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IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

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**EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY
RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCILS
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

by

Frank M. Tims and Richard H. Orth

September 1971

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ABSTRACT

The study had two purposes: (1) to determine how the Army may best monitor the performance of the CRACs in the future and (2) how to evaluate the Community Relations Advisory Council (CRAC) program.

Two criteria for successful performance were deduced for the evaluation portion from the regulation covering the Community Relations Advisory Councils: (1) the development of positive affect among the Koreans toward the Americans in CRAC and (2) the level to which the CRAC performed the tasks outlined for it in the regulation.

Extensive data were collected for about a year (1968-1969). The sample of respondents included 104 Americans and 63 Koreans from 31 CRACs. The results indicated that successful performance by a CRAC is related to (1) the attitude of the Americans, (2) the use of assistance programs, (3) the followthrough on assistance promises, (4) the quality and type of interpreters, (5) the level of continuity, (6) the approach to bargaining, and (7) the handling of sensitive topics.

Two types of recommendations were made for future evaluations. The first was a general set of guidelines for the Army to use in instituting evaluation programs. The second was twofold, with one portion consisting of a list of questions from the interview schedule used in this study that were most used in discriminating among degrees of success; and a second portion consisting of a list of general questions for concept areas from which other evaluations may be drawn.

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FOREWORD

In pointing up some of the opportunities for community relations activities open to American military personnel in Korea, General Dwight E. Beach in a Command Letter, dated 12 November 1965, wrote:

This basic Korean friendliness toward Americans is a priceless asset to the United States in the conduct of its diplomatic, economic, and military relations with the Republic of Korea. It also assists Korea to maintain itself as the principal Free World defense post in Northeast Asia. It is of great importance to all Americans that this friendly relationship be cultivated and maintained.

Preserving and improving the basic rapport between Koreans and Americans continues to be an important component of the mission of United Nations Command in the Republic of Korea. A number of activities designed to contribute to improving relations are sponsored by U. S. Forces, Korea (USFK), on a continuing basis. At the higher command levels such recurring counterpart activities as Law Day and dedication ceremonies bring together leaders of the two societies in congenial circumstances. At the grassroots level, the U. S. soldier makes his contribution by teaching English at the local orphanage or high school or by driving an army truck to help farmers haul their rice from fields to storehouses. Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) is a program to aid in the development of community facilities such as schools and health clinics, and it too has potential for creating goodwill. Another such activity or "mechanism" for improving relations is the Community Relations Advisory Council (CRAC) program. CRAC is primarily a coordinating activity, providing a working link between two structures that are otherwise little related—the U. S. military and the Korean communities near the military installations.

This study is a follow-on to an earlier CRESS report, Community Relations Advisory Councils in the Republic of Korea, by Jesse C. Kennedy and Walter Pasternak. The earlier study was primarily descriptive in nature and concerned itself with the CRAC program and impressionistic views of individual CRACs. The present study is, in a sense, the logical consequence of the Kennedy and Pasternak report in that it expands on many of the ideas generated there and further examines the individual CRACs in light of these problems.

Subsequent to the publication of this report, the civil affairs activities of the 8th U. S. Army, discussed in this report as being the responsibility of G5, have been transferred to G1; Eighth Army Regulation 530-5 was superseded by Eighth Army Regulation 550-5, effective 12 January 1970; and, the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) Program has been discontinued.

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INTRODUCTION

The objective of this study is to formulate a brief, quantitatively based evaluation of CRACs to be used by G5 staffs in the field, or by properly trained and oriented personnel in subordinate commands. The method to accomplish this goal was the performance of a field evaluation of a sample of the CRACs in the Republic of Korea.

THE FORMAL CRAC SYSTEM

Origin

After the close of World War II and the liberation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) from Japanese dominion, American troops were stationed in Korea in substantial numbers. An informal community relations council was established in Taegu in 1946, to enable the American military to discuss problems of mutual concern with local Korean community leaders.

American troops were reintroduced into Korea in large numbers during the Korean Conflict of 1950-1953, and many of these military units remained in the Republic long after open hostilities had been terminated. In recognition of the problems inherent in a situation where sizable troop units are stationed in or near civilian populations, Korean Communications Zone Headquarters issued a directive on 5 September 1953 to subordinate commands to establish CRACs in Pusan, Taegu, Kunsan, and Inchon.¹

Current Situation

The situation in Korea has changed substantially since 1953. Massive reconstruction has been completed, the economy has undergone a series of changes and achieved a measure of stability, and Koreans have been allowed to return to their homes near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Visitors to the cities of Seoul, Pusan, and Taegu see old houses and buildings being cleared to make way for new, modern structures. A superhighway links Seoul and Inchon, and the construction of a four-lane highway from Seoul to Pusan is near completion. Although life still follows its traditional patterns in much of the countryside, considerable progress is being made in construction of schools and other facilities for rural communities.

The military situation is one of maintaining readiness and coping with occasional incursions by groups of infiltrators from North Korea, who cross the DMZ or land on the Republic's rugged coast. Although the American military presence in Korea has been scaled down considerably since the Armistice in 1953, the number of CRACs established has grown until, in 1969, a total of 63 CRACs served as forums where American military representatives may meet with Korean officials and other community leaders to discuss and resolve problems. Even with the decrease in the number of American troops, the functions of CRAC appear to be more important than ever. Fraternization between American soldiers and Korean civilians, as well as Korean soldiers, is becoming more and more common. The American military now operate out of stable, semipermanent bases; numerous small businesses are located adjacent to

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the military installations, with their principal clientele the American soldiers. Americans patronize the shops, bars, and nightclubs in both the cities and villages where such facilities exist.

EVALUATION OF CRACS

In the considerable research performed on the results of increased contact between heterogeneous groups, it has been generally found that if the differences between such groups are minimal, the increased contact results in assimilation and more favorable perceptions.² However, if differences are initially great, the increased contact appears to exaggerate these differences.³ Thus, CRAC and its efficacy have become a more pronounced concern; it is not enough simply to establish CRACs everywhere possible, one must know how effective the existing CRACs are in accomplishing their stated goals.

Research into the CRAC program is not a new endeavor, but previous studies have dealt primarily with the description of the various CRACs and have gathered little "hard data"⁴ on their functions and efficiency. Nor is the idea of evaluating the CRACs new. In fact, Eighth Army, G5 (Civil Affairs Section), presently uses three sources of evaluation. One is a review of the minutes of monthly meetings that are forwarded upward through command channels or, if no meetings are held, negative reports (a report that no meetings were held) through channels are required.⁵ This approach ideally covers the entire CRAC system and permits civil affairs personnel at various command echelons to monitor the programs of subordinate units. A second approach, which covers a limited number of CRACs on a repeated basis, is attendance of meetings of selected CRACs by G5 international relations officers to provide both evaluation and assistance to the sponsoring unit. The third approach is an elaborate civil affairs inspection checklist utilized during inspections by the Office of the Inspector General. This checklist tends to be formalistic in nature and stresses the compliance with regulations dealing with civil affairs rather than focusing on the efficacy of the program or of specific CRACs.

Thus, the need for a new evaluation procedure is clear. This study attempts to set up such a procedure based on the following needs suggested by a program such as CRAC. The evaluation must have these essential elements: (1) a methodical, systematic format to permit a broad, objective overview of the system, (2) operationalized criteria drawn from a statement of objectives so that the degree of a CRAC's success in meeting the objectives of the program may be measured in a consistent manner, and (3) simplicity, so that a large number of units may be assessed in a relatively short period of time and by Army personnel who may have little social science training.

Recognizing other needs that may be served by a study of this type, the results will include three elements: (1) a descriptive section, (2) a section with the general outcomes of the trial evaluation based on a combination of the CRACs in the sample rather than on individual ones, and (3) a proposed evaluation system for G5 use to assess the efficacy of the CRACs either on a combined basis or on an individual basis.

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CHAPTER 1

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The basic purpose of this study was the examination of a selected group of CRACs (Community Relations Advisory Councils) to assess their relative success or failure. The key assumptions for this assessment were: (1) that Koreans on CRAC constitute a "target population" and (2) that the paramount criteria of success were (a) the achievement of a high degree of positive affect (feeling) among the Korean CRAC members toward American CRAC members and (b) the carrying out of tasks outlined for CRAC in the regulations.¹ In conferences with civil affairs personnel, reference was constantly made to the need for preserving the "palatability" of the U. S. Force's presence in Korean communities. When this study was undertaken, the Eighth Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, described preservation of palatability as the primary mission of CRAC.

From the outset of the study, the CRAC program was generally described by American civil affairs personnel and in the available research literature as being "successful." Visits to a number of CRAC meetings yielded impressions supporting this conclusion, as did responses to interview items and rating scales by American CRAC members. However, the responses by Korean CRAC members to similar interview items and rating scales cast a shadow of some doubt over the Americans' optimism. Thus, it was decided to use a Korean task rating and affect index as indicators of success to allow the use of a more conservative estimate—an estimate less likely to show success, where in fact there was failure.

A further word of caution is in order. CRACs were ranked according to two criteria of success (which are operationalized in chapter 3). Clearly such a ranking implies that some CRACs are better than others. However, not enough prior research has been performed in this area to allow anyone to claim that an indicated lack of success according to the criteria used in this study may be construed as a failure in the strict sense of the word. Naturally, one CRAC may be rated as worse than another, but that is not to say that a CRAC is not performing a positive function merely by its existence. The purpose here is not to judge the CRAC program, but rather to evaluate individual CRACs vis-a-vis other CRACs and to uncover areas of improvement in these individual CRACs. In order to do so, some indication of success had to be drawn up.

ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES

A problem in attitude research is the question, how are attitudes translated into behavior? It was suggested that behavioral measures of CRAC success in terms of improving relations with the Koreans were not really feasible in the context of this research effort. There is uncertainty in being able to generalize from stated intentions to actual behavioral commitment, as DeFleur and Westie warned.² This is especially true when one sees certain factors in operation that serve to nullify stated intentions. Thus, although American members of CRAC may state that they like Koreans and their culture, they may also be so caught up in their normal command duty that they can give only cursory attention to the Koreans.

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Even assuming that the Americans' behavior is congruent with their stated attitudes, another problem in trying to relate attitudinal variables to success has to do with the appropriateness of the behavior. For example, although Americans may think that a sign of friendliness is minimizing the number of disagreements, the Koreans may perceive this as a snub, indicating that the Americans do not want to take time to discuss differences or that they do not consider the views of Koreans important. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, it must be remembered that the members of the CRACs are dealing with people of a vastly different culture—a culture in which much normal American behavior is dysfunctional. With these differences in behavior is the implication that different measurement techniques must be developed to evaluate the relationship between attitudinal variables and success of such programs as CRAC.

Consequently, the second set of attitudinal variables—those involving the perceptions of the Koreans—take on additional importance. These perceptions serve indirectly as indicators of the behavioral aspects of the American attitudes, as well as measures of the Koreans' own perceptions. It is interesting to note that success was related significantly to these variables where it was not related to the Americans' attitudes.

INTERPRETERS

A factor associated with CRAC success was the availability of a proficient interpreter. The Eighth Army Civil Affairs Handbook (EA PAM 530-4, 11 Jan 68—hereafter referred to as EA Handbook), which reflects its policy, stresses the crucial nature of the interpreter's role in CRAC and contains considerable detail about the criteria for selecting and training interpreters.³ Yet, the data of this study indicated that lower level units in the field frequently have no regular, trained interpreter. CRACs in which no qualified interpreter was present were rated somewhat lower on both criteria of success. Both Americans and Koreans in the high success CRACs had a significant tendency to rate the skill of their interpreters "high" than did members of low success CRACs.

That the so-called "language barrier" is part of a larger cultural barrier which must be overcome if mutual understanding is to be increased is rarely disputed. If the commands sponsoring CRACs are not provided interpreters (preferably interpreters with some familiarity with community relations concepts) and are obliged to have meetings with unqualified translators, as some CRACs have had to do, many such CRACs will probably continue to experience misunderstandings and frustration. At this point in time, it appears unlikely that Americans proficient in the Korean language will be available in sufficient numbers for this task, so that U. S. Forces will be obliged to continue to depend on local nationals for translating and interpreting. For this reason, the careful selection of the interpreter is important. The EA Handbook sets forth the following criteria for selection.

Selection and training for CRAC interpreters remains a central problem of all CRAC activities. The interpreter should be carefully selected on the basis of his education, command of oral English (as well as written), previous experience, and social status. Each of these considerations will affect not only the actual work of interpretation but also his acceptability to both sides. For example, if the council deals with high government officials it will not want an interpreter from the lowest social elements, regardless of his linguistic prowess. If a prospective interpreter has a cloistered academic background, he probably will not be suitable for a position requiring frequent contact with the public at large. The prospective interpreter should, if possible, be interviewed by one who is proficient in the language as well as familiar with the duties of the position.

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Lastly, a cardinal principle of interpreter selection is not to leave it to an unqualified underling. Interpreters soon become identified with their employers. The commander should not hinder the execution of his own mission by permitting an undesirable interpreter to be identified with him or his colleagues.⁴

As for status criteria, the EA Handbook suggests that commanders tempted to use a KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to U. S. Army) consider some problems this may generate. The interpreter should be of sufficiently high status to communicate on a relatively equal plane with members on both sides. However, since a KATUSA is an enlisted man, he may naturally perceive a need for extreme deference and politeness in interpreting for such high status persons as Army officers and government officials. He may feel personally threatened by any translating requirement that might involve possible offense to either side. In addition, KATUSA personnel frequently have a limited command of English and may lack the social awareness to choose appropriate forms of address for variations in social rank. If it becomes necessary to use the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) personnel as translator-interpreters at CRAC meetings, it might be well to select an officer with field grade rank, if such a person is available. However, since in most lower level units, ROKA officers are not present, a civilian interpreter is preferable because he provides a measure of continuity by virtue of the fact that he is able to serve for a longer period of time.

From the data gathered, it appeared that the interpreter is much like the weather: There is almost universal agreement on the importance of this issue, but little is done about it. The issue is not whether there is fault to assess or not; the issue is the necessity to follow the suggestions in both the EA Handbook and the regulations covering CRAC.

ASSISTANCE VARIABLES

In their report, Kennedy and Pasternak identify American assistance as the principal source of interpersonal tension in CRAC.⁵ The EA Handbook also cited American assistance as tending to "offset inevitable frictions that arise when large numbers of soldiers of a different culture are placed in the middle of a civilian population."⁶ Since virtually all lower level units sponsoring CRAC provide some assistance to the community (at least in informal ways), it is difficult to transform this tendency or assumption into a hypothesis for testing (that is, does assistance actually mollify the Koreans' grievances). If the assumption is valid, representatives of the American unit should be seen in a more favorable light, as a function of their efforts is to help the community.

There appeared to be a markedly greater tendency to use Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) and other formal assistance programs in the highest rated CRACs than in either the low or middle groups. AFAK also seemed to have been used in CRACs where American members were described in most positive terms (that is, the higher affect index scores). It is worth noting that the use of formal assistance programs refers to the discussion and development of projects rather than the actual obtaining of projects. Although the most important objective of the assistance process would, of course, be the obtaining of a project, such as a new school for a myon or village, the process of developing the application, whether or not it resulted in the award of a project, seemed to have beneficial effects on the feelings of Korean CRAC members toward American CRAC members. The Eighth Army ought to consider this possibility in relation to the present administration of the AFAK program. Even though the current primary objective of AFAK, as defined in the EA Handbook is "to promote and maintain good relations between USFK (U. S. Forces, Korea) and the Korean people at the unit/village

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level"⁷ and although it is specified that "ideally, an AFAK project should be proposed by a low echelon unit in coordination with local officials,"⁸ a centralization of AFAK project formulation has developed in the major subordinate commands visited in this study. This was especially true in the two U. S. infantry divisions where projects were jointly proposed between the gun (country) government and division headquarters. Of the five major subordinate commands represented in the sample (I Corps, 2nd and 7th Infantry Divisions, 8th FASCOM [Field Army Support Command] and the 38th Artillery Brigade), only one, the 38th Brigade, follows the unit/village level project development policy. It is suggested that it might be beneficial to have the division G5 supply project application information to the units sponsoring CRACs jointly with myons which are being considered for projects. The Eighth Army G5 should continue attempts to reduce the lag between project applications, review, and funding to insure confidence in the program.

As previously stated, most assistance provided through CRAC is on an informal, day-to-day basis, usually taking the form of making available vehicles, materials, or heavy equipment for local construction projects. This assistance can be a valuable tool, since few rural communities in Korea have ready access to the kind of heavy vehicles or construction equipment that are usual in U. S. Army units.

A continuing problem is the inability to always provide the quantity of assistance requested at the time requested. This inability might often create problems that would not ordinarily arise. For example, almost half the Americans interviewed stated that the Koreans sometimes had a tendency to be unrealistic or unreasonable about assistance requests. Some respondents remarked that the Korean CRAC members would deliberately overstate their assistance needs in anticipation of getting "half what they asked for." Thus, psychological conflict over being unable to fulfill the Koreans' stated needs might result in a negative predisposition toward the Koreans by the Americans as a means of reducing these internal conflicts.

Two considerations that seemed important to the Koreans interviewed were: (1) sincerity of Americans in meeting the requests, and (2) followup of commitments with action. When asked about the American cochairman's response to assistance requests, a frequent reply from the Koreans was, "He does his best." Although all units included in the sample have provided assistance to the Koreans on a recurring basis, the manner in which requests were met seemed to be of utmost importance. Perhaps it would be advisable for the American cochairman to be prepared for specific kinds of requests (that is, those requests most frequently made by the Koreans) and to be able to discuss at length the reasons that it might be impossible to fulfill some requests. This will call for resourcefulness on the part of the commander. In addition, he must make an honest effort to meet some requests for the sake of motivating the Koreans who feel that the community expects them to get the assistance. When requests cannot be complied with, it is important that the Koreans understand why.

It is also vital that the American members understand what commitments they have made and the importance of following them up. The more successful CRACs tended to be those in which the American members were more frequently described as keeping their promises of assistance. On the other hand, a substantial number of Americans stated that they felt that Korean members sometimes assumed that commitments had been made when in fact they had not. This might have been due to inaccurate translation, the failure of the commander to make clear that he understood the commitments he had made, or the erroneous judgments on the part of the Koreans. In any event, it would be desirable to have an explicit understanding about the outstanding commitments at the end of each CRAC meeting.

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Of particular importance is fulfilling assistance commitments when these are made in exchange for some assistance from the Korean community. A striking example of this was encountered in the case of a small council located in a remote, mountainous area. During 1968 the small unit (a missile battery) sponsoring the CRAC had three different commanders, with the result that the CRAC had lapsed into inactivity. Although several assistance commitments had been made, apparently none had been fulfilled. The myon chief reported to the interviewer that the battery commander had agreed to furnish some materials for the local school and some vehicles for a soil improvement project in exchange for labor by unpaid volunteers to erect a barrier fence. In the myon chief's words: "We delivered our promise but they didn't. This is very unsatisfactory. They said they couldn't make it because of the inspection. But now the inspection is finished and they should keep their promise."

Had the American members kept their part of the bargain, the exchange would have constituted a good example of the way a unit's assistance capability can be used to barter for local labor support or other cooperation. Although the barrier fence was an operational requirement, the unit was under strength and the labor requirements for building the fence would have imposed a severe hardship on the battery. Agreements of this sort are sometimes made outside of CRAC but very few respondents, American or Korean, reported the actual use of agreements for exchange or bargaining with assistance in CRAC meetings. This is consistent with the observation made in the EA Handbook that "a conscious or unconscious reluctance has kept US chairman from utilizing CRAC in this manner [bargaining]."⁹

Twenty-four of the sixty-three Americans interviewed said that they regarded bargaining in CRAC as appropriate, but few reported its actual use. "We do it," one respondent said, "but it is very subtle. We don't come out and say we'll-do-this-if-you'll-do-that, but they know that we expect CRAC to be a two-way street." Another respondent gave a different response, saying simply, "I don't like it [bargaining]. If we try to put it on a quid-pro-quo basis, it just becomes a matter of which side can screw the other. That kind of environment would lead to their exaggerating small problems to give them more bargaining power for aid." Although the data generate no conclusions relating the bargaining technique to success, the technique might be introduced experimentally, on a selective basis in a few CRACs, where Eighth Army civil affairs personnel could observe how well it may work.

SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL REWARDS

The factor of social-emotional rewards together with the attitudinal variables show most explicitly the importance of addressing the individual Koreans in the CRACs. One may wish to quibble with the label of this category of variables; that is not important. Whatever one chooses to call it, the Americans must consider the emotional needs of the Koreans as long as the latter group is the target of the effort.

Corroborative evidence for the importance of these emotional needs is found in the section of chapter 4 dealing with vice problems. Here two examples of problems, which may appear to the Americans as being essentially the same, seem to call for entirely different actions on their part.

This social-emotional aspect of the evaluation has implications for American action outside of CRAC. This also seems reasonable since the target group's affect extends beyond the formal association within the council. The data show that the more successful CRACs tend to be those in which the American members associate with Korean members on occasions other than CRAC meetings. In high success CRACs, a significantly higher proportion of the Koreans

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reported that American members spent time with them in friendship relationships. The resulting implications are important. Through association between American and Korean CRAC members on an informal, friendly basis, some of the supposedly beneficial effects are extended to the individual's everyday environment. The ability to command the friendship and respect of military commanders in his area might be an important prestige consideration for a government official. Such a relationship could also facilitate communication between American and Korean officials, since facts and opinions that cannot be freely communicated in a formal meeting can be discussed between friends. Perhaps most important, the willingness of a commander and his representatives to seek out and interact with Korean officials on a voluntary basis conveys the impression of sincerity, a virtue prized by Koreans, but sometimes perceived as lacking in Americans.

It must be noted that this willingness to interact with Koreans has little to do with the attitudes of Americans toward the Koreans. Americans need not like Koreans or have an interest in Koreans, themselves. What American members must do is to try to influence the perceptions of the Koreans by their deeds. Merely for Americans to say that they like Koreans has little effect on the success of a CRAC; but Americans acting as if they were interested in the Koreans has a great deal to do with the success of a CRAC.

