 helps to explain these trends in terms of both ARVN leadership and enemy activities.

MACV reported that during the second quarter of 1969 "the shortage of officers and staff noncommissioned officers (NCO's) was particularly critical. During the second quarter over 4000 junior officers and NCO's were transferred from ARVN for service in the Air Force, Navy, and Territorial Forces. The shortage of personnel in many units was a contributing factor in reducing what had been a steady improvement in unit operational effectiveness."

Another factor in the second quarter has been the smaller size of the enemy units encountered by ARVN battalions -- mostly battalions and companies during the first quarter and platoons during the second. Table 1 shows that small-scale enemy attacks increased 25% in the second quarter while battalion size attacks decreased 7%. The smaller enemy unit size was also reflected in the SEER data on ARVN contacts with the enemy: whereas enemy companies and battalions were involved in 67% of the ARVN contacts in the first quarter of 1969, enemy platoons accounted for 72% of the contacts in the second quarter. These findings tend to support intelligence reports that some enemy regiments and battalions are breaking down into smaller units for future operations.

<sup>1/</sup> SEA Analysis Report, "RVNAF Effectiveness," pp. 7-12, August 1969.

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TABLE 1

ENEMY ACTIVITY LEVELS  
January - June 1969

	<u>1969</u>		
	<u>1st</u>	2nd	
	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>% Change</u>
Enemy Attacks: <u>a/</u>			
Battalion Size	15	14	- 7%
Other	970	1215	+25%
Total	<u>985</u>	<u>1229</u>	+25%
ARVN Contacts with			
Enemy Units: <u>b/</u>			
Enemy Platoons	320	681	+113%
Enemy Companies	314	195	- 38%
Enemy Battalions	348	75	- 78%
Total Contacts	<u>982</u>	<u>951</u>	- 3%

a/ Source: OSD/Comptroller, SEA Statistical Summary.

b/ Source: SEER Computer File, reports by ARVN Infantry Battalion Advisors.

Allocation of ARVN Effort. The decrease in intensity of contact with the enemy allowed more ARVN battalions to be assigned to GVN province chiefs for pacification duties. Table 2 shows that the battalions working only on pacification increased from 11 during March to 33 in June. The battalions entirely devoted to non-pacification missions (combat or security) fell from 91 to 77. The rest of the 133 ARVN battalions split their time between pacification and nonpacification missions.

TABLE 2

ARVN INFANTRY BATTALION ASSIGNMENTS a/

	<u>March</u>	<u>June</u>
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1969</u>
<u>Mission Assignments</u>		
Non-Pacification Only <u>b/</u>	91	77
Pacification Only <u>b/c/</u>	11	33
Both Pacification and Non-Pacification <u>b/c/</u>	28	22
Training, Reserve, Rehabilitation Only	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
Total Battalions	<u>132</u>	<u>133</u>

a/ Source: SEER Computer File.

b/ Battalion may have also spent part of the month on training, rehabilitation, or reserve missions.

c/ Pacification missions are defined as being performed under the operational control of the GVN province chief. A few battalions in I Corps which performed pacification-type missions under operational control of military headquarters are not included in these figures.

1/ The battalions may have also spent part of the month on training, rehabilitation, or reserve missions.

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In both quarters of 1969, the average ARVN infantry battalion spent 21-22 days a month on large unit operations (15 offensive, 6-7 defensive), and 6 days a month on small unit operations (4 offensive, 2 defensive). Table 3 shows that I Corps battalions were in large unit operations a few days more than the average (25-26 days a month), while III Corps battalions were in small unit operations a few days more than the average (8-10 days a month). The smaller size of the enemy units encountered in the 2nd quarter apparently did not affect the size of operation normally used by ARVN battalions. When assigned to work for GVN province chiefs on pacification, however, ARVN battalions tended to use smaller, shorter operations.

TABLE 3

ALLOCATION OF ARVN INFANTRY  
BATTALION EFFORT BY CORPS AREA a/

	<u>1969</u>	
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>
	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>
<u>I Corps (33 Bns)</u>		
Average No. Days Per Month on:		
Large Unit Operations	25	26
Small Unit Operations	3	2
Reserve, Training, Rehabilitation	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
Total No. Days	30	30
<u>II Corps (28 Bns)</u>		
Average No. Days Per Month on:		
Large Unit Operations	20	23
Small Unit Operations	8	6
Reserve, Training, Rehabilitation	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
Total No. Days	30	30
<u>III Corps (36 Bns)</u>		
Average No. Days Per Month on:		
Large Unit Operations	21	18
Small Unit Operations	8	10
Reserve, Training, Rehabilitation	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
Total No. Days	30	30
<u>IV Corps (36 Bns)</u>		
Average No. Days Per Month on:		
Large Unit Operations	19	21
Small Unit Operations	7	4
Reserve, Training, Rehabilitation	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Total No. Days	30	30
<u>RVN (133 Bns)</u>		
Average No. Days Per Month on:		
Large Unit Operations	22	21
Small Unit Operations	6	6
Reserve, Training, Rehabilitation	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>
Total No. Days	30	30

a/ Source: SEER computer file. Based on SEER Operational Statistics Report, Section X, Allocation of Effort.

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Combined US/ARVN Operations. MACV is apparently stressing combined operations in I and III CTZ as an effective means of training ARVN forces. During the second quarter 1969, 64% of ARVN battalions in I CTZ and 69% in III CTZ spent 2-12 days a month on combined operations with US forces. Table 4 shows that over 75% of the battalions in the 2nd, 5th, and 25th Divisions, and 51st Regiment participated in combined operations. However, these units spent only 10-23% of their available battalion days of operation in combined operations with US forces; the countrywide total was 7%.

TABLE 4

ARVN INFANTRY BATTALION PARTICIPATION  
IN COMBINED OPERATIONS WITH US FORCES a/  
(April-June 1969)

Division	No. of Bns Participating	Total Bns	% Participating	Avg No. Days Per Mo. Per Bn Participating	% of Available Bn Days on:	
					Combined Operations	Unilateral Operations
1st Div	8	17	47	11.8	18	82
2nd Div	10	12	83	4.6	13	87
51st Reg	3	4	75	9.3	23	77
I Corps	21	33	54	8.0	17	83
22nd Div	1	12	8	.7	b/	100
23rd Div	4	12	33	6.5	7	93
42nd Reg	0	4	0	-	0	100
II Corps	5	28	18	5.3	3	97
5th Div	10	12	83	3.6	10	90
18th Div	4	12	33	2.2	2	98
25th Div	11	12	92	3.2	10	90
III Corps	25	36	69	3.2	7	93
7th Div	3	12	25	1.4	1	99
9th Div	0	12	0	-	0	100
21st Div	1	12	8	.3	b/	100
IV Corps	4	36	11	1.2	b/	100
RVN	55	133	41	5.1	7	93

a/ Source: SEER computer file. Data on combined operations from Operational Statistics Report (OSR) Section IX.

b/ Less than 1%.

MACV has stated that "for the effort expended enemy KIA results were better during unilateral than combined operations."<sup>1/</sup> However, in terms of enemy KIA per battalion day, Table 5 shows that ARVN battalions were 15% more productive

<sup>1/</sup> MACV SEER Report, 2nd quarter 1969, p. 26.

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TABLE 5

RELATIVE PRODUCTIVITY OF COMBINED (C)  
UNILATERAL ARVN INFANTRY COMBAT OP  
April-June 1969

Division	Battalion Days On Combat Operations			Enemy KIA On Combat Operations		
	Combined	Unilateral	Total	Combined	Unilateral	Total
1st Div	284	978	1262	261	820	1081
2nd Div	138	589	727	319	726	1045
51st Reg	84	114	198	27	146	173
I Corps	<u>506</u>	<u>1681</u>	<u>2187</u>	<u>607</u>	<u>1692</u>	<u>2299</u>
22nd Div	2	496	498	0	207	207
23rd Div	18	244	262	7	76	83
42nd Reg	0	173	173	0	406	406
II Corps	<u>20</u>	<u>913</u>	<u>933</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>689</u>	<u>696</u>
5th Div	87	311	398	19	54	73
18th Div	26	502	528	25	459	484
25th Div	48	270	318	26	169	195
III Corps	<u>161</u>	<u>1083</u>	<u>1244</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>682</u>	<u>752</u>
7th Div	13	339	352	5	276	281
9th Div	0	464	464	0	284	284
21st Div	1	357	358	0	484	484
IV Corps	<u>14</u>	<u>1160</u>	<u>1174</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1044</u>	<u>1049</u>
RVN	701	4837	5538	689	4107	4796

Source: SEER Computer File. Data on combined operations from OSR Section IX; d. IV; data on total enemy KIA from OSR Section VII.

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(ARVN) VERSUS  
RATIONS a/

Enemy KIA Per Bn Day (Combat Operations)			% Advantage of Combined Over Unilateral
Combined	Unilateral	Total	
.92	.84	.86	+ 10
2.31	1.23	1.44	+ 88
.32	1.28	.87	- 75
<u>1.20</u>	<u>1.01</u>	<u>1.05</u>	+ 19
0	.42	.42	-100
.39	.31	.32	+ 26
-	<u>2.35</u>	<u>2.35</u>	--
<u>.35</u>	<u>.75</u>	<u>.75</u>	- 53
.22	.17	.18	+ 29
.96	.91	.92	+ 5
.54	.63	.61	- 14
<u>.43</u>	<u>.63</u>	<u>.60</u>	- 32
.38	.81	.80	- 53
-	.61	.61	--
0	<u>1.36</u>	<u>1.35</u>	-100
<u>.36</u>	<u>.89</u>	<u>.89</u>	- 60
.98	.85	.87	+ 15

a on total battalion days from OSR Section

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in combined US/ARVN combat operations than in unilateral combat operations. Table 5 shows that the 2nd Division had the best results from combined operations (88% better than unilateral operations), followed by the 5th Division (29% better), 1st Division (10% better), and 18th Division (5% better). The 25th Division and 51st Regiment had worse results (14% and 75% worse respectively). The remaining divisions had too few days on combined operations for comparison.

These results are far from conclusive, and other variables besides enemy KIA may influence results, so we plan to expand our study of combined operations in future issues.

Battalion Training Assignments. Unit training of ARVN battalions has long been neglected, and data from SEER shows that so far in 1969, little has been done to improve it. Only 48 (36%) of the 133 ARVN infantry battalions spent one or more days during the first half of 1969 assigned solely to training; the other 85 (64%) may have had intermittent training as a secondary mission while assigned to combat, security, or pacification missions (Table 6). Furthermore, detailed analysis shows that only about 15 battalions were taken out of combat for 14 or more consecutive days of training.

TABLE 6

ARVN INFANTRY BATTALION TRAINING ASSIGNMENTS a/  
January-June 1969

<u>No. Infantry Battalions</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>No. of Days Training Per Battalion</u>	<u>No. Bn Days of Training</u>	<u>No. Bn Days Available</u>
85	64	0	0	15,385
21	16	1-10	107	3,801
13	9	11-20	206	2,353
9	7	21-30	247	1,629
3	2	31-40	100	543
1	1	41-50	42	181
1	1	51-90	90	181
<u>133</u>	<u>100</u>		<u>792</u>	<u>24,073</u>

a/ Source: SEER Computer File. Based on SEER Operational Statistics Report, Section IV, Mission Assignments.

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RVNAF STATUS

*Summary.* The RVNAF force expansion has exceeded FY 1969 personnel strength goals. Additional recruitment, particularly of RF/PF, is under way against expanded FY 1971 goals. RVNAF has received 70-90% of the major equipment items programmed for FY 1970, and the Regular Forces have received all of their M-16 rifles. RF/PF units had received about 150,000 M-16 rifles by April 1969 and advisors' firepower ratings improved significantly as a result. Communication equipment for the PF is still a major problem. Promotions had filled 61% of the authorized RVNAF Captain-Colonel billets by the end of July. Desertion rates have declined in 1969, but remain a problem and are unlikely to decline further. Reports from MACV, observers' comments and statistical analysis generally agree that RVNAF performance in the field is better in 1969 than ever before.

The modernization program now calls for an FY 71 RVNAF force level of 992,800, an increase of 350,000 since December 1967.

RVNAF PERSONNEL STRENGTH INCREASES  
(Thousands of Personnel).

	Actual 1967 (31 Dec)	Actual 1969 (31 Jul)	Planned <u>b/</u> FY 71
<u>RVNAF</u>			
Army	302.8	394.6	395.8
Navy	16.0	24.6	33.1
Marine Corps	8.0	9.4	13.1
Air Force	16.1	26.9	35.8
Total Regular	<u>342.9</u>	<u>455.5</u>	<u>477.8</u>
Regional	151.4	252.0	275.6
Popular	148.8	186.1	239.4
Total RVNAF	<u>643.1</u>	<u>893.9</u>	<u>992.8</u>
<u>PARAMILITARY</u>			
Total RVN Forces	<u>155.7</u> 798.8	<u>172.6</u> 1066.5	<u>187.5</u> 1180.3

a/ Phase II Program.  
b/ Midway Proposal.

Total RVNAF strength rose 39% (643,000 to 894,000) between December 1967 and July 1969, and the RVNAF exceeded its planned FY 69 objective of 875,000. The Regional Forces increased 66% (151,400 to 252,000) during the period, while the Popular Forces increased 25% (148,800 to 186,400).

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In terms of personnel strength, the Vietnamese force expansion has exceeded expectations. It was thought that the GVN would have extreme difficulty reaching the original (FY 69) force goals, but they have now passed them. As a result they proposed significant further increases at the Midway conference, particularly in the RF/PF and paramilitary forces. At present, they are having trouble meeting police goals, but recruitment of RF/PF forces has apparently been helped by the manpower becoming available as the GVN expands its presence into contested and VC areas as part of the accelerated pacification programs.

### RVNAF EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION

Regular Forces. By June 1970 the modernization of the RVNAF ground forces will be largely complete. At that time 186 maneuver battalions will be equipped with modern individual and crew served weapons (M-16 rifles and M-60 machine guns) and their artillery will be brought up to US standards (three 105 howitzer battalions and one 155 howitzer battalion per division). They will have about 88% as many light artillery and medium artillery pieces as are possessed by US forces in SVN. By August 1969, RVNAF forces had received the following percentages of the items programmed for FY 1970: 87% of their M-16 rifles (Regular Forces had all of theirs), 90% of their mortars and howitzers, 90% of their tanks and armored personnel carriers, 75% of their modern trucks, and about 70% of their modern radios.

A Navy of six modern river assault groups, 13 standard river assault groups, over 250 patrol craft and 2 destroyer escorts will be largely equipped by June 1970.

Although four Air Force H-34 helicopter squadrons have recently been converted to UH-1 squadrons, the VNAF modernization program will not be complete until 1971-72. (This is caused by long lead-time pilot and mechanic training requirements.) The modernized VNAF will consist of 40 squadrons including 9 attack and 14 helicopter squadrons. The 9 attack squadrons will be capable of flying 180 sorties per day, or 2.5 times their current capability.

Territorial Forces (RF/PF). RF/PF equipment improvement concentrates primarily on weapons, particularly M-16 rifles. RF/PF units in the field received a total of 145,757 M-16's between June 1968 and April 1969. More have been issued since April but exact numbers are not yet available from the computer data. The infusion of new rifles resulted in steady improvement in RF/PF firepower; by June 1969, 84% of total RF units and 77% of the PF units were rated by their advisors as equivalent to or better than the VC in firepower, up from 71% of RF and 63% of PF last December.

Other equipment problems have improved in 1969. Fewer than 5% of all RF/PF units now have an inadequate supply of munitions, compared to 12% in 1968. Communication equipment remains a major problem, particularly for the PF. Despite substantial improvement, lack of enough radios continues to hamper operations for 45% of the PF platoons. One-third of RF units are short of the authorized number of radios but can still perform their missions.

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## RVNAF - LEADERSHIP, MORALE, AND DESERTIONS

Leadership - Observers' reports continue to cite good leadership as RVNAF's major deficiency. One key to improving leadership is an effective promotion system. Although the RVNAF promoted more officers in 1968-1969 than ever before, only 61% of the authorized Captain-Colonel billets were filled at the end of July 1969; the lowest proportion of billets filled was in the rank of Colonel (32% Regular, 7% Regional). US field commanders continue to report that Vietnamese officers (especially in the higher ranks) owe their promotions more to political acumen than battlefield performance. The difficulties experienced in trying to remove poor officers from command are also cited as a major obstacle to effective leadership.

Morale - Little has been done over the past few years to improve the living conditions of RVNAF personnel and their families. Recent reports indicate that the military pay raise promised by the GVN this year will be honored, but difficulties have arisen in financing it. The promised commodity increases will not be distributed at this time. The GVN financial proposals presented at Midway requested more than one billion dollars in FY 1970 to support pay and ration increases, increased housing allowances, free food issues, and other items. The financial proposals were disapproved by the US mission because their cost would be highly inflationary and would tend to perpetuate GVN dependence on imports.

Desertions - The table shows that the desertion rate has been reduced in 1969, but still remains a critical problem. Men in the ground combat forces are still deserting at 2.5 times the total RVNAF rate. Almost one-third of their manpower will desert each year at the current rate; this is equivalent to losing four of the twelve ARVN divisions. Moreover, historical experience indicates that desertion rates are unlikely to fall below their present levels.

RVNAF DESERTION RATES  
(Monthly Average Net Desertions Per 1000 Strength)

	1968	1969	
	Jul-Dec	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
RVNAF	15.0	10.2	11.0
Regular Forces	16.2	11.9	11.8
(Ground Combat Units)	35.8	25.7	26.0
Regional Forces	16.3	10.6	13.4
Popular Forces	10.3	5.8	5.4

SOURCE: MAC J-14 Selected RVNAF Personnel Data.

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## RVNAF RESULTS IN THE FIELD

Reports from MACV, observers' comments, and our analysis generally agree that RVNAF performance in the field is better in 1969 than ever before. Some ARVN units, (1st ARVN Division) are considered almost on a par with US units. On the other hand, some units are still bad and RVNAF leadership and desertion problems persist.

### Regular Forces

In the first six months of 1969, the Regular Forces' monthly average of enemy killed increased 35% over the last 9 months of 1968.<sup>1/</sup> Stated another way, in the 1968 period the regular forces accounted for 8.0 enemy killed per 1000 troop strength; in 1969 the rate increased to 10.5 enemy killed, a gain of 31%.

The Regular Forces effectiveness in recovering enemy weapons in 1969 increased to a level almost comparable to US forces. In 1968 3.1 enemy weapons were recovered per 1000 troop strength; in 1969 the figure is 5.1. (US figures were 4.1 and 5.5.) The Regular Forces accounted for almost twice as many enemy weapons captured in 1969 as in 1968. Moreover, the Regular Forces have almost quit losing weapons, a marked improvement over 1966 when they reportedly lost more weapons than they captured from the enemy.

Much of the improvement in the Regular Forces is probably somewhat independent of the equipment modernization program, which is well along but will not be complete until June 1970. Thus, the prognosis for the future is good, especially if the leadership deficiency and desertion problems are corrected.

### Territorial Forces (RF/PF)

RF/PF operational effort improved in 1969; the monthly average of operations increased 77%, contacts were up 60%, night operations reportedly doubled and night contacts were up 54%. Advisor ratings for unit aggressiveness and responsiveness to orders also improved. PF units showed less progress than the RF.

RF/PF combat results improved less than the operational effort. If we exclude the 1st quarter 1968 because of the Tet offensive, enemy killed by RF increased 19% in 1969 and PF performance increased only 6%. The enemy/RF kill ratio increased from 4.1 to 4.4; PF went from 3.2 to 3.4. Enemy weapons captured per contact with the enemy leveled off after declining during 1968.

<sup>1/</sup> First 3 months of 1968 data not available.

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EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES OF ARVN INFANTRY BATTALIONS

Data from MACV's System for the Evaluation of the Effectiveness of RVN Armed Forces (SEER) reports show that the output of ARVN infantry battalions in the first six months of 1969 was up 11% over the same period in 1968 -- from 1,750 enemy killed per month in the first half of 1968 to 1,950 per month in 1969. Most of the increase was apparently due to quantitative external factors, including a 10% increase in the number of battalions, increased support from US air and artillery, and more emphasis on combined operations with US forces. The average battalion, on the other hand, while it did spend more time on offensive operations, did not show much qualitative internal improvement: it increased only marginally in productivity -- from 14.3 enemy KIA per month in the first half of 1968 to 14.7 per month in 1969 -- and received about the same subjective Operational Effectiveness ratings from US advisors. MACV reported in its June 1969 report that major personnel and leadership problems remained to be solved.

Background. MACV designed and implemented the SEER in January 1968 to fill a wide gap in our information about the capabilities and improvement of the Vietnamese Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. From the Army/Marine Corps (ARVN/VNMC) section of SEER we now have 18 consecutive months of operational statistics (commanders' ranks and experience, mission assignments, days on unilateral and combined operations, and result, and 6 consecutive quarters of subjective US advisors' ratings (operational effectiveness, leadership, personnel, support, and logistics). The data is available on magnetic tape for analysis.

The operational statistics from SEER, although unofficial, generally agree with the sections of MACV's official Measurements of Progress and OPREP ground operations reporting system which report much of the same data in summary form. The SEER data has the great advantage of showing results by division and battalion, enabling comparison between units with similar environments and missions. The source of the data is US battalion, regiment, and division advisors, who have access to the daily operating records of the RVNAF unit they advise.

The SEER subjective ratings are a substantial improvement over other systems MACV has used to obtain qualitative information about ARVN/VNMC units (e.g., the "Satisfactory-Marginal-Unsatisfactory" ratings used in 1966-67). Each quarter US advisors (and their superior officers) answer a comprehensive list of 157 multiple-choice questions for every ARVN/VNMC battalion, regiment, and division. However, the questions are highly subjective, and require advisors to apply their own professional experience and understanding of Vietnamese standards to judge unit performance (Annex A lists the 21 questions which relate to Operational Effectiveness). The data must be used with considerable caution, due to several problems outlined in the analysis to follow.

Operational Statistics. SEER data shows that the overall productivity of ARVN infantry battalions in terms of enemy kills rose 11% and overall friendly KIA dropped 15% in the first half of 1969 compared to the same period in 1968: the number of enemy killed per month rose from 1,750 in the first

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half of 1968 to 1,950 in the first half of 1969 while the number of ARVN infantrymen killed fell from 635 per month in the first half of 1968 to 540 per month in the first half of 1969 (Table 1), raising the kill ratio from 2.8:1 to 3.6:1. These improvements occurred during a period in which the number of ARVN battalions was increasing 10% (from 119 to 133), the US was modernizing ARVN with M-15's and other equipment, US air and artillery support was made more readily available, and more ARVN battalions were emphasizing combined operations with US units. MACV's official Measurements of Progress data on enemy killed by RVNAF regular forces (including ARVN infantry) generally supports the above conclusions about the overall increase in ARVN productivity in 1969.

TABLE 1

ARVN INFANTRY BATTALIONS  
OPERATIONAL EFFORT AND RESULTS a/

	1968				1969	
	1st Qtr b/	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
<b>Effort:</b>						
No. of Bns (end of Per.)	122	126	127	131	132	133
Days per mo per bn on Large Unit Opns	Not Available		19	23	21	22
Days per mo per bn on Offensive Assignments	11	10	11	13	19	19
<b>Results:</b>						
En. KIA per Mo.	1753	1745	1514	1030	1965	919
Fr. KIA per Mo.	629	642	436	293	547	531
KIA Ratio En/Fr	2.8:1	2.7:1	3.5:1	3.5:1	3.6:1	3.6:1
En. Weapons Capt per Mo.	967	700	658	557	759	705
Fr. Weapons Lost per Mo.	170	150	61	40	68	101
Weapons Capt/Lost Ratio	5.7:1	4.7:1	10.8:1	13.9:1	11.2:1	7.0:1
<b>Results per Battalion:</b>						
En. KIA per Bn per Mo.	14.4	14.1	12.0	7.8	14.9	14.5
Fr. KIA per Bn per Mo.	5.2	5.2	3.4	2.2	4.1	4.0
KIA Ratio En/Fr	2.8:1	2.7:1	3.5:1	3.5:1	3.6:1	3.6:1
En. Weapons Capt per Mo.	7.9	5.7	5.2	4.2	5.7	5.3
Fr. Weapons Lost per Mo.	1.4	1.2	.5	.3	.5	.8
Weapons Capt/Lost Ratio	5.7:1	4.7:1	10.8:1	13.9:1	11.2:1	7.0:1

a/ Source: MACV's SEER reports, Operational Statistics section. Friendly and enemy KIA from "KIA by Cause" section of report for 1968 and 1969.

b/ March 1968 data only.

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At the same time MACV continued to report problems with personnel, leadership, and training in ARVN battalions. The SEER data reflects these internal problems in that the number of enemy killed per battalion increased only slightly (14.3 per month in the first half of 1968 to 14.7 per month in the first half of 1969). Other indicators, such as enemy weapons captured per battalion, remained about the same as 1968 levels. One encouraging sign, however, is that ARVN battalions nearly doubled the amount of time spent on offensive assignments (from 10-11 days a month in most of 1968 to 19 days a month in 1969), possibly as a result of the expanded RF/PF forces taking over more of the defensive territorial security missions from ARVN units.

Operational Effectiveness Ratings. The SEER records the US advisor's ratings of ARVN battalions on a 5-best through 1-worst scale for each of 21 subjective questions relating to unit effectiveness (e.g. does the unit attempt to make contact with the enemy during engagements? and do they employ fire and movement effectively?). They then compute a percent score for each unit, consisting of the total rating points achieved divided by the total possible points on all questions answered. Each advisor's superior officer submits answers to the same questions, and a combined average score (advisor plus superior) is then used for analysis.

During the 18-month period for which we have data, ARVN infantry battalions have shown no significant improvement in advisor's ratings. Between the first quarter 1968 and the second quarter 1969, the Operational Effectiveness ratings of 60 battalions improved, while 58 regressed (Table 2). The overall average score rose only 1.8 percentage points -- from 72.6% in first quarter of 1968 to 74.3% in the second quarter 1969. (Because of the wide range of battalion scores in both months, there is a 20% probability that the increase could have occurred by chance alone.)

