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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF:

Expires 12 July 1974

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (15 Jun 73) DAMO-ODU 12 July 1973

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th Psychological Operations Battalion, period ending 31 January 1971

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SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lessons Learned, HQ, 8th Psychological Operations Battalion, period ending 31 January 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation, Evaluation and Recommendations.

a. Personnel - None

b. Intelligence - None

c. Operations

(1) Observation: It has been noted that the Regional Force PSYWAR Companies at province level have not received necessary PSYOP equipment for operations.

(2) Evaluation: In order for the Regional Force PSYWAR Companies to conduct effective face-to-face psychological operations within their area of operations and at the same time assume the mission of U.S. Liaison and Assistance HE Teams, it will be necessary for PSYWAR Companies to have MSQ-85 or similar type PSYOP equipment.

(3) Recommendation: Based on the continuing reduction of the 8th PSYOP Battalion's mission in MR2 and eventual elimination of the mission, it is imperative that necessary action be taken to equip the PSYWAR Companies in MR2.

d. Organization - None

e. Training - None

f. Logistics - None

g. Communications - None

h. Materiel - None

i. Other - None

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ROBERT D. LAUFER
LTC, ADA
Commanding

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PHU MY DISTRICT
BINH DINH PROVINCE

8TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96240

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PHU MY DISTRICT
BINH DINH PROVINCE

I. Current situation:

A. Percentage of population in secure and insecure areas: Phu My is different from other districts in Binh Dinh. According to the August evaluation, the number of insecure hamlets (C,D,V) remains the same. In C and D hamlets, the GVN only control the population in the daytime. People in those areas suffer from pressure and control by both sides, GVN and VC/NVA. About 70% of Phu My population is under GVN supervision.

B. Chieu Hoi Program: Few activities occur. APT and VIS rarely go to rural areas, although during the period October 19-25, the PSYOP/PRA has sent a culture drama team to the district. There was no participation by APT or VIS. The activities of Chieu Hoi and VIS are new to the population, especially in remote hamlets.

C. Refugees' situation: In the villages of My Trinh, there are two refugee camps: My An and Diem Tieu settlements. There are 3000 to 5000 refugees located here. One-third receive GVN assistance through the Binh Dinh Social Welfare Service. The other two-thirds are waiting for what the GVN promised them.

II. District Background Information

A. Geographical description: Phu My District has an area of 572 sqkm. It is bounded on the north by Hoa Nhon District, by the west by Hoai An, on the south by Phu Cat and on the east by the South China Sea. One-fifth is covered with hills and mountains, but there is no elevation above 1000 meters. Along the sea coast are low sand dunes. There are two seasons in the area: The rainy season lasts from August to December and the dry season extending from January to July.

B. Population: The total population of the district is 91,858. Most of the inhabitants live in the plains area. People are scarce in the coastal zone because of VC control, except for scores of fishermens' families living in the northern part (My Duc and My Thang Villages).

1. Density and distribution:

Below is the August evaluation. September evaluation records an increase of 18 V hamlets:

Village	No. of Hamlets	Detailed Situation	Population	Evaluation
My Quang	5	B	16493	B
My Hiep	14	(1-B,3-D,10-C)	7544	C
My Tai	7	C	8302	C
My Chanh	10	(9-B,1-C)	9137	B
My Cat	5	B	4075	B
My Thanh	3	1- No inhabitants 2-D	246	D

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Village	No. of Hamlets	Detailed Situation	Population	Evaluation
My Tho	9	(1-V, 3-D,5-C)	?	C/D
My Hoa	6	(3-B,3-C)	8167	B
My Trinh	7	(5-C,2-V)	5996	C
My Phuong	9	(4-B,1-C, 4-V)	4159	C
My Loi	4	C	4942	C
My Loc	7	(1-D,5-C,1-B)	4174	C
My Duc	6	(4-C,2-B)	5581	C
My Thang	6	(4-C,2-B)	5581	C
My An	5	(1-V,2-D,2-C)	1804	D

C. Education: The instruction level is very low, because of lack of teachers. One community high school teaches up to the 9th grade only. Another private high school gives the same instruction. There are 853 students attending the schools. In theory, there is one primary school in each village. Because of security, several schools have no teachers. (My Thang, My An, My Tho, My Thanh, My Hiep, Min Tring, My Cat). 70% of the people are illiterate.

D. Economy:

1. General: Necessary items come from Saigon. Local products such as vegetables, potatoes, manioc are only produced in quantities sufficient for local consumers. Some vegetables come from Dalat and Banmethout. Fish and fish-sauce come from Tam Quan District, Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang. The coastal area is unproductive because of the VC presence.

2. Primary source of income:

a. Agriculture: There is very low production. The monthly rice import from Saigon is 2000 bags (100lbs each).

b. Fishing: Not satisfactory because of security reasons.

c. All goods are imported from Saigon, Nha Trang, Dalat, Pleiku and Banmethuot.

3. Occupational Distribution:

Agriculture	75%
Commerce	5%
Commerce in detail	10%
Workers	10%

4. Marketing System: One market opens from 0700 to 1830. All items are sold (imported from Saigon and the local area). In My Hiep and My Trinh villages, there is a market day twice a month (1st and 15th). People from other villages and districts come to trade.

5. Economic policy and control:

a. After the piaster devaluation, prices increased:

Sugar - up 20% (10$VN for 1Kg)
Rice - up 45% (500$VN for 100lbs)

Control of commerce brings no result. Speculation and the black market continue. GVN has no measures to help the population, except the village projects (only 1/10 have been carried out).

b. VC/NVA control hamlets D and V (culture and profit). They collect taxes (military support and agricultural taxes). The VC come into houses to collect, and the taxes are not paid voluntarily. The VC fix the rate.

6. Industry

35 paddy mills
2 ice plants

7. Agriculture: 3/5 of the land is fertile but one-fifth of this is under VC control and exploitation. I-4 miricle rice has not been planted yet. This rice gives good production but it cannot be used for cattle food during the rainy season because the stalks are very short. Lack of water is also a problem. There was a loss of crop in the last harvest season. Potatoes, manioc and other vegetables are also grown in the area.

