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AGO D/A ltr, 11 Jun 1980
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2. Transmitted herewith are reports of Senior Advisors to the MR 4 provinces for the period ending February 1973.

   a. LTC John H. McDonald, SA, Phu Yen Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B015, Inclosure 1

   b. LTC Frank L. Day, SA, Pleiku Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B021, Inclosure 2

   c. LTC Griffin N. Dodge, SA, Quang Duc Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B027, Inclosure 3

   d. LTC Charles B. Goodrich, SA, Dariac Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B028, Inclosure 4

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HEADQUARTERS
CIVIL OPERATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT
Darlac Province, Military Region 2
Advisory Team 25
APO San Francisco 96297

MACTN-BN-PSA

31 January 1973

SUBJECT: Completion of Tour Report (CTR)

THRU: Headquarters, CORDS
Military Region 2
ATTN: OPRE
APO San Francisco 96240

TO: Headquarters, MACV
ATTN: MACHQ (for AC of 8, CORDS only)
APO 96222

Forwarded herewith in accordance with MACV Joint Directive 4-70 is
a Completion of Tour Report. I have been assigned to the Four Party Joint

JOHN C. VANDERBOSCH
STG GE
Province Senior Advisor

1 Incl
a/o

DAMD-ODU
738020
Inclosure 4
PROVINCE ADVISORS COMPLETION OF TOUR REPORT
(RCS: MACVCORDS 3480-4)

SECTION I:

NAME: J. Vandenberg Bosch
GRADE: LTC
SSAN: 397-28-2053
BRANCH OF SERVICE: Corps of Engineers
PROVINCE: Darlac
INCLUSIVE DATE OF TOUR: 26 April 1972 - 26 January 1973
EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE: 26 January 1973
PREVIOUS TOUR IN VIETNAM: November 1966 - October 1967
ASSIGNMENT ON PREVIOUS VIETNAM TOUR: Battalion S-3, 15 Engineer Battalion, 9th Infantry Division.

SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position?
   Normal Military assignments including command of Combat Engineer Units from platoon through battalion.

2. What training did you have for this position?
   Foreign Service Institute PSA Course.

3. What additional training would you suggest for your position?
   None - The 39 week course that I attended could have been considerably reduced as I understand it now has.
4. What should be the length of tour for your position?
   
   18 months as a minimum with 2 years being preferable.

5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory? If not, specify deficiencies.
   
   Operational or program type support was satisfactory. Administrative/logistical support was marginal. Examples of unsatisfactory administrative/logistical support are: Weekly intelligence reports usually arrived between 7 and 12 day after close out date - Pay actions were routinely erroneous or late (in a twelve month tour one officer was correctly paid only twice) - Recommendations for awards were frequently lost - Generator repairmen were sent to the province without tools or parts - Painters arrived without paint.

6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming? Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available? Which ones?
   
   Generally little US support was furnished during my tenure. Program type support was generally furnished satisfactorily. No programs suffered greatly from lack of support that was due nor were any programs highly successful due to outstanding support.

7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 provide a means for reporting all information of present and future value? If not, what change would you recommend?

   By January 73 the reporting requirements in Joint Directive 4-70 had been considerably modified by elimination and Vietnamization of reports. When reports submitted through Vietnamese channels are considered the reporting requirements were sufficient.

8. Do the MACCORDS Management Information System Field Reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70 adequately measure progress in pacification programs?

   See comment on question 7 above.

9. Were instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? If not, what specific instances occurred where conflicting instructions were received?

   Instructions were generally clear without conflicting requirements. For further specifics see Section III, Reports and Analysis Directorate, Report Feedback.

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:
    
    1. Public Works
    2. Land Reform
    3. Village Self Development
11. The most effective paramilitary forces are:
   1. Provincial Recon Unit/ Special Recon Unit
   2. National Police
   3. National Field Police

   N.B there is a great gap between 1 and 2 above.

12. The most successful pacification programs are:
   1. Public Works
   2. Land Reform
   3. Territorial Security

13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:
   1. Protection of the People from Terrorism
   2. Territorial Security
   3. National Police

14. The least successful pacification programs are:
   1. Public Health
   2. Peoples Organisations
   3. Peoples Information

15. The programs that have the least impact upon the pacification effort are:
   1. Administrative Reform
   2. Manpower Development
   3. Administrative Security

16. The rural people (are) aware of the pacification efforts the GVN and US are making. If not, can they be informed?
17. The people are (more) (less) committed to the GVN than when you assumed your job. Why?

