THE FOREIGN AREA OFFICER PROGRAM
VOLUME I. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY ADVISOR

HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH, INCORPORATED

PREPARED FOR
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

MAY 1973
THE FOREIGN AREA OFFICER PROGRAM

VOLUME I: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY ADVISOR
FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT
May 1973
HSR-RR-73/1-My

THE FOREIGN AREA OFFICER PROGRAM

VOLUME I: THE ROLE OF THE
MILITARY ADVISOR

Herbert H. Vreeland, 3rd

Research and Writing Completed
31 January 1973

Submitted to:
DAMO-1AO-A
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20310

Submitted by:
Human Sciences Research, Inc.
Westgate Research Park
7710 Old Springhouse Road
McLean, Virginia 22101

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited
FOREWORD

This Final Technical Report covers Task I of three tasks to be completed under the terms of a research project entitled "An Inventory of Documented Knowledge of the Military Advisor Role and the FAS and MAO Programs," Contract No. DAHC 19-73-C-0005. The stated objective of the task is:

To identify the relevant documentation, survey and evaluate it, and draw from it a comprehensive and coherent inventory of our current state of knowledge, and lack of knowledge, of the military advisor role.

As treated here, the military advisor role covers a broad range of assignments and duties, some of which are military in nature while others may relate more to civil-military operations or to institutional programs carried out in assisted nations under joint U. S. civilian and military auspices.

Military advisor assignments are of special interest to the Foreign Area Officer Program (FAOP) because of the overlap between such assignments and MAAG duty positions which have been validated for members of the FAOP. Further, the selection and training requirements for advisors and foreign area officers appear now to be very similar and the future development of advisory missions, staffs and roles in the MAAGS can be expected to have a major influence on the shaping of FAOP policy, plans and training in the near future.

The task was originally intended to be accomplished in two stages, the first covering research and other documents of a more comprehensive and synthetic nature, and the second covering archival materials with a narrower but more detailed and specialized focus. Limitations of time and a reordering of task priorities restricted this study to the first stage. Hence this report is based on a survey of the most readily available
documentation and an abstracting of the most relevant sources. We did not attempt to survey the collections of student papers and theses at Ft. Leavenworth and Carlisle Barracks, or archives of official reports from the field. Classified sources to the level of confidential have been reviewed, but no classified material has been used in the text of this report.

The baseline for this study is a previous study of the same general nature, authored by Walter G. Hermes, of the Office of the Chief of Military History, DA, in 1965 and entitled "Survey of the Development of the Role of the U. S. Army Military Advisor." Using this as a point of departure, we have tried to further develop a picture of the role of the military advisor, but with more attention to sorting out the different sets of variables which impinge on this role, to interpreting recent advisory experiences in this light, and to noting specific trends and considerations for the future.

All of the sources used here are recent and none is older than 1965, the year the Hermes report was published. Probably the most significant change in the research picture since 1965 is the emphasis placed on surveys of advisory experience, with a strong bias, however, toward Vietnam, Thailand, The Republic of China and Korea. At this writing the Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO) is in the midst of a much more extensive survey of advisor experience, which should provide a more balanced view of the advisor role world-wide than we have been able to present here.

The report is divided in three parts. The first two deal respectively with the Vietnam experience, and worldwide experience exclusive of Vietnam. The principal reason for this division is the uniqueness of the Vietnam advisory experience and the difficulty of relating it, piece by piece, to experience elsewhere. However, many issues of general import,
highlighted by the Vietnam experience, will not be resolved by the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam.

Accordingly, the first two sections of the report have been organized so as to bring these issues to the fore. These sections are structured in almost parallel format to permit ready cross-reference of the topical discussions, and the topical outlines in both cases proceed from the organizational to the individual aspects of the advisory role. This is done to emphasize what we believe to be the most neglected aspect—i.e., the overall institutional context of advisory duties, activities and performance.

The third part of the report presents conclusions and recommendations. Many of these relate to data requirements needed in the further definition of advisory functions and roles and the planning and programming of advisor selection, training and utilization. HSR is at present engaged in developing a feedback system for the new Foreign Area Officer Program and it is anticipated that many of these data requirements will be addressed in the design of the feedback instruments for this system.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**FOREWORD** ................................................. iii

**I. THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE** .......................... 1

- Advisory Functions and Structures .................. 3
- Advisor Staff Management .............................. 6
  - Replacement System ............................... 6
  - Internal Communications and Control .............. 7
  - The Advisor-Counterpart Interface ................. 8
- Advisor Personnel Management ....................... 11
  - Selection .......................................... 11
  - Training ........................................... 12
  - Special Programs .................................. 15

**II. GENERAL EXPERIENCE** ............................... 17

- MAAG Functions and Operations ....................... 20
  - Administration of MAP ............................ 20
  - Institutional Development ........................ 22
- Advisory Functions .................................... 25
  - Military Unit Advisor .............................. 25
  - Governmental Advisors .............................. 26
  - Training Advisors ................................. 27
  - Resources Management Advisors .................. 29
  - Intelligence Advisors .............................. 29
  - Civil-Military Operations Advisors ............... 30
- Some General Characteristics of the Advisory Role 32
- Advisory Structures ................................... 34
- Advisor Staff Management ............................ 37
  - Monitoring and Evaluating Advisor Performance 37
  - The Advisor-Counterpart Interface ................. 40
- Advisor Personnel Management ....................... 42
  - Selection .......................................... 42
  - Training ........................................... 45
  - Special Programs .................................. 49
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................... 51

Conclusions .................................................. 53
   The Vietnam Experience .................................... 53
   General Experience ......................................... 54
   Recommendations ........................................... 59

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................. 61
I. THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE
I. THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE

The Vietnam experience drew upon the full range of U. S. Army advisory functions and skills, and in so doing raised many questions about how such capabilities should be recruited, organized and deployed in the post-Vietnam world of U. S. international security assistance.

Critical aspects of this experience were that the conflict involved the entire society of South Vietnam, everywhere and at all levels, that it was simultaneously a struggle for land and for loyalty, and that it was fought up and down the scale of intensity with both conventional and unconventional forces and tactics, and with local control and security fluctuating almost daily. In this setting, the demands upon the advisory components and personnel of the U. S. Army were extremely varied, ranging from the more conventional military advisory functions, through civil-military operations to advisory functions performed elsewhere by the U. S. Department of State and its overseas agencies, USIA and USAID. The structure of advisory functions and duties changed over time depending on the circumstances of the conflict and current theories as to how to wrest power from the enemy both militarily and psychologically.

Advisory Functions and Structures

In early 1970 advisory activities appear to have fallen into several major categories, as follows:

1Army, Department of, HQ, DF (OPS-IASO), Subject: Comments on CONARC Liaison Team Visit to MACV (Bartelt Report), 13 March 1970. Army, Department of, HQ, Summary Sheet (DCSPER-CSD), Subject: Progress of Programs in Support of Advisory Effort in Vietnam (U), 27 Feb 1970, (CONFIDENTIAL). CINCPAC Message (112253Z JAN 1970), Subject: U. S. Advisors in Vietnam (U), (CONFIDENTIAL). COMUSMACV Message (0110072 SEP 1971), Subject: Military Advisory Policy (U), (CONFIDENTIAL).
1. Province-District advisors
2. Unit Advisors (Field and Combat Assistance Teams)
3. Training Advisors
   a. Mobile Training Teams
   b. Training directorate advisors
4. Logistical Advisors
5. Intelligence Advisors
6. All others

The first and last of these categories reveal the complexities of the Vietnam situation from the standpoint of sorting out advisory functions and duties. Province and District advisors were assigned to Military Assistance Command Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (MACCORDS) and deployed as advisory teams potentially covering the whole gamut of military and civil-military advisory capabilities, including psychological operations and civil affairs. On the other hand, U. S. Army psychological and civil affairs units deployed in Vietnam, as well as individual officers assigned to U. S. tactical units in the S-5/G-5 position, were tasked to upgrade host force capabilities in these functional areas through advice and training, and advisors were reportedly provided to the Vietnamese General Political Warfare Directorate (GPWD) which had responsibility for those affairs normally assigned to U. S. Civil Military Operations offices. Yet, the latter kinds of advisory functions appear to have been rarely distinguished in Vietnam.

For the future it was expected that:

1. Province and district advisor would be increasingly involved with local development programs and have more contact with local civilian officials.

2. Field advisors to ARVN units would be increasingly involved in the coordination of U. S. provided assets, observation and evaluation of ARVN improvement and modification (specifically in assessing the effectiveness
of HC forces, with and without direct advisor assistance), and advise on logistical and technical matters.

3. Advisors generally would play a major role in overcoming the lack of middle management skills and the overall advisory effort would move increasingly toward developing sound management and leadership techniques among host country personnel, first to achieve political, economic, and military stability, and then self-sufficiency.

