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17 February 1975

THE ARMY RESERVE FORCES POLICY COMMITTEE

BY

COLONEL SANFORD J. LIEBSCHUTZ

ARTILLERY

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

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The Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee has served as a body of civilian-soldier advisors to the Chief of Staff for over 50 years. Its origins, historical development, current organization and operations, relationships to other interested agencies and role were examined. Data was gathered using a literature search, examination of the Committee's records, personal and mail interviews with present and former members and other officials having relationships with the Committee. The current role of committee appears to
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The concept of citizen-solder or part-time military force dates back to the pre-revolutionary war days with Rogers-Rangers. However, not until the National Defense Act of 1916 was a significant attempt made to formalize the structure and provide for effective training of a civilian-military organization. Before the concept could be fully implemented, World War I intervened and the reservists became part of the mobilized forces.

After the close of war, heeding the lessons arising from the nation's unpreparedness for World War I, Congress passed comprehensive amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916 which became the basic charter for our reserve forces during the inter-war years. Included in this legislation was an amendment to Section 5 dealing with the General Staff Corps, which provided:

"all policies and regulations affecting the organization, distribution and training of the National Guard and Organized Reserves, and all policies affecting the appointment, assignment, promotion and discharge of reserve officers, shall be prepared by Committees of .... the .... General Staff to which shall be added an equal number of reserve officers, including .... National Guard (Officers)...." (emphasis supplied).

Thus was established a body of civilian-soldier advisors to the Army General Staff which became known as the "Section 5 Committees" after the statutory section, and the predecessor of the present Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (ARFPC).
This paper will discuss the historical background of the ARFPC, describe its operations, attempt to evaluate its role, and make recommendations for its future.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

The statutory provisions were modified in 1933 by formalizing three committees, one composed of equal numbers Regular and of National Guard Officers, to deal with subjects relating solely to the National Guard, a similar committee of Regulars and Reserve Officers to deal with Army Reserve matters, and a committee consisting of equal number of the three groups to deal with matters of common interest. An additional proviso was added:

"...that the Chief of Staff shall transmit to the Secretary of War the policies and regulation prepared ... (by the Committees) ... and advise him with regard thereto."

Although the nature of the reserve forces changed considerably, the statutory provisions for the ARFPC remained unchanged over the next 23 years until a complete recodification of those portions of the United States Code relating to the Armed Forces in 1956. The new statutory provision in Section 3033 U.S.C., Title 10 was essentially identical to the provisions of the 1933 act, and with the exception of a minor language amendment in 1958, no fundamental change was made until 1967, when as part of the Reserve Bill of Rights, Section 3033 was amended. At this time, the term ARFPC was added, and the mission of the Committee was changed to
"...review and comment upon major policy matters directly affecting the reserve components of the Army, and the Committee's comments on such policy matters shall accompany the final report regarding any such matters submitted to the Chief of Staff and the Assistant Secretary responsible for reserve affairs." (emphasis added)

The statute went on to provide that the committee membership would be in the grade of Colonel or above, and would consist of 15 members, 5 from the Regular Army on duty with the Army General Staff, and 5 each from the National Guard of the United States and the Army Reserve not on active duty, to serve three year terms, with a chairman to come from the reserve component officers. The Committee structure was changed slightly to provide for two subcommittees; one excluding the Army Reserve members which dealt solely with matters dealing with the National Guard, and a similar sub-committee excluding National Guard members concerning Army Reserve Matters. The entire 15 member committee handles matters common to both reserve components.

The change in mission from "preparing" policies and regulations to "review and comment upon major policy matters" did not reflect a substantial change in the actual current role of the ARFPC. While in its early days, it did actually write regulations; the dynamics of the role of the reserves, the need for more immediate responses on day-to-day details and the lack of a large staff in the Committee, lead to the practical result that the detailed drafting of regulations and similar documents was handled by
Army Staff Officers, and the ARFPC became involved in judging proposed policies and making recommendations to accept, reject or change the proposed policies based on how the committee viewed the best interest of the reserves would be served.\textsuperscript{15}

It should also be noted that similar policy committees have been created for the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps reserves, and in addition a Reserve Forces Policy Board at Department of Defense level.\textsuperscript{16} The latter was a direct result of the Report of the Committee on Civilian Components to the Secretary of Defense (the Gray Report).

**ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION**

The current directives which implement the statutory provisions and provide for the operation and support of the Committee are Army Regulation 135-5, Chief of Staff Regulation 135-3 and Chief of Staff Memorandum 74-135.\textsuperscript{18}

Membership is limited to General Officers, except that a qualified colonel may serve as a temporary alternative in case of unforeseen exegency. Regular Army members consist of one representative each from the offices of Comptroller of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development.\textsuperscript{19} In addition a Liaison Officer is directed to be designated from Headquarters, United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) to have an equal voice, but without
vote. Until termination of the office in the 1974 DA reorganization, Chief, Office of Reserve Components monitored the committees as an observer. In addition, other DA Staff Agencies may send liaison officers or observers to the committee meetings on approval by the Chairman.20

Each Reserve Component has membership consisting of one General officer from each CONUS Army and two at large members with a limitation in each case that no more than two members of each component, including the subcommittee chairman, will be from a one CONUS Army. Terms are for a period of 3 years with no reappointment.

Chairmanship of the entire ARFPC rotates every two years between the ARNG and USAR, with the senior member of the respective component serving as Chairman. In addition, the senior member of each component serves as chairman of that component's sub-committee. USAR members as a practice all serve as commanders of troop program units. This is not only a function of the method of nomination, but also based on the fact troop unit officers can best speak concerning the import of reserve policies on the active reserve.21 In the case of the ARNG, members are divided approximately equal between troop commanders and State Adjutant Generals. This apparently is a deliberate attempt by the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to balance the more independent
troop commanders and the State AG's who may be more directly responsive to the concerns of the NGB. Under the same influence which has resulted in the "youth movement" evident in senior officers in the regular establishment, the current trend of nominees is to younger general officers.

Reserve Component members are appointed by the Secretary of the Army. ARNG members are nominated by the State Governors and recommended by Chief of the National Guard Bureau. USAR officers are nominated by Commanders of the CONUS Armies and recommended by Commander, FORSCOM through Chief of Army Reserve. The ARFPC itself is charged with monitoring its own membership, projecting vacancies and processing nominations.

Administration of the Committee's affairs is charged to two military executives, each in grade of not lower than colonel who are ARNGUS and USAR officers respectively, assigned on extended active duty for 4 year tours. The military executives have the joint responsibility to prepare agendas, organize meetings, refer matters to the committee, process its recommendations and represent the committee at Headquarters, DA. They are truly the eyes and ears of the committee. They act as liaison officers to the Army Staff when policies affecting the reserve components are involved, and represent the committee at briefings for senior army staff members. In addition, on an informal basis, knowledgeable military executives provide sources of information and advice to
members of the Army Staff and regular consultations are had when policies affecting reserves are involved. They also may serve as policy advisors to the Army Chief of Staff, and Secretary of Army. The military executive to the component which holds the chair of the entire Committee acts as the senior executive. However, the executives are charged with supporting the entire committee, not just their sub-committee and therefore must be able to respond to matters affecting either or both components. In the absence of one, the other must cover all responsibilities.

Regular Meetings of the Committee are held quarterly and generally last over 3 days. The first day, the respective sub-committees meet and receive a briefing by OCAR and the NGB respectively. In the past a joint briefing by CORC was also held before elimination of this office. The second day normally involves briefing by various army staff agencies on items of current interest, as well as status updates. Sometimes the DA staff uses this occasion to test briefings prior to presentation to the Chief of Staff. In addition to the liaison officers for various DA staff agencies, others who may attend this meeting on a regular basis include Chief of National Guard Bureau, Chief of Army Reserve, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Reserve Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, or their representatives. The Chief of Staff occasionally attends and regularly joins the Committee for luncheon. The final day the
Committee normally meets in executive session closed to all except the members and the military executives.

Between regular meetings, the military executives are charged with keeping the members up to date. This includes mailing material on a regular basis and constant communication with the respective chairmen. Many members use the military executives as a source of information. In additional special meetings have been called for urgent matters (such as Secretary MacNamara's merger proposal of 1965). The Chairmen also travel to Washington for special briefings on time critical matters.

RELATIONSHIPS

In order to better understand the actual functioning of, and role played by the ARFPC, and because nature of the ARFPC as an independent policy advisor, composed of successful individuals, and of three distinct groups (Regular Army, USAR and ARNG), it is appropriate to examine the current relationships within the committee, as well as external relationships of the committee with those groups and agencies, official and otherwise, who have interests in reserve policies.