CONTINUITY

Maintaining continuity was found to be a possible source of problems for CRAC. Lack of continuity tended to be reported more frequently by both American and Korean respondents from low success CRACs than from high success CRACs, although the association was not statistically significant where the American responses were concerned. It seemed likely that the Americans would perceive greater continuity in CRAC than Koreans, since the American members kept minutes and other written records. In units of battery or battalion size, the minutes of CRAC meetings were not usually translated into Korean. The continuity derived from the content of meetings is related to another form of continuity, the stability of the membership. A number of Koreans remarked that due to a high turnover rate among American officers the American membership was unstable.

Thus, two possible sources of noncontinuity were found: (1) the lack of adequate record-keeping to insure continuity of content and (2) the high turnover rate among the officers precluding continuity in American membership. Of course, these two sources of noncontinuity interact to exacerbate the problem. That this may be the case is easily demonstrated by the following example. An American commander promises to help the townspeople build a road. Even if the CRAC records were poorly kept, it would still be likely that the road would be built if the commander remained stationed with the unit. On the other hand, if the commander were transferred, adequate records, including the promise of assistance, would be assurance that the promise was kept. If, however, the records were sloppy and the commander were transferred, there would be good reason to expect that the roadbuilding job would not be carried out.

Continuity also has importance in other respects. When a member is really interested in the CRAC, he cannot help but learn something about the Korean members. This knowledge will likely affect many variables discussed earlier. For example, it is possible that friendly communication channels are established during the acquaintance process. Yet when the commander leaves, a new commander must go through the entire process again.

The Eighth Army recognizes the importance of the continuity variable and provides three mechanisms to assure continuity: (1) overlap in commanders' assignments, (2) continuity files,

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and (3) assignment of a full-time civil affairs employee to a unit on a continuing basis. The full-time employee applies most directly to CRAC. This person is Korean and usually serves as interpreter for the unit. Unfortunately, with this means for continuity, as well as the other two means, there is a gap between the statement in regulations and what actually exists in the field. For example, many of the units studied did not have such a person on the staff; even when he was present, this was no guarantee of success, for in this study, two of the four continuity failures had such a person on board.

CONCLUSIONS

Although this study has revealed some problems affecting the operation of individual CRACs, the study also found other CRACs that had managed either to solve their problems or to overcome them in spite of handicaps. It should be remembered that an evaluation implies the low end of the continuum as well as the high end. The evaluation of this study must have such a distinction. On the other hand, if an evaluation of the CRAC program had been the purpose here, one would have to look only at the difference between having CRACs and not having them. Presumably, the effectiveness of the CRACs in improving relations between the Korean civilians and the American military would be shown quite clearly. The desired end result of this study is to provide a mechanism whereby the problems within CRACs can be discovered and solved so that future research into the effectiveness of the CRAC program will show greater improvement in relations between Korean civilians and American military due to presence of CRAC.

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CHAPTER 2 RECOMMENDATIONS

The results of this study should not be construed as a case for discontinuing any current Eighth Army, G5, evaluation or monitoring techniques: The continuing review of CRAC minutes, the civil affairs inspection checklist, the publications sponsored by G5, and the important staff visits to CRAC meetings—all have their place in the CRAC program. The reasons for these G5 activities go beyond evaluation; they serve as an expression of command interest and support for civil affairs programs. It is clear, however, that G5 personnel need additional tools for periodic assessment of the CRAC program at lower command levels. This assessment should include periodic, brief, confidential interviews of the key Korean members by Korean personnel. The interviews should include pertinent questions that have been identified as pointing to potential problem areas in CRAC operation, such as continuity, sociability of American CRAC members, sincerity of the local commander in problem solving and assistance, followup of commitments, perceptions of the American members, and modes of problem solving. It might also be useful to sound out the Korean cochairman and police chief on feelings of the local citizenry toward American soldiers and special problems. Of course, interviews must also be carried out with the American members. A key issue is the degree to which the American reports of their activities are verified by the Koreans' perception of them. These must then be applied in generating future training and recommendations for the Americans.

Appendix C contains specific questions taken from the interview schedule. Although these questions appear to be those most useful in differentiating among CRACs, an alternate approach (appendix D) is also presented to avoid suggesting a rigid format a priori without a pretest in the immediate environment. Appendix D contains a list of topic areas with questions that will provide future evaluators with more flexibility in meeting the contingencies of their specific situations.

SUGGESTIONS FOR AN EVALUATION PROCESS

1. Clear criteria for measuring success must be established.

Eighth Army Regulation 530-5 establishes only vague criteria for CRAC success. It allows too much leeway in the development of operational definitions.

The regulation suggests that the critical aspect of CRAC success is threefold: What does CRAC do for the Koreans' feelings toward the American military personnel? What does CRAC do for the behavior of the Koreans toward the Americans? What specifically does CRAC do for the Koreans' feelings toward its American members? It should be noted that although one would expect a degree of positive correlation among these aspects, the correlation need not be highly positive.

To successfully carry out the evaluation and to derive useful results, a number of factors must be considered.

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2. The assessments of CRAC success must be carried out as inconspicuously as possible.

If the evaluations become too conspicuous, they will eventually do more harm than good. For one thing, some status may come to be attached to being interviewed, thus possibly creating discord over one individual being chosen over another. Clearly group responses will serve not as evaluation efforts, but as a forum for evaluating one's image. Consequently, appointments must be made with key CRAC members individually and the interview conducted in a private setting.

3. The interviews are privileged information.

Evaluation of CRAC is like any research employing interviews or questionnaires. If there is a chance that what respondents say will be used by individuals who have power over them, the respondents will either refuse to answer or disguise their feelings—actions that can have damaging effects on the value of the results. Thus, misuse of the interviews by G5 or other personnel may cause the respondents to mistrust the future interviewers and to withhold information.

4. The assessment is not an inspection.

Everyone prepares for inspection; each person polishes his boots, shines his brass, and the like. Inspection brings about a situation far removed from the usual routine. If the evaluation procedures are seen as a threat, or inspection, a predisposition will be created that says everything must be right. Not only does this give a false picture, but more seriously, this may cause the Koreans to wonder about the sincerity of the Americans. If the Americans are only interested in impressing their superiors, then the CRAC has little meaning for the Koreans. The respondents, both American and Korean, should understand that G5 assessment procedures are designed to identify areas in which G5 can provide assistance and guidance to the American commander in establishing and maintaining better relations.

5. The assessments must occur regularly.

Regularity in frequency and regularity in time must not be confused. Although it is important that each CRAC have a certain number of evaluations per year, these must not take place at the same time or at a regularly predetermined time, lest they become routines to which one must adapt temporarily. Furthermore, several persons in each group should be approached, to reduce the possibility of getting individual-specific responses on which to base CRAC evaluation; obviously, persons from various strata will see things differently. Specifically, each unit should be visited twice yearly, with interviews of about one-half hour each with the American commander, the American cochairman, if he is someone other than the commander, the CRAC recorder, and the first sergeant or sergeant major, if he is a CRAC member. At the same time, Korean personnel should conduct their interviews with the senior government official and the senior police official on CRAC and the local schoolmaster. Where protocol is not clear, such as when a myon has two school principals, interviews should be conducted with both.

6. Assessments must enable G5 personnel to keep accurate records.

Records may be used to identify ways in which American military/Korean civilian relations can be strengthened and to keep American cochairmen informed. Due to the relatively long time lag between assessments, the G5 records cannot totally replace a sound concern for continuity by the commander in the field. Nevertheless, the G5 records can lend support for the commander's concern for continuity.

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7. The American CRAC cochairmen must be kept aware of the results of these evaluations.

The evaluations must not take on the aura of "another form to fill out;" rather they must have direct relevance to the individual CRACs. A possible methodology is the circulation of a newsletter citing CRACs for inventiveness and innovations in handling problems, citing new problems (without mentioning names, of course), suggesting or asking for possible solutions and the like. In other words, the American members of the CRACs are not really so different from the Koreans: they, too, need their social-emotional rewards as motivation for quality work.

MEANING OF EVALUATIONS FOR CRACS

It may be said that the recommended evaluation procedure will lead to centralization of civil affairs activity. In 1961, Hausrath and others wrote:

... Instead of requiring centralization of the operational aspects decentralization is to be preferred because it fosters multiplication of the number and variety of these activities, it spreads the contact more widely, it contributes to the intent of making the activities more spontaneous and universal among the American personnel, and thereby establishes stronger rapport with the host country people.¹

As sound as Hausrath's case is, it would appear that Eighth Army's civil affairs program is suffering from too much decentralization. The posture taken here is based on the analysis of the apparent reasons for the lack of success in some lower level CRACs. Several of these reasons are related to the gap between policy and practice in some lower level units, especially the difference in these areas: (1) command interest and support, (2) regularity of meetings, and (3) the use of interpreters. Other differences relate to a conflict between missions: The officers have both a combat-related mission and a civil affairs mission. Although the two missions may be seen as related, often the individual officer may perceive that he has to make a choice, letting one ride and concentrating on the other. It is only through centralization that some help can be given him in the civil affairs/CRAC aspect.

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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY

CRITERIA

The first step in any evaluation is the development of the criteria of success that can be stated in operational or measurable terms. For this study, the success criteria will necessarily be based on the regulations setting up the Community Relations Advisory Council (CRAC) program. Thus, the following criteria are primarily a translation of Eighth Army Regulation 530-5, Community Relations Advisory Council, into measurable terms.

Although the regulation states one primary objective for CRAC, it sets several subgoals through which that objective is to be reached. Ideally, one could assume that an indication of attaining either the major goal or all the subgoals by a CRAC would point to the success of the CRAC. However, the major objective could be accomplished or appear to be accomplished without the help of the subgoals due to fortuitous circumstances. Yet, to assure success, not as a happenstance but as a modal quality, one must determine:

- (1) the degree to which the major goal is accomplished by the CRACs,
- (2) the degree to which the subgoals are accomplished by the CRACs, and
- (3) the relationship between the accomplishment of the subgoals and the attainment of the major goal.

To assess these three critical dimensions, the objectives spelled out for the CRAC program in the regulation must be translated into operational terms; that is, they must be taken from the conceptual status in the regulation and must be put into terms that allow them to be measured.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF CRAC GOALS

The current regulation governing the CRAC program states its objective is "to improve the relationship between the military unit and the surrounding civilian community."¹ The translation of this objective involves breaking down the concept of good relations into measurable components. Clearly, one component of good relations is found in the feelings expressed by one group toward another—these feelings are called affect by most behavioral scientists.² In concert with those who use this label, this study will henceforth also refer to this feeling component as affect.

Since the target of the CRAC program is the Korean membership of the CRAC program, this study deals primarily with the affect expressed by the Koreans. Thus, the operationally defined objective of the CRAC program becomes the establishment of favorable affect within the Korean CRAC members toward the U. S. military personnel conducting the program.

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Several points in these operational definitions must be considered further, the first of which is consideration of the measurement techniques. To measure Korean affect, it was decided to utilize standard questionnaire items, including semantic differential techniques.³ Although there is some criticism of these so-called paper-and-pencil assessments, most criticism emphasizes the "necessary" inference from these tests to actual behavior. In the current study, a second test is used to assess the behavioral aspect. The assessment of the behavior involves the use of reports from the U. S. personnel about Korean behavior in terms of the amount of cooperation shown. Although ideally, of course, one would wish to observe the behavior first hand, such procedure would have prolonged this study to such a degree that its utility might have been impaired. Since this study did not rely on self-reports, as many other studies of this sort do, it should not suffer due to the lack of actual observation of the behavior of the Koreans.⁴

As discussed earlier, it was also necessary to assess the degree of attainment of the subgoals of the CRAC program. Specifically, the regulation covering CRAC outlines the following subgoals:

- (a) Establishing an effective two-way channel of communication;
- (b) Identifying potential or actual problems of mutual concern;
- (c) Developing plans to solve problems of mutual concern;
- (d) Planning and executing programs of mutual interest;
- (e) Evaluating the possible effects of actions contemplated by either the local command or the community; and
- (f) Developing wholesome contacts between the command and the community.⁵

Two primary modes of operationalizing these subgoals suggest themselves. First, to be at all successful, the CRAC must meet on a regular basis to identify and solve mutual problems. According to the assumptions underlying the CRAC program, there is not sufficient informal problem-solving contact between the U. S. military and the Korean civilians, making this more formal process necessary. In fact, one would hope that as a result of the CRAC, the informal contacts for problem solving should be increased. In this respect, then, one measurable aspect of the fulfillment of the subgoals is the activity level of the CRAC.

A second approach that will be used as an adjunct to the inferential activity index is the rated achievement level of the CRAC. Since it is possible to construct a scale of success based on the degree to which the participants feel the subgoals are attained, an achievement index will be constructed based on these ratings of success in the individual categories.

DATA COLLECTION

1. Sample of CRACs

Taking into consideration the operational definitions of the concepts to be studied, the goals of the research could best be accomplished by performing a survey of CRACs in the field. Although the research into the CRAC program done by Kennedy and Pasternak⁶ focused on describing the entire CRAC system, the present study will concern itself with CRACs sponsored at battalion level or below. (Three medium-sized CRACs were included in the sample to insure the inclusion of certain subordinate commands in the sample; however, the rank of their chairmen was the same as that of the chairmen of the other councils.) This decision was based on several factors; first, it allowed variables related to size and degree of formality to intrude only minimally into the analysis. Kennedy and Pasternak observed that

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the large CRACs tended to be more formal in the conduct of meetings than the small CRACs. In this connection, a possible source of error is that CRACs at higher levels might have a substantial number of Koreans and Americans whose participation was only incidental and whose knowledge about their council was questionable. Also, in reviewing some documents at Eighth Army, G5, it was noted that regularity of meetings was a problem in some of the higher level units. Even though the regulation suggests that fewer meetings are necessary for these larger CRACs, the lack of regularity of meetings could have posed problems of control for the research, since part of the operational definition of success was the frequency of meetings.

Another consideration related to size of councils is the way in which they can handle problem solving and civil assistance. First, lower level units have more limited resources; fewer local resources in the way of materials, vehicles, manpower; and less discretionary authority than do larger units, such as divisions. In addition, there are more echelons separating the small unit commander from the source of some types of decisions. Therefore, at lower levels, problems involving allocation of resources will likely be most acute. Second, at company or battery levels, commanders tend to be younger and less experienced in civil-military relations. A final consideration was access to respondents, which was not nearly so great a problem in lower level units, where the commander usually travelled through a smaller geographic area during the course of a normal day. For example, in missile batteries, it was usually possible to depend on the presence of battery officers at either the administrative compound or at fire direction of launcher sites. This certainty facilitated the data collection process, which might otherwise have lasted much longer.

Included in the sample were 35 CRACs, representing all 32 CRACs then operating at battalion level or lower in addition to the three larger CRACs. Four of the selected councils had to be deleted from the sample for a variety of reasons. One council had ceased to meet for over three months at the time of the pretest, with the consequence that no one in the unit had ever attended a meeting. Another council was dropped when it was discovered that it had been following a quarterly meeting schedule rather than a monthly schedule. Two CRACs, both sponsored by field artillery battalions, were not included because of repeated scheduling delays. After these deletions this left 31 CRACs in the sample.

2. Sample of Individual Respondents—Americans

A review of the time available for interviews indicated that the sample of interviewees should include no fewer than two (and, where feasible, three) Americans from each CRAC. The Americans were selected in accordance with criteria designed to include those who should have been most knowledgeable about the CRAC—the American cochairman and the person who served as either recorder (secretary), CRAC officer, or civil affairs officer (the same individual usually performed all three of these functions in the small units). The third person was usually selected on the basis of availability. Although a screening criterion was the requirement that interviewees had been members of CRAC for at least three months, this was waived when it was evident that the CRAC under study had not met for several months. A total of 63 interviews were obtained from American CRAC members.

3. Sample of Individual Respondents—Koreans

The 104 usable interviews obtained from Korean CRAC members were derived from the Korean sample that included three to four members from each council. Again the interviewees were key members, persons who were most directly involved (by virtue of their positions) in

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joint problem-solving efforts with the American CRAC members. Generally, they held the following kinds of positions.

a. The senior governmental administrator: gun chief, myon chief, or ri chief (Korean administrative units are do, the equivalent of a province or a state; gun, approximately equivalent to a county; and myon, consisting of a cluster of villages called ris). This person was cochairman and, therefore, spoke for the entire Korean membership in an official capacity.

b. The senior police official. This person usually had the rank of police captain. On the village level, he might have been a sergeant or a patrolman and was the most likely to have a direct official interest in any incidents between American soldiers and Korean civilians. In many areas, the police have responsibility for the local security of their political subdivision.

c. Educator or school administrator. This person had a direct interest in many of the assistance requests. At the gun level, he might be the chief of education, a position equivalent to that of county superintendent of education in the United States, or he might be a principal or schoolteacher, depending on the size of the school and the community.

d. Representative of some significant interest group. For example, in a CRAC where several "club" owners and the local "women's betterment association" were represented by three or four persons, one of them was selected. On another CRAC, the person selected might be the commander of a battalion in the Homeland Reserve or a merchant. Like the American sample, the primary consideration here was to make the sample as representative of the key members of the CRAC as possible. (See appendix A for a note on the technical aspects of the data collection.)

4. Instruments and Data Collection Procedures

Interviews with both the American and Korean CRAC members were conducted in the winter of 1968-1969. The senior author conducted the interviews of Americans, and a Korean research associate conducted interviews of Korean CRAC members in Korean. Items used in the interviews were basically the same for both Koreans and Americans. However, due to linguistic problems, there were some variations in the way questions were phrased (appendix E contains the interview schedules).

For both Americans and Koreans, questions dealing with the following areas were used.

1. Personal background data (that is, demographics)
2. Characteristics of the geographic area
3. Exploratory questions regarding the respondent's concept of CRAC
4. Informal contacts of the respondent (that is, visiting, and the like)
5. Conduct of CRAC meetings
6. Questions relating to civil assistance
7. Behavior of Americans on CRACs toward Koreans on CRACs, and vice versa
8. Questions relating to continuity in CRAC operations
9. Rating scale for CRAC performance
10. Attitudinal data

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For attitudinal data, semantic differential scales were used and scored. The following scales were used for attitude scores.

American Interviews

Attitudes toward Koreans on CRAC
Attitudes toward CRAC councils
Attitudes toward Koreans in general
Attitudes toward the 13-month tour
(for information only)
Attitudes toward assignment to Korea
Indications of Koreans' perception of
of Americans

Korean Interviews

Attitudes toward Americans on CRAC
Attitudes toward CRAC councils
Attitudes toward Americans in general
Indications of Americans' perceptions
of Koreans

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

In accordance with the operational definitions discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the following indices were created to examine the dependent variables. All these, of course, relate to the level of success a CRAC attains.

1. The Affect Index

The affect index is based on the sum of the weighted Korean responses to semantic differential items directed toward "Americans on your CRAC council." The weights reflect favorability on a scale of 1 to 7 for each item, with 1, 2, or 3 being progressively less unfavorable, 4 being neutral, and 5, 6, or 7 being progressively more favorable. A total of 13 of these items were used to make up the index so that scores would range from 13 through 91. The scoring procedure, however, involved first summing the item response values and then subtracting 13, to yield a starting point of zero.

2. Achievement Index

The second indicator was a score based on perception of the achievement level in the six activities described in the subgoals. Each respondent, American or Korean, was asked to rate his CRAC on how well it was achieving each of the six kinds of activity. Using one item for each kind of activity, six items comprised the index. The respondent was asked to rate each activity on a continuum of 1 through 7, with 1 at the "Very Poor" end of the continuum. These ratings for each respondent were summed to yield scores ranging from 6 through 42.

3. Activity Scores

A third measure tentatively used as an indicator of success in the behavioral aspect of CRAC was the activity score, which was computed from responses to six sets of questions, each related to one of the six kinds of activity. The Koreans and Americans were each asked to name specific kinds of events that had taken place in CRAC or through CRAC in a three-month time frame just prior to the interview. Weights of 0-5 were assigned for each of the

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six kinds of activity so that there was a possible range of 0 to 30 for the summed weights. This was the activity score. If a CRAC had not met during the three months or had not met frequently and had little discussion, its score would be correspondingly low. A CRAC that had met during the period might get as much as five points for the informal communication score, but few or no points for anything else.

Again, although scores were pooled for each nationality group within each CRAC, the Korean scores were rendered unusable due to an error in translating the instrument into Korean. The error related to the time frame and was not discovered in time to salvage the data and make them comparable. Items used in the interviews of Americans for computing these scores were 38 and 41 (communication), 54 (problem identification), 57 (problem solving), 59 (program development), 61 (evaluating effects), and 64 (wholesome contacts).

One additional point that should be made with regard to the activity scores is that each component represented a separate event. It is conceivable that more than one kind of activity will be reflected in a single project. One example might be a venereal disease control problem that might involve four or five kinds of activity. Each kind of activity was not counted separately. As a scoring approach, this minimized the possibility of spuriously high scores for relatively inactive CRACs. What is desired is a more conservative estimate of activity, and although the example of venereal disease may be mentioned as a problem, its resolution may be counted as a solution or a program, but not as both in the same interview. Similarly, although a ceremonial occasion may be deemed a program in the broad sense, or a joint event for the purpose of promoting wholesome command-community contacts, the occasion cannot be counted as both a joint event and a program.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

An examination of the level of success of a program in general, and of CRACs in particular, has little meaning if one can say nothing about variables related to the achievement of success. Consequently, it was necessary to develop a set of independent variables that might affect the level of success. Specifically, variables were conceptualized in three areas: (1) the characteristics of the CRAC, (2) the circumstances in which the CRAC functions, and (3) the operation of the CRACs, themselves.

Existing literature and regulations tend to focus largely on American attitudes toward Korea and Koreans. For example, a lack of understanding of Korea and its culture and a dislike of Korea and Koreans are frequently mentioned as reasons for American failings in dealing with the civil and military populace of Korea.⁷ There is an assumption in this statement that positive attitudes on the part of Americans lead to behavior that evokes correspondingly positive attitudes on the part of Koreans. Consequently this study examined primarily American attitudes and their association with CRAC success (Korean attitudes, it may be recalled, are considered to be an indicator of that success).

