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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Infantry Division, Period Ending, 31 October 1972

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material, as appropriate. This report should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the HQ DA (DAMO-ODU) Washington, D.C. 20310, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

(Continued on page 2)
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1972, RCS CSFOR -65 (RJ) (U)

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TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
ATTN: FOR OT UT
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluation and Recommendation.

   a. INTELLIGENCE. None.

   b. OPERATIONS.

      (1) Minesweep.

         (a) OBSERVATION: During recent minesweep operations in the vicinity of the JSA Advance Camp, dense foliage, barbed wire, and swamps greatly hindered the operation.

         (b) EVALUATION: The minesweep teams are impeded by the foliage and receive false signals from the wire and metal fragments throughout the entire area. Probing for suspected mines is more difficult in the deeper swamp areas.

         (c) RECOMMENDATION: That thickener compound or flame throwers be utilized to burn off the dense growth prior to starting the sweep. It has been found that extra long probes aid in clearing areas where there is dense undergrowth and deep water.

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c. ORGANIZATION. None.

d. TRAINING.

1. Graphical Site Table for Firing Tables.
   a. OBSERVATION: The firing tables for the M31 artillery trainers do not include a Graphical Site Table (GST).
   b. EVALUATION: Although sites may be computed from the tabular firing table, a faster and more accurate method of determining site is required.
   c. RECOMMENDATION: Use of the C and D scales of any slide rule or GST provides a fast and accurate computation of the angle of site.

2. Nuclear Accident/Incident Control Plan.
   a. OBSERVATION: During the recent Nuclear/Incident Exercise, the Alpha Team hotline as depicted in FM 3-15 was found to be inadequate for inclement weather.
   b. EVALUATION: The heavy paper used for minimizing ground contamination became water-soaked and shredded as personnel moved over the hotline. Efforts to maintain records and keep equipment dry were severely hampered.
   c. RECOMMENDATION: That the heavy duty paper be replaced with heavy plastic.

   a. OBSERVATION: While Vulcan squads are authorized to fire two or more times each fiscal year, Chaparral squads are restricted to firing one missile per fiscal year.
   b. EVALUATION: During the conduct of Annual Service Practice, it was evident that Vulcan squads, having fired prior to beginning the evaluated exercise, possessed more confidence and demonstrated higher morale when compared to Chaparral squads who were about to fire their one missile for this FY.
   c. RECOMMENDATION: That additional Chaparral missiles (a minimum of six per battery) be added to the yearly authorization of 24. While all squads would not fire twice each year, the opportunity to witness the missile in action would improve confidence, enhance morale and provide the US Army with a better trained and more highly motivated unit.

e. LOGISTICS.

1. M1 Collimator.
(a) OBSERVATION: The M1 Collimator used by Division Artillery fogs up easily, making it unusable.

(b) EVALUATION: Loose seals, combined with damp weather, allow the collimator to fog quickly.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Frequent purging with nitrogen is necessary. A field expedient solution is to orient the collimator into direct sunlight to evaporate moisture. Care must be exercised while purging to preclude dirt entering the collimator and to prevent seal loosening or damage caused by high pressure nitrogen.

(2) Collimator Lighting Devices.

(a) OBSERVATION: Collimator lighting devices are rarely operable.

(b) EVALUATION: The fragile nature of collimator lighting devices combined with periodic scarcity of replacement parts, produces an excessive deadline rate for the device.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units strive for closer coordination with direct support maintenance units to order and receive the necessary replacement parts.

(3) AN/MRC-115 VHF Terminal Sets.

(a) OBSERVATION: The high deadline rate for AN/MRC-115 VHF terminal sets has been reduced by the resupply of the bearings necessary to repair blower motors in the transmitter section of the sets.

(b) EVALUATION: While the resupply problem has been corrected, the apparent basic design fault of sealed bearings in the blower motor remains uncorrected. Under extreme icing conditions during cold weather operations, airflow can still be restricted to a point where bearings fail on the motors and thus the transmitter is damaged by excessive heat.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the basic design of the blower motors be modified to enable the bearings to perform properly under extreme operating temperatures.

f. COMMUNICATION. None.

g. MATERIAL.

(1) Relocation and Erection of Quonset Buildings.

(a) OBSERVATION: The relocation and erection of quonset buildings was hampered by damaged or corroded spacers and braces.
(b) **EVALUATION:** The majority of quonset buildings designed for relocation had remained stationary for 7-12 years with severe damage caused by the wide range of Korean weather conditions. Most of the shaped metal channel spacers and braces had been corroded beyond repair which significantly reduced the ability of the buildings to withstand flexure. Upon re-erection, the buildings were not at design rigidity and were not waterproof.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Upon re-erection of the buildings, the worn and rusted channel bracing should be reinforced with 2" X 4" X required length lumber, and that tar or caulking compound be used to seal the corrugated metal sheeting.

(2) Obsolete Equipment.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The present AVLB authorized the 2d Engineer Battalion is the M48A2 model which has a gasoline engine and for which repair parts are not readily available. During the severe winters encountered in Korea, the M48A2 is extremely difficult to start and requires more maintenance than other equipment in the battalion.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The M60A1 mounted AVLB requires much the same type of repair parts and the same type engine as does the CEV. Repair parts for the M60A1 are more readily available, and this model would enable the unit to achieve a more balanced density of like items of equipment.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That the M48A2 be replaced with the M60A1 mounted AVLB.

h. OTHER.

(1) Identification of Drug Abusers.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The random urine testing program has proven to be the least effective way of indentifying drug abusers.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The urine testing program is the least effective, and the Drug Exemption Program the next least effective sub-plan for identification of drug abusers. From 1 May to 1 October 1972, only six confirmed cases and 38 indications of drug abuse were identified out of 6,578 urine samples collected. During the same period 87 exemptions were granted, 342 apprehensions were made, and 1,041 visits were made to the 2d Division’s Residential and Drop-in Centers.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Even though the urine collection system is the least effective, recommend that it be retained as it does act as a deterrent to drug abuse due to the threat of unannounced random urine testing.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1972

2d Infantry Division
S.A. Driver

5 February 1974

N/A

N/A

N/A

HQ DA (DAMO-ODU), Washington, D.C. 20310