CRISES IN A TRANSFORMING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Richard Smith Beal

University of Southern California

Prepared for:
Office of Naval Research
Advanced Research Projects Agency

January 1975
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT NUMBER
TR&A Technical Paper #24

2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.

3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER

4. TITLE (and Subtitle)
CRISIS IN A TRANSFORMING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
INTERIM TECHNICAL REPORT
7-1-74 to 12-31-74

6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
#24

7. AUTHOR(S)
RICHARD SMITH BEAL

8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(S)
ARPA #2518
N00014-67-A-0269-0029

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
University of Southern California
University Park, Los Angeles, CA 90007

10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
NR 177-952

11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS
Organizational Effectiveness Research
Office of Naval Research (Code 452)
800 No. Quincy St., Arlington, VA 22217

12. REPORT DATE
January, 1975

13. NUMBER OF PAGES
20

14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)
Office of Naval Research Branch
1030 E. Green Street
Pasadena, California 91101

15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
UNCLASSIFIED

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this report)
"Approved for public release; distribution unlimited."

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)
"Approved for public release; distribution unlimited."

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)
Threat Recognition, International Relations, Commitment,
Stress and Coping, Event Sequence

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

DR. 005335

DD FORM 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0162-014-6601
Crises in a Transforming International System

Richard Smith Beal
International Relations Research Institute
School of International Relations
University of Southern California
January, 1975

TR&A Technical Report #24
Threat Recognition and Analysis Project

"Approved for public release; Distribution Unlimited."

Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government. This research was sponsored by the Organizational Effectiveness Research Programs, Office of Naval Research (Code 452), under ARPA Contract No. #2518, N00014-67-A-0269-0029; NR 177-952.
Introduction

An international crisis, however defined or conceptualized, generates serious stress with which decision makers must cope. Distinguished from other international phenomena by its high levels of threat and surprise, and relatively short decision time, a crisis is the perfect setting for mishap, miscalculation, accidental war, unanticipated consequences and disaster. (C. Hermann, 1972: 13-14). All of the ingredients necessary for bridging the peace-war gap are embodied in a crisis. Crisis situations spawn international stresses which provoke the restraints on total conflict. In a crisis conflict thresholds become tenuous and highly susceptible to violation.

Under the stress of a crisis, decision makers face conditions of appreciable ambiguity and uncertainty. Previously acceptable policy guidelines are suddenly called into question, or are confused (Sigal, 1970: 133-149; Halperin and Tsou, 1966). Problems of accessibility to information, information accuracy and quantity, information processing and analysis become acute and disruptive (Jervis, 1970: 90-138; Janis, 1967). Perplexing problems arise when attempts are made to define and clarify the situation (Pruitt, 1965; Holsti, 1970). Tactics for coping with the crisis become uncertain (Whaley, 1973); commitments to allies, and assessments of an opponent's commitments to its allies turn into policy and intelligence quandries (Clay, 1950: 359; Murphy, 1964: 312-313; Wohlstetter, 1962). Important clues which should serve to alert decision makers to adverse futures are ignored, misread or misunderstood (Wohlstetter, 1965: 699, 701: Allison, 1971; U.S. Congressional Hearings, 1946: part 22, 527). As the crisis gains momentum whatever clarity existed initially about the relationship between the antagonists, the motives, capabilities and the ends risk being badly distorted.

Viewed as a turning point, especially a transition between peace and war (Wiener and Kahn, 1952; Schelling, 1966: 96-97; Young, 1968: 10; 1968: 6-24; McClelland, 1972: 83; Snyder, 1972: 218), a crisis is the most dramatic clue in the flow of international events anticipating a future condition of total conflict. A crisis specifically foreshadows a conflict, currently not present, at some indefinite time in the future which is more violent and more encompassing. It heralds a future condition of widespread disruption and chaos; it threatens a confrontation where the antagonists engage in an engulfing and destructive conflict. Hence, a crisis not only is threatening (C. Hermann, 1972), but it threatens even more undesirable events to come.
International crises are, therefore, threat situations (McClelland, 1974: 7 ff.) which generate stresses national decision makers must cope with to avert the anticipated state of comprehensive violence. Decision makers eliminate, reduce or redirect the international stresses by identifying, adopting and implementing policies controlling those factors tending to exacerbate the conflict toward total violence. Though this sounds like a purely "minimizing of violence" activity it should not be so construed. National policy planners certainly may adopt coping strategies employing higher levels of violence to avoid a future condition of undesirability. Frequently this is done under the guise of terminating the conflict more rapidly. Notable examples are Truman's decision to use nuclear weapons against Japan to stave off an extended Asian war at the end of World War II, (and probably also to satisfy the promises made to Stalin at Yalta), Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam war, and recently Nixon's "Operation Linebacker II", the decision to bomb Hanoi and the rest of North Vietnam on December 18, 1973. (Northedge and Grieve, 1971: 254; Ellsberg, 1971; Szulc, 1974: 61-62). Or it may be the case that coping mechanisms relying on higher levels of coercive force are chosen because national values are so threatened by external events that no other recourse seems feasible. On this point Whiting has speculated that the Chinese Communists saw the hardening United States' policy on Formosa and Korea as casting doubt on Washington's declared policy of limited objectives (Whiting, 1960: 6-8). Peking's intervention in Korea was apparently a coping mechanism utilizing greater coercive power to avert a future adverse state, namely a condition where the U.S. would make further encroachments against Chinese territory after conquering North Korea or at the very least export Chinese domestic dissension.

