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DAAG-PAP-A (M) (10 May 73) DAMO-ODU

25 May 1973

AD 910333

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army
Depot Long Binh, Period Ending 30 April 1971

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2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material, as appropriate. This report should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY DEPOT LONG BINH
APO 96332

AVCS AD MGT

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Depot Long Binh,
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

THRU: Commanding General
U.S. Army Support Command, Saigon
ATTN: AVCS GO MH
APO 96491

TO: Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Washington, D.C. 20310

I. OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. PLANS AND OPERATIONS

1. Retrograde Activities:

a. During the reporting period the retrograde program went into high gear as evidenced by the significant increase in retrograde tonnage shipped: over 41,000 short tons were shipped against less than 16,000 during the previous six month period. The total retrograde tonnage shipped during this 6 month period was seventy-percent more than the total retrograded during all of FY 70.

b. The first rail shipment of 68 CONEXes loaded with retrograde cargo destined for Okinawa went to USAT Newport, on 12 January 71. CONEXes were loaded on 17 flat cars and secured with two-inch banding. No difficulty was experienced during the loading operation, which was accomplished utilizing a 10,000 lb rough-terrain forklift. To date approximately 1,300 short tons have been retrograded by rail from USADLB.

2. Vietnamization of Warehouses:

a. One warehouse which stores office supplies, was Vietnamized during the early part of the reporting period. However, the requirement to

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store an additional stock class created problems of increased workload and documentation. The resultant backlog in receipts and issues was not reduced until a small number of U.S. Military personnel was returned to the warehouse to augment the workforce. These personnel assisted the local-national supervisor and helped coordinate document control and shipping with US Military channels outside the warehouse.

b. Vietnamization has been completed in two other Warehouses which store automotive parts. Only one American remains assigned to each of those warehouses. They coordinate activities with other warehouses in the Firepower and Mobility Storage Section and assist the local-national supervisors of the warehouses when needed.

3. Project Clean:

A small task force of six personnel was organized to make rapid identification and provide disposal instructions concerning salvage, recoup requirements, and misidentified stock locations (i.e., stored under wrong FSM). The team was responsible for thoroughly inspecting each open storage area and making disposition on site by preparing necessary documentation. The team also arranged for shipment of the items to PDO, recoup area, Self Service Supply Center, and other destinations such as the correct storage location, the retrograde area or burn pit. In the past five months the team has removed 691 lines valued at \$1,260,969 and constituting 2,737 short tons. Of this tonnage, 938 short tons were removed to PDO, 598 to recoup areas, 350 to Self Service Supply Center and 851 to other destinations.

4. Space Utilization Surveys and Rearchiving:

a. With the goal of improving space utilization to 90 per cent of net available covered storage space, USADLB has conducted a space utilization survey with the assistance of a storage representative from the Army Materiel Command. Surveys have been completed for covered storage in the Communications and Electronics, General Materiel, and Firepower and Mobility materiel categories. After having computed the percentage of covered storage space presently utilized, the storage representative has made recommendations to help improve storage patterns and modernize storage procedures.

b. Major rearchiving projects are currently in process in eight warehouses. One such project was initiated to provide essential covered storage area for unit turn ins.

5. Self Service Supply Center:

On 15 November 70, the Self Service Supply Center was officially opened. Since that time the number of customers has steadily increased from 15 to a present listing of 630. In addition there are 75 mission accounts.

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The rapid increase in number of customers caused the backup storage area to be inadequate. CONEX containers were used for additional storage. They now constitute approximately 30 percent of bulk back up storage. The Master Storage List contains 769 items, a slight decrease from the 784 items maintained in January. Sales volume has increased over the past six months from an average of \$42,400 per week to a present weekly average of \$52,300.

6. MHE Direct Support Level Maintenance:

a. In November the MHE Division received authorization to perform limited direct support level maintenance. This program is being phased in as major assemblies become available through supply channels. The MHE Division is now a direct depot customer. The 510th Maintenance Co will continue to furnish backup direct support.

b. The authorized stockage list to support the organizational and limited DS maintenance has grown to approximately 1800 lines.

7. Heavy Metal Baler for PDO Yard:

Installation of the heavy metal, scrap processing baler at the Ho Nai Property Disposal Yard was completed on 23 December 70. The final product of the baler's hydraulic metal pressing action is a compressed metal bale approximately 36 x 20 x 20 inches in size. This equipment provides the Property Disposal Activity with the capability to further reduce the overall scrap inventories by being able to offer for sale a very compact, easily transportable and more marketable item. Although the baler has experienced some maintenance problems, over 1,000 short tons of scrap metal have been processed.

