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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

0HQDA Ltr 525-72-6

úmero of the Adjutant General

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Reports: Senior Advisors, Phu Yen, Pleiku, Quang Duc, and Darlac Provinces, MR 4, Period Ending February 1973.

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2. Transmitted herewith are reports of Senior Advisors to the MR 4 provinces for the period ending February 1973.
   a. LTC John M. McDonald, SA, Phu Yen Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B015, Inclosure 1
   b. LTC Frank L. Day, SA, Pleiku Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B019, Inclosure 2
   c. Griffin N. Dodge, SA, Quang Duc Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B027, Inclosure 3
   d. LTC John C. Bosch, SA, Darlac Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B028, Inclosure 4

3. These reports are provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the authors. The reports should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, they should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

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6 February 1973

SUBJECT: Completion of Tour Report (CTR) and Interview (RCS: MACCORDS 174.01)

ATTN: MACCORDS (For ACofS CORDS)
APO SF 96222

Attached is my Completion of Tour Report as required by Joint Directive 4-70.

/GRiffin N. Dodge
LTC, FA
Province Senior Advisor

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SECTION I

NAME: DODGE, Griffin W.
GRADE: Lieutenant Colonel
SSAN: [Redacted]
BRANCH OF SERVICE: US Army; Field Artillery

PROVINCE: 24 January - 17 October 1972 Sadec Province
24 October - 1972 - 20 February 1973 Quang Duc Province

INCLUSIVE DATES: 16 January 72 - 20 February 1973

EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE: 15 July 1973

PREVIOUS TOUR IN VIETNAM: Aug 65 - Jun 66

ASSIGNMENT OF PREVIOUS TOUR: S-3 SPT CMD 1st Cav Div (AMBL) - 6 mos
BN XO 1st Bn 77th FA - 5 mos

SECTION II

1 & 2 Background for position:

a. Eight months training at the Vietnam Training Center, Foreign
Service Institute, Washington, D.C.

b. The reassignment at mid tour from DPSA Sadec Province to PSA Quang-Duc Province was quite a contrast. Sadec Province was geographically small, densely populated, socially well organized with a viable, reasonably well structured province government. Conversely, Quang Duc Province was large, sparsely populated with a 50% Highlander population, a shifting hamlet/village structure and a government structure of limited capability.

3. Additional training for position:
The training received at the Foreign Service Institute, particularly that which was keyed to Sadec Province, was excellent. I recommend additional or more intensified language training pointed toward a greater fluency in the Vietnamese language. The limited language capability attained was an invaluable asset.

4. The length of tour for PSA/DPSA:
The 1½ to 2 year tour for PSA/DPSA is appropriate. However, reassignment of such personnel between province during a tour should be held to an absolute minimum. I experienced over two months of non-productive time while learning a new Province.

5. Adequacy of Support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters:
a. Mission support from Region and Saigon Headquarters was generally satisfactory in both MII and MIV. Guidance received based on requests was normally prompt and valid. Requests for funds or materials were normally handled with dispatch whether approved or disapproved.

b. Team administrative support was generally poor. The responsibility for team support was divided between USAID and MACV. This caused occasional confusion as to which agency was responsible for what type of support. In general, USAID provided inadequate support, occasionally outstanding in MII. However, with the diminishing size of the U.S. Military presence in-country, there was a corresponding decrease in MACV support.

(1) The Sadec Province, the military members of the advisory team (consisting of from three to four officers) occupied a building which had previously been used by a division advisory team on a large MACV Compound. As most of the compound was returned by GVN control, all MACV (and PA&E) support was withdrawn. This action took place in late April 1972. Beginning in early March 1972, the province team began initiating requests for maintenance of the building to be occupied, construction of a security fence, and assistance in securing water and electrical power from local civilian sources. Although the support responsibility rested entirely with MACV, construction of the security fence and securing of local water and electrical power were only accomplished with extensive assistance from USATD sources on an emergency basis. Maintenance support for the living quarters was initiated in October 1972 — six months after the initial requests were submitted and only after continuous pressure was applied to include an IG report in late June 1972 which cited substandard housing.

