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ALTERNATIVE 1975-85 POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTS FOR MILITARY PLANNERS

A CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW WITH THEMATIC CHARTS

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A CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW

ALTERNATIVE 1975-1985 POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
FOR MILITARY PLANNERS

"...almost any day has some chance of bringing up some new crisis or unexpected event that becomes a historical turning point, diverting current tendencies so that expectations for the distant future must shift."

The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years

PART I  SOME BASIC CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS

Preface

It is the purpose of this draft overview to give a synoptic account of the entire report. We are not trying to make any particular statement very persuasive, we are simply trying to give the reader enough of an account of the material in this study so that he can be reasonably familiar with what the report contains.

The report is divided into four parts. In the first part we attempt to give a fairly complete account of the current state of the world and the current trends in the world. The objective is to provide a reasonably firm basis for our later work. In Part II we introduce a methodological device of defining to some degree artificially, to some degree realistically, three perspectives from which one can view these international issues. These three perspectives, we argue, are close to the three major perspectives within the current administration. Thus they enable us usefully to consider a range of attitudes, a range of uncertainties. In Part III we attempt to give a rather complete account of a number of very controversial trends in the United States today, particularly various kinds of domestic issues that might arise in such a way as to critically influence military decisions, military capabilities, military programs. The objective here is not to "educate" military planners in how to manipulate the general public but in a way just the opposite—how to make military planners aware enough of political trends so they can operate effectively in a classically apolitical fashion; how they can operate in such a way that they don't exacerbate trends which are poor for the country. Finally in Part IV we focus attention on the relatively narrow military problems, but even here we try to do so with enough breadth and scope as to give an adequate context to the reader. In most cases the issues dealt with in Part IV are issues which have been around a long time; for example, issues of leadership and skill have been with us since the earliest days.
of the system of war. And in general though these are kinds of issues which arise when two nation-states or two groupings confront each other, their form changes. As one would expect, the details are all important, and therefore require fresh study over and over again.

As is observed later in the study, perhaps more than any other planner, the military planner is confronted with the near impossible task of consciously, explicitly, and rationally preparing for the "most likely" course of events while responsibly hedging against the good and the bad. This is, of course, one of the main reasons for the interest of the military planner in futurist studies. Such futurist studies are now much in vogue in general. While in some important ways they represent a new phenomena, in other ways they are as old as man himself. History has recorded the lives and actions of a host of prophets, soothsayers and other visionaries whose main stock in trade (if any) may have been a touch of clairvoyance, superior perspicacity, intelligent insights and intuitions, special experience, and varying degrees of luck. Many of these characteristics still play an important role in current attempts to gain reasonably reliable perspectives of the future--and when they don't, contemporary man's capacity to address himself intelligently to the problems of the future, despite the availability of "new techniques and tools" often fails disastrously and/or miserably.

But the advance of science and technology have provided man with more "hard" tools than ever before with which to measure, quantify, relate and synthesize with the aim, ultimately, to project the "present" into various alternatives. An additional element enhancing man's capacity for reasonable prognosis are the many tangible improvements in the methodology of forecasting and prediction--some of them, of course, just being the systematic application of that increasingly uncommon quality, "common sense," and others being relatively esoteric and technical.

Man's current capacity to predict the future is also affected by the current great interest in studying and shaping the future--since the future may be as much influenced by our perceptions as by our action-oriented commitments--indeed influential images of the future can generate both self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecies. Thus, our current fascination for conceptualizing possible futures itself affects the future in very complex ways. Placed in these terms futurist studies--his own and others--are also very much a "part of the problem" that the military planner is trying to study as well as a potential solution.