The prime consideration here is to investigate how national systems cope with a highly dynamic threat situation like an international crisis. Specifically the interest is to examine the sequence of coping strategies designed to handle the stresses generated by an unfolding international crisis in its pre-confrontation stages. It is assumed that crises typically evolve out of the sequential interaction of national actors, rather than from domestic sources. It is a process that emerges, or builds-up. The components of a crisis are inherent in the international setting before the "wall" is ever erected, or the missiles discovered. Instantaneous flare-ups, disputes without some early warnings are rare. Consequently it is maintained that along the path to an international crisis of major proportions are tracks; detectable tell-tale signs in the "performance
characteristics" of nations which reveal a pre-crisis trajectory in their interactions. The question to be determined is what do pre-confrontation interactions between antagonists look like? Exactly what are the behavioral manifestations of national systems during a pre-crisis period (that is, the period preceding the confrontation characterizing a full-fledged crisis)? What similarities or differences are there in the international stresses and coping strategies selected to manage them across different crises?

International crises, though fairly recurrent international phenomena, are never exactly the same. One crisis is clearly not a replica of its predecessors or successors. Each varies with regard to issue, participants, the international environment, national and personal capabilities, ends, motives, geographic location, history or background to the dispute, escalation tempo, initiation, levels of constraint on coercion and many other factors. Classification schemes are multiple and wide-ranging. Despite this condition, the assumption to be tested is that pre-crisis interaction sequences, especially the coping mechanisms adopted to respond to the different stresses, have regularity and pattern which anticipate a more extensive confrontation to come sometime in the future. Justification for such an assumption has been advanced many times before (McClelland, 1961; 1964; 1966; 1968a; 1968b; 1968c; Bales, 1951; Tanter, 1972: 13-17). Treated as an emerging threat situation, the pre-confrontation phase of interaction can be defined by a simple ratio of threat situations (stresses) to the means (coping strategies) for meeting the threat (Withey, 1962: 110). Actions taken by national systems bearing on the same, or related issues, are incompatible or at least are perceived as incompatible, when they obstruct, prevent, interfere with, injure, portend greater dislocations in the future, or otherwise disrupt the respective behavior or objectives of the potential protagonists.

These incompatibilities are international stresses; they may involve actual or anticipated physical injury, pain or death; disruption in the normalcy of international relations; constrained and/or impoverished conditions leading to deprivation. Under these conditions pressures are produced to resolve the discrepancies (Schon, 1971: 187-190). Stresses mount to affect a change in policy necessary to accommodate the incompatibilities. When successive changes in policy fail to adjust the incompatibilities, that is to reduce the ratio between the threat situation to the means for coping with it,-- the
probability of the threatened confrontation increases. With the increase in the probability of a confrontation comes an increasing reliance on coercive coping strategies. Though the general circumstances of the pre-crisis phase are involved and highly complex, the presumption is that the stress and coping sequence is traceable; to use McClelland's phrase, the sequence leaves "tracks." The analytic task, is to identify the most iterative sequences common to the pre-confrontation phase across cases, and to isolate those sequences as indicators of future crises.

New Forces: A Transforming International System

International crises are well investigated phenomena. Case studies abound and empirical studies continue to proliferate (Hermann, 1972). But what makes the topic fresh and demanding renewed attention is the political transitions taking place currently in the international system. Political fluidity, Oran Young says, "frequently evoke an air of political expectancy which creates in decision makers a psychological receptivity to the possibility of sharp breaks with the past. In this context crises often appear as short but intense confrontations growing out of a merging in space and time of disturbances just outlined." (1968: 63). Crises attend disturbances in the system; they are products of, as well as catalysts for, international dislocations. Current international political conditions are extremely fluid, transitory, and potentially crisis-provoking. It appears 1974 is an important axial point in the re-configuration of power and influence among the international actors. Within the context the forecast offered here is that there will be an increasing tendency for political crises during this period of political instability. The expectation is the forthcoming decade will be dotted with political crises as the system works out its new alignments.

To be sure these crises will vary with respect to participants, issues, geographic location, tempo, intensity, constraints on violence and other characteristics. The pressures of the oil crisis, the food crisis, the international monetary crisis, the changing character of the strategic arms race, the precarious nature of the international economy, global inflation, natural resources scarcity, worldwide pollution, alterations in the status of underdeveloped nations, international terrorism, the changing relationship between multinationals and their host and mother countries, chronic trade imbalances, the public confidence crisis, and the apparent declining capacity of national governments to cope with their problems are
extremely unsettling. It is anticipated that these international stresses, if unabated, will entangle members of the international system in a succession of political upheavals of significant proportion. These "new forces" (Brown, 1974) justify a renewed interest in political crises. Each has surfaced in one way or another as a critical political issue. It can be expected that these new forces will continue to figure in the major disputes in the next few years. Present conditions forebode a future with more intense international stresses in the face of waning capacity to cope (Laqueur, 1974).