Table 2 also shows that US advisors upgraded the ratings of ARVN divisions somewhat more than the ratings of their component battalions and regiments. This probably means that ARVN division commanders learned to make better use of the good units in their divisions, giving less important tasks to the lower-rated units.

We have not fully analyzed the SEER subjective ratings, but there are several problems with this type of data which require that it be used with caution:

(1) During the period for which we have data, battalion advisors have turned over at least once, and probably twice. Turnover of advisors may disrupt the continuity of ratings, thus making time-series comparisons less valid.

(2) When a unit is thrown into heavy combat for the first time there may be a tendency for US advisors to downgrade that unit's ratings. The regression of rating scores in this case does not necessarily represent a decrease in effectiveness, but rather a reassessment of previously inflated ratings. The case of the ARVN 42nd Separate Regiment is a good example: all ratings went down in June 1969, immediately after the unit's engagement at

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TABLE 2

## SEER OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATINGS ARVN INFANTRY BATTALIONS, REGIMENTS, DIVISIONS

	No. of Units in Each Range						
	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89	90-100
<u>Battalions</u>							
1Q 68	2	6	10	27	36	32	6
2Q 69--old units	2	4	8	28	35	20	22
2Q 69--all units	2	5	9	34	37	22	24
<u>Regiments</u>							
1Q 68			3	9	10	9	
2Q 69--old units			3	8	8	10	2
2Q 69--all units			3	9	8	11	2
<u>Divisions</u>							
1Q 68			1	3	3	3	
2Q 69				3	2	3	2

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<u>Total</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation of the</u>		<u>No. Units</u>		
		<u>Mean</u>	<u>Improved</u>	<u>Re-gressed</u>	<u>No Change</u>	<u>New</u>
119	72.6	1.2				
119	74.7	1.2	60	58	1	14
133	74.3	1.2				
31	72.9	1.8				
31	74.4	1.9	17	14	0	2
33	74.5	1.8				
10	73.0	3.4				
20	78.2	3.5	7	3	0	0

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Ben Het and Dak To. Some or all of the decline undoubtedly represents a reassessment, rather than actual decline in effectiveness.

(3) Observers in the field have reported that major improvements have occurred in many ARVN units since July 1. SEER subjective ratings for the third quarter of 1969 will not be available until at least December 1.

(4) Many improvements in RVNAF will not be immediately apparent in the SEER subjective ratings, or even the SEER quantitative statistics. For instance, MACV is conducting many combined operations with ARVN units as a means of providing training and experience. ARVN performance is only about 15% higher in combined operations than in unilateral operations according to SEER data, but the long-run benefits are probably more important than immediate results.

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ANNEX A

MACV OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATINGS  
21 Component Questions from SEER

<u>No.</u>	<u>Question</u>	<u>Rating</u> <u>Points</u>
1.	In your judgment, roughly what proportion of the offensive combat operations did the unit fight aggressively once in contact?	
	A. all	5
	B. 3/4	4
	C. 1/2	3
	D. 1/4	2
	E. none	1
	F. not applicable	
2.	In offensive combat operations, the unit sought to make contact with the enemy:	
	A. always	5
	B. usually	4
	C. sometimes	3
	D. seldom	2
	E. never	1
	F. cannot judge	
	G. not applicable	
3.	In offensive combat operations, the unit sought to evade contact with the enemy:	
	A. never	5
	B. seldom	4
	C. sometimes	3
	D. usually	2
	E. always	1
	F. cannot judge	
	G. not applicable	
4.	In your opinion, if the unit fully employed available resources and intelligence during the reporting period and permission was given, contacts with the enemy could have been:	
	A. made no more frequently than they were	5
	B. increased by about 1/3	4
	C. increased by about 2/3	3
	D. doubled	2
	E. more than doubled	1
	F. cannot judge	
	G. not applicable	

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Question</u>	<u>Rating Points</u>
5.	By VN standards the unit has demonstrated that it performs Search & Destroy operations:	
	A. well	5
	B. acceptably	3
	C. poorly	1
	D. not applicable	
6.	By VN standards, the unit has demonstrated that it performs Security operations (other than support of Revolutionary Development):	
	A. well	5
	B. acceptably	3
	C. poorly	1
	D. not applicable	
7.	By VN standards, the unit has demonstrated that it performs Security operations (in support of Revolutionary Development):	
	A. well	5
	B. acceptably	3
	C. poorly	1
	D. not applicable	
8.	By US standards, the troops employ fire and <u>movement</u> (actions designed to keep the enemy under fire while approaching his positions):	
	A. well	5
	B. acceptably	3
	C. poorly	1
	D. cannot judge	
	E. not applicable	
9.	By US standards the unit employs fire and <u>maneuver</u> (actions designed to hold an enemy by fire while the unit maneuvers to attack a flank):	
	A. well	5
	B. acceptably	3
	C. poorly	1
	D. cannot judge	
	E. not applicable	

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Question</u>	<u>Rating Points</u>
10.	The unit conducts defensive operations:	
	A. well	5
	B. acceptably	3
	C. poorly	1
	D. cannot judge	
	E. not applicable	
11.	The unit conducts psywar:	
	A. well	5
	B. acceptably	3
	C. poorly	1
	D. cannot judge	
	E. not applicable	
12.	The unit employs crew-served weapons:	
	A. well	5
	B. acceptably	3
	C. poorly	1
	D. cannot judge	
	E. not applicable	
13.	The unit conducts ambushes:	
	A. well	5
	B. acceptably	3
	C. poorly	1
	D. cannot judge	
	E. not applicable	
14.	By US standards, the unit takes action:	
	A. quickly	5
	B. with acceptable speed	3
	C. slowly	1
	D. cannot judge	
	E. not applicable	
15.	The unit can sustain operations:	
	A. five days or longer	5
	B. up to five days	4
	C. two days or less	3
	D. overnight only	2
	E. cannot judge	
	F. not applicable	

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Question</u>	<u>Rating Points</u>
16.	The unit's efforts to collect intelligence	
	A. effective	5
	B. marginal	3
	C. ineffective	1
	D. cannot judge	
	E. not applicable	
17.	The unit reacted appropriately to intelligence received:	
	A. in almost all cases	5
	B. in roughly 2/3 of the cases	4
	C. in roughly 1/3 of the cases	2
	D. in almost none of the cases	1
	E. cannot judge	
	F. not applicable	
18.	Unit effectiveness in establishing and maintaining the requisite community attitude for successful pacification is:	
	A. adequate	5
	B. inadequate	1
	C. not applicable	
19.	Considering terrain and other factors, the commander having operational control of the armored unit employs the <u>full fire power</u> of armor (including APCs):	
	A. generally	5
	B. occasionally	3
	C. rarely	1
	D. not observed	
	E. not applicable	
20.	Considering terrain, the commander having operational control of the armored unit employs the <u>full mobility</u> of armor:	
	A. generally	5
	B. occasionally	3
	C. rarely	1
	D. not observed	
	E. not applicable	

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Question</u>	<u>Rating</u> <u>Points</u>
21.	The staff is capable of planning and conducting operations necessary for the timely accomplishment of the mission(s) of the unit:	
	A. effectively	5
	B. fairly effectively	3
	C. ineffectively	1
	D. cannot judge	
	E. not applicable	

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## NOTES ON ARVN INFANTRY BATTALIONS: CORRECTION AND UPDATES

Summary. Corrected KIA figures show that the enemy KIA by ARVN infantry battalions in the first nine months of 1969 decreased 33% from the comparable period of 1968, possibly because the enemy was not engaging ARVN units as frequently or in as large strengths in 1969. In the third quarter of 1969, U.S. advisors upgraded their overall assessments of ARVN infantry battalions from 74-75% to 78%--the first time the average battalion has shown noticeable improvement since the SEEP reporting system began in January 1968. There appears to be slight improvement in the aggressiveness ratings, but about 30 of the 133 ARVN infantry battalions consistently have low scores on this factor.

Correction. Consistent with our policy of openly correcting past mistakes, we would like to point out that the KIA data used in our October article, "Effectiveness Measures of ARVN Infantry Battalions" was in error.<sup>1/</sup> This holds for both friendly KIA and enemy KIA for 1968; the 1969 KIA figures were correct. Table 1 corrects and updates the data in the previous article.

TABLE 1<sup>a/</sup>

### ARVN INFANTRY BATTALIONS OPERATIONAL EFFORT AND RESULTS

	1968				1969		
	<u>1st</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>3rd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>4th</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>Qtr</u>	<u>3rd</u> <u>Qtr</u>
<u>Effort:</u>							
No of Bns (End of Per)	122	126	127	131	132	133	133
Days Per Mo Per Bn on Large Unit Opns	N/A	N/A	19	23	21	22	20
Days Per Mo Per Bn on Off Assignment	11	10	11	13	19	19	N/A
<u>Results:</u>							
En KIA per Mo	3665	2446	1946	1196	1965	1919	1532
Fr KIA per Mo	695	662	450	303	547	531	366
KIA Ratio En/Fr	5.3:1	3.7:1	4.3:1	3.9:1	3.6:1	3.6:1	4.2:1
En Weapons Capt per Mo	967	700	658	557	759	705	585
Fr Weapons Lost per Mo	170	150	61	40	68	101	32
Weapons Capt/Lost Ratio	5.7:1	4.7:1	10.8:1	13.9:1	11.2:1	7.0:1	18.3:1
<u>Results Per Bn:</u>							
En KIA per Bn Per Mo	30.0	19.4	15.3	9.1	14.9	14.4	11.5
Fr KIA per Bn Per Mo	5.7	5.3	3.5	2.3	4.1	4.0	2.8

<sup>a/</sup> Source: SEER.

<sup>1/</sup> See "Effectiveness Measures of ARVN Infantry Battalions," SEA Analysis Report, October 1969, pp. 17-18.

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Breaking the data down even further we find that only 28 battalions fell into Group II in both periods. Finally, the SEER report for third quarter 1969 reports that 32 battalions are not very aggressive when in contact with the enemy. These findings suggest once more that there is a group of about 28-30 battalions with consistently low ratings on aggressiveness. Twenty of them are found in 5 of the 10 ARVN divisions as follows: 9th (6 bns), 5th (5), 23rd (3), 25th (3), 7th (3). None of the battalions were from the ARVN 1st Division or 51st Regiment.

TABLE 1

## PROGRESS IN AGGRESSIVENESS

<u>No. of Quarters Spent in Group II</u>	<u>No. of Battalions</u>	
	<u>Jan-Sep 68</u>	<u>Oct-Jun 69</u>
0	66	76
1	35	32
2	17	16
3	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>
Subtotal	61	57
Total	<u>127</u>	<u>133</u>

## Enemy KIA VS ARVN Effectiveness Ratings

In the past, ARVN effectiveness was usually measured by looking at the level of enemy KIA, and we assumed there would be a strong relationship between U.S. advisors' combat effectiveness ratings and the level of enemy KIA by a unit. However, a preliminary regression analysis of the infantry battalions of the ARVN First Division indicates there is no relationship between effectiveness ratings and enemy KIA by the units.

On the other hand, the analysis did point up a fairly good relationship between the overall effectiveness ratings and the leadership ratings given to the ARVN infantry battalions by their U.S. advisors. This, of course, would be expected, and indicates the advisors' share General Ridgway's belief that a military unit's effectiveness depends primarily on the quality of its officers and noncommissioned officers.<sup>1/</sup>

<sup>1/</sup> See "How the Korean Army Improved," SEA Analysis Report, October 1969, p. 44.

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Comparing data for the first three quarters of 1968 with data for the same period in 1969 shows that the overall productivity of ARVN infantry battalions in terms of enemy KIA did not rise, but fell 33%. Friendly KIA fell only 20%, thus dropping the kill ratio from 4.3:1 in 1968 to 3.8:1 in 1969. Enemy and friendly KIA per battalion per month also showed comparable declines.

The drop in enemy and friendly combat deaths was accompanied by declines in enemy activity, and the Post Tet 1969 attacks were much less severe than the Tet offensive in 1968. Total enemy attacks declined 13% between the two periods, with battalion sized attacks down 77%. This suggests that the enemy may not have been engaging ARVN battalions as often or in as large units as he did in 1968, and this could help to explain the decline in ARVN performance.

### SEER Operational Effectiveness Ratings

In the October SEA Analysis Report we indicated that during the 18 month period from January 1968 through June 1969, ARVN infantry battalions had shown no significant improvement in their subjective ratings on operational effectiveness. The third quarter 1969 SEER Report shows that some progress has now been made, however. The mean operational effectiveness rating for ARVN battalions was 77.6 for third quarter 1969, up from the 74.3 rating for the second quarter. Moreover, the new data shows that ratings of 85 battalions increased while only 46 battalions decreased. In the past, the number of units increasing has usually been offset by an equal number of units receiving lower scores. Thus, the new latest data indicates a break with the past. Table 2 shows the effectiveness ratings.

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TABLE 2 <sup>a/</sup>

## SEER OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS RATINGS ARVN INFANTRY BATTALIONS, REGIMENTS, DIVISIONS

	Over All Rating	No. Units			
		Improved	Regressed	No Change	New
<u>Battalions</u>					
1Q 68	72.6				
2Q 69--old units	74.7	60	58	1	14
2Q 69--all units	74.3	0			
3Q 69--all units	77.5	85	45	2	0
<u>Regiments</u>					
1Q 68	72.9				
2Q 69--old units	74.4	17	14	0	2
2Q 69--all units	74.5				
3Q 69--all units	77.5	21	12	0	0
<u>Divisions</u>					
1Q 68	73.0				
2Q 69	72.2	7	3	0	0
3Q 69	73.5	5	4	1	0

	No. of Units in Each Scoring Range							Total
	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-79	80-89	90-100	
<u>Battalions</u>								
1Q 68	2	6	10	27	36	32	6	119
2Q 69-- old units	2	4	8	28	35	20	22	119
2Q 69-- all units	2	5	9	34	37	22	24	133
3Q 69-- all units	1	5	14	13	35	35	30	133
<u>Regiments</u>								
1Q 68			3	9	10	9		31
2Q 69--old units			3	8	8	10	2	31
2Q 69--all units			3	9	8	11	2	33
3Q 69--all units			2	7	9	11	4	33
<u>Divisions</u>								
1Q 68			1	3	3	3		10
2Q 69				3	2	3	2	10
3Q 69				2	3	4	1	10

a/ Source: SEER Reports.

### Aggressiveness of ARVN Infantry Battalions

In an attempt to investigate the question of ARVN improvement more fully, we have looked in detail at one of the questions used in arriving at the operational effectiveness ratings. This is a question on the aggressiveness of ARVN battalions in contact with the enemy and is one on which advisor turnover should have little or no effect. The question is:

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In your judgment, roughly in what proportion of the offensive combat operations did the unit fight aggressively once in contact?

- Group I      A. all  
                  B. 3/4
- Group II     C. 1/2  
                  D. 1/4  
                  E. None

To simplify the analysis we have lumped all battalions rated A or B in a given quarter into "Group I." All other battalions fall into "Group II." Therefore, Group II contains battalions who fought aggressively less than 1/2 the time when in contact. Table 3 shows the number of quarters a given battalion had Group II ratings during the six quarters from January 1968 through June 1969.

The data indicates that 27 battalions spent three or more quarters in Group II. This implies a fairly small, hard-core group of ARVN battalions which consistently receive low aggressiveness ratings. These 27 battalions represent only 20% of the total number of battalions but they were given over 50% of all of the Group II ratings.

TABLE 3

## AGGRESSIVENESS OF ARVN INFANTRY UNITS

<u>No. of Quarters Spent in Group II</u>	<u>No. of Battalions</u>
0	47
1	37
2	22
	Subtotal 106
3	18
4	8
5	1
6	0
	Subtotal 27
	Total 133

Table 4 gives us an indication of ARVN progress on the aggressiveness rating over time. In January-September 1968, 61 battalions were rated in Group II for at least one quarter. In October 1968-June 1969, 57 battalions fell into Group II at one time or another. Also, nine more battalions received Group I ratings during the second period. Thus the data indicate some improvement.

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### ARVN/VNMC PROBLEM AREA PROGRESS REPORT

*Summary.* ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalions are understrength, with 87% of the authorized personnel actually assigned and about 65% present for duty. The number of ARVN battalions commanded by captains (instead of Lt. Cols.) rose from 72 to 78 (59%) in the third quarter. About 20% of the U.S. advisors report that the intelligence and operation staffs of their ARVN divisions or regiments are ineffective. Some improvement in training is evident, but the problem remains severe. About 28% of the advisors who assessed ARVN dependent housing stated it was worse than the quarters provided for the Chieu Hoi program. An increasing proportion of ARVN/VNMC KIA are caused by enemy mines and booby traps (from 22% of the total KIA at the end of 1968 to 35% in the 3rd quarter 1969).

Other articles in this issue address the activities and performance of RVNAF maneuver battalions (ARVN/VNMC). In this paper we review MACV's 3rd Quarter 1969 progress report<sup>1/</sup> on several key RVNAF problem areas.

Maneuver battalion strength. RVNAF regular force strength increased 4% during the third quarter (from 101% of authorized in June, to 105% in September), but ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalions remained understrength. Their assigned strength rose from 84% of authorized in June to 87% in September. MACV states that the total shortage is the equivalent of 30 infantry battalions.

In addition to the shortage of assigned personnel in battalions, delays in replacements and other problems have reduced the number of personnel actually present for operations to only about 65% of that authorized. MACV currently is working to solve the following problems directly related to maneuver battalion strength:

(a) Desertions - MACV has established a desertion control committee to assist U.S. advisors in doing something about "the lack of productive action on the part of ARVN at all levels to apprehend and return deserters to duty" which MACV noted in June. The JGS has decided not to extend the desertion amnesty period<sup>2/</sup> from 15 to 30 days, and has recently organized desertion control committees; the effect of these actions is to maintain strong penalties for desertions and encourage deserter apprehension efforts. Desertions still constituted the major drain on ARVN fighting strength in the 3rd quarter 1969.

(b) Strength accounting - MACV has recommended that the JGS study the feasibility of adopting a daily strength summary report, and an emergency personnel requisitioning system.

(c) Replacements - in June, MACV advisors noted that "replacements for all major units have slowed to a level of approximately one fourth the January 1969 rate; the problem is particularly acute in the ARVN 2nd Division where combat losses exceed personnel arrivals." During the third quarter, the JGS raised mobilization requirements by 10,000 per month in July and August, and created a Permanent Strength Procurement Board in an attempt to reduce recruiting, desertion, and replacement problems.

<sup>1/</sup> MACV SEER Report, 3rd quarter 1969.

<sup>2/</sup> The period during which a soldier may be absent without leave without being classed as a deserter. For U.S. soldiers, the "amnesty period" is 30 days.

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Leadership. MACV reports that the leadership problem is chronic and not amenable to rapid solution. One major effort centers on identifying and promoting qualified leaders. However, despite an increase of 2,653 senior officers between December 1968 and October 1969, Regular Forces still have only 63% of their authorized senior officers assigned; rapid force expansion simply outpaced officer strength increases in early 1969. The supplemental August promotion board actions have had little effect in raising the percentage of assigned senior officers so far.

The Regular Forces have about 122% of authorized junior spaces filled, so the problem is not so much to increase junior officer strength as to improve their quality. MACV reported that a major effort is being made to increase and improve junior officer leadership courses.

MACV also stated that the problem of an overall shortage of qualified and experienced officers exists throughout ARVN combat divisions. We know from a previous study<sup>1/</sup> that leaders in the ARVN infantry division seem to be least favored in terms of promotion. Between July and September the number of battalions with captains as commanders (instead of Lt. Colonels or even Majors) increased from 72 to 78 (59%), indicating the problem is getting worse.

Ineffectiveness within division and regimental staffs. About 21% of the U.S. advisors in a position to judge division and regimental G2/S2 staff elements stated that they were operating ineffectively; 19% evaluated the G3/S3 staff elements as ineffective. The percentage of advisors rating the G3/S3 element as ineffective is decreasing, while the percentage of advisors rating the G2/S2 element as ineffective is increasing. Definite trends have not yet been established.

Training. There appears to be some improvement in command emphasis on training and in the effectiveness of RVNAF training in the 3rd quarter 1969. The number of battalion days spent by infantry battalions in training doubled in the third quarter compared to the first quarter (380 to 786). Training now accounts for 6.5% of the total battalion days available.

The JGS training doctrine currently requires that ARVN maneuver battalions receive four weeks (30 days) of refresher training in one of the national training centers every three years. This amounts to 11 battalions per quarter to cover the 133 Infantry battalions. For the first three quarters in 1969 ARVN has averaged 93 battalions per quarter or 84% of the goal. Whether this goal can be achieved in a period when ARVN operational commitments increase as U.S. troops redeploy remains to be seen. Even if the goal is achieved, the adequacy of one period of refresher training every three years is questionable especially considering the turnover in personnel from desertion rates. A minimum of one period of refresher training every year might be more effective.

The advisors rated 51% of the training to increase combat skills as effective. The figures for first and second quarter were 48% and 44% respectively. Thus, progress is evident, but 49% of the training to improve combat skills is still rated ineffective or marginal.

<sup>1/</sup> RVNAF Leadership, SEA Analysis Report, October 1969.

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The advisors rated the level of company grade officer training as below average in 33% of the cases compared to 35% in the second quarter. The level of NCO training was rated as below average in 48% of the cases down from 55% in the second quarter.

Logistics. MACV states that problems are being solved rapidly, but some items, such as water trailers and heavy engineer equipment, remain in short supply. Adequate helicopter support for large scale RVNAF airmobile operations is not available. The dependent housing self-help program still lacks construction material. Approximately 28 percent of the advisors who were in a position to assess ARVN dependent housing stated that it was worse than that provided to the Chieu Hoi program. Stock shortages still reduce the effectiveness of the commissary system.

Casualties Due to Mines and Booby Traps. The proportion of total ARVN/VNMC KIA due to mines and booby traps has risen steadily over the last four quarters. In the fourth quarter of 1968 about one-fifth of the total RVNAF KIA was caused by mines and booby traps; by third quarter 1969, the figure had risen to more than one-third of total KIA. The rise in the relative importance of RVNAF deaths by mines and booby traps probably results from a combination of the following type of factors:

(a) ARVN/VNMC units may be spending more time on combat operations in VC and contested areas, thus exposing themselves to mines and booby traps more frequently.

(b) ARVN/VNMC leadership and training may not be emphasizing the known, routine procedures for avoiding deaths by mines and booby traps.

(c) The enemy is no longer targeting ARVN/VNMC forces, except indirectly. This is seen in the absolute and relative declines in deaths by causes other than mines and booby traps.

To put the figures on ARVN/VNMC KIA into better perspective, Table 1 shows a comparison of KIA figures for both the U.S. Army and the ARVN/VNMC forces over the last four quarters. In general, the data indicates that although mines and booby traps do cause a large proportion of the deaths in the U.S. Army, the relative importance of this type of KIA is much greater for the ARVN/VNMC forces and is becoming more important every quarter.

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TABLE 1

		1968	1969		
		4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr
ARVN/VNMC	KIA	1263 <sup>a/</sup>	2003	2051	1362
	M&BT	278	541	636	477
	$\frac{1}{2}$ M&BT	22	27	31	35
U.S. Army	KIA	1374	2146	2302	1023 <sup>b/</sup>
	M&BT	239	276	311	166
	$\frac{3}{4}$ M&BT	17.4	12.9	13.5	16.2

<sup>a/</sup> Estimate.  
<sup>b/</sup> Only 2 months.

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RVNAF PERFORMANCE--A CORPS AND COUNTRYWIDE ASSESSMENT

*Summary.* RVNAF combat effectiveness indicators in 1969 show declining performance for ARVN/VNMC regular force battalions and a generally improved performance by territorial forces, particularly the RF. The regular forces, up 11% in number of battalions committed since January 1968, are down about 20% in operations conducted, enemy KIA, enemy/friendly KIA ratio and enemy weapons captured. In contrast, RF rifle companies were increased by 61% during the same period, conducted 40% more operations per company, and excluding the Tet 1968 period from the comparison, recorded 17% more enemy KIA in 1969. The number of PF platoons increased more than 25%, conducted 72% more operations per platoon and improved their enemy/friendly ratios for both KIA and individual weapons.

These indicators, however, tell only part of the story. Enemy activity has a heavy impact on combat statistics and many of the "declines" in RVNAF performance can be traced to the reduced intensity of enemy activity in 1967. The large increase in RF/PF forces and operations conducted have probably made a significant contribution to the marked progress in pacification. They have not, however, succeeded in cutting down VC incidents of terror. Population density calculations suggest that more RF/PF units should be recruited in I Corps and IV Corps.

RVNAF performance varies widely among the four corps areas. I Corps units seem to be less active but are the most effective in combat. II Corps RF/PF units are by far the worst performers in combat and in IV Corps the good RF/PF performance offsets poor combat performance by the regular battalions. III Corps units are about average in performance but seem to be the most active.

The objective of this analysis is to examine the performance and impact of RVNAF regular and territorial ground combat forces in the aggregate. In conducting the analysis, we considered RVNAF input measures such as number of units committed and operations conducted, and the interaction among these factors which yields enemy activity patterns as demonstrated by attacks and incidents; general output measures such as HES security scores, and specific RVNAF results such as enemy KIA and weapons captured. The time period examined was from the 1st quarter of 1968 through the 3rd quarter of 1969:

The analysis draws on the newly acquired MACV System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER) data and the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES). It is designed to set the stage for future province level articles on the impact of U.S. redeployments and Vietnamization. We feel that localized analysis is more likely to show these effects, but that province level studies are more meaningful if considered in the context of their corps and the country as a whole.

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RVNAF Units Committed. Table 1 shows the commitment of ARVN/VNMC and Territorial Forces (RF/PF) maneuver units from the January 1968 through September 1969. ARVN/VNMC battalions increased 11% during the period, mostly in 1968. The number of RF rifle companies and PF platoons increased 61% and 27% respectively. Most of the RF unit increase was gained during 1969, while increases in PF units were about equally divided between 1968 and 1969.