(2) Distribution of mail and official correspondence for Sadec required at least two hours of advisor time daily. All distribution was delivered to Vinh Long Province, and a member of the Sadec advisory staff had to travel by road a round trip of approximately 30 miles in order to exchange distribution.

c. In general, an inordinate amount of available advisory time was spent performing team support and individual support functions. In addition, to the distribution situation cited above, the following examples are cited:

(1) Each month approximately fifty percent of the military team members experienced pay problems (often occurring problems). In each case, the member was required to make a one to two day trip to Saigon (from Sadec) or Nha Trang (from Quang Duc) in order to correct the problem. This situation was inexcusable.

(2) Team members were required to visit existing commissaries to purchase food. Time spent doing this often detracted directly from available advisor time.

d. To prevent team support requirement from detracting from the advisory mission, the following recommendations are made:

(1) Staff each team with two or more individuals specifically assigned for administrative support (Team 32 in Quang Duc was authorized an Administrative Officer); or:
(2) Staff the next higher headquarters with sufficient personnel and transportation assets to accomplish such support for small teams.

(3) Clearly define team support responsibilities and insure that a viable organization exists in higher headquarters to make it work.

6. Programs delayed because support was not forthcoming; and, programs that were especially successful because support was readily available.

   a. Sadec Province was conducting an extensive road maintenance program during 1972. Rock for this program was imported by barge from An Giang Province. Rock deliveries were requested to be made at a small off-loading and storage site in Sadec. However, both U.S. and GVN authorities insisted that rock deliveries should be made to a site in Vinh Long Province and Sadec would pick up by truck. Until the Sadec Advisory Team arranged for private tugs (through AIK funds) to bring rock barges to the Sadec rock site, the road maintenance program experienced considerable delays.

   b. Sadec Province implemented a National Police program in which the police at the village/hamlet level took an increasing responsibility for security. Prompt and effective support by both U.S. and GVN brought sufficient police officers to the province to provide one as police chief in each village and equipment support which included communication equipment. Through support of this nature the program was successfully accomplished.

7. Effectiveness of reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive 4-70. In general, the dwindling personnel resources of the province teams was paralleled by decreasing reporting requirements during the period covered by this report. However, the reporting requirements as established in Joint Directive 4-70 obviously did not provide a means for reporting all information of present and future value due to the number of recurring and one time special reports required. For instance, both MR II and MR IV had a special recurring mid-month "Pacification Profile Update" report. This report, executed at the province level, consolidated information normally available but no conveniently retrievable from other reports (e.g. TEES) used within the region. As the U.S. presence dwindled, certain reports were "Vietnamized" - specifically the "HES" and the "TFARS". The "TEARS" was of absolutely no value to the province Team in either Sadec or Quang Duc. The value of its predecessor, (the "TFES") was particularly questionable in Sadec Province during a period of extensive territorial forces organizational flux (PF change from 155 platoons to 60 platoons; RF change from 22 companies to 39 companies). The TFES update forms were religiously executed each month (although neither MAT Teams nor District Teams existed to verify accuracy). The value of the resulting print-outs received 25 days later was of a mildly interesting historical nature.

8. Effectiveness of the MACCORDS Management Information System Field Reporting System to measure progress in pacification programs. The HES was completely "Vietnamized" in Sadec. When used within the province, the HES is a valuable management tool in isolating weak areas and showing where more emphasis may be placed. HES printouts, Hamlet Change printouts and the HES Newsletter were a valuable sources of management information. Unfortunately, the Vietnamese tend
to consider the HES as an American report which is the Province Chief's report card. MES reports are scrutinized to determine how the HES scores can be raised rather than how pacification programs can be improved. Used within the province, the HES can be a valuable tool. If used to measure one province in relation to others, it becomes an end in itself and is of very limited value.

The "TIRS" is useful locally. It provided some interesting historical statistics and can serve as a means to check HES input.

9. Instructions from higher headquarters were generally clear without conflicting requirements. However, short suspenses sometimes resulted in a hasty report (e.g. three days to completely analyze the proposed deployment of Territorial Forces in Sadec Province under varying force structure conditions).

