NEW LIMITATION CHANGE

TO
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FROM
Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov’t. agencies only; Administrative/Operational Use; 14 FEB 1972. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Attn: DAFD-OTT, Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY
AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980
SUBJECT: Operational Reports Lessons Learned, Headquarters 83d Engr Bn

1. Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

2. The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

4. As Section 1 of subject reports are not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program, they have been omitted.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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2 Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(l) Continuing turbulence.

(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel turbulence continues to be a problem in the Battalion.

(b) EVALUATION: The 83d Engineer Battalion (Construction) turned over 100% within the past six months. This is compounded by the large number of privates who are assigned direct from BCT without
attendance at AIT. Severe losses during the summer months required
the Battalion to accept 67 series (aviation) personnel to maintain an
acceptable total strength.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That AIT be reinstated for all newly
inducted personnel, and that maximum effort be made to stabilize
longer tours and distribute PCS movements throughout the year.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Requisitions are submitted for all
shortages.

b. Intelligence. None.

c. Operations.

(1) Positioning Downed Aircraft Guards.

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit is required to post guards for
downed aircraft on short notice in remote areas.

(b) EVALUATION: An excessive amount of time has often been
encountered to locate the aircraft due to incorrect grid coordinates
and areas inaccessible to vehicles.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Weather permitting, that guards be
posted, resupplied, and relieved by helicopter.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: All downed aircraft are confirmed
with DPTSEC Duty Officer prior to dispatching guards.

(2) Disassembly of Prefabricated Structures.

(a) OBSERVATION: No as-built or assembly drawings were
made of prefabricated metal structures prior to disassembly.

(b) EVALUATION: Lack of drawings or adequately labeled
members hindered reconstruction of previously disassembled metal
buildings.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all members be adequately marked and as-built drawings be made and filed with appropriate authority prior to disassembly of structure to be stored for future use.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Appropriate instructions have been included in Battalion SOP.

3) Clearing of Marshy Terrain:

(a) OBSERVATION: Poor drainage hindered clearing operations in quick soils.

(b) EVALUATION: Construction equipment was becoming mired in soils of low trafficability during clearing operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That temporary stable earth fills be constructed to support equipment, that interceptor ditches and well points be constructed to lower water table, and that hand clearing be considered where appropriate.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: All line companies will submit drainage plans in accordance with construction SOP.

4) Sub-Surface Soil Investigation.

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit accepted, as a Domestic Action Project, a Letter of Authority to construct an 1100 foot earth dam. The design was completed based on Soil and Water Conservation Service surveys which indicated a satisfactory clay foundation layer beginning about five feet below the surface. For training, the Battalion conducted its own survey which revealed a different state of affairs resulting in extensive redesign and a considerable extension of the project.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the incomplete survey a great deal of additional manpower and equipment hours were required. Of particular note was the keyway for the dam. The preliminary survey indicated a good clay layer at about five feet. However, the discovery of poor
material below the clay required the keyway depth to be increased from the original five feet to thirteen feet and increased the width from ten feet to thirty feet. Other areas which were disrupted by the survey were the actual locations of the borrow pits because the exact depth of usable material for the dam was not determined. In order to correct the problem the following actions were taken: Additional soils samples were taken to determine the suitability of material for core and keyway use and the depth of usable material defined. Borings were also taken to determine the required depth of keyway.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Constructing units should conduct their own soils survey before an earthwork construction project is begun.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Soils survey requirements have been incorporated in the Battalion Construction SOP and reemphasized to construction companies.

d. Organization. None.
e. Training. None.
f. Logistics.

l) Project Materials.

(a) OBSERVATION: Several projects have been delayed by lack of materials.

(b) EVALUATION: Although materials are supposed to be on hand before this unit is assigned a construction directive several projects have been delayed while awaiting materials procurement.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That construction projects not be undertaken until all materials are on hand.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Recommendation has been implemented.

(2) Procurement of Construction Equipment Parts.