I believe there has been very little change in the commitment of the majority of the people over this relatively short period of time. The refugees that have been cared for here are an exception in that their good care has caused these people to be more committed to GVN. The number of these people varied from 5,000 - 10,000.

18. Do you feel that the GDLD Plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in security and development of Vietnam? (Yes) If not, what change in the plan should be made?

19. Do you feel that the GDLD Plan was adequately explained to you and your counterpart? (Yes) (No) If not, how can this be accomplished?

The GDLD Plan was not explained at all by a third party but the written documents were fairly self-explanatory.

**SECTION III**

Functional Areas

**TERRITORIAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE**

**RF/FF:**

The RF/FF were generally successful in their mission of providing territorial security. There were a number of handicaps beyond control of sector under which the RF/FF operated. Tactical support from higher headquarters both ARVN and U.S. was very limited. During my entire tour airborne assets were never allocated to the sector. From April until the end of October Tactical Air was never available. From the End of October thru January some Tactical air support, primarily VNAF, was available.

In the area of logistics the biggest specific problem was shortage of claymore mines and radios. These two shortages reduced combat effectiveness to a considerable degree. At the local level it required continuous urging to get units to turn in broken equipment for repair and to accomplish the necessary paperwork to obtain resupply.

Great progress was made in getting the RF out from road security and static security into mobile operations. In April 72, in reaction to the VC/NVA offensive and the withdrawal of 23 ARVN Div. from the Province, almost all RF Units were either on road security or on basically static security missions operating well inside of the secure zone. This situation improved with many of these tasks being turned over to PF. The RF was increasingly employed in mobile operations.
The RF and PF were generally unwilling to move after dark. In nine months there were no night attacks conducted and I can recall no instance when a unit moved into a blocking position or did any maneuvering after dark. The reluctance to conduct any night operations other than ambushes was universal from the sector commander on down.

Territorial artillery improved during this time. Most importantly was the ability or willingness to displace. Initially the artillery looked upon their positions as permanent locations. After long persuasion the artillery began to displace to support operations. The accuracy of artillery fire left much to be desired although in December sector activated an artillery training team to upgrade the proficiency of the artillery platoons.

Leadership in territorial forces varied from good to poor. The Sector Staff was very competent; district staffs generally had one to three competent officers with the remainder unsatisfactory. Leadership at the battalion/company group level was good to unsatisfactory.

PSDF:

The dilemma of this program was that it was essential to arm the PSDF yet the PSDF provided a significant source of weapons to the VC. The PSDF on infrequent occasion resisted incursions of the VC. The training of PSDF conducted during the Fall of 1972 was generally well done. Resupply of PSDF ammunition was sporadic with the level of supply in the hamlets usually not above 50% of the authorized.

PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORATE

National Police Field Force:

National Police Field Forces in Darlac Province are highly inexperienced in field operations. Used primarily in sweep operations through populated areas, they have primarily served as an action arm for the enforcement of civil laws such as those dealing with residency, social vices, and deserters. Only recently have the field forces been given training and experience in field operations.

At the instigation of the National Police Commander, members of SRU were used to train National Police Field Forces, with one member of SRU assigned to each of three squads as squad leaders. With SRU members operating with them the field police conducted some highly successful operations. It is currently too early to determine if this improvement will remain after SRU members are withdrawn.

As of December '72 each district was provided one forty (40) man platoon of NPFF, with an assigned mission of field operations against local VC military and infrastructure. These platoons operate in conjunction with SRU Teams, and one such operation resulted in five (5) VC KIA and four (4) VC CIA on 4 Jan 73.
National Police Operations:

A major portion of the success of the National Police is attributable to the Commander, Major Tran Quang Vinh, who is a very dedicated and capable individual. Through his personal initiative and efforts, the National Police have achieved major results in developing into an effective GVN agency. Particular success has been noted in command operational responsibility. Regular morning briefings are held in which each subordinate section chief is required to attend and report to the Province Commander. These briefings have been instrumental in keeping the commander as well as the other sections informed of the problems and operational results of each section.

Phung Hoang after the initial weaknesses of changing to National Police authority has improved to a greater efficiency than prior to the change. Regular committee meetings are conducted with a high attendance rate by concerned agencies. Operational procedures and results have improved greatly, particularly in specific targeting.