Despite the progress in hard data, tools, and methodology--and many years of experience--it is easy to argue against the relevance and use of futurist studies by overemphasizing the role of incalculable elements or the problems caused by the admitted--and to some degree inevitable--imperfections of futurist methodology. Nevertheless, various attempts to analyze the past and present in order to identify, define and clarify recurring patterns and enduring trends have been rewarding. These and other efforts at futurology create the necessary frameworks within which one can construct plausible and usable images of the future; they also pose and counterpose other alternatives and conflicting trends. At the minimum
such studies may establish an intellectual consensus based on commonly held assumptions and couched in commonly accepted language. Of course, both the consensus and the assumptions may be wrong, but almost any usable framework is better than anarchy—at least as long as there is sufficient awareness of the possible uncertainties and the defects. But good or bad, some framework is necessary for almost any rational planning, whether it involves contingency plans or appropriate resource allocations. One can of course, always drop the requirement to be "explicitly rational" and depend instead on experience, judgment, politics, and/or sheer bias and guess, but for a lot of bureaucratic and political—as well as important substantive—reasons this is decreasingly practical or desirable—whether the major planning is done by the Joint Chiefs or by civilian systems analysts. And it is in exactly this spirit that we present this study—as a first draft of a framework which the military planner can refine and then use in his own projections and analyses.

**Domestic Issues Presented**

Though the focus is on the military planner, a rather provocative discussion of possible future social, economic and political trends affecting the United States domestic scene is included in our study. Yet, as is noted in the study, "a document directed to an American military staff which includes comment on controversial domestic trends carries with it a risk of impropriety." The mission of the United States armed forces is to defend the nation against external threats to its security and to execute those foreign policy tasks assigned it by duly constituted civilian authority. These sound traditions of apoliticism of the American military establishment are rooted in our constitution. Hudson believes, however, that an understanding of the discernible and most likely domestic trends may often be crucial to the ability of the Services to discharge their constitutional obligations while maintaining constitutional impartiality. To comprehend and anticipate the political dynamics of the society which they serve while preserving a spirit of intellectual autonomy and impartiality may become as complex a responsibility for the Services as any they have ever faced.

**Some Sources of Stability/Instability**

Central to a discussion of the inherent stability or instability of the contemporary international system is the basic, and widely accepted, notion that an intense United States-Soviet Union confrontation is extremely unlikely in the short and, perhaps, the medium range future. This consensus stems from a number of beliefs, among them: 1) neither side would deliberately seek such a confrontation; 2) indeed both sides would shrink from one; 3) no trivial cause seems likely, deliberately or accidentally, to upset the balance; and 4) the kind of crisis which would strain the system (e.g., an uprising in Eastern Europe and intervention by Americans or Western Europeans) seems relatively unlikely. While other factors may upset this stability, none currently seems likely to.
Part I also introduces the reader to Hudson's extensive use of thematic charts which are designed to present facts and views—sometimes provocatively—in any case to stimulate the military planner to reconsider familiar problems and to acquaint him with the many dimensions and interrelations of these and other aspects of today's world. Thus one chart on the first chart page usefully recalls the enduring force of nationalism and the nation-state as the basic unit in the international system. For the foreseeable likely futures the nation-state is likely to provide the framework of most corporate action in all modern societies. This current nation-state system is complex, being designed to wage peace as much as to wage war. Thus, while each nation is the sovereign judge of its own causes and other affairs, it is subject also to restraints, some of which are self-imposed, some a result of the force of world opinion and international organizations and, of course, some the result of the weighty "objective" factor of the U.S.-Soviet "consensus" and finally the pressure of other nations' threats and promises.

An Improvement in International Norms?

Among the less tangible factors inhibiting the more egoistic nation-state actions and, in effect, international violence, is the wide appreciation of the notion of "one human community" with universal basic "human rights." Lending this idea additional force has been the impact of modern technology which has opened up relatively unforeseen peaceful avenues for realizing national fulfillment and has tended to obviate pressures for territorial aggrandizement. Thus, internal development has become "both the efficient and fashionable technique for achieving most national objectives" (power, influence and wealth).

With the recent events in Czechoslovakia acting as a timely caveat, it seems reasonable to argue that this is a main-line trend toward less violence and toward higher norms of international behavior. Yet these can be reversed by "miscalculation," "irrational behavior," "revival of violent ideologies," "defensive actions designed to prevent erosion of a position," etc.