(a) OBSERVATION: Construction equipment has been delayed by lack of parts.
(b) EVALUATION: Critical pieces of construction equipment were deadlined for excessive periods of time due to inadequate supply system. Parts were locally available.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That local purchase be authorized to reduce deadline time on commercially available construction equipment.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Requests are submitted for local procurement whenever normal requisition procedures do not provide acceptable expected delivery dates. These requests are being honored.

g. Communications. Communications Shortages.

(1) OBSERVATION: The change from E series to G series MTOE reduced available communications equipment.

(2) EVALUATION: The reduction in communications seriously impaired the ability to adequately control and support remote construction projects under simulated combat situations.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That E series communications be reinstated.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: Appropriate action has been recommended to change the TOE.


(1) OBSERVATION: No small excavation or slab size compaction equipment exists in the Construction Battalion.

(2) EVALUATION: In our secondary mission to support post construction, the need often arises for small excavation and materials handling equipment as well as tamping equipment suitable for building slab sub-bases. The mission is frequently hampered by having to use hand methods or over-sized equipment in close quarters.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That excavation equipment such as the Case "Construction King" and tamping equipment such as the Ingersoll-Rand upright and plate compactors be procured and issued to construction units supporting Facilities Engineers.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 83d Engineer Battalion (Construction), Period Ending 31 October 1971
RCS CSFOR-65(R3)

(4) COMMAND ACTION: None.

i. Other. None.

FREDERICK W. MUELLER, JR
LTC, CE
Commanding
TO: Commanding General, Third United States Army, ATTN: DCS O/T AJAGT-T-V, Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330


2. Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

RAYMOND R. ANDRZEJ
CPT, AGC
ASSY ADJ GEN
HQ, Third United States Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330 21 DEC 1971

TO: Commanding General, United States Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia 23351

1. Subject report is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.

2. This headquarters concurs with basic letter and preceding indorsement. The 83d Engineer Battalion has been advised that personnel changes should not be included in paragraph one of subject report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

M.V. Howard
CC2, USA

8
ATOPS-TNG-UT (22 Nov 71) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 83d Engineer Battalion
(Construction) Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ CONARC, Ft Monroe, VA 23351 31 JAN 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

The basic report has been reviewed and is approved as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

F. M. FRITZ
LT, AGC
Asst AG

CP:
CG, Third US Army
ALCEG-BC 18 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 52d Engineer Battalion (Construction), Period ending 31 October 1971. RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.
   
   a. Personnel. None.
   
   b. Intelligence. None.
   
   c. Operations. Various problems as indicated below are encountered in the planning and accomplishment of Domestic Action Projects.
   
       (1) Scope of work as indicated by the requestor on Domestic Action Projects is not clearly defined.

DAFD-OTT
712021
Incl 2
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 52d Engineer Battalion (Construction), Period ending 31 October 1971. RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

(a) Observation: Requests for off post projects by civilian agencies under the Department of Defense Domestic Action Program tend to be very general in nature and in many cases the requestors are not really sure of what they want.

(b) Evaluation: Project requests tend to be of the "I want a little dirt road from here to there" type request. When upon evaluation by the engineers, the request actually amounts to excavating, hauling, placing, shaping, and compacting approximately 200,000 cubic yards of earth. Also in many cases the requestors solution to his problem is not the best or most feasible.

(c) Recommendation: During the initial recon of the project all possible solutions to the problem must be discussed. If the original project request should be changed, the change to the request should be made in writing by the civilian agency being aided. The Engineer unit must be prepared to do more design work than might be normally expected.

(2) The duplication of effort in Domestic Action Projects.

(a) Observation: During Domestic Action Projects there are sometimes unnecessary duplications of efforts.

(b) Evaluation: During many Domestic Action Projects there has been work done on the project before the Engineer unit becomes involved. Unless the requestor is asked specifically, he may have information that you need but is not aware of it. For example, prior to starting an earth moving project a topographic map of the area was prepared. Subsequently, it was found that the requestor had on file a topographic map of the area but was not really sure what it was.

(3) Construction units and supported civil agencies often do not understand the others' organizational structure.

(a) Observation: Off post Domestic Action Projects are sometimes delayed due to the misunderstanding of the organizational structure of the Army by the civilian agency being aided, and vice-versa.