Enforcement of civil laws and drug abuse is highly commendable. The National Police pursuit and energetic enforcement of drug laws and have been effective in controlling illegal drugs. In both these categories the National Police are highly independent except for the occasional need of outside financial support in the conduct of drug operations.

A weak point in the Police is the operation at district level. Inspections have revealed a lack of effort in the collection of information with districts choosing to rely on Province as a primary source of information. Although district initiated operations are planned and executed, the majority of operations within the districts' areas of responsibility originate at Province.

A continual problem is the recruitment of sufficient competent Montagnard Police to work in the country side which has a predominately Montagnard population.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE

Village Self Development:

This program was quite successful in accomplishing the required number of projects and did cause a number of wells, offices and classrooms to be built. In its goal of training village officials the program was less successful particularly in "Weak Highlander" villages. In these villages the District Chief generally "tuled" the projects thru to completion. The HD credit portion of this program was much less successful with well under half of the allocated funds used as of January 25.
31 January 1973

RD Cadre:

RD Cadre are generally competent and knowledgeable and the program is effective in upgrading the capability of village officials and accomplishing certain government programs. These cadre have been particularly effective in regards to the VND Program.

Ethnic Minorities:

The effectiveness of this service was directly related to the dynamic service chief Mr. Y Jut Suon To. Single-handedly he raised the level of effectiveness of this service by approximately 100%. RD Cadre were re-organized, retrained and redeployed. The culture-drama team was revitalized and feeding programs at Montagnard Boarding Schools were improved. The RD Cadre provided the main force behind the HBLD Program at Suon Jat and the operation of the refugee camp at Dam Ba. The literacy program was slow getting started because of a lack of qualified instructors but finally did start the latter part of 1972.

Local Government:

The main effort to develop local government was in the area of training village and hamlet officials. The training program at Pleiku was well attended except for the interruption caused by the NVA offensive. Training at Vung Tau was poorly attended because of reported high cost of living at Vung Tau and regimented life at the training facility. In-province training generally met the goals. The training given was mediocre. The implementation of decree 120 enabled GVN to replace some uncompetent officials. The quality of officials selected under 120 has yet to be determined.

Aid in Kind:

During my tenure the AIK Funds available to Darlac were between 150,000 and 200,000 piasters per month. All expenditures were personally controlled by the PSA. The amount of money involved was not enough to make a significant impact on the province.

WAR VICTIMS DIRECTORATE

War Victims:

The care of displaced War Victims was generally excellent. The peak refugee population in Darlac reached approximately 10,000 and then stabilized to about 5-6000. The majority of displaced War Victims were highlanders from Kontum. The Social Welfare Service was generally understaffed to cope with the refugees. The maze of paperwork and the ever present requirement for name lists compounded the difficulty. Even with these difficulties the care provided to the refugees was quite adequate and efficient. The payments to i
Place War Victims which should be made immediately from a revolving type fund were never made in what I would consider to be an expeditious manner.

Social Welfare:

The majority of Social Welfare Service's effort went into the War Victim Programs. The support to the Hamlet Building Land Development Program for resettlement of Hru at Buon Jet was quite successful. The service successfully operated a kitchen facility in Kienethout City to provide low cost meals. Support of orphanages and day care centers was accomplished by fund transfers only. The food-for-peace programs generally under Social Welfare Service operated in "fits-and-starts". In spite of considerable advisory effort this program never was able to operate smoothly and continuously. The reason for this were many including late shipments of food, insufficient Social Welfare Cadre to expeditiously accomplish the paperwork properly, and a sometimes recalcitrant attitude on the part of the province accountable officer.

CHIEU HOI DIRECTORATE

Chieu Hoi:

The Chieu Hoi Program usually reached the assigned goals. The center operated as required. The program in nine months produced only one Hoi Chanh of any significance. This was a female who claimed to be a platoon leader and contributed a significant amount of intelligence.

REPORTS AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

Report Requirements:

During my tenure the reporting requirements were not excessive. Of the reports required as of the end of my tour the least valuable was the rice production report, my FDO was told only to submit this every other month. This in effect lost half of the rice harvest. The TFES Report was discontinued during the Summer of 1972. Prior to that time when this Province had one man district teams, the accurate completion of this report was beyond the capability of a single DSA. The TFES was then superceded by the Vietnamized TFARS. This report got off to a poor start. The instructions initially came out in English only - ambiguities were never resolved - Due dates were changed - Input forms were distributed after the report was due in. Since its rocky start the Vietnamese have shown an interest in submitting the report on time but its value as a management tool to the Vietnamese at sector level is very dubious.