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:
   a. Land Reform
   b. Public Works
   c. Public Safety

11. The most effective paramilitary forces are:
   1. National Police Field Force
   2. RD Cadre
   3. Peoples Self Defense Force

12. The most successful pacification programs are:

   Sadec Province                   Quang Duc Province
   1. Land Reform (Land to the Tiller) Land Reform (Main Living Area)
   2. Public Administration          Public Works
   3. Village Self Development       Youth Affairs

13. The programs that have the greatest impact upon the pacification effort are:

   1. Land Reform
   2. Public Administration
   3. Village Self Development

14. The least successful pacification programs are:

   Sadec Province                   Quang Duc Province
   1. Labor                         Labor
   2. Chieu Hoi                     Village Self Development
   3. Social Welfare                Chieu Hoi

15. The programs that have the least impact on the pacification effort are:

   1. Labor: Requirement for labor limited in both provinces.
   2. War Victims: Insignificant number of war victims generated in each Province.
3. Chieu Hoi

16. The rural people are aware of the pacification efforts the GVN and the US are making. In Sadec Province where the government and social structures are well organized, the rural population was generally well informed. Intensive VIS programs assisted greatly in accomplishing this. In Quang Duc Province the rural people were not well informed due to a limited information program and limited literacy of the Highlanders.

17. In Sadec Province, the people's commitment to the GVN increased during my tenure due to intensive province sponsored programs which directed massive VIS and public service efforts toward the population. In these efforts (called "An Dan" campaigns), the province massed military, intelligence, police, information and public service resources into small geographical areas for an intensified three to five days campaign. The major purpose of these campaigns was to bring the government to the people. The people's commitment to GVN increased in Quang Duc Province due to intensive pre-cease fire information efforts.

18. The pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals which will improve security and development in Vietnam. Goals in some cases were unrealistic. For example, Quang Duc Province accomplished nearly 300% of its taxation goal in September of 1972. Obviously the goal was too low. Conversely, Sadec Province, with an exceptionally effective land to the Tiller program, was falling short of its goals because it was simply running out of land. Goals, as established in the plan, provide good targets. Unfortunately they tend to become an end in themselves and, when exceeded during a specific period, the agency responsible for achieving a goal relaxes its operations.

19. I feel that the pacification plan was adequately explained to my counterpart and myself.

SECTION III
FUNCTIONAL AREAS
TERRITORIAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE

RF/PF: The major effort during my tenure in Sadec was ungrading PF to RF. Within a six month period the following changes were accomplished:

a. PF reduced from 150 platoons to 60 platoons.

b. RF increased from 22 companies to 37 companies.

c. Three company group headquarters were converted to battalion headquarters.

d. Four additional battalion headquarters were created.

e. Four battalions (16 companies) were deployed out of province.

The PF to RF upgrading program was conducted in a precipitous manner which jeopardized local security. As a result the VC propaganda effort operating in areas recently vacated by PF Platoons increased and became bolder. Fortunately there were no major enemy military efforts during the period.

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My major failure with territorial forces program was improving the lot of the individual soldier. Housing for soldiers and dependents was from inadequate to non-existent. Pay was normally late. The delay in designating mobile battalions (during upgrading programs in both Sadec and Quang Duc Provinces) delayed the individual soldier receiving his pay increase. Soldiers were inadequately supplied with food and clothing. There appeared to be insufficient attention to the welfare of the individual soldier by all levels of command.

PSDF. This was generally a successful program. Unfortunately, PSDF was often considered as a military force when in reality it was an armed social club.

PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTORATE

During my tenure in Sadec Province there was vast increase in the National Police area of responsibility. The National Police took over the "Protection of the People Against Terrorism" (POPAT) program. The village police chief became the village deputy for security, and the National Police became responsible for coordinating local security. Reorganization to accept these new responsibilities was accomplished successfully in Sadec Province. The assignment of sufficient police officers to place one in each village was a great help as was additional assistance provided by higher headquarters. In contrast to the intensive efforts to upgrade the National Police in Sadec Province, the National Police of Quang Duc sort of muddled along. The isolation of the province made it an undesirable police assignment, and the educational level of the local people drastically limited the local recruiting base. This lack of support seemed to hold true even on the advisory side as Advisory Team 32 shared a Public Safety Advisor who resided in Lam Dong Province. Although a capable individual, the Public Safety Advisor could do little beyond making occasional visits and preparing the required reports.

