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THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE—A BLUEPRINT FOR MILITARY
AND POLITICAL WEAKNESS

BY

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RESEARCH PAPER

THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE--A BLUEPRINT FOR MILITARY AND POLITICAL WEAKNESS

A MONOGRAPH

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This monograph examines a number of the findings of the Gates Commission Report on the all-volunteer armed force. It provides arguments which tend to refute their findings regarding historic reliance on voluntarism, pay, voluntarism among career forces, and the impact of the draft on voluntarism.

Also addressed are cost, flexibility, patriotism, and the responsibility to meet the threat facing our nation.

It concludes that the all-volunteer force concept will result in a smaller, less capable force and the end of conscription may well alter our national will to retain our leadership position in the world.
This monograph is an examination of the all-volunteer force proposal—a subject on which I believe there are great problems and little regard for experience. I chose to write on this subject for the following reasons: (1) in over 20 years military service, I have known but few men who did not initially enter the armed forces directly or indirectly as a result of the draft; (2) I know no officer who has related to me that he believed the all-volunteer force to be in the best interest of either the services or the nation; (3) there is a growing attitude within the armed forces that we are going to have an all-volunteer service regardless of the merits of any such program, and; (4) I believe the all-volunteer program is the wrong response to the wrong pressure groups at the wrong time in our history, and any decision of such magnitude, in the face of current threats, should be made by public referendum rather than by Executive and Congressional decree.
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INTRODUCTION

The President of the United States, in a statement on March 27, 1969 announced the creation of an All-Volunteer Armed Force Commission. He said, "I have directed the Commission to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving toward an all-volunteer force."\(^1\)

This commission, headed by Thomas S. Gates, presented the President the plan he requested during February, 1970. The plan specified that the Commission favored a volunteer force and recommended three major tasks conducive to implementation: first, increase average levels of "base pay" for all officers and enlisted men in their first two years of service as well as for medical and reserve personnel; second, improve internal living conditions associated with military life and increase recruitment capability; and third, establish a stand-by draft system to be activated by joint resolution of Congress upon request by the President.\(^2\)

The President responded to the Commission in a "Message on Military Manpower" sent to the Congress April 23, 1970. He said, "The Commission members concluded unanimously that the interest of the Nation will be better served by an all-volunteer force than by a mixed force of volunteers and draftees, and that steps should be taken in this direction."\(^3\)


\(^2\) Ibid., p. 10.

Thus, the Gates Report is being used as a license for ending conscription in America and reverting to an all-volunteer armed force. This proposal raises two salient questions: (1) Is the all-volunteer force in the best interest of the military services? and (2) Is such a proposal in the best interest of the nation?

The Gates Report findings placed significant reliance on the belief that America has historically relied on Voluntaerism; that there is a linear correlation between increased pay and rates of volunteers; that the military services today are made up predominately of volunteers; and that the absence of the draft does not seriously affect numbers of volunteers in the presence of increased pay.

There is considerable evidence that America's reliance on voluntarism, especially where large armies are concerned, has been so small as to be almost meaningless in projecting future volunteer behavior. There is evidence to indicate that increased pay will not necessarily produce sufficient quality volunteers. There is evidence to indicate that the draft is of overwhelming importance in influencing volunteers. There is questionable validity in projecting future volunteer behavior from the numbers of regular military men, with over four years service, because their reasons for remaining in the service may be completely different than their reasons for initial enlistment.

The above factors will be discussed under Military Aspects of the all-volunteer proposal. The evidence will reveal that the all-
volunteer program will probably result in a smaller, less capable, less educated, armed force that is less representative of the American society.