(b) Evaluation: Prior to Engineer work being started on a Domestic Action Project the action officer of the civilian agency must coordinate with several different levels of staff officers. This occasionally causes some confusion after the project has been started because the civilian agency attempts to coordinate with the wrong personnel. On the other hand, the Engineer unit must maintain contact with several civilians because on many occasions there is no single project officer. For example during a Battalion project to design and construct a track/football field complex for the Colorado School for the Deaf and Blind, the local Jaycees made arrangements to provide all necessary materials.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 52d Engineer Battalion (Construction), Period ending 31 October 1971. RCS CFTOR-65 (R3)

Most of the material was obtained by donations, therefore the Engineer project officer must deal with several independent suppliers, the Jaycees, and the head of the Deaf and Blind School in addition to constant coordination with the city utilities department.

(c) Recommendation: A pre-construction meeting between all involved Engineer personnel and civilian personnel should be held. As a minimum several things must be discussed:

1. Technical details of the project.

2. Organizational and internal problems peculiar to each which might influence the project, i.e. the project may be stopped when post levies the Engineer Battalion for 100 personnel for post guard and detail.

3. Identify all materials that will be required and how they will be obtained. The Army generally never supplies material for Domestic Action Projects.

The project officer for the construction should be carefully selected for ability and tact. Also after initial coordination it is best for the construction project officer to do the bulk of coordinating with the various civilian agencies, keeping the Battalion staff informed, with staff ready to aid on call.

d. Organization: none

e. Training: none

f. Logistics: none

g. Communications: none

h. Material: none

i. Other: none

[Signature]

BRTHAR J. MIIIIAN
LTC, GE
Commanding
AMNCA-GG-T (20 Nov 71) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 52d Engineer Battalion
(Construction), Period Ending 31 October 1971. RCS CSFOR-65(R3)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, FORT CARSON AND HEADQUARTERS, 4TH
INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED), Fort Carson, Colorado 80913
24 Nov 1971
THRU: Commanding General, Sixth United States Army, ATTN: AMOPS-T1
Presidio of San Francisco, California 94129

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

The attached Operational Report of Lessons Learned, RCS (CSFOR-65
(R3)) for the 52d Engineer Battalion has been reviewed with concurrence.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Assistant Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 52d Engineer Battalion (Construction), Period ending 31 October 1971. RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, SIXTH US ARMY, Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129 29 DEC 1971

THRU: Commanding General, US Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, VA 23351

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

Subject report has been reviewed and is approved.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Terry C. Hill
1LT, AGC
Asst AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 52d Engineer Battalion
Construction Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ CONARC, Ft Monroe, VA 23351 1 FEB 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-2A) WASH DC 20310

The basic report has been reviewed and is approved as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

F. M. FRITZ

F. M. FRITZ
IM, AGC
Asst AG

CG, Sixth US Army
2. Lessons Learned: Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

a. Personnel:

(1) Early selection of color guard personnel.

(a) Observation: The personnel to accompany the colors to CONUS were not chosen until the start of the Group's standdown.

(b) Evaluation: The color guard received only three weeks prior notification, and, coupled with the one week mail delivery time to CONUS, there was not much time for coordinating with dependents or for changing prior plans.

(c) Recommendation: While the actual redeployment date and location must remain classified until the unit's actual departure from RVN, and, as such, cannot be released to dependents, it would be advantageous to select the color guard personnel as early as possible, giving them maximum time for personal planning.

(a) Command action: None

(2) Efficient staffing of personnel.

(a) Observation: The freeing of personnel gains for a redeploying unit, coupled with normal losses through EROS, created several serious shortages within the Group headquarters. The S-1 section, with greatly increased paperwork, was left with only one clerk-typist and only one awards clerk, and the PEO section, tasked with providing standdown coverage, was left with zero personnel.

(b) Evaluation: Normal losses, without accompanying personnel gains might well leave a unit critically short in some MOS's, and, with the increased workload caused by standdown, personnel within the unit are not always available to be shifted between sections.

(c) Recommendation: That personnel assets be carefully scrutinized well in advance to allow ample time for replacements to be identified and trained.