The two internal relationships are those of ARNG and USAR, Reserve Components and Regular. Surprisingly, there appears to be little parochialism in any of the three groups. The ARNG and USAR, except for the 1965 merger battle, have tended to act with a considerable degree of unanimity. One defense official views
the Committee as an excellent channel by which the two components can communicate, but a more realistic view is that it is in their self-interest to reach a common position vis-a-vis a particular issue so that they are stronger when presenting it to the Regulars. Likewise except for the merger issue, the Regular members, at least in recent years, appear to be their own men and independent thinkers. This independence is institutionalized in CSR 135-3, where the independence of each Regular Army member is clearly stated, and they are abjured to base their decisions on their own experience and judgment, and not to vote as a block. Voting records indicate a considerable lack of unanimity among regulars with the split tending to favor the reserve positions.

Externally, we should consider relationships with OCAR, NGB, Chief of Staff, Department of Army Staff, Secretary of the Army, the Reserve Officers Assn, (ROA), the National Guard Assn (NGA), Senior Reserve Commanders Association (SRCA), and Congress.

The OCAR relationship apparently differs depending on perspective. From the OCAR point of view, it appears fine and is described as a "close" one. OCAR uses the USAR sub-committee as a sounding board, and brings problems to them early. The only apparent conflicts are as a result of personality differences. From the Committee's perspective, however, there is a feeling that the relationship is much less effective and that OCAR fails to use the Committee as well as it could.
In recent years a former OCAR practice of including the USAR military executive in its internal briefings has pretty much been discontinued. Certainly, OCAR currently exercises no control, and perhaps little effective influence on the USAR members.

The relationship between the NGB and the ARNG members is a little different. Apparently, the NGB is somewhat more effective than OCAR in getting its interests to the ARNG members and Chief. NGB has a closer relationship with the ARNG Chairman. However, ARNG members generally claim as much independence as USAR members. Nevertheless, the NGB can exercise considerably more influence on those members who are State AG's because of its ongoing, direct relationship to them.

Relationships with the Army Chief of Staff have varied over the years, generally good, with perhaps the major determining factor the importance of the role of the reserve components. Coincidentally with a major up-grading of the role of the reserves was General Abram's assumption of the Chief of Staff mantle. Having previously served as a member of the Committee, and monitored its role as a former CORC, he was very favorably disposed towards an effective role for the Committee. Not only was the implementing regulation, CSR 135-3, expanded to give a broad definition of what he considered the scope of major policy matters to be reviewed by the Committee, but he directed that he would not review any policy matter involving the reserves unless it had been referred to the Committee for its comment.
The Department of Army Staff, generally reflects the personality of the Chief of Staff, and therefore, as might be expected, current relationships appear to be excellent. This also appears to be a function of the current importance of the role of the reserve components. The relationship is also firmly planted in CSR 135-3 where the Army Staff is firmly directed to insure "each major policy matter affecting the reserve components" is referred to the Committee, that the Military Executives will be included on all briefing affecting reserve matters, and kept informed about reserve policy matters as they are being formulated. The attitude of the Army Staff toward the committee, as well as the importance of the reserves, may be well-reflected in the fact that whereas in past years, Regular member alternates attended with a fair degree of regularity, currently the principal members are generally present. In the past there has been reluctance on the part of some Army Staff members to show all their cards to the Committee; now more and more the staff is using the Committee to surface issues, and to check briefings and policies before briefing the Chief of Staff (which also allows them to have the benefit of comments and/or endorsements of the Committee). The most recent change also requires each Army Staff agency to provide a representative to keep the military executive briefed.

Relationships with the Army Secretariat are more limited,
but tend to be reflective of the same considerations found in the relationship with the Chief of Staff. Current relationships are good, and there is a very co-operative and interested attitude, particularly on the part of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs. However, one wonders what the attitudes may be on the part of the active side including the Secretariat, if the future budget constraints become very severe, and a battle results between reserve and the active forces for limited dollars.