There are other aspects of the all-volunteer armed force proposal which are broad, numerous, and in many cases intangible. They are beyond the scope of a paper such as this one. However, cost, flexibility, patriotism and the threat to our survival will be briefly discussed. The essential reason for this is to illustrate that our cost outlays for the all-volunteer force may be inconsistent with policy and public demands: that the Stand by Draft Concept in the Gates Study may limit flexibility by weakening the President's ability to honor our commitments to other nations: that patriotism is a factor in ending conscriptism, but one of which there is no objective answer to its impact: and lastly that the threat facing our nation, and the national and individual responsibility to meet this threat impacts heavily upon one's agreement or disagreement to end conscription and thus the citizen responsibility to our national security.
MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

TRADITIONAL RELIANCE ON VOLUNTARISM

The Gate's Report says, "the United States has relied throughout its history on a volunteer force except during major wars and since 1948." This reliance is hardly relevant. America in her pre-World War II period had always allowed her military forces to fall to an unacceptable security level. The Army during the Revolution at its peak was 26,000 men; five years after the War, there were 80 men in uniform. Between 1812 and the Mexican War of 1846 the Army averaged 6,000 men. From the Civil War to the Spanish American War an average of 26,000 made up the Army. From this period to World War I the average strength of the Army was 76,000. Until World War II the Army averaged 150,000. After two wars in Europe in less than 25 years, national leaders had learned that peacetime military strength was the essential ingredient of peace. They also learned that America had a new leadership role in the world because of atomic power and the threat of Communism expansion. President Truman quickly realized that new demands would be placed on our people and other resources to meet the threats of this new conflict called the "Cold War." The "Truman Doctrine," which followed, changed America's national strategy from "mobilization," where historically, we were prepared to raise forces after hostilities began, to "deterrence" where the

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4 Gates, p. 6.

size and capability of in-being forces would probably determine whether war would, in fact, ever occur. Thus, it was not until after World War II in our history that significant numbers of men were required for peacetime military service. In the short period without a draft (1947-1948), voluntarism could not be tested and with the urgency of the military requirements, the draft was re-enacted in 1948. Since 1948 draft quotes have been issued, in both peace and war, because insufficient numbers of men have volunteered. If any statement can be made regarding America's past procurement of military manpower it would be that our legislators and our citizens have traditionally evaded conscription whenever possible. An example of individual resistance to conscription and military service on the part of citizens is well documented in a Department of Defense (DOD) study recently depicted, in part, in US News and World Report. During the peak build up for Vietnam from 1965 to 1969 1.4 million men avoided the draft by apparent legal "loop-holes" in the laws. Over 1.8 million obtained college deferments. Other deferments rose 124 percent, from 220 to almost 500 thousand. Dependency deferments increased by over 400 thousand. Further, the numbers of men avoiding the draft today in Canada is 70 to 100 thousand. In 1971, DOD listed 98,324 military deserters or those absent over 30 days. The desertion rate today is almost twice the World War II rate--

142 per thousand in 1971 compared to 73 per thousand in 1944. Briefly stated, American reliance on voluntarism during wars, and between wars, has been of such a small magnitude as to be inconclusive in predicting any degree of future reliance on procurement of military manpower.

ON PAY

The Gates Report says, "The recommended increases in basic pay are designed to provide the Army with the quantity and quality of volunteers required for a force level of approximately 2.5 million men." It also says, "The evidence is overwhelming that, if compensation is set at levels which satisfy Army requirements, the other services will be able to attract enough qualified volunteers to meet their respective requirements." These statements indicate the Gate's Commission relied heavily upon the belief that pay is the vital element of voluntarism. Is this belief questionable? I believe that it is.

In 1964 a survey was made of almost seven million non-veterans 16 to 19 years old. They were asked the question, "What is the most important factor in choosing a job or career if there were no draft?" From this large sample, only 8.6 percent considered pay as the most important factor in choosing a job or career.

