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HQDA Ltr 525-74-22

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (29 Apr 74) DAMO-ODU 8 May 1974

Expires 8 May 1975

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (US Army Depot, Da Nang, Period Ending 31 October 1971)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material, as appropriate. This report should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the HQ DA (DAMO-ODU) Washington, D.C., within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

1 Incl
as

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY DEPOT DA NANG
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349

AVCD-AD-M

16 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (US Army Depot, Da Nang Period Ending 31 October 1971) RCS CSFOR-65

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Withdrawn

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AVCD-AD-M 16 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (US Army Depot, Da Nang Period Ending 31 October 1971) RCS CSFOR-65

2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Lack of critical skills in Depot personnel.

(a) Observation: Individuals with the proper skills and adequate experience were not assigned to the Depot in sufficient numbers.

(b) Evaluation: This situation developed because of military phase-downs in MRI and the lack of military replacements at the U.S. Army Depot, Da Nang. The manpower shortage was aggravated by the increased station returns due to unit standdowns in MRI.

(c) Recommendations: To allow the Depot to adequately staff itself to perform its mission with reduced military personnel, manpower shortages must be determined early so that Contractor Personnel can be requested through contracts to meet the manpower needs of the Depot.

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(1) Typhoon Preparations

(a) Observation: Preparation for the monsoon and typhoon season is a long, time consuming task, but can reap major rewards in the salvaging of building equipment and materiel.

(b) Evaluation: Monsoon preparation in MRI must begin about 15 August for major installations. A series of self help projects were initiated in late August to prepare the Depot facilities for the monsoon and typhoon seasons. These projects included a massive sandbagging operation wherein over 40,000 sandbags were emplaced; a systematic program of roof maintenance to include drainage systems repairs; the clearance of silt and debris from drainage ditches, and the construction of a sea wall to protect billeting spaces on the beach. Preparations undertaken by this command saved the vast proportion of the Depot structures during Typhoon Hester.

(c) Recommendations: These advanced preparations are best accomplished by indigenous personnel hired on a temporary basis. Protection must be complete and omnidirectional winds prepared for. Wind shields to consist of CONEX containers or double "A" pack large crates make excellent wind shields when placed around door or other warehouse structures. It is imperative that higher headquarters give a minimum warning of twenty-four hours of the approach of a typhoon.

(2) Overstockage

(a) Observation: During the period 1 June 1971 through 30 September 1971, the US Army Depot experienced a severe overstockage of perishable subsistence. The maximum refrigerated storage capacity at the Depot was 2,000 short tons. However, the on hand inventory rose to an excess of 4,000 short tons. This was caused, primarily, by troop reductions which occurred during the third and fourth quarters of FY 71, which were scheduled for the first quarter of FY 72. The first of these was severe power failures which caused outages for a total of 150 hours in various reefer banks. The second problem was the poor condition of the refrigeration equipment. A survey taken in August 1971, indicated that of the 245 available refrigerated boxes, only 84 met the minimum sanitary and mechanical requirements for the storage of perishable subsistence. As a result of these factors, the Commanding Officer, 175th Veterinary Detachment, estimated that the Depot would experience a $500,000.00 loss of perishables within the period 1 June to 30 September.

(b) Evaluation: In order to avert these wide spread losses, the Depot initiated the following actions: Cancellations were requested on requisitions or the diversion of incoming shipments for those that could not be canceled in time. Sea Land refrigerated vans were used for temporary storage and sixty refrigeration units were obtained from the Force Logistics Command (Marines) to be utilized as replacements for unserviceable Depot refrigeration units. Even with these measures, the Depot was forced to condemn 278 short tons of perishable subsistence valued at $256,000 during this period. In order to prevent even greater losses, the Depot was further forced to substitute or incorporate comerised subsistence into the menu 331 times for a total of 5,000,000 pounds.

(c) Recommendation: In order to preclude an occurence of the above situation, it is recommended that vital information concerning the change of troop strength be provided to Depot and Class I Support Activities in sufficient time so that programed requirements may be altered, canceled, or diverted. Efforts must be made to reduce the order shipment time for perishable subsistence in order to more realistically forecast monthly troop requirements. Back-up power systems should be considered essential for Class I operation and consideration should be given to the construction of permanent cold storage facilities in depots for perishable subsistence rather than utilizing prefabricated boxes which have a relatively short life span.