TABLE 1

	NUMBER OF RVNAF UNITS (Monthly Average)						
	1968 1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1969 1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr
<u>ARVN/VNMC Maneuver Bns</u>							
I CTZ	34	34	38	39	39	39	39
II CTZ	28	28	29	31	32	34	34
III CTZ	60	64	64	67	61	60	62
IV CTZ	43	43	43	44	47	48	48
RVN	<u>165</u>	<u>169</u>	<u>174</u>	<u>181</u>	<u>179</u>	<u>181</u>	<u>183</u>
<u>RF Rifle Companies</u>							
I CTZ	124	140	151	152	165	184	214
II CTZ	247	269	282	292	311	337	357
III CTZ	220	237	252	265	297	337	366
IV CTZ	315	349	384	392	428	471	526
RVN	<u>906</u>	<u>995</u>	<u>1069</u>	<u>1105</u>	<u>1201</u>	<u>1329</u>	<u>1463</u>
<u>PF Platoons</u>							
I CTZ	710	724	737	751	763	768	883
II CTZ	1068	1119	1140	1168	1191	1197	1271
III CTZ	745	795	829	845	860	871	963
IV CTZ	1675	1747	1849	1927	1976	1996	2207
RVN	<u>4198</u>	<u>4385</u>	<u>4555</u>	<u>4691</u>	<u>4790</u>	<u>4832</u>	<u>5324</u>

Source: SEAFRS and TFES Computer Files.

The distribution of units by Corps area changed little during the expansion, as shown by Table 2. III Corps has the most Regular Forces and IV Corps ranks first in the number of RF/PF units.

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TABLE 2  
ALLOCATION OF UNITS BY CORPS AREA  
(7)

CORPS	ARVN/VNMC Battalions		RF Rifle Companies		PF Platoons	
	1968	1969	1968	1969	1968	1969
I	21	21	1-	15	17	17
II	17	19	27	24	25	24
III	36	34	24	25	18	18
IV	26	26	35	36	40	41
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Table 3 gives a different picture of RF/PF force distribution. Measured in terms of units per 10,000 rural population, II and III Corps have 60% to 90% more RF coverage and about 25% more PF coverage than the other two Corps. This suggests an imbalance of forces, which should be taken into account in determining the distribution of future force increases or RVNAF force structure changes; the population to be protected should be a prominent factor in such decisions. For example, IV Corps ranks second in regular units, third in density of territorial forces, and last in number of U.S. units committed. It has also been the least secure, according to the Hamlet Evaluation System.

TABLE 3  
RF/PF FORCE DENSITY  
(Units per 10,000 Rural Population)  
(Monthly Avg)

	1968				1969		
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr
<u>RF Rifle Companies</u>							
I CTZ	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.0
II CTZ	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.6
III CTZ	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.9	1.9
IV CTZ	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1
RVN	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3
<u>PF Platoons</u>							
I CTZ	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.5	2.7	3.5	4.0
II CTZ	5.7	6.0	6.0	6.1	6.0	5.9	5.9
III CTZ	4.4	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.8	5.1
IV CTZ	3.4	3.5	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.1	4.6
RVN	3.9	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.5	4.4	4.8

Source: TFES and HAMDA Computer Files

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RVN/AF Operations<sup>1/</sup>. Table 4 indicates that:

1. Except for I Corps, the average ARVN/VNMC battalion is conducting about 20% fewer large operations in 1969 than it did last year. Small unit actions (platoon or larger) by these forces have also declined below 1968 levels after a first quarter 1969 upsurge.

2. In contrast, the average RF company and PF platoon has increased to new levels of small unit operations some 40% to 70% above those in 1968. Substantial gains by both forces were reported in all four corps areas.

The increased number of operations by territorial force units in 1969 is even more significant if we add the effects of the force expansion. For example, the 3rd quarter 1969 countrywide average is 30 operations per PF platoon per month for 5324 platoons; or almost 160,000 operations. A year earlier the average was 20 operations per month for each of 4555 platoons, or 91,000 operations. Thus, total PF operations increased 76%. This improvement may help account for the dramatic rise in HES scores during 1969.

<sup>1/</sup> The criteria for ARVN/VNMC large and small unit operations changed slightly between 1968 and 1969, with the heaviest impact on small unit operations (SUO) data. In 1969 the category known as "SUO less than platoon size" was eliminated. We, therefore, deleted that category for the 1968 data displayed. The 1968 and 1969 data is thus internally consistent, but strict comparisons between the two years may not be completely accurate. RF/PF criteria for small unit actions remained constant and include all small unit actions by a fire team or larger.

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TABLE -

RVNAF OPERATIONS  
(Monthly Average Per Unit)

Operations by ARVN/VNMC Bns c/ Large Unit Opns (LUO)	1966 <sup>a/</sup>	1968 <sup>b/</sup>	1968				1969		
			1st <sup>a/</sup> Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr
I CTZ	5	5	6	5	5	5	4	3	9
II CTZ	7	4	10	7	5	4	5	4	4
III CTZ	11	9	11	9	10	14	10	9	9
IV CTZ	15	12	15	14	15	14	13	13	11
RVN	10	c	13	9	9	10	9	8	8
<u>Small Unit Opns (SUO)</u> (Plt size & larger)									
I CTZ	49	17	62	57	39	36	15	10	26
II CTZ	40	30	54	46	47	14	61	9	21
III CTZ	45	81	45	42	50	45	87	82	75
IV CTZ	35	30	28	29	41	43	55	21	15
RVN	42	45	43	42	45	37	58	37	39
<u>Operations by RF/PF Units</u> (SUO by fire team or larger)									
<u>RF Rifle Companies</u>									
I CTZ	42	55	27	30	48	64	65	50	51
II CTZ	43	61	33	36	49	55	60	62	69
III CTZ	59	83	45	53	64	74	84	82	100
IV CTZ	45	53	31	44	51	56	61	57	55
RVN	47	66	34	42	53	61	67	63	69
<u>PF Platoons</u>									
I CTZ	20	33	8	21	22	28	36	32	31
II CTZ	18	31	13	15	19	26	30	30	34
III CTZ	16	29	10	13	19	22	27	30	30
IV CTZ	19	30	12	16	21	26	31	33	27
RVN	18	31	11	16	20	25	31	32	30

Source: AMFES/SEER and TFES Computer Files.

a/ Excluding ARVN/VNMC operations data for Jan and Feb 68 in I CTZ; for all other Corps areas Jan data only is excluded.

b/ First three quarters only.

c/ Excluding reserve, training, and rehabilitation.

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RVNAF Results. Table 5 indicates that the large reported increase in RVNAF effort did not produce equivalent results, at least in terms of enemy combat deaths. Compared to 1968 as a whole, results were down in 1969 for all forces in all Corps, except for RF units in III and IV Corps. However, if we eliminate 1st quarter 1968 (Tet offensive) from the comparison, we find that RF units are killing 17% more enemy this year, with PF results about the same, and ARVN/VNMC results down about 20%--the same amount their large operations have decreased. Thus, the RF units appear to be picking up more of the combat burden in 1969, particularly in IV Corps where enemy KIA by RF has increased 34%.

TABLE 5

	1968a/		1968				1969		
	1968a/	1969b/	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr
<b>ENEMY KIA BY RVNAF</b> (Monthly Average)									
<u>ARVN/VNMC Bns (Per Bn)</u>									
I CTZ	37	24	41	47	40	19	31	25	16
II CTZ	14	12	25	11	17	3	12	21	4
III CTZ	16	11	22	27	7	7	11	12	9
IV CTZ	28	13	60	22	17	13	15	12	11
RVN	23	15	36	27	18	10	17	17	10
<u>RF Rifle Companies (Monthly Totals)</u>									
I CTZ	422	421	598	245	452	393	512	392	360
II CTZ	549	171	1515	310	188	183	196	147	171
III CTZ	311	326	315	369	330	230	304	407	266
IV CTZ	762	962	909	757	662	720	966	895	1025
RVN	2044	1880	3337	1681	1632	1526	1978	1841	1822
<u>PF Platoons (Monthly Totals)</u>									
I CTZ	523	473	496	433	582	583	565	420	433
II CTZ	139	83	287	85	119	64	91	86	73
III CTZ	131	111	202	133	113	76	118	132	83
IV CTZ	583	551	822	602	464	444	619	578	455
RVN	1376	1218	1807	1253	1278	1167	1393	1216	1044

Source: AMFES/SEER and TFES Computer Files.

a/ For ARVN/VNMC battalions, 1st quarter data excludes Jan and Feb for I Corps units, and Jan data only for remaining areas.

b/ 1st three quarters only.

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Table 6 indicates that the enemy/friendly kill ratio for ARVN/VNMC battalions has declined 19% in 1969; the RF ratio dropped 9%. However, the PF ratio rose 30%, for a significant improvement. The kill ratios for all forces are highest in I Corps for both years.

TABLE 6

ENEMY/RVNAF KIA RATIO

	1968 <sup>a/</sup>	1969 <sup>b/</sup>	1968				1969		
			1qtr <sup>a/</sup>	2qtr	3qtr	4qtr	1qtr	2qtr	3qtr
<u>ARVN/VNMC Bns</u>									
I CTZ	7.9	6.2	9.3	7.7	8.5	6.6	6.9	5.4	6.1
II CTZ	4.8	4.3	5.6	3.1	6.0	5.6	4.7	6.0	2.4
III CTZ	4.1	3.9	3.8	4.9	2.7	4.0	3.7	3.9	4.1
IV CTZ	5.2	3.2	5.7	4.2	5.3	4.0	3.4	2.9	3.3
RVN	5.4	4.4	5.7	5.2	5.6	4.8	4.6	4.4	4.1
<u>RF Rifle Cos.</u>									
I CTZ	5.9	5.7	7.6	4.1	4.5	8.1	5.7	6.2	5.2
II CTZ	4.9	1.9	8.9	2.2	2.4	3.4	2.2	1.8	1.9
III CTZ	3.3	3.6	2.5	3.0	5.3	3.5	3.3	4.3	3.3
IV CTZ	4.5	5.0	3.8	4.9	4.5	5.4	5.4	4.9	4.8
RVN	4.6	4.2	5.4	3.5	4.2	5.0	4.4	4.4	4.0
<u>PF Platoons</u>									
I CTZ	5.3	5.3	3.6	4.6	6.3	8.5	5.2	6.0	6.7
II CTZ	1.6	1.3	2.1	1.1	1.6	1.2	1.4	1.2	1.5
III CTZ	1.5	2.5	1.3	1.5	1.9	2.2	2.3	3.0	2.2
IV CTZ	2.4	3.4	1.8	3.1	2.5	3.1	3.4	3.3	3.6
RVN	2.7	3.5	2.0	2.7	3.1	3.9	3.4	3.4	3.8

Source: AMFES/SEER and TFES Computer Files

a/ For ARVN/VNMC Battalions, 1st quarter data excludes Jan and Feb for I Corps and Jan data only for remaining areas.

b/ 1st three quarters only.

Table 7 indicates that ARVN/VNMC battalions in all Corps are capturing 14% fewer weapons in 1969. However, they improved their ratio of enemy KIA to weapons captured from 3 KIA to 1 weapon in 1968 to 2.5 to 1 in 1969. The RF have captured 7% more weapons due to a sharp increase in III Corps. The PF captured fewer weapons in 1969, with the largest drop in I Corps. Once again, the PF appear to be showing the most improvement, this time in III Corps; IV Corps recorded the greatest RF improvement in terms of enemy combat deaths.

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TABLE 7

**ENEMY WEAPONS CAPTURED BY RVNAF**  
(Monthly Average)

	1968 <sup>a/</sup>	1969 <sup>b/</sup>	1968				1969		
			1Qtr <sup>a/</sup>	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr	2Qtr	3Qtr
<b>ARVN/VNMC Bns (Per Bn)</b>									
I CTZ	10	9	11	10	12	8	9	10	7
II CTZ	3	2	6	3	4	1	2	3	1
III CTZ	7	6	8	11	5	3	8	5	4
IV CTZ	7	5	14	7	4	5	8	4	3
RVN	7	6	11	9	6	4	7	6	4
<b>RF Rifle Cos (Total All Cos)</b>									
I CTZ	147	130	207	131	137	113	121	143	126
II CTZ	93	74	159	91	73	48	66	73	83
III CTZ	174	250	142	193	180	181	220	296	233
IV CTZ	275	280	242	247	316	293	262	277	300
RVN	689	734	750	662	706	635	669	789	742
<b>PF Platoons (Total All Plts.)</b>									
I CTZ	219	157	195	211	276	192	168	131	171
II CTZ	51	38	103	28	48	25	42	41	32
III CTZ	86	83	85	98	99	61	91	91	68
IV CTZ	181	147	267	183	150	125	146	171	124
RVN	537	425	650	520	573	403	447	434	395

Source: AMFES/SEER and TFES Computer Files.

a/ For ARVN/VNMC battalions, 1st quarter data excludes Jan and Feb for I Corps units, and Jan data only for remaining areas.

b/ 1st three quarters only.

Table 8 indicates that the ARVN/VNMC battalions captured 10 enemy weapons for every one they lost in both 1968 and 1969; the RF improved their performance by 67%. The PF improvement of 200% is extremely good. In all 3 cases II Corps is the worst performer by far; I Corps is generally the best.

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TABLE 5

RATIO OF ENEMY WEAPONS CAPTURED  
TO FRIENDLY WEAPONS LOST

	1968 <sup>a/</sup>	1969 <sup>b/</sup>	1968				1969		
			1st <sup>a/</sup> Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr
<u>ARVN/VNMC Bns</u>									
I CTZ	19	24	9	11	35	54	23	17	78
II CTZ	4	2	4	2	5	41	6	1	7
III CTZ	13	14	8	16	15	13	20	11	13
IV CTZ	7	12	7	5	14	9	13	8	18
RVN	10	10	7	8	15	16	16	5	20
<u>RF Rifle Cos</u>									
I CTZ	4	19	3	8	3	9	5	5	9
II CTZ	1	3	1	1	1	2	3	2	3
III CTZ	3	6	1	3	8	9	10	4	8
IV CTZ	4	5	2	5	7	5	5	5	4
RVN	3	5	1	3	4	5	5	4	5
<u>PF Platoons</u>									
I CTZ	2	5	1	8	7	7	3	5	9
II CTZ	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
III CTZ	1	6	1	3	4	9	7	5	7
IV CTZ	1	3	0.2	1	2	2	2	3	3
RVN	1	3	0.4	2	3	3	2	3	4

Source: AMFES/SEER and TFES Computer Files.

a/ For ARVN/VNMC Battalions, 1st quarter data excludes Jan and Feb for I Corps units, and Jan data only for remaining areas.

b/ 1st three quarters only.

Overall Assessment

If we confined our RVNAF effectiveness evaluation to enemy KIA and weapons captured, we would be compelled to conclude that RVNAF performance, except for the RF, has not improved much during 1969. However these factors are only part of the story. The intensity of enemy activity has declined sharply in 1969, compared to the same period in 1968; enemy battalion sized attacks are down 75%, for example. This means that RVNAF forces would have had fewer targets and been placed in defensive situations (in which they probably fight best) less often. In short, the "decline" in RVNAF performance is probably best explained by the drop in enemy activities.

Finally, the large increases in RF/PF forces and the effort they expended have probably had a significant impact on pacification progress. At the end of March 1968, 60% of the SVN population lived in relatively secure circumstances,

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the figure is now over 90%, partly due to the expansion of GVN presence into the countryside via US and ARVN strike forces, followed up by heavy recruiting for RF/PF in the areas being cleared. However the RF/PF have not succeeded in cutting down VC terror incidents; the number of casualty producing terror incidents per 10,000 population has remained constant.

### Corps Comparisons

Based on Tables 1 through 8, plus HES and terror data not shown in this paper, we have attempted in Table 9 to characterize and compare the four Corps areas in terms of RVNAF input and results in 1969.

The overall impressions conveyed by Table 9 are as follows:

-- RVNAF units in I Corps are less numerous and less active, but are the most effective in combat.

-- Territorial Forces (RF/PF) in II Corps are reasonably active, but are poor performers in combat.

-- In III Corps, regular and regional forces are the most active but are only average performers in combat.

-- Territorial Forces in IV Corps are very effective but regular forces have a poor combat performance record.

-- The relationship between HES security scores and RVNAF performance seems to be some function, as yet obscure, of unit density, operations conducted and combat performance. There is no clear relationship between HES security scores and protection of the populace from terror at the corps level.

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TABLE 9

RANKING OF THE CORPS AREAS

Units	Effort		Results			
	Committed	Operations Conducted per unit	KIA Ratio	Enemy wpons captured	HES Sec-urity Score	Terror Protection
I CTZ					3	3
ARVN/VNMC	3	4	1	1		
RF	4	4	1	3		
PF	4	1	1	1		
II CTZ					2	4
ARVN/VNMC	4	3	2	4		
RF	3	2	1	4		
PF	2	2	1	4		
III CTZ					1	1-2
ARVN/VNMC	1	1	3	2		
RF	2	1	3	2		
PF	3	4	3	3		
IV CTZ					4	1-2
ARVN/VNMC	2	2	4	3		
RF	1	3	2	1		
PF	1	3	2	2		

a/ Lowest terror rate per 10,000 population ranked first, etc.

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ARVN-US COMBINED OPERATIONS

*Summary.* The percentage of ARVN battalions participating in combined operations has decreased in 1969 and so has the percentage of battalion days spent on combined operations. On the whole, limited statistical data on enemy KIA indicate that ARVN effectiveness has not increased over a period of time as a result of participating in combined operations. ARVN does 45%-75% better during a combined operation than it does operating alone, in terms of enemy KIA per battalion day and kill ratios.

Table 1 shows that the percentage of ARVN infantry battalions participating in combined operations has been declining since the third quarter of 1968, except for a very small increase in the third quarter of 1969. Fourth quarter figures are not yet available, but the continuing redeployment of US combat units suggests that the percentage is unlikely to rise.

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE OF ARVN BATTALIONS PARTICIPATING IN  
COMBINED OPERATIONS <sup>a/</sup>

	<u>1968</u>					
	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>
	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>
Percent of Battalions on Combined Operations	30.6	40.6	38.6	30.0	23.0	24.6

<sup>a/</sup> Figures are the average of monthly percentages.

Source: SEER Computer File. Data on combined operations from OSR Section IV.

Table 2 shows that the number and percentage of battalion days spent on combined operations has also declined since the 1st quarter 1969, although the decline is smaller. Table 2 also reflects the impact of American troop withdrawals from Vietnam. All figures for ARVN divisions in I Corps show a decline in percentage of battalion days spent on combined operations, with the First Division showing the biggest decline. With the complete withdrawal of US troops from IV Corps, combined operations there dropped to zero in the third quarter of 1969 (they were never very high, probably because of the limited US presence in IV CTZ). Consistent with other reports, every division in III Corps increased the amount of time spent on combined operations in the 3rd quarter, although the increase for the 18th Division is only from 1% in the first quarter to 4% in the third. The 5th Division spent 25%, and the 25th Division, 21% of their battalion days on combined operations during the 3rd quarter.

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TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE OF ARVN BATTALION DAYS SPENT ON COMBINED OPERATIONS

		<u>1969</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>Total</u>
		<u>1Qtr</u>			
<b>I Corps</b>					
1st Div:	Bn. Days	398	284	207	889
	% of Total	26	18	13	19
2nd Div:	Bn. Days	66	138	123	327
	% of Total	6	13	11	10
51st Regt:	Bn. Days	9	84	16	109
	% of Total	3	23	4	10
<b>II Corps</b>					
22nd Div:	Bn. Days	99	2		101
	% of Total	9	.2		3
23rd Div:	Bn. Days	113	78	18	209
	% of Total	11	7	2	7
42nd Regt:	Bn. Days	21		13	34
	% of Total	6		4	3
<b>III Corps</b>					
5th Div:	Bn. Days	215	107	274	596
	% of Total	20	10	25	18
18th Div:	Bn. Days	11	26	47	84
	% of Total	1	2	4	3
27th Div:	Bn. Days	158	108	231	497
	% of Total	15	10	21	15
<b>IV Corps</b>					
7th Div:	Bn. Days	55	13		68
	% of Total	5	1		2
9th Div:	Bn. Days	4			4
	% of Total	.4			.1
21st Div:	Bn. Days	40	1		41
	% of Total	4	.1		1
<b>Countrywide</b>					
	Bn Days	1189	841	929	2959
	% of Total	10	7	8	8

Source: SEER Computer File. Data on combined operations from OSR Section IX; data on total battalion days from OSR Section IV.

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Tables 3 and 4 show our two readily available measures of ARVN performance, kill ratio and kills per battalion day. They indicate that ARVN does better on combined operations than on unilateral ones, achieving kill ratios about 75% higher and 45% more kills per battalion day when working with US units. Moreover, Table 5 indicates that ARVN has a 10% better kill ratio on combined security-pacification operations than it does on combined combat operations. When operating alone the kill ratios of ARVN units on such operations are well below those for combat operations.

TABLE 3

### KILLS PER BATTALION DAY FOR COMBINED AND UNILATERAL OPERATIONS

	1969						Change in Unilateral
	1st Qtr		2nd Qtr		3rd Qtr		
	Combined	Unilat- eral	Combined	Unilat- eral	Combined	Unilat- eral	
<u>I CTZ</u>							
1st Div	.34	.29	.92	.73	.56	.51	+ .22
2nd Div	3.91	1.04	2.31	.94	.78	.96	- .08
51st Regt	.22	1.81	.32	.63	.94	.35	-1.46
<u>II CTZ</u>							
22nd Div	.88	.24	-	.29	-	.28	+ .04
23rd Div	.68	.13	.09	.17	0	.07	- .06
42nd Regt	.76	.98	-	1.10	0	0	- .98
<u>III CTZ</u>							
5th Div	.36	.15	.36	.21	.42	.46	+ .31
18th Div	1.00	.36	.96	.50	.04	.38	+ .02
25th Div	.26	.33	.70	.35	.50	.27	- .06
<u>IV CTZ</u>							
7th Div	.69	.52	.38	.36	-	.45	- .07
9th Div	0	.44	-	.34	-	.39	- .05
21st Div	.40	.54	0	.68	-	.66	+ .12
Countrywide	.64	.49	.90	.49	.50	.42	- .07

Source: SEER Computer File.

Note: "0" means some operations were run but no kills were obtained.  
 "-" means no operations were run.

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TABLE 4

## KILL RATIO FOR COMBINED AND UNILATERAL OPERATIONS FOR ARVN DIVISIONS BY QUARTER

	1969						Change in Unilateral
	1st Qtr	Unilat- eral	2nd Qtr	Unilat- eral	3rd Qtr	Unilat- eral	
	Combined		Combined		Combined		
<u>I CTZ</u>							
1st Div	6.2	4.3	6.2	5.5	7.7	11.0	+ 6.7
2nd Div	11.2	4.1	7.4	4.4	6.9	5.6	+ 1.5
51st Regt	2/0	7.7	3.0	4.0	2.1	4.2	- 3.5
<u>II CTZ</u>							
22nd Div	12.6	2.5	-	3.3	-	3.0	+ .5
23rd Div	9.6	4.2	7.0	3.2	-	1.4	- 2.8
42nd Regt	5.3	8.5	-	3.6	-	0	- 8.5
<u>III CTZ</u>							
5th Div	4.9	1.7	3.9	1.7	4.8	2.9	+ 1.2
18th Div	5.5	3.0	25/1	3.8	2/1	8.8	+ 5.8
25th Div	8.2	3.3	8.4	3.5	10.6	3.6	+ .3
<u>IV CTZ</u>							
7th Div	2.2	3.2	5.0	2.3	-	2.3	- .9
9th Div	-	2.6	-	2.4	-	4.1	+ 1.5
21st Div	1.2	3.4	-	2.5	-	4.1	+ .7
Countrywide	6.5	3.6	6.5	3.4	6.4	4.0	+ .4

Source: SEER Computer File.

Note: "0" means no enemy were killed, but at least one ARVN was killed.  
 "-" means no enemy or ARVN were killed.

TABLE 5

## ARVN INFANTRY BATTALION KILL RATIOS

	1969		
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr
Combined Operations			
Combat	NA	6.5	6.5
Security & Pacification a/	NA	7.1	7.1
All Operations			
Combat	4.1	4.2	4.5
Security & Pacification a/	2.9	2.1	3.3

a/ Includes security, active pacification, and static pacification.  
 Source: SEER Computer File.

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One of the most important questions about US/ARVN combined operations is: "Does significant participation in combined operations improve ARVN's subsequent performance when it operates alone?" The only data readily available to answer this question are shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4, which show the amount of time each unit has spent on combined operations (Table 2) and the subsequent results in terms of enemy KIA per battalion day (Table 3) and the enemy/ARVN kill ratio (Table 4). Any measure of ARVN effectiveness based solely on enemy KIA has significant shortcomings because it does not take into account changes in enemy tactics and aggressiveness and changes in ARVN missions and tactics. Thus, our findings must be considered with caution, and are in no way conclusive.

In order to see if time spent on combined operations improved subsequent ARVN performance we ranked the ARVN units by time spent on combined operations and the two enemy KIA variables. Our statistical correlation analysis shows no relationship between time spent on combined operations and improved performance in killing the enemy.<sup>1/</sup> Moreover, we checked to see if the level of an ARVN unit's performance (not improvement in performance, as above) was related to the amount of time spent on combined operations. Again we found no relationship.<sup>2/</sup>

1/ Spearman's  $r^2$  for percentage of time spent on combined operations versus improvement in kills per battalion days is .055. For improvement in kill ratios it is .041.

2/ Spearman's  $r^2$  of .006 percentage of time spent on combined operations and kills per bn day; and .095 for kill ratios.