8Gates, p. 57.
9Ibid.
Another 1964 survey was made of 9,700 non-veterans 16 to 25. These men were asked the question, "If there were no draft now, you had no military obligation, and military pay was exactly the same as you could make in civilian life, would you volunteer for the armed forces?" The results of this survey are depicted below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIZE OF SAMPLE</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>IN-SCHOOL</th>
<th>% WHO VOLUNTEER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4,048</td>
<td>16-19</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>20-25</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,297</td>
<td>16-19</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,315</td>
<td>20-25</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A weighted average of the percent who would have volunteered indicated 3.7 percent of the total sample surveyed would have joined the armed forces. The Gates Study indicates by 1975 there will be 8.3 million men 17 to 20 in America's male population. This population will consist of seven million whites, 73 percent who will qualify for service, and one million blacks, 53 percent of whom will qualify. Actual computations indicate, using the above qualifying percentages, that of 8,347,000 males, 17-20, 5,861,510 will qualify for service. This figure, multiplied by the 3.7 percent in the survey above, reflects that in 1975, 216,875 men will volunteer. Thus, this survey indicates that volunteer annual accessions will fall short of the Gates estimated 332,000 annual requirement (2.5 million men force) by well over 100,000 men. In fact, it falls well short of the annual

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11Ibid., p. 10051.
12Gates, p. 146.
accessions estimated by the Gates Report for a two million man force level (259,000).

It must be noted also that the survey above was made in 1964 before the build-up for Vietnam. It is highly possible, with the decrease in public support commonly acknowledge, that any such survey taken today would reveal lower percentages who would volunteer.

ON CAREER FORCES

The Gates Report says, "The often ignored fact is that our present armed forces are made up predominately of volunteers and that all those men who have more than four years service, 38 percent, are true volunteers." In a literal sense, this may be true. However, the Gate's Report goes further and says, "With true volunteers now providing some 250,000 enlisted men annually, a fully volunteer force of 2.5 million men can be achieved by improving pay and conditions of service sufficiently to induce approximately 75,000 additional young men to enlist..." This reasoning ignores a number of vital issues. The reason men remain on active duty may, in many cases, be completely different than the reasons for which they initially entered the armed forces. For example, what percent of our true volunteers were initially draft motivated? What percent of our true volunteers were

13Ibid., p. 43.

14Ibid., p. 7.

15Ibid.
draft motivated and remained on active duty for personal reasons, i. e., financial, family, retirement, or the fact they found out after entrance that they liked military life.

There are many surveys that indicate numerous men remain on active duty though they do not enjoy military life. Several such survey results will be shown here—they are testimony to the fact that it is not possible to translate reasons for remaining in the service to projecting future numbers of volunteers.

In 1964, 38,499 enlisted men were surveyed to assess their attitudes toward military life. Of the most senior group 21.9 percent stated they "do not like" military life. Of the entire group, which probably included draftees, 20.8 percent "likes the Army very much," 30.2 "liked it somewhat," and 49 percent "did not like military life in the Army at all." The survey also indicates that the more education a man had, the more apt he was to dislike military life.

In another survey of enlisted mens attitude in the Army, 51.4 percent of whites disliked military life and only 35.2 percent of non-whites disliked the life. A survey of black attitudes toward military life on the basis of racial equality, and compared to their home region, indicated 84 percent believed the military environment

16 Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Men (1970), p. 195. (Survey was made by National Opinion Research Center (NORC), University of Chicago, 1964.)

17 Ibid., p. 208.
was better. Further, from 9,515 enlisted men with less than a high school education, 42.8 percent of the whites did not like the Army against only 28.5 percent of the blacks in the same category.\(^{18}\)

Such surveys may reflect to some degree why blacks have re-enlisted in the Army after their first tour of service at over twice the percentage rates of whites. The figures are indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>WHITE RE-ENLISTMENTS</th>
<th>BLACK RE-ENLISTMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Gate's Report indicates that black volunteer participation rates exceed white rates 19.15 to 15.38 percent on initial entrance into the services.\(^{19}\) If higher relative percentages of blacks volunteer for military service, and higher percentages re-enlist after their first tour, there will be a small but steady increase in the black population of the military services. This is mentioned as an exception because racial equality may be a voluntarism factor for both initial enlistment and re-enlistment for blacks. In any event, the true volunteer criteria for career military men are very complicated and do not generally coincide with initial criteria for entering the armed forces.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., p. 221-222.