(3) Commercial Vehicles

(a) Observation: Commercial material handling equipment (MHE) is difficult to maintain in a theatre of operations.

(b) Evaluation: Operation of MHE is accomplished by warehousemen who use equipment sporadically and have no real attachment to the vehicle. This causes an overall decline in the operation maintenance program. Commercial forklift repair parts utilization data and stockage levels do not appear adequate to meet support maintenance requirements. Of total equipment deadlines some 90-95% are in the shop awaiting parts at the DSU level.

(c) Recommendations: In a threatre of operations, where labor is relatively cheap, permanent MHE vehicle operators be hired. Realistic repair parts stockage levels and improved offshore rebuild procedures be instiuted on MHE to preclude the backlog of vehicles awaiting parts such as engines and transmissions.

(4) Courier Service between ICCV and the ADP Directorate

(a) Observation: A courier service or direct transceiving of data is absolutely essential. Courier runs are scheduled once per day between ICCV and the ADP Directorate. The couriers thus far have utilized regular Air Force flights between the two locals as the means of transportation. U21 flights have been used only occasionally.

(b) Evaluation: There has existed a basic lack of coordination and communication between ICCV and ADP. The Air Force flights have been quite unstable and untimely. The reliability of the courier individuals arriving on scheduled flights has many times been in doubt. This problem has caused long delays in receiving an assortment of magnetic tapes.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that improved telephonic communication between ADP and ICCV be established, use of the more stable U21 flights, and more responsible courier individuals.

(5) Commercial Power Outages and Power Fluctuations at the ADP Facility

(a) Observation: During the months of April to July the ADP facility suffered numerous commercial power outages and power fluctuations. These sudden and unexpected outages and fluctuations resulted in many machine malfunctions, program reruns, and a general decline in the condition of the equipment. Reruns of programs caused slowdowns in throughput of the customer requisitions to the Depot, thus causing a decline in Depot and ADP response rates.

(b) Evaluation: An analysis of the commercial power system as it was during the time frame indicated inadequate power generation for the amount being demanded. Sporadic overtaxing of the available power was causing the fluctuations.

(c) Recommendations: ADP went to its own power supply with a resulting increase in reliability. Power outages have thus leveled off to almost zero and reruns due to power fluctuations have declined sharply.

(6) Station Returns

(a) Observation: The USADD has been receiving station returns from stand down units in less than condition ready for issue.

(b) Evaluation: When equipment is returned to the Depot from units standing down, it should be in an issuable condition. However the Depot has been receiving considerable returns that are not fit for inclusion into Depot stock. As a result a station returns inspecting and processing facility had to be established to segregate and classify all station returns. This is very time consuming and utilized manpower resources that could be employed elsewhere.

(c) Recommendation: Units should identify and classify returns prior to shipment to the Depot. A tighter control should be placed on units standing down.

(7) Chu Lai Project

(a) Observation: When the 23rd Infantry Division began standing down, there were many supplies that required classification and ultimate disposition.

(b) Evaluation: A team of two LCO's from the Directorate for Quality Assurance USADD were dispatched to monitor the operation. The team was able to classify and provide disposition instructions to the 23rd Infantry Division, specifically the 23rd S&T Battalion and the 723rd Maintenance Battalion. The team was also available to provide guidance as to the proper blocking and bracing of Conex containers and Vans. Those items on the initial items list and those items in Depot pack were returned to the Depot. Unserviceable items were sent directly to PDO. Serviceable but unidentifiable stock and stock in less than depot pack was sent to Sagami. Segregating the stock at the point of initial loading precluded unnecessary shipping of scrap material and unnecessary handling of stock at the Depot level.

(c) Recommendation: QA team should be made available in the future to Division size units standing down.

d. Organization: None

e. Training

(1) Instruction of Vietnamese Employees

(a) Observation: Vietnamese employees assigned to work in the warehouses lacked sufficient training to properly perform their assigned functions as warehousemen.

(b) Evaluation: The language barrier and the technical nature of the job led to numerous problems and loss of efficiency in the warehouses. Paperwork and forms were improperly completed, lost, or discarded and frequently misrouted which caused inaccuracies in the Locator and ABF listings.