Report Feedback:

Feedback on the HES was outstanding. The HES Newsletter is highly responsive with instructions that are clear, concise, and timely. The Hamlet
change report is also very helpful. The Management By Exception printout is of little value to the province or district. The information in this printout is already well known long before it comes back down to province and without further knowledge of the situation is an unreliable basis upon which to make decisions.

PHOENIX DIRECTORATE

Phoenix:

See Section on National Police Operations

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Public Health:

This program has the potential for great impact on the local population. The Province Hospital was understaffed and underfunded but within these constraints was operated in a generally satisfactory manner. The benefits of the Health Program were greatly diminished by the time they got down to the people. An adequate supply of medicine generally was not available at the village or hamlet level although the number of health workers was adequate. At the district level the proper operation of the dispensary was a matter of considerable advisory attention. Though there were sufficient personnel assigned to the dispensaries, their motivation and attitude often left something to be desired.

Education:

Education was available to most children of the Province. Many problems in this area could be solved if increased control and discipline powers were given to the service chief at province level. The requirement to have teacher assignments made at Saigon made little apparent sense at this level. I would recommend that the education service chief at province also be given responsibility for all high schools in the province. Responsibility for the Montagnard boarding schools is somewhat split between MDEM and Education. The funding level in MDEM is too low to maintain acceptable standards for the boarding facilities. Dormitories are overcrowded, the structures are in some cases worse than the most primitive long houses that the children come from. The food allocation of about 120 piaster per child per day is very low and the MDEM does not even fund at this rate for the number of children that actually should attend the boarding schools. The service is then put in the dilemma of essentially refusing some children an education or of trying to squeeze even more sleeping space and food out of an already inadequate facilities and monetary allowances.
Public Works:

This service functioned efficiently within the scope of equipment and funds available. The equipment was barely sufficient to support the specifically funded road maintenance and construction projects. There is a distinct need for more equipment to support other province projects. The 2 graders and 2 bulldozer were not sufficient to support projects such as clearing land for refugees and clearing sites for Return-to-Village projects.

Economic Development:

Economic development in Darlac was primarily left to normal market forces of supply and demand. The economy is primarily agrarian and most of the produce is consumed within the province. The major exports from the province are rubber, coffee and timber. Little was done to encourage production of these three crops and the government function was largely regulatory.

Land Reform:

The principal Land Reform Program in this province was the Main Living Area (MLA) Program. There was a small amount of land distributed under the Kien Dien Program. The MLA Program has been very successful up to the present time. Personnel working in this program at Region and Saigon were particularly helpful and responsive. This program was well received by the Montagnards and US control through representation on the Joint Committee was helpful. The one item of guidance required is the cut-off date for squatters to have valid claim on MLA land. In some cases this is holding up MLA's. The measure of the ultimate effectiveness of the MLA Program has yet to come. This will be the degree to which the GVN will uphold the MLA against encroachment. I believe that the degree to which the government backs up the MLA boundaries will mine to a significant extent the degree to which the Highlander is actively loyal to the GVN.

Domestic Production:

The only item that the government actually was responsible for was TN rice to the extent of about 800 hectares. The expansion of other crops particularly coffee was due to normal market forces. The lumber industry was hampered by the war and should greatly expand during peace if not over taxed. So far no thought has been given to reforestation.

Labor:

This program was very low level in Darlac, a predominately rural area. The program was of such limited scope that although carried out in accordance with national goals it made not significant impact.
Youth Affairs:

This program was not very imaginative and had little impact upon pacification.

Public Administration:

See comments on Local Government

PSYOP:

As a separate program supported by JUSPAO this program did not really exist at province level. The responsibility for monitoring this program was one of many additional duties assigned this Sector S-2 Advisor.

The political warfare section of the sector was reasonably active. The civic action group in the Polwar Company completed a very limited number of projects but were often concerned with fixing up new billets and offices.

Vietnamese information service was active but suffered from somewhat of a credibility gap due primarily to oversell of their part.
**Document Title:** Senior Officer Debriefing Report, Period Ending February 73

**Authors:**
- LTC John M. McDonald
- LTC Frank L. Day
- LTC Griffin Dodge

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**Supplementary Notes:**
N/A

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