8. Rail Operations:

Rail shipments from USA Terminal Newport to USADLB increased substantially during this reporting period. A total of 55 trains, consisting of 796 railcars carrying 13,192 short tons were offloaded by depot personnel. Initially each activity was responsible for offloading its own cargo; however, off loading procedures have improved immensely by assigning the cargo discharge of Class IV material to the handling activity and the off loading of all other cargo to the Directorate for Transportation.

9. Production Problems for Industrial Gas/Dry Ice Facility:

a. Industrial gas and dry ice production at USADLB was formerly the responsibility of the 74th and 518th Engineer Detachments. The gas and dry ice production by these units during 3rd and 4th quarters FY 70 and 1st and 2nd quarters FY 71 was less than 30% of amounts required for issue by USADLB. To augment the production, USADLB procured gases from civilian

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contractors, 7th Air Force through an Inter-Service Support Agreement, and from off-shore sources in Japan and Okinawa.

b. The production capability of the generating plants was seriously hampered by the nonavailability of repair parts. Of 37 Red Ball requisitions submitted during the time-period stated above, only six were filled; of 112 "02" requisitions, only 22 were filled; and of 246 "05" requisitions, only 51 were filled.

c. Compounding the problem was the fact that LOS qualified personnel were in short supply (only half of the two-thirds assigned personnel had been LOS qualified) and the 74th Detachment was scheduled for deactivation.

d. To resolve the problem, USADIB submitted a Purchase Request and Commitment document to have the industrial gas/dry ice production facility contractor-operated. The contract was awarded to Pacific Architects and Engineers on 26 April 71. The estimated annual savings are \$470,000.

B. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION.

1. Preparation of MTDA and Revised Organization and Functions Manual:

a. The current personnel and equipment authorization document (MTDA P5W023AA04) is not consistent with the present USADIB organizational structure, which was modified during the last reporting period in order to be responsive to changing requirements and workload. Specific problems were experienced in identifying space reductions under the troop withdrawal program in that current operating elements lending themselves to reduction could not be identified on the document.

b. An MTDA was prepared which completely overlaid the operating elements (i.e., specific warehouses and storage pads). This document was prepared primarily to resolve problem areas resulting from the manpower survey (which was completed 26 April). Additionally a new Organization and Functions Manual was prepared consistent with the MTDA.

c. As a result of the above actions, directorates can easily adjust their organizations to compensate for loss of manpower, and can rapidly identify areas to be reduced based on workload by comparing like operations. These actions also enable management to identify specific spaces for conversion under the Vietnamization program.

2. Resources Conservation Program:

Following is a summary of FY 71 resources conservation (Cost Reduction) actions submitted to date:

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<u>ACTIONS</u>	<u>NO. REC</u>	<u>DOLLAR VALUE</u>
Submitted	37	\$1,516,400
Validated	34	709,200
Rejected	2	522,900
Pending Validation	1	204,300

C. SECURITY OPERATIONS.

1. Troop Command:

On 17 January 71, Troop Command participated in a joint sweep of an area outside the 3rd Ordnance Ammunition Depot. Other units participating in the sweep were the 159th Engineer Group, 29th General Support Group and 3rd Ordnance Battalion. The USADLB Troop Command provided a company size unit consisting of five officers and one hundred and thirty nine enlisted personnel. The sweep produced negative intelligence information.

2. Provost Marshal:

With the commencement of railroad operations through USADLB, experience has shown that 6 Military Policemen can check an arriving 16-car cargo train in 15 minutes. The six man railway security team remains with the cargo train during its entire stay on USADLB. Upon departure it is again thoroughly searched for items of US Government property to preclude pilferage.

II. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. PERSONNEL: None

B. INTELLIGENCE: None

C. OPERATIONS:

1. Erroneous Depot Capitalization:

a. Observation: Various depot debit secondary items transactions containing erroneous extended dollar values are being posted to the ABF. Most such entries are attributed to either unit of issue or unit price error on receipt transactions and physical adjustment gains.

b. Evaluation: These erroneous gains cause inflation of depot capitalization, tend to distort actual valuation receipts, and create the unnecessary work load involved in sorting out actual transactions and inventory value and, subsequently, depot performance.