(c) Recommendation: A senior NCO thoroughly knowledgeable in warehouse procedures and completion of required paperwork was tasked to develop and present a class on warehouse procedures. A block of instruction was presented on how to receive, store, and issue stock as well as related paperwork in the Vietnamese language through an interpreter. Employees were given practical exercises and an opportunity to ask questions. Detailed instruction was also given on use of documents and their importance. Approximately 30 percent of the employees participated and the remaining 70 percent will receive the instruction in the future. The Vietnamese employees were attentive and interested and it appears the classes were successful from both a morale and operational standpoint.

f. Logistics

(1) Hand Carry Requisitions

(a) Observation: The present system of processing hand carry requisitions using both the manually prepared Material Release Order (MRO) and the machine prepared MRO is unnecessary.

(b) Evaluation: This situation is caused by the use of manually prepared MRO which is typed while the customer waits, and the use of machine cut MRO which is prepared by the computer in the daily cycle ahead of normal requisitions. A difference exists in that there is a delay of up to 48 hours when using the machine prepared MRO. This is not always critical but does require consideration. Of benefit in using this method is the fact that all posting is accomplished automatically. Manually prepared MRO's require post-post action but is offset by the speed with which an MRO can be processed and urgently needed items expedited.

(c) Recommendation: That the computer prepared MRO's be discontinued. This would accomplish a two-fold purpose. It would eliminate the need for the extraction from the normal daily computer output of these special MRO's and would expedite those requisitions meeting the requirements for hand carry requests.

(d) Command Action: The elimination of the machine cut MRO process was placed in effect on 1 October 1971. At first a slight increase in the normal daily hand carry volume was observed but this increase quickly diminished and is presently no greater than prior to the change. There have been no complaints from customers.

(2) Procedures to Upgrade the Reliability and Accuracy of the Availability Balance File (ABF)

(a) Observation: The ABF and the Master Locator File were found to be widely divergent: there were over 30,000 locations for FSN's which showed a zero balance on the ABF.

(b) Evaluation: The Master Locator appeared more reliable than the ABF as an indication of items actually on hand. The MRE's and the Redball section were constantly finding or issuing items which were not reflected on the ABF. This situation developed because no one had ever been specifically assigned the task of correcting the exceptions that would not post to the ABF. The divergence continued to grow until it reached its present proportions. Much of the problem can be traced to FSN changes which have not been recorded; incorrect FSN's on items received; transposition errors, etc. As a result of these type of errors, accountability for these items was impaired.

(c) Recommendation. It is recommended that a permanent team be established to insure that all posting exceptions are corrected and disposed of in an appropriate manner. This team would be charged with the responsibility of investigating all exceptions which are readily corrected. This would include obtaining disposition instructions on all items which are classified as not identifiable. This team would have the authority to request inventories as appropriate.

(d) Command Action: The Depot organized such a team in September; it consisted of an OIC, and one member each from the Storage, ADP, Stock Control and Quality Assurance sections. Initial results from the team are most encouraging. During its initial operation, this team had added over 2,100 lines to the ABF and has disposed of over 600 items which cannot be identified.

(3) Wall to Wall Inventory of a Depot

(a) Observation: To properly account for Depot assets it is necessary (and required by regulation) to conduct wall to wall inventories. This is a major undertaking and requires close control, supervision and follow-up to produce maximum results.

(b) Evaluation: Prior to conducting a wall to wall inventory, the area to be inventoried must be accurately and completely located using an acceptable location system. The inventory must then be conducted by qualified individuals and interruptions must be kept to a minimum. Since transactions, issues, receipts and rewarehousing are suspended on those lines which are being inventoried it is critical that the number of lines to be frozen at any one time be given careful consideration. The count should be reviewed and inspected by an outside element to determine its degree of accuracy. Due to mislabeled boxes, administrative errors and stock number changes, numerous adjustments to the records do not take on the initial submission to ADP and a team is required to detect and correct these exceptions. The overall success of the Depot's wall to wall inventory was outstanding as indicated by the fact that the Depot capitalization rose from $60 million to over $100 million.