1. Availability of a Qualified Interpreter

The language barrier has long been recognized as a problem in intercultural communication and, therefore, relations between people of different cultures. A literal translation may involve differences of meaning. When an expression or phrase with which the interpreter is unfamiliar is used, the interpreter may be reluctant to admit that translation is difficult. He may omit the sentence or he may make an attempt to approximate its meaning. Since the

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interpreter's ability may be questioned by the others if he frequently admits he does not understand what has been said, he may understandably try to conceal his lack of ability by guessing, by omitting fragments, or by offering crude translations. Another consideration is the interpreter's loyalties. Is his identification with the U. S. military so strong that he views the Korean representatives as antagonists? Does he tend to favor the Korean side in his translation? Does he try to use his position as the link between two cultures for personal gain or aggrandizement? These are some of the complex questions that may be raised in this area and that would call for a separate study in themselves. Therefore, this study limits itself to several specific questions about the interpreter: If the interpreter is a U. S. employee, what is his principal duty assignment? If the interpreter is not a U. S. employee, what is his position in the community? What is his skill level, as evaluated by CRAC members? Is he trusted by both Korean and American CRAC members? Does he tend to favor one side or the other during CRAC meetings?

2. Communication of the Limitations of Assistance Efforts of the U. S. Military

Kennedy and Pasternak cited American assistance to the local community as a principal source of tension in CRAC.⁸ Koreans may find it difficult to understand why an obviously affluent U. S. Army should have difficulty supplying the community with a few needed items, such as lumber and cement. This may be at variance with the Koreans' usual acceptance of military priorities and has probably developed from precedents set by the U. S. Army. Several questions in the interviews related to assistance and its part in the operation of CRAC, such as the relative emphasis the Koreans placed upon assistance and their understanding of the limitations placed on a commander on what he could do in the way of local civil assistance. Other questions were designed to elicit data regarding the nature of the American cochairman's response, as perceived by Koreans, to the community's assistance requests and about the kinds of assistance provided. Still other questions dealt with the use of the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) program. Specific questions about AFAK in this study ask if, as Eighth Army Regulation 530-5 directs, maximum use of CRAC is made to "discuss the initiation and sound implementation of Armed Forces Assistance to Korea,"⁹ or if the CRAC under study has current AFAK construction underway, or if an application is being processed.

3. Followup of Assistance Commitments

A potential source of considerable discontent among the Korean CRAC members is the careless approval by a commander of an assistance request that later cannot be fulfilled. A commander may find that a given piece of equipment is no longer available or that increased manpower requirements make it impossible for him to supply a driver or operator. This inability to deliver the promised assistance may make the commander's next commitment less credible in the eyes of the Koreans. If the defaults are frequent, he may suffer loss of esteem among the Koreans, especially if the commitment was perceived by them as having been in exchange for some favor on their part. The Koreans may have already begun preliminary work on a project that cannot be completed without the promised assistance. The promise of the assistance may have caused them to bypass other avenues of procurement in anticipation of support by the unit, and, when the unit defaults, the project is delayed. Clearly, this may lead to Korean resentment against the CRAC on the part of the Koreans.

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4. Social-Emotional Rewards That May Further Motivate the Korean CRAC Members

This sort of reward refers to the satisfaction that emerges from a sense of participation and full membership in the group. Specific questions in this area focus on (1) association/nonassociation of American and Korean CRAC members, (2) satisfaction of Korean members with the amount of discussion in the meetings, and (3) whether the Koreans see the council's decisions as decisions in which they have had meaningful participation. Clearly, if members of either side, but especially the Korean members, do not perceive themselves as equals to their counterparts, the whole program may suffer. This factor, then, was expected to have a bearing on the success of the CRAC.

5. Bargaining as an Approach to Eliciting Cooperation in CRAC

In the EA Handbook is the statement:

A well-conducted CRAC meeting can frequently reach an amicable agreement by diplomatic bargaining—an art which the Koreans respect and to which they are not strangers. A realistic appraisal of the CRAC will indicate that both groups have the ability to give something the counterpart group desires. Too often, however, requests are presented and discussed independently. A CRAC meeting is really a forum in which bargaining can take place. A conscious or unconscious reluctance has kept U. S. chairmen from utilizing CRAC meetings in this manner. U. S. members should cultivate a conscious effort to match requests and bargain for acceptable results.¹⁰

Several items included in the interviews of Americans that dealt with (1) the respondent's orientation toward the appropriateness of bargaining as an approach to CRAC operations, (2) the frequency of bargaining, and (3) the results from bargaining. The Koreans were simply asked whether bargaining occurred in order to corroborate the Americans' indications. The Koreans would not use bargaining to advance the American interests; therefore, to ask the Koreans for more information about bargaining would have no utility in this evaluation. Moreover, asking the Koreans anything about bargaining is extremely risky, since the word they use for bargaining, hun jong, has negative connotations.

6. Continuity Problems

The usual tour in Korea for unaccompanied U. S. personnel is 13 months; in areas outside of the city of Seoul, the tour is nearly always for 13 months with practically no exceptions. This has led to some very serious continuity problems, since an officer has a limited time in which to familiarize himself with the local situation and his duties and then to brief his successor before departing from the command. Because there are relatively few personnel in the theater with sufficient experience for a thorough understanding of the U. S. Forces' situation in Korea, this feeling was well expressed by a respondent who said, "Since 1953, we have not had seventeen years' experience in Korea—only the same experience seventeen times." Another colorful expression with similar implications for continuity is the "thirteen-month tour syndrome—six months to learn your job, a month of home leave, and six months to think about your next assignment."

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Another aspect of the continuity problem is the month-to-month surveillance of problem areas and projects. When the CRAC meets infrequently, when records are not properly kept, and when the commander has little interest in the CRAC, continuity is lost and the CRAC tends to concentrate only on problems of immediate importance. If the CRAC is active and meets on a regular basis, it can actually provide the commander with some degree of continuity in dealing with problems. For example, the Korean members may know that during the rainy season certain roads tend to wash out or that a particular retaining wall on the U. S. compound gave way and collapsed two years ago and may do so again. They may have other knowledge related to the ROK Government policies that enhance the U. S. unit's local security. They can often provide information not readily available through U. S. Army channels about the social, cultural, economic, and climatic characteristics of the area. In this research, the data related to continuity were collected through a direct question addressed to each respondent, American or Korean, about whether continuity was adequate in his particular CRAC. Additional data related to continuity included the frequency of meetings and documentary evidence about the frequency of changes in command in the sponsoring units studied.

SUMMARY

The existing literature and preliminary exploratory work in this research identified eight potential problem areas that might impede the attainment of the objectives set down for CRAC in Eighth Army Regulation 530-5: attitudes, interpreter problems, communicating the limitations of assistance capabilities, followup of assistance commitments, social-emotional rewards of CRAC participation for Korean members, use of bargaining in CRAC as an approach to eliciting cooperation, continuity problems, and problems possibly related to age differences of American and Korean CRAC members.

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


Figure 1. Distribution of Community Relations Advisory Councils (CRACs) in the Republic of Korea

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CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CRACS STUDIED

Figure 1 is a map of the Republic of Korea showing the distribution of the CRACs over the country. Ten CRACs are located in the I Corps sector, where American troop concentration is high; three, along the Main Supply Route (MSR) from Seoul south to Chonan; and the remainder are dispersed in rural areas, principally south of Seoul. A complete list citing the units included in the sample appears in appendix B.

The size of the CRACs studied varied from six to twenty members. Usually Koreans were more numerous on the CRAC than were Americans, although this disparity was not pronounced. One exception was found and it proved to be unusual in terms of the status of Americans on that CRAC. When its members were interviewed, the Americans had not attended for several meetings, but the Koreans continued to meet and discuss the town's problems. In this case, the Americans were regarded as participants in a kind of town meeting, but their presence was not essential to the group. Quite clearly this was not in the spirit of the CRAC program.

Meetings among the smaller CRACs tended to be relatively informal, as one might expect from CRACs of this size. Although CRACs at these levels were expected to meet once a month, in practice many of them met less frequently. The data indicate that the CRACs studied met an average of 2.1 times during a three-month period. Forty percent of the respondents reported the cancelling of at least one meeting during this period.

Two questions called for estimates from the Koreans: how much transience was there in the community, and to what extent was the community economically dependent on the American military unit. Transience here referred to geographically unstable elements in the population. A relatively small proportion (15 percent of the sample) placed this estimate above 10 percent, with almost all the higher estimates in the 11 to 20 percent range. As for estimates of dependency, 7 percent of the sample rated their community as not dependent; 41 percent, slightly dependent; 31 percent, moderately dependent; and 21 percent stated that their community was highly dependent on the American compound. In other words, 93 percent of the Korean respondents indicated that to some extent the community was dependent upon the American military.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CRAC MEMBERS INTERVIEWED

As expected from the distribution of the CRACs, the Korean sample was essentially a rural group. Approximately 86 percent of the Koreans interviewed lived in rural areas; the remainder lived in urban areas. However, the rural-urban distinction should be viewed with reservations, in the light of what is known about the appointment of public officials in Korea. For example, the fact that a police chief is stationed in a rural area does not necessarily mean that the area is his home. He may have been transferred there from a city such as Pusan; or

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he may have been assigned to duty in a myon several miles from a city and actually reside in the city, commuting to and from work. A gun (county) chief may have previously been chief of another gun in another area. Provincial, gun, myon, and ri (subdivision of a myon) government posts are appointive, not elective, and one need not have been a resident of the area for such a appointment.

The educational background of the Korean respondents was relatively high by Korean standards. Almost 3 percent had advanced degrees and 28 percent held basic college or university degrees. Moreover, 28 percent were high school graduates, 27 percent had finished middle school, and only 14 percent had attended only primary school.

By position in the community, the sample was composed of persons such as: government officials, appointed heads of administrative units, 34 percent; police, 22 percent; educators, 15 percent; physicians, 2 percent; government employees, 5 percent; representatives of club owners, 5 percent; and other persons, 17 percent.

The Koreans in the sample were considerably older as a group than the Americans on CRAC. The ages of the Koreans ranged from 30 to over 65, with the median age being about 45, almost 20 years older than the median American age.

Of the Koreans interviewed, about 60 percent had lived for more than three years in the community represented on CRAC. About 71 percent had never traveled outside Korea; of those who had traveled, only two persons had been to the United States. Approximately 68 percent of the Koreans had never served in the military forces; 23 percent had service as enlisted personnel, and the remainder or slightly less than 10 percent had been officers.

The Koreans tended to have more experience as CRAC members than did the Americans. Most Americans were company grade officers serving their first tour in Korea, with less than one year of service on CRAC. On the other hand, 62 percent of the Koreans had served for more than one year and 26 percent of them had served on more than one CRAC.

Most Americans had been in the Army a relatively short period of time. Sixty-three percent of the Americans had less than 4 years of service, while 27 percent had less than 2 years of service. About 30 percent of the Americans had more than 10 years of service. Of the officers interviewed, 39 percent said they were career officers.

EVALUATION INDICES

In the earlier discussion, it was determined that the CRACs would be assessed along three lines: (1) the amount of contact generated through meetings, (2) the development of positive affect toward the Americans on CRAC, and (3) the carrying out of the prescribed activity based on the regulation.¹ Let us now examine the results of these evaluations.

1. CRAC Effectiveness and Activity Level

An activity score covering a three-month time frame was computed for each CRAC, based on the actual CRAC activities reported by interviewees. Responses to items 38 and 41, 54, 57, 59, 62, and 65 were used to compute the activity level (see appendix E). Averages computed by summing the Americans' scores within each CRAC and dividing by the number of Americans interviewed in that CRAC yielded mean activity scores for each CRAC. Theoretically, these scores could have ranged from 1 (no informal communication and no meetings)

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through 30 (frequent informal communication between American and Korean CRAC members plus five specific events under each of the five remaining categories of activity). The actual range of mean scores was from 3 to 22.5, with 15.6 as the mean for the entire distribution and 16.6 for the median.

2. Affect Index Scores

It must be recalled that the affect scores were to be collected only from Koreans. Responses to 13 of the 19 semantic differential items under "Americans Participating in Your CRAC Council Are," were used to calculate the affect index. Six items were discarded because they did not fall within the evaluative dimension.² Because of the relatively large number (13) of items on which this index is based, the possible range of scores extended from zero at one extreme to 78 at the other. Each item had a possible value of 1 to 7, but scores were reduced by subtracting 13 from the cumulated score so that the maximum score was $(13 \times 7) - 13 = 91 - 13 = 78$, and the minimum score was $(13 \times 1) - 13 = 13 - 13 = 0$.

Most individuals indicated high scores on the affect index with a mean score of 56.8. Only 15 cases had scores of 39 or below, and two-thirds of these were as low as 35. In contrast, 42 cases or 40 percent of the Koreans were in the 60 to 69 range, and 13 cases or 12 percent were in the 70 to 78 range. Significantly, scores over 60 indicated the predominance of extremely favorable affect toward the American CRAC members by the Korean respondents.

3. CRAC Achievement Index Task Ratings

Americans generally tended to be more favorable in rating their CRAC than did the Koreans. With a possible range of 1 through 7 for each of the six rating items (see table 1), a range of scores from 6 through 42 would be possible for each respondent's rating. Using 24 as the lowest positive rating, 86 percent of the Americans rated their CRAC favorably, while only 54 percent of the Koreans rated their CRAC favorably.

The mean task ratings assigned to their CRACs by Americans was 30.2, which reflects a moderately favorable evaluation; the mean task ratings by Koreans were 23.8, slightly under the minimum favorable rating of 24 discussed above. The distribution of scores obtained by summing the six item values for each respondent were subjected to the median test to determine whether the distribution of American responses was significantly different from that of Korean responses. This test yielded a chi-square value of 29.16 with one degree of freedom, a value significant beyond the .001 level. Furthermore, the mean response to each item tended to be at least one point higher for Americans than for Koreans, ranging from 3.9 to 4 for Koreans and 4.7 to 5.3 for Americans. These mean item values are shown in table 1. Cumulated task ratings by Americans and by Koreans for their respective CRACs were calculated and averaged for each group within each CRAC. The correlation between Korean and American task ratings in the same CRAC was .43, which is significant at the .05 level.

4. Associations Among the Three Indices

Since the three indices presumably measure the same thing—that is, the level of success attained by the CRACs—it is necessary to examine how they are associated. Furthermore, since the activity index and the task rating scores can theoretically be derived from both the Korean and American samples, the degree of their agreement will also be considered.

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TABLE 1
MEAN RATINGS OF CRAC TASK ACHIEVEMENT,
BY NATIONALITY OF RESPONDENT

	American	Korean
1. Establishing an effective two-way channel of communication	5.3	4.0
2. Identifying problems of mutual concern	5.1	4.0
3. Developing plans to solve problems	5.1	4.0
4. Developing programs of mutual interest	4.7	3.9
5. Evaluating effects of actions planned by the command or the community	4.7	4.0
6. Developing wholesome contacts between the command and the community	5.2	3.9

Let us consider first the relationship between the activity score and the remaining indices. First of all, it must be recalled that the activity index was computed only from the responses of the American members because of the faulty translation of the English version of the instrument into Korean. Table 2 shows that the task rating scores based on American interviews correlated .76 with activity scores and the Korean task rating scores correlated .26 with activity. Only the first of these correlations is significant beyond the .01 level. The affect index scores correlate .17 with activity level, an association which is clearly not significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 2
INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG THE VARIOUS RATING
SCALES OF CRAC SUCCESS*

	Korean Affect Index	American Task Rating	Korean Task Rating	American Affect Index
Korean Affect Index	1.00	.41†	.69‡	.17
American Task Rating		1.00	.43†	.76‡
Korean Task Rating			1.00	.26
American Affect Index				1.00

* Since the judges did not rank the councils numerically and were not asked to place any in the middle success group, their ratings cannot be meaningfully correlated with the other ratings.

† $p < .05$

‡ $p < .01$

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It appears, then, that the Americans have a different view from the Koreans toward the importance of activity in reference to good community relations. It may be that the Americans are equating the number of things accomplished (particularistic criteria) with success of CRAC. The Koreans, on the other hand, may be defining the success of CRAC in terms of some universalistic criterion, such as interpersonal harmony in the relationship between American and Korean members. Another interpretation may be that a highly active CRAC does not necessarily distribute satisfactions to both sides on an equal basis. Problems considered resolved by Americans may appear to be open issues to the Koreans or vice versa. Koreans may feel that the matter has not been sufficiently discussed for all members to arrive at an acceptable decision, or that all sides of the question have not been heard.³

From the results of the present investigation, it becomes apparent that the selection of the activity level of a council as a criterion of success is not warranted. To be sure, one cannot overlook the statement in the regulations governing frequency of meetings and stressing the notion of functioning. For the remainder of the current study, it will be granted that a certain degree of activity must be taking place to have a viable program. Nevertheless, this particular index will not be considered in further detail.

Although task ratings were assessed among both the Koreans and the Americans serving on the CRACs, the affect index was relevant only to the Korean portion of the CRAC membership. Thus, the association between these two indices was determined by nationality. As table 2 shows, the affect index scores for each CRAC correlated .69 (significant beyond the .01 level), with the task ratings by Koreans and .41 with American task ratings (significant at the .05 level).

Most of the American ratings of CRAC tended to be highly favorable and did not discriminate well between high success and low success CRAC. Since the Koreans were defined as the target group in this analysis, it was decided to use Korean responses as the bases for grouping CRACs according to success. Additional weight was given to this decision by the fact that there was a substantial correlation between the American task ratings and the Korean task rating ($r = .43, p < .05$).

One further test was performed to check the validity of the groupings of the CRACs into their various success categories. In addition to the quantitative ratings discussed above, qualitative evaluations were made by a panel of three judges. These judges appeared well suited to make this judgment: They were all Korean nationals and research personnel of the U. S. Army Research Unit, Korea. They were asked to select the 10 best and 10 worst CRACs; on the basis of their agreement, 10 CRACs were identified as a high success group and 8 CRACs as a low success group. In these groupings, the judges were 78 percent in agreement with both sets of quantitative criteria. For these distributions, see figure 2.

GROUPINGS USED

It must be recognized that due to the same score or ties in total score on either of the two indices, the size of the groupings will vary from index to index. This also means that a particular council could easily be in one group for the first index and in another adjacent group for the second index. Thus, for example, a CRAC in the high success group could be on the affect index as well as in the middle success group on the task rating index.

When a complete reversal in the relative position of a given CRAC occurs, that is, from low success group to high success group, then an explanation is clearly in order. The CRAC

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


Figure 2. Grouping of CRACs According to Relative Success, Based on Korean Task Ratings, Affect Index Scores, and Ratings of Judges

numbered 56 is a case in point. This council was clearly atypical of the councils studied in this research. Number 56 is made up of representatives of a myon in the I Corps area north of Uijongbu and representatives of a missile battery several miles distant. On a day-to-day basis, these two groups have little contact. Since the myon has no facilities for entertaining soldiers, it is not frequented by the troops. In fact, most troops in the myon area are ROKA soldiers. At the CRAC meetings the topics discussed were usually assistance requests from the Koreans—yet at the time of the interview, CRAC had not met for a period of three months. During the interview with the American cochairman, he said that he saw no functional relationship between the battery and the myon since they were geographically distant from one another and saw little of one another, although there may have been a reason for the CRAC's makeup at some time in the past. The apparent reason for the discrepant position of this CRAC in the groupings on different criteria is that the CRAC was inactive and, therefore, accomplished little. On the other hand, there was limited contact and relatively little opportunity for conflict. Thus, the affect could easily have been positive.

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Although CRAC number 54 occupies a position in the high success group on task rating, it is in the middle success group on affect index. A further word is in order about this council because of its unique nature. This CRAC had not been attended by Americans for three months at the time of the interviews, yet it received a high rating. The CRAC was achieving at a level satisfactory to the Korean members, even without the participation of the American contingent. The possible reasons for American nonparticipation will be explored later in this report.

ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES

As was outlined in the previous chapter, various attitudinal aspects of the relationships between American and Korean members and the relationship of the members to the councils were analyzed. Since the regulation states that the approach by the American members toward the situation is critical, the findings about their attitudes will be considered first.

1. Attitudes of the Americans

A critical aspect of the dealings of Americans on the councils may be their attitude about their assignment to Korea, for in many ways the assignment to Korea may be considered to have negative aspects. For instance, since the assignment usually involves a 13-month separation from one's family, one may find it difficult to adjust to living in a vastly different culture, and the like. Offsetting these negative aspects are the excitement of an overseas tour, the chance to see the Orient, and the like. To be sure, there are positive and negative aspects to any assignment, but the relative salience of the negative aspects may be much higher.

Six semantic differential-like items were used in calculating this attitude score. The basic consideration in the items addressed the worth of the assignment. The score an individual received was the sum of scores on the six items minus six to give a range of 0 to 36.

There was a tendency for the respondents in the middle success group to score highest on this attitude area. In table 3, for high, middle, and low success CRACs, based on affect index scores, the average attitude scores in this area were 22.7, 31.5, and 19.1 respectively. When CRACs were grouped according to task rating, the respective average scores were 21.5, 24.9, and 21.0. This attitude area apparently was not directly related to the relative success of CRAC. One interpretation is that this attitude is rather generalized, while CRAC is a specific area of concern.

TABLE 3
SUCCESS OF CRAC AND ATTITUDES OF AMERICANS
TOWARD THEIR TOUR OF DUTY*

Groups	Affect Index	Task Rating	Overall Mean
High Success	22.7	21.5	22.1
Middle Success	31.5	24.9	28.2
Low Success	19.1	21.0	20.1
Overall Mean	24.4	22.5	23.5

* The higher the score, the more favorable the attitude.