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IV CORPS - RVNAF PERFORMANCE AND RECENT ACTIVITIES

*Summary.* Despite the recent enemy buildup in the Delta, the RVNAF commanders and their US Advisors indicate that the current RVNAF forces in IV Corps can handle the situation. The additional enemy battalions in and adjacent to IV Corps are being countered with 9 more IV Corps battalions assigned to combat missions than before the withdrawal of the 9th US Infantry Division. The release of 11 ARVN battalions from pacification duties, assignment of two newly activated ARVN cavalry squadrons, and provision of three more Marine battalions from the JGS reserve account for the increase.

The 9th ARVN Division has become a mobile reaction force, making the first time in the war that an ARVN Division has operated outside its traditionally assigned area. The 21st ARVN Division is doing a good job containing the new enemy regiment in its area but the 7th Division has generally failed to respond to its increased responsibilities. The recent replacement of the division commander is indicative of Vietnamese concern, and the new commander is reported to have moved aggressively after assuming command.

Performance by the Territorial Forces (RF/PF) materially augments the uneven regular force performance and they are, in fact, successfully coping with a proportionately greater share of the increased enemy activity than are the ARVN/VNMC battalions. As a result, IV Corps' pacification program has continued to progress. In the 44th Special Tactical Zone (STZ), however, which includes the 3 border provinces, there has been some regression since September 1969.

Friendly Forces. There are now more forces committed to combat in IV Corps than at any previous time (see Table 1). The RVNAF has compensated for the withdrawal of the US 9th Infantry Division's 8 battalions by: (1) Activation of 20 RF rifle companies and about 350 PF platoons, releasing 11 ARVN battalions from pacification duties, (2) assigning 2 newly activated cavalry squadrons to IV Corps, and (3) providing an additional 3 battalions of Vietnamese Marines from the JGS reserve. At the time of the withdrawal announcement in June 1969, there were 39 combined US/ARVN/VNMC battalions assigned to combat operation; at the end of January 1970, IV Corps reported 47 ARVN/VNMC battalions on combat operations, a 20% increase. The addition of more US helicopter assets to the 164th Combat Aviation Group during the same period now allows the US to support RVNAF IV Corps units with 3 Combat Aviation Battalions and 1 Air Cavalry Squadron.

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TABLE 1

FRIENDLY FORCES - IV CORPS

	Monthly Average		June 69				Jan 70			
	1968	1969	Combat	Pac	Other <sup>a/</sup>	Total	Combat	Pac	Other <sup>a/</sup>	Total
<u>Maneuver Battalions<sup>b/</sup></u>										
US	6	5	8	0	0	8	0	0	0	0
ARVN/VNMC	44	48	31	12	4	47	47	1	4	52
TOTAL	50	53	39	12	4	55	47	1	4	52
<u>Territorial Forces<sup>c/</sup></u>										
RF Rifle Cos.	360	489	170	282	58	510	178	307	45	530
PF Platoons	1800	2051	69	1861	69	1999	89	2154	170	2413

a/ Reserve, training, and rehabilitation.

b/ Includes US and ARVN cavalry squadrons.

c/ Data for RF/PF units available only through December 1969.

Enemy Forces. The initial movement of NVA units and filler personnel into IV Corps beginning last summer was generally regarded as a long standing enemy plan to recoup Tet 1968 losses and prevent further GVN encroachment of prime VC recruiting and supply sources. The enemy buildup in IV Corps (see Table 2) began with the movement of the 273rd VC Regiment (comprised almost entirely of NVA personnel) which disappeared from III Corps in April 1969 and was later discovered moving through the southern portion of the Delta to the U Minh forest base area. The NVA 18B Regiment arrived in mid-summer and remained in the Chau Doc Seven Mountains area just inside the southernmost portion of the IV Corps - Cambodian border until February 1970.

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TABLE 2

IV CORPS ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

	<u>Dec</u> <u>67</u>	<u>June</u> <u>68</u>	<u>Dec</u> <u>68</u>	<u>June</u> <u>69</u>	<u>Dec.</u> <u>69</u>
<u>Battalions</u>					
VC Maneuver Bns	29	32	26	34	35
VC Combat Support Bns	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>
Sub Total	32	34	28	38	38
NVA Maneuver Bns	0	0	0	0	7
NVA Combat Support Bns	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Sub Total	0	0	0	0	7
 Total Bns	 32	 34	 28	 38	 45
 <u>Strength<sup>a/</sup></u>					
VC Combat Strength	20,211	17,654	17,566 <sup>b/</sup>	17,576 <sup>c/</sup>	15,325 <sup>d/</sup>
VC Guerrillas	<u>28,100</u>	<u>23,000</u>	<u>24,300</u>	<u>21,700</u>	<u>18,881</u>
Sub Total	48,311	40,654	41,866	39,276	34,206
NVA Combat Strength	0	0	0	0	3,420 <sup>e/</sup>
Total VC/NVA Strength	<u>48,311</u>	<u>40,654</u>	<u>41,866</u>	<u>39,276</u>	<u>37,626</u>

Source: MACV/CICV Order of Battle (collateral).

- a/ Does not include about 8000 non-combat administrative service personnel.
- b/ Includes 100-300 NVA fillers.
- c/ Includes 900-1800 NVA fillers.
- d/ Includes 1500-2500 NVA fillers.
- e/ Does not include NVA fillers in VC units.

Recent intelligence reports indicate that 3 additional NVA regiments are now located adjacent to IV Corps; the 101D NVA Regiment across from Chau Doc Province, and the 88B and an unidentified NVA regiment further north in the "Parrot's Beak." In February, some of these regiments reportedly were beginning to move further into IV Corps and these latest movements, together with a large scale logistics buildup in Cambodia, suggest that the enemy may have expanded his plans to include a challenge to Vietnamization. By December 1969 RVNAF in IV Corps faced 42 enemy maneuver battalions, a 24% increase over the 34 in June 1969. By January the number of VC/NVA maneuver battalions had increased still further and total strength was slightly above that for June 1969.

Enemy Activity. Enemy activity data in Table 3 reflects the recent buildup in IV Corps, particularly in the 44th STZ. In all areas, the monthly average for the last half of 1969 is considerably higher than for the same period in 1968. Comparing 1968 and 1969 in the first two columns, however, shows 1969 lower than 1968 except for the 44th STZ and the 7th ARVN Division Tactical Area.

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TABLE 3

IV CORPS ENEMY ACTIVITY  
(By Division Tactical Area)

Enemy Activity (Monthly Avg)	1968	1969	2nd Half 1968	2nd Half 1969
	<u>Attacks</u>			
7th Div	23	19	10	18
9th Div	17	14	6	12
21st Div	37	23	17	23
44th STZ <sup>a/</sup>	11	16	7	20
IV Corps Total	<u>88</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>73</u>
<u>H/S/T</u>				
7th Div	114	115	61	118
9th Div	101	68	36	63
21st Div	184	101	83	94
44th STZ <sup>a/</sup>	39	72	27	77
IV Corps Total	<u>438</u>	<u>356</u>	<u>207</u>	<u>352</u>

<sup>a/</sup> Includes the provinces bordering Cambodia: Chau Doc, Kien Phong and Kien Tuong.

RVNAF Operations. Reports and comments received in Washington from RVNAF commanders and their US advisors indicate that the forces now in IV Corps can handle the present enemy buildup. The 9th ARVN Division has begun operating as a mobile reaction force in the Delta, marking the first time an ARVN division has operated in regimental size outside its traditional area of operations. Beginning in early November, the 9th ARVN Division has successively operated for about 3 weeks each in areas of the 21st ARVN Division, 7th ARVN I Division, and the 44th Special Tactical Zone.<sup>1/</sup> Colonel Di, commanding the 9th Division, states that he can move a regiment anywhere in the Delta in 4 hours and the entire division in two days.

In contrast, the 7th ARVN Division by all reports failed to respond to their increased responsibilities following the withdrawal of the 9th US Division from their 3 province area. Enemy units, fragmented by US operations in the area, benefited not only from receipt of NVA fillers, but also from 7th ARVN Division reversion to large unit operations. The data in Table 4 shows the heavier emphasis on large unit operations by the 7th Division compared to the other two ARVN divisions. The infusion of new personnel and respite from daily pressure allowed the enemy to consolidate and inflict heavy casualties on the 7th in November. The replacement of the division commander in January is indicative of Vietnamese concern and the new commander is reported to have

<sup>1/</sup> A zone comprised on the 3 border provinces: Chau Doc, Kien Tuong, and Kien Phong. The 44th STZ has no organic division troops; security is normally provided by Ranger battalions from the 4th Ranger Group, CIDG, and RF/PF.

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moved aggressively after assuming command, actively supervising units in the field and encouraging small unit actions during darkness. In mid-February he moved the 7th Division headquarters from My Tho to Dong Tam, formerly occupied by the headquarters and one brigade of the US 9th Infantry Division.

TABLE 4

RVNAF OPERATIONS - IV CORPS  
(Monthly Average)

	<u>1968<sup>a/</sup></u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>2nd Half</u> <u>1968</u>	<u>2nd Half</u> <u>1969</u>
<u>ARVN/VNMC Large Unit</u> <u>Operations (LUO)</u>				
<u>Battalion Days b/</u>				
7th Div	147	272	147	282
9th Div	240	258	240	243
21st Div	215	210	215	231
ARVN Inf Total	602	740	602	756
IV Corps c/	725	937	725	949
<u>Number of Operations</u>				
7th Div	111	177	115	178
9th Div	181	112	191	70
21st Div	201	137	202	112
ARVN Inf Total	493	426	508	360
IV Corps c/	623	518	627	418
<u>ARVN/VNMC Small Unit</u> <u>Operations (SUO)</u>				
7th Div	432	288	535	68
9th Div	279	266	269	80
21st Div	77	372	939	111
ARVN Inf Total	788	926	1743	259
IV Corps c/	1553	1152	1818	509
<u>RF/PF Operations - IV Corps</u> (SUO by fire team or larger)				
RF Rifle Companies	16709	28462	20728	30613
PF Platoons	34022	66693	44079	70330

a/ January 1968 data for ARVN/VNMC not available.

b/ Data series began July 1968.

c/ Includes all Infantry, Ranger, Cavalry, and Marine battalions.

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The 21st ARVN Division, operating in the southernmost part of the Delta, reacted quickly to the infiltration of the 273rd VC Regiment, inflicted severe casualties during the enemy move and have prevented the enemy from exploiting the situation by keeping him isolated in the U Minh base area.

Performance of the Territorial Forces (RF/PF) in IV Corps materially augments the uneven effectiveness of the regular forces. Unlike other Corps areas, a significant number of RF companies conduct combat operations and the total number of RF/PF operations has continued to increase in IV Corps.

RVNAF Results. The data in Table 5 shows that in spite of the build up on both sides, the intensity of the 1969 main force conflict in IV Corps is less than for 1968 in terms of contacts and enemy KIA. The Territorial Forces (RF/PF), however, are much more engaged than in 1968 and are doing reasonably well in terms of KIA ratios. The KIA ratio for the 7th Division in 1969 not only lags the other two divisions, but also the PF. This performance of the RF/PF in the face of increased intensity may account for the continued progress in HES Security Scores. <sup>1/</sup> There has been continued progress in all areas except in the 44th STZ, where the increased enemy activity has depressed the security score from a high of 93.9% in September to 91.8% by the end of December. For the entire Corps, the security score was 76.2% in June, 83.6% in September, and 87.2% in December.

Recent Activity. We examined the MACV weekly OPREP-5 reports through 21 February 1970 to gain a preliminary but more current view of the IV Corps situation. This data seems to indicate improved performance in IV Corps; enemy KIA figures are slightly above the monthly average for the last half of 1969 while the friendly KIA is about one-third less. Enemy activity levels continued at or above the 2nd half 1969 rates through January, but showed a slight decrease in February. In the area of the 7th ARVN division, an operation initiated on 18 January continues to inflict damage on the enemy forces. The primary friendly force involved is the three VMC battalions recently sent to that area and the cumulative results as of 21 February show 221 enemy KIA versus 37 friendly KIA, a 6 to 1 ratio. Operations in the 44th STZ and the areas of the 9th and 21st Divisions show equally good results.

<sup>1/</sup> Refers to percent of total population rated relatively secure (ABC).

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TABLE 5

RVNAF RESULTS - IV CORPS  
(Monthly Average)

	<u>1968<sup>a/</sup></u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>2nd Half</u> <u>1968</u>	<u>2nd Half</u> <u>1969</u>
<u>ARVN/VNMC Contacts</u>				
7th Div	105	66	103	46
9th Div	82	74	79	66
21st Div	<u>106</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>111</u>	<u>88</u>
ARVN Inf Total	<u>293</u>	<u>225</u>	<u>293</u>	<u>195</u>
IV Co. ps b/	371	273	362	228
<u>RF/PF Contacts</u>				
RF Rifle Companies	692	1116	841	1221
PF Platoons	815	1303	1035	1226
<u>Enemy KIA by ARVN/VNMC</u>				
7th Div	196	135	93	128
9th Div	163	146	120	152
21st Div	<u>340</u>	<u>174</u>	<u>184</u>	<u>174</u>
ARVN Inf Total	<u>699</u>	<u>455</u>	<u>397</u>	<u>454</u>
IV Corps b/	1072	612	640	578
<u>Enemy KIA by RF/PF</u>				
RF Rifle Companies	762	1016	691	1102
PF Platoons	583	553	454	507
<u>Enemy/Friendly KIA Ratio</u>				
7th Div	3.5	2.4	3.3	2.1
9th Div	3.4	2.9	3.0	3.5
21st Div	6.9	3.4	5.2	4.0
IV Corps ARVN/VNMC b/	5.2	3.2	4.7	3.2
RF	4.5	4.4	5.0	4.0
PF	2.4	3.1	2.8	2.8

a/ January 68 data for ARVN/VNMC not available.

b/ Includes all Infantry, Ranger, Cavalry and Marine units.

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RVNAF GROUND INTERDICTION IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS

Summary

RVNAF ground combat units have conducted operations outside of South Vietnam (RVN) continuously since late April 1970, with distinct variations in scope, combat intensity, and amount of RVNAF committed from each RVN Military Region (MR).

The results of these operations so far indicate that:

-- They have made a definite contribution in dislocating enemy main force units from MRs III and IV and limiting the VC/NVA offensive capability within those MRs. The enemy has been forced to react to RVNAF initiative.

-- The size and duration of 1970 operations launched from MR III appear excessive, leading to later morale problems in the units involved and contributing to temporary GVN control losses within MR III. Those from MR II were at the other extreme, neither frequent enough nor large enough to show any apparent effect on the enemy. MR IV seems to have achieved a better balance between the scope of internal and cross border operations.

-- Conducting two simultaneous large scale operations in Cambodia and Laos in 1971 was overly ambitious and probably required more combat support capability than is programmed for RVNAF.

-- The capabilities of RF/PF units in each MR are crucial in determining the scope of cross border operations. Without significant improvement in Territorial and Pacification forces, RVNAF regular forces are not completely free to conduct extended operations, either out of country or in remote areas inside the country.

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## Details

Objectives. RVNAF ground interdiction operations are primarily conducted to limit enemy capabilities inside South Vietnam by disrupting their logistic and sanctuary system adjacent to the RVN border. On two occasions RVNAF has gone further into Cambodia to assist the Cambodian forces (FANK), whose continued visibility helps divert the enemy threat from South Vietnam.

Scope and Intensity. The cross border operations can be described in three distinct periods over the past year (Table 1).

-- The initial Cambodian operation (May-June 1970) was a large scale RVNAF offensive augmented by US units. This operation encountered little coordinated enemy resistance, but there were several clashes with VC/NVA rear guard units.

-- From July 1970 through January 1971, RVNAF continued operations in Cambodia on a reduced scale and without assistance from US ground combat forces, although US air support and artillery fire from positions within RVN was provided. These operations were designed to stop the enemy from re-establishing his sanctuaries and to help the Cambodian forces. VC/NVA units in Cambodia generally refused contact with RVNAF during this period, but increased their resistance in December and January.

-- In February and March 1971, RVNAF conducted simultaneous operations in Cambodia and southern Laos to disrupt the enemy supply system and to pre-empt enemy offensives within RVN. These operations evoked a strong enemy reaction, resulting in heavy losses for both sides, particularly in Laos.

TABLE 1

### FORCES IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS (Monthly Average)

	<u>US/RVNAF</u>				<u>VC/NVA<sup>a/</sup></u>		
	<u>May-June</u>		<u>July 70-</u>	<u>Feb-Mar</u>	<u>May-June</u>	<u>July 70-</u>	<u>Feb-Mar</u>
	<u>1970</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>Jan 71</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>Jan 71</u>	<u>71</u>
	<u>US</u>	<u>RVNAF</u>	<u>RVNAF</u>	<u>RVNAF</u>			
<u>Combat Bns</u>							
Cambodia	22	39	22	31	69	67	65
Laos/DMZ	--	--	--	20	20	26	40
Total	<u>22</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>105</u>
<u>Combat Strength</u> (OCO)							
Cambodia	18.2	21.1	11.6	16.7	20.6	20.0	20.0
Laos/DMZ	--	--	--	12.5	9.2	10.7	27.1
Total	<u>18.2</u>	<u>21.1</u>	<u>11.6</u>	<u>29.2</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>30.7</u>	<u>47.1</u>

Source: Oprep 5, Special Oprep, MACV All-Source Enemy OB, CINCPAC Strength Reports and SEER.

a/ Dual threat units located outside RVN, but which could be introduced rapidly enough to constitute a threat to GVN MSs.

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The KIA and combat intensity (KIA per 1000 RVNAF) data in Table 2 illustrate the different combat intensities of the three periods. The heaviest fighting occurred this year.

-- In February and March of this year, RVNAF KIA and VC/NVA KIA by RVNAF were nearly 2½ times greater than during the first Cambodian operations.

-- The Laotian operation this year was nearly 3 times as intense as the initial RVNAF operation into Cambodia.

-- The combat intensity in Cambodia this year was below the first operations last year but about double the intensity during the intervening period.

TABLE 2

COMBAT INTENSITY IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS  
(Monthly Average)

	US/RVNAF				VC/NVA <sup>a/</sup>		
	May-June 1970		July 70- Jan 71	Feb-Mar 71	May-June 1970	July 70- Jan 71	Feb-Mar 71
	US	RVNAF	RVNAF	RVNAF			
<u>KIA</u>							
Cambodia	181	438	108	245	6422	772	2399
Laos	--	--	--	766	--	--	6821
Total	181	438	108	1011	6422 <sup>b/</sup>	772	9220 <sup>c/</sup>
<u>KIA per 1000 RVNAF</u>							
Cambodia		21	9	15	187	67	144
Laos		--	--	61	--	--	546
Total		21	9	35	187	67	316

Source: OPREP 5, Special OPREP, and MACV Measurements of Progress.

a/ Includes only those VC/NVA deaths attributable to US/RVNAF ground operations. Does not include those killed by FANK forces or as a result of the air interdiction campaign.

b/ Includes 2472 killed by US forces.

c/ Includes 2982 killed by aircraft (KBA), 800 in Cambodia and 2182 in Laos.

GVN Commitment by MR. RVNAF ground interdiction operations in February-March 1971 absorbed about 27% of their 188 combat battalions, compared to 21% in the initial Cambodian operations and 12% during the intervening period (Table 3). MR III has provided the bulk of RVNAF units throughout all periods, and the two reserve divisions (Airborne and Marine) have also been heavily committed.

In GVN MRs II and IV, RVNAF has concentrated on internal operations since July 1970, but MR II operations have been more defensive than those in MR IV. Plagued by a well entrenched VC infrastructure in the populated areas and a paucity of regular forces, MR II has conducted only one short, four battalion foray into Cambodia since June 1970. MR IV has concentrated on

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reducing the remaining enemy strongholds in the Delta, with shallow penetrations into Cambodia using a minimum of regular forces augmented by Border Defense and RF battalions.

TABLE 3

RVNAF COMMITMENT IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS BY MR  
(Monthly Average)

	Combat Battalions			Combat Strength (000)		
	May-June 1970	July 70- Jan 71	Feb-Mar 71	May-June 1970	July 70- Jan 71	Feb-Mar 71
MR I	0	0	20	0	0	12.5
MR II	6	a/	0	3.2	0.1	0
MR III	21	16	28	12.1	8.7	15.3
MR IV	12	6	3	5.8	2.8	1.4
RVN	39	22	51	21.1	11.6	29.2

a/ Less than 1. Four battalions during the last two weeks in November yields an average of 0.

Impact on the Enemy. RVNAF ground interdiction operations, combined with the closure of Siem Reap in 1969 and the survival of the Cambodian government (GKR), have caused a significant realignment of the VC/NVA main force threat to GVN MRs III and IV (Table 4).

-- The enemy's main force combat strength inside of MRs III and IV has dropped 60% since April 1970 as a result of enemy units (1) moving into Cambodia to protect their logistics network and fight FANK, and (2) taking heavy losses. Supply problems have further limited the capability of remaining units, and no offensive has been mounted in MRs III or IV this dry season.

-- Some of the enemy units driven into Cambodia are still targeted against MRs III and IV. If we count them, the total threat reduction is 20%.

The effect in MR II is less apparent. Some enemy forces have been forced out of the MR but the total threat has not declined. The lack of significant RVNAF cross border operations may have contributed to the recent VC/NVA offensive in Kontum and Pleiku.

MR I was not directly affected by the 1970 operations into Cambodia. It is still too early to gauge long range effects of Lam Son 719.

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TABLE 4

VC/NVA MAIN FORCE THREAT TO RVN  
(Combat Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Within RVN</u>		<u>Outside RVN<sup>a/</sup></u>		<u>Total Threat</u>	
	<u>Apr 70</u>	<u>Feb 71</u>	<u>Apr 70</u>	<u>Feb 71</u>	<u>Apr 70</u>	<u>Feb 71</u>
MR III	27.8	7.8	0	13.5	27.8	21.3
MR IV	13.9	8.9	0	1.8	13.9	10.7
Subtotal	41.7	16.7	0	15.3	41.7	32.0
MR I	29.0	17.9	9.5	12.7	38.5	30.6
MR II	14.0	11.5	2.2	4.8	16.2	16.3
RVN Total	84.7	46.1	11.7	32.8	96.4	78.9

Source: MACV All Source Enemy OB

a/ Dual threat units located outside RVN borders but which could be introduced into GVN MRs rapidly enough to constitute a threat. Does not include NVA targeted solely against FANK in Cambodia.

RVNAF Performance. These operations have demonstrated that RVNAF can plan and conduct large scale operations with a diminishing reliance on US logistical support. During the initial Cambodian operations, ARVN divisions were rapidly moved and concentrated at the desired location with organic transportation. The 9th ARVN division, for example, moved from the Parrot's Beak (next to MR III) to the Chau Doc area in northwestern MR IV in three days.

Air support for the two simultaneous operations this year, however, was beyond the present VNAF capability and represents more than 70% of the attack sortie rates programmed for VNAF in FY 73. Support in Laos was almost entirely US, but VNAF furnished 67% of the attack sortie support in Cambodia.

The intense combat this year exposed some of the problems cited in the after action report of the first "Vietnamization Test" under intense combat-- the 1969 Ben Het-Dak To campaign in the western highlands of MR II:

-- Battlefield coordination deficiencies, both in maneuvering the ground units and between ground units and supporting aircraft, were evident.

-- Replacement of battle casualties by unit rotation severely limited RVNAF's ability to stay in sustained combat. There is no system for replacing individual losses while the unit remains in combat.

On balance, RVNAF units have performed well against enemy forces in the former sanctuary areas, including the lightly regarded 18th and 5th Divisions in MR III.

The high morale generated in MR III units during the initial Cambodian operations has since deteriorated, however, because of the large, sustained commitment and increased casualties during February and March. MG Hieu, the

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ARVN 1st Division commander, contends that inflicting high casualties on the enemy has little or no long range effect on him, but the cost to RVNAF seriously damages ARVN morale.

Impact within RVN. The RVNAF ground interdiction efforts must also be evaluated in terms of their contribution to continued progress in the RVN. Table 5 shows that the enemy threat realignments largely offset US redeployments and RVNAF out of country commitments during 1970; the ratio of friendly to enemy combat battalion strength has been maintained at or above early 1970 values since July 1970.

Nevertheless, there were GVN control regressions in MR III during the last quarter of CY 1970 and in MRs I, II, and southern MR IV during the first quarter of 1971.

TABLE 5  
FORCE RATIOS AND GVN CONTROL

	<u>Main Force Ratio<sup>a/</sup></u>					<u>GVN Control<sup>b/</sup></u>				
	<u>(Monthly Average)</u>					<u>(End of period rating in %)</u>				
	<u>1970</u>				<u>1971</u>	<u>1970</u>				<u>1971</u>
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th</u>	<u>Feb-</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th</u>	<u>Feb-</u>
	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>March</u>
<u>Within RVN</u>										
MR I	2.4	1.9	1.8	2.7	2.8	56	61	70	73	62
MR II	3.3	2.8	3.2	2.8	3.1	41	42	53	55	52
MR III	2.7	2.7	5.0	4.4	3.5	59	63	72	69	72
MR IV	2.3	1.9	2.3	2.4	2.2	53	58	65	69	71
RVN	2.7	2.3	2.7	3.0	2.9	52	56	65	67	66

a/ Strength ratio of US/ARVN/RVNAF maneuver battalions (including ARVN cavalry squadrons but excluding border defense battalions) to VC/NVA maneuver and combat support battalions.

b/ Special indicator developed for the Vietnam Special Studies Group (VSSG) based on HES (generally parallels the HES AB security score).

The internal shuffling of regular units to launch large scale cross border operations, or (as in MR IV) to operate at length in remote areas inside RVN, places an increased responsibility on the FF/PF, particularly if there is a significant US redeployment during the period.

Commenting on the fourth quarter regression in MR III, 2 of the 3 ARVN division commanders and an MR II staff officer (in separate interviews) stated that the control decline stemmed from ARVN preoccupation in Cambodia; that much of the MR III regular RVNAF combat force was either preparing for, standing down from, or conducting operations in Cambodia during the last half of 1970. This gave small VC/NVA bands a relatively free hand to attack pacification forces (RF/PF/PSDF).

