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2. Transmitted herewith are reports of Senior Advisors of the MR 4 Provinces, for the period ending February 1973.

   a. LTC K. Kobata, SA, Bac Lieu Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B007, Inclosure 1


   d. LTC Frederick R. Daly, SA, Ba Xuyen Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B030, Inclosure 4

3. These reports are provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the authors. These reports should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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HEADQUARTERS

ADVISORY Task 55 (Kien Giang Province)
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
APO 96215

MACDR-55/SA

14 February 1973

SUBJECT: AFKIS-Province Advisor Completion of Tour Report
(RCS: MACORDS 174-03) LTC EDWARD P. METZKER, 219-14-2905

THRU: DEPCORDS
Delta Regional Assistance Command
APO 96215

TO: Headquarters
Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: MACORDS, (ACofS, CORDS)
APO 96222

1. Attached is the Province Advisor's Completion of Tour Report for the period 19 August 1972 to 15 February 1973.

2. My short tour as Province Senior Advisor has been one of the most challenging and personally rewarding assignments of my Army career. As in past tours in this capacity, I cannot imagine another position in the Army structure where a field grade officer would have the scope and depth of responsibility associated with the job of PSA. The most rewarding aspect was the opportunity to work on a "people" level. By that I mean, the opportunity to work to develop successful programs aimed at assisting a deserving people in need of improvement of the basic requirements of life stretching from the womb to the grave. As in the past, I was fortunate to serve with an advisory team consisting of a majority of young, dedicated, talented, professional Americans, both civilian and military. The adoption of the CORDS concept was the key to achieving the necessary coordinated, single-minded effort (which, in my mind, successfully surmounted the majority of the problems inherent in advising and assisting this complex political struggle). I feel I can confidently make this statement because I was a part of, and witnessed the rivalry, waste, duplication of effort and hazy perception of the total mission which existed prior to inception of the CORDS concept. I hope someone or some group at the national policy making level loudly and clearly gets the message of the success CORDS has achieved. Then I hope they see the wisdom of creating some kind of cooperative, self-fertilizing organization (even a quasi-permanent or ad hoc arrangement) similar to CORDS, which could plan ahead for future assistance contingencies. A most pleasant aspect of this tour was working with a group of key province military and civilian officials who were intelligent, in-focus, competent, dedicated leaders. The level of competency has improved greatly across the board, compared to my recollection of previous tours.

DAMO-ODU
73B018
Inclosure 2
After long introspection on where Kien Giang was when I served here over 3 years ago, where it has progressed to today, and what may lie ahead in the future, I end up with a feeling of genuine overall optimism that is only somewhat guarded. People everywhere seem to be getting off the fence and deciding that in the absence of something better, the present government presents the best case for a better future, particularly when compared to what the other side has to offer. I believe this has come about in part by the suffering and destruction caused by the enemy offensives and high points of the past year, the attempts of the GVN to alleviate the resultant misery (even though feeble in most instances) and the rapid and widespread growth of the economy in most of the province. In a way, I guess it can be said that the government has "out-economy'd" the enemy in the viewpoint of a majority of the people. The road ahead will be difficult and the old problems of corruption, indifference and apathy remain serious, and pose areas of vulnerability which must be watched carefully. But the people are tough, and have shown an amazing resilience and tenacity which more and more seems to turn out in the governments' favor as it strives and blunders toward solving both old and current problems.

I recommend continued heavy emphasis at every level we can apply pressure, to get government "people-oriented" programs moving and make them effective. Only when the people in the hamlets and the villages, motivated by vested self interest, get involved in government sponsored and assisted programs, do they begin to realize that there is, in fact, an established government and then begin to think about the merits of supporting it. Along this line, previously, the MOE had the responsibility for school construction, teacher training and teacher salaries and assignments. The villages and hamlets assumed responsibility for school construction, and have successfully filled the need for these facilities. Now, with increased village revenues, the village should be given the responsibility for teacher salaries and assignments. This would leave MOE free to only concern itself with training new teachers, upgrading persons now teaching and generally overseeing the quality of education. Obviously, continued efforts to reduce or eliminate corruption go hand in hand with efforts to improve the efficiency of and expand "people programs". Finally, I'd like to see a repeat of the psychological campaign waged by the officer candidates and warrant officers prior to the ceasefire. It should really be an ongoing program, because the exposure was profitable to both the people and the young future leaders concerned. And the distinct impression I get is that that young group of uncomplicated and motivated young men were successful in getting across much of the governments' message by the time their visit ended.