The National Police Field Force (NPFF) had the potential of providing the National Police an excellent action arm. In both provinces this force conducted a number of anti-VC operations -- but were rarely successful. In Sadec, one NPFF Platoon performed static guard for the local power plant.

A dynamic, uncorrupted National Police organization is a critical requirement for RVN. During my tenure I saw little advancement in this direction by the National Police. There were all too few exceptional leaders. A survey conducted in Sadec Province in May 1972 disclosed little respect for the police, and tales of petty corruption abounded. Progress was either slow or nonexistent.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE

VILLAGE SELF DEVELOPMENT. As mentioned earlier, Sadec Province had a well organized, cohesive social structure. As a result VSD could and did work well. In one area, an all weather road suitable for small vehicles was constructed through the purchase of rock and culvert and all labor performed by families living along the route. Conversely, the VSD program in Quang Duc was not as
successful. My brief tenure which included some personal observation and reports indicated a lack of organization and in some cases projects dictated by district chiefs in an effort to meet VSD goals.

RD CADRE. The RD Cadre in Sadec was an efficient organization that had a great potential. The potential was not realized as the RD Cadre was no longer a necessary program in Sadec. In Quang Duc where the capabilities of RD Cadre were desperately needed, the program was not well directed.

ETHNIC MINORITIES. This effort simply lacked direction and leadership. An example was the use of the STRD Cadre. These people were simply placed in villages without programs or direction and as a result accomplished little or nothing. The Ethnic Minorities Chief in Quang Duc has a trained Public Health Worker but absolutely incompetent as the EM Chief. Some of the slack was picked up by the Province Deputy for Highlander Affairs and CORDS area specialists.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT. As a result of an extensive survey conducted by CORDS personnel in Sadec Province numerous deficiencies in the conduct of local government were brought to light. Most of the deficiencies were simply the result of insufficient knowledge on the part of the administrators. Using the results of the survey as a basis, the province, under the guidance of the Deputy for Administration, developed additional training programs pointed toward local administrators. As of the time of my departure from Sadec, the training was well underway.

Local government in Quang Duc Province is not as well developed - resulting from the lack of leadership potential and the limited education of the majority of the Highlanders. This results in a relatively complex government system administered by nearly illiterate people. The solution to the problem is a far better education program and even if Highlander education became widespread immediately we could not expect results overnight.

AID IN KIND. Aid in Kind funds were well used both in Quang Duc and in Sadec. In Quang Duc a recent use was to finance a chicken raising project which encouraged private individuals to undertake poultry ventures. A second AIK grant was used to encourage Highlanders to cultivate paddy rice. Such funds were used quite successfully in Sadec to provide program impact - that is a final push to complete an ongoing project. Funds were also used to increase effectiveness of an intensive information program. Such funds were best used in an impact situation where the additional resources can put the finishing touches or something local people had already initiated.

WAR VICTIMS DIRECTORATE

Little activity with war victims was experienced in either Sadec or Quang Duc Province. The Social Welfare Chiefs in both provinces were reluctant to seek eligible people. Instead they took the "Mandarin" attitude of waiting for the problems to seek them followed by an effort to explain away the problem rather than do anything about it. The Social Welfare Chief in Quang Duc Province had abundant supplies of Food for Peace commodities. He would cheerfully allow these conditions to spoil (saving them for emergencies) instead of issuing them
where needed. The requirement is simply for greater initiative on the part of the Social Welfare Chief.