With changes in advisory functions and roles, changes in advisory structures were contemplated:

1. Province advisory staffs would be greatly reduced. Advisors at district level and with RF/PF units would be phased down.
   a. In March 1969, as part of a special study of DSA problem areas, Hammond recommended that district advisory teams be tailored in size and composition to the district in which they were to serve and that there be a common data base on team composition. It is not clear what phasing down means, but the principles of team-to-district tailoring would seem to hold as long as such teams were in operation.
   b. Use of mobile advisory teams to advise RF/PF unit leaders and assist GVN village officials to plan and perfect village defenses.

2. Tactical advisory teams would be reduced and eventually phased out below the division level. Use of MTTs for refresher training and training for items of equipment to be expanded.

3. Assuming the NVA would (a) withdraw, or (b) revert to insurgent tactics, further reductions in the U. S.

---

advisory assistance effort would be feasible, and there would be more interchange of civilian and military roles in pacification and rural development.

4. A fewer number of longer term advisors would be retained at all levels of logistics, organization, and management and training, both civilian and military.

5. Advisors would be used more as "special assistants" to key Vietnamese.

**Advisor Staff Management**

Replacement System

The advisor replacement system was able to meet in-country requirements for branch fills but fell behind in authorized grade fills. This meant a lack, at all levels, of the requisite experience normally associated with the authorized grades. In terms of unit operations, such shortages were more or less of a problem depending on the size of the unit—i.e., a 150-200 man Province Team could cover shortages in numbers as well as grade and experience imbalance whereas a 30 man team had limited if any flexibility.

Other problems in filling in-country requirements resulted from the length of the requisitioning cycle—ten months—and the shortness of the tours. MACV advisor requirements were subject to continuing change, so that by the time replacements arrived in-country to fill requisitions made ten months earlier, there was a good chance they would be placed in assignments quite different from the ones for which they had been requisitioned and trained. This, coupled with lower-than-authorized grade fills, and

---

short tours, resulted in many advisors feeling ill-prepared for their assignments at the outset, at a continual disadvantage with respect to their counterparts in terms of status and experience, and, finally, unable to settle into the job long enough to learn the job well and to work most effectively with their counterparts. Accelerated promotions, while making the authorized grade fill picture look better on paper, did not generate the necessary depth of maturity and experience in grade.

On balance, the inability to fill at authorized grades was seen as the crux of the requirement/assignment problem, overshadowing other issues such as selection, training, preparation, and discontinuities in the requisition cycle and shortness of tour.

Internal Communications and Control

At the height of the U. S. advisory assistance effort (1965-1969) the advisory system experienced many of the familiar symptoms of a rapidly expanded bureaucracy: overextended and complex channels of communication within the organization, both vertically and laterally, excessive paperwork, lack of a clearcut relationship between what an advisor was expected to do and his mandate and resources to do it, and, at the lowest levels, a feeling of isolation from decision-making centers while bearing most of the brunt of daily operations. In particular, many field advisors with ARVN units felt they were being held personally accountable for the success or failure of their units, an accountability which seldom squared with their formally defined functions and roles, the resources available to them, or any reasonable expectation of what could be accomplished under the circumstances. This situation was made worse by the high turnover rate among advisors and the lack of any dependable system by which the job experience of previous advisors could be accumulated and passed along to their successors in the same jobs.  

Thus, from a manpower management standpoint, observers found advisors generally complaining about their lack of prior knowledge of and preparation for their specific in-country assignments, the difficulty of capitalizing on earlier advisory experience in these assignments as a way of compensating for the shortness of the assignment, the internal conflicts in the advisor role, and their inability to resolve these and other job problems via the advisory communications system.

Corrective measures recommended at the time emphasized improvements in personnel management and communication within the advisory organization, both vertically and laterally; as an example of more efficient personnel management, it was suggested that entire advisor teams be rotated as units rather than individual members of the team being rotated on short assignments.

It was recognized that reduction and restructuring of the advisory staff during the wind down would in itself alleviate some of the management problems, particularly those of vertical command and communication, but it was also perceived that more effective management systems could further reduce the manpower requirements of an advisory group.

The Advisor-Counterpart Interface

Counterpart relations are seldom mentioned in the official documentation on Vietnam available to this study, but they are a prominent issue in external research studies undertaken between 1965 and 1969. Based

exclusively or largely on interviews with active or former Vietnam advisors, these studies turned up considerable evidence that individual advisors and advisory teams and staffs in Vietnam were constantly confronted with counterpart problems of a sort which impaired, or threatened to impair, their ability to accomplish their primary mission.

Certain kinds of recurrent advisor-counterpart problems appear to have been by-products of the U.S. advisory system's replacement or in-country management procedures: we have already mentioned the effects of (1) mismatching of advisors with CPs, by grade and level of experience; (2) short tours; and (3) poor vertical communication channels and inadequate methods for transmitting advisor experience within the advisory staffs. Generally, these conditions tended to handicap advisors in their effort to exert continuous and effective levels of influence over counterpart decisions and behaviors. Many advisors seem to feel that tailored U.S. training and longer in-country training and acclimatization prior to assuming full responsibility for an advisor assignment would have done much to compensate for these problems, but as will be pointed out later, there is a basic fallacy in trying to offset personnel management problems with training.

Other kinds of problems seemed to originate on the Vietnamese side of the fence where the counterpart system had its own staffing and management peculiarities and problems. An HSR interview survey of former U.S. advisors turned up numerous accounts of advisors in Vietnam having to deal with incompetent, corrupt or obstructive counterparts, and feeling compelled at times to go beyond their advisory roles. The following quotation is from this study:

(U) To accomplish their purposes more effectively, advisors sometimes find it desirable or necessary to go beyond their immediate counterparts and to intervene in the sets of relationships which constitute the counterpart structure. The most frequently reported situation
is one in which an incompetent or obstructive counterpart makes it unusually difficult or impossible to accomplish anything by working through him. In such cases advisors have usually tried to put pressure on their counterparts through the counterpart chain of command.\textsuperscript{6}

Still another set of problems may be attributed to misunderstanding of, or unwillingness to go along with, the other side's \textit{modus operandi} with respect to priorities, procedures and assignments of responsibility.

Effective advisor-counterpart relations, and overall management of advisor-counterpart interfaces, is an important consideration for all the U. S. advisory assistance efforts. Much of what could be learned from the Vietnam situation hopefully will never need to be reapplied, and certainly from a doctrinal standpoint this experience should in no way overshadow our varied and proven experience in other areas where U. S. MAAGs have played effective though less publicized roles. In any event, any lessons that can be pulled from this experience are best weighed in the same scale with the Korea experience.

Probably the single most universally applicable lesson is the need for more systematic reporting on advisory-counterpart experiences, particularly at the level of advisory commands and units. In Vietnam, most of the systematically generated and readily accessible information is based on personal experiences of individual advisors, while information on the counterpart relations of commands and units is scattered in official documents or intertwined with other issues in more comprehensive surveys of advisory experience.

Advisor Personnel Management

Selection

In Vietnam, with the requirements for unusually large numbers of advisors at all levels, the selection issue until recently revolved around the matter of adequate grade fills, the need here being so great that it left little room to consider the question of what particular qualities were desirable after the grade requirements were met.

With the reduction in the absolute numbers of advisory personnel required, quantitative grade fills become less of a problem, and there is the possibility of significantly raising the quality-in-grade of those who remain. One approach is to handpick a residual advisory staff from among those job-proven advisors who still have six months or more in-country tour time to complete. Once this "local levy" has exhausted its time-bound opportunities, future requisitions depend on less personalistic methods.

Assuming that grade fills are adequate, the selection process moves to identify and tap for advisory assignments those officers in each grade level best suited to the advisor role; however, those deemed most qualified are, more often than not, those least anxious to adopt the advisor role, which brings selection to the question of whether it shall proceed on a voluntary or directed assignment basis.

Vietnam provided considerable evidence that the Army has among its career officers, a large component of individuals who, for whatever reason, have been reluctant to advisor assignments in a combat area, have enjoyed their first advisory assignments, and have in many cases elected multiple advisory tours, often consecutive. However, one of the
hard facts from Vietnam is that even highly competent and outstanding officers, who performed well in advisory assignments, and who found the role sufficiently challenging and rewarding to elect multiple tours, collectively were unable to convince their most competent fellow officers, either by word or example, that an advisory assignment in Vietnam was anything but a career deficit, and that promotions boards would not continue to downgrade advisory assignments in relation to more traditional types of assignment.

In effect, all the evidence indicated that long run requirements for top-notch Vietnam advisors in the required grade and branch could not be met by a volunteer self-selection process: careful screening of volunteers could eliminate the unsuited, but it could not assure that enough of the most competent, capable officers in each grade would volunteer in the first place.

Thus the trend in advisor selection, at least for future staffing of advisory structures in Vietnam, has moved toward directed assignment through special advisor programs geared to the newly defined functional areas and career programs with validated advisory duty positions (MAOP), both of which hope to motivate the selected officers by various kinds of individual or family benefits.