Edward P. Metzner
LTC, FA
Province Senior Advisor

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SECTION I

NAME:  METZNER, EDWARD P.
GRADE:  LTC
SSAN:  219-14-2905
BRANCH OF SERVICE:  FIELD ARTILLERY
PROVINCE:  KIEN GIANG
INCLUSIVE DATES OF TOUR:  7 AUG 1972 - 15 FEB 1973
EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE:  22 FEB 1973
PREVIOUS TOUR (S) IN VIETNAM (DATES - INCLUSIVE) OCT '64 - OCT '65
       JAN '67 - AUG '68
       JAN '70 - JUL '71
       AUG '72 - FEB '73
G-5 ADVISOR (PACIFICATION AND PSYWAR) 7TH ARVN INF DIV
G-5 ADVISOR ARVN II CORPS
PSA DINH TUONG
PSA CHUONG THIEN
PSA KIEN GIANG
PSA VINH BINH
PSA KIEN GIANG
SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position?

Almost 21 years as a combat arms officer, to include a short tour in Korea, 3 previous tours as an advisor in Vietnam, civilian college degree plus attendance at the Command and General Staff College and the War College.

2. What training did you have for this position?

Two months language training at the Vietnam Training Center, Foreign Service Institute in 1969.

3. What additional training would you suggest for your position?

As much language training practicable in order to reach a high level of fluency.

4. What should be the length of tour for your position?

1½ to 2½ years.

5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory?

Support was satisfactory, except that in too many instances the theory of support from the rear to forward stopped at Region. Motion picture support from AARPS was disorganized and film necessary for morale of isolated district teams frequently arrived unshowable. Equipment support was satisfactory in all areas except projectors. Consideration should be given in future drawdown situations to increase the maintenance float levels of those items required to support isolated district teams, i.e., projectors, generators, butane refrigerators etc. Regarding development programs, there was very little technical support given to province. Most advisors from Region and Saigon came to collect information to support programs they were espousing, or they suggested programs and projects to Provincial Services which showed little consideration for the existing Vietnamese system, or the meagerness of resources at province level.

6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming? Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available? Which ones?

Education, the Sorghum program and the Public Works "Province Package" consisting of road building equipment suffered from lack of support. Support available enhanced success in Land Reform, Social Welfare and Rice Production.

7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 provide a means for reporting all information of present and future value? If not, what changes would you recommend?

Yes - but. Too many one time reports requirements were sent from higher when the information requested was on hand in the US-VN files at the requesting level if somebody had taken the pains to seek it out. Many one time reports continue for months on end e.g.,
Psychological Report, Refugee Situation Report, and Provincial Monthly War Victims Report. Many of the suspense dates are made oblivious to logistical problems involved in data gathering at province level.

8. Do the MACCORSDS Management Information System Field Reporting requirements set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 adequately measure progress in pacification programs?

Yes.

9. Were instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? If not, what specific instances occurred where conflicting instructions were received?

Instructions were usually clear, but too often short suspense times were unrealistic and precluded the depth of research needed to make reports cogent, in depth and placed in context giving then meaning.

ANSWER QUESTIONS 10 - 15 BY GIVING AN ORDER OF PRIORITY.

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:
   1. RF/PF (Territorial Security)
   2. LTTT
   3. HDC

11. The most effective para military forces are:
   1. RF
   2. PF
   3. NP

12. The most successful pacification programs are:
   1. Land Reform (LTTT)
   2. Local Revenue Improvement
   3. Public Administration
      (Security excluded in above consideration)

13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:
   1. Territorial Security
   2. LTTT
   3. Education
   4. WSD/RD Credit
14. The least successful pacification programs are:
   1. Education
   2. Youth Affairs
   3. Peoples Organizations

15. The programs that have the least impact upon the pacification effort are:
   1. Eradication of Social Evils
   2. Peoples Organizations
   3. Manpower Development

16. The rural people are aware of the pacification efforts the GVN and US are making. If not, how can they be informed?

The rural people are aware of the GVN efforts, but few are remotely aware of the US contributions. The people are not cognizant of the pacification effort as a GVN policy objective, but only individual programs as they directly affect their life style.