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A curvilinear relationship between attitude toward the tour of duty and success of CRAC has several possible sources. It may be that negative feelings toward the tour manifest themselves in negative feelings toward the military aspects of the tour, with a resultant increased effort to make the tour as worthwhile as possible by working on the civic action aspects. On the other hand, negative attitudes may manifest themselves in the disregarding of all the aspects of the tour. Thus, a negative attitude could lead to either a high or a low success level in the officer's application to CRAC. When the attitude toward the tour is favorable, presumably the officer is committed to all the aspects of the tour, resulting in less than maximal results. Commitment in one area may necessitate a relaxation, even if temporary, in another.

No comparisons were possible about an individual's attitude toward CRAC. Virtually everyone involved with CRAC, whether American or Korean, expressed positive attitudes toward the program as a forum for furthering mutual understanding and friendship, as well as a problem-solving mechanism. Thus no difference should be found across different groupings. Consequently, this analysis was bypassed.

The American attitudes toward Koreans was addressed in two ways. First, responses to 22 items with values from 1 to 7 for each response were summed and 22 subtracted from this total; the scores were then divided by 2 for coding purposes. Twenty-two or about one-third of the Americans interviewed had scores that tended to reflect unfavorable attitudes toward Koreans in general. Using item analysis, three items were selected for a refined version of the attitude score: greed versus generosity, insincerity versus sincerity, and dishonesty versus honesty. Summing the responses to these three items, scores with a theoretical range of 3 to 21 were obtained. The actual range of these scores was 3 to 19. The scores from this index also correlated significantly ($r = .70$, $p < .01$) with the scores obtained from the entire index of 22 items.

Second, using only the three-item scale, the following results were obtained in comparing general attitudes toward Koreans to success of the CRAC. For the affect index, there was a slight linear trend for success to increase as attitudes toward Koreans became more favorable. For the task rating index, the trend was curvilinear so that middle level success groups had the lowest scores on the attitude measure. These results are summarized in table 4.

TABLE 4

SUCCESS OF CRAC AND ATTITUDES OF AMERICANS TOWARD KOREANS*

Groups	Affect Index	Task Rating	Overall Mean
High Success	15.2	14.2	14.7
Middle Success	13.6	12.1	12.9
Low Success	12.5	13.4	13.0
Overall Mean	13.8	13.2	13.6

* The higher the score, the more favorable the attitude.

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Presumably, Americans' involvement with the CRAC program modifies their attitudes toward Koreans. Whether or not this change generalizes to the whole Korean population is a question that is not within the scope of this study. However, if the attitudes toward Koreans on the CRAC are different from those toward Koreans in general, the resulting relationship to success of the CRAC may also be different.

Scores for attitudes toward the Korean CRAC members were calculated by summing the responses to 14 items, each dealing specifically with Koreans on the CRAC, and subtracting 14 from the total. Possible range of scores was from 0 to 84; a score of 42 would have been construed as a "neutral" score, since it would be the average of an equal number of equally positive and negative responses. For example, 7 very positive and 7 very negative responses would total 56, less 14, for a score of 42. Also, 14 "neutral" responses would total $14 \times 4 = 56$, less 14, and would yield a score of 42. The actual range of scores observed was 31 to 79, with the median at 58. Only 8 cases fell in the range of 31 to 42.

When distributed across CRAC success scores based on affect index, the mean scores for high, middle, and low success CRACs were respectively, 59.5, 72.3, and 49.2, as shown in table 5. Distributed by CRAC success scores based on task ratings, the mean scores were all approximately equal: 54.5, 54.9, and 54.6 respectively.

TABLE 5

ATTITUDES OF AMERICANS ON CRAC TOWARD THE KOREANS ON CRAC*

Groups	Affect Index	Task Rating	Overall Mean
High Success	59.5	54.5	57.0
Middle Success	72.3	54.9	63.2
Low Success	49.2	54.6	52.1
Overall Mean	60.3	54.4	57.4


* The higher the score, the more favorable the attitude.

2. Korean Perceptions of Americans

Although the attitudes of Koreans are used as a dependent variable, certain aspects of their perceptions may operate as independent variables in the CRAC model. This factor was suggested in the discussion of the Americans' attitudes toward Korean CRAC members. It is possible that certain actions are perceived by the Koreans as entirely opposite to what may have been the Americans' intentions.

Using the affect index as a basis for grouping on success, the Koreans in the high success group tended to perceive relations between Americans and Koreans in the area as harmonious, with 72.2 percent of this group saying that the American troops liked Koreans. Most or 55 percent of low success groups also expressed this opinion. When asked whether Koreans in the area liked Americans, the response pattern was somewhat different, with 64 percent of the high success group replying affirmatively, as opposed to only 45 percent of the low success group. However, both these distributions, which are shown in figures 3 and 4, were not significant.

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* Due to rounding errors, all percentages do not total 100.

Figure 3. Do Americans in the Area Like Koreans?
Korean Respondents Grouped by Success on the Affect Index




Figure 4. Do Koreans in the Area Like Americans?
Korean Respondents Grouped by Success on the Affect Index

Based on the task rating, 74 percent of the Koreans in the high success group reported that Americans were liked by the local people, whereas 45 percent of the Korean response in the corresponding low success group indicated that Americans were liked. Moreover, 79 percent of the Koreans in the high success group said that American soldiers in the area liked Koreans, while 55 percent of the Koreans in the low success group reported that the local people were tolerated by Americans rather than liked. These distributions, statistically significant beyond the .01 level, are shown in figures 5 and 6.

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


Figure 5. Do Americans in the Area Like Koreans?
Korean Respondents Grouped by Success on the Task Rating Index




Figure 6. Do Koreans in the Area Like Americans?
Korean Respondents Grouped by Success on the Task Rating Index

Turning now to the relationships between the American and Korean members of the CRACs, figures 7 and 8 show that, based on the affect index, all Koreans in the high success group reported that Americans on CRAC genuinely liked the Koreans on CRAC. Only 45 percent of the Koreans in the low success group gave this response; this difference is statistically significant beyond the .001 level. In fact, 29 percent of the low success group and 5 percent of the medium success group voiced the opinion that the American CRAC members attended the meetings only because they had been ordered to by higher headquarters. When asked whether the Koreans on CRAC genuinely liked the Americans on CRAC, 97 percent of the high success

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group responded that they did; only 52 percent of the Koreans in the low success group gave this response. Again, the difference is statistically significant beyond the .001 level. Eight of the respondents, five of whom were in the low success group, said, "We are obligated to like them if we want assistance."




Figure 7. Do Americans on CRAC Like Koreans on CRAC?
Korean Respondents Grouped by Success on the Affect Index




Figure 8. Do Koreans on CRAC Like Americans on CRAC?
Korean Respondents Grouped by Success on the Affect Index

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Parallel analyses for the task rating index yielded essentially similar results. The relationship between Americans and Koreans on their CRAC was described as most cordial by Koreans in the high success group—all Korean respondents in that group voiced the opinion that the Americans on CRAC liked Koreans on CRAC, while only 61 percent of those in the low success group reported the same opinion. Similarly, 98 percent of the Koreans in the high success group said that Americans on CRAC were genuinely liked by Koreans on CRAC, in contrast to 63 percent of the Koreans in the low success group who said this. These distributions, statistically significant beyond the .001 level, are shown in figures 9 and 10.




Figure 9. Do Americans on CRAC Like Koreans on CRAC?
Korean Respondents Grouped by Success on the Task Rating Index




Figure 10. Do Koreans on CRAC Like Americans on CRAC?
Korean Respondents Grouped by Success on the Task Rating Index

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Most people agree that good press reports do a great deal to enhance an individual's or a group's image. Since the Koreans may be guided, at least initially by their expectations, and since these expectations and initial actions may have some bearing on the success of the CFACs, it was decided to ask the Koreans what kinds of impressions they gained through the news of the American soldiers.

For the groupings based on the affect index the following results were obtained. When asked about the impressions of Americans (soldiers) they obtained through the news, 25 percent of the Koreans in the high success group said that these impressions were good and 10 percent of those in the low success group gave the same response. Of the Koreans in the high success group, 36 percent actually reported that the Americans' image in the news was bad, while 45 percent of those in the corresponding low success group gave this response. The remainder of the responses were essentially neutral or mixed. This distribution, although statistically not significant, is shown in figure 11.





Figure 11. What Kind of Impression of Americans Do You Get from the News? Korean Respondents Grouped by Success on the Affect Index

Figure 12 for the same question, indicated that 31 percent of the Koreans in the high success group based on the task rating index reported favorable impressions while 13 percent of those in the low success group gave this report. This distribution is statistically not significant at the .05 level.

3. Summary

Thus, one may feel reasonably comfortable in asserting that it is not so much the attitudes that the Americans hold, as it is the perceptions that the Koreans have of Americans and of their relationships with Koreans that are associated with the success of CRACs. Much of the data on the American attitudes indicated that the extremes tend not to be associated with success or failure directly.

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* Due to rounding errors, all percentages do not total 100.

Figure 12. What Kind of Impression of Americans Do You Get from the News?
Korean Respondents Grouped by Success on the Task Rating Index

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The following sections present the results of the analyses for the independent variables. The discussion follows the same sequence of these variables as appeared in chapter 3.

1. Use of Interpreters

The U. S. Forces, Korea, Policy Directive 5-3, states, "The conduct of council meetings and affairs requires the services of proficient Korean interpreters who are acceptable to both the U. S. and Korean components."⁴ No attempt was made in this research to conduct an in-depth study of interpreter problems, but several relevant questions were included in the interviews. Only seventeen of the CRACs studied or 55 percent had an interpreter who was employed either specifically as such or as a civil affairs specialist. Nine CRACs or 29 percent relied on some other employee of the U. S. Army, including a kitchen employee, a houseboy, a motor pool parts clerk, and a Repairs and Upkeep (R&U) supervisor. Two CRACs used ROKA personnel, two used local Koreans not employed by the United States, and the remaining CRAC had no regular interpreter. Grouping the CRACs by affect index, it was observed that 70 percent of the CRACs in the high success group had interpreters who were either employed as interpreters or civil affairs specialists, as compared with 33 percent of those in the low success group. Grouping CRACs by task rating, 63 percent of the high success CRACs had interpreters with these qualifications as compared with 42 percent of the low success CRACs.

A substantial number of the Americans, that is 36 percent, said that the language difference was frequently a source of communication problems in CRAC meetings; only 3 percent said that language was never a problem in meetings. Of the Koreans, 35 percent identified language as a frequent source of communications problems and 27 percent identified language as an occasional source of problems, while 38 percent said that it was not a source of problems for them. Respondents of both nationalities were asked to evaluate further the language skill

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of the interpreter in their CRACs. Grouping CRACs by affect index (see figure 13), it was observed that 94 percent of the Americans and 78 percent of the Koreans in the high success group rated the interpreter as good to excellent. In the low success group only 48 percent of the Americans and 40 percent of the Koreans gave the interpreter ratings of good to excellent. Grouping by task ratings showed that 96 percent of the Americans and 79 percent of the Koreans in the high success group rated the interpreter's language skill as good to excellent, as compared with 57 percent of the Americans and 32 percent of the Koreans in the low success group rating him as good to excellent (see figure 14).

Another question raised by various personnel in the civil affairs field was the extent to which an indigenous interpreter's sympathies are with his employer and the extent to which they are with his nationality group. This may influence the degree to which he can render faithful translations where conflicting interests are concerned. Both American and Korean respondents were asked whether they thought the interpreter on their CRAC was fair and whether he tended to favor a particular group in his translations. The majority response from the Americans and Koreans was that the interpreter was fair. However, the Koreans tended to be somewhat more trusting of the interpreters, with 77 percent of the Koreans and with 59 percent of the Americans voicing this opinion. Figure 15 shows the results of the analysis of the interpreter's fairness by the CRAC's rating on the affect index. Seventy-one percent of the Americans and 86 percent of the Koreans in the high success group said that their interpreter was fair, as compared with 71 percent of the Americans and 75 percent of the Koreans voicing this opinion in the low success group. In the grouping by task rating, the pattern was essentially the same: 74 percent of the Americans and 83 percent of the Koreans in the high success group said that the interpreter was fair, as compared with 86 percent of the Americans and 71 percent of the Koreans in the low success group. The only remarkable feature of the distributions was that 21 percent of the Koreans in the low success group, based on task rating, said that the interpreter tended to favor the Americans, as compared with 5 percent in the corresponding high success group. Data for this item are presented in figure 16.

It may be said from the foregoing that the regulation is correct in asserting the importance of the interpreter.⁵ Although the presence of an excellently rated interpreter does not appear to assure success, the presence of a poor interpreter seems to assure the lack of success. With respect to fairness, however, there seems little difference across the success ratings of the CRACs. This is not totally unexpected. It cannot be said that the fact that an individual is an untrained interpreter makes him unfair.



2. Use of Assistance

Several aspects of material or equipment assistance may be important to the success of a CRAC. A primary factor must be the ability of the local commander (presumably the CRAC cochairman) to communicate the limitations to the assistance he can provide. The reasons for the limitation were discussed above and will not be repeated here.

Figure 17 shows that although 62 percent of the Americans indicated that Koreans on CRAC were aware of the limitations on commanders regarding their assistance capability, some interesting trends appear, especially for the grouping using the affect index. Clearly, a lack of understanding by the Koreans is associated with a lack of success.

At the same time, a good understanding of these limitations does not appear to assure the highest level of success; knowledge of the limitations was greatest among members of the

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


* Due to rounding errors, all percentages do not total 100.

Figure 13. Ratings of Interpreter's Skill by American and Korean Respondents, Grouped by Success on the Affect Index

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Americans




$X^2 = 12.29$

df = 2

$p < .02$

Koreans



$X^2 = 26.55$

df = 2

$p < .001$

* Due to rounding errors, all percentages do not total 100.

Figure 14. Ratings of Interpreter's Skill by American and Korean Respondents, Grouped by Success on the Task Rating Index

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




Figure 15. Ratings of Interpreter's Fairness by American and Korean Respondents, Grouped by Success on the Affect Index


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$X^2 = .21$

df = 2

p = ns




$X^2 = 2.98$

df = 2

p = ns

Figure 16. Ratings of Interpreter's Fairness by American and Korean Respondents, Grouped by Success on the Task Rating Index


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$X^2 = 8.25$

df = 2

p < .025



$X^2 = .48$

df = 2

p = ns

Figure 17. American Assessment of Koreans' Understanding of Limitations of Sponsoring Unit's Assistance Capabilities

middle level success group, with 79 percent indicating awareness. This does not seem totally unreasonable. If the commander has nothing or is explicit in stating his limitations of assistance capability, his functioning within the CRAC may be somewhat hampered. On the other hand, if he can make the Koreans feel a little uncertain about his limitations, they may work harder with him.

Figure 17 also shows the result when the CRACs are grouped according to the task rating index. Clearly, across success groupings there is little difference in the Americans'

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perception of the Koreans' understanding of the local commanders' limitations. However, it must be noted in passing, that only the low success group shows a smaller percentage of Koreans' understanding of the limitations.

As important as the Korean's knowledge of the limitations placed on the commander is the degree to which the Americans follow through on promises of assistance. If, for instance, promises are not kept time after time, the Koreans will soon learn not to trust the Americans on CRAC. Indeed, this may well generalize to a distrust of Americans in general. Thus, the Koreans were asked if the local American commander was usually sincere and reasonable in meeting assistance requests. The majority of Korean respondents replied that he was or that he at least did the best he could under the circumstances. Grouping CRACs by affect index, figure 18 shows that 93 percent of the respondents in the high success CRACs rated the commander as sincere and reasonable, while 58 percent in the middle success group and 24 percent in the low success group also gave this response. Seven percent of the Koreans in the high success group, 42 percent in the middle success group, and 76 percent in the low success group rated him less than sincere. This trend was essentially replicated when CRACs were grouped according to the task rating index. Eighty-one percent of the Koreans in the high success group rated the commander as sincere, while 76 percent and 13 percent of the middle success and low success groups, respectively, gave the same response. Nineteen percent in the high success group, 24 percent in the middle success group, and 87 percent in the low success group rated the commander as less than sincere. These data are shown in figure 18. Because of the many alternatives presented for this item and the relatively small number of correspondents, the original distribution was not amenable to chi-square analysis. Therefore, the response categories were collapsed into the two alternatives shown in figure 18. The fact that a respondent was placed in the "No, other," category does not necessarily indicate that he felt that the commander was insincere, it simply reflected some level of doubt.

Additional analyses were made of further data relating to the assistance. One set of these data deals with the nature of the assistance typically provided. Most assistance provided by American units to Korean communities through CRAC was in the form of providing vehicles or construction equipment for local projects. Table 6 shows that of the Korean respondents, 65 percent said that this was the most frequent form of assistance. Materials such as cement, lumber, and sandbags were reported by 15 percent of the Koreans as the most frequent form of assistance, 11 percent reported that medical assistance was the major assistance effort, 3 percent identified AFAK (Armed Forces Assistance, Korea) as the principal source of assistance, and 6 percent said that there had been no assistance. There was one "didn't know" response. No statistically significant trends were noted in these data as far as CRAC success was concerned.


TABLE 6

MOST FREQUENT FORM OF ASSISTANCE INDICATED BY KOREAN RESPONDENTS

Form	Percentage
1. Providing vehicles and construction materials	65
2. Cement, lumber, and sandbags	15
3. Medical assistance	11
4. AFAK	3
5. No assistance	6

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Criteria: Affect Index



Criteria: Task Ratings by Koreans




Figure 18. Is the American Commander Usually Sincere and Reasonable in Meeting Assistance Requests?
Korean Respondents Grouped by Success on the Affect and Task Rating Indices

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Another important aspect of the assistance program was the relative emphasis ascribed to it by both the Americans and the Koreans. Twenty-nine percent of the Americans responded that the Koreans frequently placed too much emphasis on assistance, while 16 percent said that the Koreans occasionally placed too much emphasis on assistance. As figure 19 shows, when CRACs are grouped by affect index, 39 percent of Americans in the high success group said that Koreans placed too much emphasis on assistance, while 37 percent in the middle success group and 62 percent in the low success group gave this response. Grouping CRACs by task rating, 30 percent of Americans in the high success CRACs said that Koreans at least occasionally placed too much emphasis on assistance, as compared with 55 percent in the middle success group and 52 percent in the low success group. It should be noted that these findings are not unequivocal. Grouping by the affect index yields results that are only marginally significant ($p < .10$); grouping by task rating index yields results that are not significant at the .20 level (see figure 19).



Another aspect of assistance remains to be discussed. Until the material lot of the Korean people improves substantially, assistance by the U. S. military to the community will continue to be a frequent topic at CRAC meetings. Apparently, across the various success groupings there were few differences between the frequency with which assistance was discussed in CRAC. The Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) program has made relatively large assistance projects available to communities through sponsorship by U. S. Army units. In practice the program is centralized at G5 in I Corps, the two U. S. infantry divisions (2nd and 7th), and at the 8th Field Army Support Command. It operates at the unit-village level only in the CRACs studied in the 38th Artillery Brigade. Therefore, it is not surprising that fewer than half the American respondents (44 percent) reported that AFAK was discussed in their CRAC or that projects were developed at that level. A few or about 8 percent knew nothing at all about the AFAK program.

When CRACs were grouped according to affect index scores, 76 percent of the American respondents in the high success group, as contrasted with only 37 percent of those in the low success group, reported that AFAK was implemented through their CRACs. This finding was significant at the .05 level. Grouping CRACs by task rating showed that 68 percent of the Americans in the high success CRACs and 45 percent in the low success CRACs reported the use of AFAK in their CRAC. Data for these distributions are shown in figure 20.

Fourteen CRACs had submitted applications for AFAK projects. Twelve of the 14 units with applications pending were units of the 38th Artillery Brigade. Nine of the 14 units were in the high success group on at least one of the two criteria of success used in this study and no lower than in the middle success group on the other. Based on affect index scores, 7 of these 9 units were in the high success group; based on task rating, 8 were in the high success group.

In summary, it appeared that assistance is an important factor in the CRAC program. However, it also appeared that assistance per se was not the critical aspect. Most critical was how the problem of assistance was handled by both the Koreans and the Americans. It seems that each side must understand the other more clearly in terms of its feelings about assistance. The Americans must learn how to state their position in terms of the limitations imposed on them, and they must follow through on the assistance promises they make. At the same time, the Koreans must learn that the U. S. field commander has neither unlimited resources nor unlimited power to grant assistance projects.

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* Due to rounding errors, all percentages do not total 100.

Figure 19. American Assessment of Korean Overemphasis on Assistance

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



Figure 20. American Assessment of Use of AFAK in CRAC

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3. Social-Emotional Rewards

A primary factor that is essential in determining the success of a CRAC is the social-emotional reward obtained by the members. This factor should not be limited to only one group, because it is important to both the American and Korean members. In addition, it must be realized that the actual rewards are not the consideration in this study, but the effects of these rewards as they determine an individual's commitment to making the CRAC function well.

A social-emotional reward that might enhance the desire of Koreans to contribute to the activities of CRAC is the feeling that their participation in CRAC is a rewarding and meaningful experience. When asked if their feelings about CRAC had changed since they first became members, 18 percent of the Koreans replied that their feelings about CRAC had changed for the worse. Although the explanations given for this change varied, they seemed to focus on either indifferent or condescending attitudes of the Americans on CRAC or disappointment with the small amount of assistance from the Americans. As figure 21 shows, when CRACs are grouped by affect index scores, 92 percent of the Koreans in the high success CRACs still had positive feelings about CRAC, as compared with 81 percent in the middle success group and 55 percent of those in the low success group. Grouping CRACs by task rating, 93 percent of Korean respondents in the high success group reported positive feelings about CRAC, as compared with 79 percent in the middle success group and 58 percent in the low success group.

Americans are warned against trying to deal with problems discussed in CRAC in the brisk, "efficient" manner characteristic of American culture.⁶ The intent of the regulation recognizes the value of patience and taking time to try to deal effectively with foreign cultures, especially Oriental cultures. Ninety-five percent of the American respondents stated that they thought the amount of discussion at CRAC meetings was satisfactory to the Korean members; only 78 percent of the Korean respondents agreed. When CRACs were grouped by affect index, all the Americans in the high success group, 95 percent in the middle success group, and 90 percent in the low success group felt that the Koreans were satisfied with the amount of discussion. When CRACs were grouped by task rating, the results were essentially replicated (see figure 22).