Training

Because of the quantitative demands and peculiarities of the advisor replacement system, much more attention has been devoted to training criteria than to selection criteria. Whether consciously or unconsciously, training was perceived as the most tangible way of compensating for in-country problems resulting from the impossibility of fine-tuning selection,
assignment and in-country advisor management procedures. Hammond stated that in a list of ten problem areas isolated in interviews with DSAs in Vietnam, a general lack of adequate training and preparation for advisor duties was one of the most clearcut and widespread problems identified by his respondents.

With respect to the content of formal training and preparation for advisory assignments, Hickey in 1965 identified the following areas that needed considerably more attention:

1. **Area information** on cultural and social differences, political conflicts within host countries, and on the history, traditions, concepts and practices—i.e., "the real innerworkings"—of the HC military.

2. **Cross-cultural perspective**, especially understanding of the implicit assumptions of other cultures and the appropriate and legitimate behaviors of counterparts in the light of these assumptions as well as local customs and values.

3. **Cross-cultural communication skills**, including the use of interpreters, and interaction with counterparts.

4. **Civic action roles**, including CA principles and techniques, reasonable levels of effort, and reasonable outcome expectations.

Hammond, four years later, in a study of problems encountered by District Senior Advisors, isolated the following additional content requirements:

5. Training tailored to particular kinds of advisory assignments, in particular areas.

6. Training in reporting systems.

---

7 Hammond, op. cit.
8 Hammond, op. cit.
As regards training methods, most recommendations fall in three categories: (1) simulation of real world experience, (2) direct learning from the experiences of previous job incumbents, and (3) devices to promote continuous on-the-job learning and guidance. Specific recommendations, noted particularly in surveys of DSAs, are:

1. Use of role-playing and role reversal sessions, with former DSAs as instructors, to teach advisor-counterpart interaction skills.

2. As adjuncts to training, advisor handbooks should impart more in the way of policy guidelines, and guidelines which will help him to define his own role in relationship to his counterpart.

3. Periodic group sessions of advisors in which advisors of the same functional area could air problems, share experiences, and learn from each other.

4. Systematic use of diaries and near-end-of-our-field debriefings to document job experiences, develop CP profiles, and provide a running record of advice given, accepted and rejected. Such materials to be used as orientation and guidance for advisor replacements.

One of the principal problems in developing training requirements for advisory positions in Vietnam has been a general failure to separate training requirements from manpower management requirements. Too often what are reported as training deficiencies are in actuality assignment compromises or errors seen from the perspective of the advisor who has been brought up to accept misassignments as in the nature of the system and therefore a professional challenge, while pre-assignment training and job preparation are seen as the legitimate target of all or most of his on-the-job frustrations. A case in point is the constant reference, in advisor interview data, both to inadequate preparation for working with counterparts and to being mismatched with the counterpart in grade and experience level.
Command recommendations for improving the structure of training have taken two tacks: (1) the development of more specialized training packages or programs tailored to particular types of advisor function and assignments, and particular locales (the MAPA and PSA courses at Ft. Bragg are examples of these), and (2) a general review of CONUS advisor training programs to cut dead-time in favor of early in-country arrival and expanded in-country training.

Estimates of the total time that should be devoted to formal in-country training vary from one week to one month, most advisors interviewed tending to favor the longer period. Specific recommendations for expanded in-country training are: the use of entrance-exit seminars in which replacements are briefed by departing advisors, and five-day orientation courses after the replacement has been on the job for one month.

Special Programs

An advisor program consists of a package including entry requirements, training tailored to the function, utilization tour of prescribed length, and a series of benefits designed to reduce adverse impacts of extended advisory tours on (1) the officer's career, and (2) his family life.

Beginning with the PSA advisor program, the trend has been to design such programs along functional lines. The PSA program, established in 1967, was followed by recommendations from the field that it be accompanied by a DSA program, and that DCSPER continue the development of such programs for other categories of advisory function. A DSA program was established in January, 1969, and requirements for other functional programs were laid out.9

II. GENERAL EXPERIENCE
II. GENERAL EXPERIENCE

In concluding his survey of the U. S. Army military advisor role, Hermes made the following observation:

In retrospect the role of the U. S. military advisor has not undergone an orderly historical evolution during the past quarter century. For the most part the role has been dependent upon the circumstances in each country receiving military assistance. Conditions of war or peace, domestic tranquility or internal insurgency, crisis or non-crisis--these are the factors that have generally determined the scope of the advisory role.¹

Since the Hermes report was published (1965) there have been a number of systematic efforts to study the characteristics of the advisory role, both in particular environments and world-wide, and to generalize where possible regarding future requirements. In recent studies and staff papers there has been a noticeable tendency to move past selection and training requirements to a concern with advisory personnel management systems and with designs, specifications and management requirements for advisory staffs deliberately tailored to particular environments and host countries.

Some of these concerns have certainly been dramatized by the Vietnam experience and yet they belong really to the era of the Nixon Doctrine in which rationalization of our advisory system is an essential compensation for a reduced and less visible international security assistance stance.

What follows is an examination of more recent advisory experience, outside of Vietnam, and a consideration of how this can inform us about advisory roles and the training, deployment and management of advisory staffs in the 1970's.

MAAG Functions and Operations

As a first consideration we discuss the larger context of MAAG functions and operations because these more or less determine the kinds of advisory functions and structures, and levels of advisory effort, which the MAAGs support.

Administration of MAP

Under grant aid, most MAAG duties are geared to the administration of the MAP rather than to advising host country forces. The burden of planning, in conjunction with the 5-year funding and budgeting cycles, falls mainly on the MAAGs (as does most of the paperwork). Since the MAP decision-making process is dependent on the advisory staff for the information on which it bases its decision, and since materiel receives primary attention, advisors have a heavy commitment to the gathering and presenting of materiel-related information and to monitoring the subsequent disposition of these assets in-country. The amount of effort actually devoted to MAP administration vs. advising and training depends on the relative size of the MAP units in the MAAGs: small MAAGs with relatively large MAP units must devote most of their effort to MAP administration, large MAAGs with relatively small MAP units can spend more time advising and training.

Under foreign military sales (FMS), the primary function of the MAAG is to provide the information upon which FMS decisions are made and secondarily to act as a sales negotiator between the host country and

---

the U. S. government; here, as with grant aid, the decision making process is dependent on the MAAG advisory staff for the gathering of the required information. However, the host countries now assume the burden of planning and administration, and the MAAG staff can devote less time to paperwork and monitoring and more time to advising and training. Since host countries are often unprepared for their new responsibilities, they may rely on the MAAG advisory staff as much for advice and training in planning and management as in technical matters.

The shift from grant to sales aid (envisaged in the proposed International Security Assistance Act) has as a corollary an emphasis on the generation of self-sustaining capabilities, and increasing self-reliance on these capabilities, by host nations. Because of heavy dependence on the U.S. military assistance for managerial capabilities, particularly resource and training management, many host nations will need heavy advisory assistance in these areas. Hammond\(^3\) notes that U. S. military advice will have to concern itself more with "transfer technology"—i.e., with increasing the host country potential for problem identification and self-reliant capabilities to solve the problem. In the past, with most advisory efforts having been expended on hardware and hardware-related functions, American advisors have generally failed to address many distinct functions normally performed by any military establishment: management functions, operational command and control, force planning, development of strategic doctrine and plans that are particularly suited to their own objectives, and structures and local situational needs, joint-service supported operations and combined operations, research and development.

\(^3\)Paul Hammond, *Foreign Military Access and Advice: Some MAAG and Milgroup Options* (U) (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1970. [CONFIDENTIAL.])
Whether the MAAGs can return to their pre-MAP historical role of military advisory group status is questionable. Their visibility may be reduced and host countries may come to expect less from them, but one analyst has made a strong case for the likelihood that under FMS advisory staffs will shift from grant aid administration to active and competitive promotion of U. S. military sales in the hope of maintaining a large and influential U. S. advisory presence abroad.\footnote{Refson, op. cit.} If the trend is toward shrinkage in size and visibility, another analyst has pointed out the possibility that the MAAG rank structure would be reduced, thus lowering the status of the MAAGs in relation to the unified commands.

**Institutional Development**

Institutional development is defined principally in two documents: a DCSOPS study called Nation Building Contributions of the Army (NABUCA)\footnote{Army, Department of, International and Civil Affairs Directorate DCSOPS, Nation Building Contributions of the Army (NABUCA) (Washington, D. C.: Author, September 1968. CONFIDENTIAL.)} and an ACSFOR study called Institutional Development.\footnote{Army, Department of, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Doctrine and Systems Directorate, Institutional Development (Washington, D. C.: Author, 1970.)} The areas of institutional development are social, economic and political and involve above all the relation of the people--i. e., the civilian population--to their government. In the latter study, institutional development is defined as civic action plus internal security. Stated another way, civic action and internal security are what the military does to strengthen the ties between people and government. The U. S. military promotes institutional development in host countries through the medium of the advisor-counterpart systems, and in such a way that the host country generates its own capability to develop institutions.
At the present time, MAAGs do not have a distinct "institutional development" function and there are no "institutional development" programs as such administered through unified commands or by MAAGs. However, much of what MAAGs do in the way of advising and training -- e.g. to promote host country "stability" -- can easily be subsumed under this heading. It merits some attention here as concept rather than function because of its implications for emerging doctrine in Civil-Military Operations and for the coordination of U.S. military and civilian operations abroad. Both of these concerns may be expected to impinge increasingly on the definition of MAAG advisory functions and roles.