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c. Recommendation: That a USARPAC 3S systems change be considered which would block from posting all secondary item debit transactions exceeding either 50% of the established requisition objective and/or a total extended valuation over 25 thousand dollars. Such entries would be "excepted out" for manager review and could only be posted with override coding following validation of input data.

2. Receiving Errors Due To Improper Markings:

a. Observation: Numerous shipments of Non-Standard Repair Parts have been received where the manufacturers use identically sized markings with both the part numbers and the applicable stock number of the end item (i.e., P/O END ITEM FSN). This method of marking has been confusing. Since inexperienced receiving clerks do not know which is the correct number to use when picking up the item on the records, the wrong item number is often picked up. Eleven million dollars worth of discrepancies on the SIT Report were caused by errors in identifying the correct part numbers on packages marked with part numbers and end item application stock numbers. This marking problem has been referred for action to USAMC to insure that all Non-Standard Repair Parts are marked in such a manner that the part numbers are readily identifiable.

b. Evaluation: Lack of experienced supply personnel and increased reliance on indigenous personnel make it imperative that this problem of insufficient markings be corrected at its source.

c. Recommendation: All other depots in Vietnam should be advised of this problem so that care can be taken in their receiving elements to avoid picking up part numbered items under the FSN's of end items. Army Materiel Command should take action to correct the marking of part numbered items.

3. Utilization of Materiel Readiness Expeditors:

a. Observation: Materiel Readiness Expeditors were established under USARV Regulation 700-24. Their primary mission is to coordinate emergency requirements of units receiving support from supply sources such as USADLB. Recent emergency supply actions have indicated that the MRE program is not being utilized on many occasions to support emergency requisitions.

b. Evaluation: USADLB estimates that over 50 percent of recent emergency actions have involved failure to use the MRE program. In most instances, inexperienced unit personnel have simply been unaware of the MRE program. In other cases, units receiving support from USADLB may not view the MRE program as an expeditious means to fill emergency requisitions.

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c. Recommendation: That increased emphasis be placed on the familiarization with and use of the MRE procedures, and, concurrently, that the MRE program be reviewed to determine its overall effectiveness.

4. Problems in Outside Storage of Non-Perishable Subsistence Commodities:

a. Observation: Open storage of some non-perishable subsistence often results in serious deterioration of products and increases the problems of commodity management.

b. Evaluation: Several commodities, especially those that are acidic in nature, deteriorate rapidly when in outside storage. Examples are cherries, tomatoes, and citrus products. The problem is that moisture causes some of the cans to leak, releasing the acidic juices, which accelerates the corrosive process on the remaining cans in the pallet. Several large amounts of products have been involved or put on force issue in the recent past. This adds to the commodity management task. Most of these pallets are packed "A over A" which means that they should be weather-proof. However, there is no fibreboard or plastic at the bottom of the pallets between the bottom cases and the wooden skid. This is the area where most of the moisture enters the pallet.

c. Recommendation: That outside storage pads not be used for storage of acid-bearing commodities if at all possible. It is also recommended that "A over A" packs be modified so that fibreboard and plastic are used between the lowest layer of cases and the wooden skids. This modification should allow outside storage for a much longer period of time.

5. US Military Personnel Remaining in Vietnamized Warehouses:

a. Observation: As noted in Part I above, Vietnamization of operations at USADLB has continued as a major activity during this reporting period. From an overall point of view, the Vietnamization program has been a marked success in USADLB warehouses. Yet two problems requiring further consideration have arisen as a result of the Vietnamization program in the warehouses: (i) a need continues for coordination of transportation and document control through US Military channels; and (ii) pilferage and theft from the warehouses have become acute problems, and it is suspected that local-national employees are involved in much of these illicit activities.

b. Evaluation: (1) At this point in the Vietnamization program, it is likely that document control and coordination of transportation support through US Military channels can most effectively be handled by US Military personnel working in cooperation with local-national warehouse employees.

(2) Pilferage from warehouses has resulted not only in considerable dollar loss, but also in a lowering of the storage-to-locator

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location accuracy: It appears that employees involved in pilferage "stage" items to be stolen by placing them in existing stock locations. Efforts have been made to find and remove these pilferage "staging areas". In addition, a system of unannounced, random Military Police checks, to include "body search", has been instituted with the effect of substantially reducing pilferage.

c. Recommendation: That a limited number of US Military personnel remain with those warehouses ear-marked for Vietnamization for the purposes of (i) coordinating transportation and document control, so long as these activities continue to be provided through US Military channels, and (ii) minimizing pilferage.