Apparently the Koreans are somewhat less satisfied with the amount of discussion given to the problems than the American assessment indicated. This points directly at a possible source of difficulty within the CRAC program: the American members have a different frame of reference from that of the Koreans and apparently judge Korean satisfaction according to their own frame of reference.⁷

In addition, the Koreans themselves expressed a much stronger feeling of dissatisfaction in the lower success councils. This result extended across both criteria of success. Clearly then, this topic is one that deserves careful consideration by the Americans, if they wish to improve the chances of success in the CRAC program.

Another question in the realm of social-emotional rewards, previously raised by Kennedy and Pasternak⁸ is: How are decisions made in CRAC? Do they result from discussion and consensus or from pressure on the part of Americans? This latter question was also asked in the present study. Only three Koreans indicated that Americans frequently or occasionally forced decisions against the will of Koreans, whereas fifteen or 24 percent of the Americans agreed. The remainder of both Koreans and Americans said that this happened either seldom or never. Grouping the CRACs by the affect index (see figure 23), 6 percent of the Americans in the high success group reported a tendency to impose decisions, at least occasionally;

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



Figure 21. Korean Assessment of Their Own Satisfaction with the Amount of Discussion in CRAC

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



Figure 22. American Assessment of Korean Satisfaction with the Amount of Discussion in CRAC

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



Figure 23. American Assessment of Use of Coercion in Decisionmaking in CRAC

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36 percent in the middle success group and 29 percent in the low success group also gave this response. The Korean scores were not used in this more detailed analysis because of their almost uniform denial of a tendency in the Americans to impose decisions. Grouping by task rating, 15 percent of the Americans in the high success group said that Americans frequently or occasionally imposed decisions, while 39 percent in the middle success group and 22 percent in the low success group also reported this.

Note that the distribution on the affect index and on the task rating index is significantly different from chance at less than .10 and .001 levels respectively. However, relationship between CRAC success and American pressure to make decisions is not monotonic. Substantially fewer Americans report coercion in the low success groups than in the middle level success groups. This result is somewhat difficult to explain. It appears that simply keeping coercion to a minimum does not insure success for a CRAC. At the same time, the presence of coercion does not insure failure, but does seem to limit the level of success attainable. Clearly, this must be a situational factor.

A final aspect of the social-emotional reward system of the CRAC, addressed in this study, is the socializing that may be present. For the purposes of this study, this factor is called the sociability aspect. Kennedy and Pasternak observed that both Koreans and Americans said CRAC could be more effective if the Korean and American members on the councils spent more time together in friendly association.⁹ Fifty-six percent of the Koreans indicated that friendship relations occurred in the form of conversation and refreshments before or after meetings. Forty-three percent of the Koreans stated that American CRAC members actually had friendly relationships with Korean CRAC members outside CRAC. When CRACs were grouped by affect index, an association between the sociability of American CRAC members and success of their CRAC appeared (see figure 24). Fifty-three percent of the Koreans in the high success group, 51 percent in the middle success group, and 23 percent in the low success group said that American CRAC members spend time in friendship with Korean CRAC members other than at actual meetings. When CRACs were grouped according to task rating, 69 percent of the Koreans in the high success group, 29 percent in the middle success group, and 24 percent in the low success group stated that American CRAC members associated with Korean CRAC members in friendships outside of CRAC. This latter finding was significant beyond the .001 level.

The distributions by success grouping are interesting. Apparently friendly relationships do not guarantee success placement higher than the middle level according to the affect index. On the other hand, they do appear to insure high success rating on the task rating index. It seemed that friendly relationships did not guarantee that the Koreans would like the Americans, but these did seem to guarantee that the Koreans would be willing to work with the Americans to solve problems. This apparent lack of relationship between liking and friendliness should not be too difficult to understand. Individuals are often forced into friendly relations with no apparent consequence on their liking each other.

Therefore, it is reasonably safe to claim that the social-emotional reward system set up by the CRAC largely determines the success achieved. When the Koreans obtained their rewards, they tended to say that the CRAC was successful. However, one caution is in order here: these findings cannot be used to imply causal relationships. Nevertheless, certain social-emotional rewards are factors in the Koreans' perceptions of the success of the CRAC in which they serve.

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



Figure 24. Korean Assessment of Friendly Relations in CRAC

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4. Bargaining

Behavior toward Koreans in and out of meetings may have an important bearing on the attitudes of the Koreans toward the American CRAC members, on their view of CRAC as a worthwhile endeavor, and on their tendency to feel satisfied (and, hopefully, further motivated) or dissatisfied with their participation in CRAC. This behavior on the part of Americans may be based on any number of attitudes relevant to CRAC operation. For example, Kennedy and Pasternak said that the art of diplomatic bargaining may provide a tool for eliciting cooperation from Koreans in CRAC.¹⁰ Eighty-one percent of the Americans and 94 percent of the Koreans reported that this technique was not used in CRAC meetings. However, bargaining was apparently utilized by some members outside of CRAC. Most of those who reported that bargaining was being used in CRAC meetings said it occurred very seldom. It is interesting, though, that on the basis of the affect index, those who expressed the greatest reluctance to bargain with their counterparts were in the high success group. Of the Americans in the high success CRACs, only 22 percent said that they thought it appropriate to bargain with their counterparts in trying to resolve problems, while 52 percent of the Americans in the low success CRACs agreed with this judgment. Grouping the CRACs on the basis of task rating, this relationship shifted in the opposite direction, with 45 percent of the Americans in the high success CRACs saying that bargaining was appropriate and 39 percent of the Americans in the low success CRACs agreeing. Figure 25 shows the distribution for this item. It must be noted that the findings for both the task rating and the affect index are not significant and should only be interpreted as mild trends.

5. Continuity

Since CRAC is an ongoing program, with a fairly high turnover in its American composition, continuity should be an important factor for the success of a CRAC. Of the several aspects to continuity, one is the degree of continuity in the content of meetings and another is the degree of continuity in commander (American cochairman) and the recorder who is responsible for preparing and keeping minutes of meetings and related materials. This latter aspect of continuity is especially difficult in view of the thirteen-month tour, which is the normal duration of an assignment to Korea, as well as the frequent transfers within Korea.

Both Korean and American CRAC members were asked, "Do you think there is a great deal of continuity in your CRAC program, or is it just a matter of taking things up as they occur?" Of the Americans, 76 percent said that there was a great deal of continuity, as did 62 percent of the Koreans. Grouping the CRACs by affect index (see figure 26), it was found that 88 percent of the Americans and 86 percent of the Koreans in the high success group said that there was a great deal of continuity. Seventy-two percent of the Americans and 45 percent of the Koreans in the low success group also gave this response. When CRACs were grouped by task ratings (see figure 27), 84 percent of the Americans and 73 percent of the Koreans in the high success group said that there was a great deal of continuity, as did 68 percent of the Americans and 42 percent of the Koreans in the low success group.

Once again, the differing perceptions of the Americans and the Koreans appear in these analyses. Note that the rating of continuity maintains a fairly high level across all success levels on both criteria among the American respondents. On the other hand, the Korean indication of continuity drops off substantially in the lower success levels. The instrument is not sensitive enough to pick up the variations in the Americans' perceptions. A "ceiling effect"¹¹ may well have been established, concealing subtle variations. Evidence for this reasoning is derived from the statistically significant relationship between success and

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



Figure 25. American Assessment of Appropriateness of Bargaining in CRAC

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



Figure 26. Ratings of Continuity by American and Korean Respondents, Grouped by Success on the Affect Index

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



Figure 27. Ratings of Continuity by American and Korean Respondents, Grouped by Success on the Task Rating Index

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continuity when the assessments of the Koreans were considered. Here, the ratings were not nearly so high, allowing deviations both toward a higher percentage and toward a lower percentage. In any case, since the perceptions and feelings of the Koreans are the focal points of the CRAC program, the significance of the relationship between continuity and success for the Koreans establishes the importance of trying to maintain continuity within a CRAC.

6. Characteristics of the Sponsoring Unit

One might well ask what types of sponsoring units have more successful CRACs. Indeed, it appears that air defense artillery (ADA) batteries fared slightly better in the Koreans' ratings of the CRACs and their American members than did other types of units. Based on the affect index, 8 of the 10 units in the high success group were ADA, as were 5 of the 9 units in the corresponding low success group. When groupings were based on task ratings, 8 of 11 of the units in the high success group and 6 of the 12 units in the low success group were ADA. Although statistically not significant, this finding is worth mentioning. The type of unit should be explicitly included in further studies of the CRAC program. The two sponsoring units larger than battalion size (both of which had the executive officer as cochairman) were in the low success group on both criteria. Other than that, the size of the unit did not appear to be a significant factor. The age of the cochairman was also not significant to the relative success of CRACs. Location of the units seemed to have some bearing on the ratings, but these data presented a trend that was not statistically significant. Using the affect index for grouping CRACs, only 20 percent of the sponsoring units in the high success group and 44 percent of the low success CRACs are located north of the I Corps rear boundary where troop density is relatively high. The remainder are located either south or east of this area, most of them in isolated locations with low troop density. Using task ratings as the criterion for grouping, 18 percent of the high success CRACs and 50 percent of the low success CRACs are north of the I Corps rear boundary. These characteristics of the unit sponsoring the CRAC were not statistically related to success. However, the present study was not set up to consider this specific point, and the trends found should be explored further in future evaluations of the CRAC program.

Civil affairs personnel have repeatedly claimed that a favorable attitude toward CRAC on the part of the commander is critical to the successful operation of the CRAC. If the commander does not view CRAC as worthwhile or important, it is reasonable to expect that he will neglect it or delegate the chairmanship to a subordinate. Moreover, he may voice positive sentiments about CRAC, but Koreans may perceive this as superficial and insincere, if his behavior does not also reflect a positive attitude toward CRAC. The commander's attitudes toward CRAC, toward Koreans, and toward numerous other aspects of his unit's situation in the community are likely to be communicated through his subordinates. If he delegates the chairmanship, the Koreans may assume that he does not consider it important enough for his personal attention. Three CRACs in the low success groups on both affect and task ratings indices and one CRAC in the high success group were councils in which the chairmanship had been delegated to a subordinate officer. Once again, this is statistically not significant, nor was this a central theme in the present study. However, the low frequency of CRACs with a subordinate as chairman may have concealed the significance of this factor.

Another area of concern was the members' expectations of the outcomes from their participation on a CRAC. Table 7 shows the categories of the Americans' expectations.

Although the distribution of the American responses to this question showed no clear trends across success grouping, it should be noted that the vague result of better relations was far and away the response most frequently made.

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TABLE 7

AMERICANS' EXPECTATIONS FROM PARTICIPATION IN CRAC

	Percentage
1. Better relations	33
2. Resolve problems or prevent incidents	19
3. Mutual support	14
4. Nothing	12
5. To give assistance and listen to requests	6
6. Miscellaneous	26

When Americans were asked what they thought Koreans expected from CRAC, 62 percent replied, "Assistance;" 22 percent said, "Better relations;" and 12 percent said, "Resolving problems or prevention of incidents." Miscellaneous responses accounted for the remainder (see table 8). Comparisons across success groups by affect index revealed no appreciable trends. Grouping CRACs by task ratings revealed no differences that could be regarded as statistically significant.

TABLE 8

AMERICANS' PERCEPTIONS OF KOREANS' EXPECTATIONS FROM CRAC

	Percentage
1. Assistance	62
2. Better relations	22
3. Resolving problems and preventing incidents	12
4. Miscellaneous	4

The dominant Korean expectations from CRAC participation are shown in table 9. The distribution of responses was similar to that of the American perceptions.

TABLE 9

KOREANS' EXPECTATIONS FROM PARTICIPATION IN CRAC

	Percentage
1. Assistance	61
2. Friendly relations	15
3. Mutual cooperation and understanding	10
4. Miscellaneous	14

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Using the affect index for grouping, 53 percent of the Koreans in the high success group and 74 percent in the low success group said, "Assistance," while 36 percent of same high success group responded with "Mutual cooperation and understanding" or "Better relations," and 19 percent of the low success group gave either of these responses. Using task ratings as a basis for grouping, 52 percent of the Koreans in the high success group said assistance was their expectation, while 71 percent of the members in the low success group gave this response.

When the Koreans were asked what the Americans expected from CRAC, 47 percent responded, "Mutual cooperation and understanding" or "Better relations." Twelve percent said that the Americans were holding CRAC meetings only because they were ordered to by headquarters. The results of the analysis of the Koreans' perceptions of American expectations in the area of cooperation and relations were interesting. Fifty-seven percent of the Koreans in the high success group and only 32 percent in the low success group gave either "Mutual cooperation and understanding" or "Better relations" as the Americans' objective. Although these data were statistically not significant, the clear trend shown indicates that this topic should be considered in future research and evaluation of the CRAC program.

7. Handling of Sensitive Topics

Every matter brought before CRAC has a potential sensitivity; vice-related matters may be especially sensitive because they involve differing viewpoints about morality. When theft is mentioned, there is a potential implication that one side is collectively victimized, while the other side is not concerned enough about it. When prostitution is discussed, each side can blame the other for the presence of prostitution; the implication may somehow be present that the Americans can be blamed for supporting it financially or the Koreans can be blamed for permitting it to occur. The same holds true for narcotics traffic; one side may blame the other for permitting the sale of narcotics, while the other side may blame their counterparts for not preventing the purchase of narcotics. As an indicator of how such topics are handled in the CRACs, two questions were asked of the American respondents:

1. How are "business girls" (prostitutes) in the area dealt with by the command?
(That is, how are problems concerning them addressed?)
2. Would you bring a theft problem (involving Koreans) before CRAC for help?

The responses to the handling of the "business girls" were: (1) directly, that is, not involving CRAC or Korean officials, but rather a consultation between a representative of the unit and a representative of the business girls or the individuals concerned; (2) through CRAC; (3) through some local official such as the police chief; and (4) combinations of modes. Forty-two percent of the Americans reported that problems related to prostitutes were resolved through CRAC meetings, 16 percent reported that the problems were dealt with on a direct basis without involving the officials or CRAC members, and other kinds of responses accounted for the remainder. Grouping CRACs by affect index, figure 28 shows that 17 percent of Americans in the high success group, 42 percent in the middle success group, and 65 percent in the low success group reported that the problems concerning prostitution were handled through the CRAC. Dealing directly with the girls or their organization was reported by 61 percent in the high success group, 37 percent in the middle success group, and 30 percent in the low success group. It appeared that bringing the prostitution problem to the CRAC for solution had a negative effect on the affect index success rating. If prostitution is a problem, bringing it out in the CRAC rather than dealing with the prostitute directly may offend the Korean CRAC members.

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



Figure 28. American Assessment of Modes for Handling the Problem of Prostitution

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As shown in figure 28 the same results were obtained when CRACs were grouped according to task rating. Twenty-nine percent of the Americans in high success CRACs, 29 percent in the middle success group, and 68 percent in the low success group reported that this kind of problem was handled through the CRAC. Fifty-seven percent of the Americans in the high success group, 53 percent in the middle success group, and 16 percent in the low success group reported that their unit dealt directly with the prostitution problems. It should be noted that the responses reviewed here do not necessarily reflect the actual presence or absence of prostitution as a topic, but rather the mode of dealing with the problem.

As for the method of dealing with theft problems alleged to involve Koreans, 33 percent of the Americans said that they would turn to the entire CRAC for help; 44 percent said that they would turn to an individual Korean, usually the local police, for help; and 18 percent said that the problem would be handled independently, without involving CRAC or its Korean members. Grouping CRACs by affect index scores, showed that 44 percent of Americans in the high success group, 33 percent in the middle success group, and 24 percent in the low success group said that the problem would be brought before the entire CRAC. There was no clear trend in the association between CRAC success and dealing with the theft problem. When CRACs were grouped by task rating, 46 percent of the Americans in the high success group and 26 percent in the low success group said that they would bring the problem before the entire CRAC. Fifty percent of those in the high success group and 39 percent in the low success group said they would deal directly with a local official. The eleven respondents who said that the problem would be handled independently and would not involve CRAC members were about evenly divided between the middle and low success groups. These distributions were not statistically significant.

Two suggestions may be derived from these data: (1) American CRAC chairmen might consider avoiding the direct presentation of prostitute problems on CRAC or at least refrain from using CRAC as a forum for dealing with the girls and their troop-related problems, and (2) methods of dealing with the community that exclude community leaders may be offensive. For example, the direct handling of theft cases alleged to involve Koreans without consulting the local officials may create ill will. These two observations are by no means invariant; the situation will vary from one CRAC to another. The American cochairman might ask himself if alternative modes of dealing with prostitution problems are available. Two alternatives of dealing directly with these problems are available. One is by instituting an open-door policy for designated representatives at the compound headquarters. Another is establishing a "parallel" CRAC that does not include officials who are members of the regular CRAC and who might be offended by the presentation of the problem. Both these courses appear to entail less risk of offense. Problems such as theft may fall within the responsibility of myon chief or the police chief. A commander should ask himself what would be the likely reaction of the officials if they were not consulted. Although there may be good reason for not involving them in the problem, this alternative should be weighed carefully. An important purpose of CRAC is to create a cooperative spirit between the American unit and the community, so that local resources will be available for joint resolution of problems. A notable example of full utilization of local resources occurred in the town of Munsan, where a cooperative effort between the Munsan police and a U. S. 2nd Division unit curbed a severe theft problem at a location called "Slicky Boy Corner." This achievement was attributed to a program that originated through CRAC discussions.

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SUMMARY

In this chapter a wide selection of variables has been examined in relation to the success achieved by a CRAC. First, a set of variables that were explicitly to be studied were analyzed. Second, a set of variables that were not directly an integral part of this study were also analyzed as an outcropping of the primary task. Frequently some intriguing trends appeared among this latter set of variables. Unfortunately, as must be expected when a variable appears as a sidelight, equivocation became necessary at some points. However, these variables do indicate two things: (1) there are too many facets to the success of CRAC than can be covered in one study and (2) that one study may (and should) lead directly to additional research.

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NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Korean Communication Zone, Headquarters, AGO 92.2 /CZA, 5 September 1953.
2. Leon Festinger and H. H. Kelly, Changing Attitudes through Social Contact (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, 1951).
3. Yehuda Amir, "Contact Hypothesis in Ethnic Relations," Psychological Bulletin, 71 (1969), p. 338.
4. Jesse C. Kennedy and Walter Pasternak, Community Relations Advisory Councils in the Republic of Korea (Washington, D. C. : Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, December 1968). AD 846-409L. FOUO.
5. Eighth Army, G5, has the responsibility for administering the CRAC program in Korea. United Nations Command/U. S. Forces, Korea, Assistant Chief of Staff, J5, provides policy guidance to G5.

CHAPTER 1

1. Eighth Army Regulation 530-5, Community Relations Advisory Councils, 7 October 1967, paras. 3.a-3.f; hereafter cited as Eighth Army Regulation 530-5.
2. M. L. DeFleur and F. R. Westie, "Verbal Attitudes and Overt Acts," American Psychological Review, 23 (1958), pp. 667-673.
3. Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Handbook, Eighth Army Pamphlet No. 530-4, 11 January 1968, p. 62ff; hereafter cited as EA Handbook.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
5. Jesse C. Kennedy and Walter Pasternak, Community Relations Advisory Councils in the Republic of Korea (Washington, D. C. : Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, December 1968). AD 846-409L. FOUO.
6. EA Handbook, p. 64.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

CHAPTER 2

1. Alfred M. Hausrath, Civil Affairs in the Cold War, Special Study Staff Paper, ORO-SP 151 (Bethesda, Md. : Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, February 1961), p. 15.

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CHAPTER 3

1. Eighth Army Regulation 530-5, Community Relations Advisory Councils, 7 October 1967, section 3; hereafter cited as Eighth Army Regulation 530-5.
2. For example, E. E. Jones and H. B. Gerard, Foundations of Social Psychology (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), p. 707.
3. C. E. Osgood, C. J. Succi, P. H. Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957).
4. E. J. Webb et al., Unobtrusive Measures: Non-Reactive Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966).
5. Eighth Army Regulation 530-5, paras. 3.a-3.f.
6. Jesse C. Kennedy and Walter Pasternak, Community Relations Advisory Councils in the Republic of Korea (Washington, D. C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, December 1968). AD 846-409L. FOUO. Hereafter cited as Community Relations Advisory Councils.
7. See the following works: C. L. Wood, R. A. Kinney, and C. L. Henning, Civil Affairs Relations in Korea (Baltimore, Md.: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, 1955); Kennedy and Pasternak, Community Relations Advisory Councils; Robert L. Humphrey, Fight the Cold War: A Handbook for Overseas Orientation Officers (Washington, D. C.: American Institutes for Research, 1965); and Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Handbook, Eighth Army Pamphlet No. 530-4, 11 January 1968, pp. 68-70; hereafter cited as EA Handbook.
8. Kennedy and Pasternak, Community Relations Advisory Councils.
9. Eighth Army Regulation 530-5, para. 5.c.
10. EA Handbook, p. 61.

CHAPTER 4

1. Eighth Army Regulation 530-5, Community Relations Advisory Council, 7 October 1967, 3.a-3.-f; hereafter cited as Eighth Army Regulation 530-5.
2. C. E. Osgood, C. J. Succi, and P. H. Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957).
3. It has been widely recognized in the behavioral science literature that the more personal contact (through discussion and exchange of views) there is among members of a group, the more likely it is that they will agree on opinions or attitudes. For further discussion of this general area, see Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), pp. 566-570.
4. U. S. Forces, Korea, Policy Directive 5-3, 20 February 1968, section VII.
5. Eighth Army Regulation 530-5, para. 8.
6. Eighth Army Regulation 530-5.
7. See Lorand B. Szalay, "The Analysis of Cultural Meanings through Free Verbal Association," Journal of Social Psychology, 72 (1967), pp. 161-187.

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8. Jesse C. Kennedy and Walter Pasternak, Community Relations Advisory Councils in the Republic of Korea (Washington, D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, December 1968), p. 39. AD 846-409L. FOUO.