Current development of CMO doctrine offers some hope that this definition of institutional development will be expanded beyond the rather narrow confines of civic action and internal security and at the same time given more operational substance and focus. Two of the major functional components of CMO -- civil affairs and psychological operations -- provide a broader base of doctrine. In recent years they have come under heavy attack, the former because of its lack of relevance for and applicability to the LDCs, and the latter because of its absorption with technique and avoidance of the broader policy and planning issues of national communications. However, with the improvement and integration of doctrine for these two functions, Civil Military Operations could become the prime vehicle of institutional development.

At this stage of development it is still not fully clear how the CMO function will be discharged in the structure of MAAG operations and duties. A block of instruction on CMO is incorporated in the POI for the MAO C&SC so that MAAGs can expect that all graduates of the course will have at least an educated and fairly current awareness of what CMO is all about. Eventually, it is anticipated that at least a major responsibility for CMO will reside in the S/5-G/5 staff position, and from this position there are several ways in which CMO concepts might be put into practice.
The major consideration here is the relation between CMO and MAAG advisory functions and duties. Although at the present time there are no positions in MAAGs, Missions and MILGPs specifically designated as CA or Psyops Advisor, it is conceivable that in the future the S/5-G/5, in addition to providing staff assistance in civil-military matters to U. S. commanders and Senior Advisors could also be expected to provide CMO advice directly to host country counterparts. If this is so, then it is also conceivable that the advice could address a broad spectrum of internal stability and developmental issues going well beyond the traditional concerns of civil affairs and psychological operations, and having little to do with the impact of U. S. forces and operations on the civilian population.

This possibility is certainly implied, if not advocated, in the DCSOPS and ACSFOR studies cited above, and it raises two questions: (1) Which of the potential issues in "institutional development" will CMO doctrine choose to consider, and in what way, and (2) how much of what kinds of "institutional development" doctrine and guidance will be funneled through the advisory system to the host country counterparts?

In answering these questions a major consideration is the fact that the MAAG will not have the civil-military operations field to itself. The State Department considers that its functions include "Handling political aspects of the presence of U. S. forces in foreign countries" and as one author notes, this "could be interpreted as investing a major civil-military function (in the G/5-S/5 sense) in civilian personnel." More to the point, components of the State Department and other U. S. civilian agencies are also involved in "institutional development"—e.g., AID has its own form of civic action and USIA assists HC nations to develop their communications system. The more MAAGs get into the business of advising HC counterparts in the broader potentialities of CMO, the more likely

---

they are to require careful coordination of their activities with those of U. S. civilian agencies on the country team. In this event it can be anticipated that some members of the CMO advisory staff will have to serve as liaison officers between the MAAG and the civilian agencies.

Advisory Functions

In this section we consider the types of advisor functions which have emerged, or are in the process of emerging, on a world-wide basis, as well as the advisory structures and organizations related thereto. Not all of these functions will be equally represented in the MAAGs, and some may hardly exist at all, depending on the MAAG’s overall mission and principal duties. However, they merit consideration and definition as likely candidates for future emphasis in functional training programs.

Military Unit Advisor

A unit advisor is a direct advisor to a combat or combat support services unit. In Vietnam such advisors were also referred to as ARVN field advisors, or combat assistance teams. There do not appear to be functional programs for training unit advisors, probably on the assumption that since this is the most "military" type of advisor function, an officer with branch proficiency in grade is adequately prepared except for some area orientation and cross-cultural communication skills training. In actuality, and as was clearly demonstrated in Vietnam, unit advisors need to be knowledgeable in a much wider range of conditions and problems involving low intensity conflict, unconventional warfare and civil-military operations. Besides advising conventional forces on conventional warfare doctrine, he may advise and instruct these,
or paramilitary forces, in unconventional warfare or low intensity conflict doctrine, civic action and related activities undertaken by HC units. He must also consider and advise on the impact of military operations of HC units on civilian populations, including the handling of refugees generated by combat. As an arm of the U. S. MAP he must monitor the disposition and use of U. S. equipment provided under MAP aid, observe and evaluate the performance capabilities and effectiveness of the advised units, and provide information which will be of use to MAP decision-makers either in grant aid or FMS planning.

**Governmental Advisors**

We use the term "governmental" here to cover such advisory functions as performed by Province and District Senior advisors in Vietnam. We have no evidence of this function being performed by U. S. advisory staffs in recent years outside Vietnam; certainly the MACCORDS set up is unique. However, it seems entirely conceivable that such a function would be needed in other parts of the world, particularly in contested areas adjacent to communist-held territory in Southeast Asia.

Governmental advisors are advisors to the governors of territorial subdivisions--provinces, districts, etc.--where the state of conflict is such as to pose constant threats to law and order, normal civilian government operations and the viability of civilian government itself. Civil government may be operating under martial law, and the officials in charge may be HC military personnel. The areas of concern of a governmental advisor resemble in many respects those of civil affairs, assuming that civil affairs are conducted in the midst of a low intensity or mid-intensity conflict situation of indefinite duration.
Local security, institutional development and political stability are all major foci of the advisor's concerns, with the emphasis shifting among these concerns depending on the success of pacification efforts. Thus, the governmental advisor has a major responsibility for the coordination of civil-military operations, particularly in such things as population and resources control, military civic action and military psyops. Principal points of coordination in the U. S. advisory system will be the S/5-G/5 staff officers assisting the U. S. Senior Advisor or serving on unit advisory teams. The use of U. S. civilian vs. military personnel for this advisory function depends to some extent on the level of conflict, on the need for coordinating civil and military operations as an immediate security measure, and on the relative emphasis between security and development.

Training Advisors

While all types of advisors to HC agencies or units have some training responsibilities, and conversely, all U. S. military trainers of HC military personnel are in a sense advisors, two distinct types of "training advisor" appear to be emerging, partly in response to the reduction of U. S. forces and advisory staff in Vietnam and partly out of the new orientations in MAP. The concerns here appear to be two-fold: (1) to promote self-sufficiency on the part of the HC military establishment, and (2) to keep training geared to real HC threats and needs rather than to the latest developments in U. S. weapons technology and nuclear age strategic and tactical doctrine. The principal aims are (1) to accomplish more training in HC-sponsored facilities, rather than in CONUS or CONUS-sponsored facilities, and (2) to concentrate on U. S. assistance to improve HC capabilities for training, rather than on the U. S. training of individual HC replacements.
The first of these types are the HC training directorate and HC training facility advisors. Their duties are both technical and managerial. The former must know the centralized operations of a military training directorate. The latter must know about identification of training requirements, curriculum design, methods of instruction, and methods of evaluating both student and faculty performance. He must also know how to set up, staff, and administer a training facility, including budgeting and projecting of future staffing and funding needs against anticipated enrollments.

On the assumption that most assisted nations will require some direct training by U. S. personnel, there is need for the second type—the Training Officer on the U. S. advisory staff who will be concerned with (1) the processing of HC individuals for out-of-country training under MATP auspices, (2) the processing of U. S. trainers for in-country service to fill critical gaps in HC training capabilities, and (3) the management of MTTs. More than before, this type of training advisor will have to be specially attuned to the increased requirements for the U. S. training of HC high-level resource managers and trainers.

In the future, one of the most important aspects of the Training Officer's function may be regulating the flow of ideas as well as people through the MAAG-HC military interface. HC trainees in CONUS installations leave their own country with certain expectations which may not be fulfilled and return with exposures and experiences for which they were not prepared and which present some problem in refitting the individual to the domestic scene and scale of operations. Also, MTTs coming in-country may require some political guidance so that they do not do or say things prejudicial to U. S. objectives or US/HC relations.
Resources Management Advisors

This category of advisor function is also becoming increasingly important both in terms of the withdrawal of U. S. forces from Vietnam and the world-wide reorientations of MAP. As the emphasis on MAP and MAP training shifts towards a much greater emphasis on resource management capabilities by HC personnel, so resource management advisors can be expected to serve as critical in-country supports to the current trends in the training of HC military managers at all levels. U. S. advisory staffs will be required to devote more of their efforts to advising HC counterparts at all levels in a variety of resource management activities, including procurement, logistics, maintenance, organization, personnel management systems, planning and programming, finance and budgeting, and research and development.

Presumably a breakdown of this function into various categories of trainable subfunctions will depend partly on how HC military managers are sorted out for training in U. S. service schools, and partly on how managerial responsibilities are structured in each of the assisted HC military establishments.