The Political Basis of the Stability

Despite the above possibilities for violence, the world seems safer at this writing than it was in the fifties and than it may be in the eighties or nineties. This argument is illustrated by a graph on one chart and supported by a list on another chart. This last chart lists sixteen specific reasons: first and foremost is the dramatic postwar recovery of Europe and Japan. Rather paradoxically, this "contribution" to world stability is enhanced by the continued relative military weakness of Japan and Germany, the two most powerful nations economically behind the United States and the Soviet Union, and by the weakness of the underdeveloped nations as well. Had any of these countries had the kind of nuclear weaponry during the decade of 1950-1960 that should be available to some of them in the next decade or so, the world would likely have
experienced some extremely touchy situations. Indeed under these circumstances war scenarios would be quite easy to compose even today. But this points up that one should not be too sanguine in the long run, since this study considers as a serious possibility that many of these sixteen reasons for the current feeling of safety will end by the end of this century. For example, a couple of dozen nations will possess significant (anno 1965) strategic arms and delivery capability. Moreover, in the seventies the Soviet Union will not feel "inferior" to the United States in strategic weapons capability. A sense of strategic parity with the United States prompted the Soviet Union once before (the late fifties and early sixties) to attempt political gains and the removal of this recent psychological inhibition may have unforeseen consequences.

Contrary to those who would view this development with great and urgent concern, there are those who would argue that the impact of the Soviet "Thermidor" is undermining Soviet ideological fervor and that the passions of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution are spent. (Indeed, many would argue that the great postwar ideological confrontation between communism and "capitalism" has ended and that even Washington's conflict with Peking is not essentially ideological in nature but more of a clash with traditional Chinese ("Middle Kingdom") aspirations.) A series of disappointments in the foreign policy sphere, within the communist movement and the absence of encouraging internal development dynamics may also have contributed to a Soviet loss of confidence or, as some would have it, of "nerve." This latter notion is, to say the least, controversial and one which the vacillating and indecisive behavior of the Soviets both before and after the August events have done little to clarify.

Turning Point Issues

While we may never be able to discern the core of Soviet resolve at any given moment or in future perspective, the basic world political environment with its various trends toward increasing pluralism and complexity will pose challenges to existing alliances, regional understandings and raise new and disturbing issues in all modern societies. It is of first-rank importance, therefore, that possible turning point issues be recognized and their probability and possible impact assessed. Foremost among these would be the outcome of the Vietnamese war, of the Middle East confrontation or a Sino-Soviet rapprochement or "reversal of alliances." The success or failure of Soviet occupation policies in Czechoslovakia, for example, could have ramifications far beyond the Soviets' sphere of influence in Europe. A relatively successful pacification of Czechs and Slovaks could infuse new elan into a communist "movement" now in general disarray and whet once again Soviet appetites for foreign "adventures." It might also deal a grievous blow to Western morale. Conversely, failure to discipline the Czechs and Slovaks and contain the ideological and political challenge of the Czechoslovak "experiment" could loose other "revisionist" trends in the area, exacerbate the Sino-Soviet dispute and, in general, increase the possibility of a rebellion in East Europe, an area which represents in any case an unstable factor of no small consequence in the current international system.
Finally, a likely development is the emergence of several nations by the end of 1985 as potential or real nuclear powers. Most importantly from the political point of view are the indications that Japan will probably be among them and that Europe may have arrived at some effective regional nuclear arrangement. Thus, the world of 1985, our study notes, "might be one of four or more nuclear power centers with competitive foreign policies."

Alternative Future Perspectives

Even a mere listing of possible turning point issues is a studied and tangible stride toward a more meaningful understanding of both the present and the future. It encourages juxtaposition of one alternative to another and by comparative analogy helps clarify feasible policy options. The eight separate sections or chapters following our lengthy discussion of the sources of current international stability and instability are variations on the same theme. The first of these notes a general agreement that most advanced societies are undergoing rapid and basic social and cultural changes, perhaps as fast as any modern society has ever experienced. Borrowing once again techniques developed in our "Year 2000" study, some of the basic trends contributing to the quickening pace of change are charted. Of particular importance for our future considerations is the radical metamorphosis which our own American value systems are undergoing. Paradoxically, part of the reason for this unprecedented pressure for change is the generally acknowledged "success" of the "current system." This economic success is then the justification for a "permissive dilution" or "distortion" of attitudes and values. All this generates new social experiences, new institutional expressions, modes of behavior ("mosaic pattern of life styles"), etc. Basic economic shifts and swift evolution (or collapse) in value systems may act to polarize societal forces and complicate the difficult transition to a post-industrial society which most currently developed countries will be making by the 1975-1985 period.