The expectation is that these forces will generate with ever increasing frequency political crises. By illustration, Gelb and Lake have recently observed that international food aid was hardly a major political issue in Washington until 1973 (1974: 176). Customarily the USDA determines crop availability and establishes stock reserves to maintain domestic prices. The Secretary of Agriculture selects which food stuffs should be exported. Congress passes price support legislation, while the State Department and AID make decisions on the questions of foreign need and political-diplomatic advantages in aiding selected foreign allies. But in 1973, the cohesive factors holding their routinized system together eroded because world hunger reached crisis proportions. Gelb and Lake assert: "The availability of food for food aid was not the problem. American farmers were producing record crops. The problem was that food aid was now trapped in the web of inflation, concern about balance of payments, and pressures to cut back on government spending. It was also being squeezed because of its direct impact on the American consumer. As Administration officials argued, it was hard to visualize a more inflationary program than PL-480-- shipping scarce resources out of the country." (Gelb and Lake, 1974: 177).

Kissinger's speech before a special meeting of the United Nations General Assembly elevated the food aid issue to full diplomatic-political stature. The Secretary's remarks on the food crisis were couched in terms of the general natural resource shortages problem. He made some initial warnings to oil producers and the declaration that American food prices were increasing. But the principal thrust of the speech was the American pledge to make a major effort to ward off more universal starvation and famine. Later before the World Food Conference in Rome, Kissinger extended his remarks on the food crisis.
We meet to address man's most fundamental need. The threat of famine, the fact of hunger, have haunted men and nations throughout history. Our presence here is recognition that this eternal problem has now taken on unprecedented scale and urgency and that it can only be dealt with by concerted worldwide action...

We must act now and we must act together to regain control over our shared destiny. Catastrophe when it cannot be foreseen can be blamed on a failure of vision or on forces beyond our control. But the current trend is obvious and the remedy is within our power. If we do not act boldly, disaster will result from a failure of will; moral culpability will be inherent in our foreknowledge. The political challenge is straightforward: Will the nations of the world cooperate to confront a crisis which is both self-evident and global in nature? Or will each nation or region or bloc see its special advantages as a weapon instead of as a contribution? Will we pool our strengths and progress together, or test our strengths and sink together? (Kissinger, 1974f)

Raised to the level of political sensitivity, these issues become new international stressors. In varying degrees and formats each issue has the potential, like the oil crisis, of causing dramatic changes in the system. Scant knowledge is available about what consequences these changes could have, but there is every reason to believe that the pressure to use coercive diplomacy, when conflicts of interest become more intense (Seabury, L.A. Times, Sunday, Dec. 8, 1974) will increase along with the probability of acute crises.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has been particularly consistent and cogent about the profound political changes taking place in the international system. The Secretary is certainly not without his critics (Schaetzel, 1973: 66-74; Hoffmann, 1973: 3-6; Hoffmann, 1972b; Brzezinski, 1973: 714-718) who principally argue that Dr. Kissinger, though he may perceive accurately the system's transformation, is responding in very traditional ways incapable of accommodating the new stresses.

Even so, Kissinger has repeatedly made reference to the changing character of the international system. Before the Council on World Affairs in New Delhi on October 28, 1974,
Kissinger outlined his view of the "new world." The central features of this new system are its economic interdependence, complexity and universal aspirations. Held together by the speed of communication and the "spectre" of nuclear war, he asserted the world had undergone profound changes. These changes "signified the transition from a bipolar world locked into confrontation and seemingly destined for some final encounter to the new world of dispersed power and reduced tension." (Kissinger, 1974e: 1).

The American view of global affairs has appreciably altered because of these changes. It is obvious the Secretary views detente as a response to global complexity. He considers it as an operational response (coping strategy) to the "political lesson" of the current age: namely, "that national interest can no longer be defined or attained in isolation from the global interest, and the moral challenge of our age is to free ourselves from the narrow perception of the nation state and to shape a conception of global community." (Kissinger, 1974e: 1).

Threats of economic disaster, environmental erosion and widespread starvation and famine are universal and confront leaders around the world with the necessity of adopting truly cooperative foreign policies. These are not conventional political problems; high politics has customarily been restricted to the classical security problem where an advantage for one party could be conceived of as a disadvantage for the other. The new sources of political tension revolve around issues where a gain for one nation does not come at the expense of another.

Kissinger recognizes, however, that a transition from conventional diplomacy to global cooperation and national restraint will not be "effortless." The United States and its allies as well as its antagonists will undoubtedly experience significant trauma in adopting new "views of right and wrong, of the possible and the ideal...." (Kissinger, 1974e: 2). Nevertheless, the Secretary envisages an unprecedented crisis if the nations of the world do not cope with their common threat situations through collective diplomacy.