6. Use of the Army Master Data File (AMDF) and Authorized Stockage List (ASL) by USADLB Receiving Branch:

a. Observation: The receipt of stock with incorrect stock numbers and unit of issue increased with the accelerated unit turn-in due to troop withdrawals from Vietnam.

b. Evaluation: The rate of Material Release Denials (MRD's) and the percentage of "finds" through intensive research, indicated that invalid stock numbers and/or unit of issue data were contained on receipt documents. Storage personnel determined that corrective action could best be applied at the time of receipt. Two Recordak machines for viewing AMDF film were obtained, and documents for unit turn-ins were screened for verification of stock number and unit of issue data prior to shipping to Storage. This approach has proven to be highly successful in reducing Material Release Denials.

c. Recommendation: That this use of AMDF and ASL be considered as a means for other receiving activities to reduce Material Release Denials caused by incorrect entries for stock number and unit of issue.

7. Pre-numbered Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMD's):

a. Observation: Blank TCMD's have heretofore been manually typed, using Material Release Order (MRO) and Load Sheet information. All information, to include the control number, was manually typed on the blank TCMD's. Much of this information is the same for all documents.

b. Evaluation: Pre-numbering and other constant data can easily be machine printed, using data processing facilities. Machine-printed TCMD's have been prepared and are presently being used by the Directorate for Transportation. All future TCMD's will be pre-printed in this fashion to establish better control and more efficient operation.

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c. Recommendation: That other commands employing TCMD's consider the machine pre-printing of control numbers and other constant data to improve control and efficiency.

8. USARPAC 3S: Version 34:

a. Observation: In March and April 1971, USARPAC 3S computer programs, Version 34.1 and 34.2, were implemented by Directorate for Data Systems. Since implementation of these programs computer output has not been at an acceptable level of timeliness and accuracy.

b. Evaluation: With version 34 programs, it has been found that cycle times have changed and that it takes a longer time to run cycles. A number of problem areas (i.e., "bugs") had to be removed from the programs. It appears that version 34 was not tested by USARPAC for a sufficient length of time, utilizing actual input documents, to insure that all requirements would be met prior to implementation. Version 34 is not the first 3S program to cause troubles - there has been a recurring problem with these versions, making considerable "de-bugging" necessary.

c. Recommendation: That future computer programs be more fully tested prior to implementation. Furthermore, during the implementation phase new programs should be run on a parallel basis to insure that all managerial output data is available to a depot's stock control element.

9. Utilization of Tape Files:

a. Observation: Computer time was lost because of mounting improper files for a production run.

b. Evaluation: Due to processing a large volume of incorrect tape files were sometimes mounted due to operator errors or errors in maintaining the tape library. A system was developed that included a comparison of reel numbers and record counts to detect errors. This balancing technique provides a check to ensure the correct files are utilized.

c. Recommendation: This procedure be utilized in other data processing installations.

10. Program Loops:

a. Observation: On occasion, after programmer personnel have departed for the day, a production program encounters a loop (e.g., constantly repeating a series of instructions without actually processing any records).

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b. Evaluation: After several programs encountered the above situation, it became apparent that some method of identifying the program problem on the spot was necessary and take immediate corrective action so the program could run through to completion.

c. Recommendation: The input areas of all programs with extensive running time should be provided in the operators guide and instructions provided for locating bad records and/or blocks. Additional instructions should be provided to enable operators to eliminate the bad records and/or blocks with by-passing instructions or with utility routings and restart procedures.

D. ORGANIZATION: None

E. TRAINING.

1. Training for Local-National Employees:

a. Observation: US Military personnel turn-over and increasing troop withdrawal has meant increased reliance on Vietnamese local-national employees at USADLB.

b. Evaluation: This condition makes it important for local-national personnel to be adequately trained to ensure continuing efficiency of operation, whether to help teach newly-assigned US personnel or to maintain continuity of a Vietnamized operation.

c. Recommendation: That training for local-national personnel CTI and LACPO programs, be expanded to include training for upward mobility to middle management positions in preparation for the further withdrawal of US Military personnel.

2. Troop Reductions and Retrograde Training:

a. Observation: The current US troop withdrawals have placed a higher workload on USADLB in the areas of supply and storage, quality assurance, and property disposal, since these areas must deal with sharply-increased retrograde requirements while having fewer personnel assigned.

b. Evaluation: This trend has resulted in many OJT personnel in retrograde or retrograde-related activities, because men have been shifted from one directorate to another to accommodate to the workload.

c. Recommendation: That necessary information be incorporated into the instruction programs at the appropriate Army Service Schools concerning the methods and problems of retrograde activities.