Three U.S. "Futures"

Given the steadily rising rate, in the U.S., of domestic dissent and protest and its obvious potential for escalation, the proposition could be argued that in the period under review the United States could become difficult to govern. There are, of course, many "de-fusing" factors in American society plus the expectation that current levels of dissent are now "peaking," however, which make a less grim future perspective appear more plausible. We examined seven possibilities in the report. We will consider only three here.

In the "neutral prognosis" set forth in the report it is assumed that the resolution of Vietnam did not have a profoundly unsettling effect on the main lines of social evolution and that U.S. society in general proves to be very flexible and tolerant toward the new "late sensate." "post
sensate," (and perhaps insensate) cultures and "life styles." In this projection, "deviant" behavior is mainly confined to intellectual and upper middle class groups and the loss of "nerve" of the nation's elites (analogous to what happened in Third and Fourth Century B.C. Athens) is not shared by the population at large. Relatively more serious is a negative syndrome of increasing international irritation with U.S. foreign policies and actions and a profound U.S. disenchantment with such patent misunderstanding and lack of gratitude. In short, there is mutual alienation between the U.S. and the rest of the world.

A saving grace of this U.S. society is the emergence of "neo-stoicism." By staffing the bureaucracy in much the same way as the "soldier-public official" did in Imperial Rome, the neo-stoic becomes one of the mainstays of the establishment.

There are dissenting scenarios to the one given above. A more optimistic version holds that the transition to a "mosaic of life styles" is much smoother and enjoys a fairly general acceptance. Both conservative and radical criticism is less persuasive, government programs aimed at meliorating social injustices and positive charismatic projects are relatively successful and there is less spotlighting of societal defects and societal apathy and boredom. In particular greater participation by the young and the black, blunts militancy and effectively demonstrates the flexibility of the system. Members of the "Technocratic and Responsible Center" form the hard core of ruling elites.

A third and more pessimistic prognosis is the "negative" of the second. It foresees severe stress introduced in society by the "value ferment" and the various ostentatious and provocative life-styles. One becomes increasingly polarized and increasingly prone to ignore the currently operative restraints. One result: more internecine violence. Externally, America exhibits a dangerous dichotomy, tending toward unilateral interventionism and toward withdrawal to "Fortress America." Mutual antagonism between the U.S. and its former allies rises significantly, resulting in such things as a degree of economic protectionism which could possibly signal the beginning of a world economic crisis. America moves toward internal strife and possible totalitarian solutions.

European Alternatives

Europe is in a state of flux; while it still has low morale it also seems to have tired somewhat of being an object rather than a participant of world politics. Regardless of this emergent aspiration to play a larger role it would appear on balance that Europe during the 1975-1985 period will continue to be more passive than active on a global scale. Barring a major crisis or almost complete U.S. withdrawal from or abdication of certain major interests, Europe's interests are likely to be fairly parochial; it would take a major crisis indeed to turn Europe from its usual preoccupation with such domestic affairs as constructing mass consumption and post-industrial societies.
There are, however, enough problems of secondary order which are still at the center of European politics. There is the question of British entry into the Common Market, or the extent to which economic integration will spill over into the political, and/or the extent to which interlocking "functionalism" will gradually replace the nation-state as the main vehicle for action and expression. France is extremely reluctant, Germany beset with problems of reunification, others with the problem of Soviet hegemony. The fires of traditional national disputes—borders, minorities, the cohesion of a multi-national state like Yugoslavia—are not extinguished; they smoulder on. Even the resourceful Scandinavians have yet to overcome the basic problems of a natural geopolitical regionalism.

While NATO remains very much a part of European defense schemes, especially among smaller nations, strategic nuclear issues are still moot questions. Europe, having experienced war devastation, holds decidedly different views than does the U.S. on the strategic and tactical use of nuclear weapons. But even the question of whether NATO continues to exist or in what changed form is secondary to the need to channel internal socio-political forces constructively toward the kind of institutions able to cope with the future demands of a post-industrial society. As noted elsewhere in this study, there is a tangible decline in traditional political parties amidst increasing criticism of the Western welfare state. This on-going struggle over resource allocations is compounded by distinct differences in three currently active generations. The first having experienced war and appeasement built the system, the second grew up with the threat of nuclear destruction overshadowing many, perhaps all, political issues, and the third has experienced unprecedented affluence and safety.