17. The people, as you know them, are more committed to the GVN than when you assumed your job, why?

More people have a somewhat better understanding of the goals and objectives of the government and they relate more to them then to those of the other side. People can see a better future for themselves and their children because of the government's programs, and there isn't any better alternative at present. VC promises are becoming evident as empty and baseless over the long haul. In the final analysis, related to the needs and aspirations of the people, the government is "out economic-ing" the other side. If corruption declined to an acceptable minimum extant to the government would soar.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in security and growth of Vietnam? Yes. If no, what change in the plan should be made?

But in many instances quotas and goals are unrealistic and arbitrary when measured against the talent or understanding and resources available to those tasked to obtain them. The plan must be more tailored to the real situation in each province and contain a realistic balance of needs and resources culminating in goals and quotas. The effectiveness of the PPDC in carrying out the objectives of the pacification plan is greatly hindered by its ignorance of its overall objectives. The plan is sufficiently detailed to provide this guidance on goals, but fails to delineate where these goals should dovetail with other services to contribute to the development of a given area. Because of the lack of this inter-service coordination, any goals are reached each year without any visible growth taking place.
19. Do you feel that the pacification plan was adequately communicated and explained to you and your counterpart? Yes. If not, how can this be accomplished?

But the basic plan and the cycle which produces the yearly province supplement to the plan have suspenso requirements which are much too short to permit the province staff to do the depth of research, conduct the inter service/agency coordination and honest evaluation required to make it substantially more than a paper exercise.
RF/PF: Most RF units and some PF units have improved their performance based primarily on the constant, personal leadership by example of the Province Chief, and his direct impact on the majority of strong District Chiefs in the province. There has been a steady growth of sense of urgency in many units, again due primarily to the catalytic effects of the, dedication, professional skill and leadership of the tier echelon in the province. The degree of competence at this level is vastly improved as compared to past experience. Those units that remain inert, ineffective and unresponsive generally suffer from a history of incompetent, corrupt or cowardly leadership which will take time and the arrival of talent or its development through training to correct. Province forces are sufficient to react to and halt and quickly reverse enemy transgressions against the population (given no increase in present enemy strength) except in Hieu Le and Kien Minh Districts. These areas of concern could be bolstered by forces available to province if selected ORs which now protect unpopulated areas could be eliminated. Numerous request to do so have been disapproved by CG MR4. Realistic and lasting improvement of security in these areas will be accomplished only by assignment of ARVN forces. PF recruitment has posed no problem, But, PF recruiting has been a failure compounded by steady casualty attrition and desertions. The "instant upgrading" of FF to PF has not provided a solution but instead has caused several operational catastrophies and added to the desertion rate. Problems caused by drafting into the PF would nullify any resultant short term gains. It appears that the only successful solution to eradicating the present low strength in most province PF forces will be the slow process of constant improved training and the development of unit leaders to the point where sound leadership, good support and fair and impartial treatment and concern for men will permit the present recruiting level and resulting decrease in casualties and desertions to level out.

Logistical support for territorial forces has been constantly improving due primarily to the personal competence and involvement of the SLS Commander and the Sector SL (both soon to be transferred under the new plan by CG MR4 to move people every 6 years). The breating of a plan to supply remote units direct from sector, harassing sub-sector has been long overdue and should be expedited. Commodity control, maintenance and supply economy have improved slightly and needs heavy emphasis all along the line of command. A "pet tough" policy replacing the present toleration of theft, pilferage and diversion of supplies is needed and long overdue.

Many of the RF and PP units are long overdue refresher type training. At present there is no announced program for PP company refresher training. The Sector Training Site approach for PF refresher training is a step in the right direction, but this program was begun with little advanced planning and no funds to support it. It it is to be made a success it has to have fund's to operate. Improvements need to be made in the areas of housing, messing, training areas, and in training aids to support this training. The PF Control Headquarters Upgrade Program was begun but halted before it was completed. Two of the four Battalions which were formed have not received their weapons platoons. At present there are plans to train only one battalion sized unit in CY 73 and this is not until July 1973. The IRRP Training Program has been expanded. During CY 73 9 RF Companies and 40 PP Platoons are scheduled for this type training. If province meets it's quota for IRRP training an' properly employ these trained units, it
should greatly improve the territorial force capability for pacification during the ceasefire.