Intelligence Advisors

Intelligence has been recognized as a distinct advisory function since World War II and there are intelligence advisor positions shown in the TDs for the military assistance commands in Iran, Korea, Thailand and some of the Latin American countries. (These positions are included in the consolidated duty position list for the FAOP.) The intelligence advisor's duties include providing staff advice to U. S. commanders and senior advisors, as well as advising HC counterparts on the
organization and operation of effective intelligence systems, and the gathering of military intelligence on the intent and activities of insurgents.

While attaches have intelligence functions, and while some attaches have tended to accord importance to the advisory aspects of their duties (possibly where the U.S. military mission is so small that the attache carries much of the advisory load), we would tend to discount the role of the attache as an advisor on intelligence since there would appear to be an inherent conflict between this and his primary role as a gatherer of intelligence on HC forces and capabilities. However, a well-developed HC military intelligence system could be a very important adjunct to the attache's role if there were sufficient U.S.-HC trust and mutual concern over the internal stability situation. Also, with the current interest in encouraging HC military establishments to assess their own internal threat situation more fully and realistically, a well-developed HC military intelligence system would certainly seem to be one of the prime ways of doing this.

Thus, both in terms of current recognition and future emphases, it seems that the intelligence advisory role may grow in importance and that it may provide another avenue for obtaining much needed information about relations between HC military establishments and the rest of the HC society.

Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Advisors

At the present time there do not appear to be any civil affairs, psychological operations or CMO advisor positions designated in any of the MAAG, Mission or MILGP Tables of Distribution world-wide. We have not encountered in the literature any reference to a CMO advisory...
function addressed to HC counterparts. However, there appeared to be an increasing need for such advisors in Vietnam with the reduction of U. S. forces there. CMO doctrine, as of 1969, strongly implied such a function ("G/5-S/5 advises commanders or Senior U. S. Advisors; helps host country forces in efforts to gain popular support of government").

Thus it would seem, in the light of development now occurring, that the G/5-S/5 in MAAG staffs would be explicitly tasked with advising HC counterparts in civil-military operations under certain conditions, a possibility which we discussed earlier under general MAAG functions (see p. 20). As a minimum, HC military establishments should be thinking about CMO, building some CA and Psyops components into their overall force structures, and training these units for various kinds of domestic civic action programs even under the lowest intensity type of conflict situation. This kind of approach to "poliico-military" problems, which stresses early development of HC capabilities for strengthening ties between people and government, is a minimum application of the "institutional development" concept discussed above. If we are to give assisted nations any encouragement or assistance whatever in this regard, it is hard to see where to separate help, training and advice. Further, unless there is some explicit and rather comprehensive doctrine of this sort on paper, it leaves U. S. security assistance open to the charge that it is concerned only with building military establishments, honing them to immediate local "threats," and backstopping them with U. S. forces, and

---

not really concerned with improving the long-range relations between HC military forces and the HC populace at large, and their capabilities to sustain an improving relationship on their own.

We are not here advocating any of the current trends in international security assistance policy; we simply wish to point out that much of what has been said and is being done under the rubric of nation building, institutional development and politico-military affairs clearly points to the latter concern, and therefore presents compelling arguments for the institutionalization of CMO functions in MAAGs, and the designation of positions with clearcut direct advisory responsibilities in CMO.

Some General Characteristics
of the Advisory Role

Aside from different functions and specific duties, there are several characteristics of the advisory role which appear to cut across most functional categories and types of duty. The list of characteristics presented below is a composite from several different sources, and no one characteristic applies equally to all types of advisory activity, just as, for example, the concern with preserving human life is a general concern of medicine, but does not apply equally to all types of medical practitioner. These characteristics are worth examining because of (1) the general trends in the development of the advisory role which they suggest, and (2) their implications for the selection, training, management and guidance of advisors, both as individuals and as key operators in the security assistance system.

1. The advisor role is generally becoming more complex, involving mixtures of technical advice, exchanges of information and information gathering, liaison and coordination, planning and programming,
administration and management, and diplomacy. It is in this sense that the advisory role is fully integrated into the broader set of roles included in the MAO and FAO concepts.

2. The changes they seek to make often involve long-range objectives and large portions of a typical advisory tour.

3. These changes frequently have social, economic and political as well as military impacts, and therefore require considerable coordination between military and civilian agencies operating in-country.

4. Advisory roles are generally unfamiliar roles: in trying to induce development and improved HC military capabilities they are often required to engage in activities—e.g., creating new organizational structures, developing human resources—in which they have had no direct experience in their own military careers.

5. In achieving their objectives they are dependent on the sustained cooperation of counterparts in the HC military establishment and government.

6. Lacking direct control over the variables critical to the achievement of their objectives, they tend to develop "personalistic" ways of relating to and influencing their counterparts, with the result that: (1) they take up many concerns not directly related to the work in an effort to induce counterpart cooperation, and (2) they are inclined to over-identify with the counterpart, to assume an advocacy role with respect to the CP's interests, and to see the main payoffs of their efforts as political rather than technical.

7. To the extent that they lack clearcut policy guidance, they tend to view military objectives in isolation from the real military threats facing the HC, and to assume that their job is to prepare the HC military to meet any eventuality. As a result, they
tend to create pressures for increases in both grant aid and military sales of U.S. produced equipment, often inappropriate to the real need.

8. They tend to support traditional arguments for military assistance long after they have been brought into question by world events.

9. When restrictive assistance policies are imposed, the advisors bear the brunt of the HC's displeasure and the burden of explanation, and are peculiarly concerned with their own credibility and professional image. In a shift from grant aid to sales, they tend to become highly competitive "salesmen" of U.S. assets and resources, particularly when they are confronted with the possible loss of U.S. influence and the elimination of the need for U.S. advisors. Thus, they have an unusually high "personal" stake in the U.S. security assistance effort.

10. For all of the above reasons, they have an important impact on MAP decision-making machinery.

Advisory Structures

The prospect of reduction in the size of our military missions includes the prospect of also reorganizing the advisory structures both to reduce the absolute requirements for advisory personnel and to achieve more efficient and effective use of advisory skills.

One idea, advanced independently by two authors in somewhat different terms but expressing the same general principles, is to reduce the existing MAAGs to CORE MAAGs including a smaller number of resident U.S. advisors whose operations would be fully integrated with the other components of U.S. assistance. This resident staff would be supported with permanently organized teams of advisors/trainers and a corps of roving consultants called in at the request of the resident staff. Resident advisors on the MAAG would be trained, and have a mixed bag of
duties, at the "generalist" end of the spectrum, while the nonresident back-up teams or consultants would consist of individuals with more specialized skills. Permanently organized teams would develop generalized formats for their combined effort, then adapt these to particular in-country environments. This same principle might also be applied to resident advisory staffs--i.e., they might be cast in a few basic models to fit a limited number of types of HC situations, then refitted to particular countries.

In addition to lowering the MAAG profile, the advantages presented for such an arrangement are: (1) greater discrimination in MAAG contacts with HC governments, (2) simplification of advisor-counterpart relationships, (3) greater flexibility in use of resources and skills than MAAGs can now bring to bear, and (4) greater selectivity of personnel.

A more comprehensive approach to flexible security assistance is the Security Assistance Operational Support Package concept. Starting from the same prospectus for the reduction of the U. S. military profile overseas, the SAOSP concept envisages that MAAGs and Missions will in the future be limited in their ability to provide requisite types and levels of advice and instruction, and that some means must be found to supplement their efforts on an "as needed" basis in order to assure that assisted nations acquire increasingly self-reliant capabilities for maintaining their own internal security.

In essence, the support package program would determine the types of experience and expertise needed by assisted nations, and develop contingency plans for identifying, tapping and marshalling such resources among U. S. Army personnel at all levels. A typical "package" generated by the program would consist of a "pre-arranged, tailored, area oriented and possibly language qualified team of experts" which could be made
available to unified commands on call to supplement MAAG and mission capabilities. Personnel would not be detailed to permanent duty with support teams, and all requirements would be met by using personnel on a temporary basis.

Tactical units, schools and centers, headquarters and other U. S. military elements would be tasked to provide support packages tailored to the need of specific countries and regions. A variety of prototype packages would be developed representing the full spectrum of Army functional areas and offering flexible mixes of services--e.g. assessment, advice, instruction, training and operational support. Also under consideration is the employment of three different types of SAOSP geared to levels of threat to internal security in any given country: Type I, geared to a pre-crisis situation with emphasis on the development of self-sufficiency in the HC military establishment; Type II, geared to augmentation of the MAAGs when a threat materialized or appeared imminent; Type III, geared to providing low-profile U. S. military back-up in the form of combat service support to friendly military forces.