8. Land Reform Program:

a. GVN: Declaration of lands slowed down because of too much paperwork (population mostly illiterate). In insecure/remote areas, automatically the Pro-VC/NVA tillers (or in-between) "own" the land they farm.

b. VC/NVA: In D and V areas, near the mountains or the sea coast where the VC has control, the population is influenced by propaganda and pressure to cultivate the land.

III. Government and Parties

A. The structure of the District Administration is similar to other RVN districts.

B. Relationship between District and Hamlets/Villages: Villages are autonomous so each village has legal qualifications. Control exists only on paper. Villages present projects to the District Chief just for information. Thus several village chiefs are never present in their village. Since the election, the population has never seen the village chief.

C. Political parties: These are officially recognized:

Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang	Lam Van Man, Chairman (My Quang Village Chief)
Nhan Xa Dang (ex-Can Lao)	Ho Van So, chairman (ex-civil servant)

There are two other parties (not yet recognized by the Ministry of Interior).

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Dia Viet Cach Mang	(Great Vietnam Revolution Party)
Cap Tien	(Progressive Party)
Vietnam Kow Wing Tang	(RVN)

Among those parties, the VN Kow Wing Tang is considered strongest with the most prestige. However the Progressive Party (not yet officially recognized) is considered good because it has members in almost all the villages of the district.

D. Religious Groups:

Cult of Ancestors	52%
Buddhists	30%
Roman Catholic	15%
Cao Dai	3%

IV. Summarization:

A. District government officials and administrators: The administrative machine at District level is considered satisfactory and with the diligence of the District Chief and deputy chief the population now has their sympathy. However, some employees in the District administrative office are not very capable in their assignment. In other services, not under the District Chief's control, the VIS, Chieu Hoa and Police, the people work with indifference. EXAMPLE: VIS/Chieu Hoi program for October, planned by the District Chief has never been carried out because the VIS and APT never follow their orders. Only the 8th PSYOP Bn field team and the culture drama team sent by the Province PPA operated. There were no improvement measures taken by the district chief.

B. Attitudes

1. Toward the local government:

a. The authorities help the population, but the District Chief has no influence over ARVN soldiers' indifference towards the inhabitants. In My Heip Village, the ARVN soldiers and the VC are equally disliked. When a village project was planned, the population promised a 1/3 contribution. Now they refuse because of communist pressure. The same situation is repeated in insecure villages such as My Hiep, My Cat, My An, My Thanh, My Tho and My Trinh.

b. Refugees living in Dien Tien and Truc Dao hamlets, My Trinh village are complaining about the village/hamlet chiefs' indifference. The latter don't intervene to provide them with the food and cash support determined by the government.

c. In My An, My Thanh, My Tho villages, there is almost no traffic by road. Hamlet/village chiefs live in the district compound and the population never meets them. When needed, the villagers don't know where to find them. Therefore, the inhabitants are under VC propaganda and control more than GVN's influence.

d. Opinions toward local authorities and GVN:

(I) RD agents are inefficient, and reluctant to help. Therefore, the population rarely listens to the GVN's radio broadcasts.

(II) Poverty is increasing. Gifts from foreign countries never come to the population's hands.

(III) Double pressure from VC and the government along with poverty and illiteracy make the people inert. They have to obey orders.

(IV) Though there has been improvement in living conditions compared to past years, sky-rocketing prices increase the difficulties. Other problems include the harvest loss, no help from GVN and VC robbery.

(V) Rich people leave the countryside to live in Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Saigon. The old people stay on and look for a chance to live. "We fled from the VC and come here (My Chanh, Diem Tieu, My Hoa) to simply exist. We long for peace and a return to our native villages. Only the old people stay in village/hamlets. The young have left for other places or they have followed the VC. We don't know what the representatives have promised. They have all forgotten. When they ran for office, they gave many promises. Once elected, they simply vanish."

e. Opinions concerning senate elections: Even the population in cities weren't informed of the men who ran for office. They never listen to GVN talks, but obeyed mechanically the village chief's order: "Go to vote" without understanding anything. (This is expressed by an old inhabitant of Tuic Dan Hamlet, My Trinh Village). Rural people don't yet understand elections. They elect their village chief, then complain later.

f. Opinions concerning GVN policy: The policy is always good and right. Just the practice is wrong. The end of corruption is required to beat the communists. If this situation keeps going the communists will conquer the south. More education for GVN agents and punishment/restraint measures are necessary.

2. Towards US involvement in Vietnam: According to the communists, if they succed in taking over Phu My District, they will have the whole province under control. So Phu My is their "compass". Their control and their infrastructure are very tight. People living in the district in secure areas are pro-GVN. The remaining are pro-VC either because they have children with the VC or because they live in VC-controlled areas. Those living in secure areas don't like the VC or the GVN. They only want peace in their family and among their children.

Estimation of the populations following is as follows:

Pro-GVN	-	35%
Pro-VC/NVA	-	35%
Half-way	-	30%

C. Aspirations: PEACE - Peaceful living and work and a return to native villages.

D. Needs: Lack of water creates problems in agriculture. If the rainy season is late, the harvest is lost. Irrigation is needed and hoped for.

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PHU CAT DISTRICT

BINH DINH PROVINCE

8TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION

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Schools and teachers are also desired; currently 60% of the population is illiterate. Rural and upban dispensaries are also needed.

E. PSYOP program

1. GVN - Almost no activity. There is a lack of cooperation by VIS, Chieu Hoi, RD and S5. The agents are lazy and lack initiative. Population in C and B hamlets/villages have not heard anything from VIS/APT. The efforts of PSYOP field teams and culture drama teams have brought some distraction to the people and not as some believe, instruction or information relative to GVN policy. The GVN agents are unaware of the fact that VC are establishing a strong infrastructure in Phu My District.

2. VC/NVA: In insecure areas, close to the mountains and sea coast, the VC are making propaganda and organizing infrastructure. EXAMPLE: They come in hamlets/villages by night to persuade people to join their controlled areas and promise gifts of land. In GVN-controlled areas, they dissuade people from contributing to village projects. Meanwhile, they urge people to pay what they call the "military support taxes".