The NGA and ROA are the two reserve component professional organizations. In the case of the NGA, there is a very close relation to the Committee. Indeed one writer on the National Guard has asserted that the ARNG members provide a direct channel of information to the NGA and are very subject to NGA influence, while another suggests that while the ROA has sought to duplicate this influence, it has not been as successful, due in part to the fact that while members are nominated by the Governors of the States, the USAR members are nominated by the Active Army. I suggest that today, at least, each case is somewhat overstated. There is no question that while the Committee has been a direct source of information to the NGA, the ARNG members assert independence. The lack of success of the ROA is more likely due partly because of the weakness of its efforts among all services, partly because of its orientation towards congressional relationships, and probably most of all due to the greater independence of the USAR members.
In recent years a new unofficial group has appeared on the scene, the SRCA. Open to all general officer members of the USAR, it is gaining recognition as an effective spokesman for senior army reserve commanders (in part probably due to the default of the ROA). Until recently there has been no formalized contact between the SRCA and the USAR members of the Committee, other than the fact that most, if not all, the USAR members were also SRCA members. However, in the summer of 1974, the SRCA decided to establish formal liaison with the Committee; the impact remains to be seen.

Nowhere has the ARFPC obtained a greater credibility or a more friendly reception than with the United States Congress. Since the establishment of the Committee was by Congressional direction, the Congress has looked favorably upon the views of the Committee and any Secretary or Chief of Staff who has omitted to consult with or provide the views of the Committee to Congress on reserve matters has been the target of Congressional ire. The following quotation involving the proposed reserve re-organization in 1962 is illustrative:

"The subcommittee (No.3 on Military Reserve Posture of the House Committee on Armed Services) is strongly convinced that the Department of Defense and Department of the Army would be well advised to utilize the counsel and suggestions of the various Reserve Forces Policy Boards ... made available to them by the Congress. These Boards, which are the statutory creatures of Congress, were
properly designated to be in a position of influence in guiding and formulating the development of Reserve policy. Recent events indicate that these boards ... have become subordinated to a position of a mere official observer in the development of policy ... the subcommittee wishes to take the opportunity to emphasize that the Department of Defense and the individual service departments should operate within the framework and intent of statutes passed by Congress.\textsuperscript{35}

ROLE AND IMPACT OF THE ARFPC

Having viewed the structure, operating arrangements and relationships of the ARFPC, what is its role and what impact has it played?

It is submitted that the role can best be described as being the only organized body of individuals who live within the civilian community, who can advise the Chief of Staff and through him the Secretary of the Army on reserve matters without being bound by Army bureaucracy. Certainly this is a much tougher charter than to be merely guardians of the reserve. As a member of the reserve, one finds that a major difficulty in dealing with the active army is that they are constrained by their environment and as such may fail to appreciate the relationship to the civilian community. The Committee with a foot in each of the worlds is best able to bridge this gap in dealing with reserve policy where it may be most critical.

If this is the philosophical basis, how is the role defined in practice? First, by the Committee itself. Its approach to its work, and the professional competence and perspective it shows, will provide its greatest validity. In
the past it has been criticized as too often dealing with minutiae, more form than substance, and the parochial problems of its members.

Second, the leadership of the Committee, both its Chairmen and military executives, will impact considerably on the acceptance, as well as its performance. In addition to acceptance of the Committee on the Chief of Staff level, much of the influence of the Committee in recent years had been due to the quality of its leadership.

Finally, acceptance by the Chief of Staff of a full role for the Committee will determine whether its efforts will be really effective (or whether indeed its major recourse towards impacting on reserve policies will be limited to surfacing them at the Congressional level). Under the present favorable attitudes, the charter of the Committee is broad, and its role and effectiveness can be as broad.

In analyzing the impact of the Committee's role, a review of a few major activities during the past decade is helpful. The major failure was dealing with the MacNamara plan to merge the USAR into the ARNG in 1964-65. Because of the perceived threats and gains to their respective interests, the reserve component members split along predictable lines, with the regular member supporting the DOD position in favor of the ARNG.
When the STEADFAST reorganization of reserve component support was proposed in 1973, the Committee reviewed the proposal in detail and were able to have numerous changes added which contributed much to the eventual effectiveness of the program.

As a result of a suggestion from one of its members, a team from the Committee visited the United Kingdom in 1971 to study the British Reserve forces. As a result of their report, the idea surfaced which resulted in the formation of the highly successful Committee for the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve.

During 1973, while the Army was engaged in the "Total Force Study", the Committee established a working group within itself to review the methodology of development of the reserve component (RC) troop structure. As a result of their efforts, the Committee developed a report which found gaps in current procedure, recommended changes to make more effective revisions to the RC troop list. This report has been incorporated into the Total Force Study as permanent methodology.