9. Ibid., p. vi.

10. Ibid., p. 49.

11. B. J. Winer, Statistical Principles in Experimental Design (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), p. 157.

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APPENDIX A

SOME TECHNICAL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

SAMPLING PROBLEMS

The following two problems precluded obtaining a larger sample of Americans.

(1) There were frequent delays in interviews due to operational requirements of the units visited. These operational requirements resulted from unannounced visits of senior level officers, inspection, and, in the 2nd Division area, frequent incursions of North Korean infiltrators that required the immediate attention of persons scheduled for interview.

(2) Poor road conditions constituted another problem. Even though nearly all field trips were made by jeep, washed-out roads in remote areas sometimes made it impossible to reach the units. Data collection was also handicapped by the worst snowstorm in Korea for the past 47 years.¹ Roads south of Seoul, where the remaining data collection had been scheduled, were closed for several weeks to all but emergency traffic.

COORDINATION PROBLEMS

Prior to actual data collection, several steps were taken. First, all instruments were submitted to the U. S. Embassy in Seoul, Eighth Army, G5, and ROK Army, G5, for review and concurrence. When this concurrence had been received, letters of introduction were obtained by Eighth Army, G5, for the Korean interviewer scheduled to visit to the Eighth Army area. Parallel coordination was carried out by the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), with ROKA unit commanders in the areas notifying the local police chief of the interviewer's identity and purpose. In addition, the Korean interviewer was also instructed to carry his ROK civil identification card and his Eighth Army civilian employee identification.

When the interviewer arrived at each town, myon, or ri scheduled for research, he visited the local police box and introduced himself. This was doubly useful, since the police chief was usually one of the persons to be interviewed. This procedure was especially important in view of the very real possibility of a stranger's being mistaken for a North Korean agent. Infiltration of enemy agents into the ROK was intensified during the time the survey was in the field; coastal areas, where much of the research was conducted, were under particular alert to watch for enemy agents. A forceful example of what can happen under these circumstances was reported in an article in the Korea Times:

Mokpo, Cholla-namdo

Police mistook a 42-year-old man as a north Korean agent and killed him on the spot while drinking in a tavern here.

The police identified him as Hong Kang-nam of Yongdu-dong, Seoul.

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Kim Ung-Yong, a Mokpo resident, informed on Hong as a possible agent. Police quoted Kim as having said that Hong wanted to know where the Chosun Bank was. "Chosun" is equivalent to "Hankook" (Korea). The former is used in north Korea.

The two men were to meet the next day, but Kim told of the suspicious man when Hong failed to show up, he said.

Kim found the man drinking in a tavern two days later and brought three policemen from Talsong police box. The three opened fire on the agent-suspect and killed him on the spot, Kim said.²

Coordination of visits to units for interviews of Americans was established by two procedures. First, the formal coordination was accomplished by a letter from the Chief, U. S. Army Research Unit-Korea (USARUK), which was disseminated by Eighth Army G5, Assistant Chief of Staff (ACofS), through command channels. The formal coordination was followed up informally by the researcher placing a telephone call to the unit, confirming the date, time, and purpose of the visit.

Coordination of supplementary data collection efforts, including attendance at CRAC meetings, was accomplished through EA ACofS, G5.

PROBLEMS OF RAPPORT

Obviously, special considerations must be taken into account when field research is conducted in a foreign area. Koreans are not accustomed to striking up acquaintances involving a brief introduction followed by a series of to-the-point questions of a personal nature. In the United States, the public opinion pollster is an established position with a reasonably clear set of role expectations—he is accepted as part of the everyday scene; this, however, is not yet the case in Korea. The researcher is an intruder, a man who must be evaluated and accepted at leisure before one proceeds to do business with him. For this reason, the researcher must exercise a skill and a culturally defined judgment. He must be able to strike the proper balance between the formality decreed by custom and the intimacy required by his mission. He must evaluate the position of the respondent relative to his own. Furthermore, he must assess the respondent's mood—a skill which the Koreans call nunchi, or eye measurement. In the West, the term "sizing-up" is the nearest equivalent of nunchi. The interviewer must also decide whether he should use ordinary forms of address, honorific forms, or the most honorific forms reserved for persons of high position and the aged.

Clearly, the task of interviewing the Korean CRAC members required a Korean interviewer. It is doubtful that an American, particularly a stranger, could have achieved the same rapport as a Korean, and the responses would very likely have been merely superficial. Furthermore, an American not thoroughly familiar with the culture, including the language, might have made numerous offensive blunders without realizing it.

The researcher for the Korean interviews was selected on the basis of how he would be received. This man was a retired ROKA major, 40 years of age, who carried with him letters of introduction from the ACofS, G5, ROKA. Since many of the government officials with whom he conducted interviews were former ROKA officers, his military background and the letter of introduction proved to be valuable assets.

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The Korean interviewer had another asset—his age. In Korea age has honorific value so that it is difficult for a young man to be comfortable when he treats as his equal a man many years his senior. It was the consensus of several Korean research personnel consulted that a young man (that is, one in his twenties) might have great difficulty obtaining a serious interview.

Still another contribution to rapport was the procedure of first visiting the police box in the area and introducing oneself. The police in Korea enjoy considerable influence in rural areas. Many policemen were former military officers, because a considerable number of Army officers were permitted to transfer in their equivalent grade to the Korean National Police (KNP) after the military revolt of 1961. Thus, the interviewer's identity was quickly established and accepted.

It is interesting to note that despite the length of the interview, cooperation was generally good. Both Americans and Koreans seemed to welcome the opportunity to voice their opinions about CRAC and civil affairs programs in general and to talk about conditions in their areas.

In the interviews of Americans, the researcher took care to point out that while the research was sponsored by the Office of the Chief of Research and Development (OCRD) and supported by Eighth Army, the research effort was outside command or staff activities of Eighth Army and that no raw data inputs to Eighth Army staff would be made. These assurances gained quick acceptance, for no one refused to respond to the interviews.

NOTES

1. "Snow Storm Claims 4," Korea Times, January 30, 1969, p. 1; "Snow Hazards," Korea Herald, January 31, 1969, p. 2; and "Snow Piles up in ROK," Stars and Stripes, January 31, 1969, p. 7.

2. "Cops Kill Man Mistaken for Red Agent," Korea Times, August 26, 1969.

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APPENDIX B LIST OF UNITS VISITED

<u>Major Subordinate Command</u>	<u>Specific Unit</u>
A. 1 Corps	1. 2nd Bn., 76th FA 2. 36th Engin. Gp.
B. 2nd Inf. Div. (M)	1. 4th Recon. Sqdn., 7th Cav. 2. Hq., 2nd DISCOM 3. 2nd Engr. Bn.
C. 7th Inf. Div. (M)	1. 1st Bn., 73rd Armor 2. 2nd Bn., 8th FA
D. 8th FASCOM	1. Co. C, 13th S & S Bn. 2. Co. C, 335th Maint. Bn. 3. Hq., 83rd Ord. Bn. (Ammo) 4. Camp Howard (23rd Dir. Spt. Gp)
E. 38th Arty. Bde. (AD)	1. Hq., 7th MG, 2nd Arty. 2. Btry. A, 7th MB, 2nd Arty. 3. Btry. B, 7th MB, 2nd Arty. 4. Btry. C, 7th MB, 2nd Arty. 5. Btry. D, 7th MB, 2nd Arty. 6. Btry. B, 7th MB, 5th Arty. 7. Btry. C, 7th MB, 5th Arty. 8. Btry. D, 7th MB, 5th Arty. 9. Btry. A, 4th MB, 44th Arty. 10. Btry. B, 4th MB, 44th Arty. 11. Btry. C, 4th MB, 44th Arty. 12. Btry. D, 4th MB, 44th Arty. 13. Btry. E, 4th MB, 44th Arty. 14. Btry. F, 4th MB, 44th Arty. 15. Hq., 6th MB, 44th Arty. 16. Btry. A, 6th MB, 44th Arty. 17. Btry. C, 6th MB, 44th Arty. 18. Btry. D, 6th MB, 44th Arty. 19. Btry. A, 2nd MB, 71st Arty. 20. Btry. C, 2nd MB, 71st Arty.

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APPENDIX C SPECIFIC EVALUATION QUESTIONS

AMERICANS

1. How long have you been here on this tour?
 - 1 1-3 months
 - 2 4-6 months
 - 3 7-9 months
 - 4 10-12 months
 - 5 13-15 months
 - 6 More than 15 months
 - 7 DNA (Did not answer)

2. Age
 - 1 Under 20
 - 2 20-24
 - 3 25-29
 - 4 30-34
 - 5 35-39
 - 6 40-44
 - 7 45-49
 - 8 50-54
 - 9 55-59
 - 0 60-64
 - X 65+
 - Y DNA

3. How long have you been in the military service?
 - 1 Less than 2 years
 - 2 2-4 years
 - 3 5-7 years
 - 4 8-10 years
 - 5 11 years or more
 - 6 DAC (Department of Army civilian)

4. Rank
 - 1 2 Lt.
 - 2 1 Lt.
 - 3 Capt.
 - 4 Major
 - 5 LTC
 - 6 Col., or General
 - 7 Enlisted man
 - 8 DAC

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5. Position on CRAC?
 - 1 Cochairman
 - 2 Member
 - 3 Acting chairman

6. Have you served elsewhere on CRAC?
 - 1 Yes in Korea
 - 2 Yes, elsewhere
 - 3 Yes, Korea and elsewhere
 - 4 Only in Korea
 - 5 DNA

7. Generally speaking, do you think Koreans in this area like Americans?
 - 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 More tolerated than liked
 - 5 DNA

8. Generally speaking, do you think Americans in your unit like Koreans?
 - 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 More tolerated than liked
 - 5 DNA

9. How about the people on CRAC? Do you think the American members on CRAC genuinely like the Korean members on CRAC?
 - 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 Other, _____
 - 5 DNA

10. Do you think the Korean members on CRAC genuinely like the American members on CRAC?
 - 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 Other, _____
 - 5 DNA

11. Korean representation on CRAC varies somewhat in its makeup from one location to another. Naturally, the Korean government and police officials and a school representative are on all cases. Are the local club owners or business girls represented on your CRAC?
 - 1 Club owners
 - 2 Business girls
 - 3 Club owners and business girls
 - 4 Neither
 - 5 Don't know
 - 6 DNA

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12. Does the difference in language create problems in making yourself understood in CRAC meetings?

- 1 Yes, frequently
- 2 Yes, sometimes
- 3 No
- 4 Don't know

13. Who is your interpreter at CRAC meetings?

- 1 U. S. employee, Korean
- 2 Korean civilian, not employed by the U. S.
- 3 ROKA (Republic of Korea Army) or KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to U. S. Army) personnel
- 4 Other, _____
- 5 No interpreter
- 6 DNA

14. How would you rate the interpreter's skill?

- 1 Excellent or outstanding
- 2 Good or very good
- 3 Fair or adequate
- 4 Poor
- 5 Don't know
- 6 DNA

15. CRACs are said to have a number of functions that serve to help them reach the stated objective of IMPROVING RELATIONS. Listed below are some of these functions. Please indicate the extent to which you feel they are taking place; mark "7" as the best possible achievement of the function shown.

a. Establishing an effective two-way channel of communication.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

b. Identifying potential or actual problems of mutual concern.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

c. Developing plans to solve problems of mutual concern.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

d. Planning and executing programs of mutual concern.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

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e. Evaluating the possible effects of action contemplated by either the local command or the community.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

f. Developing wholesome contacts between the command and the community.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

16. Do you think the Korean members are satisfied with the level or extent of their participation in CRAC meetings?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA
17. Do you think the Korean members are satisfied with the amount of discussion which takes place in CRAC meetings?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA
18. Do you think Americans sometimes impose decisions on the Koreans that they may passively accept, without really having a sense of mutual agreement?
- 1 Frequently
 - 2 Occasionally
 - 3 Very seldom
 - 4 Not at all
19. Do you socialize with the Korean members after CRAC meetings or on occasions between CRAC meetings?
- 1 In conjunction with meetings only
 - 2 Between meetings and at meetings
 - 3 No
 - 4 DNA
20. Do you feel that there is a great deal of continuity in the CRAC program from one meeting to the next, or is it a matter of just taking up matters as they occur?
- 1 Adequate continuity
 - 2 Very little continuity
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA

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KOREANS

1. Some areas are referred to as being "dependent" on U. S. compounds; other areas are only slightly dependent; while still others are highly dependent, since most of their people either work on the compound, or get most of their income from the compound. Would you say your community was:
 - 1 Not dependent on compound
 - 2 Slightly dependent on compound
 - 3 Moderately dependent on compound
 - 4 Highly dependent on compound
 - 5 Don't know
 - 6 DNA

2. Generally speaking, do you think the Koreans in this area like Americans?
 - 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 More tolerated than liked
 - 5 DNA

3. Generally speaking, do you think Americans in this area like Koreans?
 - 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 More tolerated than liked
 - 5 DNA

4. How about the people on CRAC? Do you think the American members on CRAC like the Korean members on CRAC?
 - 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 Other, _____
 - 5 DNA

5. Well, do the Korean members genuinely like the American members on CRAC?
 - 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 Other, _____
 - 5 DNA

6. Does the difference in languages create problems in making yourself understood to the American members in CRAC meetings?
 - 1 Yes, frequently
 - 2 Yes, occasionally
 - 3 No
 - 4 Don't know
 - 5 DNA

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7. Who is your interpreter in CRAC meetings?

- 1 U. S. employee, Korean National
- 2 Civilian Korean National, not employed by the U. S.
- 3 ROKA or KATUSA
- 4 Other arrangement _____
- 5 No interpreter
- 6 DNA

8 How well do you think the interpreter translates? What is his skill level?

- 1 Excellent or outstanding
- 2 Good
- 3 Adequate, or fair
- 4 Poor
- 5 Don't know
- 6 DNA

9. CRACs are said to have a number of functions that serve to help to reach the stated objective of IMPROVING RELATIONS. Listed below are some of these functions. Please indicate the extent to which you feel they are taking place, in your CRAC, considering the points on the scales shown as "1" as "poor" and "7" as the best possible achievement of the function shown.

a. Establishing an effective two-way channel of communication.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
		Somewhat			Very	
Very Poor	Poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Good	Outstanding

b. Identifying potential or actual problems of mutual concern.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
		Somewhat			Very	
Very Poor	Poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Good	Outstanding

c. Developing plans to solve problems of mutual concern.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
		Somewhat			Very	
Very Poor	Poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Good	Outstanding

d. Planning and executing programs of mutual concern.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
		Somewhat			Very	
Very Poor	Poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Good	Outstanding

e. Evaluating the possible effects of actions contemplated by either the local command or the community.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
		Somewhat			Very	
Very Poor	Poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Good	Outstanding

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f. Developing wholesome contacts between the command and the community.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

10. In the past, has there ever been a time when the Americans made an assistance commitment, which later could not be "delivered" or "made good"?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA
- Remarks _____
11. When was this? Has it been during 1968?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Does not apply (skip)
 - 4 Don't know
 - 5 DNA
12. When the Americans make a promise of aid, do they usually keep the promise?
- 1 Always
 - 2 Usually
 - 3 Sometimes
 - 4 Seldom
 - 5 Never
 - 6 Don't know
 - 7 DNA
13. Do you feel that the American members on your CRAC give you the opportunity to participate meaningfully in making decisions in CRAC?
- 1 Always
 - 2 Usually
 - 3 Sometimes
 - 4 Seldom
 - 5 Never
 - 6 Don't know
 - 7 DNA
14. Do you think the amount of discussion that takes place in CRAC is satisfactory?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA
15. Do you think the Americans on CRAC have a tendency to impose decisions on the Korean community rather than arriving at decisions by mutual agreement?
- 1 Frequently
 - 2 Occasionally
 - 3 Very seldom
 - 4 Never

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16. Generally, would you say that most decisions involving the problems that arise between the American military and your community are made to your satisfaction?
- 1 All decisions are resolved satisfactorily
 - 2 Most decisions are resolved satisfactorily
 - 3 Half of the decisions are resolved satisfactorily
 - 4 Few of the decisions are resolved satisfactorily
 - 5 None is resolved satisfactorily
 - 6 Don't know
 - 7 DNA
17. Do the American members on CRAC spend much time with the Korean members in friendship relationships?
- 1 Yes, in conjunction with meetings only
 - 2 Yes, on occasions other than meeting dates
 - 3 No
 - 4 Don't know
 - 5 DNA
18. Do you think that there is much continuity in the CRAC program from one meeting to the next, or is it just taking up matters as they occur?
- 1 Great deal of continuity
 - 2 Very little continuity
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA
19. When your community asks for something from the U. S. Army, is the U. S. commander usually sincere and reasonable in considering the request?
-
-

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APPENDIX D

SUGGESTED EVALUATION TOPICS

AMERICAN RESPONDENTS

Area	Types of Questions
<u>Social-Emotional Rewards</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. What effect does serving on CRAC have on your career?2. What support do you receive from higher command?3. Is this support important?4. Do you have informal relationships with Korean CRAC members?5. Do you see them and visit outside the CRAC meetings?
<u>Assistance</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Does your CRAC rely on formal assistance programs?2. Does your CRAC rely on AFAK?3. Are the Koreans assistance requests reasonable?
<u>Interpreter</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Does your CRAC have a qualified interpreter?2. Are discussions hampered by the lack of quality translations?3. Have you tried to learn conversational Korean?
<u>General</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. What function does CRAC serve? (list)2. How important are these? (list and scale)3. Is CRAC fulfilling its stated goals?4. Is your CRAC fulfilling its stated goals?5. What are some specific accomplishments of your CRAC?

KOREAN RESPONDENTS

<u>Social-Emotional Rewards</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Extent of discussion of problems2. Extent of participation3. Informal interaction outside CRAC4. Sociability of the Americans5. Friendship visits6. Are sensitive topics handled in a proper manner?7. How should sensitive topics be handled?
<u>Perceptions</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Do Americans on CRAC like Koreans?2. Are the Americans on CRAC liked by Koreans?3. Are the limitations of the commander in assistance programs adequately communicated?4. Is there continuity in your CRAC?5. Are assistance promises kept?

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Perceptions (continued)

6. Do the American members understand your needs?
7. Are American soldiers liked by Koreans?

Interpreter

1. Is the interpreter well-qualified?
2. Do translation problems hamper discussion?

Assistance Programs

1. Does your CRAC make use of AFAK?
2. Does your CRAC make use of any formal assistance program?
3. What is the American response to requests for assistance?

General

1. What function does CRAC serve? (list)
2. How well does your CRAC fulfill these functions? (list with scale)
3. What are some specific accomplishments of your CRAC?

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APPENDIX E INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

This appendix contains the interview schedules for both the American and Korean respondents. Note that the interview schedules were not questionnaires that the respondents completed. Consequently, some questions remain in the schedule that were not, in fact, asked during the actual data collection. For example, since pretests indicated that bargaining occurred only rarely, the questions dealing with this subject were then not asked during the actual interviews, even though these questions appeared on the schedule.

In addition, it should be noted that instructions appearing in the following schedules were used as guidelines by the interviewers and were not read verbatim. This flexibility was necessary to insure the respondent's complete understanding of the task he was being requested to perform.

The category "did not answer" is shown by DNA; Department of the Army Civilian, by DAC; venereal disease, by VD.

AMERICAN INTERVIEWS

1. Number of tours _____
2. How long have you been here on this tour?
 - 1 1-3 months
 - 2 4-6 months
 - 3 7-9 months
 - 4 10-12 months
 - 5 13-15 months
 - 6 More than 15 months
 - 7 DNA
3. Have you had other overseas service?
 - 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 DNAWhere? _____ How long? _____
4. Have you served in other parts of Asia?
 - 1 Japan
 - 2 Southeast Asia
 - 3 Other
 - 4 Japan and Southeast Asia
 - 5 Japan and other
 - 6 Southeast Asia and other

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4. Have you served in other parts of Asia? (continued)

- 7 Japan, Southeast Asia, and other
- 8 Only in Korea

5. Age

- 1 Under 20
- 2 20-24
- 3 25-29
- 4 30-34
- 5 35-39
- 6 40-44
- 7 45-49
- 8 50-54
- 9 55-59
- 0 60-64
- X 65+
- Y DNA

6. How long have you been in the military service?

- 1 Less than 2 years
- 2 2-4 years
- 3 5-7 years
- 4 8-10 years
- 5 11 years or more
- 6 DAC

7. Rank

- 1 2 Lt.
- 2 1 Lt.
- 3 Capt.
- 4 Major
- 5 LTC
- 6 Col. , or General
- 7 Enlisted man
- 8 DAC

8. Position on CRAC?

- 1 Co-chairman _____
- 2 Member _____
- 3 Acting chairman _____

9. Have you served elsewhere on CRAC?

- 1 Yes, in Korea
- 2 Yes, elsewhere
- 3 Yes, Korea and elsewhere
- 4 Only in Korea
- 5 DNA

10. How long have you served on CRAC in Korea? ____ years ____ months

- 1 1-3 months
- 2 4-6 months
- 3 7-9 months

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10. How long have you served on CRAC in Korea? (continued)

- 4 10-12 months
- 5 13-24 months
- 6 25-36 months
- 7 37 months or more

11. How long as co-chairman?

- 1 1-3 months
- 2 4-6 months
- 3 7-9 months
- 4 10-12 months
- 5 13-24 months
- 6 25-36 months
- 7 37 months or more

12. When do you expect to leave Korea?

13. Primary Duty Assignment?

- 1 Commanding officer, Battalion or group
- 2 Commanding officer, Company or battery
- 3 Platoon leader
- 4 Executive officer, Battalion or group
- 5 Executive officer, Company
- 6 Staff, Battalion or group
- 7 Staff, Company
- 8 Adjutant, Battalion or group
- 9 Other _____

14. Does your unit have a civil affairs officer? Who is he?

- 1 Self
- 2 Other
- 3 No civil affairs officer
- 4 Don't know
- 5 DNA

15. Are you a career officer?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Undecided
- 4 DNA

16. How would you describe this area?

a. What occupations are most common here?