3. Effectiveness:

a. Strength: None

b. Weaknesses:

(I) No close cooperation among VIS, APT, RD and S5

(II) Laziness, inertia

(III) No efficient control measures towards agents

(IV) Plan of activity not carried out correctly

(V) Poorly motivated leaders.

VCI total in Phu My District:

Village	Total
My Hiep	162
My Hoa	36
My Quang	8
My Cat	26
My Chanh	46
My Phoung	57
My Trinh	57
My Tho	58
My Tai	54
My Thang	106
My Thanh	32
My Duc	124
My An	107
My Loc	73
My Loi	78
	1034 VCI's in the district

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PHU CAT DISTRICT

I. Current Situation

A. Percentage of population in secure and insecure areas: Plains areas are 85% GVN controlled in the daytime. Remote areas near Nui Ba mountains are under VC control. The village of Cat Chanh is controlled by the VC.

B. Chieu Hoi Program: There are notable lack of agents, lack of means, laziness and few activities. These stagnated activities have produced only seven ralliers since January. This is a very small number, considering the number of families having relatives with the VC.

Village	VCI's
Cat Son	91
Cat Nhon	208
Cat Trinh	430
Cat Chanh	VC controlled
Cat Khanh	318
Cat Hiep	66
Cat Tuong	152
Cat Tai	267
Cat Thang	124
Cat Minh	524
Cat Hanh	286

C. Refugees' situation: 2 settlements:

1. Vinh Kien/Khanh Loc Hamlet, Cat Hanh Village
2. My Hung Hamlet, Cat Thang Village.

Refugees come from remote VC-controlled areas. They return to their native hamlets by day to work their fields and take refuge in the settlement at night. A problem for local authorities is that the VC use those men for propaganda and organizing infrastructure.

II. Background Information

A. History (See Tam Quan District Area Study)

B. Geographical description: Phu Cat District consists of 619 sqkm. It is bounded on the north by Phu My, on the west by Binh Khe, on the south by Tuy Phuoc, and on the east by the South China Sea.

The Phu Cat area is very fertile. 1/6 of the area is covered with mountains, Nui Ba mountain being the highest at 1100 meters. Fishing areas are good for 20 Km along the sea coast. Fisherman can operate all year long except during periods of rough weather. There are two seasons in the area: The rainy season extending from August to December and the sunny season from January to July.

C. Population: There are 94,582 inhabitants in the area of which 70% live in the plains area, 5% along the coast and 25% in the mountains. The population density and distribution is as follows:

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Village	Population	Remarks
Cat Trinh	17391	
Cat Tuong	8868	
Cat Nhon	7322	
Cat Thang	7023	VC-controlled
Cat Chanh	2344	
Cat Hanh	8495	
Cat Tai	8834	
Cat Minh	9449	
Cat Khanh	12430	
Cat Son	4124	
Cat Hiep	8578	

D. Education:

1. Facilities:

a. High Schools: There are three high schools (one public, two private) with a total enrollment of 1128.

b. Primary Schools: There are 8 community schools and 10 private schools. There are also 34 elementary schools in hamlets (New Life Schools) with an enrollment of 8803 schoolboys.

2. Level of education breakdown: Education is on a low level when compared to Qui Nhon City. The reasons are as follows:

a. Lack of teachers and laziness of the district teachers. They will not go into the villages and hamlets and there have been several cases of desertion where teachers quit their jobs. Local authorities and the Qui Nhon Education Service do not know where they have gone.

b. Rich families' children study in Qui Nhon City or Saigon.

c. Because of the low standard of living, parents are not often conscious of the importance of instruction. Mostly they are farmers and fishermen and their children go to school only as a formality. When the children know how to read and write, they no longer attend school and stay home to help their parents.

E. Economy:

1. General: Nothing remarkable. All items come from Qui Nhon and Saigon. Prices are considered low compared to a few weeks ago when the "parallel rate" was promulgated. (This was a result of the piaster devaluation for US Forces).

2. Primary source of income: Manioc flour. Before the war, 4000 to 5000 tons were produced every year. Now, about 40% of the farmers are in production, producing 1600 to 2000 tons a year. Fishing is also important. Much is sold to the districts close to the mountains in Pleiku, Kontum, and Phu Bon Provinces. Production has diminished because of storms and chemicals. The occupation breakdown is as follows:

Occupation		Percentage	Income
Agriculture		70%	Fair (according to seasons)
Fishing		5%	Good
Commerce		2%	
	Big Shop-owners	0.5%	VN$1000-2000/day
	Retailers	1.5%	VN$300-800/day
Workers		23%	VN$500-1000/day

F. Agriculture

1. 2/3 of the land is cultivated. IR-5 and IR-8 rices are now planted and IR-20 rice will be distributed in December. Production is not enough for the local population, however, and each month 30 to 50 tons of rice are imported into the district. Because of the recent flood, crop damage is estimated at 90%.

2. Other: By products are also produced: Onions (10 to 20 tons yearly), potatoes, manioc and vegetables. Vegetables are brought in from Dalat.

G. Marketing System: Prices are considered low compared to the period of promulgation of the parallel rate. One market in the district is open from 0700 to 2000. All items are exposed. PX items are sometimes available at very high prices (4 times normal prices). In villages, one market day every 5 or 7 days takes place when people from surrounding areas gather to exchange goods. Generally these market days are from 0730 to 1400.

H. Industry: There is no major industry in the area. Minor industries include making palm-leafed hats (conic). Production consists of 200 - 500 hats every month. They are sold in Qui Nhon, Pleiku, Kontum and Phu Bon. There are two small brick making operations, a cement block plant; and one ice plant.

I. Economy Policy/Control:

1. Local authorities have no way to control the local economy; only 60 to 80% of the economic measures ordered by Saigon are observed. The blackmarket still operates and a shortage of items and rocketing prices persist. The self-development program is not strictly controlled and is only a facade.

2. VC/NVA: In VC-controlled areas, the communists are planning to attract the people who live in insecure villages (Cat Thang, Cat Hanh) to work for them.