During 1974, the Secretary of Defense directed a 48,000 structure decrement in the Army's reserve components. During the early planning stages, the ARFPC surfaced several problem areas. The Committee, while disliking and disagreeing with the decrement, reviewed the problem and prepared a proposed methodology to develop criteria for retention of Reserve
Component units, which was submitted to and accepted by the Chief of Staff's Office.

THE FUTURE OF THE ARFPC

If, as I have suggested, the importance of the role of the Committee as policy advisor to the Chief of Staff, may be dependent on two major external factors, namely the role of the reserve forces it represents in the overall defense posture, and the receptivity of the Chief of Staff to its role, it is certain that the Committee, with its strong Congressional mandate, will continue to have a place regardless of the lessening of the impact of these favorable external factors.

It is submitted, however, that the Committee can impact favorably on its own destiny. Based on an analysis of the considerations and relationships discussed earlier, and assessing the opinions of the many whose views were sought, following are suggested actions or policies which can enhance the future of the Committee.

1. The Committee should remain within its charter as policy advisors. It has no mandate, and indeed no mechanism, for implementation of policy. This does not mean that the Committee cannot be innovative and suggest policy or implementation methodology as it has successfully done in the past.

2. The Committee should insure that it deals with major concerns, and not spend valuable resources dealing with minor
concerns which are better left to the NGB and OCAR.

3. The Committee requires the strongest leadership possible in its chairmen as well as military executives. Since the seniority system is a constraint in the chairmanship selection, this magnifies the importance of the membership selection process. The military executives, besides having a quality professional background, must also be aggressive in fulfilling their roles, seeking more responsibility and taking active parts in the operations of the army staff.

4. There appears to be limited formal relationships between the reserve component members of the Committee and the constituencies which they represent. The stature and effectiveness of the members as reserve policy advisors could be enhanced, if they developed systematic ongoing briefings or consultations with the CONUS Army Commanders, fellow general officer commanders and State AG's in order to insure that they as members, have the broadest knowledge of reserve concerns, and in turn they are able to convey the ongoing views and activities of the Committee to these outside parties.

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FOOTNOTES


2. US Laws, Statutes, etc., Public Law 85.


4. Ibid. Section 5

5. For simplification, the current designations Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (ARFPC) and Army Reserve Subcommittee/Army National Guard Subcommittee will be used throughout, regardless of the time frame of reference used, rather than the former designation General Staff Committee on Reserve and National Guard Policy, or Section 5 Committee.

6. In addition to the cited sources, numerous interviews have been had with persons now or formerly associated with the Committee in various capacities including a confidential survey of some members. Many comments and opinions were expressed provided they were not attributed to the speaker. In order to preserve the anonymity of these individuals, and obtain candid opinions, as well as avoiding personal characterizations, none of these sources are cited. However, the author does wish to express his thanks to the ARFPC, its Chairman and military executives for their cooperation and assistance in making material available for this essay, and giving freely their time, without which this would not have been possible.

7. US Laws, Statutes, etc., Public Law 64.

8. Ibid.


11. US Laws, Statutes, etc., Public Law 90-168 (Also known as "Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Revitalization Act").

12. Ibid.
13. Previously, and probably since World War II, the Committee membership totaled 21, 7 regulars and 7 each from the ARNG and USAR. Apparently, the number 7 was based on a member from each reserve Component from each of the 6 CONUS armies and one at large. Because of the reduction of the CONUS armies to 5, the 1967 amendment limited the number of members of each component to 5. Subsequent reduction of the CONUS armies to 3 has resulted in 1 member being designated from each CONUS army, with 2 at large. See later discussion, p. 5.

14. For example, records of the Committee indicate that during the early 1930's, General Douglas MacArthur, then Army Chief of Staff, sat with the members as they together drafted regulations on reserve matters.

15. The exact definition of the charter of the Committee was, however, a matter of dispute. This issue surfaced in 1961 and 1962, when a substantial reorganization of the reserve component structure was under consideration. In an exchange of correspondence between MG Carl T. Sutherland, Chairman of the Army Reserve Subcommittee and Elvis Stahr, Secretary of the Army, the scope of the Committees vote was debated. The position of the Secretary was in substance that the term "prepare" really meant "review and recommend." A collateral issue was also injected when the Secretariat insisted that if a certain policy was imposed by DOD, there was no option on the part of DA, and therefore the Committee had no part in its review. This was the original position taken by Secretary MacNamara when he attempted to impose the USAR-ARNG merger in 1966-67, which was later reversed, and which Congress was very critical of. It should be contrasted with the action of the Committee in the 48,000 decrement discussed on page 16. See letters from MG Sutherland to Secretary Stahr on 13 December 1961, 16 December 1961, 20 April 1962 and 15 June 1962; letter from Secretary Stahr to MG Sutherland on 1 June 1962; Fact Sheet for Chief of Staff from Office of Judge Advocate General, 21 December 1961, and undated memorandum for Undersecretary of the Army from MG Darnell, ACSRC concerning MG Sutherland's 20 April 1962 letter, all in files of the Committee.