A Debate on Detente

As in the past a central question in any new policy debate concerning Europe is that of the most effective approach to overcome the divisions of Europe. The Czechoslovak affair seems also to have both lent new impetus to this desire, and foreclosed the bridge-building policies. Those interested in reunification now ask more intensely than ever: Is detente the appropriate frame? Has the tactic of "peaceful engagement" or "bridge-building" been discredited? Are there viable alternatives? These and other old and new assumptions governing approaches to not only the question of a divided Europe but East-West relations in general conclude Hudson's discussion of various current European alternatives, given the current international system.

Japan: Portents of Power

Japan will start the seventies as just barely the third largest economic power in the world, having passed France and West Germany in the late sixties. By the end of the seventies she should have grown by a factor of 3, and by the mid-eighties perhaps a factor of 5 over what it
was in 1970. Therefore, during most of the period of interest Japan will not only easily be the third strongest economic power in the world but it will be a near-superpower. There are of course uncertainties in this prediction but it is interesting to note that in the last two decades there has been great emphasis on the likely topping out of Japanese growth rates by both the Japanese and non-Japanese economist. This emphasis has almost disappeared. It is of course possible that all the economists will be wrong together. One can make very persuasive arguments that the Japanese will be able to deal with all of their problems and while some topping out may occur at the end of the period, most likely there will be no serious topping out until the end of the century, if then.

There will, of course, be a transition period in which there will be at least some tension and possibly great tensions caused by Japan's being an economic giant and a political dwarf. In addition, as discussed in the report, it may well be a culture-identity crisis, a radical reversion to traditional value systems or simply a search for new meaning and purpose. Any of these might cause serious instabilities.

Nevertheless, in the standard surprise-free projection, we assume that the assumption of power by the Showa (postwar generation) is relatively trouble-free and Japan's alliance with the U.S. is continued. She is internationally active—maintaining correct, even cordial, relations with Russia and attempts to mediate relations between China and the world—and is increasingly conscious of her major role in Asia. Essentially she strives—for concrete economic and political reasons—to be the model citizen of the world.

A pro-American version of this scenario would tend to accentuate the position above, particularly as regards Japan's positive activism along parallel lines with U.S. policy in Asia. A negative variant suggests the emergence of a nationalist, right or left-oriented Japan which would be implicitly anti-American and would likely seek to carve out spheres of primary or even exclusive influence, both economic and political, in Asia, Africa and Latin America which would challenge contemporary blocs, groupings and other areas of influence. Other alternatives discussed fall among the above possibilities.

Soviet Contradictions

From one point of view, it can be argued that Soviet foreign policy since the founding of the Soviet state has evolved from one of frankly fostering revolution to, with some important exceptions (e.g., some aspect of Soviet Middle East policy), an almost conservative policy of defending the status quo interests of a superpower. This trend may be an accurate reflection of the assumed basically conservative cast of the current Soviet leadership. In particular the traumatic historical experience of Stalinism has caused the Soviet Union to build in "organizational obstacles" to a return to such radical rule. One such obstacle is, of course, the collectivist nature of the Soviet Communist party executive;
It seems to many to have proven also to be a formidable obstacle to the
effective conduct of a dynamic foreign policy. Indeed, it would appear
that not only has there been little or no "progress" in the sixties in
the sense of positive Communist achievements, but that Soviet society
gives increasing evidence of a "Russian" regression. But there is no
room for Western complacency. On the contrary, The contradiction be-
tween theory and practice, between doctrine and reality poses the pros-
pect of an unacceptable and intolerable failure to achieve some of the
fundamental norms of Soviet society. The seeming current inability of
any faction or political movement operating within the "system" to over-
come these contradictions augurs ill for the stability of Soviet society
and the International Communist movement. Moreover, no other large and
modern power is saddled with the geo-political and frontier complications
confronting the Soviet leadership. While there is no doubt that the
Soviets could cope physically with stark threats and challenges on its
political periphery (e.g., Czechoslovakia, China?), the situation in
the coming fifteen years may get both complex and more challenging--and
therefore perhaps increasingly crisis prone.