III. Government and Politics

A. Government

1. The structure of district government is the same as in other RVN districts. The district chief is a designated officer. The deputy chief is designated officer and a civilian administrative assistant.

Each village has 1 elected village chief, an assistant, and a committee of 1 to 7 members.

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2. Relationship between District Government and Village/Hamlet Government: Because of the legal qualification of the village, the village chief and representatives give opinions concerning everything, including development projects. The district chief plays only the role of advisor or supervisor. Every month, village chiefs meet to make reports of tasks done in the villages and discuss orders from Saigon - the district has no close control over village/hamlets.

B. Political Groups

Organization	Chairman	Remarks
VN Kouoming Tang	Mr. Nguyen Duong	The oldest party, wide participation and of good standing
Social Democratic (P)	Mr. Nguyen The Long	Newly formed.
Progressive Party	Mr. Nguyen An Trach	Still unimportant.
Liberal Democratic Force	Mr. Nguyen Luin Chanh	Newly formed.
Greater Union Force	Mr. Huynh Ngoc Anh	Comes in second rank after VN Kouming Tang. Attracts several intellectuals.
VN People's Sociolist Party	Mr. Ro Ngo	3rd rank, many members.

C. Religious Groups:

Cult of Ancestors	70%
Buddhist (An Quang)	15%
Catholic (RC)	7%
Cao Dai	5%
Evangelic	3%

IV. Summation

A. District Government officials and administrators: Almost all the area civil servants work without enthusiasm because the living standard is too high compared to their low pay.

Personnel of Chieu Hoi, Police, VIS, and RD are under the control of Provincial agencies, the district chief's orders are not seriously observed. This class of personnel is often lazy and reluctant to go into villages. Reports are often "false" and sent directly to provincial agencies. However, the administrative personnel have shown sympathy while dealing with the population's paper problem.

B. People's attitudes

1. Towards district officials/administrators: The population continues to keep silent and doesn't complain. RD agents bring no real help to the village. In hamlets Tan Xuan, Vinh Kien, Khanh Loc (Cat Hanh Village) and Cat Hiep Village, the population can rarely meet with their hamlet/village chiefs when needed. In hamlets like Tan Xuan, Khanh Loc, Vinh Kien, Khanh Loc, Vinh Kien (Cat Hiep Village), the village chief is an old man of 58. The assistant village chief in charge of security was previously a Communist Party member and has oppressed the population during the time of the Viet Minh. He now continues his oppression, but the population makes no complaint.

Because of this situation, in the villages of Cat Hanh and Cat Hiep communists profit from this opportunity to make propaganda and set up infrastructure. As for rural projects, the population's contribution is 1/3, but only 1/5 of the projects are actually carried out. The population doesn't understand the red tape and formalities which delay the projects. When the formalities are over the rainy season comes and then almost all the projects are adjourned until the rainy season is over in January or February 1971.

The population doesn't like the agents (workers, cadre) because these agents rarely contact the people. They are often impolite so no meaningful relationship is fostered. Some of the requests made and presented to authorities have not been examined for several years.

Refugees in Cat Chanh Hamlet, Thin Hanh Hamlet, Cat Trinh Village, My Hung, Hung My, Cat Thant Village, Tan Xuan, Vinh Kien and Cat Hanh Village are awaiting assistance of the social welfare service. Some families have received support, others haven't. The recent flood caused 90% crop damage and relief has not yet come to victims. Land owners at Phu Cat Air Base and surrounding areas have been waiting for indemnification from the US government for 3 years, but their case has never been settled. The fact is, the US Government has paid indemnification but the money was given to the previous district chief who absconded with the funds. An explanation is necessary for the people concerned. Population in Cat Chanh, Thin Hanh Hamlets of Cat Trinh Village said: "If the US doesn't pay indemnification for our land, we will go to Saigon to see the senate chairman in early 1971 to request it."

2. Toward ROK: The ROK troops take care of rural road 502 which runs along villages Cat Tuong, Cat Nhon and Cat Thang south of the district. The population is grateful to ROK troops. Thanks to their presence, the VC don't come to cause trouble, as they did 3 months earlier. ROK troops, however, occasionally make advances towards village women and cause damage to crops. ROK troops stationed along rural road TL05 (Cat Khanh Village) are good since they maintain security, help villagers, and talk to the children.

3. Toward US Troops: US troops around Phu Cat Air Base often shoot indiscriminately, sometimes killing cattle. Chemical spraying around Phu Cat Base has caused damage to neighboring areas. Population in Cat Thanh, Cat Hai, Cat Nhon, Cat Tuong, Cat Khanh Village (where there are no US troops present) are sympathetic to US soldiers. There are sporadic visits and medicine distribution from MACV and PSYOP Teams.

4. Toward the VC/NVA: In GVN controlled areas, pro-VC people still exist. The majority of people living in VC controlled areas are strictly controlled. i.e. Cat Chanh Village has 10 hamlets, only 3 of which are GVN controlled.

In GVN controlled villages of Cat Hiep and Cat Hanh, the majority of the population are pro-VC because of oppressions from rural authorities. People living there at night return to their native villages in the daytime to cultivate land. They are under the influence of VC propaganda and persuasion. Many families have sons with the VC. In those two villages, about 80% follow the VC.

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In Binh Dinh, since the Viet Minh days, the communists have conducted very efficient propaganda. Local authorities have no frequent meetings and don't publicize GVN policy. VC propaganda is more active in the area. Area analysis leads to this distribution:

Pro-GVN	-	30%
Pro-Communist	-	20%
In-between	-	50%

The in-between elements listen to whichever side is stronger. In fact, they follow no one. They are vulnerable to VC propaganda because VC maintain district contact.

V. PSYOP Program

A. GVN: The district authorities do not give adequate importance to PSYOP. VIS, Chieu Hoi agencies have no plan or program. People have few opportunities to listen to VIS, or Chieu Hoi programs (once every 2-3 months). In many areas, people never see the activities of VIS or Chieu Hoi. The PFA/PSYOP Binh Dinh sent a culture Drama Team of 7 members and a PSYOP field team. The plan was drawn up by VIS sub-service, but got no attention from the district chief. Only one VIS agent followed the teams' activities. The sub-sector S-5 sent 2 people who did nothing; they were just present. The VIS agent did not speak or publish GVN policy.