16. The Reserve Forces Policy Board was created by Public Law 1028, Laws of 1956, and is designated as "the
principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components" US Code, Title 10, Section 175(c). The Air Reserve Forces Policy Committee traces its ancestry to the original ARFPC, and currently has an identical mission to the ARFPC. US Code, Title 10, Section 8033(a). The Navy and Marine Corps Policy Boards, originated in the Naval Reserve Act of 1938, but the current legislative basis is the 1956 recodification of Title 10, US code. The mission is to "report to the Secretary of the Navy on reserve matters." US Code, Title 10, Sections 525(c) and 5252(c).

17. Committee on Civilian Components (Gray Committee), Report to the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Forces for National Security, 30 June 1948, Section 5. The Gray Report notes the distinction between the Navy and Marine Corp Policy Boards which "advise the Secretary" and the Army and Air Force Boards which "prepare policy" and suggests they "should have common purposes and report directly to the Secretaries." It also suggests that similar committees should be appointed at lower echelons.

18. US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 135-5 (hereafter referred to as AR 135-5).
US Department of the Army, Chief of Staff Regulation 135-3 (hereafter referred to as CSR 135-3).
US Department of the Army, Chief of Staff Memorandum 74-135 (hereafter referred to as CSM 74-135).

19. For many years the office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) had a permanent membership as did the Comptroller of the Army (COA). The COA membership was dropped when the membership was reduced in 1967. However, the ACSI, evidently because of lack of interest in the Reserve, as well as lack of general officer assistants who could easily attend, asked to get off the Committee. COA was anxious to return and obtained the former ACSI membership.

20. Subsequent to the change of seats between ACSI and COA, the Surgeon General wanted a membership. Since one was not available, he asked and was granted permission to send a liaison officer. Currently, in addition to the directed liaison officer from FORSCOM, official liaison
officers attend on behalf of the Surgeon General, ACSI, and Chief of Engineers. The Army Material Command has an unofficial observer.

21. The only other potential source of USAR members - mobilization designees - do not have the day-to-day contact with the problems of the reserve, since almost without exception they serve on the staffs of DOD, DA, or senior active Army Field Commands.

22. AR135-5, para. 4; CSR 135-3, para. 2c, d; CSM 74-135, para's. 1, 3.

23. By way of comparison, the Reserve Forces Policy Board meets quarterly, but the policy Committees/boards of the other services meet once a year, for a two week session.

24. This article will consider the record of recent years. Historically, there have been many changes. The time has long past since LTG Milton Reckord, long-time advocate of a strong Army National Guard, was able to use the Committee to substantially enhance the role of the ARNG, such that he considered his lengthy service on the Committee as a "milestone" in his distinguished career. See "Milton Atcheson Reckord", The National Guardsman, February 1966, pp. 22-25.

25. CSR 135-3, para. 2e.

26. The following language was added to CSR 135-3 of 12 June 1974:

"Major policy matters, for the purpose of this CSR, are defined as those having a significant impact on the fundamental basic structure of the Reserve Components, such as proposals to enact, amend, or repeal legislation directly affecting the Reserve Components; the promulgation of regulations, or changes thereto, which affect the status of the Reserve Components and their personnel; any studies, surveys, or policies of the Reserve Component structure; and matters affecting the organization, distribution, training, appointment, assignment, promotion, or discharge of Reserve Component personnel."
27. No such specific direction was given by his predecessor General Westmoreland, but there was substantially the same effect because the then Secretary of the General Staff required such review by the Committee. Whether General Weyand will change the policies of General Abrams is yet to be determined.

28. This is contrasted with the remarks of an alternate member from the active Army in the mid-sixties, who said that once the decision not to mobilize the reserves for Vietnam was made by President Johnson, all he cared about the reserves was how much equipment they had which could be grabbed to fill the active needs.