(c) Recommendation: In order to avoid involving the inventory team in normal day to day operations, the Depot contracted with a civilian firm to conduct the location survey and physical inventory. This approach allowed the contractor to concentrate completely on the inventory which would not have been the case had a military inventory team been used. Prior to conducting the location survey and the physical inventory, the contractor conducted training for all team members to insure they were well versed in inventory techniques. The use of a contractor for this purpose is strongly recommended. Determining the number of lines to be inventoried at any one time is a critical area. A backward planning approach is necessary to effectively determine the correct size for each inventory freeze. First, the desirable freeze time frame must be determined. It is unsatisfactory for a line to be frozen for an excessive length of time since a long freeze will congest receiving operations and deprive the customer of needed items. Since a small lot requires the same amount of nonproductive, administrative processing time as a large lot, it is not desirable or efficient to have small lots. This is a subjective decision based upon the critical nature of the items. Second, the number of lines to be counted must be determined. The number of lines must be capable of being counted within the selected time frame. Factors which influence the time required to count a line include the number of locations for the line, the type of pack, the type of storage and the nature of the line. The best guide to use when deciding how many lines to inventory in a given lot is the number of locations involved. With a few exceptions, i.e.; lumber, the number of locations is the most significant factor. It is recommended that the backwards planning approach be used and that the number of locations be given primary emphasis when determining the size of any one lot. The Depot's Directorate for Quality Assurance validated each count and this technique proved most successful. It is recommended that any agency separate from the count team be used for this function. For an inventory to be effective, a follow up has to be conducted on all inventoried FSN's, to insure that they are posted to the ABF. Whenever the FSN is not on the skeleton ADDF, it will be rejected as an exception and will not be posted to the ABF. The Depot was not fully prepared

for the high volume of exceptions which were generated as the results of the inventory being posted. It was originally intended to use the normal inventory and adjustment section to perform the required research on the exceptions but it proved necessary to augment this section. A more desirable course of action would be to include the exception processing under the review of the inventory team and to staff them appropriately.

(4) (U) Storage Procedures of Class IX Supplies

(a) Observation: It was determined that a requirement existed to evaluate issue and storage procedures of Class IX supplies.

(b) Evaluation: A critical "open box" problem existed in the open storage area for Class IX supplies. This was caused by improper storage in warehouse locations and warehousemen opening depot packs in open storage in order to fill a requisition.

(c) Recommendation: A study was made regarding available covered and open storage space. A logical relocation system was initiated to consolidate Class IX items by type of pack according to the Master Location System. The hardstands surrounding the warehouse in question was cleared to make maximum use of open storage for Class IX. Action was initiated to rewarehouse the warehouse and to take advantage of available covered storage space. It included the expansion of rack facilities using existing metal racks left by the Navy and odd sized lumber not suitable for other use, resulting in considerable monetary savings to the Depot. The increased covered storage resulting from the use of rack pallets enabled a consolidation of Class IX supplies and to a large extent eliminated the "open box" problem. As a result, losses of Class IX stocks have been considerably reduced, maximum advantage has been taken of critical covered storage, and better utilization of critically short MHE equipment and personnel was effected.

g. Communication: None

h. (U) Material

(a) Observation: In standdown procedures, adequate preservation and packing material, particularly lumber, is not available.

(b) Evaluation: To keep material returned to the Depot in issuable condition, sufficient packing must be provided. Weather conditions require appropriate preservation procedures to assure the safekeeping of the stock. To ship stock in insufficient pack is to lose the stock.

(c) Recommendation: Lumber requirements should be determined immediately upon receipt of standdown orders. The lumber allocations to the units must be adequate to meet their needs.

i. Other (Security)

(1) Forged Requisitions

(a) Observation: During the period 1 January 1971 to 31 October 1971 the Depot has experienced increased attempts of theft of perishable subsistence through forged requisitions.

(b) Evaluation: The document control system which the Depot had used prior to the increase in attempted thefts was basically standard. On a walkthru, the customer would requisition through Class I. Class I would in turn type a DD Form 1149 requesting the items from the Depot. This document was then carried to the stock control division where it was edited, initialed, logged in, and a suspense copy was pulled. The remaining copies were forwarded to the "break" section where items listed on the 1149 are copied on a break sheet and forwarded to the reefer banks for fill. The main area where the forged documents were entering the system was at the break section. Personnel would enter the office carrying a document with the proper numbers of copies pulled, but obviously with forged signatures. However, as time went on, the signatures were starting to take on a reasonable likeness to the authorized customers. For this reason, the Depot initiated the following procedures to reduce these losses: it held bi-weekly meetings with key personnel to discuss possible means or theft and ways to prevent them; it established closer control of documents from the time requisitions are submitted to stock control through storage and back to stock control; it established and coordinated with stock control office and storage document control a specially annotated code for all requisitions that can be altered on a minutes notice by either party without being detected by requisitioner; and it decreased the number of personnel who handle documents. As a result of these procedures in the last 30 days three attempted forgeries exceeding $15,000.000 worth of perishable subsistence and the personnel attempting the thefts have been detected by Depot subsistence personnel and turned over to the military police.