VIS and Chieu Hoi agents are reluctant to go into hamlets because of a reported lack of means. Because of their laziness, inertia, and fear, the 8th PSYOP Bn field team meets difficulties working with VIS agents. The main problem is the Phu Cat district chief does not give enough attention to PSYOP.

B. VC/NVA: In both VC-controlled and GVN controlled areas (Cat Hanh, Cat Hiep, Cat Thang) the VC are inciting the population to upset the present GVN and to claim the establishment of a coalition government. The VC are preparing the population for the upcoming political struggle. They appeal to refugees to return to their native villages where they would give them land. In the previous mentioned villages and near Nui Ba mountain, the infrastructure has been established.

C. Brief: Binh Dinh is the largest province in MR II and is an area where the communists were strong in Viet Minh time. The population has been fairly well indoctrinated. This is the moment to win over the people for the upcoming political struggle. Therefore, if the GVN agents, the Province/District authorities are indifferent to the needs of the people in their particular areas of responsibility we might speculate that in the future more people would follow the communists than the GVN. The local authorities need to reorganize PSYOP agencies, re-train their personnel and oblige their agents to visit the hamlets to publish the news from Saigon and the Paris Peace Talks. The authorities must prepare public opinion since that is what the communists are doing. To reach that goal, it is highly recommended that the Province/District authorities:

1. Directly guide the PSYOP task.
2. Hold night meetings with the population
3. Bring the populace to an understanding of GVN policies.
4. Make the agents more active, let them talk to people, not just have a good time.

5. Make the agents aware of their duty and mission.
6. Sympathise with the population.
7. Be polite and cordial in talks with the people.

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8TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION DISTRICT STUDY

APO SAN FRANCISCO 96240

DIEN KHANH DISTRICT

KHANH HOA PROVINCE

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DIEN KHANH DISTRICT

I. Current Situation

A. Percentage of land in secure and insecure areas: The GVN controls 95% of the land. The VC control remote mountainous areas and often make sudden raids in the villages of Dien Dien, Dien Son and Dien An.

B. Chieu Hoi Program: Within the Pacification and Chieu Hoi Special Program, a campaign is being conducted with the cooperation of the following:

1. APT - 10 men
2. Polwar agents - 10 men
3. VIS agents - 6 men
4. RD agents - 22 men
5. Khanh Hoa 8th PSYOP Bn HE Team - 2 men

This combined force, although appearing strong, lacks adequate transportation and equipment. As the men must conduct night ambushes, day-work is rather neglected. The rainy weather also prevents satisfactory propaganda activities.

Old leaflets and old posters have lost their relevancy. By-weekly night broadcasts bring negative results because of bad weather.

Since early this year, Dien Khanh District has only had 2 ralliers (one in January and one in April).

C. Refugee Situation: There is no settlement village or hamlet in Dien Khanh. However, local authorities are planning to create two settlements in Dien Tho and Dien Phuoc Villages where refugees coming from Cambodia (Mountaineers and Vietnamese) can establish themselves in 1971.

II. District Background Information

A. History: Dien Khanh was a Champa capital. Nguyen Anh took over the area and built a fortress around the two villages Dien Toan and Dien Thanh (previous appellations: Phu My and Truong Thanh). The fortress was built in 1793 with a perimeter of 336 Km and a height of 8.5 meters with gates at the 4 sides. (See Van Ninh District area study).

B. Geographical Description: Dien Khanh District consists of 136,380 sqKm. It is bounded on the North by Van Ninh District, on the South by Vinh Xuong District, on the West by Darlac Province and on the East by Vinh Xuong District. One-fifth of the land is covered by average sized mountains, the highest summit of these mountains is the Chu Vung Giang Mountain with an altitude of 1488 meters. The remaining part is fertile plains. There are two seasons in the area: The sunny season extending from February to September and the rainy season extending from October to January.

C. Population: 46,127 people. They live mostly in the plains area. There are no mountaineers in Dien Khanh District.

1. Distribution and Density:

VILLAGES	HAMLETS	POPULATION	HES	TOTAL
Dien Toan	Phuoc Thanh	5416	B	6144
	Phuoc Trach	728		
*Dien Son	Dia Dien Tay	1876	D	3357
	Dia Dien Nam	1481		
Dien Thanh	Non Pop Hamlet	176	B	5831
	Phu Khanh	3445		
	Truong Thanh	1183		
	Khanh Thanh	1027		
Dien Lac	Truong Lac	1158	B	3817
	Thanh Minh	2659		
Dien Binh	Nghiep Thanh	489	C	1331
	Hoa Phuoc	678		
	Luomp Phuoc	164		
Dien Phuoc	An Dinh	210	C	2023
	Phuoc Thien	276		
	Phuoc Tuy	1537		
*Dien Hoa	Non Pop Hamlet	115	B	2180
	Lac Loi	473		
	Quang Thanh	945		
	Binh Khanh	647		
*Dien Dien	Dai Dien Dong	2280	D	4055
	Dia Dan Trung	1775		
*Dien An	Phu An Nam	4174	D	5173
	An Ninh	481		
	Vo Kien	518		
Dien Phu	Phu An Bac	1767	B	4142
	Phu Nam	735		
	Phu Cap	1640		
Dien Loc	My Loc	463	D	789
	Danh Thanh	235		
	Dai Hoi	91		
Dien Tho	Phuoc Hung	389	C	813
	Son Thanh	424		
Dien Lam	Phu Coc	1211	B	1382
	Xuan Khanh	171		

(NOTE: * Communist-frequented villages)

D. Education:

1. Facilities

a. High Schools: There is one public high school (from the 6th to 12 grade) with a student body of 1500 pupils. Also in the district are 1 semi-public and 1 private school (Bo De, with 6th to 9th grades being taught). 750 school children are in these schools.

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b. Primary Schools: 3 school groups: I, II, III; 3600 school-children (from 1st to 5th grade). In these groups a special class (Agriculture and Forestry) is held for those in the 6th grade. This program has two parts: generalities and particular technique. Each class has 60 to 70 children.