Finally, to end on an optimistic note, sector forces displayed an overall aggressiveness, tenacity and motivation during actions and counter-actions in the past ceasefire period which has been previously not experienced. The reason apparently is a widespread realization of the criticality of the times. At present they have been successful in controlling or reestablishing control of the situation to date.

PSDF: This program has been notably successful in urban and heavily populated areas and has ranged from effective to ineffective as population density and overall security decreased. There have been many striking instances where strong local leadership and identity with vested interest in the government have produced results originally envisioned in the concept, and individual and collective bravery in the face of overwhelming odds. The program should continue, with emphasis on quality instead of quantity in urban and high population density areas that have good to moderate security. It should be reduced or eliminated in sparsely populated and remote areas where it is mainly ineffective and contributes a source of weapons to the enemy.

NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE: The field police are well trained, equipped and qualified. When properly used by District Chiefs and District Police Commanders they have been effective. They have conducted urban and rural patrols that has increased security in some areas. But the tense security situation has delayed the expansion of patrols to many isolated villages and hamlets. Their effectiveness in conducting anti-VCI operations varies throughout the province. Independent and combined operations have been conducted which resulted in a significant number of VC/VCI neutralized and a noticeable amount of weapons, explosives and documents seized. The Field Police have actively supported other police units in law enforce-ment/security functions.

NATIONAL POLICE OPERATIONS: The Province Police Command and District Police Commanders are well trained. Although some are relatively new to police work they are developing into efficient and capable commanders. The structure of the Province Police Command is well defined and the commander exercises firm control over all units in the organization. Information is well disseminated within the department and greatly enhances the operation of the entire police effort.

Significant improvement has been made in the area of Public Safety. In order to increase police efficiency and effectiveness, 5,033 policemen attended in-service-training courses. In the area of operations 616 additional police personnel were assigned to village level to provide police services to the people; urban and rural patrols were established to expand security, and to maintain law and order. Police Operation Centers were established to oppose criminal, terrorist, insurgent and subversive elements, narcotic suppression activities were increased, and the National Identity Card Program was completed. The following progress was made in the logistics area; ten village police stations were renovated or constructed; other facilities received needed maintenance; additional commodities were received and improvement was made in the distribution to district and village levels. Management systems were implemented to provide commanders with the necessary information to make sound operational decisions. Telecommunications equipment was installed in all village police stations and the police operation centers.
The Province Police Command made a determined effort to accomplish the goals established in the CD & LD Plan. They assumed additional civil security responsibilities, suppressed criminal activities, maintained law and order, deployed additional police personnel to village level to provide police services to the people, conducted operations that resulted in a significant number of Criminal Subversives neutralized, and they improved coordination with local administrative and security forces.

In the area of civil law enforcement the police are reluctant to detain GVN military personnel and their dependents for violations of civil offenses because military personnel have responded with acts of reprisal. Past experience indicates that little if any attempt is made by the ARVN Provost Marshal or the individual unit commanders to discipline military personnel for these retaliatory acts. Local team advisory efforts have been unable to solve this problem. This situation must be resolved by GVN Civil and Military authorities at the National level. GVN Civil and Military Intelligence/Security agencies do not effectively support the police in protecting the people from terrorism. The Intelligence/Security agencies do not respond to Police Operations Centers request for intelligence information. Significant advisory thrust at province and district level have been unsuccessful in obtaining the necessary support. GVN Civil and Military Command emphasis is needed in this area to generate sufficient support. Some personnel who attend training courses are not assigned to positions commensurate with their training, limited success has been achieved at correcting this situation. Records are not centralized due to a shortage of space, filing cabinets, and the refusal of Special Branch to release their records to the Technical Bureau. Recommendations have been made to construct filing cabinets locally with miscellaneous funds. However, funds should be allotted to construct additional office space for the Technical Bureau. The Province Police Command is required to transport practically all commodities from Region/NPC Headquarters to province, and province requires the districts to transport from province to district and then to village. The correct flow of commodities should be from higher headquarters to lower. Advisory efforts to correct this situation have been unsuccessful. National Police Command emphasis is needed to correct this logistics procedure.

**COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE**

**Village Self Development:** Although the VSD program has not been entirely successful in accomplishing its goal of allowing the people to participate in their own development, the money has not been wasted. As a training exercise in people-participation, the program's success seems to have been determined more by the quality of the village/bulet officials and the degree of the village's sophistication than by any other factors. However, in all villages, an infrastructure of a GVN presence was established and this could not have been accomplished without VSD. Fortunately during the latter half of 1972, the RD Cadre was assigned a primary role in VSD implementation. These cadre have succeeded in correcting the more chronic village abuses and eliciting greater and more significant people-participation.
The 1972 VSD Fund totaled better than forty-five million piasters. 32.3 million piasters was allotted to 115 Cat I, 21 Cat II, 11 1971 and 2 inter-village projects. All have been reported complete although it will be well into 1973 before the last project is accepted and signed for. The RD Credit portion of VSD funds was 13 million piasters. However, with the matching funds and capital from 1970 and 1971, the fund totaled 37.2 million piasters. Thus far, only 22.4 million has been loaned to 957 persons. The delay in loans can be attributed to the slow start of this year's planning and the instability of many villages because of enemy pressure.

RD CADRE: Although the RD Cadre are only about half their authorized strength, their 1972 reorganization reaches into every village and hamlet. The cadre have assumed their responsibility for VSD, People's Information, Rural Teenagers, and Rural Post Office. Besides making good progress during the turmoil of reorganization and the Easter Offensive, they made commendable contributions to such associated programs as War Victim Relief, Education and Land Reform. The RD Cadre's only limiting factor has been the small size of the village cadre teams, and the team leader's subordinate position to inept and ill-prepared village chiefs.

ETHNIC MINORITIES: The lot of the ethnic Cambodians in this province has not changed appreciably. The Cambodian Service Chief continues to view his role as one of defending the Cambodian cultural heritage, as opposed to securing equal treatment and participation in village and hamlet life. The Cambodians are not discriminated against as such, but because of their geographic and linguistic isolation, they enjoy fewer of the benefits found in predominantly ethnic Vietnamese hamlets.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT: Drastic changes in this province have occurred over the past several months. PM Decree #120 removed about 1/3 of the previously elected hamlet chiefs; however, most were replaced by experienced village officials who had been displaced by the same Decree. During the same period, 1/4 of the 40 villages in province were assigned military village chiefs, because of the local deteriorating security situation. It is still too early to judge the overall effects of these reshufflings. But some of the changes were definitely for the better. The one caveat, which could manifest during the anticipated political struggle to come, is that the new appointees will have less time to gain the people's confidence.

AID IN KIND: These funds were a great asset for implementing projects not previously planned. Although originally intended as a source of funds for high impact assistance, the funds have also been an effective advisory lever to induce counterparts into areas or projects they initially felt sceptical about.

REFUGEES: The completion of about the entire backlog of Resettlement Refugees (3,981 persons) occurred during the last six months of 1972. The RTV program retired better than 25 thousand from its backlog, but there are probably 40 thousand more in Kien Giang who are entitled to the program benefits but have not yet received any. The greatest hindrance to the progress of the RTV payments has been the inaccuracy of the village prepared name lists. This results in considerable loss of time and effort on the part of the SIS to rectify, before submission to Saigon. The RTV Development Projects have been almost completely a waste of money because of the on-again off-again history of their funding. Now that the money is once again available, projects are no longer relevant in many cases.
This is the reason less than 50% of the 1972 RTV projects have even been started. With current demands being made on Village/District officials time, they give scant attention to projects of marginal impact.

SOCIAL WELFARE: By far the most significant and effective efforts of the SW was in the field of War Victims Relief. Since the start of the 5th Easter Offensive, more than thirty-six thousand displaced war victims have been generated. Some required only one or two days of assistance while other war victims relief centers continued for months. In the payment of benefits to in-place War Victims, the SW’s time and effort were greatly hampered by the ill-prepared and falsified lists of the village and Provinces survey teams. However, even with these delays, the SW has been able to process and pay claims to better than fifteen thousand persons. The majority of the claims still outstanding are in areas not yet secured, or areas that received damage subsequent to the list being prepared.