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3. Standardization of Item PDO Criteria to cut Retrograde Costs:

a. Observation: During a tour of retrograde operations on 7 April 71, the Deputy Commanding Officer of 2nd Log Comd, Okinawa, stated that numerous items being retrograded to his location were of PDO caliber. Additionally he pointed out that many items awaiting recoup here would be considered as PDO prospects in Okinawa.

b. Evaluation: Apparently PDO criteria is at a variance between here and Okinawa which results in needless costs for recoup and shipping.

c. Recommendation: That PDO criteria be standardized to save expenditures in retrograde operations and that this principle be considered a teaching and training point for future operations of this magnitude.

F. COMMUNICATION: None

G. MATERIAL: None

H. OTHER:

1. Central Reference Library for Data Processing:

a. Observation: For a considerable period of time, each programmer, analyst, or team kept a separate filing system depending on requirements. While separate systems were adequate for programmer/analyst personnel who had been in this installation for an extended period of time, the files were not the most efficient reference source for the constant flow of new personnel. Therefore, a central reference library for all programmers and analysts was instituted. This library now contains all programs, documentation, technical manuals, and a comprehensive list of the library's contents and is available for all personnel.

b. Evaluation: The central reference library has increased the efficiency and effectiveness of all programmer/analyst personnel.

c. Recommendation: Each data processing installation review their programmer/analyst filing methods and consider a central reference library. With a central repository for all programs, system documentation, and hardware and software manuals; new personnel will immediately know where publications are located, speeding their orientation and increasing their effectiveness.

2. Duplicate Tapes for Source and Object Decks:

a. Observation: In several instances, source program card decks have been lost. In order to make changes to the program and/or assemble a new object card deck, the source deck either had to be keypunched from

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the source deck listing or reconstructed from the object deck. In either case a considerable amount of time was lost by programming and keypunch personnel. A system is available for maintaining card images of source and object decks on magnetic tape and punching out these decks when necessary. Recently the programming staff undertook the task of creating a tape containing images of the operational source decks used by this activity. To date, approximately 320 source decks have been recorded on tape and a duplicate tape is maintained at an alternate site as a backup to the original.

b. Evaluation: Implementation of this system at an earlier date would have saved considerable time and would have been very convenient.

c. Recommendation: Data processing facilities should implement this system to aid in recovering list or destroyed source and object decks. The duplicate tape kept in off-site storage permits recovery if the original tape is damaged or destroyed.

3. Work Sheet for Mass Movement of Vehicles:

a. Observation: It has become evident during USADLB participation in the retrograde program that the present MILSTRIP logistical concept is not completely adequate for rapid, massive retrograde movement of vehicles.

b. Evaluation: Lack of experienced and qualified personnel, coupled with increased mass-movement requirements for vehicles, necessitated the development of an additional document: a work sheet developed to protect IFC's and to consolidate like items for crew servicing. The work sheet also facilitated processing of retrograde vehicles through the USADLB Vehicle Park to the Directorate for Transportation, because an advance copy of the work sheet could be given to Transportation for early planning. Further, the use of a file copy of completed work sheets has aided cross correlation and the establishment of procedures easily visible for audit.

c. Recommendation: That a standardized work sheet, similar to that used by USADLB and attached as Inclosure 2, be developed and utilized to facilitate mass vehicle movements.

4. Effects of Rainy Season on Bunker Line:

a. Observation: During this reporting period, continued emphasis has been placed on re-building and upgrading defensive positions in the USADLB sector of Long Binh Post perimeter. It was necessary to rebuild the sector command bunker, to strengthen or replace wire barriers, and to replace walk ways and ladders.

b. Evaluation: Rainy weather causes rapid deterioration of wooden structures.

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c. Recommendation: That bunkers and facilities be built using
cement or treated wood to insure longer usefulness.

2 Incl
Organizational Structure of
US Army Depot Long Binh;
Sample Work Sheet for Mass
Movement.


ISIDOR J. KERSHROT
Colonel, OMC
Commanding

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
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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
US ARMY DEPOT, LONG BINH



DATE _____

WORK SHEET # _____

SHIPPING
RETROGRADE
LOG BOOK REQUEST

TRANS/VP
KEYSTONE/DEPOT

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