2. Level of Education and Breakdown: The Public High School Headmaster is satisfied with the understanding existing with the parents. Since the parents often contact their children's schools, much care is given to the school children. Teachers are in adequate quantity. Therefore, the result is better education than most other districts. Parents let their children finish high school instruction because most Dien Khanh people are rather rich.

E. Economy

1. General: Local products are prevalent. Rice is sent from Saigon (80 tons monthly) since local rice production doesn't keep up with the increasing population.

Last month's flood caused 35% damage to the crops raising the prices of products from 5 to 10 dollars per kilo.

2. Primary Source of Income:

a. Local products: Sold in Nha Trang daily are potatoes, corn, vegetables, ginger, peanuts and fruits (lemons, manioc, etc)

b. Bananas come in second rank among the products taken out of Dien Khanh District.

3. Agriculture: About 4/5 of the land is cultibated with IR-5 and IR-8 rice. IR-20 is not yet popular in Dien Khan, production has been increased from 3 to 4 times. Sticky rice is also planted with 1/10 of the ricefields cultivated with this rice. Flood conditions have also caused damage to stick rice.

4. Industry:

2 - paddy-mills
3 - brick plants
1 - ice plant

5. Occupational Distribution:

Occupation	Occupational Distribution	Income Distribution
Agriculture	45%	Very prosperous
Labor	40%	200-500$VN Daily
Commerce	10%	
Firsthand	3%	500/1000$VN Daily
Retail	7%	200/800$VN Daily
Civil Servants	5%	Rather poor.

F. Land Reform Program

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1. GVN: The special pacification program is emphasized in mountainous areas and less secure villages such as Dien An, Dien Son and Dien Dien.

Land registering meets with some difficulties in the villages near the mountains such as Dien Son and Dien Dien.

2. VC/NVA: The communists have no land program in Dien Khanh. However, in their secret zone and in remote mountain areas they want the villagers to work for them for periods of 3 to 5 months. Afterwards the villagers are released (information given by a district intelligence agent).

G. Government and Politics

1. Government

a. Structure: Like other districts in RVN territory.

b. Relationship between District Authorities and Village/Hamlet Authorities: Because of the legal qualification of villages and hamlets, the District Chief is considered an intermediary between Province and villages. This is a cause of delay in the execution of rural projects. Currently, the number of rural projects is:

Completed	-	24
In Progress	-	29
Planned	-	27

Other factors also cause delay:

-Project has to be approved by Province through District mediation.
-Very slow material support (what was expected in January has just arrived to District and Villages in November). In addition, some villages have new village chiefs and personnel from the last election of 25 October 1970: Dien Dien, Dien Phu, Dien Loc, Dien Son and Dien An.
-Projects approved by the province return to the villages in the rainy season and therefore cannot be initiated at that time, particularly construction projects.
-Loose relationship between district and villages.

2. Religious Groups:

Buddhists	-	40%	(VN Quoc Tu)
Ancestor's Cult	-	35%	
Roman Catholic	-	20%	
Cao Dia	-	5%	

3. Parties: The only party authorized to operate in Dien Khanh is the VN People's Socialist Party, the chairman being Nguyen Duc Tien who is a retired civil servant. The party creates organizations in some villages and hamlets but its activities are rather weak. It is known only to some GVN workers, military, and teachers.

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III. Summation

A. District government officials & administrators: An old villager in Dien Thanh comments on the progress achieved by civil servants. He observed understanding, quicker execution, faster solution for problems, but still some laziness. Some civil servants exhibit an attitude of intimidation towards the population:

Sympathetic	70%
Intimidation	30%

The improvement is the result of the GVN training policy (the old villager's opinion). Civil servants often neglect their duties, because of their difficulties in keeping up with the standard of living. Efficiency is rather low. RD agents are mostly lazy and VIS agents are often unable and lazy because of age.

B. People's attitude

1. Toward District/Village Authorities: The villager has direct contact with village officials, so problems are solved on the village level. The village also has more knowledge today and rural officials have accomplished some programs. However, there still are some intimidators among rural officials, though they are decreasing.

Here are some of the population's complaints:

a. Renewal of the ID cards: Because of lack of organization and personnel, people often have to wait three to five days. Meanwhile, they must neglect all work in the fields and wait at the ID card office.

b. Flag painting: Each family has to pay 50VN$. People say that it's RD and VIS's duty (GVN's duty) and should not be at the expense of the village budget (an old villager's opinion). The same old man said: "Flag painting is of no use. Why paint flags? We live in GVN-controlled area. We are against the communist. Everybody knows that. So people in remote areas don't paint flags, do they follow the communists? In addition the government invents things to make people pay."

Villagers want peace so that they can earn their living easily and their children can go to school. The population in Dien Toan, Dien Loc and Dien Thanh says: "Prices are going up, income decreases, the lack of security hampers all productive activities (farming, commerce)." The living is very restricted. However, life in Dien Khanh District is better than in other districts because of good roads and better security.

Children in Dien Son, Dien An, Dien To An and Dien Dien come to the district town at night for security reasons. Only old people stay in the villages as they are safe from abduction and killing.

2. Toward US troops and Allied Forces: Except the MACV Team, US troops aren't stationed at Dien Khanh. There are no problems. Korean troops are stationed at the district town and in mountainous areas with no reported problems.

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3. Toward the VC/NVA: There is little influence except for some families at Dien An, Dien Son, Dien Dien and Dien Toan who have sons or relatives with the VC, and some families who have been induced to follow the VC. The group is rather small since the population doesn't like communism. Therefore, though VC make raids, they don't have the population's support. Resentment against the VC is growing because of rice stealing and forced indoctrination courses in the mountains. Those who are obliged to attend the indoctrination courses usually report to the authorities when they are freed. Without the population's support, the VC obtain no results in the villages. A man of 50 years of age in Dien An Village said: "Who can be seduced by the VC: We are not easily deceived. I send my children (12 and 14 years of age) to the district town every night. I would forfeit all my effort in raising them if I kept them here and let the VC capture them."