The traditional agenda of international affairs--the balance among major powers, the security of nations--no longer defines our perils or our possibilities. To some extent we have mastered many of the familiar challenges of diplomacy. Yet suddenly we are witnessing a new threat to the governability of national societies and to the structure of international stability. A
crisis threatens the world's economic system. The industrialized nations see decades of prosperity in jeopardy; the developing countries see hopes for development and progress shattered or postponed indefinitely. And even the newly wealthy oil producers are beginning to perceive that their gains will be swept away in a global crisis.

Tagore wrote with foresight: 'During the evolution of the nation the moral culture of brotherhood was limited by geographic boundaries, because at that time those boundaries were true. Now they have become imaginary lines of tradition divested of the real obstacles. So the time has come when man's moral nature must deal with this fact with all seriousness or perish.'

The time has come for nations to act on this vision... (Kissinger, 1974e: 5, 8).

In one form or another the Secretary has repeated the themes of interdependence, collective action, universal threats of nuclear war, economic collapse, declining energy, adequate food supplies, eroding environmental quality, population problems, improper use and management of the seabed, and growing governmental inability to cope with national disasters (Kissinger, 1973; 1974a; 1974b; 1974c; 1974d; 1974e; 1974f; 1974g). Dr. Kissinger's concern is that traditional concepts and current policies are lagging far behind the perils of the day. This is further compounded by his expectation that international peace and security depends not so much on managing the present crises of "inflation, fuel, and food," but on resolving them.

Before the 29th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 1974 the Secretary of State contended:

The delicate structure of international cooperation, so laboriously constructed over the last quarter century, can hardly survive-- and certainly cannot be strengthened-- if it is continually subjected to the shocks of political conflict, war, and economic crisis.

The time has come, then, for the nations assembled here to act together on the recognition that continued reliance on old slogans and traditional rivalries will lead us toward:
--A world ever more torn between rich and poor; East and West, producer and consumer;

--A world where local crises threaten global confrontation and where the spreading atom threatens global peril;

--A world of rising costs and dwindling supplies of growing populations and declining production. President Ford dedicated our country to a cooperative, open approach to build a more secure and more prosperous world. The United States will assume the obligations that our values and strength impose upon us.

But the building of a cooperative world is beyond the grasp of any one nation. An interdependent world requires not merely the resources but the vision and creativity of us all. Nations cannot simultaneously confront and cooperate with one another.

We must recognize that the common interest is the only valid test of the national interest.

It is in the common interest, and thus in the interest of each nation:

--That local conflicts be resolved short of force and their root causes by political means;

--That the spread of nuclear technology be achieved without the spread of nuclear weapons;

--That growing economic interdependence lift all nations and not drag them down together.

We will not solve these problems during this session, or any one session, of the General Assembly.

But we must at least begin:

--To remedy problems, not just manage them;

--To shape events, rather than endure them;

--To confront our challenges instead of one another (Kissinger, 1974d: 2).
Following his boss' lead, Winston Lord, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, has also addressed himself to the issue of a changing international system. Naturally Lord's ideas deal explicitly with redefining American foreign policy in a new and "ambiguous" age. Lord's assessment of the profound changes in the international system is that the United States must confront the fact that she can neither escape the world through isolation, nor dominate it with its preeminent power. Consequently, he asserts, "America is destined to cope with a shrinking planet of dispersed power, diverse goals, and interdependent economies." (Lord, 1974: 1). Given that (1) most American allies have regained their strength and self-confidence, (2) the ideological conflict with Communist states has diminished, (3) U.S. nuclear superiority has retreated in favor of parity and the specter of proliferation, and (4) national prosperity hangs on the stability and well-being of the world economy, the U.S. is forced to re-evaluate its purposes.

Post World War II alliances, Lord argues, were formed when America was clearly the dominate power, Communist expansion was a universal threat, and economic growth was assumed. Today's emerging reality is fundamentally different. The U.S. does not maintain a position of unequivocal dominance among its allies. Europe is seeking a new unity and strength; Japan has a prominence in the international system independent of its major Western ally; and even Latin America is enjoying a new sense of autonomy. These changes are sufficient to require a redefinition of the Western alliance. A new molding is necessary if the alliance can expect to persist as a viable force in the future.

Lord sees the decline of ideology as a positive trend in world politics. He is not totally convinced that Communist states will not act like revolutionary movements some time in the future, but for the moment they appear to be assuming their proper role as world powers rather than revolutionaries. The United States has matured in its attitude toward the domestic structures of foreign powers. It is unlikely that America can force a change in a state's internal political structure, but by reducing international tensions there is hope for a transformation. The United States is learning, however slowly, to deal with states on the basis of their foreign policies and not their domestic politics. Certainly fragmentation in the Communist bloc, the emergent parity in the strategic balance and new economic incentives between the East and West have contributed markedly to a decline in ideological contests.
While there is no doubt that national security, viewed in traditional terms, must be perpetuated--"a strong national defense stretches ahead for as far as we can see"--present conditions suggest power is harder to define and establish. Accordingly, Lord contends, "Once, political, military, and economic power were closely related. But in the modern world additional armament cannot always be translated into additional political leverage; economic giants can be politically weak; countries can exert political influence without possessing either military strength or economic might. Power is spread more diffusely across the globe, and its use is more complex" (Lord, 1974: 9-10).