\(^{19}\) Gates, p. 148.
The Gate's Report gave light treatment to the tremendous impact of the draft on the numbers of men who volunteer for the armed forces.

A DOD survey of first term individuals during 1964 who were not conscripted indicated that approximately 41 percent of the officers, 39 percent of the enlisted men, and 71 percent of the Reserve enlisted entered the service as a result of the draft. 20

During 1964, 530,000 enlisted men entered the armed forces. Those actually drafted constituted 28.7 percent of total DOD force accessions. 21

The numbers who volunteered because of draft pressure made up 38.6 percent of the total. Adding these two figures provides the total percent of all personnel entering the armed forces as a direct or indirect result of the draft, or 66.7 percent. It is important to note that 1964 was prior to the Vietnam build-up.

The figures resulting from draft pressure are high within DOD at large; however, within the Army alone they are even higher as the majority of draftees end up in this service. Total Army enlisted accessions during 1964 were 267,000 men. Of this group, 151,000 were actually drafted, and 116,000 volunteered. 22 Of the 116,000 volunteers, 38.6 percent or 44,776 were considered by DOD to have volunteered.

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because of the draft. This indicates that 195,776 (drafted 151,000 +
draft motivated 44,776) or 73 percent of all men who entered the Army
in 1964 did so because of the draft.

The number of officers' required annually for a 2.5 million man
force are depicted below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>TOTAL NUMBER</th>
<th>% OF FORCE</th>
<th>AVERAGE ANNUAL REQUIREMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>101,690</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>69,795</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>16,605</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>131,602</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD TOTAL</td>
<td>319,692</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>28,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximately 90 percent of all first term officers are com-
missioned through Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) and Officers
Candidate School (OCS). The Army acquires 63 percent of all their
new officers from ROTC alone. 24

The 1964 survey mentioned earlier indicated that 41.3 percent
of all newly acquired officers are draft motivated. This is an
average for all military services. By individual service it was
Army 48.4 percent, Navy 40.3 percent, Air Force 38.9 percent and
Marine Corps 27 percent. By source of commission the percentage
draft motivated were OCS 51.4, ROTC 45.4, Direct Appointment 57.8,
Military Academic 10.9, and other 19 percent. 25


24Ibid., p. 23.

25US Congress, Review of Administration and Operation of Selective
Services, p. 10039.
A Group Research Project by officers representing all the military services was accomplished at the Naval War College in 1970. Their purpose was to determine the feasibility of an all-volunteer officers corps in the absence of the draft. Their well-supported conclusions are as follows: (1) The all-volunteer corps is not feasible given the current attitude of American youth; (2) The Air Force can marginally fill minimum annual requirements—the other services can do so only at the expense of quality; (3) The draft is the major incentive for the majority of first term officer volunteers; (4) ROTC enrollment will continue to decline in the Seventies; (5) Degree of service selectivity will diminish; and (6) Without a draft, services will attract youths of lower socio-economic background and reduced levels of academic achievement. 26

The current reduction in ROTC enrollment may be testimony to the future interest by our youths in a military career. These figures must be viewed in an atmosphere of diminishing obligations to the draft. In 1969 enrollment was 212,417. In 1970 it was 155,946. Today it is 109,598. This is a decline in ROTC enrollment of 50 percent in two years. 27

As mentioned earlier, 71 percent of a large sample of Reserve enlistees joined up because of the draft. In 1965, when Reserve


Force Mobilization was ruled out as a national course of action for the Vietnam build-up, 810,000 physically fit, draft eligible men signed up in our Reserve Forces. The DOD made a study of this group and found that 83 percent, by their own admission, joined the Army Reserves to avoid the draft. 28