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Similar comments have been noted in recent Province Senior Advisor reports from MR I and southern MR IV, where security declines were attributed to regular force operations in Laos and in the U Minh Forest respectively.

A related internal effect of large scale interdiction operations was noted by MG Toan, commander of the 2d ARVN Division, who said that the resources committed in Laos precluded his planned offensive in western Quang Tin and Quang Ngai.

MR II, having conducted little or no ground interdiction operations, apparently is declining due to a combination of poor intelligence, relatively few forces for the large area, and units of dubious quality. General Dzu has acknowledged that he had little useful intelligence on enemy movements outside MR II, particularly around the critical tri-border area (Base Area 609). He rated both his divisions as poor and the RF/PF as the worst in the country. To counter the recent enemy offensive in the highlands he has had to draw battalions from the coastal and southern areas. After the termination of the Laotian operation, however, he was reinforced with a brigade of airborne troops to assist in defending Fire Support Base 6 in Kontum province.

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RVNAF LEADERSHIP

The Vietnamese Regular forces have only half (51%) of the authorized captains and above, and their number has dropped 800 (11%) in the past year in spite of a 19% increase in Regular forces. Based on US standards, the RVNAF forces should have 65% more officers and NCOs than are presently in the Regular, RF and PF forces. MACV programs have not found a way to fill 6200 vacant captain and higher Regular spaces (of 12,500) or to get the RVNAF even to promise more than 1700 promotions per year to these ranks. Data are so bad that gains and losses of officers cannot be tracked, but present programs clearly are not going to eliminate present deficiencies, much less those impending under the 601,000 authorized force level.

RVNAF Leader Strength and Shortages

Table 1 shows that the total officer strength in RVNAF Regular Forces increased by only 41 during the year ending 31 March 1968. More important, total personnel in the critical ranks of captain and above actually declined by 793 (11%) in the same period. Moreover, the leadership density declined as total regular officers increased only .1% in face of a 19% increase in the total force. Non-commissioned officer (NCO) strength increased by 8189 in the Regular Forces (12%) but NCO density per force also dropped. Most (80%) of the NCO increase occurred in the lowest rank (Sergeant).

The RVNAF Regional Forces (RF) increased by 835 officers in the year ending March 31, 1968; but they gained only 36 captains and above. The RF gained 1195 NCOs, mostly in ranks above sergeant. Both officer and NCO density dropped (Table 2).

In contrast to the Regular and Regional Forces, increases in Popular Forces (PF) squad and platoon leaders have both kept pace with PF strength gains\*(Table 3).

Our information about RVNAF officers and NCOs is not sufficient for us to project future officer-NCO expected inputs, losses, or strength levels. To help judge the extent of the RVNAF officer-NCO shortage, we have compared the current officer-NCO levels with the authorized RVNAF levels and with comparable officer-NCO densities in the U.S. Army.

\* Squad leader and platoon leader are the only PF ranks. They act only as tactical leaders; ARVN sector and subsector staffs assign their missions and are supposed to provide needed support.

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TABLE 1

## VIETNAMESE REGULAR FORCE OFFICER AND NCO STRENGTHS <sup>1/</sup>

	<u>Actual</u>			<u>Authorized</u>	<u>% Actual to Author- ized (1968)</u> <sup>2/</sup>
	<u>Oct 31 1966</u>	<u>Mar 31 1967</u>	<u>Mar 31 1968</u>	<u>Apr 15 1968</u>	
<u>Officer</u>					
General	2	2	1	134	22
Lt Gen	6	9	3		
Maj Gen	14	12	10		
Brig Gen	17	21	15		
Colonel	88	94	93	365	25
Lt Col	315	374	428	1130	38
Major	1249	1483	1755	2832	62
Capt	5276	5192	4089	8021	51
Subtotal	5967	7187	6394	12482	51
LLT	6552	8196	8562		
2LT	6243	4998	7008		
Aspirant (WO)	6570	8580	7038		
Subtotal	19365	21774	22608	17746	127
Total Officer	26332	28961	29002	30228	96
<u>NCO</u>					
MSGT 1st Class	2435	2339	2446	2813	87
MSGT	6338	6527	6918	9536	73
SFC	17341	17853	18984	23030	82
SGT	41514	43861	50421	41892	120
Total NCO	67628	70580	78769	77271	102
Total Officer and NCO	93960	99541	107771	107499	100
<u>Total Regular Force Strength</u>	328638	329432	390891		
<u>% Leaders to Total Strength</u>					
<u>SVN Regular Forces</u>					
Officers	8	9	7		
NCOs	21	21	20		
Officers and NCOs	29	30	28		
<u>USARV</u> <sup>3/</sup>					
Officers			11		
NCOs			26		
Officers and NCOs			37		

<sup>1/</sup> Source: MACV J1.

<sup>2/</sup> March 31, 1968 actual; April 15, 1968 authorized.

<sup>3/</sup> Source: DCSPER 46 Report.

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TABLE 2  
REGIONAL FORCE  
OFFICER AND NCO STRENGTHS <sup>1/</sup>

	1967 As of <u>Mar 31</u>	<u>Actual</u>	1968 As of <u>Mar 31</u>
<u>Officer</u>			
Colonel	2		1
Lt. Col.	16		20
Major	95		116
Captain	<u>574</u>		<u>586</u>
Subtotal	<u>687</u>		<u>723</u>
1st Lt.	1157		3193
2nd Lt.	3792		3065
Aspirant (W.O.)	<u>3240</u>		<u>2730</u>
Lieutenant & Aspirant Total	<u>8189</u>		<u>8988</u>
Total Officers	<u>8876</u>		<u>9711</u>
<u>NCO</u>			
M Sgt. 1st Class	924		816
M Sgt.	1825		2095
SFC	5111		6656
SGT	<u>19047</u>		<u>18535</u>
Total NCO	<u>26907</u>		<u>28102</u>
<u>Total Regional Force Strength</u>	141772		167056
<u>% Leaders to Total Strength</u>			
Officers	6.2		5.8 6 .8
NCOs	19		17
Officers and NCOs	25		23

<sup>1/</sup> Source: MACV J1

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TABLE 3

ACTUAL POPULAR FORCE  
LEADER STRENGTH<sup>1/</sup>

	<u>31 Mar 67</u>	<u>30 Sep 67</u>	<u>31 Mar 68</u>
<u>PF Leaders</u>			
Platoon Leader	2,688	2,804	3,200
Squad Leader	<u>9,155</u>	<u>9,921</u>	<u>10,361</u>
Total	11,843	12,725	13,561
<u>Total PF Force Strength</u>	143,657	140,615	155,349
<u>% Leaders to Total Strength</u>			
Platoon Leaders	1.9	2.0	2.1
Squad Leaders	6.4	7.1	6.7
Platoon and Squad Leaders	8.2	9.0	8.7

1/ Source: MACV J1.

Comparison with RVNAF authorized levels (Table 1) indicates that the Regular Forces have been able to fill only half (6394 of 12,482) of their captain and above slots; moreover, they have lost ground in the past year. The recent increase in authorized RVNAF force levels to 801,000 and the resulting new unit activations are likely to further increase the critical shortage of captains and above.

By US standards, RVNAF has a significant shortage of officers and NCOs. A comparison of US and RVNAF data show that:

1. The density of officers in US Army infantry divisions on 30 April 1968 was 7.2% in contrast to 5.9% for ARVN infantry division on 29 February 1968.\*\*

2. On March 31 the actual density of Vietnamese regular officers was 64% that of the US Army (USARV) deployed in Vietnam and Vietnamese NCO leadership was 77% of USARV (Table 1). Moreover, the 15 April 1968 authorized strengths for SVI Regular Forces were only 73% of actual USARV officer strength and 77% of USARV NCO strength.

\*\* The ARVN Infantry Division has a greater officer density than the US Marine Division (5% on 30 April 1968).

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3. As regular officers provide staff direction to RF/PF through sector and subsector headquarters, a more realistic comparison of actual leader density for all RVNAF forces comes through contrast of total RVNAF officer-NCO density to that of USARV - 60% for officers and 63% for NCOs.

4. The relative density of leadership for total RVNAF forces is actually even less than indicated by the foregoing comparisons, because Vietnamese regular officers and NCOs include personnel for a training base, an army wide overhead, and headquarters not included in USARV. A comparison of RVNAF (including RF/PF) leadership densities with US Army worldwide figures yields the following: RVNAF officer density is 55% that of the US Army worldwide and RVNAF NCO density is 57%.

### Present Programs to Improve RVNAF Leadership

In 1966 MACV advised the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) to institute several programs to improve RVNAF leadership including: (1) a better promotion system, (2) training to improve leader quality, and (3) increases in junior officers. Results of a JGS program in each area are set forth below.

Promotion. ARVN has two types of officer ranks: permanent and functional (similar to permanent and temporary in the US Army). There are two promotion systems: Annual and special. The special system contains two categories - "battlefield" and "special, other than battlefield." The JGS establishes yearly allocations for annual promotions to permanent grade. There is no quota for special promotions to either permanent or functional grade.

We consider here only promotion to the grades captain and above because promotion from the Aspirant and 2d Lieutenant ranks is automatic after two years in grade. The JGS uses a promotion board system which considers and selects officers. The promotion board used efficiency reports for the first time in 1967 to make its selections.

During CY 1966, annual promotions to captain and above were 2988 (against an allocation of 3592 promotion slots), and special promotions were 714 (Battlefield - 2 and Other - 712) for a total of 3702. In 1967 both allocations (1704) and total promotions (1273 through 18 October 1967) were much lower. (See Table 4.) Moreover, fewer allocations were filled (63% versus 83% in 1966) and by 18 October 1967 only 34% as many officers had been promoted. Total promotions to grades captain and above averaged about 2500 per year for 1966 and 1967. At this rate, it would take 2.5 years with no losses to fill the 15 April 1968 authorized billets for captain and above; this does not take into account the increase needed to meet the new 801,000 approved RVNAF force level.

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TABLE 4  
1967 RVNAF OFFICER PROMOTIONS

	Promotion to					<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>GEN</u>	<u>COL</u>	<u>LTC</u>	<u>MAJ</u>	<u>CPT</u>	
<u>ANNUAL PROMOTIONS</u>						
Allocated	-	45	220	626	813	1704
Considered	-	83	369	2083	689	3224
Selected	-	6	135	540	397	1078
% Allocation Selected	-	13	61	86	49	63
% Considered Selected	-	7	37	26	58	33
Promoted as of 18 Oct 67		6	104	445	326	881
<u>SPECIAL PROMOTIONS<sup>1/</sup></u>						
Battlefield	-	-	3	20	33	56
Non Battlefield	5	7	56	119	149	336
Total	<u>5</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>139</u>	<u>182</u>	<u>392</u>
<u>TOTAL PROMOTIONS<sup>1/</sup></u>	5	13	163	584	508	1273

<sup>1/</sup> As of 18 October 1968.

The promotion data also suggest two other problems. First, the "special, other than battlefield" category accounted for 19% of the promotions in 1966 and for 26% in 1967. The "battlefield" category promoted 2 officers in 1966 and only 56 (4%) of the officers in 1967. The data clearly indicate that service in battle is not the path to quick promotion in RVNAF. This adds to the incentive to avoid combat assignments.

Second, selection by the board of only 33% of the officers considered for annual promotion in 1967 suggests serious problems in the selection process. It is unknown whether the introduction of efficiency reports in 1967 caused the great reduction in annual promotions. Whatever the cause, RVNAF promotion policy clearly needs revision to get more qualified leaders to the rank of captain and above.

Offshore Training. The overseas training program for RVNAF leaders promises long term benefits but has high short range costs. Table 5 shows that this program deprives ARVN of the services of about 1000 (average FY 1968-69) experienced leaders per year. Figures are not available on the ranks of Vietnamese personnel selected for overseas training but the majority are believed

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TABLE 5  
ARVN TRAINING IN US

Branch of Service	Trained in US			Total Schooled by Branch of Service	Branch of Service % of Total Schooled
	FY 64- FY 67	FY 68 <sup>1/</sup>	FY 69 <sup>2/</sup>		
Combat					
Airborne	0	19	0	19	.5
Armor	58	45	16	119	3.1
Artillery	101	34	34	169	4.4
Infantry	152	140	110	402	10.4
Ranger	0	2	11	13	.3
Special Forces	12	7	0	19	.5
Subtotal	<u>323</u>	<u>247</u>	<u>171</u>	<u>741</u>	<u>19.2</u>
Combat Support					
Engineer	163	199	152	514	13.3
Signal	192	37	37	266	6.9
Intelligence	457	179	210	876	22.7
Pol War	114	68	57	239	6.2
Subtotal	<u>926</u>	<u>483</u>	<u>486</u>	<u>1895</u>	<u>49.1</u>
Combat Svc Support					
AG	65	36	36	137	3.5
Finance	36	46	29	111	2.9
JAG	9	1	2	12	.3
Logistics	85	61	24	170	4.4
Medical	23	27	31	81	2.1
MP	46	26	21	93	2.4
Ordnance	61	22	32	115	3.0
QM	49	43	26	118	3.1
Trans	39	33	24	96	2.5
WAFC	15	7	7	29	.8
Miscellaneous	151	55	53	259	6.7
Subtotal	<u>579</u>	<u>357</u>	<u>235</u>	<u>1221</u>	<u>31.7</u>
Total	<u>1828</u>	<u>1087</u>	<u>942</u>	<u>3857</u>	<u>100.0</u>

1/ Programmed.  
2/ Approved.

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to come from the middle officer ranks. More personnel (50% of the total) are selected in the combat support group than the size of their group (estimated 25% of ARVN) warrants. Conversely, only 19% of the personnel attending school in the US were from combat branches, although the assigned strength in combat units is 47% of the total ARVN strength\*. The rationale behind the types of training and their effectiveness are unknown. Nor is it clear that the off-shore training program has complemented Vietnamese training capabilities or provided critical specialities.

Junior Leaders. In 1966, COMUSMACV initiated a reserve officer training course for selected ARVN NCOs to relieve the shortage of junior officers in ARVN infantry units. The OCS program, plus direct appointment of senior NCOs to officer rank, and battlefield commissions greatly reduced ARVN junior officer shortages in 1966. The resulting 27% excess of junior officers (Table 1) led JGS to curtail the OCS program in 1967. (We do not have data to determine where the excess junior officers are assigned.) Quotas for direct appointment which were well met in 1966 and 1967 have been established again for 1968. Actual battlefield promotions were a bare 10% of quotas in 1967, suggesting that the quotas are unrealistic or that the Vietnamese simply will not promote on the basis of battlefield performance (Table 6).

TABLE 6

## RVNAF NCO COMMISSIONING PROGRAM RESULTS<sup>1/</sup>

	1966	Planned	
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
Direct Appointment			
Regular Forces	401	484	371
Regional Forces	100	100	100
Subtotal	<u>501</u>	<u>584</u>	<u>471</u>
Special Battlefield			
Regular	16	100 <sup>2/</sup>	80
Regional	4	100 <sup>3/</sup>	134
Subtotal	<u>20</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>214</u>
Officer Candidate School			
Total	<u>1725</u> <u>2246</u>	<u>155</u> <u>939</u>	<u>--</u> <u>685</u>

- <sup>1/</sup> Source: MACV J1  
<sup>2/</sup> 10 awarded as of 18 Oct 67  
<sup>3/</sup> 2 awarded as of 18 Oct 67

\* As of June 30, 1967

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Reducing Middle-Rank Shortages

Almost 800 officers, captain and above in rank, have been lost or discharged from the Regular Forces in the past year. To alleviate the officer shortage and support the current force expansion, the GVN would be well advised to recall all those fit for service under general mobilization. In addition, the GVN should offer direct reserve commissions in an appropriate grade to persons with needed managerial skills and experience. Revision of the promotion system is needed to reward performance and to advance personnel with growth potential and battlefield competence. Finally, the service school system must be designed to improve critical skills and to provide genuine career opportunities for the proven leaders advanced by new promotion measures.

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*August 1*

RVNAF LEADERSHIP

We reported in June that Vietnamese Regular Forces had only half of their authorized captains and above. We have since learned that JGS is reluctant to promote large numbers of officers in the field grades, but nevertheless, have set an objective of filling them to 80% of authorized strength by the end of 1969. Further, there are significant shortages of senior NCOs which need to be filled.

The most recent figures (Table 1) show that regular and regional forces have only 50% of authorized captain through colonel strength despite a 1446 increase (31 March-30 June) of officers in these ranks. Authorizations have increased almost as rapidly as officer procurement. Although detailed data on the source of these new officers is not available; there are indications that the large gains come from calling up senior reserve officers, stopping retirements, and promotions on Armed Forces Day (19 Jun 68).

TABLE 1

RVNAF OFFICER STRENGTHS

	Regular			Regional Force			Total		
	Auth 12/31/68	On Hand 6/30/68	% On Hand	Auth 12/31/68	On Hand 6/30/68	% On Hand	Auth	On Hand	% On Hand
COL	414	109	26	52	2	4	466	111	24
LTC	1208	552	46	100	20	20	1308	572	44
MAJ	2993	2109	70	830	182	22	3823	2291	60
CAPT	8493	4586	54	2897	974	34	11390	5560	49
Subtotal	13108	7356	56	3879	1178	30	16987	8534	50
LT, & Aspir	19190	23344	122	11120	9948	89	30310	33292	110
TOTAL	32298	30700	95	14999	11126	74	47297	41826	88

To reach the 80% goal for both "main" and regional forces by the end of 1968 would require promotion of 46% of the lieutenant colonels, 32% of the majors and 27% of the captains in about 18 months. If these promotions were made to captain, major and lieutenant colonel, the resulting promotion rates would be close to that for US Army temporary promotion to major.

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The figure for promotion to colonel is high until one notes that the RVNAF forces have only 24% of the personnel authorized in this rank. Morale and performance cannot be high in a service where, if all authorized jobs are held, 62% of the lieutenant colonels must be holding down colonels jobs, 48% of the majors are holding lieutenant colonels' jobs, and 47% of the captains are holding major's jobs. Waiting to achieve the 80% objective until the end of 1969 defers recognition and pay that should go with the responsibilities deserving officers are already holding.

Our June article reported that "special other than battle promotions accounted for 26% of all promotions for the period reported on in 1967." Data for the first six months of 1968 indicate that they account for 59% of all promotions. In contrast, battlefield promotions were 56 (4% of total) in 1967 and 195 (5% of all) for first six months of 1968. MACV finds that battlefield criteria are too stringent. We agree, and believe that the JGS must promote good combat leaders faster if RVNAF performance is to be dramatically increased.

We do not understand Vietnamese reluctance to fill these authorized spaces. The authorizations may be inflated, but we have no way to tell. Until the JGS reasons for not promoting to fill these vacancies are known and coped with, we do not foresee any real progress on this issue.

Table 2 shows that the creation of new units has intensified the shortage of senior NCOs. If all authorizations are valid, and all the positions are filled, then 27% of E7s hold E8 jobs, 1% of E6s hold E7 positions and 17% of E5s occupy E6 slots. The 9% overage of E5s indicates that there is an experienced NCO pool from which to select senior NCOs. We do not know the JGS attitude to this problem.

TABLE 2

NCO STRENGTH  
(30 June 1968)

	Regular Forces			Regional Forces			Total		
	Auth	On Hand	% On Hand	Auth	On Hand	% On Hand	Auth	On Hand	% On Hand
E 8	3224	2041	63	2131	796	37	5355	2837	53
E 7	10690	7267	68	1931	2114	109	12621	9381	74
E 6	24579	19553	80	8926	6831	76	33515	26384	79
Subtotal E6 to E8	38493	28861	75	12988	9741	75	51491	38602	75
E 5	48103	55726	116	2113	19962	94	69261	75708	109
TOTAL	86601	84587	98	3-151	29703	87	120752	114290	95

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TABLE 1

RANKING BY DIVISION OF ARVN LEADERSHIP  
AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (1968)

	Infantry Divisions									
	I CTZ		II CTZ		III CTZ			IV CTZ		
	1st	2nd	22nd	23rd	5th	18th	25th	7th	9th	21st
Leadership Rating	1	5	2	4	9	10	5	2	7	8
Bn Days of Opns	1	7	4	3	9	10	6	2	5	8
Opn Days of Contact	6	5	8	7	9	10	3	1	3	2
% Contacts of Opns	8	4	10	7	6	8	2	3	4	1
Opns/1000 Men	2	7	2	2	9	10	6	1	2	7
Friendly KIA	1	5	8	7	9	10	3	2	6	3
Enemy KIA	1	4	8	7	9	10	3	2	5	6
KIA Ratio	1	2	7	9	7	10	2	5	2	5
En KIA/1000 Men	1	4	8	7	9	10	2	2	5	6
En KIA/Contact	1	2	7	7	7	10	3	5	4	6

Division performance appears to be tied to the level of enemy activity as well as leadership. The exceptions to the correlation between leadership and performance include the II CTZ divisions (22nd and 23rd) which had fairly good leadership ratings and were aggressive (2nd in battalion days of operation per 1000 ARVN), but their performance was poor compared to other divisions. Previous studies showed that ARVN performance improved markedly during periods of intense enemy activity such as Tet 1968. Since II CTZ had the lowest incident rate in SVN in 1968 (Table 2), we can speculate that there is a relationship between enemy activity levels and ARVN performance. Thus, II CTZ performance might improve if the level of incidents increased and they had more opportunity to engage the enemy and show what they could do. To take a reverse case, the 25th Division which was in one of the highest incident areas has only an average leadership rating and lacked in aggressiveness (sixth in operations per 1000 ARVN). Yet it had one of the best performance records.

TABLE 2

ENEMY ACTIVITY BY DIVISION <sup>a/</sup>  
(1968 Monthly Average)

	I CTZ		II CTZ		III CTZ			IV CTZ		
	1st	2nd	22nd	23rd	5th	18th	25th	7th	9th	21st
Incidents	482	234	120	124	171	108	279	211	240	248
Division Ranking	1	5	9	8	7	10	2	6	4	3

<sup>a/</sup> Source: VCIIA Computer File. Incidents include attacks, sabotage, anti-aircraft fire, terror, harassment and propaganda.

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TABLE 3

ARVN DIVISION COMMANDERS

<u>Division</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Length of Service in Current Jobs (Mos.)</u>	<u>Birthplace</u>
1st Infantry	Ngo Quang Truong	MG	30	SVN
2nd Infantry	Nguyen Van Toan	BG	23	SVN
22nd Infantry	Nguyen Van Hieu	BG	34	China
23rd Infantry	Vo Van Canh	Col	8	IVN
5th Infantry	Pham Quoc Thuan	MG	46	NVN
18th Infantry	Do Ke Giai	BG	32	SVN
25th Infantry	Nguyen Xuan Thinh	MG	16	NVN
7th Infantry	Nguyen Thang Hoang	BG	10	SVN
9th Infantry	Tran Ba Di	Col	10	SVN
21st Infantry	Nguyen Vinh Nghi	BG	11	SVN

Source: DIA Biographic Data Reports.

Comments

"one of the hardest working and most professionally competent officers in the Vietnamese Armed Forces.... an excellent and aggressive commander...."

"an excellent leader and an intelligent decisive, and conscientious officer who is concerned for the welfare of his troops." (US source) "unwilling to use his troops in any way that would endanger them.... rumored to be corrupt and a playboy." (Vietnamese source)

"one of the ablest senior Vietnamese officers."

"Hard-working, thorough, and highly motivated, Colonel Canh is considered a well-qualified officer."

"considered to possess good military knowledge, remarkable initiative, good organizational ability, and high sense of duty....an outstanding reputation.... in 1966 evidence of corruption."

"The performance of the 18th Infantry Division has been rated satisfactory and its overall leadership adequate."

"The 25th Division, prior to the assumption of command by General Think, was generally considered to be the worst combat unit in ARVN. Think has begun to make changes that will eventually improve the 25th's reputation....sets an example for his men."

"a professional military officer who is highly intelligent, extremely shrewd, quick to apprehend, and is deliberate in thinking and speech. He commands the attention of his subordinates."

"average intelligence and shows good judgment. He is a strong leader both by example and by force of authority."

"very intelligent. He replaces MG Nguyen Van Minh.... under Minh the 21st Division was one of South Vietnam's finest combat units."

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NOT FOR...

The ability of the division commander is undoubtedly a major influence on lower level leadership in the division and the division's combat performance. Table 3 provides data on each division commander including rank, number of months in the job, birthplace and comments on his military capabilities extracted from DIA biographic data reports. The comments concerning the division commander's ability conform with the relative performance and leadership of the divisions. For example, the best commander in SVN is considered to be the 1st Division commander and his division was first in performance and leadership. The 18th Division commander received a very poor rating when compared with comments made about other division commanders, and his division is the worst in SVN. The 2nd Division commander is said to be "unwilling to use his troops in any way that would endanger them." This view may result from his relative lack of aggressiveness (7th in battalion days of operation per 1000 ARVN). However, once in contact with the enemy his troops do well (2nd in KIA ratio), supporting the comment that he is "an excellent leader." Since the 25th Division improved significantly during 1968 (discussed below) the new division commander is living up to the expectations set forth in the comment about him. All the IV CTZ commanders took control in mid-1968, so the indicators probably reflect more the ability of their predecessors than that of the current commanders. The same is probably true of the 23rd Division commander in II CTZ who has been in his job only eight months.

ARVN Versus RF/PF Division Performance

Previous studies indicate that areas where RF and PF performed well (I and IV CTZ) were the same CTZ with good ARVN performance. Conversely, poor ARVN performance areas (II and III CTZ) were the same as poor RF/PF areas. In an attempt to define this relationship more clearly we compared the performance indicators of ARVN with those of RF and PF at division level. The map provides the location of each division tactical area of operation. Table 4 shows that the correlation between the performance of ARVN and the RF/PF forces operating in the same areas is clear. By summing the performance indicators (KIA ratio, enemy KIA per 1000 men and enemy KIA per contact) and ranking them for each force by division, the relationship between ARVN and RF/PF performance stands out.