There is still some question as to how the resident MAAG and Mission advisory staffs would manage these support teams once they had arrived in-country. Granted that they would gain in the specialized technical expertise and experience needed to fill a particular gap in their own capabilities; but the efforts of the support team would have to be informed, guided and monitored by the resident advisory staff, and this task could conceivably detract from the latter's performance of other critical duties.
Advisor Staff Management

In interviews with program coordinators for MAPA and MAO C&SC, we obtained some information on replacement problems seen from the standpoint of graduates of these courses, who feel that many of the MAAG and MILGP positions for which they have been trained are being filled by officers who have not attended the MAPA or MAO C&SC, and are not MAOP members. Some of these positions are advisory positions. For purposes of this report, we did not determine whether there is a comparable problem at the MAAG end—i.e., requisitioning MAPA or MAO C&SC graduates and not getting them—or to what extent the kinds of problems encountered in Vietnam—i.e., changing in-country requirements, lengthy requisition cycles, lower-than-authorized grade fills—are also seen as problems by MAAGs and MILGPs.

Monitoring and Evaluating Advisor Performance

To date, the most systematic analysis of advisor performance available in published form is Froehlich's study of KMAG advisors and their counterparts. The stated objective of the study is:

The experimental development of a conceptual definition of what constitutes effective advisor-counterpart interactions and means with which to assess them—in effect a research tool with which to identify and assess conditions that influence the product of advisor-counterpart interactions.

The criterion of effectiveness developed in the study is whether interactions did or did not result in the willingness to continue working together. This is shown to be related to three categories of conditions as judged or perceived by advisors and CPs.

a. Personal traits—competence; congeniality.

b. Critical behaviors—frequency of occurrence; desirability of frequencies.

c. Advisor's primary concerns—monitoring; developing plans and policies; providing technical know-how; procuring materials.

All of the above appear to make a difference to advisors and counterparts in the sense that they may influence the willingness to work together and the importance of this criterion is summed up in a section entitled Guidance to Successors:

"When experienced advisors define the advisory role by recommending to successors ways in which they might achieve effectiveness, their guidance reflects the necessity to conceive effectiveness as the outcome of transactions involving a counterpart. In other words, where the formal statement of KMAG's responsibilities leads to a definition of effectiveness in terms of the extent to which each is achieved, the definition implicitly used by advisors adds an additional aspect to the criterion, viz. how does the counterpart react to the fulfillment of the mission and the manner in which it was achieved? Most of the recommendations given by advisors include or imply reference to counterparts' reactions to the advisors."10

As Froehlich points out, this criterion has the merit of avoiding the inequities inherent in applying the same effectiveness yardstick to all advisors, given the heterogeneity of their objectives and the obstacles they encounter. It should be noted, however, that it is a function of prolonged and fairly intensive advisor-counterpart interactions, and may not apply as readily to all kinds of advisor-counterpart interfaces—e.g. those managed along less personalistic and more bureaucratic lines, as suggested in proposals for reducing and restructuring MAAG advisory staffs. For future applications, two kinds of standards are needed: (1) individual job performance standards that are adjustable to the practical possibilities and limitations of any given job, in any given situation and that include, but are not limited to, acceptable standards of relationship with HC nationals generally; and (2) advisory unit or agency performance standards, oriented mainly toward efficient management of advisory personnel and toward realistic levels of output.

Advisory performance standards and measures should also be responsive to some input from the counterpart side of the fence and there needs to be some fuller development of methods for regular monitoring of the work of advisors and of the impacts of the advisory staff on counterpart individuals and units. The feasibility of tapping military counterparts for usable information on the impacts of the advisory system has been demonstrated by survey research in Taiwan and Korea.11

Effectiveness is something to be promoted on a daily basis through guidance and surveillance, information sharing, and, if necessary, refitting of the advisory structures and their management. The alternative is a constant search for better selection criteria, training requirements or assignment procedures that may have little to do with the real in-country variables that have a major influence on the success of an advisory effort.

The Advisor-Counterpart Interface

Aside from what has been said in regard to Vietnam, or mentioned in the previous discussions of advisory functions, structures and roles, there is little to add here to the subject of managing the advisor-counterpart interface.

Major published studies of advisor-counterpart relations are available only for Vietnam, the Republic of China, and Korea; the HumRRO Project DEBRIEF, based on a world-wide sample of advisory experience, will certainly change this picture.

All of the existing studies serve to highlight the same cross-cultural perception and communications issues; they provide some guidance regarding selection and training of advisors, but offer little systematic insight on the general problem of managing the interface between the advisory organization and the HC counterpart organization.

The few management observations which have been published are as follows:

1. The effectiveness of the advisor-counterpart relationship appears to vary directly with the amount of time advisors and counterparts spend together, whether social or working. (In Korea, under General Roberts,
the KMAG shared offices with their counterparts and shared intimately daily tasks and problems.)

2. Management problems appear to differ at the top and the bottom of the advisor-counterpart interface. (In the Repbulic of China, U. S. advisors of rank of Major and above had the most trouble with command responsibility issues; Captains and below had the most trouble with maintenance and supply issues.)

3. The giving or withholding of U. S. money and materiel has been considered an important lever for obtaining counterpart cooperation. There is evidence, however, that it is counterproductive in the long run.

4. Allowing the counterpart to have his way in matters not at serious variance with U. S. policy and doctrine can be turned to advantage when it is necessary to insist on strict adherence to our approaches.

5. Management problems can be much reduced if:
   (a) managers of advisory structures inform and guide their units as to the desirable and undesirable forms of advisor-counterpart relations,
   (b) counterpart structures are informed as to how advisors are trained and tasked, and what to expect of them,
   (c) both sides agree at the outset, and at a high level, to closely monitor the behavior of their own personnel, and to take immediate corrective action in individual cases. (Such an arrangement appears to have worked well in Korea under General Roberts; in Iran, counterparts were offered the choice of (1) assessing and correcting their own deficiencies, or (2) having us assess and report them.)


13 Ibid.

14 Sawyer, op. cit.
There is an apparent lack of interest in the comparative study of advisor-counterpart relations, as a management rather than a cross-cultural communications problem. If so, we suspect this can be attributed to a fundamental condition: the deepseated belief on the part of Country Teams that the in-country situation which each faces is so unique in every respect, and the advisor-counterpart system so much a creature of the peculiar historical development of that particular mission, that it is impossible to make any meaningful cross-mission comparisons much less to draw any valid or useful conclusions across the board.

**Advisor Personnel Management**

**Selection**

Qualities desired in officers assigned to advisory positions, and criteria and procedures for selecting officers with these qualities, are discussed in several recent studies of advisory experience. There appears to be general agreement on the qualities but less agreement on what selection criteria to use to capture these qualities.

Qualities are:

1. Professional motivation and commitment.
2. Professional competence.
3. Self control and emotional stability.
4. Strong social interests, a positive feeling of enhanced well-being when interpersonal relations are harmonious, and the capacity to accurately apprehend the affective reactions of others, often under limited communications conditions.
5. Curiosity and an ability to enjoy novel experiences.
6. Patience and persistence in seeking to make long-term changes.

7. A high tolerance for differences in advisor-counterpart perceptions of priorities, while persisting in efforts to make improvements.

8. Ability to effectively negotiate "gentlemen's agreements" in the absence of a single, common set of rules and source of authority for the advisor-counterpart relation.

9. Ability to work alone in unfamiliar environments and unstructured situations; a high tolerance for ambiguity and frustration.

It is often assumed that all or most of these qualities exist in an officer who has "successfully completed an advisory tour" and that this criterion alone is the simplest and most foolproof way of picking people for future advisory assignments. There are, however, no generally accepted and institutionalized standards of what constitutes success, or acceptable levels of achievement under various conditions.

Guthrie, in a study for the Navy, proposed that reliance be placed on a combination of (1) history data in personnel jackets, (2) ratings and evaluations by the potential advisor's current Commanding Officer, and (3) on data supplied by the man himself. Using data from individual personnel jackets, Guthrie claims to have found that effective advisors tended to have a higher level of education, more exposure to social sciences, earned their commission at an earlier age and had better scores on the Officer Fitness Report prior to service in Vietnam. (These results are

---

compatible with those of Askenasy\textsuperscript{16} on factors affecting the accuracy of American officers' perceptions of Korean attitudes and opinions and findings by Erickson\textsuperscript{17} that officers with advisory experience suggested the FSI entrance exam, senior service school qualifications and OERs as selective devices for advisors.) Data supplied by the man himself provide a measure of his ability to face twelve problems involving technical skills, adaptability to strange environments, personal habits, family stability, ability to work alone in unstructured situations, and sense of responsibility, commitment and purpose.

As matters stand now it appears that the best way to pick people for advisory assignments is to use a combination of records (for indicators of educational and professional interest, motivation and competence, and background experiences indicating adaptability to the unfamiliar\textsuperscript{18}), judgment of associates (assessment, by peers and supervisors, of candidate's expectable performance in roles and situations requiring the qualities listed above), and self-selection (the individual's response to the challenges and potential rewards of an advisory assignment, as described to him or as presented to him in test questions).