(c) Recommendation: In order to preclude future occurrence at other locations it will be necessary to insure that refined procedures exist at all Class I facilities for document control and issues. Signature cards will have to be updated at least every 60 days and ID cards checked against signature cards.

(2) Photo Identification Passes

(a) Observation: There were a large number of unauthorized personnel in the warehouse and storage areas.

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(b) Evaluation: This situation is caused primarily by a large number of visitors, who regardless of intent, are an unnecessary burden to warehousemen and supervisors. A large majority of these personnel are from units and are guided by Material Release Expeditors (MRE's) in their tours of the Depot.

(c) Recommendation: Storage Division has several legitimate reasons for desiring only essential personnel in these areas, not the least of which are safety, due to the traffic of warehouse vehicles, and the physical security of building and material. Only essential personnel should be allowed in these areas.

(d) Command Action: A completely redesigned identification system utilizing photo identification passes for use only by bonafide MRE's has been instituted. This system enables only those persons recognized as duly authorized unit representatives to gain access to warehouse and storage areas, and then only to the extent necessary for them to accomplish their mission. The system has drastically reduced the number of unauthorized "visitors" and the resulting congestion in these areas. Passes are controlled and issued by the Customer Assistance Branch.

GORDON WEISINGER
Colonel, QMC
Commanding

AVCD-GO-O [16 Nov 71] 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Depot, Da Nang, Period Ending 31 October 1971 [RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)]

Headquarters, US Army Support Command Da Nang, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96349

TO: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-OH APO San Francisco ~~96349~~ 96375

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters US Army Depot, Da Nang and concurs with the basic report as modified by the below comments:

1. (Withdrawn: applies to Part I of ORLL)

2. Page 1 para 2a(1) records reflect that the USA Depot Da Nang strength was in excess of their manning level during the period covered. Within the manning level, the command has not experienced an unusual or critical shortage of personnel with supply MOS.

3. Page 2 para 2c(3).

a. Assignment of specific operators to specific vehicles has proved to be a valuable enhancement of operator care and maintenance of US Army military vehicles. This procedure results in fixing of individual responsibility and installing individual pride in "his" item of equipment. It is therefore most probable that similar assignment of local national operators to specific MHE items would serve to decrease the high deadline rate of MHE.

b. Two big problems hindering adequate support of commercial items are lack of adequate stockage of repair parts and shortage of competent repair facilities. The Philco-Ford Corporation in Da Nang has been doing an outstanding job of repairing forklifts for this area, but the overload condition is a drain on their parts and maintenance capabilities. If the required repair parts were more readily available and off-shore backup rebuild support improved, the readiness posture of MHE would be further enhanced.

AVCD-GO-O [16 Nov 71] 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Depot, Da Nang, Period Ending 31 October 1971 [RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)]

4. Page 4 para 2c(6). Units standing down do not have the knowledge nor the experience in all instances to identify and properly classify Depot returns. The best solution to this problem has been the establishment of a QA Team which coordinates with the Keystone Team and the units. This minimizes the Depot receiving station returns in less than ready for issue condition. It is recommended that this procedure be continued.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

STANLEY M. FUSCUE
MAJ, AGC
Assistant AG

4 MAR 1972

AVHDO-DO (16 Nov 71) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (US Army Depot, Da Nang) Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, US Army Depot, Da Nang and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Additional comment follows:

Reference item concerning "Courier Service", paragraph 2c(4)(c), page 3! Only the most responsible individuals are presently used for courier duty. U-21 flights are used extensively. Also, a direct data link between ICCV and Da Nang Depot is being installed. Presently, USARV Courier Service is being used with a delivery time generally within 24 hours.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

P.H. RODDA

Cy furn:
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Colonel Sherman Weisinger

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