TABLE 4

RANKING OF PERFORMANCE FACTORS

	<u>Infantry Divisions</u>									
	<u>I CTZ</u>		<u>II CTZ</u>		<u>III CTZ</u>			<u>IV CTZ</u>		
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>22nd</u>	<u>23rd</u>	<u>5th</u>	<u>18th</u>	<u>25th</u>	<u>7th</u>	<u>9th</u>	<u>21st</u>
ARVN	1	3	7	8	8	10	2	5	4	6
RF	1	3	6	9	3	10	8	5	7	2
PF	1	2	8	9	5	10	7	3	6	3

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ARVN INFANTRY  
DIVISION AREAS  
OF OPERATION

NOTE: The 44th Special Zone was formed in mid-1968 from parts of the 7th and 9th Divisions (Kien Thong, Kien Phong and Chan Doc provinces).

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The influence of ARVN on RF/PF performance occurs in several ways: (1) The chain of command. The RF and PF are under the control of the district chief who reports to the province chief. For military purposes the province is considered a sector of the division area and the province chief reports to the division commander. Thus in joint military operations between ARVN and RF and/or PF the division commander has operational control over all forces involved. This provides a direct link between ARVN leadership, particularly the division commander, and RF/PF performance. (2) Combat support. Requests for artillery or air support for territorial forces go through military channels to ARVN. (3) Division orientation. Those divisions which are oriented toward combat operations set the example for territorial forces and use RF/PF in combined operations, while bad divisions tend toward static security missions and the RF/PF do likewise. (4) Reinforcement capability. Poor ARVN divisions might tend to fail to reinforce RF/PF when they are engaged in combat more frequently than good divisions. As a result, RF/PF would have the tendency to avoid combat.

One exception to the correlation between ARVN performance and RF/PF performance in the division area is the 25th Division. Before 1968 the 25th Division was considered one of the worst in South Vietnam. In January 1968 a new division commander was assigned and performance improved. The KIA ratio was 8:1 in 1968 versus 3:1 in 1967. The 25th Division killed 14% of total enemy killed by ARVN in 1968 versus only 4% in 1967. The RF and PF failed to match this improvement of the 25th Division in 1968. However, 1st quarter 1969 data indicate that both RF and PF improved their KIA ratio. RF ratio rose from 3:1 to 5:1 and PF rose from 1:1 to 3:1. This may mean that there is a time lag between ARVN improvement and RF/PF improvement, which would seem to be a reasonable assumption.

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RVNAF LEADERSHIP

Summary. The RVNAF promoted more officers in 1968 than in any previous period for which we have statistics, and the number of officers increased by about 35%. Despite this, only 51% of the authorized captain to colonel billets were filled at the end of April 1969. The continuing short-fall is the result of the rapid growth of officer authorizations in the expanding RVNAF, as the promotion system is unable to keep pace with the force expansion. Achievement of the 1969 promotion goals for captains to colonel will require 33% more promotions than last year. Nonetheless, the substantial 1968 increase in the actual numbers of RVNAF officers should help alleviate the serious shortage of leaders, especially in the junior officer ranks.

Progress in Recent Months

Total RVNAF officer strength increased by 13,426 (35%) in the 12 months ending April 30, 1969, an unprecedented expansion by Vietnamese standards. (In the previous 12 months, Regular Force officer strength had increased by only 41.) However, as Table 1 shows, two-thirds of the increase was in the aspirant to first lieutenant ranks, bringing them up to 110% of authorized strength, while the captain to colonel ranks were at half strength (51%).

We reported in June and August 1968 that the Regular Forces had only about half of their authorized captains and above. By December, a large number of promotions had raised the figure to 66%, but increased authorizations in 1969 dropped it back to 55% by April, despite 1,288 more promotions between December and April. The Regional Forces still had only 34% of their authorized captains and above in April 1969, despite adding 963 (133%) more officers to fill these slots in the previous 12 months.

Plans for CY 1969

The persistent shortages in officers result in a large part from the increased demands for officers to fill out the expanding RVNAF force structure. Authorized officer spaces have increased more rapidly than officer promotions, especially in the captain-colonel ranks. Compounding this rapid growth in authorizations is the fact that the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) did not carry out all of their announced programs to meet their 1968 promotion objectives.

The JGS goal for 1968 was to fill 67% of the authorized captain-colonel billets. However, in December the JGS cancelled special promotions which were supposed to complete the 1968 requirements, although there were enough eligible officers available. As a result, Table 2 shows that only 59% of the slots were filled by December, with the two ranks of colonel and lieutenant colonel showing the greatest shortfalls.

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TABLE 1

RVNAF OFFICER INCREASES <sup>a/</sup>

	1968 (APR)			1969 (APR)			CHANGE	
	Auth.	Act.	Act./ Auth. %	Auth.	Act.	Act./ Auth. %	Auth.	Actual
<u>REGULAR FORCES</u>								
Cpt-Col	12482	6365	51	17929	9915	55	5447	3550
Aspirant-1Lt	17746	22608	127	23509	25296	108	5763	2688
Total	30228	28973	96	41438	35211	85	11210	6238
<u>REGIONAL FORCES</u>								
Cpt-Col	NA	723	NA	4932	1686	34	NA	963
Aspirant-1Lt	NA	8988	NA	13211	15213	115	NA	6225
Total	NA	9711	NA	18143	16899	93	NA	7188
<u>TOTAL</u>								
Cpt-Col	NA	7088	NA	22861	11601	51	NA	4513
Aspirant-1Lt	NA	31596	NA	36720	40509	110	NA	8913
Total	NA	38684	NA	59581	52110	87	NA	13426

<sup>a/</sup> As reported by MACV from Vietnamese JGS Gain/Loss Reports.

TABLE 2

RVNAF REGULAR AND REGIONAL FORCE OFFICER STRENGTH <sup>a/</sup>

	1968 (APR)			1968 (DEC)			1969 (APR)			Change From April 1968 (Actual)
	Auth.	Act.	Act./ Auth. %	Auth.	Act.	Act./ Auth. %	Auth.	Act.	Act./ Auth. %	
<u>REGULAR FORCES</u>										
Col	365	93	25	414	146	35	591	165	28	72
L/Col	1130	428	38	1208	618	51	1774	702	40	274
Maj	2832	1755	62	2993	2138	71	4215	2402	57	647
Cpt	8021	4089	51	8493	5725	67	11349	6646	59	2557
Total	12728	6365	52	13108	8527	66	17929	9915	55	3550
<u>REGIONAL FORCES</u>										
Col	NA	1	NA	52	3	6	56	4	7	3
L/Col	NA	20	NA	100	48	48	133	59	44	39
Maj	NA	116	NA	830	224	27	982	285	29	169
Cpt	NA	586	NA	2897	1656	36	3761	1338	36	752
Total	NA	723	NA	3879	1331	34	4932	1686	34	963
<u>TOTAL</u>										
	NA	7088	NA	16987	9958	59	22861	11601	51	4513

<sup>a/</sup> As reported by MACV from Vietnamese JGS AO-3 Gain/Loss Reports.

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At the same time the December promotions were cancelled, General Vien directed that the 1968 promotion shortfall be added to the 1969 annual promotion quota, which is designed to fill 85% of the authorized captain through colonel spaces (Table 3). He also directed that 20% of the total 1969 quotas be allocated to battlefield promotions and announced the following actions to increase RVNAF promotions during CY 1969:

1. The original annual promotion board will be reconvened in May to reconsider for promotion all personnel who were previously eligible, but who were either not selected by the board or not approved by the promotion authorities.

2. A new promotion board will be convened in August to consider for promotion those personnel who become eligible during calendar year 1969.

3. In the development of their recommendations, these boards will not be limited by certain minimum requirements that previously had to be met.

Table 3 indicates that 6000 promotions in the captain-colonel ranks are needed to achieve the 1969 objectives. This is 33% above the April 1968-April 1969 promotion figure of 4500, and may be difficult to meet.

TABLE 3  
CAPTAIN - COLONEL PROMOTIONS - 1969

	Actual Apr 69	1969 GOALS		Promotions Needed to Meet Goal	Promotions April 1968- April 1969
		Officers	% Act./ Auth.		
<u>RVNAF</u>					
Colonel	149	309	60	160	75
Lieutenant Colonel	666	1012	70	346	313
Major	2362	3370	80	1008	816
Captain	6781	11280	90	4499	3309
Total	9958	15971	85	6013	4513

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RVNAF LEADERSHIP

Summary. Leadership is the crucial element in an effective Vietnamese combat force. Efforts to improve RVNAF leadership this year include removing two mediocre division commanders and promoting about 3,400 senior officers. Serious problems remain, however. The most acute officer shortage is in the field where many slots are filled by officers one or two ranks below that authorized for the job. The rapid force expansion has negated officer strength increases; only 59% of senior officer slots were filled in September.

Combat Duty. Few RVNAF officers seek combat commands because there is little incentive for them to do so. For example, RVNAF commanders in the field appear to be least favored in terms of promotions. Most battalion and regimental commander slots are filled by officers one or two ranks below the TO&E authorized rank for the job. There are two reasons for this: lack of emphasis on field promotions and lack of qualified personnel for the jobs.

Table 1 represents a one month sample of the ranks of battalion commanders. Although the battalion CO should be a Lt. Colonel (LTC), only 11% hold this rank (half are majors and 39% are captains). July data show that 45% of all RVNAF LTC slots were filled, indicating that the emphasis on promotions is not on field officers but non-combat or staff officers.

ARVN infantry division battalions are least favored of all types of battalions. Of the 133 division infantry battalions, only two have LTC's as CO with 15-16 years of commissioned service and an average of 15-20 months on the job. Clearly, the least rewarding job in terms of promotion is that of division infantry battalion commander.

TABLE 1

BATTALION COMMANDERS RANK AND SERVICE  
(July 1969)

	<u>RANK</u>			<u>Total</u> <u>CO's</u>	<u>%</u> <u>LTC</u>	<u>Avg. Yrs.</u> <u>Commissioned</u>	<u>Avg Mo's</u> <u>Assigned</u>	
	<u>COL</u>	<u>LTC</u>	<u>MAJ</u>					<u>CAPT</u>
Division Inf Bns		2	56	72	130 <sup>a/</sup>	2	11	11
Airborne Bns		7	2		9	78	16	20
Rangers Bns		3	8	12	23	13	10	20
Artillery Bns		3	34		37	8	15	17
Cavalry Bns	1	8	4		13	62	15	15
Marines Bns		1	5		6	17	12	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>218</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>13</b>

Source: SEER.

a/ Three battalions not rated.

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Divisions with good performance appear to be divisions with higher ranking battalion commanders (Table 2). For example, 1st Division in I CTZ has consistently been one of the best performing divisions in SVN. It is also a division with most battalions commanded by majors (rather than captains). Also, the battalion CO's averaged only 9 years commissioned service versus 10-14 years elsewhere, indicating a faster promotion rate for this division. In addition, the 1st Division battalion CO's are more experienced, averaging 15 months on the job versus an 11 month average for all division infantry battalion commanders. To take a reverse example, the 5th ARVN Division has one of the worst performance records. Eleven of its 12 battalion CO's are captains. However, the problem is probably more a lack of qualified personnel than slow promotions because they have an average of only 7 years of commissioned service and 8 months on the job.

TABLE 2

DIVISION INFANTRY BATTALION CO'S RANK AND SERVICE  
(July 1969)

	<u>RANK</u> <u>LTC</u>	<u>MAJ</u>	<u>CAPT</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>CO's</u>	<u>Avg Yrs</u> <u>Commissioned</u>	<u>Avg Mo's</u> <u>Assigned</u>
1st Div	1	14	2	17	9	15
2nd Div		3	9	12	10	11
51st Regt	1	1	2	4	14	7
22nd Div		6	6	12	11	16
23rd Div		5	7	12	11	7
42nd Regt		1	3	4	13	13
5th Div		1	11	12	7	8
18th Div		5	7	12	13	5
25th Div		8	4	12	14	15
7th Div		9	3	12	11	15
9th Div		2	10	12	10	12
21st Div		1	8	9	7	9
Total	2	56	72	130	11	11

Source: SFER.

As a result of the undesirability of combat command, many units have low ratings in leadership though some improvement has been made in the last year and a half. The countrywide index of average leadership ratings of infantry division battalions stood at 77 (out of a possible 100) at mid-year, up from 73 in 1st quarter 1968 (the Tet offensive period). Between first quarter 1968 and mid-1969, the number of infantry division battalion commanders which received good ratings on indicators of aggressiveness increased about 20%. However, less progress was made in improving the leadership of company grade officers and NCO's. Only the 1st and 2nd Divisions and the 51st Regiment, all in I CTZ, showed significant improvement in their battalions' overall leadership ratings.

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Officer Shortage. The RVNAF officer corps is bottom heavy with too many junior officers (lieutenants and aspirants) and too few senior officers (captains through colonels). The persistent shortage of senior officers resulted mostly from the increased demands for officers to fill out the expanding RVNAF force structure; authorized officer spaces increased more rapidly than officer promotions. Compounding this rapid growth in authorizations, the Joint General Staff (JGS) failed to carry out all of their announced 1968 promotion objectives and these carried over into 1969.

Efforts this year to increase promotions centered around special promotion boards (in May and August) and relaxation of certain minimum requirements for promotions. Despite a net increase of 3,438 senior officers so far this year, however, the JGS will probably not meet their 1969 goal of filling 85% of these slots; only 59% were filled in September. Even if RVNAF strength does not increase during the remaining months of 1969, the JGS would have to promote about 6,100 more junior officers to meet the 85% goal. Since the promotion board met in August, we can expect increases in promotions to show up later in the year but probably not enough to meet the goal. Assigned junior officers exceeded authorized spaces by 8,426 in September, representing 123% of Regular Forces and 123% of Regional Forces spaces.

Conclusion. The problem of improving the RVNAF leadership is a difficult one as it depends on action by the GVN which they are not anxious to take. However, much could be done if we could find ways of inducing better qualified individuals into command slots by making such jobs more attractive. This might be done by authorizing combat pay, giving double service time for time spent on combat duty, and accelerating promotions for combat officers. Conversely, "safe" jobs (in headquarters, in Saigon etc.) could be made less attractive by slowing promotions. There is a limited number of qualified individuals for the combat jobs, however, and this pool of qualified people should be expanded through training.<sup>1/</sup>

<sup>1/</sup> Training is the subject of the following article in this month's Analysis Report.

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ARVN DIVISION COMMANDERS

*Summary. Poor ARVN division commanders adversely affect the performance of several ARVN infantry divisions in SVN. I CTZ divisions remain the best. IV CTZ division performance declined in 1969. Four new commanders have been appointed since August but only one (the 7th) appears to be making significant improvements in his division. Advisors' assessments of ARVN Division commanders seem to differ from those of experienced observers in several cases.*

The capability of an ARVN division commander is a key factor in the performance of RVNAF forces in the Division Tactical Area (DTA) under his command. Unlike the US military, the ARVN division commander retains tight control of all operations and activities in his area, allowing little leeway for subordinate initiative and responsibility.

Specifically, the division commander has control of all military forces within the division tactical area (DTA). For military purposes the province chief reports to the division commander and for joint operations RF/PF forces come under his command. In addition, combat support and reinforcements to all GVN forces are controlled by ARVN leadership. The division commander has considerable influence in other areas as well. For example, if the division commander is corrupt and insists on payoffs and bribes, this puts severe pressure on his subordinates to do the same. Another example is that a commander may or may not stress personnel benefits for his men. Where he does, as in the case of the former 22nd Division CG, Gen. Hieu, promotions are faster and desertions are less of a problem.

Analysis suggests a close correlation between ARVN leadership and ARVN as well as RF/PF combat performance. Divisions with good leadership and performance had good commanders and conversely, poorly performing divisions had mediocre commanders. To cite obvious cases of commander influence, Gen. Tuong in the 1st Infantry Division is widely recognized as an excellent combat leader by both Vietnamese and Americans. The performance ratings and indicators show that his division ranks first or second in almost every category when compared with all ARVN divisions. On the other hand, the 5th and 18th divisions have long had the worst performance ratings and in August 1969, as a result of considerable pressure by US officials, these commanders were removed. Annex A discusses this relationship between leadership and combat effectiveness in greater detail.

As an example of the difference it might make if all divisions performed as well as the best, we projected possible enemy KIA using the performance factors of the best divisions. In 1969 the 1st and 2nd Divisions averaged 23 enemy KIA per 1000 ARVN per month. If all ARVN divisions performed at this rate, ARVN would average about 2700 enemy KIA a month (or over 32,000 a year). This would be about 70% higher than ARVN's 1969 level of enemy KIA

In the past US persuasiveness and pressure accompanied by evidence of corruption and effectiveness resulted in the removal of a number of province and district chiefs as well as the 5th and 18th Division commanders. One

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experienced observer noted that about 85% of the new province and district chiefs turned out to be better than their predecessors. In the case of the new 5th and 18th Division commanders, however, the new ones seem little better than those they replaced. This demonstrates the importance of following up on command changes to ensure the new appointees are more effective. The 7th Division commander was also recently replaced and appears to be an outstanding leader. Thieu's choice may be an indication that he realizes the critical importance of the division commander to RVNAF performance.

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ARVN Leadership and Division Combat Performance

Table 1 shows the shifts in ARVN Division leadership rankings between 1968 and 1969 from the SEER. The Second Division improved significantly and the division is now first or second in every performance indicator. II and IV CTZ divisions dropped in leadership rankings and III CTZ divisions rose.

TABLE 1

RANKING BY DIVISION OF ARVN LEADERSHIP

	Infantry Divisions									
	I CTZ		II CTZ		III CTZ			IV CTZ		
	1st	2nd	22nd	23rd	5th	18th	25th	7th	9th	21st
1968	1	5	2	4	9	10	5	2	7	8
1969	2	1	6	5	7	8	3	4	10	8

Table 2 shows a comparison of leadership and combat performance indicators of aggressiveness and effectiveness in 1969. In order to compare the relative standing of each division in leadership and performance indicators they were ranked from highest to lowest (1 to 10). There are wide disparities in combat performance among the ten ARVN divisions. One of the key factors appears to be leadership. In general those divisions with good leadership ratings had good performance and poorly led divisions had poor performance.

TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF LEADERSHIP AND COMBAT PERFORMANCE  
BY DIVISION - 1969

	I CTZ		II CTZ		III CTZ			IV CTZ		
	1st	2nd	22nd	23rd	5th	18th	25th	7th	9th	21st
Leadership	2	1	6	5	7	8	3	4	10	8
Aggressiveness										
Operations	1	2	3	6	10	7	8	4	5	9
Contacts/1000 ARVN	1	1	3	7	10	6	8	5	4	9
Contacts	2	1	3	10	5	8	9	7	6	4
Effectiveness										
Enemy KIA	2	1	8	10	9	5	7	4	6	3
KIA Ratio	1	2	6	6	9	3	4	10	8	5
Enemy KIA/1000 ARVN	3	1	8	10	9	4	7	5	6	2
Enemy KIA/Contact	2	1	5	10	8	3	3	6	7	5
Advisor Rating	1	2	5	8	7	9	4	6	10	3

Source: System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER).

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Previous studies indicated that in areas with good ARVN performance RF/PF performed well, and conversely poor ARVN performance areas were the same as poor RF/PF areas. In 1969, however, there appeared to be no correlation between ARVN and RF performance although the ARVN-PF relationship was clearly shown (Table 3).

TABLE 3

COMPARISON OF ARVN/RF/PF COMBAT PERFORMANCE  
BY DIVISION - 1969

	I CTZ		II CTZ		III CTZ			IV CTZ		
	1st	2nd	22nd	23rd	5th	18th	25th	7th	9th	21st
ARVN	2	1	8	9	9	3	5	6	6	4
PF	3	1	9	10	7	8	4	2	5	6
RF	7	4	7	10	3	7	6	2	4	1

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### Division Commanders

The ability of the division commander is undoubtedly a major influence on lower level leadership in the division and the division's combat performance. The table provides data on each division commander including rank, number of months on the job and comments on his military capabilities from DIA biographic data reports, advisor evaluations and experienced observers. The comments concerning the division commander's ability conform with the relative performance and leadership of the divisions. They must be read, however, as one reads efficiency reports. An "able" commander, for example, is distinctly inferior to an "excellent and aggressive" commander.

### I CTZ (1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions)

Clearly the I CTZ divisions ranked highest in the country in both leadership and performance. However, the 1st Division leadership rating declined between 1968 and 1969 (85 to 81) while the 2nd Division rating rose (77 to 82) and this is reflected in their relative standing in performance indicators. In 1968 1st Division was number one in all effectiveness indicators while 2nd Division averaged third. In 1969, 2nd Division appeared to have a slight edge in performance just as it did in leadership.

The 1st Division commander is considered to be the best division commander in SVN and his division was first in 1968 in performance and leadership and second in 1969. He has held his job for three and a half years. Recent reports indicate he may be named a corps commander in 1970.

The second Division commander, BG Toan, was involved in the now famous cinnamon smuggling case last year. His participation led to a recommendation that he be relieved for corruption but President Thieu refused to do so. Despite General Toan's dubious business interests, his division's leadership and performance ratings are now the highest in SVN. Observer comments (see table) indicate Gen Toan has serious drawbacks as a combat commander. However, these comments are based primarily on observation during 1968 when 2nd Division's performance was only average. Also, much of the 1969 improvement may have been due to support from US forces. High desertion rates and resulting personnel shortages continue to be serious problems for the 2nd Division.

### II CTZ (22nd and 23rd Infantry Divisions)

Division performance may be tied to enemy activity levels as well as leadership. The indicators which partially depend on enemy presence and activity (enemy KIA, KIA/1000 ARVN, enemy KIA/contact) were very low for II CTZ divisions. They had better ratings in leadership, but the combined factors of only average leadership and low enemy activity contributed to the very poor overall ratings.

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The 22nd Division lost its commander to the 5th Division in August. While he commanded the 22nd division it was rated 2nd in leadership in 1968 but dropped to 6th in 1969. Performance was poor in both years. The new 22nd Division commander was formerly the Commanding General of Quang Trung Training Center in Gia Dinh. Although he appears to have good potential, time will tell whether he displays the qualities desired in a combat commander.

The 23rd Division's leadership and performance worsened in 1969. Little is available on the division commander, Col. Canh, in Washington. What is known is uninspiring.

### III CTZ (5th, 18th and 25th Infantry Divisions)

The 5th and 18th Divisions appear to have improved somewhat in 1969. In 1968 the 18th Division ranked lowest (10th) in every indicator of leadership and performance. In 1969, although still ranking low in many areas, it was not last in any. It showed substantially improv. kill ratios, for example. Advisors indicate that an increase in joint and combined operations as well as refresher training provided to three battalions by the Australians contributed to improved scores. The 5th Division did not show much improvement except in leadership (from 9th to 7th). The new division commanders of both divisions have poor reputations and may not be significant improvements over their predecessors.

The 25th Division has devoted most of its effort to pacification support. Thus, while it is ranked 3rd in leadership, it ranked at the bottom in aggressiveness and in the middle in effectiveness. One reason for this is that until the Fall of 1969 the 25th largely limited its operations to pacification in areas of Hau Nghia and Long An that had relatively few main force enemy troops.

The new 5th Division commander received average leadership ratings when he was commander of the 22nd Division but division performance was poor. He replaces General Thuan whose removal was recommended by US advisors and who was accused of corruption.

The former 18th Division commander, General Giai, generally recognized as incompetent, was replaced by General Tho, considered by some as equally bad. Although the 18th improved in 1969 while still under General Giai's command, this may be attributed to the increased emphasis of US units operating in the same area on conducting joint and combined operations with 18th Division battalions and more training.

Observers were optimistic that General Thinh would improve the 25th Division. In 1969 the division ranked 3rd in leadership, and in important effectiveness indicators such as KIA ratio, enemy KIA per contact and advisor rating, the 25th was 3rd or 4th. Low marks in aggressiveness and total enemy KIA reflect the division's emphasis on pacification security missions and lack of operational activity in areas of significant enemy presence. Overall, the division's performance appears to have regressed in 1969 from 1968 when it was 2nd or 3rd best in the country. However, by late 1969 the division had moved

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significant forces against critical enemy base areas in Tay Ninh and reportedly is achieving success.

IV CTZ (7th, 9th and 21st Infantry Divisions)

The 7th ARVN Division in IV CTZ deteriorated in almost all indicators in 1969. Leadership went from 2nd to 4th and the kill ratio dropped from 5th to 10th. In fact in some instances the kill ratio was in favor of the enemy. Contacts were low (7th) despite one of the highest enemy densities in the country in their DTA. The redeployment of the US 9th Division in the summer apparently contributed to this decline in effectiveness. The situation was serious enough for President Thieu to replace the 7th Division commander in January with Col. Nguyen Khoa Nam who has a reputation as an aggressive leader.

The 9th Division was ranked last in leadership and effectiveness by US advisors in 1969. Lack of aggressiveness was a frequent criticism and most performance indicators were below average. The 21st Division was considered the worst division in IV CTZ in 1968 and the best in 1969. The division's performance actually changed very little (8th in leadership, very low aggressiveness ratings, slightly higher effectiveness ratings) but the 7th and 9th Divisions declined, therefore shifting relative rankings.

The recent appointment of Col. Nguyen Khoa Nam to command the 7th ARVN Division hopefully will be a significant improvement over his predecessor. Gen. Hoang, the former commander, was known for his conservatism and his subordinates lacked initiative. Seventh Division performance deteriorated in 1969, particularly after the departure of the US 9th Division. The new commander's reputation is that of a dynamic and aggressive leader. Col. Nam's advisors indicate he has "outstanding leadership ability" and judgment. "His services are sought all over Vietnam; he has excelled in all areas." In one advisor's opinion he is one of the great leaders of SVN and one of the most competent officers he has ever known. It is obvious that the 7th Division will need an officer of this caliber to arrest the deterioration of the 7th's performance and face problems posed by the enemy's buildup of forces in the northern Delta.

The 9th Division's low ranking leadership and effectiveness ratings reflect the assessment of Col. Di as a weak and unaggressive commander whose attitude affects the leadership of his subordinates and the performance of the division.