Together with many other observers of contemporary affairs, Lord sees global interdependence as the newest reality and a force transcending political boundaries and ideologies. It links nation states to one another's fates. Breakdowns in economic sectors trigger domestic instability and challenge the fragile structure of the international system. Easy choices, vast surplus, endless supplies, low rates of inflation, unlimited growth rates are gone. The critical question remains whether concepts for grappling with these issues together with the necessary capacity and will to act even exist? "What is at stake is mankind's faith that man still shapes his future" (Lord, 1974: 14).

Outsiders are not convinced the bureaucracy and the "lords" of foreign policy formulation accurately perceive the shifting nature of the international system, despite what they say. In a book aimed primarily, though not exclusively, at statesman and bureaucrats, Seyom Brown has called attention to the "cracks in the plaster." Brown's work is a thoughtful, policy-oriented study designed to show the general erosion of the cold war coalitions and the nation-state system. He reasons that these structures have been so influential in the past, that the consequences of their breakup are likely to be severe and extremely destabilizing. The policies of "pragmatic marginalism" (Brown's phrase for describing the tendency of policy makers to deal with those specific problems "clearly within reach with capabilities readily at hand") and conservatism will not be capable of coping with the volatility of a changing world system.

Brown rejects the position taken by Walter Laqueur and others that nothing really has changed and that cold war antagonisms are as active as ever (Laqueur, 1972a; 1972b; 1972c; 1973). A counter-position is advanced which argues that the premises upon which NATO and the Warsaw coalitions
were formed are no longer as salient as they once were. The military security issue is being fragmented. The value of military allies to deter aggression is receding; there is a growing awareness that policy goals can be pursued independently of a strong cohesive military coalition; while, the costs for maintaining military forces overseas are outstripping their relative value. (On the status of U.S. troops in Europe see Taylor, 1974: 588). East-West relations are depolarizing and nonmilitary issues are producing growing tensions among the allies (Harrison, 1972; Oberdörfper, 1972; Nalmgrnen, 1970-71: 125-126; Shuster, 1973; Lewis, 1973). Both the Atlantic alliance and the Soviet bloc are undergoing significant stress and strain.

It has become evident to statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic and in Japan that the tight alliance pattern of the 1950s is unsustainable, and even the looser relationship of the 1960s is coming apart on many issues. More and more the coalition is being transformed into a vast web of intersecting adversary and cooperative relationships. And it is this latter feature that progressively defines and sets the tone of international politics outside the communist sphere....

In the sum, it appears that important cultural and economic currents running through Eastern Europe are undermining the hierarchical basis of the Soviet coalition and in so doing are increasing the costs to the Kremlin of maintaining tight control. In the main, these costs take the form of the demoralization of the most creative and productive elements within the communist world, which in the long run could affect the balance of power on which the physical security of the Soviet Union itself finally depends. Increasingly the Soviet leadership is therefore faced with the profound dilemma of balancing immediate control against real power over the long term (Brown, 1974: 44, 65).

The saliency of the ideological conflict between East and West is declining. The strains that characterized the 1950s and '60s are being modified by economic incentives (Patolichev, 1970: 6-7) between America and the Soviet Union, and the newly established relationship with mainland China. But while East-West relations are depolarizing, North-South stresses are being aggravated. Brown fully expects these tensions will be exacerbated further in the
years to come. Pressures from the strain of over-population, industrialization, environmental quality, declining energy and natural resources will continually frustrate the relationships between the haves and the have-nots.

The central thesis of this portion of Brown's argument is that these changes will produce a new system of world politics.

The particular characteristics of the emerging system cannot be forecast with confidence, just as the adult behavior patterns of a child cannot be predicted. Tendencies can be observed from which potential courses of development can be inferred; but which main course will be taken, and then which subsequent paths, is highly contingent upon unpredictable environmental and internal events (Brown, 1971: 109).

Though forecasts are difficult, Brown envisages the emerging system will be one of "multiple coalitions" dependent on cross-cutting interdependencies. The consequences of this interdependency can be benign or extremely threatening and disruptive. Which pattern evolves is contingent on how statesmen cope with the confusing situation facing them. Despite his uncertainty about what the future will look like, Brown is positive that the traditional coalitions of the cold war are disintegrating.

Concomitant with the disintegration of cold war alignments and the emergence of multiple interdependencies, there are pressures challenging the nation-state system. Dissolving the state arguments are fairly common in the literature (Wagner, 1974: 435-466; Keohane and Nye, 1972; Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, 1971). International stresses such as technology, economic transnationalism, cosmopolitanism (meaning low identification with national allegiances), affluent alienation (meaning rejection of the prevailing cultural norms and the adoption of "countercultures") and ethnicity (the eroding force of nationhood itself) are producing a crisis in the established political order of the nation-state system. The primacy of the nation-state as the principal actor in the current system is under attack. Political order is suspect and the possibilities for violence measurably increased as actors in the system vie for status and prestige, and seek new relationships and rules for behavior.