The National Guard memberships are also greatly influenced by the draft. Some estimates indicate that 80 to 90 percent are draft motivated. An excellent reflection of the magnitude of the draft's influence is evident in the examination of entrance "waiting lists" when the draft was halted on June 30, 1971 for lack of legislation. Army Guard strength dropped over 10,000 in less than 90 days. More significantly, since last spring names on the waiting list for entrance into the Army Guard dropped from 55,000 to 16,000 or approximately 70 percent. The Air Force waiting list dropped from 25,000 to 15,000 to approximately 40 percent. 29

Finally, how many men will volunteer for the Combat Arms of the Army without a draft? During 1969 the Army surveyed 836,000 volunteers for active duty and found that 50 percent believed they would be drafted. Of 71,342 of these volunteers, 44,000 volunteered to obtain occupational specialities, and only 2.5 percent selected the Combat Arms. 30 The US


Army says it needs some 20,000 soldiers per month in FY 72. It estimates that only 5,000 will volunteer. Moreover, past experience indicates that of 5,000 only 300 would choose the Combat Arms of the Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery. These units require 6,500 per month or 20 times the projected numbers of current volunteers.

OTHER ASPECTS OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

In the preceding pages it was shown that there is considerable doubt that the all-volunteer force will generate a quality military structure. Several of the basic objections to the all-volunteer force as listed in the Gates Report, along with the Commission's answers to them, will be discussed here. In addition, the threat and America's responsibility in the use of her power will constitute the final remarks in this part.

COST

The Gates Report indicates that a voluntary force will cost less than a mixed force of volunteers and draftees. The Commission based their analysis on the belief that conscription itself is a tax today unaccounted for in defense budgets. They also believe that reduced turnover among the ranks in an all-volunteer force will generate great savings in training costs. The facts are, that the hidden conscription tax has already been almost eliminated by major pay increases to all first term military men. In addition, the Army has no intentions of significantly altering personnel turnover in the US Army. To do so would stagnate promotion opportunity in merely a few years and thus defeat the incentive required to attract career oriented individuals—the very purpose of The Modern Volunteer Army Concept.

In reality, the cost of ending conscription and proceeding with the voluntary concept range from $3 to $17 billion per year. Best estimates by military experts expect a $5 to $6 billion annual cost for a 2.25 to 2.5 million man force.\(^{33}\)

It certainly cannot be ignored that this cost is being generated at a time in our history where unprecedented pressure exists to decrease defense spending. In this regard, it appears inconsistent that America is increasing defense outlays, especially for general purpose forces, at the same time we are reducing manpower. The plan appears to be that we will have less men, at greater cost, training in additional conventional equipment, for a limited war mission almost precluded by the Nixon Doctrine. It is also ironic that public dissent against conscription closely parallels dissent against defense spending—the irony being that you can't solve the draft problem without increasing defense spending.

**FLEXIBILITY**

The Gates Report says that our flexibility to expand rapidly in times of crisis will not be affected by the all-volunteer concept. The Commission's reasons are that military preparedness depends on forces in-being; Reserve forces are readily available; and that a stand-by draft will be available to our government.\(^{34}\)

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\(^{34}\)Gates, p. 13.
It is true that military preparedness relies heavily upon forces in-being. This is commonly accepted with reference to strategic forces in the nuclear age. It is also true, to a degree, with the conventional forces designed to honor America's commitments abroad. However, our last two wars have refuted this argument. When the Korean conflict began we had just under one and a half million men in uniform. This was an insufficient force to do the job. Thus, the Nation called up over 800,000 Reserves and drafted over 1,000,000 men. The draftee, sustained the majority of casualties. For Vietnam, with the exception of not calling the Reserves, men had to be drafted in large numbers to sustain the combat operation—again an illustration where success did not depend solely on in-being forces. The argument that sufficient flexibility exists with in-being forces must be refuted simply by the fact that in any future conflict, similar to those in the past, men will have to be drafted. This is the central problem with the Gates Commission Stand-by Draft Concept.