Reports indicate the 21st Division commander, Gen. Nghi, may be transferred to a new post in 1970. Eighth in leadership for two years, performance is spotty and the division has personnel problems. In November one of the battalions was led by a first lieutenant. Observers indicate Gen. Nghi is a better staff officer than division commander.

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AVN. DIVISION COMMANDERS

Commanders

US and Advisor Comment

Experienced Observer Comment

MG Ngo Quang Truong  
(1st Infantry Division)  
43 months as CG

"One of the hardest working and most professionally competent officers in the Vietnamese Armed Forces... an excellent and aggressive commander..."

1. "Outstanding, aggressive commander."  
2. "Terrific. Better than most US. On the go and out with units all the time. Tough on subordinates. 'In' with US so he gets good people and is able to promote them and hold them."

BG Nguyen Van Tuan  
(2nd Infantry Division)  
24 months as CG

"An excellent leader and intelligent, decisive, and conscientious officer who is concerned for the welfare of his troops...consistently displays his personal courage under fire to encourage his troops." (US source) "unwilling to use his troops in any way that would endanger them...rumored to be corrupt a playboy." (Vietnamese source)

1. "Grossly overrated. Division performance is marginal. Lacks aggressiveness. Would relieve him."  
2. "Super defensive. Lacked aggressiveness. Looking upward rather than downward goal to his people. Couple of very bad reports from province advisors in his area."

BG Le Ngo Erien  
(22nd Infantry Division)  
6 months as CG

"displays the highest moral fiber desired of a leader...Decisions made by him reflect careful analysis of the situation and matured judgment... He is highly respected by his subordinates as a good leader who is not hesitant to praise or punish when demanded by the situation...has the capability of assuming the highest office in RVNAF."

1. "Good reputation, but I don't know him. Was pleased to see Hieu relieved." (See 5th Division below.)  
2. "Bright guy who made good use of his staff in US. Ran the Quang Trung Training Center well. Have not seen him in the field, but found him aggressive and intelligent on the whole. Have not observed him as division commander."

Col. Vo Van Canh  
(23rd Infantry Division)  
17 months as CG

"Hard-working, thorough, and highly motivated, Col. Canh is considered a well-qualified officer. Very good division commander. Strong minded, aggressive. Well grounded in tools of his trade. Accepted advice readily. Know his strong points and weak points. Not particularly politically oriented. Ready to accept government policy; not a political man. Scheduled to be promoted to BG. Very attentive to desires of US commanders in the area. Very honest. Personally brave, ready to lead by example."

1. "Good reputation, but I don't know him."  
2. "Never met him, but I recall at the time of his appointment middle grade ARVN officers were asking, 'How did this guy get it?' His reputation is not high among this group."

MG Nguyen Van Hieu  
(5th Infantry Division)  
6 months as CG

"One of the ablest senior Vietnamese officers." Former CG of the 22nd Infantry Division.

1. "Poor as 22nd Division commander. Americans are over-impressed by his fluent English, which he learned in Malaysia."  
2. "When Hieu was in the 22nd Division it was like 2nd Division performance--non-innovating and careful, even when enemy forces were depleted. Insufficient concern with the RF and FP while in the 22nd Division and conflicts with province officials."

BG Lam Quang Tho  
(18th Infantry Division)  
6 months as CG

"He exudes self confidence and has a noticeable influence on the actions of his junior officers. He is highly respected and admired...a competent general officer."

1. "Coward and military incompetent, despite his six foot height and bearing. Was the armor commander at the crucial battle at Ap Bac, which ARVN lost."  
2. "Don't know him as a division commander. Tall, good military bearing--US officers think he's great and he gives good briefings. The Vietnamese generals think he's a dud. They hate his guts. He always looks up. Doesn't aggressively carry out his duty. Rides the fence."

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Commanders

MG Nguyen Xuan Thinh  
(25th Infantry Division)

"The 25th Division, prior to the assumption of command by General Thinh, was generally considered to be worst combat unit in ARVN. Thinh has begun to make changes that will eventually improve the 25th's reputation...sets an example for his men...Improving in aggressiveness and the mastery of commanding a division."

1. "Fair commander. Clearly the 25th Division is unimpressive."
2. "Don't know enough about him to comment."

MG Nguyen Thanh Hoang  
(7th Infantry Division)  
19 months as CG, relieved  
in January 1970

"a professional military officer who is highly intelligent, extremely shrewd, quick to apprehend, and is deliberate in thinking and speech. He commands the attention of his subordinates." Replaced in Jan. 1970 by Col. Nguyen Khoa Nam, former commander of the 3rd Airborne Brigade.

2. "Relieving him was a good move. He was a lousy province chief. Super defensive, indecisive. Didn't replace poor officials. Tried to do all the work himself, didn't use his staff."

Col. Nguyen Khoa Nam  
(7th Infantry Division)  
1 month as CG

"outstanding leadership ability. His full devotion seems to be being a full time soldier. His services are sought all over Vietnam...one of the great leaders in this country...one of the most competent officers I have ever known."

1. "Good reputation."
2. "Don't know him."

Col. Tran Ba Di  
(9th Infantry Division)  
19 months as CG

"Colonel Di clearly commands the division, however, his leadership is weak dealing with significant failures by some of his commanders and sometimes with poor staff performance...this lack of force and aggressiveness extends to combat operations in that his units seldom take full advantage of enemy contacts by exploiting them effectively. In other respects, his competence as a commander is far above average."

1. "Better than before, but only fair."
2. "As a province chief he made such effective use of RF-PF in 1963-64 that no ARVN battalions were needed in Phong Dinh or to protect Can Tho, despite the presence of substantial VC forces in the province. The Vietnamese say he is doing a good job, but the Division is in a tough area and the problems of operating the division tactically seem beyond him. Lacks the necessary experience at Division level. Would do well if he had an absolutely first rate advisor who could help him with the tactics of employing the Division."

MG Nguyen Vinh Nghi

"very intelligent. He replaces MG Nguyen Van Minh... under Minh the 21st Division was one of South Vietnam's finest combat units."

1. "Poor commander in the 21st Division, but excellent staff officer as chief of staff in I CTZ."
2. "Saich Chief of Staff in I CTZ. Super defensive posture--put barbed wire around Bac Lieu. The Division is at top of its old steam--I attribute this to his old's domineering--scars his commander. Overrated."

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RVNAF OFFICER AND NCO SHORTAGE

*Summary.* The RVNAF officer corps is bottom heavy with too many junior officers (lieutenants and aspirants) and too few senior officers (captains through colonels). The persistent shortage of senior officers resulted mostly from the increased demands for officers to fill out the expanding RVNAF force structure; authorized officer spaces increased more rapidly than officer promotions. Compounding this rapid growth in authorizations, the Joint General Staff (JCS) failed to carry out all of their announced 1968 and 1969 promotion objectives and probably will not reach 1970 goals either. The RVNAF need to increase the rate of senior officer promotions to at least one and one half times the 1969 rate to reach 1970 goals. Imbalances in NCO ranks persist but improved in 1969, and 1970 goals may be attained.

Strength. Table 1 shows that the RVNAF officer corps (both Regular and Regional) increased 19% in strength in 1969 ( a net gain of 9362 officers.) Most of this increase resulted from add-ons at the bottom--13,627 aspirants were commissioned last year. Because most of the new officers are aspirants the imbalance in the officer corps structure persists. Junior officers are overstrength (120%) but senior officers have only 62% of their authorized spaces filled. This is an improvement over the end of 1968 when junior officers were 129%, and senior officers 59%, of authorized--against significantly lower authorized strengths.

TABLE 1

RVNAF OFFICER STRENGTH<sup>a/</sup>

RVNAF Officers	31 Dec 1968 Strength			31 Dec 1969 Strength			Net Change		
	Auth	Actual	%	Auth	Actual	%	Auth	Actual	%
Col	466	149	32	647	250	39	181	101	7
LtC	1308	666	51	1907	1016	53	599	350	2
Maj	3823	2362	62	5197	3320	64	1374	958	2
Capt	11390	6781	60	15110	9562	63	3720	2781	3
Subtotal	16987	9958	59	22861	14148	62	5874	4190	3
Lt/Asp	30330	39022	129	36720	44194	120	6390	5172	-9
Tctal	47317	48980	104	59581	58342	98	12264	9362	-6

<sup>a/</sup> Regular and Regional Forces.

NCO strength increased by 17% (a gain of 22,659) in 1969. The 1968 imbalance of too many E-5s and a shortage of E6-E8 improved although shortages in the E7 and E8 ranks continued.

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TABLE 2

RVNAF NCO STRENGTH<sup>a/</sup>

RVNAF NCOs	31 Dec 1968			31 Dec 1969			Net Change		
	Auth	Actual	%	Auth	Actual	%	Auth	Actual	%
E8	5798	3731	64	7929	5564	70	2131	1833	6
E7	13259	11142	84	17811	13032	73	4552	1890	-11
E6	36150	30038	83	45567	47136	103	9417	17098	20
E5	71622	86786	121	90390	88660	98	18768	1874	-23
Total	126829	131697	104	161697	154392	95	34868	22695	-9

a/ Regular and Regional Forces

Promotions. There has been no major renovation in the RVNAF officer promotion system since 1965, but some reform has taken place.<sup>1/</sup> While the Vietnamese have a better promotion system on paper, it has changed little in the way it operates. The promotion system responds more to the politics of the senior generals than to the needs of the professional military service. The result is that it has been unable to respond effectively to requirements for professionalism and to the war itself. For example, the RVNAF has not loosened significantly the educational requirements for commission, nor has it used quotas for battlefield promotions. The steady expansion in the size of the RVNAF has overtaken army politics in the sense that the need for more officers, and hence promotions, has outstripped the capacity of the RVNAF political system to sanction such promotions. Unless the promotion system is regularized and given the autonomy it clearly needs, the increase in RVNAF effectiveness may be limited.

In 1968 the RVNAF JGS established a series of promotion goals designed to achieve 90% of authorized strength in all officer and NCO grades for the combined regular and regional forces by the end of CY 1970 (Table 3). However, the JGS cancelled the December special promotions designed to complete the 1968 portion of the goals because of administrative delays by RVNAF field commanders in submitting prerequisite recommendations. The 1968 promotion shortfall was added to CY 1969 promotion quotas. The fact that National Day (November 1) celebration promotions did not occur in 1969, plus the general failure to meet training and promotion goals established by the RVNAF in 1968, contributed to the failure to meet 1969 goals. In fact, the RVNAF failed last year to reach its 1968 goals for senior officers.

Two new programs that should increase officer strengths in 1970 are the planned input of combat-experienced NCOs as officer candidates and a larger effort to rotate combat unit officers and school instructor officers. Even with these new programs, the continued force structure increases and a lack of eligible and qualified personnel for promotion goals for all grades make it doubtful that the CY 1970 promotion goals will be met.

<sup>1/</sup> See annex for a summary of promotion policies and procedures.

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TABLE 3

RVNAF PROMOTION GOALS.  
(% of Authorized Strength in Grade)

	<u>Goals</u> <u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>End CY 69 Actual</u>	<u>69 Shortfall</u>
Col	40	60	90	39	-21
LTC	60	70	90	53	-17
Maj	65	80	90	64	-16
Capt	70	90	90	63	-27
E8	70	80	90	70	-10
E7	80	85	90	73	-12
E6	80	90	90	103	+13
E5	109	123	100	98	-25

Table 4 shows that, assuming no attrition or increases in authorized officer strength, but allowing for changes in rank through promotion, the JGS made only about half of the officer promotions needed to meet its 1969 goals. NCO's fared better with the minimum promotions needed but still failed to meet their goals in filling authorized spaces for E7 and E8 (as shown in Table 3) presumably due to attrition.

TABLE 4

1969 OFFICER/NCO PROMOTIONS

	<u>Dec 1968</u> <u>Strength</u>	<u>Dec 1969</u> <u>Goal a/</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Promotions</u> <u>Needed b/</u>	<u>1969</u> <u>Promo-</u> <u>tions</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>
Col	149	388	239	239	108	- 131
LTC	666	1,335	669	908	421	- 487
Maj	2,362	4,158	1,796	2,704	1,526	-1,178
Capt	<u>6,781</u>	<u>13,590</u>	<u>6,809</u>	<u>9,513</u>	<u>4,452</u>	<u>-5,061</u>
Total	<u>9,958</u>	<u>19,471</u>	<u>9,513</u>	<u>13,364</u>	<u>6,507</u>	<u>-6,857</u>
E8	3,731	6,343	2,612	2,612	2,694	+ 82
E7	11,142	15,139	3,997	6,609	5,291	-1,318
E6	30,038	41,010	10,972	17,581	26,017	+8,436
E5	<u>86,786</u>	<u>111,180</u>	<u>24,394</u>	<u>41,975</u>	<u>35,128</u>	<u>-6,847</u>
Total	<u>131,697</u>	<u>173,672</u>	<u>41,975</u>	<u>68,777</u>	<u>69,130</u>	<u>+ 353</u>

a/ 1969 objectives (Table 3) multiplied against 1969 authorized TO&E strengths.

b/ Promotions needed are larger than the difference between the 1968 strength and the 1969 goal to account for the additional spaces that must be filled as officers or NCO's are promoted upward. For example, if you fill the 239 Col. spaces by promoting 239 LTC, you now need to promote 908 Majors to LTC to reach your 1969 goal, etc. (669 to meet your goal, plus 239 to replace the LTCs promoted to Col.).

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Table 5 shows the number of promotions needed to reach 1970 goals of 90% fill in all ranks except E5, where 100% fill is required. The RVNIAF needs to increase the rate of senior officer promotions to at least one and a half times the 1969 rate to reach 1970 goals. Casualties, retirements or increases in the authorized strengths would mean an even higher rate of promotions is required. Unless the JCS takes steps to ease promotion policies and increases the rate of promotions, they will fail to attain their 1970 goal for senior officers. They may, however, be able to reach NCO goals.

TABLE 5

CY 1970 PROMOTIONS

	<u>1970 Goal<sup>a/</sup></u>	<u>Promotions Needed<sup>b/</sup></u>
Col	582	332
LTC	1716	1,032
Maj	4677	2,389
Capt	<u>13599</u>	<u>6,426</u>
Total	20574	10,179
E8	7136	1,572
E7	16030	4,570
E6	41010	-1,556
E5	<u>90390</u>	<u>174</u>
Total	154566	4,760

a/ 1970 objectives (see Table 3) multiplied against 1969 authorized TO&E strengths.

b/ Promotions needed are larger than the difference between the 1968 strength and the 1969 goal to account for the additional spaces that must be filled as officers or NCO's are promoted upward. For example, if you fill the 332 Col. spaces by promoting 332 LTCs, you now need to promote 1,032 Majors to LTC to reach your 1969 goal, etc. (700 to meet your goal, plus 332 to replace the LTCs promoted to Col.).

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ANNEX

RVNAF PROMOTION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Types of Grades: There are two types of grades provided for in the directive. These are permanent (for officers and NCOs), and functional (for officers in the grade of first lieutenant and above). The permanent grade is official for pay allowances, retirement, and most significantly, for promotion list seniority. The functional grade, while also official for pay, allowances, and retirement, is not official for promotion list seniority. Promotion list seniority is based solely upon the time in permanent grade. While the RVNAF permanent grade may be compared to the US permanent grade, the RVNAF functional grade should not be compared to the US temporary grade. An RVNAF officer who holds a functional grade may not be promoted directly to the next higher permanent or functional grade. He must first be promoted (converted) to the permanent grade equivalent to his present grade. A permanent captain, for example, may be promoted directly either to permanent major or to functional major. A functional captain, however, may be promoted (or converted) only to the grade of permanent captain.

Types of Promotions: There are two general types of promotions provided for by directive. These are annual and special. Annual promotions are made on the basis of selection lists similar to those used in the US Army promotion system. These selection lists are prepared by promotion boards which meet each year in the fall to consider for promotion all Regular and Regional Forces personnel who meet the basic criteria for promotion (time in grade, etc.). In the preparation of the lists, promotion boards are required to employ an objective point system which takes into account each eligible individual's seniority in service, seniority in grade, present position, seniority in present position, military schooling, civilian schooling, awards and decorations, time of service in combat units, efficiency reports, and disciplinary record. Annual promotions are normally to permanent grades, although they may, depending upon force level requirements, be to functional grades. Special promotions, on the other hand, are made on the basis of individually considered commanders' recommendations. They are normally granted as special battlefield promotions to those individuals who have consistently distinguished themselves on the battlefield or as special non-battlefield promotions to those individuals who have served meritoriously in non-combat positions. These promotions may be to permanent or functional grades according to the services performed and the current grades of the individuals being promoted.

Promotion Criteria: Promotion criteria provided for in the directive vary according to type of promotion and the particular grade involved. The following chart depicts the current time in grade criteria for annual and special non-battlefield promotions to the grades indicated:

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<u>GRADE</u>	<u>ANNUAL</u>	<u>SPECIAL</u> <u>NON-BATTLEFIELD</u>
Col - 1LT	2 yrs	1 yr (6 mo in psn)
2LT - CPL1	2 yrs	6 mo (3 mo in psn)
CPL - PFC	1 yr	6 mo (3 mo in psn)

The times in grade shown are all times in permanent grade. Promotions to private first class, second lieutenant, and first lieutenant are automatic after the times in grade shown for annual promotion. Exceptions are that aspirants who are graduates of the officer training school at Thu Duc are automatically promoted to second lieutenants after 18 months in grade and second lieutenants who are graduates of the Vietnamese Military Academy at Dalat are automatically promoted to first lieutenant after 18 months in grade. Promotions to corporal first class for corporals who have a CCI Certificate and promotions to sergeant first class for sergeants who have graduated from the NCO Training School are also automatic after three years in grade. In addition, first lieutenants who hold the functional grade of captain may be promoted to the permanent grade of captain after 18 months in the permanent grade of first lieutenant, and outstanding second lieutenants may, based upon their commanders' recommendations, be promoted to permanent first lieutenant after only one year. The following chart depicts the current time in grade criteria for special battlefield promotions:

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>SPECIAL</u> <u>BATTLEFIELD</u>
Col - SFC	6 mo (3 mo in psn)
SGT - CPL1	3 mo (6 mo in svc)
CPL - PFC	none

There are no apparent exceptions to these criteria. As indicated, battlefield promotions to corporal and PFC may be made without regard to time in grade, time in position, or time in service.

Promotion Authorities: While recommendations for annual and special promotions are made by promotion boards and unit commanders respectively, the actual promotions are made only by the several promotion authorities. The following chart lists the promotion authorities and grades to which each is empowered to promote:

President	General Officer
Prime Minister	Permanent Colonel
Minister of Defense	Functional Colonel through Permanent Major
Chief, JGS	Functional Major and below

The Chief, JGS has delegated a portion of his promotion authority to subordinate commanders.

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LEADERSHIP AND ARVN COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

*Summary.* The February 1970 Analysis Report presented data which suggested leadership and combat effectiveness were closely related. Further evidence of that association was found through correlation and regression analysis of three ratings from the SEER Quarterly Report - combat effectiveness, leadership, and quality of personnel. Within each division the three ratings usually show similar patterns, but the overall trends and their timing are quite different among the divisions. There is a high correlation between combat effectiveness and the leadership in ARVN infantry, but only a moderate one between combat effectiveness and the quality of ARVN personnel. This indicates improving leadership is more likely to increase combat effectiveness than is improving the quality of personnel. Additional evidence from regression analysis shows that an increase in leadership will yield more than four times the improvement in combat effectiveness that an equivalent increase in quality of personnel would.

In the System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER) there is a quarterly report in which the advisors of battalions and higher units respond to 157 questions on various aspects of the unit, its personnel and its operations. This paper will be concerned with the questions and ratings pertaining to combat effectiveness, leadership and quality of personnel. The ratings are composed of the weighted answers to selected questions.<sup>1/</sup> Appendix A shows the dimensions measured by questions in the combat effectiveness, leadership, and personnel ratings; for example, personnel ratings measure the physical condition of the troops, how eager for combat and loyal they are, how effectively morale incentives are used, and how often pay is delayed.

Tables 1-4 show the combat effectiveness, leadership and personnel ratings for the twelve ARVN divisions and separate regiments during 1968 and the first two quarters of 1969. For most units, the ratings are similar within each division, e.g. the three ratings for the 1st Division peaked during the second and third quarter of 1968 and declined thereafter (see Table 1). However, the ratings of the divisions show different patterns among themselves; they do not fluctuate at the same times. For example, the 2nd Division (Table 1) shows a large decline in the 3rd quarter 1968 and consistent increases thereafter, but the 42nd Regiment shows increases in the 3rd and 4th quarters of 1968 and in the 1st quarter of 1969 but very large rating drops in the second quarter of 1969 (see Table 2).

<sup>1/</sup> These ratings are calculated by adding the weighted responses to selected questions and dividing that sum by the total possible score. For example, if on seven questions the highest possible score is 35 (5 points is the highest on each of the seven questions) and the advisor gives the unit five 4's and two 3's, a total of 26, the units rating would be  $26 \div 35$  or .743.

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TABLE 1

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, LEADERSHIP, AND PERSONNEL  
RATINGS FOR UNITS IN I CTZ

<u>Units</u>	<u>1968</u>				<u>1969</u>	
	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>
1st Comb Eff	70.9	88.0	90.9	83.6	83.6	82.2
Leadership	72.9	89.6	88.2	82.3	83.1	81.9
Personnel	77.7	88.8	91.9	86.8	88.2	87.6
23rd Comb Eff	66.4	71.4	59.0	66.7	74.4	86.8
Leadership	64.5	70.6	59.0	66.5	77.2	86.0
Personnel	77.6	78.4	70.5	74.8	78.2	82.3
51st Comb Eff	86.0	77.8	90.6	86.4	92.1	87.1
Leadership	77.2	71.0	87.6	84.7	84.9	85.1
Personnel	85.7	90.8	92.0	80.4	77.9	82.1

Source: SEER Quarterly Reports for 1968 and the first two quarters of 1969.

TABLE 2

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, LEADERSHIP, AND PERSONNEL  
RATINGS FOR UNITS IN II CTZ

<u>Units</u>	<u>1968</u>				<u>1969</u>	
	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>
22nd Comb Eff	70.8	71.5	74.7	78.2	74.9	73.5
Leadership	72.0	72.0	75.3	80.3	76.1	76.6
Personnel	80.0	82.7	81.0	80.9	82.2	81.5
23rd Comb Eff	72.1	64.8	72.9	72.5	66.9	72.0
Leadership	75.4	69.8	74.3	72.6	71.5	77.3
Personnel	80.4	73.4	81.9	79.4	80.2	83.8
42nd Comb Eff	80.0	73.5	76.7	81.9	89.2	67.6
Leadership	80.6	78.8	76.6	79.7	83.2	72.0
Personnel	83.0	79.1	82.9	83.6	85.1	67.5

Source: SEER Quarterly Reports for 1968 and the first two quarters of 1969.

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TABLE 3

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, LEADERSHIP, AND PERSONNEL  
RATINGS FOR UNITS IN III CTZ

Units	1968				1969	
	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>
5th Comb Eff	73.2	73.4	64.2	71.5	70.6	74.1
Leadership	71.0	74.0	68.8	70.5	71.7	76.3
Personnel	74.9	79.1	76.2	78.0	80.7	82.6
18th Comb Eff	76.3	79.8	68.8	66.0	61.0	65.6
Leadership	76.5	80.4	68.6	68.4	64.7	68.8
Personnel	78.1	84.0	77.1	71.7	71.3	71.8
25th Comb Eff	71.5	76.9	73.5	72.4	71.5	80.7
Leadership	74.2	81.0	74.3	74.7	69.5	79.5
Personnel	74.5	80.8	81.3	83.9	86.7	87.8

Source: SEER Quarterly Reports for 1968 and the first two quarters of 1969.

TABLE 4

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, LEADERSHIP, AND PERSONNEL  
RATINGS FOR UNITS IN IV C.

Units	1968				1969	
	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>
7th Comb Eff	70.3	71.6	81.8	78.5	72.5	68.5
Leadership	71.8	71.0	80.5	81.6	75.3	76.0
Personnel	82.3	84.3	90.0	89.8	85.7	81.4
9th Comb Eff	67.6	57.6	74.9	71.6	66.8	60.7
Leadership	69.6	63.2	74.5	68.2	68.5	65.9
Personnel	78.6	82.2	82.5	79.3	75.4	74.4
21st Comb Eff	79.7	74.0	75.3	84.4	80.6	75.4
Leadership	74.3	77.1	79.3	82.6	80.7	77.0
Personnel	82.7	80.3	80.8	87.9	82.4	89.9

Source: SEER Quarterly Reports for 1968 and the first two quarters of 1969.

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Correlations calculated for the SEER ratings of combat effectiveness, leadership, and personnel show a high association between combat effectiveness and leadership ( $r^2 = .842$ ) but only a moderate association between combat effectiveness and quality of personnel ( $r^2 = .500$ ). The substantial difference in the two correlations suggests that there is no "halo effect" in the data. That is, advisors do not rate all aspects of a unit's performance the same because of a general impression of unit performance, rather they seem to judge each characteristic of the unit independently. A close examination of Appendix A indicates that the questions for combat effectiveness and those for leadership are quite different and therefore it is probably safe to assume these ratings tap different factors.

Table 5 shows the moderate relationship between the data on quality of leadership and quality of personnel ( $r^2 = .436$ ). Moreover, Table 5 shows that the multiple correlation predicting combat effectiveness ratings from both leadership and personnel ratings is not much larger than that for leadership alone (the multiple  $R^2 = .859$  and is only slightly larger than the .842 correlation between combat effectiveness and leadership). This means that combat effectiveness can be predicted nearly as accurately using leadership ratings alone as by using both leadership and personnel ratings. This implies that if one were to improve combat effectiveness in ARVN infantry and had only limited resources, it would prove more effective and efficient to concentrate on improving leadership rather than personnel.