Occupation %

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16. How would you describe this area? (continued)

- b. What percentage of the people in this area could be described as transient, i. e. , Koreans who are not permanent residents of the area, but are here because they were displaced, or are drifting without any permanent occupation?

1 0-10%
2 11-20%
3 21-30%
4 31-40%
5 41-50%
6 51-60%
7 61-70%
8 71-80%
9 81-90%
0 91-100%
X Don't know
Y DNA

- c. I'd like to ask the same question with regard to the village adjacent to the compound. What percentage of these would you call transient?

1 0-10%
2 11-20%
3 21-30%
4 31-40%
5 41-50%
6 51-60%
7 61-70%
8 71-80%
9 81-90%
0 91-100%
X Don't know
Y DNA

- d. To what degree would you say this area is economically dependent on the U. S. Army?

1 Highly dependent
2 Moderately dependent
3 Slightly dependent
4 Not dependent
5 Don't know
6 DNA

- e. To what degree would you say the village adjacent to the compound is economically dependent on the U. S. Army?

1 Highly dependent
2 Moderately dependent
3 Slightly dependent
4 Not dependent
5 Don't know
6 DNA

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f. What would you say are the four greatest problems among the Koreans in this area?

- 1 _____
- 2 _____
- 3 _____
- 4 _____

g. What is the source of drinking water in the community represented on your CRAC?

- 1 Govt. pipelines
- 2 Wells, not at U. S. compound
- 3 River, lake or stream
- 4 Source from U. S. compound
- 5 Don't know
- 6 DNA

h. What is the source of electricity in the community?

- 1 Govt. power lines
- 2 Local generator, not at U. S. compound
- 3 Power from U. S. compound
- 4 No electricity
- 5 Don't know
- 6 DNA

17. Have you had much contact with Koreans, prior to serving on CRAC?

- 1 A great deal
- 2 A moderate amount of contact
- 3 Very little contact
- 4 No contact
- 5 DNA

18. Do you think your feelings about CRAC have changed since you first came into contact with the program? _____ How? _____

19. (If 18 was yes) Why do you think your feelings about CRAC have changed?

20. What do you think the Koreans expect from CRAC? What do they seem to think should be its major concerns and objectives?

21. Well, what do the Americans expect from CRAC? What do they think should be its major concerns and objectives?

22. How do you think the Americans can help the Korean community here?

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23. How do you think the Koreans here can help the American unit here?

24. Have the Koreans here done anything to help the Americans with our problems?

_____ what?

Problems

Assistance given

1. _____	_____
2. _____	_____
3. _____	_____

25. What have the units on your CRAC done to help the Koreans with their problems?
Especially those you mentioned (item 16f)

Problem

Assistance given

1. _____	_____
2. _____	_____
3. _____	_____

AFFECT

26. Generally speaking, do you think Koreans in this area like Americans?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 More tolerated than liked
- 5 DNA

27. Generally speaking, do you think Americans in your unit like Koreans?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 More tolerated than liked
- 5 DNA

28. How about the people on CRAC? Do you think the Americans on CRAC genuinely like the Koreans on CRAC?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 Other, _____
- 5 DNA

29. Well, do you think the Koreans on CRAC genuinely like the Americans on CRAC?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 Other, _____
- 5 DNA

30. How about the local Korean press—do you think our image is good, bad, or neutral?

- 1 Good
- 2 Bad
- 3 Neutral

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30. How about the local Korean press—do you think our image is good, bad, or neutral?
(continued)
- 4 Don't know
 - 5 Mixed
 - 6 No local press
 - 7 DNA
31. What do the local people like most about us?
- 1 _____
 - 2 _____
32. What do the local people dislike most about us?
- 1 _____
 - 2 _____
33. In your opinion, is there anything that could be done to improve the relationship between your unit and the local community? What?
- 1 Yes, more assistance
 - 2 Yes, change behavior of troops
 - 3 Yes, learn Korean
 - 4 Yes, other
 - 5 No
 - 6 Don't know
 - 7 DNA
34. I have noticed that the Korean representation on CRAC varies somewhat in its makeup from one location to another. Naturally, the Korean government and police officials, and a school representative are on all cases. Are the local clubowners or business girls represented on your CRAC?
- 1 Club owners
 - 2 Business girls
 - 3 Club owners and business girls
 - 4 Neither
 - 5 Don't know
 - 6 DNA
35. (If 34 is no) What are the reasons that the club owners, business girls, are not represented on CRAC?
- _____
36. How are these people dealt with, if they are dealt with?
- _____
- _____
37. Is there a separate, informal, local CRAC dealing with these people?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA

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INFORMAL CONTACTS

38. Is there any one individual Korean on your CRAC you feel you can go to with a community relations problem and expect some help in solving it? Who is he?

- 1 Gun governor, village or myon chief, mayor
- 2 Police official _____
- 3 Education or school principal
- 4 Physician
- 5 Govt. official, not mentioned above
- 6 Merchant
- 7 Club owner's representative
- 8 Civic association representative
- 9 Other _____
- 0 No one, don't know
- X DNA

(if a second preference is expressed, indicate code here _____)

39. Do you meet with or telephone this person informally to work out problems? How about for social meetings?

- 1 Problems only
- 2 Social meetings only
- 3 Both social meetings and problem solving
- 4 No
- 5 DNA

40. Is this informal contact in the form of visits to your office, visits to his office, meetings somewhere in town, telephone calls, or what?

- 1 Telephone calls only
- 2 Visits to Korean's office
- 3 Visits to U. S. unit
- 4 Mutual visits
- 5 Telephone and visits to Korean's office
- 6 Telephone and visits to U. S. unit
- 7 Telephone and mutual visits
- 8 DNA

Remarks _____

41. How often do you meet with or talk to this person about problems in a typical month?

- 1 1 time
- 2 2 times
- 3 3 times
- 4 4 times
- 5 5 times
- 6 6 times
- 7 7 times
- 8 8 times
- 9 9 or more
- 0 Not at all
- X Don't know
- Y DNA

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42. How often do you meet with this person for conversation, drinking, or other social activities?

- 1 1 time
- 2 2 times
- 3 3 times
- 4 4 times
- 5 5 times
- 6 6 times
- 7 7 times
- 8 8 times
- 9 9 times
- 0 Not at all
- X Don't know
- Y DNA

43. When you meet to work out problems, what kinds of problems do you usually discuss?

44. Do you think the Koreans on your council are willing to discuss all problems of concern to them frankly, or do you feel that there are certain problems which they are hesitant to bring up or discuss?

- 1 Discuss problems frankly
- 2 Hesitant to bring up some matters
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

45. What problems are these, and why do you think the Koreans are reluctant to discuss them?

Problem	Why reluctant
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

46. How about the American CRAC members? Do they feel free to bring up all problems of mutual concern, or are there some we don't want to discuss?

- 1 Yes, _____
- 2 No, discuss all freely
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

47. Is the difference in language a source of problems in making yourself understood in CRAC meetings?

- 1 Yes, frequently
- 2 Yes, sometimes
- 3 No
- 4 Don't know

48. Who is your interpreter at CRAC meetings?

- 1 U. S. employee, Korean _____
- 2 Korean civilian, not employed by the U. S.
- 3 ROKA or KATUSA personnel

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48. Who is your interpreter at CRAC meetings? (continued)
- 4 Other
 - 5 No interpreter
 - 6 DNA
49. How would you rate his skill?
- 1 Excellent or outstanding
 - 2 Good or very good
 - 3 Fair or adequate
 - 4 Poor
 - 5 Don't know
 - 6 DNA
50. Do you trust him?
- 1 Yes, without reservation
 - 2 Yes, within limits
 - 3 No
 - 4 DNA
51. Do you think he is fair to both sides in translating?
- 1 Fair to both sides
 - 2 Sometimes unfair to both sides
 - 3 Favors Americans
 - 4 Favors Koreans
 - 5 Don't know
 - 6 DNA
52. Approximately how many hours do you spend each month working with Korean CRAC members on problems of mutual concern, other than assistance projects? _____
53. Approximately how many hours per month do you spend working with Koreans on planning or executing assistance projects? _____
54. What "problems of mutual concern" would you consider typical of the problems your CRAC has dealt with in the past few months?
- 1 _____
 - 2 _____
 - 3 _____
 - 4 _____
 - 5 _____
55. Were the Koreans cooperative in planning solutions to these problems? (Read each for response)
- | | Yes | No | Don't know |
|---|-------|-------|------------|
| 1 | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 2 | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 3 | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 4 | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 5 | _____ | _____ | _____ |

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56. Were these problems first mentioned by American or Korean members?

	American	Korean	Mutual or evolved from discussion or recurring	Don't know
1	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	_____	_____	_____	_____

57. What kinds of solutions were worked out for these problems? Were these solutions satisfactory to you?

	a. Solution or disposition	b. Satisfactory		
		Yes	No	Don't know
1	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	_____	_____	_____	_____

58. (If any of the responses of 57b were no, then ask) Why were the solutions not satisfactory?

1	_____
2	_____
3	_____
4	_____
5	_____

59. We speak of programs of mutual interest, in which both Koreans and Americans participate, working together. What programs of this kind have taken place here during the past three months?

1	_____
2	_____
3	_____
4	_____
5	_____

60. Were these programs satisfactory to you? Do you think they were successful?

	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Don't know	DNA
1	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	_____	_____	_____	_____

61. When the U. S. Army plans a new construction project, such as a bridge or an airstrip, they have to consider whether it will cause problems for the Koreans. Also, when the Army changes its policies regarding such issues as passes and defense plans, they consider that it may cause problems for civilians as well. When the Korean Government starts new construction (such as a road) or changes its policies (such as curfew hours), this may cause problems for the American Army unit in this area. One way we can avoid some of the problems is to discuss the planned activity or changes in

CRAC councils. Has your CRAC had any discussion of these kinds of matters in the past three months?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

62. What were these topics?

1 _____
2 _____
3 _____
4 _____
5 _____

63. Were any problems identified as a result of these discussions?

	Yes	No	Don't know	DNA
1	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	_____	_____	_____	_____

64. Have any jointly-sponsored events (involving both Koreans and Americans) taken place in this community in the past few months? (examples: athletic events, ceremonies, tours of places of local interest, picnics)

65. What were these events?

1 _____
2 _____
3 _____
4 _____
5 _____

66. Were these events well attended by both Americans and Koreans?

	Yes	No	Don't know	DNA
1	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	_____	_____	_____	_____

67. Are any jointly sponsored events scheduled in this community during the next 30 days?

- 1 Yes, _____
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

Evaluation of CRAC Functions

68. CRACs are said to have a number of functions which serve to help it reach the stated objective of "IMPROVING RELATIONS." Listed below are some of these functions. Please indicate the extent to which you feel they are taking place "7" is the best possible achievement of the function shown:

a. Establishing an effective two-way channel of communication.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

b. Identifying potential or actual problems of mutual concern.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

c. Developing plans to solve problems of mutual concern.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

d. Planning and executing programs of mutual concern.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

e. Evaluating the possible effects of action contemplated by either the local command or the community.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

f. Developing wholesome contacts between the command and the community.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

69. Do you ever get the feeling that Koreans place too much emphasis on assistance programs which will benefit them, rather than on problems which should be of mutual interest to both the military and the Korean community? (If yes, ask if this is frequently)

- 1 Yes, frequently
- 2 Yes, occasionally
- 3 No
- 4 Don't know
- 5 DNA

70. Do you think that either side places too much emphasis on matters primarily of concern to their own side, rather than matters which should be of mutual interest?
- 1 Yes, U. S. side
 - 2 Yes, Korean side
 - 3 Yes, both sides
 - 4 No
 - 5 Don't know
 - 6 DNA
- Remarks _____
71. I have noticed some chairmen attempt to bargain with their counterparts in meetings, stating that the U. S. side is in a position to help the Korean community if the Korean community will help the U. S. side. This is often done very diplomatically, and I personally, do not know how the Korean members feel about this. How do you feel about it? Is this kind of "bargaining" appropriate and proper as an approach to CRAC problems?
- 1 Appropriate and proper
 - 2 Not appropriate/proper
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA
- Remarks _____
72. Has this approach been used in your council?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA
73. (If yes to 70) Has the approach been used frequently, occasionally or just one or twice?
- 1 Frequently
 - 2 Occasionally
 - 3 Once or twice
 - 4 Don't know
 - 5 DNA
 - 0 Not used
74. (If 70 is yes) Do you think this approach has been very effective, somewhat effective, slightly effective, or not at all effective?
- 1 Very effective
 - 2 Somewhat effective
 - 3 Slightly effective
 - 4 Not effective
 - 5 Don't know
 - 6 DNA
 - 0 Not used
75. (If 72 is 1, 2, or 3) What kinds of problems have you been able to get cooperation on by bargaining with offers of assistance?
- 1 _____
 - 2 _____
 - 3 _____

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76. (If bargaining has been attempted, but success has been lacking) What do you feel is the reason bargaining has not worked out so well in your council?

77. In the past, has there ever been a time when your CRAC made an assistance commitment which later could not be "delivered" or "made good"?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

Remarks _____

78. Has any assistance project such as road building, or school construction been started but not completed in one construction season?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

79. When a project is proposed or brought before CRAC for submission as an AFAK project, what is the usual procedure for developing the project and getting it approved?

80. Do you think the Koreans on CRAC understand the limitations of the AFAK program?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

81. Do you think the Koreans understand the limitations on a military commander regarding what he may or may not offer in the way of assistance to the community?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

Remarks _____

82. Do you think the Koreans are often unrealistic or unreasonable in their requests for assistance?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

83. Do you think the Koreans on your CRAC sometimes assume you have made an assistance commitment, when you have not actually made this commitment?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA
84. Do you think the Koreans are satisfied with the level or extent of their participation in CRAC meetings?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA
85. Do you think the Koreans are satisfied with the amount of discussion which takes place in CRAC meetings?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA
86. Do you think we sometimes impose decisions on them which they may passively accept, without really having a sense of mutual agreement?
- 1 Frequently
 - 2 Occasionally
 - 3 Very seldom
 - 4 Not at all
87. Do you socialize with the Korean CRAC members after CRAC meetings or on occasions between CRAC meetings?
- 1 In conjunction with meetings only
 - 2 Between meetings and at meetings
 - 3 No
 - 4 DNA
88. What form does this social activity take? Parties? Drinking? Visits to tea rooms?
-
-
89. Do you feel that there is a great deal of continuity in the CRAC program from one meeting to the next, or is it a matter of just taking up matters as they occur?
- 1 Adequate continuity
 - 2 Very little continuity
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA
90. What would you say is the most important factor influencing this continuity (or lack of)? (Probe question) Do you think certain kinds of problems tend to persist, or to recur? (Look for references to cyclical problems, planning).
-
-

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91. Generally speaking, would you say that the majority of the problems brought before the CRAC are at the initiative of the U. S. or Korean participants?
- 1 U. S.
 - 2 Korean
 - 3 About 50-50
 - 4 Don't know
 - 5 DNA
92. In the past three months how many CRAC meetings have been held?
- 0 0
 - 1 1
 - 2 2
 - 3 3
 - 4 4 or more
 - 5 Don't know
 - 6 DNA
93. How many CRAC meetings have been cancelled during the past three months?
- 0 0
 - 1 1
 - 2 2
 - 3 3
 - 4 4 or more
 - 5 Don't know
 - 6 DNA
94. Who cancelled these meetings?
- 1 _____
 - 2 _____
 - 3 _____
 - 4 _____
95. When meetings have to be cancelled, is it usually at the request or initiative of the U. S. or Korean co-chairman?
- 1 U. S.
 - 2 Korean
 - 3 50-50 or mutual request
 - 4 Don't know
 - 5 DNA
 - 6 No meetings cancelled in past
 - 7 Events cancelled only due to pressure of events, such as activity of North Korean agents in the area.
96. If your command was suddenly faced with a significant increase in VD rates could you expect much cooperation from your CRAC council taking steps to reduce VD, or at least tighten up the regulation of business girls in the area?
- 1 Yes, a great deal of help
 - 2 Yes, some help
 - 3 No help
 - 4 CRAC is not where problems would be confronted
 - 5 Don't know
 - 6 DNA

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97. Assuming that thefts of such items as sandbags and communication cable had been a major problem in your unit recently, would you try to use either the CRAC council or one of its Korean members to confront this problem? How would you go about getting cooperation?
- 1 Appeal to reason, remind them of defense needs
 - 2 Mentioning possible sanctions against community, "get tough" policy
 - 3 Bargaining
 - 4 Remind them of U. S. —Korean friendship
 - 5 Seek help of individual member
 - 6 Other, specify _____
 - 7 Don't know
 - 8 DNA
 - 9 Would not ask

Before we go on to the second part of the interview, let me ask you a few rather general questions about the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) Program.

98. What do you think of the AFAK program—is it of much value to your community relations program?

99. Do you think the program should be changed in any way? If so, what changes should be made?

- 1 Yes, see remarks
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

Remarks _____

100. How do you think the best use of AFAK can be made?

101. Are any AFAK projects sponsored by your unit under construction now?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

102. Is there any project you have been recently asked by local people to sponsor under AFAK, and which is still being considered, on which the final decision has not been made?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

Project

Who requested

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The interviewer briefly explained the use of the following scales to the interviewee. Only after the interviewer was certain that the interviewee understood how to use the scales were they presented to the interviewee.

THE THIRTEEN-MONTH TOUR IN KOREA

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	
Too short								Too long
Is a hardship tour								Not a hardship tour
Worthwhile								Not worthwhile
Men goof off								Men work hard

ASSIGNMENT TO KOREA IS

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	
Desirable assignment								Undesirable assignment
Harms a man's career								Helps a man's career
Dangerous								Safe
Pleasant								Unpleasant
Important assignment								Unimportant assignment
Men work hard								Men goof off
Exciting								Boring

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KOREANS ON YOUR CRAC COUNCIL

3 2 1 0 1 2 3

Realistic								Unrealistic
Impractical								Practical
Patient								Impatient
Dominant								Passive
Selfish								Unselfish
Cooperative								Uncooperative
Honest								Dishonest
Idealists								Cynics
Hostile								Friendly
Good								Bad
Arrogant								Humble
Superior to Americans								Inferior to Americans
Superior to other Koreans								Inferior to other Koreans
Representative of community								Not representative of community
Respect Americans								Disrespect Americans
Try to help us								Try to hurt us
Independent								Looking for a handout
Frank								Reticent
Wise								Foolish
Trustworthy								Untrustworthy
Dependent								Independent

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GENERALLY, CRAC COUNCILS ARE

3 2 1 0 1 2 3

Worthwhile									Not worthwhile
Worthless									Valuable
Impotent to solve problems									Problem-solving group
Can do much to promote friendship									Can do little to promote friendship
Can do much to promote mutual understanding									Can do little to promote mutual understanding
Can do much to promote wholesome contacts between military personnel and local Koreans									Can do little to promote wholesome contacts between military personnel and local Koreans
Can do much to control VD									Can do little to control VD
Dominated by Koreans									Dominated by Americans
Can do little to curb thefts from U. S. compounds									Can do much to curb thefts from U. S. compounds
Not an effective channel of two-way communication between U. S. and Korean officials									An effective channel of two-way communication between U. S. and Korean officials
Not a good forum for information exchange									A good forum for information exchange
Effective									Ineffective

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GENERALLY, KOREANS ARE

3 2 1 0 1 2 3

Kind									Cruel
Greedy									Generous
Sensitive									Callous
Competent									Incompetent
Poor									Rich
Arrogant									Humble
Superior to Americans									Inferior to Americans
Bad									Good
Sincere									Insincere
Practical									Impractical
Truthful									Deceitful
Dishonest									Honest
Beautiful									Ugly
Sophisticated									Naive
Stupid									Intelligent
Industrious									Lazy
Clean									Dirty
Unpatriotic									Patriotic
Dominant									Passive
Anti-American									Pro-American
Ambitious									Indolent
Cowardly									Brave
Considerate									Inconsiderate
Civilized									Uncivilized
Rigid									Flexible
Moral									Immoral

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GENERALLY, KOREANS THINK THAT AMERICANS ARE

3 2 1 0 1 2 3

Kind								Cruel
Trustworthy								Untrustworthy
Hostile toward Koreans								Friendly toward Koreans
Likeable								Despicable
Foolish								Wise
Generous								Stingy
Patient								Impatient
Arrogant								Humble
Good								Bad
Superior to Koreans								Inferior to Koreans
Respected by Koreans								Disrespected by Koreans
Powerless								Powerful

GENERALLY, KOREANS FEEL THAT AMERICANS

3 2 1 0 1 2 3

Manipulate Koreans								Are manipulated by Koreans
Keep promises								Break promises
Look down on Koreans								Look up to Koreans
Care about Korean problems								Don't care about Korean problems
Like Koreans								Dislike Koreans

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KOREAN INTERVIEWS

1. How long have you lived in this immediate area?
 - 1 1-3 months
 - 2 4-6 months
 - 3 7-9 months
 - 4 10-12 months
 - 5 13 months - 2 years
 - 6 25 months - 3 years
 - 7 More than 3 years

2. How long have you served on CRAC in this community?
 - 1 1-3 months
 - 2 4-6 months
 - 3 7-9 months
 - 4 10-12 months
 - 5 13 months - 2 years
 - 6 25 months - 3 years
 - 7 More than three (3) years

3. Have you served on CRAC anywhere else? How long? Where? _____
 - 1 1-3 months
 - 2 4-6 months
 - 3 7-9 months
 - 4 10-12 months
 - 5 13 months - 2 years
 - 6 25 months - 3 years
 - 7 More than 3 years
 - 8 Only served in CRAC in this area

4. Are you the co-chairman of the CRAC council here? How long have you been chairman?
 - 1 1-3 months
 - 2 4-6 months
 - 3 7-9 months
 - 4 10-12 months
 - 5 13 months - 2 years
 - 6 More than 2 years
 - 7 Not a co-chairman
 - 8 DNA

5. Have you ever traveled outside of Korea? _____ Where? _____
 - 1 Traveled abroad, U. S.
 - 2 Traveled abroad, other than U. S.
 - 3 Never traveled outside of Korea

6. What is your age, please?
 - 1 Under 20
 - 2 20-24
 - 3 25-29
 - 4 30-34
 - 5 35-39
 - 6 40-44

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6. What is your age? (continued)

- 7 45-49
- 8 50-54
- 9 55-59
- 0 60-64
- X 65+
- Y DNA

7. Were you ever in the Military service? How long?

- 1 One year or less
- 2 13 months - 2 years
- 3 25 months - 3 years
- 4 More than 3 years
- 5 Never in service
- 6 DNA

8. What was your rank?

- 1 2 Lt.
- 2 1 Lt.
- 3 Capt.
- 4 Major
- 5 LTC
- 6 Col. or General
- 7 Enlisted man or W. O.