(d) Command action: Clerks were shifted from other areas to augment S-1 section.

(3) PIO coverage.

(a) Observation: There are numerous commitments required by PIO personnel during the standdown phase, climaxcd by the actual redeployment ceremony which is usually held on X-day or X-1. However, personnel receiving drop will have left the unit for the replacement battalion by X-2 day.

(b) Evaluation: Should the PIO personnel meet the criteria for tour curtailments, it is essential that replacements be found to provide coverage for the redeployment ceremony.

(c) Recommendation: That positive action be initiated to ensure that the proper PIO coverage is provided throughout standdown.

(d) Command action: The adjutant assumed the additional duty of PIO Officer.
Awards and Decorations

(a) Observations: The number of awards to be processed shortly before and during standdown was twenty times larger than normal, due to the fact that all personnel assigned were leaving the unit at the same time rather than being staggered throughout the year. The problem was compounded in this particular case by the fact that the unit had no awards clerk.

(b) Evaluation: To speed the handling of the increased number of awards during the standdown, the procedure to follow in submitting the recommendation need to be formalized, publicized and enforced, and a final cut-off date for processing be established to ensure that all individuals entitled to awards receive them prior to departing from the unit.

(c) Recommendation: That all award submission be cut-off NLT 30 days prior to standdown, so that all persons actually receive their award prior to leaving.

(d) Command Action: The 5-1 section was augmented by personnel from other sections to process the backlog of awards.

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(1) MAC/LOC Equipment

(a) Observation: Redeploying units experienced great difficulties in turning-in their MAC/LOC equipment. The Keystone facilities would not accept MAC/LOC items and special disposition instruction had to be requested through command channels. The replies were often slow in coming and were not received until the units were well into standdown.

(b) Evaluation: Requesting disposition instructions for each item of MAC/LOC equipment for each redeploying unit seems inefficient. Since this is a continuing problem, turn-in procedures should be standardized and made available to the units.

(c) Recommendation: That redeploying units be permitted to turn-in their MAC/LOC equipment to the Keystone facility. Being required to turn-in MTOE items through one location (eg. Cam Ranh Bay), while having to retrograde MAC/LOC items through Long Binh works a definite hardship upon redeploying unit.

(d) Command Action: Higher headquarters has been advised of the difficulties involved with turning-in MAC/LOC equipment.

(2) Aircraft Requests

(a) Observation: Due to the Group's large area of operation, aircraft transportation is absolutely essential. The Group's requirements during the months of September and October, when only one or two aircrafts were available each day, caused the headquarters to be hard pressed in carrying out its command and control responsibilities.
Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

(b) Evaluation: The 577th Engineer Battalion, this Group's successor organization, has no organic aircraft, and is dependent upon other units for its aviation support. The 577th has a standing request for one UH-1 per day and it is essential that the CO receive this aviation support as an absolute minimum.

(c) Recommendation: That appropriate steps be taken to insure that a helicopter is available on a daily basis.

(d) Command action: Higher headquarters has been informed of this continuing need, and the required aircraft has been provided.

(d) Organization:

(1) Task force organization

(a) Observation: This headquarters has commanded several battalion-sized task forces, and, invariably, these task forces have experienced more difficulties than the battalions, due to the fact that they experience the same problems but lack the formal command elements to handle them. The task forces lack the close supervision of supply, maintenance, and personnel matters present within a TOE battalion.

(b) Evaluation: Battalion-size aggregations of engineer companies require a complete battalion headquarters to minister to administrative and operational requirements.

(c) Recommendation: That future task forces be organized with a headquarters company (-) to effect the command and control, administrative, and logistical/maintenance requirements of the task force.

(d) Command action: This headquarters has been closely monitoring the affairs of the task forces and rendering as much assistance as possible.

e. Training: None

f. Logistics

(1) No overlap of transportation areas of responsibility.