TABLE 5

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS ( $R^2$ ) BETWEEN SEER  
COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, LEADERSHIP, AND  
PERSONNEL RATINGS

	<u>Comb Effect Vs. Leader</u>	<u>Comb Effect Vs. Pers</u>	<u>Comb Effect Vs. Lead. &amp; Pers</u>	<u>Leadership Vs. Pers</u>
For all twelve divisions	.842	.500	.859	.436
For the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 18th, 25th, 21st divi- sions and 42nd Regt	.890	.719	.922	.608
For the 22nd, 23rd, 7th, and 9th divisions and 51st Regt	.783	.266*	.798	.213

\* Statistical significance:  $p < .01$  - all other  $r^2$  are significant at  $p < .001$ .  
Source: SEER Quarterly Reports for 1968 and first two quarters of 1969.

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Regression analysis of combat effectiveness, leadership and personnel ratings for the twelve major ARVN divisions and separate regiments also indicates that leadership has stronger influence over combat effectiveness than does quality of personnel. The regression equation presented in Appendix B indicates that an increase in leadership will yield more than four times the improvement in combat effectiveness that an equivalent increase in the quality of personnel would.

Additional correlational analysis presented in Table 5 shows the relationships found between combat effectiveness, leadership and personnel are not consistent among the divisions. For some units the relationships are stronger (these units are 1st, 2nd, 5th, 18th, 25th, and 21st Divisions and 41st Regiment). The remaining units (51st Regt., 22nd, 23rd, 7th, and 9th Divisions) had lower correlations. Table 6 shows that for the time period covered (1 Qtr 68 to 2nd Qtr 69), the divisions in the group with the highest correlations are not those with the highest, lowest, or extreme ratings; rather, they rank at all levels in both combat effectiveness and leadership ratings.

TABLE 6

RANKINGS OF MAJOR ARVN UNITS ON COMBAT  
EFFECTIVENESS AND LEADERSHIP RATINGS a/b/

<u>Divisions/Regiments</u>	<u>Combat Effect.</u>	<u>Rank Order</u>	<u>Leadership</u>	<u>Divisions/Regiments</u>
51st	86.7	1	83.0	1st *
*1st	83.2	2	81.8	51st
*1,2nd	78.2	3	78.5	42nd*
*21st	78.2	4	78.5	21st*
*25th	74.4	5	76.0	7th
7th	73.9	6	75.5	25th*
22nd	73.9	7	75.4	22nd
*5th	71.1	8	73.5	23rd
23rd	70.2	9	72.1	5th *
*2nd	70.8	10	71.2	18th*
*18th	69.6	11	70.6	2nd *
9th	68.2	12	69.2	9th

a/ Note: Asterisks indicate divisions in the group with the highest correlation between leadership and combat effectiveness ratings.

b/ Source: SEER-AMTEA Quarterly Reports for 1968 and the first two quarters of 1969.

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## APPENDIX A

Combat Effectiveness includes:

1. How aggressive is the unit?
2. How well does it perform offensive operations by both US and VN standards?
3. How well does it perform defensive and psywar operations and conduct ambushes?
4. How well does it utilize crew-served weapons and armor?
5. How well does it collect and use intelligence?
6. How quickly does the unit react or take action?
7. How adequate are the unit's efforts at pacification?
8. How effective is the unit's staff?

Leadership Ratings include:

1. Is the unit's commander overly concerned about taking casualties; does he rely excessively on air or artillery support; does he try to avoid enemy forces?
2. How effective is the commander in heavy combat?
3. Does the commander take the initiative?
4. How good are the commander's relations with his men and superiors?
5. How strong is the company level officer and NCO leadership?
6. Are the troops eager for combat, loyal, responsive to commands, and respectful of the rights and property of the populace?
7. How effectively are morale incentives used?

Personnel Ratings include:

1. Does poor physical condition of the troops affect the units operations or its strength?
2. How eager for combat and loyal are the troops?
3. How effectively are morale incentives used?
4. How often is pay delayed?

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## APPENDIX B

The regression equation arrived at by analysis of the ratings takes the form:

$$\text{Combat Effectiveness} = .7996 (\text{Leadership}) + .1780 (\text{Personnel})^{1/}$$

Verbally, this equation can be stated as: the combat effectiveness rating of a unit equals .7996 times the leadership rating plus .1780 times the personnel rating. The coefficients .7996 and .1780 are called Beta-weights. In a regression equation, Beta-weights are useful in deciding which of two or more variables has the strongest influence over the dependent variable, the larger the Beta-weight, the greater the influence.

The above equation shows that leadership has a much stronger influence over combat effectiveness than does quality of personnel. A one point increase in leadership will increase combat effectiveness .7996 points while a one point increase in personnel will increase combat effectiveness only .1780 points (22% of leadership). In other words, an increase in leadership will yield more than four times the improvement in combat effectiveness that an equivalent increase in quality of personnel would.

<sup>1/</sup> The equation will, of course, not yield the precise value for combat effectiveness, but the error will usually be very small. For example, the equation yields a combat effectiveness rating of 74.7 for the 25th Division in 4th Qtr 1968, while the true rating is 72.4; the equation gives a combat effectiveness rating of 81.1 for the 1st Division in 2nd Qtr 1969 while the true rating is 82.2 (refer to Tables 1 and 3 for the true values).

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RVNAF LEADERSHIP

Summary. A recent MACV study supports earlier findings that leadership is the most important factor in combat effectiveness. Despite the importance of leadership, battalion commanders usually do not have the rank for the job they hold. In addition, little progress was made in increasing the number of battalion commanders holding the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1969.

Previous studies<sup>1/</sup> indicated that poor ARVN division commanders adversely affect the performance of several ARVN divisions in South Vietnam and that improvement in the overall quality of leadership in combat units would yield more than four times the improvement in combat effectiveness that an equivalent increase in quality of personnel would. Other evidence indicates serious shortages and imbalances exist in the RVNAF officer and NCO ranks. As a result of this situation, and a preference for promoting noncombat leaders, 60% of the battalions in ARVN divisions and about 40% of all ARVN/VNMC battalions are commanded by captains instead of lieutenant colonels.

A recent MACV study<sup>2/</sup> supports these findings. It states that ARVN has some truly outstanding leaders, but is often hesitant to replace poor performers, partially due to the limited depth and unknown quality of potential replacements. The problem is complicated by the lack of a regular rotation policy which leaves many officers in command slots for long periods. This in turn tends to lead to caution and complacency.

The MACV study rates each battalion commander as above average, average or below average and provides brief comments on each one. The results are shown in Table 1. More than half the battalion commanders were rated above average; 27% were average and 14% below average, while 5% were not rated due to recent assignment to command. In general these assessments correlate with ratings provided by the advisors on each unit through SEER. (However, of the 100 battalion commanders evaluated above average, 13 had units which received below average combat effectiveness and leadership ratings in SEER.)

1/ SEA Analysis Report, February, 1970, p. 29 and March, 1970, p. 21.  
2/ Assessment of ARVN/VNMC Organizations, February 10, 1970.

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TABLE 1

ADVISOR ASSESSMENT OF BATTALION  
COMMANDER LEADERSHIP - 4Q 1969

	Above Avg		AVG		Below Avg		Unevaluated	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Inf Divisions	72	( 54)	36	(27)	19	(14)	6	( 5)
Airborne	5	( 56)	2	(22)	2	(22)	0	( 0)
Cavalry	8	( 47)	5	(29)	2	(12)	2	(12)
Ranger	9	( 45)	7	(35)	2	(10)	2	(10)
Marine	6	(100)	0	( 0)	0	( 0)	0	( 0)
Total	100	( 54)	50	(27)	25	(14)	10	( 5)

Examples from the advisors' comments indicate that the regimental commander's leadership can significantly influence the leadership and performance of his subordinate commanders. The commander of the 4th Regt (2nd ARVN Division) has "one of the finest ARVN units;" two of his four battalions have newly assigned commanders and two are rated "consistently excellent" and "among the finest units of the division." Another regimental commander (6th) in the same division is rated average. Only one of his battalion commanders has a high rating. Two were "handicapped by inadequate guidance from higher headquarters" and one was not rated.

If a regimental commander takes measures to stimulate morale, his battalion commanders usually follow his example. In the 23rd Division one regimental commander is below average and does not consider his troops. Of his four battalion commanders, three neglect their men, resulting in poor to fair morale. Another 23rd Division regimental commander attends to the needs of his men and is rated above average. All four of his battalion commanders reportedly care for their men, producing good to excellent morale.

Table 2 indicates that little progress was made in increasing the number of battalion commanders holding the rank of lieutenant colonel, the authorized rank for the job. Infantry divisions fare worse than other types of combat units; about 60% of their battalion commanders were captains in January (no change from first quarter 1969) and only 3 of their battalions were commanded by Lieutenant Colonels. In contrast, only 9% of the battalion commanders in the other combat units (airborne, cavalry, marines, rangers) were captains, down from 19% in first quarter 1969. The data indicate the promotion system has not been responsive to the needs of the combat units, particularly those in the infantry divisions.

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TABLE 2  
RANKS OF BATTALION COMMANDERS  
 (End of Quarter)

	<u>1969</u>				<u>1970</u>
	<u>1Qtr</u>	<u>2Qtr</u>	<u>3Qtr</u>	<u>4Qtr</u>	<u>Jan</u>
<u>Infantry Div Bn COs</u>					
Col	0	0	0	0	0
LTC	4	2	3	1	3
Maj	49	57	52	51	50
Capt	78	73	78	80	81
Lt	0	0	0	1	0
Total	<u>131</u>	<u>132</u>	<u>133</u>	<u>133</u>	<u>134</u>
<u>Other Bn COs</u>					
Col	1	1	0	0	0
LTC	21	19	24	28	28
Maj	46	58	59	58	63
Capt	16	11	12	11	9
Lt	0	1	0	0	0
Total	<u>84</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>100</u>
<u>Total Bn COs</u>					
Col	1	1	0	0	0
LTC	25	21	27	29	31
Maj	95	115	111	109	113
Capt	94	84	90	91	90
Lt	0	1	0	1	0
Total	<u>215</u>	<u>222</u>	<u>228</u>	<u>230</u>	<u>234</u>

Source: SEER.

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IMPACT OF A CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP: THE ARVN 7TH DIVISION

Summary. The installation of a new 7th ARVN Division commander in January 1970 significantly improved the operational performance of the Division, and led to 13-17% A-B and A-B-C population gains during the first half of 1970 in its Division Tactical Area (DTA). The new commander, Col. Nam, immediately changed one (later two) of his three regimental commanders, and ordered all three to move out from their base camps and operate in areas where the enemy is located. With its new commander the Division achieved its highest number of enemy killed (190 per month) and its highest kill ratio (3.5 to 1) since the Tet and May offensives of 1968.

As a result, the Division has seized the initiative from the same enemy forces which clearly dominated the area in late 1969 after the US 9th Division departed. Hamlet Evaluation System (HES/70) data shows that company size and larger VC main and local forces in populated areas are steadily being reduced. Population rated A-B reached 65% in June, up 17% from December.

Under its conservative former commander the 7th Division's performance had deteriorated significantly in late 1969. Its operational effectiveness was rated second worst among the 10 ARVN divisions. Besides poor leadership, one reason for the deterioration was that the US 9th Division left the DTA before it could train the 7th Division for combat responsibility under MACV's new Vietnamization plans.

Col. Nam has not only achieved outstanding results with a below average division, but is working hard to correct many of the problem areas which still affect his units. The success of the 7th Division under Col. Nam's leadership clearly indicates that replacing a poor commander with a good one is the best way to achieve a better ARVN division.

Background

The 7th ARVN Division is responsible for the Tien Giang Division Tactical Area (DTA) in northern IV Military Region (MR), consisting of Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, and Kien Hoa provinces. Kien Hoa has been a traditional VC stronghold since the 1940's: it provided secure base areas and VC manpower for a concerted expansion of VC dominance into neighboring areas from 1960-1968, including the rich, keystone province of Dinh Tuong. The enemy's effort culminated in the Tet offensive of early 1968.

It became apparent that the enemy threat in the DTA was too much for the 7th Division and local RF/PF forces to handle alone. The 7th Division has historically been weak and considered below average in combat effectiveness by US advisors. To reverse the pattern of VC success in the DTA, the US 9th Division developed and applied a variety of air-mobile tactics which were extremely successful in defeating enemy main force units on the battlefield.

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### Problems in 1969

As was common in other areas of the country before the Vietnamization program began in mid-1969, the task of improving RVNAF effectiveness was left almost entirely in the hands of advisors. There was little growth in the 7th Division's capability to participate in the kind of main force conflict US forces were fighting, much less assume the entire responsibility. In the first half of 1969, only 1% of the Division's battalion days were spent on joint operations with the US 9th Division; most of the Division's time was spent in RF-like defensive missions, such as providing security for populated areas. Meanwhile, the ARVN 9th and 21st Divisions, facing similar threats but without US combat force assistance, continued to develop and generally performed well throughout 1969.

In June 1969 the US began withdrawing forces from South Vietnam under the Vietnamization program, with the 9th Division among the first units to leave. By end-August 1969, all US ground combat forces had left the DTA, leaving the ARVN 7th Division and the RF/FF to do all the fighting there. The results were nearly disastrous:

-- Just before US forces left, the enemy began sending reinforcements to the DTA, including one NVA regiment (the 88th) and fillers for some VC battalions. This move was designed to strengthen two of the enemy's remaining areas of control in the Delta (Base Areas 470 and 490), in accordance with COSVN's Resolution 9, issued late in 1969.

-- The 7th Division's performance dropped to new lows, even below that of RF forces in the DTA. At one point in the 4th quarter an entire battalion of the 11th Regiment was badly mauled by a VC main force battalion.

US advisors attributed many of the Division's problems to poor leadership. The commander, Brigadier General Hoang, was known for his conservatism, and his subordinates seemed to lack initiative. US advisors rated the 7th Division seventh in leadership and ninth in operational effectiveness among the ten ARVN divisions in the 4th quarter of 1969.

### Changes in 1970

Both US and GVN officials recognized in late 1969 that the 7th Division's deteriorating performance was inadequate to meet the enemy threat in its DTA. Accordingly, President Thieu appointed a new division commander.

(1) Change in Commander: In January 1970 Col. Nguyen Khoa Nam, the dynamic and aggressive commander of the 3rd Airborne Brigade, assumed command of the 7th Division. At the time, Col. Nam's advisors indicated that he had "outstanding leadership ability" and judgment, and that "his services are sought all over Vietnam; he has excelled in all areas."

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(2) Other Changes: No other major changes were felt necessary. The number of maneuver battalions attached to the 7th Division from other organizations (Vietnamese Marines, Rangers, or ARVN 9th Division) remained about the same as in the fourth quarter 1969 (3-4 battalions). Overall combat support decreased or remained below average: Table 1 shows that tactical air support and helicopter airlift sorties decreased in 1970, and helicopter gunship sorties and artillery rounds increased but remained below the countrywide average for ARVN/VNMC battalions.

TABLE 1

SUPPORT TO THE ARVN 7TH DIVISION

<u>Rates per Bn per Mo.</u>	<u>7th Division</u>			<u>RVN-Wide</u>		
	<u>1969</u>		<u>1970</u>	<u>1969</u>		<u>1970</u>
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>1st</u>
	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>	<u>Half</u>
Tactical Air Sorties	3.1	1.6	.6	4.2	2.8	6.2
Helicopter Gunship Sorties	9	11	15	6	10	17
Helicopter Airlift Sorties	68	169	130	36	62	88
Artillery Rounds	367	577	922	711	677	985

Effects of Changes

The arrival of Col. Nam had two immediate, positive effects on the 7th Division's performance: The Division's tempo of operations picked up, and its motivation and leadership improved. As a result, the Division's operational results reached two-year highs, and pacification in the DTA advanced.

(1) Tempo of Operations. Soon after his arrival, Col. Nam ordered the Division to stop performing some of its RF-like missions, abandon its "9 to 5" pattern of daily operations, and move its base of operations out from populated areas such as My Tho and Ben Tre cities into the field. The data in Table 2 shows the dramatic results:

--First, offensive combat operations increased to 58% of the Division's effort, up from 29-38% during the US 9th Division's tenure in the area, and 45% in the second half of 1969. The Division achieved this by passing some of its pacification and static security missions to RF and PF. The offensive missions of the RF, still far above the countrywide average, are gradually being reduced and limited to protection of population in the Secure and Consolidation Zones under the MACV-JGS Area Security Concept.

-- Second, the large operations became fewer but lasted longer. The battalions increased the average number of days they spent in the field on each large unit operation to 5 in 1970, up from 1.3-1.6 in 1968-1969. Small unit operations

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(or at least reporting of them) were virtually eliminated (down 87%) in 1970, probably because they were considered inappropriate at this stage of the main force conflict in the DTA.

TABLE 2

RVNAF MISSION ASSIGNMENTS AND OPERATIONS a/

	7th Division Area			RVN		
	<u>1969</u>		<u>1970</u>	<u>1969</u>		<u>1970</u>
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half
<u>Mission Assignments</u> (% of Bn Days and Units)						
<u>Division Battalions: b/</u>						
Combat	38	45	58	47	47	59
Security-Pacification	50	35	22	45	39	29
RF Rifle Cos:						
Offensive	36	35	33	20	19	20
<u>Operations b/</u> (Per Bn. Per Month)						
Large Unit Operations (LUO) <sup>a/</sup>	14.7	14.8	4.7	9.1	8.0	4.1
Small Unit Operations	42.4	5.7	.7	51.3	45.1	42.5
Days on LUO	21.8	23.5	23.3	21.7	20.1	19.3
Days per LUO	1.5	1.6	5.0	2.4	2.5	4.7

a/ Source: MACV-J3 SEER/AMFES computer files for ARVN infantry battalion data. MACV-CORDS TPES computer files for RF data.

b/ For ARVN infantry battalions only. For 7th Division, organic battalions only.

(2) Motivation and Leadership. Col. Nam appears to be commanding the respect and admiration of US and GVN officers who work with and for him. Reports indicate he is delegating authority to his regimental commanders, who in turn are encouraged to follow the same pattern in directing their battalion commanders.

-- One of Col. Nam's first acts as commander was to relieve the commander of the 12th Regiment, and replace him with a newly-promoted ARVN lieutenant colonel with a good record as commander of a ranger unit in I CTZ. In May, Col. Nam replaced the weak commander of the 11th Regiment. US advisors report that the 10th Regiment commander has turned out to be a "real gem" when delegated increased authority under Col. Nam, and that all three commanders are now competing in a useful way.

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-- The Dinh Tuong province chief stated that the 7th Division has improved under Col. Nam. He said the division is now pursuing the enemy, conducting night operations, remaining in the field a good part of the time, and delegating authority for assigned areas to the province chiefs.

-- At the battalion commander level, two replacements had taken place by May 31. For the most part, it appears some effort is being made to see whether command changes at higher levels will produce changes in the motivation and performance of the battalion commanders. One US advisor believes that 40-50% of the battalion commanders are now at acceptable levels, and most of the others can reach those levels.

(3) Operational Results: As a result of its increased tempo of operations and motivation in 1970, the 7th Division achieved its best operational results in two years:

-- In the first half of 1970, the 7th Division achieved its highest number of enemy killed (190 per month) and its highest kill ratio (3.5 to 1) since the Tet and May offensives of 1968. Table 3 shows that both indicators had fallen to lows (128 enemy killed, and 2.1 to 1 kill ratio) in the last half of 1969.

-- For the first time since 1968 the Division killed about as many enemy and achieved a better kill ratio than did RF in the DTA. In the dismal second half of 1969, the Division killed only 128 enemy a month, 42% lower than the RF's 222, and barely above the PF's 111. At its low point, the Division's kill ratio was only about 2 to 1 (2.1).

TABLE 3

OPERATIONAL RESULTS a/

	7th Division			RVN-Wide		
	1969		1970	1969		1970
	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half	1st Half	2nd Half	1st Half
<b>Results (Monthly Average)</b>	<u>143</u>	<u>128</u>	<u>190</u>	<u>1880</u>	<u>1606</u>	<u>2602</u>
<b>Enemy KIA:</b>						
Division Battalions b/	143	128	190	1880	1606	2602
RF	201	222	198	1910	1924	1948
PF	142	111	123	1305	1066	1118
<b>Enemy KIA per 1000 Str:</b>						
Division Battalions	21.7	21.0	31.7	25.6	22.6	35.9
RF	19.1	16.9	13.8	13.5	12.0	11.8
PF	8.9	5.9	5.7	8.1	6.0	5.6
<b>Enemy/Friendly KIA Ratio:</b>						
Division Battalions	2.7	2.1	3.5	3.7	4.4	5.9
RF	4.0	2.7	2.4	4.4	3.8	3.6
PF	2.6	2.4	1.5	3.4	3.3	2.3

a/ Source: MACV-J3 SEER computer files for ARVN infantry battalion data.  
MACV-CORDS TFES computer files for RF/PF data.

b/ ARVN infantry battalions only. For 7th Division, organic battalions only.

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(4) DTA-wide Effects: In 1970 the 7th Division seems to have taken the initiative against the same enemy forces which clearly dominated its area in the second half of 1969. In addition, it has prevented further inroads into populated areas and provided the necessary security for significant pacification gains, despite a shift of enemy emphasis to terror instead of actions against military targets.

-- The HES/70 shows that A-B, A-B-C, and rural GVN-controlled population all increased 9-17% in the DTA in the first half of 1970, compared to a 3-8% increase countrywide. Table 4 shows that on June 30, 1970, 65% of the DTA population was rated A-B (security ratings), compared to 48% in December 1969; 45% of the rural population was GVN controlled, compared to 36% six months before. The 1970 increase is also significant because the emphasis being placed on pacification was low compared to that during the all-out Accelerated Pacification Campaign in late 1969.

-- The operational success of the 7th Division has not yet reduced the overall enemy threat to the DTA, consisting of 2,000-3,000 men organized into 2 main force regiments, 13 main and local force battalions, and numerous smaller units. Their influence is gradually being limited, however, and HES/70 shows that company-size and larger VC/NVA main and local forces in populated areas are steadily being reduced. On June 30 they affected only 46% of the population in the DTA, compared to 66% last December.

-- Overall pacification gains in the DTA in the first half of 1970 have been impressive, but terrorist incidents are at record high levels. However, the Province Senior Advisor of Kien Hoa, where most of the terrorist increases occurred, stated that in June the reaction of the civilian population to armed incursions by the enemy into populated areas is encouraging:

"It is clear that the enemy is fast losing what little voluntary popular support he may once have had, and that his sole recourse is to open military conquest; which he cannot achieve, and terrorism, which is much more difficult for him to carry out than in years past."

#### Problem Areas

The evidence clearly indicates that Col. Nam has "turned the division around" and made it much more effective, though still below average. His remaining problems are those common to most other ARVN divisions as well. US advisors now feel the 7th Division is in a good position under its new leadership to do something about the problems during the coming months.

-- The desertion rate for the 7th Division remains high at 35-36 per 1000 per month. This is slightly above the average for ARVN/VNMC combat units (33 per 1000 per month), and probably reflects general conditions such as economic problems, poor dependent housing, and poor administrative practices. One result of high personnel turnover is the declining strengths assigned to 7th Division

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TABLE 4  
GENERAL OUTPUT MEASURES  
(Monthly Average)

	1968	1969 1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1970 1Q	2Q
<b>Chieu Hoi</b>							
7th ARVN DTA	246	378	411	471	233	179	276
RVN	1476	3309	2379	4425	4162	2565	2842
<b>HES Security Scores<sup>a/</sup></b> (End of Period Shown)							
<b>ABC Population (%)</b>							
7th ARVN DTA	(56)	(68)	(74)	(79)70	(83)71	79	84
RVN	(76)	(81)	(86)	(91)81	(93)87	89	90
<b>AB Population (%)</b>							
7th ARVN DTA	(31)	(32)	(34)	(46)48	(52)48	56	65
RVN	(48)	(51)	(56)	(68)62	(71)68	74	75
<b>GVN Control (% of Rural Population)<sup>b/</sup></b>							
7th ARVN DTA	(24)	(28)	(31)	(40)35	(53)36	41	45
RVN	(27)	(32)	(39)	(54)47	(62)48	52	56
<b>Enemy Activity<sup>c/</sup></b>							
<b>Total Attacks</b>							
7th ARVN DTA	23	24	16	15	20	13	15
RVN	326	315	420	253	298	230	461
<b>Terror Incidents<sup>d/</sup></b>							
7th ARVN DTA	33	35	32	38	36	30	68
RVN	508	547	523	435	381	440	785

a/ Old Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) data in parentheses; revised HES/70 data starts 3rd Qtr 1969.

b/ Developed by Vietnam Special Studies Group.

c/ Includes ambushes, assaults, and indirect fire attacks (attacks by fire).

d/ Assassinations, abductions, woundings only.

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battalions in 1970 (504 per battalion) compared to 1969 (511-550).

-- As of March 31 (latest data available), US battalion advisors and their superior officers rated 3 of the Division's 12 battalions as "unaggressive" -- i.e. the unit fights aggressively while in contact with the enemy only 50% or less of the time (Table 5). Five battalions had poor leadership ratings for their company grade officers and for NCO's, and all 12 battalions were receiving untimely intelligence from higher headquarters over half the time. Hopefully, the report for June 30 will show improvement in these areas.

TABLE 5  
7TH DIVISION BATTALION PROBLEM AREAS

SEER QSN. No.	Problem Area	Number of Battalions	
		1969 4th Qtr	1970 1st Qtr
3	Unit does not fight aggressively while in contact a/	3	3
15	Reinforcements slow or too small when in contact a/	6	5
24	Commander fails to take decisive actions a/	3	2
27	Leadership of company grade officers is poor	6	5
30	Leadership of NCO's is poor	5	5
31	Intelligence collection is poor	4	1
32	Untimely intelligence from higher headquarters a/	12	12
34	Security leaks are forewarning enemy a/	8	3
42	Poor actions to cope with desertions	2	2
43	Poor quality of dependent housing	8	9
44	Inadequate quantity of dependent housing	7	11
92	Inadequate spare parts available	1	0
	(Total Battalions)	(12)	(12)

a/ 50% or more of time.

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