These processes, that is the disintegration of cold war
alignments and the decline of the nation-state system, are trends anticipating and producing a transformation in the system.

The forces now ascendant appear to be leading toward a global society without a dominant structure of cooperation and conflict—a polyarchy in which nation-states, subnational groups and transnational special interests and communities would all be vying for the support and loyalty of individuals, and conflicts would have to be resolved primarily on the basis of ad hoc bargaining in a shifting context of power relationships (Brown, 1974: 186).

In anticipation of this transformation, Brown suggests that world community structures will have to be substantially strengthened and "a decisive shift in basic socio-political attitudes toward community—who is responsible for whom, who is accountable to whom—"if man is ever to cope with his dramatically new world.

Zbigniev Brzezinski, long critical of the Administration's foreign policy, joins Brown in trying to alert Washington to the "broad systemic and dynamic crisis."

In fact, the present crisis has made its (the United States') role more important than at any point in the last 10 years. Thus, the time has come to bury the cliche about the retraction of American power. The central issue today is the redefinition of American power in ways that are relevant to present circumstances. More specifically, the point of departure for an effective U.S. policy must be a clear-headed recognition of the depth and extent of the existing crisis, as well as commensurate institutional and personal realignments in the policy-making processes of the U.S. government (Brzezinski, 1974-75: 66).

The Columbia scholar doubts whether the United States is institutionally prepared to respond to the present state of affairs, a "state of social emergency" (Brzezinski, 1974-75: 72). He argues with other analysts that the assumptions undergirding the post-World War II international system are invalid today. Atlantic harmony and European integration and progress can no longer be assumed as synonymous. Progress toward a liberal, free trade system based on fixed monetary rates appears more and more
doubtful, and the monolithic threat of revolutionary powers appears less monolithic, less threatening and less revolutionary. Finally, the less developed nations show signs of surprising unity and assertiveness.

These changes, Brzezinski posits, demand "a major architectural effort rather than an acrobatic foreign policy." The issues placed on the global agenda by these alterations require "cooperation, joint planning and consultation." The inherent dynamic pushes essentially non-political matters to the level of political accommodation and adaptation. U.S. policy makers, if they hope to cope with these problems, should broaden their scope, eliminate the personalization of foreign policy and modernize their conceptual frameworks.

Puchala and Fagan are two additional voices in the chorus heralding decisive changes in international politics: "A number of us currently engaged in the study of international relations sense that international politics have changed structurally, procedurally and substantively during the last ten years." (1974: 249). This change is not viewed as a revolution where the traditional "security paradigm," dominating the most recent era from 1945-1960, is replaced with a contradictory and incompatible one. A more subtle shift has occurred. Security contests are still very active forces, but governments are increasingly preoccupied with "enhancing" the overall welfare of their citizenry through their foreign policies and selected international machinery. This is true because new complexities have arisen in the international system affecting its "structure, process, and substance."

Structurally the system has considerably more active entities controlling or at least significantly influencing foreign affairs. A tremendous proliferation of non-national actors have arisen to place new matters on the global agenda and significantly influence their final disposition. The number of international organizations has grown; the foreign policies of multinational corporations are more prominent and decisive today than ever before, and, the growth of transnational relations has precipitated a new kind of politics (Singer and Wallace, 1970: 239-287; Nye and Keohane, 1972). International interactions are, consequently, more diverse making government to government behavior but one strand of systemic behavior.

Subsystems are politically more active today. Puchala and Fagan reason that this activity appreciably changes the meaning of global politics. How global politics means that
few events have isolated consequences whereas it once referred exclusively to the reach of super power politics. The behavior of states, large and small, proximate and distant, influence one another. Subsystem politics have not supplanted the cold war system, a position somewhat at odds with Brown's views, but it is more analytically appropriate to view the present system as containing both forces.

Structural complexity is compounded further by new international processes, namely—integration. By integration, Puchala and Fagan mean "peaceful transnational problem solving." (1974: 258). The process involves the use of foreign policy instruments to achieve peaceful problem solving. Again Puchala and Fagan do not hold that integrative processes are replacing competitive ones; however, they do assert that integration processes are more frequent and more influential in bilateral relationships than ever before. The viability of international integrative processes facilitates regionalism. "In this vein, most obviously, regionalism is certainly alive and well in the 1970s, in Western Europe where the Six recently became the Nine, in Central America where a common market agreement seems to have withstood an international war, in South America where the Andean Group is grasping the development dilemma by the horns via international cooperation, and in Africa where the "try, try again" ethic prevails despite any number of false starts." (Puchala and Fagan, 1974: 258).