This Concept stipulates that the President must have Congressional approval prior to drafting men for combat duty. This is an absolute limitation to flexibility since no President would commit ground troops to hostilities without a guarantee of conscripted replacements. The question must also be asked whether a President can honor the Nation's commitments without this flexibility.

Under the "Nixon Doctrine" the Chief Executive states, "First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments." The

commitments he speaks of are the agreements the United States has made with other nations to assist them if subject to aggression. Most of the nations involved stake their political and economic future on the confidence that America will fulfill her obligations under such commitments. Such agreements have been made by the American people through their representatives. They involve not only material support, but human and psychological support. Thus, if the President must go to the Congress to obtain conscripted manpower to support a force required to honor a commitment, several problems surface. First, a commitment is worthless until tested in the Congress in another nation's hour of need. Second, the President cannot state without qualification that America will honor her commitments as he cannot speak for the Congress.

Thus, to believe in ending conscription and adopting the stand-by draft concept, one must accept the possibility that the Congress will not necessarily support a President's request for a draft to honor a national commitment. I interpret this as an absolute limitation to flexibility.

PATRIOTISM

The objection is that the all-volunteer force will undermine the traditional belief that each citizen has a moral responsibility to serve his country. The Gates Report answer to this is, "Compelling service through a draft undermines respect for government by forcing
an individual to serve when and in the manner the government decides, regardless of his own values and talents."

No one knows the answer to this problem. When we examine the past we see that American boys have been required to face a military obligation to their country usually at an age when completing high school. At that time, if qualified mentally and physically, an individual had to decide whether he would enlist, try for officers training, or take his chances with draft. In any event, he became aware, probably for the first time, of a citizen obligation to the security of his country. The benefits of facing such a decision are unknown, but if the draft is eliminated so will be this exercise of his obligation. It is possible that its elimination could alter, in the long run, the "National Will" to sustain our powerful leadership role in the world.

Since 1948, with almost two million men reaching draft age each year, and two wars, less than five million men have been drafted. The raw probability of being drafted has seldom ever exceeded one in seven since World War II. Is this an unreasonable exposure for a young man toward the security effort of the Nation? This is a difficult question, yet a very important one. It is one for which there is no objective answer, yet patriotism may face its test in a future world characterized by war. In some measure, the test of feasibility, suitability and acceptability for ending conscription

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rests on how one views the threat to the American way of life. This threat, and its characteristics will therefore be discussed here in the final part of this paper.

THE THREAT

The "Protracted Ideological Conflict" between totalitarian and free societies is an inescapable aspect of today's world. While Russia speaks of co-existence and detente, she continues to build her ever-increasing nuclear forces. She expands her interest into the Arab world, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and across all oceans. She has matured in her effort to politically subvert the world. Her methods have changed because her objective is thought to be within her grasp by political and economic means. Russia's use of overt force will continue to be optimized using "Third World" forces and Russian arms.

China's Mao Tse-tung states, with little qualifications, that "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." He spreads his ideology to other Asians, South America, and Africa. The idea that this aging leader could die tomorrow, and two signatures could ally these two giant political masses is the reality of today's world. Anyone who believe that a democracy can divide these great powers, whose goals are alike but tactics are different, is in my opinion the great optimist of the century.

The ideological conflict as it exist leads me to believe that America is today in a World War; one where diplomacy and negotiations have little effect toward altering the long term objectives of our
adversaries. This fact is substantiated by the fact that in less than 50 years over one billion persons have lost their liberty to the Communist ideology.