Training provides an additional selection device, particularly as it simulates real world experiences and forces the trainee to demonstrate how he would behave in given situations frequently encountered in


\textsuperscript{17} Erickson and Vreeland, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{18} In an HSR study of advisory experience it was suggested, on the basis of some statistical evidence, that pre-military experience in living and working with people of different social and cultural backgrounds appears to be related to adaptability to the advisor role. Also a device which might be useful in selecting officers for advisory duty, particularly from the lower grades, would be to include OER identifiers to evaluate an officer's suitability for advisory duty.
advisory assignments. However, it is probably more reliable as a device for self-selection out than as a screening device employed by personnel managers, since behaviors observed in training do not correlate well with those observed on assignment.¹⁹

Training

U. S. Army training in advisor functions and roles is incorporated in the Military Assistance Programmer/Advisor (MAPA) and Military Assistance Officer Command and Staff Courses at Fort Bragg, and the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Both MAPA and MAO C&SC are heavily weighted toward the procedural-technical aspects of military assistance and advice (with the difference that MAO C&SC is also strong in area analysis and development theory); MAPA includes a ten-hour block on the advisor role, cross-cultural communication and advisor-counterpart relations; MAO C&SC offers nine hours on cultural self-awareness and cross-cultural communication, but none of this is specifically pitched toward the advisor role. The C&GSC contains a four-hour block of instruction called "The Military Advisor" which is devoted exclusively to the advisor role.

Requirements for what to train in derive principally from two sources: (1) feedback from overseas military assistance commands, related mainly to procedural-technical components of advisor training, and (2) research surveys of advisory experience, related mainly to role management skills. MAPA advisor instruction appears to rely mainly on the former and C&GSC on the latter. Whether or not this division of labor between command and social science research is natural and obvious is

¹⁹Guthrie, op. cit.
something that probably should be considered; more importantly, the existence of two different fountain-heads for training requirements suggests that some means be found to cross-reference the requirements so as to coordinate their impact on advisor training programs.

A second reason for earlier coordination of command and research approaches to the identification of training requirements is the fact that actual job performance is controlled by variables other than training which deserve equal consideration in research designs and in the analysis of survey response data. Unless these two sets of variables are distinguished, it will be impossible to properly distinguish valid training requirements—i.e., those which derive from job requirements or job-related conditions—from the invalid ones—i.e., those which are inferred from errors in officer assignment and utilization, and deficiencies in guidance and supervision on the job.

It is not at all clear, at least to this author, that we have so far distinguished the effects of inappropriate or inadequate advisor training from ineffective or underdeveloped advisor management in terms of service-wide personnel systems and in terms of the in-country command, control and guidance of MAAG advisory staffs.20

A third reason for coordination is the need to sort training requirements out by advisor function and role and by level of universality. Commenting on the work of previous laborers in this vineyard, Graham says:

20 This point was raised earlier in regard to Vietnam; we also note that Froehlich speaks of implications for both training and management in his survey of advisors in KMAG (Froehlich, op. cit., 1969-71). We suspect also that if this distinction were more clearly drawn, it would explain some of the bimodal distributions that have emerged from responses to questions on training requirements.
A tendency was apparent for writers to offer general conclusions presumably applicable to all kinds of advisory assignments, but their observations were often based on a limited sample of advisory assignments and locations. In addition, substantial differences between advisory duty requirements and military occupation specialty specifications have been largely ignored. Attempt at generalization also ignored differences among tactical, technical, and administrative roles, between advisors working in combat and non-combat situations, and between regular and reserve officers' motivations and career requirements.\footnote{Warren R. Graham, Preparation and Utilization of Military Assistance Officers (Washington, D. C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, September 1969), p. 3.}

In sum, training requirements need to be:

1. Distinguished from management requirements.

2. Distinguished among themselves as to whether they are role general or functional specific; those that are functional specific should be further linked to requirements of classes and levels of jobs in functional areas.

3. Further distinguished among themselves as to whether they are universally applicable in terms of role, functions and jobs, or are applicable only in particular parts of the world or particular military assistance commands.

The most comprehensive and specific list of generic training requirements relevant to advisor training is the one published by HSR in Operational and Training Requirements of the Military Assistance Officer. While addressing themselves to training of the Military Assistance Officer, the authors of this study concluded that the core training requirements for an
advisor are the same as those for all other types of MAO function. This is supported by the DA OACS FOR study, Institutional Development\textsuperscript{22} where it is stated that (1) MAOP and FASP were designed with a broad advisory concept in mind, and (2) training for these programs teaches many of the basic skills required by an advisor in order for him to fulfill his role as an institutional developer. However, in view of what has been said earlier, the HSR list of training requirements needs to be rethought in the light of (1) the possibility that it may reflect some management as well as training requirements, and (2) the desirability of breaking it down by types of advisor function.

Some consideration should also be given to including training in arms control objectives and the implications of advisor activities for arms control.

The structure of training needs more attention on a world-wide basis, particularly to determine whether the training requirements are best addressed in CONUS service schools or MAAG-sponsored in-country orientation and training programs.\textsuperscript{23} Some means must also be found to bridge the real gap between pre-assignment training in service schools and post assignment training in the field, which relies heavily on in-house institutional lore.

A number of sources have commented on the structure of language training, which continues to be a problem in all overseas training programs. The following are summaries of these comments:

1. Area knowledge, cross-cultural communication and language training should be combined in one package.

\textsuperscript{22}Department of the Army, ACSFOR, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{23}Froehlich, 1968, op. cit.
2. Lengthy, intensive language training programs should be revamped so that they become programs for training in cross-cultural communication and interaction.

3. Amounts and levels of language training should be related to distinctions in functional responsibilities and to the level of operation in the advisory structure--i.e. there is a need for more language training at lower levels in the structure.

Special Programs

The desirability of establishing a special career program for advisors has been under consideration for a number of years. To date, there exist only courses designed to prepare Army personnel for advisory assignments (MATA and MAPA), the Province and District Senior Advisors Programs for officers destined for these particular assignments in Vietnam, and the Foreign Area Officer Program which prepares officers for a wide range of politico-military positions some of which are explicitly designated as advisory while others have important advisory components. Since the FAOP is not restricted to advisors and since the other courses and programs are bound to assignments, not to individual careers, there does not exist yet a special career program for advisors geared to the individual on the order of the other special career programs defined in DA Pamphlet No. 600-3.

On balance, the idea of establishing such a special career program for advisors does not seem to have much currency at this time. The thrust appears rather to up-grade advisory assignments in the promotion board decision making process, and to provide through more appropriate personnel management systems means of identifying, training and utilizing a pool of officers with specifiable advisory qualities, skills and experience.
who can be retrieved as needed for individual or team advisory assignments on a world-wide basis. This approach is certainly supported by the current C&GSC at Fort Leavenworth, which assumes that any officer may be eligible at some time in his career for an advisory assignment, and by the new Security Assistance Operational Support Package concept.

There remains, however, a potential conflict between this method of filling advisory assignments—i.e., the resource pool method—and the career program utilization tour method, at least in terms of those advisory positions included in the validated duty position list for the new FAOP.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section of the report summarizes the main points of the previous two sections. Since a study of this type—an inventory of knowledge—is not directed toward any pending actions, it does not require that conclusions and recommendations fall out in any particular way. Hence the recommendations listed at the end of the section are fortuitous, and represent the author's subjective perceptions of what current knowledge implies for further investigation or for action.

Conclusions

The Vietnam Experience

1. A wide range of advisory functions and duties were performed by U. S. Army units and individuals. Among the various categories of advisor recognized, the least distinguishable were the psychological operations and civil affairs advisors. Much of this type of advising was submerged under the more general rubric of Province and District advisor. However, U. S. Army psyops and civil affairs units deployed in Vietnam, as well as S-5/G-5 officers with tactical units, appear to have had such advisory missions.

2. During the height of the U. S. involvement the advisory organization in Vietnam became almost unmanageably large and complex, involving serious problems both in the replacement system and in the internal communications system. This situation was expected to be much improved with a reduction in force: (1) replacements could be selected on the basis of grade skill and experience rather than availability, and (2) communications lines could be shortened and simplified.

3. As U. S. forces withdrew, it was expected that reduced advisory staffs would focus on improving Vietnamese capabilities in organization, management, logistics and training, at all levels. The effort would concentrate on key GVN officials in headquarters and the employment of mobile advisory and training units for most of the field advisory activities.
4. The Vietnam experience has generated strong recommendations for (1) the development of advisor programs designed to select, train, assign and motivate the most highly qualified officers, (2) training geared to functional and regional types of assignment, (3) a greater reliance on post-assignment in-country training coupled with more efficient and realistic training in CONUS, and (4) the upgrading of advisory assignments in promotion board evaluations and decision making.

General Experience

1. The shift from grant aid to military sales will have an effect upon the advisory functions of MAAGs, MILGAP, and missions and on the advisory role. In the future:

a. The advisory role will be oriented less toward the transfer of programmed assistance and more toward the transfer of capabilities for self-reliance and increasing self-sufficiency in the HC military establishment.

b. At the same time, there is some evidence that resident advisory staffs may be slow to adjust to this new role, and that they may continue to support the more traditional MAP role of security assistance—e.g. by becoming "salesmen for" U. S. assets—in the hope of preventing a reduction of U. S. prestige and influence overseas.

c. In either case, advisors—particularly those in most immediate contact with HC military personnel, agencies and units—will remain a critical link in the process by which MAAGs, and unified commands obtain information about the HC and make decisions. Advisor perceptions of U. S. and HC policies, objectives and resources, as well as of their own role in U. S.-HC transactions, will be an important element in this process.