CHIEU HOI DIRECTORATE

CHIEU HOI: The Chieu Hoi Service had a less than spectacular year in 1972, especially if it is compared to 1971. However, there were no large unit operations, which usually increase the number of Ho Chi Chanhs. The most prominent aspect of the program is the Armed Propaganda Team. However, these teams have been drastically reduced and reorganized, so it is doubtful whether we will see a repeat in the future of their 1972 performance. Although the Chieu Hoi Service should be phasing down, the 1973 goal will be higher than 1972. The Service expects the same number of Ho Chi Chanhs, but they are planning to process out a large number of POWs from An Thoi Prison Camp.

REPORTS AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

REPORT REQUIREMENTS: As already mentioned, there seems to be a disproportionate amount of data going up the channel, for the feedback that is coming down the channel. It is assumed that some data is required for reports sent to Washington, and not used strictly for planning. But it does cut the effectiveness of field advisors to always be hounding counterparts for information, and never being able to show them constructive results of that gathering. Also, the time required to research and produce reports going up and reading the many reports received which were of information value only, seriously affected the time available to advise and monitor counterparts. This became especially onerous during the drawdown phase when a diminishing team and increasing reports requirements placed the team almost exclusively in the reporting business.

PHUNG HOANG DIRECTORATE

PHUNG HOANG: There has been moderate success in this program due to the Province Chief’s personal emphasis on it. The District Chiefs of Kien Le, Kien An, Kinh Binh, Kien Tan and Kien Thanh recognize the importance of the program and give it personal support, but they are inhibited in making any lasting significant breakthroughs against the VCI by the lack of talent in the district Police Operation Centers. The transition of the Phung Hoang Program into the Police Operation Centers was completed on or about 1 May 1972. At first there was a decrease of neutralizations. However, operations increased to five or six a week by August. One significant problem exists in the POPAT elements of the POC’s. Although contact is maintained between POPAT elements and other intelligence/security forces, other intelligence agencies fail to respond to POPAT requests for essential
elements of information. Concentrated advisory efforts have failed to solve this problem. As a result, the Situation Sector cannot assemble the detailed dossiers required for targeted operations.

To improve the present POPAT Program the quarterly neutralization list should be eliminated for two primary reasons. First, goals should be established that are attainable. Previous quarterly name lists have contained names of VCI who are highly inaccessible. This is substantiated by the small number of neutralizations that have been made of those VCI on the quarterly name list. The bulk of neutralization have been as a result of operations conducted on unsolicited intelligence reports. Second, goals should capitalize on the ability of the police rather than identify their weaknesses. Established goals should take advantage of the strength of the existing POPAT program. In place of the quarterly name list the province should be given a quota of VCI to neutralize from their VCI population.

Peoples Intelligence nets exist in name only. The people of the villages and hamlets know the VCI and how they operate. But the Police and other intelligence agencies are sitting and waiting for people to walk in and volunteer that information. It isn't going to happen because of the historic cultural restraints which prevent the people from doing so, and because of the peoples vulnerability to reprisals. Until the government goes to the people, educates them why the information is important, and secretly and discreetly asks for the information in an understandable manner, it won't be forthcoming.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

PUBLIC HEALTH: The withdrawal of the KILPHAP Teams seems to have in no way retarded the Public Health Program. There is now existing in province an infrastructure of Maternity/Infirmary/Dispensaries sufficient to meet current health needs. However, it will probably take several years of training to have all the existing facilities staffed and operating at an optimal level. The few areas still lacking health facilities are those with little or no security. Any future inputs to the Rural Health Program would best be utilized by upgrading the quality of the existing facilities, or making the present locations more accessible to the surrounding population.

EDUCATION: This is probably the darkest program in the whole pacification effort. All the problems are acknowledged by the Education Service, yet few of the problems are properly addressed, let alone solved. Education in the population centers is characterized by over taxing of the existing facilities and under utilization of the teaching personnel. Rural Education has the reverse problem; vacant and abandoned facilities, with the few teaching personnel forced to work long hours and handle enormous classes. The recruitment and training of teachers is almost totally ineffective in meeting current education demands. The only bright spot on the horizon is the possibility that Local Revenue Improvement will generate sufficient funds at village level for each locality to begin hiring and paying its own teachers.