CHIEU HOI DIRECTORATE

The Chieu Hoi program in both Sadec and Quang Duc Provinces could be considered a failure on the surface. Neither province received many Hoi Chanhns during my tenure. However, there were good reasons for this. There was, frankly, a relatively small number of VC in each province. Also there were no major military operations in either province. The advisors in Sadec were very much in favor of closing the Chieu Hoi Center in that province. I felt that the center in Quang Duc could still serve its purpose although I estimated a minimum of Chieu Hoi activity.

REPORTS AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

See paragraph 7, Part II.

PHUNG HOANG DIRECTORATE

As the U.S. Phung Hoang advisors were withdrawn and the responsibility for this program was transferred to the National Police, there was a corresponding decrease in the effectiveness of this program. In Sadec Province, the program experienced a precipitous decrease followed by steady improvement as the National Police became proficient with procedures. In addition, the Province Chief was placing strong emphasis on the program. In Quang Duc I found the program nearly dormant. The lack of a full time Public Safety Advisor, an underdeveloped National Police Program and a rather small VC Infrastructure all contributed to the situation.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

PUBLIC HEALTH. An advisory program for Public Health was almost non-existent in both Sadec and Quang Duc. Sadec had a viable Public Health Program, a good hospital staffed with competent doctors, and dispensaries and maternities could be found throughout the province.

The advisory team in Quang Duc had an assigned medical NCO. On his own initiative and with my encouragement, he was providing a limited Public Health Advisory effort. He achieved limited success in improving existing district dispensaries. He was able to distribute medicines, conduct MEDCAP operations and place required furniture in some locations. The existing Public Health structure was of limited competence. The Public Health Chief was a poor administrator and had questionable professional skills. Fortunately, the local Catholic Church did operate a dispensary. The situation in Quang Duc can only be corrected by the assignment of competent GVN medical personnel to the Province who are seriously interested in improving the Public Health situation.

EDUCATION. The education program in Sadec was very good. Although sufficient
teachers were assigned, there were some remote schools that did not have enough. In such cases, RD Cadre or PF soldiers were pressed into serving successfully. Conversely Quang Duc had the initial disadvantages of being remote, having undesirable (rustic) working and living conditions, and a large Highlander population with inherent language problems. The existing education program could best be exemplified by an incident which occurred prior to my arrival. A number of teachers went on strike against the Education Service Chief in protest of his alleged corrupt practices. The result of the disturbance was the arrest and reassignment of several teachers and the arrest and investigation of the Education Service Chief for corruption at the multi-million piaster level. Some of the slack in the education program is taken up by extensive efforts on the part of volunteer religious organizations oriented on Highlander education. In addition I have observed highly dedicated teachers conducting night adult education language classes. Education is one of several desperate requirements in Quang Duc. The problem can be solved only by the assignment of qualified dedicated teachers and administrators to the province by the GVN. Where can such people who are willing to come to remote, rustic Quang Duc be found?

PUBLIC WORKS. The Public Works in Sadec was well organized and very functional. The same situation was true in Quang Duc - - within the resources available to the province. The three major roads in Quang Duc Province are in a deplorable state of repair - - impassable in many areas. Repair is absolutely beyond the capability of the province Public Works to accomplish - - yet repair of these roads is critical to the economic development of the area. Although there has been some lip service toward support in this area, outside help is desperately used but little has been forthcoming. Public works programs are successful in the province. Gia Nghia, the province capitol, now has limited electrical power that did not exist one year ago. There is some road repair. But the area is far behind the rest of the country. Aid in the form of funds, technical assistance and qualified labor are clearly required.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Quang Duc Province has untapped timber resources. The lumber industry in the province is minimal due to transportation difficulties already described. Efforts are going forward both through GVN and US advisory channels to attract timber interests.

LAND REFORM. The program has been a bright light in both Sadec and Quang Duc Provinces. The land to the Tiller (LTTT) program in Sadec has been well administered with only minor delays in processing titles at higher levels. Compensation for land lost has been somewhat slower. The success of the program is exemplified by the fact that the province is fast exhausting the eligible hectarage.

The Main Living Area (MLA) land program in Quang Duc is also meeting excellent success. The program is, of course, complicated by the vast displacement of the Highland people due to security and their own nomadic instincts, but positive results are being accomplished. I felt that the importance of these programs cannot be overstated and they must have continued support.