2. More attention will be paid by advisory staffs to improving HC capabilities in internal threat analysis, force structure planning, resource management, training, and other areas in which assisted military establishments had been overly dependent on MAP planning and programming.
a. Resource management may be expected not only to assume increasing importance, but also to go through a process of sorting out of its various components in relation to specific advisory functions.

b. There are a large number of resource management components, most of which are of a fairly technical nature and well established in service school curricula and specialty career programs.

c. The full range of these components is potentially exploitable through the advisor system, either by resident in-country staffs or advisory elements in the proposed security assistance support package teams.

d. It is not clear, however, how the sorting out of resource management components will occur in terms of advisor training programs, the assignment of skill identifiers, the organization of duty positions for advisors, and the division of labor between military and civilian specialists in advisory roles.

3. A major question is whether military advisory staffs will include the function of promoting HC "institution" or "nation" building capabilities beyond advice on the planning and conduct of military civic action programs.

a. Emerging CMO policy should logically address this question and if possible define the functions of the CMO advisor in such a way as to clarify his direct advisory duties in the area of HC civil-military relations.

b. The Type I Support Teams envisaged under the SAOSP concept are also concerned with the same issue, since their pre-crisis development activities presumably will include advising on political as well as economic and social development.

4. The reduction in the size of MAAGs will have a number of implications for the size, structuring and activities of advisory staffs.

a. Advisory staffs will have to be tailored more closely to in-country priorities and requirements, with more flexible mixes of advisory function. By the same token, individual staff members will have to train and operate more as "generalists" possibly wearing several functional "hats" at the same time.
b. Advisor specialists will be utilized in a flexible structure of mobile support teams, available on call by the MAAGs, and tailored to fit the particular in-country requirements.

c. There will be a need for more efficient employment and management of resident advisory staffs as well as in the management of support teams and the advisor-counterpart interface.

5. Criteria for selecting officers for advisory assignments in general should be essentially the same as those for selecting officers to become members of the FAO Program. However, differences will appear at the level of specific kinds of advisory assignment.

   a. Advisor positions in the new FAOP duty position list are geared to the special career program entry and training requirements; qualified program members should have preference over non-members in assignment to these positions.

   b. Resident advisor positions in MAAGs may require somewhat different assignment criteria from advisor positions on mobile support teams; the same is true between the major functional areas of advising.

   c. Other factors which certainly will influence assignment criteria are the type of sociocultural environment in which the advisor will be working, and the amount and type of interaction required with HC personnel.

   d. Formal training in CONUS can serve as a testing ground for both selection and assignment criteria, particularly if realistic simulation of foreign job environments and situations can be developed.

6. Generic training requirements for advisors appear to be the same as those for other categories of officers scheduled to serve in positions of politico-military importance. Such training can best be accomplished in the FAO C&SC; this would be followed with specialized training by particular function, area, and command.

   a. Resident staff will need more time allotted to in-country training as the requisite information and knowledge becomes focused increasingly on the peculiarities and specifics of the particular country, U. S. mission and assignment.
b. Support team advisors will require more training in the in-country requirements for their services.

c. In any case, much greater attention needs to be paid to separating training requirements from management requirements; this applies mainly to CONUS training since presumably both sets of requirements will be met simultaneously in in-country orientation, and on-the-job training.

7. Criteria for advisor performance should be derived from standards for both individual and unit performance. Although each kind of performance obviously impacts on the other, the two must be kept distinct for the same reason that training requirements must be kept distinct from advisory staff management requirements.

a. Criteria for individual performance derive from job requirements, both technical and managerial, within the limits of individual control, and they relate back to the selection criteria and training requirements for the individual advisors.

b. Criteria for unit performance derive from the mission, SOP, capabilities and limitations of the particular in-country advisory staff, and relate to the management requirements for such units.

c. A combined criterion such as "willingness to continue working together" may be universally applicable across all types of advisor assignment involving counterparts, but it does not tell us in what respects the index of effectiveness can be raised by better selection, training and assignment policies, and in what respects by better overall management of the in-country advisory organization and the advisory-counterpart interface.

8. While criteria for selection of advisory personnel, the design of advisory training programs, and the assessment of advisor performance on the job remain as important as ever, management of the advisory system is of equal importance. There are two major components of this system:

The Advisory Personnel Management System.

a. This involves the methods and procedures by which qualified officers are identified, steered into various training or career programs and placed in advisory assignments.
b. DOD Directive 2000.10, Subject: Selection and Training of Security Assistance Personnel, lays down general methods and procedures which the findings of this study fully support.

c. Current problems with this system appear to be (1) the assignment of officers to MAAGs with the wrong MOS---i.e., misassignment--or without appropriate preparatory training---e.g., MAPA or MAO C&SC, and (2) competition between officers who are and are not members of the FAOP for the same FAOP-validated duty positions to which FAOP members presumably have a prior claim as utilization tours.¹ The creation of an advisory resource pool under the SAOSP concept will only complicate this situation unless there is some comprehensive planning to fit alternative recruitment and assignment tracks into a single coherent frame.

d. The validation of key and supporting advisory positions for the Foreign Area Officer Program appears to have satisfied earlier proposals for the creation of a special career program for advisors.

In-Country Management of MAAG Advisory Staffs

a. This involves all of the policies and procedures, rules and guidelines, requirements, standards, and internal communications systems on the basis of which MAAGs conduct their advisory operations. It includes the determination of the specifications for advisory positions in the MAAG TDs, the definition of advisory missions and duties, in-country orientation and on-the-job training for advisors, the monitoring of advisor activities, the provision of an adequate interface with counterpart structures, and the monitoring of the flows of materiel, advice, information and other forms of exchange across the interface in the light of defined U.S. military and political objectives.

¹It is recognized that assignment of ideally qualified officers to MAAG positions is hindered by actual personnel constraints. Such constraints fall into the following general categories: (a) scheduling problems (there are only four MAPA courses per year), (b) requisitions not properly annotated to identify required training, (c) insufficient lead time to allow attendance at one of the listed courses, (d) inflexible reporting dates, (e) officer's availability. Improvements are being realized as requisitioning agencies validate their requirements for AERB or FAO utilization.
b. DOD Directive 2000.10 (see above) also specifies responsibilities for monitorship of the manning of the MAAG system to include qualifications, competence and performance of assigned personnel. The findings of this study fully support the need for this directive and the general pattern of distributing monitorship responsibilities and functions.

c. Current problems in the in-country management of advisor operations are not as apparent as they are in personnel management, at least in the documentation surveyed by this study. There is some evidence in the literature, however, that in-country advisor management could stand improvement in the following areas: (1) the provision of clearer policy and procedural guidelines, against which advisors can interpret their particular missions and decide among alternative courses of action, (2) more effective accumulation and transmission of job experience and institutional lore from one job incumbent to the next, and (3) methods of assessing advisory performance which distinguish between individual and organizational variables in performance, and provide useful feedback to in-country staff management as well as to advisory personnel systems.

Recommendations

1. Training requirements derived from surveys of advisor experience must be coordinated with training requirements derived from overseas advisory commands.

2. Requirements for training should be reexamined to determine which are best met by CONUS service schools and which by in-country orientation and on-the-job training conducted by MAAGs, MILGPs and missions. Examination of advisor training requirements to determine which are best met by the various training vehicles (service schools, in-country orientations, OJT) should be a continuous process.

3. Training requirements must be distinguished from, and supported by, specifiable management requirements for advisory staffs.

Many of these recommendations have been implemented, either explicitly or implicitly, in DOD Directive 2000.10, dated January 17, 1972.
4. Training of advisors should consist both of generic, or core, training, such as offered in the MAO C&SC, plus specialized training in some functional area. Training specifically for advisor roles should be available in areas other than programming.

5. Criteria for assigning officers to advisory positions should include a matching of the officer's experience and training in functional areas and special skills with the comparable requirements of the position. Commands should identify positions requiring specific qualifications to assist OPD in matching the individual to the job.

6. Alternative routes, or procedures, for the selection and assignment of officers to advisory posts should be coordinated.

7. Standards for individual job performance on the job must be based on explicit yet reasonable expectations of what the individual advisor can and cannot do in that job.

8. Individual performance standards must be distinguished from, yet complemented by, standards for the performance of entire advisory organizations in their respective overseas environments.

9. CMO doctrine should be required to spell out the role of the advisory staff in imparting this doctrine, including concepts of "institution building," to HC military counterparts.

10. The SAOSP concept should be carefully examined to determine more precisely what kinds of assistance and advice in CMO will be provided by Type I Support Teams to HC military establishments.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Army, Department of, HQ, Memorandum (DAMO-IAO). Subject: Army Civil Affairs Trends and Developments. 27 Dec 1972.