9. What is the highest educational level you have achieved?

- 1 No schooling
- 2 Primary school
- 3 Middle school
- 4 High school
- 5 University, but did not graduate
- 6 University graduate
- 7 Advanced degree (specify MA, Ph. D., MD, etc.)

10. What is your position (job) in this community?

- 1 Gun chief, village or myon chief, mayor
- 2 Police chief
- 3 Educator or school administrator
- 4 Physician
- 5 Govt. official, not mentioned above
- 6 Merchant
- 7 Club owner's representative
- 8 Civic association representative
- 9 Other, _____
- 0 DNA

11. What are the greatest problems among the Korean people in this _____ (ri, myon, dong, city)?

- 1 _____
- 2 _____
- 3 _____
- 4 _____

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12. What occupation do most of the people practice here in this _____?
Are most of the people farmers, industrial workers, craftsmen, or what?

OCCUPATION	PERCENT
1 _____	_____
2 _____	_____
3 _____	_____

13. We speak of "transients" in the population people who are not permanent residents here, but are here because they were displaced, or are drifting without any permanent occupation. What percentage of your myon, gun, town, city, or the like would you estimate to be "transients"?

- 1 0-10%
- 2 11-20%
- 3 21-30%
- 4 31-40%
- 5 41-50%
- 6 51-60%
- 7 61-70%
- 8 71-80%
- 9 81-90%
- 0 91-100%
- X Don't know
- Y DNA

14. How about the community just outside the U. S. compound? What percentage would you say is "transient"?

- 1 0-10%
- 2 11-20%
- 3 21-30%
- 4 31-40%
- 5 41-50%
- 6 51-60%
- 7 61-70%
- 8 71-80%
- 9 81-90%
- 0 91-100%
- X Don't know
- Y DNA

15. We speak of some areas being "dependent" upon U. S. compounds. Some areas are only slightly dependent, while others are highly dependent, since most of their people either work on the compound, or get most of their income from the compound—Would say your community was

- 1 Not dependent on compound
- 2 Slightly dependent on compound
- 3 Moderately dependent on compound
- 4 Highly dependent on compound
- 5 Don't know
- 6 DNA

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16. What is the source of drinking water for most of the people in your community?
- 1 Govt. pipelines
 - 2 Wells, not at U. S. compound
 - 3 River, lake, stream
 - 4 Source from U. S. compound
 - 5 Don't know
 - 6 DNA
17. What is the source of electricity in your community?
- 1 Govt. power lines
 - 2 Local generator, not on U. S. compound
 - 3 Power from U. S. compound
 - 4 No electricity
18. Have you had very much contact with Americans, prior to serving on the CRAC?
- 1 A great deal
 - 2 A moderate amount of contact
 - 3 Very little contact
 - 4 No contact
19. How were you first contacted by the Americans who asked you to serve on the CRAC?
(e.g., telephone, through personal friend, by letter, etc.)
-
-
20. What was your first reaction to this? How did you feel about it?
-
-
21. Would you say you still feel the same about it? _____
22. (If not) Why? What would you say caused your feelings to change?
-
-
23. What do you think the Americans expect from the CRAC? What do they seem to think should be its major concerns and objectives?
-
-
24. What do the Koreans expect from the CRAC? What do they think should be its major concerns and objectives?
-
-

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25. How do you think the Korean community can help the Americans here?

26. Is there any way in which the Americans can help the Koreans here? How?

27. Have the Americans here done anything to help you with any of the problems you have mentioned (in item 11)? _____ What? _____

Problem

Assistance given

28. With what problems have you helped the Americans?

Problem

Assistance given

29. Generally speaking, do you think the Koreans in this area like Americans?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 More tolerated than liked
- 5 DNA

30. Generally speaking, do you think Americans in this area like Koreans?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 More tolerated than liked
- 5 DNA

31. How about the people on CRAC? Do you think the Americans on CRAC like the Koreans on CRAC?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 Other, _____
- 5 DNA

32. Well, do the Koreans on CRAC genuinely like the Americans on CRAC?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 Other, _____
- 5 DNA

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33. How do you get (learn about) the news? Which of these is the source of most of the news you get?

- 1 Newspaper, magazines
- 2 Radio
- 3 Television
- 4 Word-of-mouth (i. e., neighbors, friends, associates)
- 5 Don't know
- 6 Other, _____
- 7 DNA

34a. What kind of impression of the Americans do you get from the news?

b. Is this impression good, bad, or neutral?

- 1 Good
- 2 Bad
- 3 Neutral
- 4 Don't know
- 5 Other, _____
- 6 DNA

35. What do the Koreans like most about American Soldiers?

36. What do Koreans dislike most about American Soldiers?

37. What do Americans like most about Koreans?

38. What do Americans dislike most about Koreans?

39. What could the U. S. military do to improve the relationship with your community?

COMMUNICATION

40. Who would you say is the most influential person in your community?
(Identify by position) Position

- 1 _____
- 2 _____

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41. Why is he (1) so influential?

42. Is there any one American on CRAC who you feel you can go to with a problem of mutual concern, and expect a significant amount of help or co-operation in solving the problem? Who?

	Name	Position
1	_____	_____
2	_____	_____

43. Why would you say this person is helpful?

44. Do you meet informally with or telephone this person to work out problems? How about social or friendship meetings?

- 1 Yes, problem-solving only
- 2 Yes, friendship only
- 3 Yes, both friendship and problem-solving
- 4 No
- 5 DNA

45. Is this usually a telephone call, a visit to your office, a visit to his office, a meeting somewhere in town, or what?

- 1 Telephone call
- 2 Visit to Korean's office
- 3 Visit to American's office
- 4 Exchange of visits in both Korean and American offices
- 5 Telephone and visits to Korean's office
- 6 Telephone and visits to U. S. unit
- 7 Telephone and mutual visits
- 8 Other, _____
- 9 No visits, no telephone calls
- 0 DNA

46. How often do you meet with or talk to this person about problems in a typical month?

- 1 1 time
- 2 2 times
- 3 3 times
- 4 4 times
- 5 5 times
- 6 6 times
- 7 7 times
- 8 8 times
- 9 9 times or more
- 0 Not at all
- X Don't know
- Y DNA

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47. How often do you meet with this person for conversation, drinking, or other social activity?

- 1 1 time
- 2 2 times
- 3 3 times
- 4 4 times
- 5 5 times
- 6 6 times
- 7 7 times
- 8 8 times
- 9 9 times or more
- 0 Not at all
- X Don't know
- Y DNA

48. What kinds of problems do you usually discuss?

49. Do you, and the other Koreans on CRAC, feel free to discuss all problems of interest to both yourselves and the Americans, or are there some problems you hesitate to bring up or discuss?

- 1 Discuss all problems
- 2 Hesitate to discuss some problems or topics
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

50. What problems or topics are these? Why do you or the other Koreans hesitate to discuss them?

1 _____

2 _____

3 _____

51. Do you think the Americans are unwilling to discuss (or hesitant to discuss) some problems in CRAC meetings?

- 1 They will discuss all problems
- 2 They are unwilling or hesitant to discuss some
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

52. What do you think these problems are?

1 _____

2 _____

3 _____

53. (If problems were mentioned in item 52) What do you think are the reasons Americans hesitate to discuss these problems?

1 _____

2 _____

3 _____

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54. Is the difference in languages a source of problems in making yourself understood to the Americans in CRAC meetings?
- 1 Yes, frequently
 - 2 Yes, occasionally
 - 3 No
 - 4 Don't know
 - 5 DNA
55. Who is your interpreter in CRAC meetings?
- 1 U. S. employee, Korean National
 - 2 Civilian Korean National, not employed by the U. S.
 - 3 ROKA or KATUSA
 - 4 Other arrangement
 - 5 No interpreter
 - 6 DNA
- 56a. How well do you think he translates? What is his skill level?
- 1 Excellent or outstanding
 - 2 Good
 - 3 Adequate, or fair
 - 4 Poor
 - 5 Don't know
 - 6 DNA
- b. Do you think he is fair to all members in his translations, or does he favor one side?
- 1 Fair to all
 - 2 Favors some members, but not one side
 - 3 Favors the Americans
 - 4 Favors the Koreans
 - 5 Don't know
 - 6 DNA
57. Approximately how many hours do you spend in a typical month working with American CRAC members, outside of actual CRAC meetings, on working out problems of mutual concern, other than assistance projects such as AFAK? _____
58. And how many hours do you spend in a typical month working with Americans on planning or executing assistance projects? _____
59. In the CRAC meetings, what problems are discussed? I would like to ask you to name the five most typical problems your CRAC has considered in the past few months.
- a. List problems:
- 1 _____
 - 2 _____
 - 3 _____
 - 4 _____
 - 5 _____
- b. (Do not ask respondent for this information, but if he states that the meetings are primarily social in nature, and that not many problems are discussed, indicate by a check mark below)
Meetings are primarily social events _____
Not indicated _____

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60. Were the Americans cooperative in planning solutions for these problems? (read each problem and ask for response)

	Yes	No	Don't know	DNA
1	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	_____	_____	_____	_____

61. Were these problems first mentioned by the Korean or American members?

	American	Korean	Mutually brought up	Recurring
1	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	_____	_____	_____	_____

62. What kinds of solutions were formulated for the problems we are discussing?

1	_____
2	_____
3	_____
4	_____
5	_____

63. Are these solutions satisfactory to you? Why not?

1	_____
2	_____
3	_____
4	_____
5	_____

64. We speak of programs of mutual interest, in which both Koreans and Americans participate, working together. What programs of this kind have taken place here in the past few months?

1	_____
2	_____
3	_____
4	_____
5	_____

65. Were these programs satisfactory to you? Do you think they were successful?

	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Don't know	DNA
1	_____	_____	_____	_____
2	_____	_____	_____	_____
3	_____	_____	_____	_____
4	_____	_____	_____	_____
5	_____	_____	_____	_____

66. When the U. S. Army plans a new construction project, such as a bridge or an airstrip, they have to consider whether it will cause problems for the Koreans. Also, when the Army changes its policies regarding such issues as passes and defense plans, they consider that it may cause problems for civilians as well. When the Korean Government starts new construction (such as a road) or changes its policies (such as curfew

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hours), this may cause problems for the American Army unit in this area. One way we can avoid some of the problems is to discuss the planned activity or changes in CRAC councils. Has your CRAC had any discussions of these kinds of matters in the past few months?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

67. What were these topics?

- 1 _____
- 2 _____
- 3 _____
- 4 _____
- 5 _____

68. Were any problems identified as a result of these discussions?

- | | Yes | No | Don't know | DNA |
|---|-------|-------|------------|-------|
| 1 | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 2 | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 3 | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 4 | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 5 | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |

69. Have any jointly sponsored events (involving both Koreans and Americans) taken place in this community in the past few months? (Examples: athletic events, ceremonies, tours of places of local interest, picnics)

- 1 _____

70. What were these events?

- 1 _____
- 2 _____
- 3 _____
- 4 _____
- 5 _____

71. Were these events well attended by both Americans and Koreans?

- | | Yes | No | Don't know | DNA |
|---|-------|-------|------------|-------|
| 1 | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 2 | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 3 | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 4 | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 5 | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ |

72. Are any jointly sponsored events scheduled in this community during the next 30 days?

- 1 Yes _____
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

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Evaluations of CRAC Functions

73. CRACs are said to have a number of functions which serve to help it reach the stated objective of "IMPROVING RELATIONS." Listed below are some of these functions. Please indicate the extent to which you feel they are taking place in your CRAC, considering the points on the scales shown as "1" as "poor" and "7" as the best possible achievement of the function shown:

- a. Establishing an effective two-way channel of communication.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

- b. Identifying potential or actual problems of mutual concern.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

- c. Developing plans to solve problems of mutual concern.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

- d. Planning and executing programs of mutual concern.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

- e. Evaluating the possible effects of actions contemplated by either the local command or the community.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

- f. Developing wholesome contacts between the command and the community.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Poor	Poor	Somewhat Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Outstanding

Now, I would like to ask you some more general questions:

74. What kinds of things would you say an American should keep in mind when he is meeting with Koreans, on a CRAC council or elsewhere?

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75. In your CRAC council, do you think either side places too much emphasis on matters that are primarily of interest to that side, rather than matters which should be of mutual interest?

- 1 Yes, the U. S. side
- 2 Yes, the Korean side
- 3 Yes, both sides
- 4 No
- 5 Don't know
- 6 DNA

76a. Do you think the American co-chairman on your CRAC ever uses the promise of assistance, or aid, to persuade the Koreans to agree with him on other problems?

- 1 Yes, frequently
- 2 Yes, occasionally
- 3 No
- 4 Don't know
- 5 DNA

b. What do you think of this?

77. In the past, has there even been a time when the Americans made an assistance commitment, which later could not be "delivered" or "made good"?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

Remarks _____

78. When was this? Has it been during 1968?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Does not apply (skip)
- 4 Don't know
- 5 DNA

79. Well, when the Americans make a promise of aid, do they usually keep the promise?

- 1 Always
- 2 Usually
- 3 Sometimes
- 4 Seldom
- 5 Never
- 6 Don't know
- 7 DNA

80. Do you feel that the Americans on your CRAC give you the opportunity to participate meaningfully in making decisions in CRAC?

- 1 Always
- 2 Usually
- 3 Sometimes

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80. Do you feel that the Americans on your CRAC give you the opportunity to participate meaningfully in making decisions in CRAC? (continued)

- 4 Seldom
- 5 Never
- 6 Don't know
- 7 DNA

81. Do you think the amount of discussion that takes place in CRAC is satisfactory?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

82. Do you think the Americans on CRAC have a tendency to impose decisions on the Korean community rather than arriving at decisions by mutual agreement?

- 1 Frequently
- 2 Occasionally
- 3 Very seldom
- 4 Never

83. Generally, would you say that most decisions involving the problems which arise between the American military and your community are made to your satisfaction?

- 1 All of them resolved satisfactorily
- 2 Most of them resolved satisfactorily
- 3 Half of them resolved satisfactorily
- 4 Few of them resolved satisfactorily
- 5 None of them resolved satisfactorily
- 6 Don't know
- 7 DNA

84. Are most of these problems worked out in CRAC, or in informal meetings between a few persons?

- 1 In CRAC
- 2 Informally
- 3 About half-and-half
- 4 Don't know
- 5 DNA

REMARKS _____

85. Who are these persons? Who are the Americans and Koreans who work out problems informally?

	Americans	Koreans
1	_____	_____
2	_____	_____
3	_____	_____
4	_____	_____

86. Why is (American, 1st choice) helpful in working out problems with Koreans?

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87. Do the Americans on CRAC spend much time with Korean CRAC members in friendship relationships?
- 1 Yes, in conjunction with meetings only
 - 2 Yes, on occasions other than meeting dates
 - 3 No
 - 4 Don't know
 - 5 DNA
88. Do you think that there is a great deal of continuity in the CRAC program from one meeting to the next, or is it just taking up matters as they occur?
- 1 Great deal of continuity
 - 2 Very little continuity
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA
89. Generally speaking, would you say that the majority of the problems brought before the CRAC are at the initiative of the U. S. or Korean participants?
- 1 U. S.
 - 2 Korean
 - 3 About 50-50
 - 4 Don't know
 - 5 DNA
90. During the past three months, how many meetings of CRAC have taken place?
- 1 1
 - 2 2
 - 3 3
 - 4 More than 3
 - 5 Don't know
 - 6 DNA
 - 0 None
91. How many meetings have been cancelled during the past 3 months?
- 0 0
 - 1 1
 - 2 2
 - 3 3
 - 4 More than 3
 - 5 Don't know
 - 6 DNA
92. (If 91 was not "0") Were the meetings cancelled by Americans or Koreans?
- 0 None cancelled
 - 1 Americans
 - 2 Koreans
 - 3 Both, or mutual request
 - 4 Don't know
 - 5 DNA
93. Why were the meetings cancelled?
- 1 _____
 - 2 _____
 - 3 _____

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AFAK and other assistance

Now, I would like to ask you some questions about assistance programs.

94. Do you know about the "AFAK" program? Can you tell me generally what it is?

95. What kinds of projects has your community had under AFAK?

	Project	Year
1	_____	_____
2	_____	_____
3	_____	_____

96. Do you think the AFAK program has been of any value to your community?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

97. Well, has your experience with the AFAK program generally been satisfactory?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA

REMARKS _____

98. Why do you say this, what is the reason you have been satisfied (or dissatisfied) with AFAK?

99. Let me ask, when there is an AFAK project, what is the source of labor for the project? Are the workers volunteers, or are they paid (contract labor)?

- 1 Volunteers
- 2 Paid labor
- 3 Don't know
- 4 DNA
- 5 No projects, no experience with AFAK, etc.

100. What kind of help does the local U. S. Army unit provide most often? Transportation? Materials? Medical aid? AFAK projects?

Most often _____
Other _____

101. When your community has to ask for something from the U. S. Army, is the U. S. commander usually sincere and reasonable in considering the request?

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102. Is volunteer labor used in your community for construction or repair for public facilities such as schools, roads, culverts, and bridges?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA
103. Has the American commander ever asked for volunteer labor to help with military construction, repairs, grass cutting, clearing, trees, road maintenance, or some similar project?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA
104. If he were to ask, do you think the people here would be willing to help?
- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Don't know
 - 4 DNA
105. Let me ask you something about the ROKA. What types of assistance programs have the ROKA Conducted in your area in the past year?
- 1 _____
 - 2 _____
 - 3 _____
106. Have you actually seen Korean soldiers working on these projects?
- _____
- _____

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AMERICANS PARTICIPATING IN YOUR CRAC COUNCIL ARE:

3 2 1 0 1 2 3

Realistic									Unrealistic
Practical									Impractical
Patient									Impatient
Dominating									Passive
Selfish									Unselfish
Cooperative									Uncooperative
Honest									Dishonest
Idealist									Cynical
Hostile									Friendly
Good									Bad
Arrogant									Modest
Superior to Koreans									Inferior to Koreans
Superior to other Americans									Inferior to other Americans
Respect Koreans									Disregard Koreans
Try to help us									Try to hurt us
Frank									Reticent
Wise									Stupid
Trustworthy									Untrustworthy
Usual									Unusual

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GENERALLY THE CRAC IS:

3 2 1 0 1 2 3

Worthwhile										Not worthwhile
Cannot settle problems										Can settle problems
Effective for the advancement of friendly relations										Hardly effective for the advancement of friendly relations
Maybe very helpful for mutual understanding										May hardly be helpful for mutual understanding
May promote wholesome association between American troops and local Koreans										Can hardly promote wholesome association between Americans and local Koreans
Helpful very much for reducing VD										Not very helpful for reducing VD
Dominated by Koreans										Dominated by Americans
Can hardly control (check) theft in U. S. compound										May highly check the theft in U. S. compound
Can hardly be an effective mutual contact point between government officials of ROK and U. S.										Effective mutual contact point between ROK and U. S. government officials
Not an excellent get together for communication										Excellent place for discussion for communication (exchange of opinions)
Effective										Ineffective

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GENERALLY AMERICANS ARE:

3 2 1 0 1 2 3

Kind								Cruel
Greedy								Generous
Sensitive								Callous
Competent								Incompetent
Poor								Rich
Arrogant								Modest
Superior to Koreans								Inferior to Koreans
Bad								Good
Sincere								Insincere
Practical								Impractical
True								False
Dishonest								Honest
Beautiful								Ugly
Sophisticated								Simple
Stupid								Wise
Diligent								Lazy
Clean								Dirty
Not patriotic								Patriotic
Dominating								Passive
Anti-Korean								Pro-Korean
Ambitious								Idle
Coward								Brave
Considerate								Not considerate
Educated								Not educated
Stubborn								Flexible
Moral								Immoral

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GENERALLY AMERICANS THINK THAT KOREANS ARE:

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	
Kind								Cruel
Trustworthy								Not trustworthy
Hostile to Americans								Friendly to Americans
Agreeable								Contemptible
Stupid								Wise
Generous								Stingy
Patient								Impatient
Arrogant								Modest
Good								Bad
Superior to Americans								Inferior to Americans
Respected by Americans								Disregarded by Americans
Incompetent								Powerful

GENERALLY AMERICANS FEEL THAT KOREANS:

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	
Control Americans								Controlled by Americans
Keep promises								Do not keep promises
Look down on Americans								Look up to Americans
Interested in American problems								Not interested in American problems
Like Americans								Dislike Americans

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13. ABSTRACT The study had two purposes: (1) to determine how the Army may best monitor the performance of the CRACs in the future and (2) how to evaluate the Community Relations Advisory Council (CRAC) program. Two criteria for successful performance were deduced for the evaluation portion from the regulation covering the Community Relations Advisory Councils: (1) the development of positive affect among the Koreans toward the Americans in CRAC and (2) the level to which the CRAC performed the tasks outlined for it in the regulation. Extensive data were collected for about a year (1968-1969). The sample of respondents included 104 Americans and 63 Koreans from 31 CRACs. The results indicated that successful performance by a CRAC is related to (1) the attitude of the Americans, (2) the use of assistance programs, (3) the followthrough on assistance promises, (4) the quality and type of interpreters, (5) the level of continuity, (6) the approach to bargaining, and (7) the handling of sensitive topics. Two types of recommendations were made for future evaluations. The first was a general set of guidelines for the Army to use in instituting evaluation programs. The second was twofold, with one portion consisting of a list of questions from the interview schedule used in this study that were most used in discriminating among degrees of success; and a second portion consisting of a list of general questions for concept areas from which other evaluations may be drawn.		

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