(a) Observation: The 35th Engineer Group was supported by both the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command and the Saigon Support Command Transportation Commands, each with a strictly defined and rapidly enforced zone of responsibility. SSC supported Task Force Whickey at Phan Thiet and the 815th EBC on QL-20, while ORBSC supported the 299th and 577th Battalions at Phan Rang and Don Duong respectively. In order to supply Phan Thiet or Dillard from Group headquarters in Cam Ranh, the supplies had to be moved by water to Newport and then hauled overland to their destination. Similarly, with the closing of CRB depot, the 299th and 577th received items from Long Binh which moved by water to Cam Ranh and then to the unit.

(b) Evaluation: The system causes added, often lengthy, delays and also greatly increases transportation costs.
Lessons Learned Headquarters 35th Engineering Co.

Period Ending 31 October 1971

Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

Cont'd

(c) Recommendation: That each individual shipment of supplies be evaluated as to the most economical means of shipment.

(d) Command Action: Our units haul their own supplies as much as possible to expedite delivery. The added haul burden, reduced required support of LOC operations.

(2) Lack of heavy lift capability.

(a) Observation: Our engineer units possess much heavy equipment which is beyond their capability to transport. Keystoneing an engineer unit presents a major problem. The number of heavy lifts exceed the capability of organic transportation to move during the keystone time frame.

(b) Evaluation: This diversion of engineer haul asset has hampered mission operations and resulted in increased deadline rate for 10-ton tractors and 25-ton trailers.

(c) Recommendation: That transportation units be specifically tasked to lend heavy lift support to keystoning units.

(d) Command Action: Tractors and trailers were borrowed from all available sources, at considerable expense of time and effort and loss of LOC operating efficiency.

(g) Communications:

(1) Maintenance of the AN/RC-163 radio set.

(a) Observation: The life of the multiplexer, TD-356, maybe greatly prolonged, if the unit is turned off when not in use, or exchanged for a spare periodically when in continuous use.

(b) Evaluation: This procedure allows the multiplexer to cool and also permits the operator to clean it.

(c) Recommendation: That this practice be encouraged among all users.

(d) Command Action: All operators are required to conduct a daily two-hour preventive maintenance Standdown of the TD-356.

(2) Crypto support of subordinant units.

(a) Observation: Crypto support of outlying units, not authorized a crypto account of their own, has created several problems. There were several incidents during the reporting period involving possible SOI compromises, necessitating nil-month SOI changes.

(b) Evaluation: Users must be impressed with the importance of crypto security and not to be lax with their SOI extracts.
Recommendation: Crypto equipment and codes should be issued from the responsible account on hand receipt and the borrowing unit should initiate a daily accountability check to be forwarded to the parent unit monthly. Crypto codes should be delivered monthly to eliminate the chances of more than one month's code being compromised at one time. The codes should be included on the daily inventory and forwarded to the parent unit to be destroyed. Hand receipts should be reviewed and renewed monthly.

Command action: This headquarters has implemented the above recommendation.

Material and maintenance,

Vehicle cleanliness for Keystone.

Observation: Keystone units were sending vehicles and equipment to Keystone facilities which were caked with mud, penultimate asphalt, and other foreign matter, without attempting to remove such matter prior to processing for Keystone.

Evaluation: The above practice causes much wasted time, especially on the wash rack, for Keystone units. The wash rack time is almost doubled if foreign matter is not removed prior to retrograde.

Recommendation: Keystone units initiate the policy of washing vehicles with diesel prior to retrograding vehicles and equipment to Keystone facilities. We encourage the use of AK's, if needed, in order to not detract from the unit's mission.

Command action: All Keystone units were informed by the maintenance section, this HQ, the CO, 35th Engineer Group (Const), and by T/MX to comply with the above recommendation before retrograding any vehicles or equipment. The situation was remedied upon compliance by the units.

Excess MCA-LOC equipment.

Observation: Disposition instructions for excess MCA-LOC equipment were requested numerous times from USARENGROMDV by this HQ's with no results. Excess in this case is equipment considered excess to Group's mission as determined by the Group Commander.

Evaluation: Lack of response from USARENGROMDV caused this HQ to lateral transfer (DA Form 3161) equipment from Keystone units to other units within Group where there was no real need for the equipment. This caused undue hardship on units by transferring equipment to them and the haul required for repeated moves.