The final element of increased international complexity is the "novelty" achieved in the range of salient substantive issues. Actors in the system are still assiduous patrons of power politics, but the new dimensions of welfare politics have been added to their behavioral inventories. Puchala and Fagan consider their change in the substance of world affairs as the core of the systems new complexity. The change leads the authors to expect governments to view the behavior of other actors more in economic terms rather than militarily. Issues about trade, aid and money form the basis for future inter-actor collaboration or collision. In sum, questions of national security have moved from the center of governments focus to center left to allow these nonsecurity issues to share the limelight.

As Stanley Hoffmann has espied, a changed international system produces the setting for some very difficult "choices" (Hoffmann, 1973: 3-42). Under a declining security dilemma, whether real or imaginary, priorities are revamped. Third World conflicts are confused, and traditional explanations of high politics contests become unacceptable. Asymmetrical multipolarity, shifting attentions from the

At the root, there is the displacement of the security dilemma; the move from a world dominated by a single chessboard--that strategic-diplomatic one (which either eclipsed or controlled all others)-- to a world dispersed into a variety of chessboards. This is partly the result of the nuclear stalemate (which has somewhat neutralized the strategic chessboard and reduced, if not its fundamental importance, at least its daily saliency), partly the product of economic and social processes and scientific invention in a world obsessed by the quest of economic growth (Hoffmann, 1973: 5).

Hoffmann anticipated these new chessboards in 1968 (Hoffman, 1968: 10-51; see also Hoffmann, 1970: 389-413). Over the system's muted bipolarity, its manifest polycentrism and its emerging layer of multipolarity, Hoffman foresaw a number of alternate chessboards where the new politics would be played out. The complexity, diversity and emergence of these new forces requires, not the grandiose blueprints, which have guided politics in the past, but moderate, low profile "gardening."

Considerable attention has been given to the observation that the international system is undergoing a transformation. The different positions reviewed agree that the importance of the military-security issue is lessening. Few, if any, observers of contemporary world affairs contend that national security has become an obsolete issue. More than likely they would agree with Maxwell Taylor who argues that the traditional military requirements for national security continue to have legitimate claims "on national systems (Taylor, 1974: 579-584). Nevertheless, he recognizes that traditional rationales may no longer be acceptable. Publics are generally dissatisfied and unresponsive to the standard military case for massive military programs, to say nothing of their growing pessimism about the ability of military power to resolve the more critical threat situations. The changes observed above have made national populations conscious and apprehensive of new, nonmilitary threats to national life. Today they are more real than the threat of military aggression. Taylor acknowledges this:
"...I am fully convinced that the most formidable threats to this nation are in the nonmilitary field" (Taylor, 1974: 592). But the addendum to this acknowledgement is that these changes have generated new threat situations likely to cause as much turbulence and disorder in the next decade as in preceding ones. International crises are, therefore, just as likely as before because of the changes in the structure, processes and substance of the international system.

An unsettled international system is a seedbed for crises. To return to Oran Young's point about political fluidity and crises, there can be little doubt but that the international setting is ripe, and the conditions conducive for systemic crises.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

"Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis."
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 63:

Allison, Graham T. (1971)

Allison, Graham T. and Halperin, Morton H. (1972)
"Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications." WORLD POLITICS, 24:40-79.

Bales, Robert F. (1951)

Brown, Seyom (1974)

Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1972)

Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1973)

Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1974-75)
"Recognizing the Crisis." FOREIGN POLICY, 17:63-74.

Clay, Lucius D. (1950)
DECISION IN GERMANY. Garden City, New York: Doubleday.

Ellsberg, Daniel (1971)

Frohlich, Norman; Oppenheimer, Joe A.; and, Young, Oran R. (POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND COLLECTIVE GOODS. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Halperin, Morton H. and Tsou, Tang (1966)
"United States Policy Toward the Offshore Islands."
PUBLIC POLICY, 15:119-132.

Halperin, Morton H. (1971)

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY. Washington,

Hermann, Charles F., Editor (1972)
Harrison, Selig D. (1972)
"Nixon Journey Spurs Japan to Recast Policy."
WASHINGTON POST, March 2.

INTERNATIONAL CRises: INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH. Ne
Hilsman, Roger (1967)
TO MOVE A NATION: THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY. New York: DoubleJay.

Hoffmann, Stanley (1968)
GULLIVER'S TROUBLES, OR THE SETTING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN

Hoffmann, Stanley (1970)
"International Organization and the International
System." INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 24:389-413.

Hoffmann, Stanley (1972b)
"Will the Balance Balance at Home?" FOREIGN POLICY,
7:60-87.

Hoffmann, Stanley (1973)
"Choices." FOREIGN POLICY, 12:3-42.

Holsti, Ole R. (1970)
"Individual Differences in 'Definition of the
Situation.'" JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION,
14:233-309.

Janis, Irving L. (1967)
VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF
FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company.
Jervis, Robert (1970)
THE LOGIC OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Jr., editors (1972)
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Kissinger, Henry A. (1973)
"U.S.-European Relations." Department of State NEWS RELEASE.
An address by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to
the Pilgrims of Great Britain, at the Europa Hotel,

Kissinger, Henry A. and Simon, William (1974a)
"Global Aspects of Energy Crisis." Department of State
NEWS RELEASE, Office of Media Services, January 10.
Press Conference.