IV. PSYOP Program

A. GVN: The campaign "Return to the Source" is going on in Dien Khanh, with the cooperation of APT, RD, Polwar and VIS. There is no satisfactory result so far with regard to the Chieu Hoi viewpoint. There are other causes:

1. Lack of transportation.

2. Workers are numerous and lazy. Sometimes they make ambushes at night and rest during the daytime.

3. They don't go to remote, mountainous areas.

4. Lack of equipment: The only equipment belongs to the 8th PSYOP Bn HE Field Team in Khanh Hoa.

5. The countryside is now covered with water and mud.

6. Night broadcasts are operated in secure areas only and not where communists could listen.

However, there is close cooperation between the VIS, RD, APT and Polwar groups. It is noticeable that VIS agents are mostly too elderly towork effectively. Performances of the campaigns are not yet known. There is also a lack of eagerness in the execution.

B. VC/NVA

1. According to a document seized from a VC killed December 6, 1970, a VC artillery squad will be sent to Dien Khanh. They will establish their operation center in Dien An Village. Previously, VC infrastructure was organized in Dien An, Dien Son, Dien Dien and Dien Toan Villages. But without the population's support, the VC could not perform any significant work. They would make sudden incursions in those insecure villages to force the population to pay contributions. In the present rainy period, they come to collect rice and clothes. On December 1, 1970, they came to Dia Dien Nam Hamlet, Dien Son Village, to contact VCI and buy rice/salt, collect food and bring the supplies to their secret zone in An Chua Mountain. The communists are re-establishing the VCI, particularly in Dien An Village.

2. The communists force families which have sons in the GVN or the ARVN to go into the mountains for 7 to 8 days and be indoctrinated. Then they send these inhabitants back home to spread propaganda. Before being released, the captured villagers are coerced to write letters to induce their sons to leave the GVN ranks.

Families having no relatives serving in GVN are obliged to spread propaganda among their neighbors.

3. In mountainous areas, buffalo boys of 8 to 12 years old are taught communist sorgs and anti-GVN songs (hamlets Dian Dien Trung and Dai Dien Dong and Dien Dien Village).

Example:

"The enemy opening the front gate, we stop the front gate
The enemy opening the rear gate, we stop the rear gate
The enemy fleeing to the sky, we shoot."

(Declaration of a Dien Dien 10 year-old buffalo boy. The parents of the boy now keep him home).

4. The communists say that in 1971 the US troops will be completely withdrawn from Vietnam and the government will be taken over by the communists.

C. Remarks: This rainy season is most favorable for the Chieu Hoi appeal. According to documents, the communists are suffering from a lack of food, clothing and medicine. Men working in the "Return to the Source" campaign realize that now is the time to conduct activities and be conscious of their duties. EXAMPLE: DIOCC/VIOCC and intelligence agencies must be more active. Propaganda should be strongly directed at VC secret zones. The VC night incursion raids should be intercepted.

The daytime broadcast missions must be operated in remote hamlets.

The work will be hard but should bring results. It is much better to set up plans and actively campaign than to return with empty hands because of a lack of leadership and loyalty of the responsible persons.

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1-A HEART LETTER FROM COLONEL, PROVINCE CHIEF OF NINH THUAN CALLING THE TROOPS IN NINH THUAN COMMUNIST RANKS.

Again and again, I have insistently called you and told you that the Communists and your leaders have always lured you into death. As you have known, they thought that their "General Offensive" of Mau Than New Year aganist Southern cities were decisive. But what were the results? ... About 150,000 of your comrads were burnt in the fire. Recently, the Communists have also suffered heavy defeats in the Cambodian battlefields, the territory is no more your safe base.

1-B It is really cruel for you, if you continue to sacrifice for the Communists invasion treacherous plan, you will certainly have a fearful future. Today, the promotion day of "National Love Campaign", I insistently appeal to you to make up your mind and return so that you could see your parents, wives, children, brothers and sisters, like over 160,000 of your comrads who have returned to the Great National Family since the Chieu Hoi Policy began. In Ninh Thuan particularly, since early 1970, 48 men have left your ranks to rally to the Just Cause. Among them are your leaders: Tran Quan Chinh, Thuan Bac District unit leader; Hoang Thach Yen, Assistant NVA Platoon leader; Tran Thanh Hoa, Company leader. Follow their steps with assurance, in order to build a beautiful Vietnam, rich and strong.

Friendly

Colonel Tran Van Tu

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1-A

TÂM THƯ CỦA ĐẠI TÁ TỈNH TRƯỞNG NINH THUẬN GỞI CÁC BẠN CÁN BỘ TRONG HÀNG NGŨ CỘNG SẢN TẠI NINH THUẬN

* * * * * *

Đã nhiều lần tôi tha thiết kêu gọi và cũng từng nói cho các bạn biết bọn Cộng - Sản và cấp Chỉ - Huy của các bạn luôn luôn lừa dối các bạn vào cỏi chết. Như các bạn đã từng nghe, thấy các cuộc tấn công vào thị xã miền Nam hồi Tết Mậu - Thân, Cộng - Sản tưởng " Tổng - Công - Kích " là ăn đứt. Nhưng kết quả ? . . .Trên dưới 150.000 chiến - hữu của các bạn đã đem nướng mình trong lửa đạn.

Gần đây, Cộng - Sản cũng đã bị những đòn cay cú trên khắp chiến trường lãnh thổ KAMPUCHIA nói đấy bây giờ không còn là căn cứ an toàn cho các bạn nữa.

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1-B

Thật là phủ phàng cho các bạn, nếu cứ tiếp tục hy - sinh cho dã tâm xâm lược của Cộng - Sản, chắc chắn các bạn sẽ nhận một tương lai hải-hùng khủng khiếp.

Hôm nay ngày phát động CHIẾN - DỊCH TÌNH THƯƠNG DÂN TỘC, tôi tha thiết kêu gọi các bạn hãy dứt khoát trở về để được thấy cha mẹ, vợ con anh, chị em như trên 160.000 chiến hữu của các bạn đã trở về với ĐẠI GIA - ĐÌNH DÂN - TỘC từ ngày có Chính - sách Chiêu - Hồi đến nay.