Recommendation: A holding area should be established, controlled by USARENGROMDV, in order to redistribute excess MCA-LOC equipment throughout the other Groups. This holding area, when monitored by a representative from USARENGROMDV and proper documentation are utilized, could be used as a maintenance float for critical MCA-LOC equipment.
Lessons Learned, 35th Engineer Group
AVH-CO Period Ending 31 October 1971
Lessons Learned: Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

(j) Command action: Plans are underway at USAENGCOMDIV for implementation of the above recommendation.

(3) Group level accountability of MCA-LOC equipment.

(a) Observation: When an item of MCA-LOC equipment is sent to Long Binh Dynalectron repair facility, accountability is often lost on the item, because of the length of time required for repair and the perogative of the Group Commander to ship a piece of equipment to another site where there may be a greater need.

(b) Evaluation: The loss of accountability of MCA-LOC equipment is a problem that has come up quite often. The situation is such that Reports of Survey (DD Form 200) are often late and submitted by Property Book Officers who have no information on a particular piece of equipment, and hence come up with incomplete date and circumstances.

(c) Recommendation: That each Group initiate a MCA-LOC property book to be signed for by the MCA-LOC Project Officer.

(d) Command action: HQ USAENGCOMDIV has instituted a stock record account and picked up excess MCA-LOC equipment.

MORTON F. ROTH
LTC, CE
Commanding
AVCC: (21 Nov 71) 1st Ind

SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 35th Engineer Group
        (Construction), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSPOR-65 (13)

U.S. Army Engineer Command Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96491

: Commanding General, U.S. Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO San
       Francisco 96375

1. The significant activities and lessons learned have been reviewed and
   are an adequate reflection of the unit's operation during this period.

2. Reference item concerning "EQA/LOC Equipment", page 11, para 2c(1).
   Concur. Action has been taken to coordinate through Hq, USARV and the
   Support Commands to allow units to turn in excess EQA/LOC equipment thru
   Keystone facilities and local property disposal offices. No action by
   USARPAC or DA is recommended.

3. Reference item concerning "Aviation Request", page 11, paragraph 2c(2).
   Concur. Since aviation is organic to Group, maintenance and operational
   scheduling should be rigidly controlled to insure proper utilization. Sup-
   port for 35th Engineer Battalion is provided by a UH-1H three times weekly
   and one OH-58 on full time basis. No action by USARPAC or DA is recom-
   mended.

4. Reference item concerning "Maintenance of the AN/GRC-163 Radio Set",
   page 13, paragraph 2g(c). Concur. Paragraph 2g(1)(c) should be augmented
   to read: "This practice should be required among all users. If continuous
   operation of the radio set is necessary, the daily maintenance standdown
   should be performed at a time when radio traffic normally is at a minimum.
   Even if no spare multiplexer unit is available for use during this mainte-
   nance period, the resultant benefit of a daily maintenance program (pro-
   longed equipment life) outweighs the fact that the equipment must be non-
   operational for a period of time each day." No action by USARPAC or DA is
   recommended.

PR: THE COMMANDER:

THOMAS E. SAWER
ILT, ADA
Act Asst Adjutant General

7
AVHD-DO (21 Nov 71) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 35th Engineer Group (Construction), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65(R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 16 DEC 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 35th Engineer Group (Construction) and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

J. L. Childress

CPI AGC

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL

Cy thru:

USARENCOM-V

35th Engr Gp
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 35th Engineer Group (Const), for Period Ending 31 October 1971

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 JAN 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. MANHATTAN
L.T. AGC

[Signature]
**UNCLASSIFIED**

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<th>3. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initials, last name)</th>
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<tr>
<td>CO, 83d Engr Bn, 52d Engr Bn, 35th Engr Gp</td>
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<th>5. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES</th>
<th>7b. NO. OF REPS</th>
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<th>6a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO</th>
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<th>6d. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)</th>
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<th>12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY</th>
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<th>13. ABSTRACT</th>
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**DD FORM 1473**

**UNCLASSIFIED**