Kissinger, Henry A. (1974b)
"Opening Remarks." Department of State NEWS RELEASE,
Energy Conference of Oil-Consuming Nations in
Washington, D. C.

Kissinger, Henry A. (1974c)
"Challenges of Interdependence." Address by the
Secretary of State before the Sixth Special Session of
the United Nations General Assembly, New York, New
York. Department of State NEWS RELEASE, Office of Media
Services, April 15, 1974.

Kissinger, Henry A. (1974d)
"Maintaining the Momentum Toward Peace." Address by
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger before the 29th
Session of the U.N. General Assembly, New York, New
York. Department of State NEWS RELEASE, Office of Media
Services, September 23, 1974.

Kissinger, Henry A. (1974e)
"Toward a Global Community: The Common Cause of India
and America." Address by Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger before the Indian Council on World Affairs,
New Delhi, India, October 28, 1974.

Kissinger, Henry A. (1974f)
"The Global Community and the Struggle Against Famine." 
Address by Henry A. Kissinger before the World Food
Kuhn, Alfred (1974)
THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS: A UNIFIED, DEDUCTIVE,
SYSTEM-BASED APPROACH TO SOCIAL SCIENCE. San Francisco:

Laqueur, Walter (1972a)

Laqueur, Walter (1972b)

Laqueur, Walter (1972c)
"The Cool War." NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (September,
17), 15ff.

Laqueur, Walter (1973)
"Kissinger and the Politics of Detente." COMMENTARY,
6:46-52.

Laqueur, Walter (1974)
"The Next Ten Years: A Review of History Yet To Be
Written." HARPER'S MAGAZINE (December), 68-76.

Lewis, Flora (1973)
"Redefining Atlantic Ties: Difficult Hurdles Lie
Ahead." NEW YORK TIMES, September 13.

Lord, Winston (1974)
AMERICA'S PURPOSES IN AN AMBIGUOUS AGE. Washington,

McClelland, Charles A. (1961)
"The Acute International Crisis." WORLD POLITICS,
14:182-204.

McClelland, Charles A. (1964)
"Action Structures and Communication in Two
International Crises: Quemoy and Berlin." BACKGROUND,
7:201-215.

McClelland, Charles A. (1966)
THEORY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. New York:
Macmillan Company.

McClelland, Charles A. (1968a)
"Access to Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events,
1948-1963." In QUANTITATIVE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:
INSIGHTS AND EVIDENCE. Edited by J. David Singer. New
McClelland, Charles A. (1968b)
"International Interaction Analysis: Basic Research and Some Practical Uses." World Event/Interaction Survey. School of International Relations, University of Southern California (Mimeo.)

McClelland, Charles A. (1968c)
"Interaction Analysis and Foreign Policy Futures." World Event/Interaction Survey. School of International Relations, University of Southern California (Mimeo.)

McClelland, Charles A. (1972)

"Threat Situations: A Search for a Controlled Definition." Technical Report No. 12, Threat Recognition and Analysis Project School of International Relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California (mimeo).

Malmgren, Harold B. (1970-71)
"Coming Trade Wars? (Neo-Mercantilism and Foreign Policy)" FOREIGN POLICY, 1:125ff.

Murphy, Robert (1964)
DIPLOMAT AMONG WARRIORS. New York: Doubleday.

ALLIANCE POLITICS. New York: Columbia University Press.


Oberdorfer, Don (1972)
"Japan-China Pact: Gains for Both, Risks for U.S." WASHINGTON POST, September 30.

Patolichev, N. (1970)
Pruitt, Dean G. (1965)


Schaetzel, J. Robert (1973)
"Some European Questions for Dr. Kissinger." FOREIGN POLICY, 12:66-78.

Schelling, Thomas C. (1966)
ARMS AND INFLUENCE. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Schon, Donald A. (1971)

Seabury, Paul (1974)
"It's Time to Consider Force Against Arab Oil Nations." LOS ANGELES TIMES, December 8, Part 6, 3.

Shuster, Alvin (1973)

Sigal, Leon V. (1970)
"The 'Rational Policy' Model and the Formosa Straits Crisis." INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 14:121-156.


Snyder, Glenn (1972)

Szulc, Tad (1974)
Tanter, Raymond (1972)


U.S. Congress (1946)

Wagner, R. Harrison (1974)
"Dissolving the State: Three Recent Perspectives on International Relations." INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 28:436-466.

Wiener, A. J. and Kahn, Herman (1962)

Whaley, Barton (1973)
CODEWORK BARBAROSSA. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press.

Whiting, Allen S. (1960)

Whitney, Stephen B. (1962)

Wohlstetter, Roberta (1962)
PEARL HARBOR: WARNING AND DECISION. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Wohlstetter, Roberta (1965)

Young, Oran R. (1968)