Riêng tại Ninh - Thuận, từ đầu năm 1970, đến nay cũng đã có 48 người rời bỏ hàng ngũ các bạn trở về với Chính - Nghĩa. Trong đó có các cấp Chỉ-Huy các bạn: Anh TRẦN-QUÂN-CHÍNH. Huyện đội-trưởng Thuận - Bắc, HOÀNG THẠCH YÊN. Trung đội-phó (Bộ - đội Bắc - Việt xâm nhập) TRẦN THANH HOA. Đại - Đội - Trưởng . . . v. v. . .

Các bạn hãy mạnh dạn theo bước các người đó, hầu xây đắp một nước Việt-Nam tươi đẹp, phú cường.

Thân ái,

Đại - Tá TRẦN - VĂN - TƯ

6A-800-70

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TRANSLATION OF VC PROPAGANDA

Phase VIII: All people must obey this order. Anyone violating this order will be punished. Because of the advantages to the people and our country and to protect the People's Revolutionary Power, the VC Uprising Council calls upon the people to carry out the above order so we know immediately who those people are acting against this order. We will reward you if you comply with this order or we will bring you before a court if you do not obey this order.

VC Uprising Council of M'Drak District
2 February 1971

- -

TO: PF and PSDF

Our people in the whole nation are ready to stand up and kill all of the puppet government and will set up our democratic government and your parents will be among those people. The People's Revolution-army committee and Liberation Army in Darlac province are calling on you to make no resistance when the liberation army attacks. Put your arms down and your hands up and the liberation army will not kill you. We are calling on you to join us to kill all of the puppet government we can set-up our democratic government. Bring you arms to the people's revolution and don't join the American-Thieu-Ku Army.

People's Revolutionary Committee and
Liberation Army of Darlac Province

- -

TO: All Soldiers and Officers of the Theiu-Ky-Khiem Government

American imperialism has lost. Although they are stubborn they must withdraw their troops. They have been carrying out a scheme called Vietnamization of the war aimed at extending their aggressions in South Vietnam by "your blood and bone." You are Vietnamese, you cannot serve in the GVN Army. You cannot continue to make targets in order to die for the Americans and create evil. You must use your weapon to kill Americans and their henchmen and return home. You must help the people to destroy evil doors from obtaining power and not obey the order os American or orders of evil doors. Anti-war and desertion are the way to save yourselves, family and countmy.

People's Revolutionary and Liberation
Front of Darlac Province

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TRANSLATION OF VC PROPAGANDA (Cont'd)

TO; Thieu-Ky-Kiem Government Servants, Village/Hamlet Officials, PSDF, STROC, Police and CIDG, all Officers in Khanh Duong District

Americans, like the French before, came to take over our country, set up a puppet government, place all the people in concentration camps, recruit people for their army and set up intelligence cadrc to follow the people. If you are working for them you are just as guilty in the eyes of the people's revolution. You must understand that: they have destroyed all of the people's farms, placed the people in concentration camps and using the people to fight for them. They induce the people with money and clothes to carry their weapons and fight against the People's Revolution. The Americans think they will win the war, that is why they stopped bombing in the north. They are withdrawing their troops, the people will not give up. The people will stand up and destroy the Thieu-Ky-Khiem government and it's army when all American troops withdraw. The people's revolution will take over the country from them, so you must stop working for Thieu-Ky-Khien government and stop resisting the Liberation Army. Bring their weapons and important documents to the Liberation Army. Fire back at the Americans and the people who fight with them. You must communicate with the Liberation Army and destroy all the concentration camps to save the people. The people will thank and praise you very much because the people don't like the American-thieu-Ky government any more than the French government before it.

Liberation Army
Darlac Province

TRANSLATION OF VC PROPAGANDA

APPEAL OF THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE U.S. CAMP ON THE SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLEFIELD.

...In face of such a situation, for the sake of justice and morality, and for the friendship among nations and world peace, the PRGRSVN appeals to the officers and men on the South Vietnam battlefield to rise up and together with the progressive people in the U.S. and to use every appropriate form of struggle in demand that the Nixon administration end immediately the war of aggression, and bring home forthwith all the troops of the U.S. and the other countries of the U.S. camp so that the South Vietnamese people may settle their own internal affairs by themselves free of foreign interference. Motivated by its humanitarian policy, the PRGRSVN welcome and support all anti-war-act collective or individual by American officers and men and will create every facility for them to withdraw promptly and safely from South Vietnam. The PRGRSVN calls upon them...

1. To resolutely refuse to take part in terror, raid, refrain from bombing, shelling, firing and any other acts of massacre against the Vietnamese people, to let the Vietnamese people live about freely to earn their livelihood. To struggle against the U.S. warmongers and their puppets and refrain from all hostile acts against the Vietnam People's Liberation Armed Forces; to use every form of struggle to resist being forced to take part in terror operation, and if compelled to go to battle to stay down and refrain from all acts of terror.

2. To struggle courageously for repatriation without delay.

3. To seek every appropriate mean to contact the local people, Revolutionary Power of Liberation Armed Forces and inform them of your anti-war attitude and action so that the latter may refrain from attack you or may provide you an assistance when necessary.

4. Those of you who want to escape the war of aggression in Vietnam and return to their country or persist to any other countries in the world by crossing over to the side of the Vietnamese revolution will enjoy humanitarian treatment from the Revolutionary Government and the People's Liberation Armed Forces who will ensure them safely and afford them every facility.

~~Inclosure 4~~

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TRANSLATION OF VC PROPAGANDA (cont'd)

5. The officers and men of the other countries in the U.S. camp who take anti-war action will also enjoy the same treatment as mentioned above. Officers and men of the U.S. and other countries in the U.S. campl for the sake of peace and independence of the nations, for the honor of your country, and the happyness of your family and you own life, rise up to demand that the Nixon administration immediately comply with the common aspiration of the American people and of yourselves VIZ: peace in Vietnam and immediate withdraw of all US expeditonary troops. The just struggle of the Vietnamese people and the proggressive people in the United States against the Nixon administration's stubborn policy of dragging out the war of aggression will certainly win complete victory/

South Vietnam December 29-1969
THE PRGRSVN

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