DOMESTIC PRODUCTION. Quang Duc Province cannot produce enough rice to feed itself. However, the potential exists. If the Highlanders can be taught to grow
paddy rices; if the Highlander can be convinced to create paddy land; and if new cultivated areas can be created in Duc Xuyen District aided by reconstruction of LTL 344 from Gia Nghia to Duc Xuyen, the province has the potential for a rice surplus. Efforts are going forward, albeit slowly, to accomplish the above.

LABOR. Not applicable.

YOUTH AFFAIRS. Generally a good program in both Sadec and Quang Duc. Advisory participation was limited to occasional transportation and financial assistance. The success of these programs was the result of competent leadership.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. The civil servants of Sadec Province were generally competent and interested in doing a good job. Cooperation between province officials was usually very good. Conversely, Quang Duc sometimes has the feelings of a "Siberia" where officials that are of questionable honesty or competency are "exiled". In general, civil servants do not want to come to Quang Duc and, when assigned, are reluctant to bring their families. As a result, the level of public administration suffers. Not all public officials are bad. However, prior to my arrival, advisory personnel participated in the removal of one district chief and one service chief, and were actively developing derogatory information on two other service chiefs.

JOINT UNITED STATES PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

PSYOP AND VIS. Generally good programs operating with advisory support limited to small amounts of funds and material. Again the programs had good leadership.

ADDED COMMENTS

Status as of the Cease Fire. Quang Duc remains a backward province. However, the Province Chief has demonstrated exceptional initiative in his efforts to hold the population under GVN control during the twenty-four hours on each side of the cease fire. He accurately assessed the enemy military capability and successfully secured the existing surface lines of communication within the province as well as the six major population centers by a careful deployment of his available forces. The enemy's single military effort for a last minute land grab was repulsed.

Remaining Major Problems. The problems facing Quang Duc are legion. I might place the major case in this order:

1. Reconstruction and repair of existing surface lines of communication within the province. The road net in Quang Duc is barely usable. Although good roadbeds exist, some roads are impassable. Repair and reconstruction is critically needed as a prelude to any development effort and to attract outside trade. There is nothing available locally to correct the situation. Massive assistance in the form of ARVN engineers and/or GVN funded private contractors is required.

2. The Inherent Highlander/Vietnamese Problem. This problem has long been

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recognized, and some actions are taking place. The Province Chief's personal example of treating Highlanders with respect and dignity is a step in the right direction. As we have not yet solved this problem in the United States it is tough to propose a solution here. Strict enforcement of laws benefitting Highlanders will help.

3. Education. This problem as it pertains to Quang Duc has already been cited. An education program, which is suited to their needs and tradition, is critically needed for the Highlanders. It is through education that the Highlander can be accepted as a productive member of Vietnamese society.

4. Other. Improving the local administration and upgrading the National Police are the remaining major problems. These have been previously cited. Recommendations for Remaining Advisors. Current information indicates that the remaining U.S. Advisory presence in Quang Duc will consist of a single REC Advisor. Based on this I propose the following:

1. That the single US Advisor in Quang Duc be tasked with only the bare minimum of administrative and housekeeping activities. All of these are time consuming and detract directly from the advisory effort.

2. That continued emphasis be placed on teaching Highlanders to grow paddy rice.

3. That outside advisory assistance be provided for reconstruction and repair of the surface lines of communication in the province; and that outside advisory assistance be provided to upgrade educational opportunities available to the population.

4. That the resident advisor continue to emphasize the MLA Program.

5. That the resident advisor initiate a program to upgrade local, district and provincial administration.
**Report Title:**
Senior Officer Debriefing Reports: Senior Advisors, Phu Yen, Pleiku, Quang Duc, and Darlac Provinces, MR 4, Period Ending February 73 (U)

**Authors:**
- LTC John M. McDonald
- LTC Frank L. Day
- LTC Griffin Dodge
- LTC John Bosch

**Date:**
6 Feb 74

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**Supplementary Notes:**
N/A

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