29. CSR 135-3, para. 2a, c, d, and 3a.

30. Note also the current competition to be represented by liaison officers. See footnote 20.

31. CSM 74-135. This is an outgrowth of the elimination of CORC, and is the method by which the military executives can be kept up to date on all matters affecting reserve components, and provide a planning arrangement for Committee agendas. It reinforces the favorable attitude of the Chief of Staff.


34. Although available records contain no specific evidence, it is probable that LTG Reckord and his mentor BG John M. Palmer had a part in suggesting the Committee to Senator James W. Wadsworth of New York, the principal architect of the 1920 Act. See Derthick and Reckord.

35. US Congress, House, Subcommittee 3 of the Committee on Armed Services, Report on Military Reserve Posture, 1962, pp. 6671-6672. Additional discussions of this nature are found in extensive hearings on
controversial reserve proposals over the past dozen years, such as the 1962 reorganization and the 1965 merger proposals. For example see:
US Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Reserve Components, 1951, pp. 125-126.

36. CSR 135-3, para. 2a.

37. Although the formal vote on the merger was reported at 14 to 7 in favor, with only the Army Reserve members dissenting, information was given to the author that at least one Regular Army dissented originally but then changed his vote. For the atmosphere of the vote, see the testimony of MG Kaine, Chairman of the Committee, before the House Armed Services Committee, pp. 4243-4244.


40. Fred C. Weyand, GEN, Vice Chief of Staff, Letter to Chairman, Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee, 21 May 1974.

41. There is no specified criteria for the military executives. However, since they are operating at a DA staff level, in order to maintain professional credibility with their peers, their educational qualifications should be equal. In addition, because of no supporting staff, they must be capable of adapting quickly to the DA staff procedures. It is suggested that graduation from senior services school (resident or non-resident) and prior service on the DA or a senior Army field command staff either on extended active duty or as a mobilization designee would be most desirable prerequisites.
42. Successful relationships within the Army staff have been developed by military executives who have made it a point to explore these contacts, and volunteer their services to assist in projects, regardless of direct applicability to the Committee.
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(Ideas of the Army Secretariat on how the Committee should conduct its affairs.)

2. Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee, Inquiry to the Judge Advocate General, Subject: Duties of the Chief of Staff, Army and Secretary of the Army under Section 3033 U.S.C., Title 10, pertaining to the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee, 16 Oct. 1970, with Comment 2, by the Judge Advocate General dated 12 November 1970.

(Statement of the legal position of the role of the Committee.)


(Analysis and recommendations of the Committee on the Hollingsworth Study.)


(Analysis and recommendations of the Committee with respect to a methodology to restructure the reserve.)


(Summary of Committee study which resulted in several policy recommendations.)

(A brief summary of the current role of the Committee written by one of its military executives.)


(Bibliography covering the Guard and Reserve forces. Helpful but not scholarly in depth.)


(Analysis of the membership allocations for the Regular Members of the Committee.)


(Study by the Committee of a methodology to approach the proposed 48,000 decrement.)


(A controversial but important book on the National Guard. Includes detailed discussion of involvement of the NGA with the Committee.)


(Comments of the USAR members on the MacNamara Merger Proposal.)


(Position of the ARNG members on the MacNamara Merger Proposal.)

(The comprehensive study of structure of the reserve forces following WWII. Recommended DOD RFBP.)


(Excellent pamphlet summarizing the history of the Army Reserve.)


(Excellent scholarly article on the controversial Macnamara Merger Proposal.)


(Interesting article on one of the most famous and influential members of the ARNG, who had much influence on the Committee.)


(A study of the policy making structure of the Army reserve forces with particular emphasis on the role of pressure groups. Discusses relationships of ARFPC. Most comprehensive work in field. Dated, but still valuable for perspective.)


(Hearings on the proposed MacNamara USAR-ARNG Merger. Detailed discussion of role of ARFPC).

(Current implementing directive for the ARFPC.)


(Current directive for DA Staff support of Committee.)

21. **US Department of the Army, Chief of Staff Regulation 135-3: Co-ordinating Matters Regarding Reserve Components, Washington, 12 June 1974.**

(Current directive for Co-ordination of activities of the DA staff and Committee.)


(The current statutory provision for the Reserve Forces Policy Board.)


(The current statutory provision for the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee.)


(The current statutory provision for the Naval Reserve Policy Board.)


(The current statutory provision for the Marine Corps Reserve Policy Board.)

(The current statutory provision for the Air Forces Policy Committee on Air National Guard and Air Force Reserves Policy.)