PUBLIC WORKS: At year's end, all programmed projects were completed, with the exception of TL #47 on Phu Quoc Island. The lack of ARVN Engineers and the remote location of the island have contributed to the difficulties of building this road. Little real advancement was made in the secondary road system in 1972. Some road and bridge upgrading was achieved, but it represented almost strictly a holding action. With the replacement of the Public Works Chief in September, most work slowed to a standstill. However, the coming of the dry season has seen a sharp rise in road maintenance and
improvement. The "Province Package" was a welcome addition to the services meager resources, but in such an elongated province much equipment work time is lost just moving it from one job to another.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DOMESTIC PRODUCTIONS: The people in Kien Giang Province derive most of their income from either agriculture or fishing, and their supporting enterprises. The rice mill owners saw a less than prosperous year in 1972. The production was up over the previous years, but much of the production was not being marketed thru the local rice mills. However, most farmers have enjoyed two years of good rice prices, and if this trend continues the Agriculture Services efforts at double cropping and crop diversification should give the farmers a good and solid economic base.

The greatest economic development has taken place in and around the fishing industry. This year saw the Province move from a trans-shipment point to a substantial fish processing center. Although none of the eight to ten new plants are yet running at full capacity, all of them seem to have assured local or foreign markets for their production. The money generated from this provincial enterprise has made itself felt in a construction boom — houses and businesses, that has given the Delta its first skyline.

LAND REFORM: As in the previous two planning years, the 1977 LLT goal will be met and exceeded. However, much of the work the PLAS Chief had been to accomplish was retarded by enemy pressure in those areas with the largest blocks of undistributed land. The success of the LLT program can be attributed to a well organized and administered PLAS, and the fact that this province has an exceedingly large amount of abandoned land. Although landlord compensation is far from complete, but progress has been made and the compensation dossiers are forwarded with minimum delay or errors. An effort is now being developed by the ADB Chief to try and attract some of this compensation money into the ADB/Rural Bank System.

LABOR: As in all provinces, there is a general shortage of labor here because of military mobilization. However, Kien Giang also has the dual demands of fishing and agriculture on its labor force, plus the labor requirements of an autonomous city (pop. 117,000). The greatest demand is for semi-skilled and skilled laborers, but anyone with relatives to aid him should be able to obtain employment. There are numerous labor organizations, mostly in Pach Mia City, and two confederations of labor associations. These offer representaional needs to their membership, but most seem to be of a social fraternal nature.

YOUTH AFFAIRS: This service centered its activities around urban areas and did little or nothing in the countryside, and youth activities at province level showed a slight increase in the latter half of 1972. This was due to programs planned from Saigon, rather than an increase in Youth Organizations coordination at province. The province has a fairly large infrastructure of youth organizations already established, but most of these are centered around traditional religious or social groups. The one exception is the recent activity with rural teenagers proves that the FM Cadre have begun. Although only in its formative stage, it promises to develop into a uniform structure to which other groups may be attached or affiliated.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: Since the issuance of PM Decree 120, all villages and hamlets have been reorganized to comply with the order. About one third of the hamlet chiefs were replaced, but most of the reasons removed were replaced by experienced officials whose job slots were eliminated. At the same time of the reorganization, one fourth of the village chiefs were replaced by military men. It is still too early to judge whether this was a prudent decision. The Province will certainly have to undergo a whole new
series of training courses for village/hamlet officials. However, the remaining officials seem to be a little better educated, and most all have job experience of some relevance to their current tasks. Since the reorganization, there has been noticeable improvement in both official attendance, and attention to village/hamlet affairs.

PSYOPS: The Vietnamese Information Service continued to transfer its responsibility for People's Information, at village/hamlet level, to the RD Cadre. While careful not to distinguish itself, VIS has managed to maintain a representational position on the Special Province and District Psyop Teams. The Sector Political Warfare Company has done a commendable job of keeping the people informed of the current CVN positions. Their support of the Special Psyop Teams was a great asset, and this task was accomplished while still maintaining normal Psywar/Civil Action functions with the Sector Forces.