The above situation coupled with the nuclear stalemate; the breakup of colonial empires; the preponderance of military hardware available in almost every country; the ineffectiveness of the United Nations; the rebirth of guerrilla warfare in projecting Marxism; and the rising expectations of the under-developed world all tend to indicate a future even more laden with conflict than in the past. This past has been characterized by war. Since 1898 there have been 128 major wars and the number in-being has steadily increased. From 1938 to 1947 there were 12. From 1948 to 1957 there were 28. From 1958 to 1967 there were 45. There are over 30 wars in progress today. 38

Thus, for those Americans waiting for a Declaration of War before rallying to our national security, it is interesting to note that there have been over 200 significant outbreaks of violence in the world during the past 25 years: there has not been one single Declaration of War since World War II. 39

No one will deny that every man living in freedom today does so because of American power in the world. We have accepted this leadership role, and the national responsibility associated with it. The

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responsibility is not just a national obligation, it is also an individual one. We cannot isolate ourselves as we once could have. Ballistic missiles preclude isolation as a feasible security strategy. A 100 billion dollar import-export market precludes isolation as an economic strategy. Leaving the weaker part of the Free World for the Communist to exploit precludes isolation as a political strategy. Our security, in the long run, will depend upon our willingness, as a nation and individuals, to use the power bestowed upon in what ever method necessary to perpetuate our ideological ends. The morality and responsibility associated with our power were best expressed by General C. H. Bonesteel, III, when he said, "It has not been that power is amoral—that should be self-evident—but that the immorality or morality of its use is essentially a matter of the conviction and beliefs of its users. Comprehension of this fact is the most important of all. Power cannot meaningfully be discussed in the abstract. The existence of real power requires of those who can apply it a real and inescapable responsibility. They must have convictions. If power is to be used responsibly in the service of all mankind, as we in the free and open society of the United States believe we have been doing, then our society must have convictions. If we lose these convictions, we shall eventually become powerless and shall turn the defense of freedom over to those willing to use their power to achieve their totalitarian ends."  

CONCLUSION

America's historic reliance on volunteerism has been insignificant in fulfilling vital peacetime military manpower requirements. Most individuals have entered the military services, both in peace and war, largely as a result of conscription. Those who chose a military career did so for numerous reasons not all of which were necessarily relevant to the enjoyment of military life.

There is considerable evidence to indicate that increased pay will not significantly stimulate voluntarism except possibly for recruits from lower social and economic backgrounds. This situation impacts heavily on the military's ability to obtain quality manpower. The ever-expanding technological base of our armed forces will require greater "line" expertise in the future than in the past. It appears that the probability of acquiring technically-minded persons to work our weapon systems, computers, etc., will be significantly decreased without the draft, and will most certainly become the major military problem of the Seventies.

The general participation of Americans in ROTC will decrease with an end to the draft. Officer quality will decrease as today's minimum individual requirements give way to lower standards. Combat Arms will have extreme difficulty in obtaining needed manpower.

The Reserve forces will face the greatest manpower crisis in their existence. Eliminating the obligation to selective service will probably reduce Reserve and Guard units to their lowest level since the end of World War II. This condition may seriously impact
on the general thinking today that Reserve forces will be relied on more in the future.

It generally appears that the Gates Commission findings are questionable in many of the military aspects. All indications are that the all-volunteer armed force, without conscription, will result in a much smaller, less educated, and less combat capable military. This situation is neither in the best interest of the military services or the Nation.

Other aspects of the all-volunteer armed force may indicate that the true issue here is not how the program will affect the military, but how ending conscription will affect America. The high cost of such a program will be difficult for the public to accept with current pressure to redress national priorities. The Nation's flexibility, and possible credibility, will be weakened by an Executive procedure whereby the President cannot guarantee a draft to replace troops needed to fulfill a commitment. Patriotism across the Nation may possibly be altered with the ending of conscription and the historic citizen responsibility toward our security effort.

Finally, the issue involved here may well rest on how one views man's struggle in the world environment. I see this struggle as an ideological one, ladened with hostilities in the future, where the success for free men will rely heavily upon their degree of acceptance of individual and national responsibility. The factors brought out in this paper are singularly not critical of this responsibility. However, taken all together these factors weigh heavily against both
the success of the volunteer force, and the "National Will" to retain America's leadership role in the world. Consequently, I view this program as a Blueprint for Military and Political Weakness.

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