The above point of view is relatively widely accepted and in fact we
will point out that it is in particular accepted by those who hold to the
prospectus of the "Pragmatic Interventionist"3 or the "Prudential Inter-
nationalist."4 However many, including those who hold to the perspective
of the "Aggressive Democrat,"5 argue that there is a good deal of wishful
thinking in the above picture. That when it was necessary for the Soviets
to act with decision, they did, in Czechoslovakia, and their consequent
firmness in the face of all kinds of opposition indicates their ability
to carry out without fanfare or fuss, long-term policies that would be
almost impossible for any Western country. In this perspective the col-
lective leadership may not be a defect, rather it may be in its total
sense a large enough body with shared values so that we can pursue long-
term policies without easily being led astray and yet small enough to be
cohesive and disciplined. In this point of view the tendency of Westerners
to impute to the presidium the same kind of issues we have in our own
country of, for example, hawks and doves, misunderstands the nature of
presidium disagreements. No organization, of course, is monolithic or
without disagreements, but where there can be disagreements about tactics
and details, there can be no disagreements about basic principles and goals.

Whether one accepts either of the above views, one can also argue
that just as an aftermath of the Czech occupation the Soviets are going
to be forced to follow a firm and relatively long-term policy of repres-
sion and that in fact the Czech intervention set back any notions of
erosion in the current Soviet system perhaps a decade or two.

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3These are Hudson descriptive terms for representative policy pes-
tures. They are discussed at some length below and in Part II of the
study.
East European Dilemma

As indicated by the last remark, the European communist bloc of nations looms particularly large in estimates of Soviet stability. Originally established as a military, political and psychological cordon sanitaire separating the Soviet Union from the influence of Western Europe, a resurgent Germany, etc., this communist alliance may have become more of a liability than an advantage. The strong cultural and ethnic confidence of the region, its ubiquitous nationalism and its common European heritage—most of it alien to Russia—forges a formidable resistance to Soviet hegemony and the Bolshevik variant of socialism. East European communist leaders, unless identified with reform communist heresies or anti-Soviet feelings, are widely regarded by the people they ostensibly rule as Soviet mandarins, representatives of an alien social and economic doctrine which not only distorts national traditions but is demonstrably inefficient. Thus, only in Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Albania does communist rule enjoy any real "legitimacy," and in three of these states it achieves it by being in opposition to the Soviet Union. Far from performing one of its original functions as a reliable filter of dangerous ideas, East European heresies and deviations pose a frontal challenge to the permanence of communism as it has been practiced in the Soviet Union for over a half century. Since the death of Stalin, the Soviet military forces have had to intervene twice to maintain Soviet mandarins and to prevent what might be the beginning of a fatal tumble of communist dominoes in Europe. But the vacillation in political nerve demonstrated by Khrushchev in the intervention in Hungary and non-intervention in Poland—and some of the later Rumanian and Czech events—seem to bespeak of a continuing process of East European challenge and a relatively unpredictable Soviet response in the future. All this creates a volatile political situation which could easily affect over-all European security and/or the stability of the Soviet regime itself.

All this makes it very important to be relatively familiar with the various kinds of crises which could occur and with the option and counter-option which might be available to the various protagonists. In particular various scenarios based on past East European models can be constructed as well as new ones (such as sudden leadership changes following a major foreign debacle). All of these constructs must contend with what is likely to be a monumental constant of future Russian political history: consistent authoritarianism and a basic unwillingness to let any part of the Soviet Empire go. And given the innate chauvinism of the Russian people, even if the U.S.S.R. went the Czechoslovakia route, Soviet interests would still likely be in conflict with the interests of the West.

China—Still Opaque

It goes without saying that future alternatives for China are plagued with more unknowns and variables than for other projects. There are only a few areas of fairly firm expectation. The communist party will thus maintain a functioning centralized government. Even the cultural
revolution seems not to have endangered the communist hold on the country. It did, however, point up probable future clashes between two basic forces—the party bureaucracy and an increasingly technically oriented government apparatus. An ascendant technocratic government bureaucracy aligned with a viable faction within the communist party could introduce significant alteration in both internal and external Chinese policies. Regardless of which group is in power in China, this huge nation will inevitably cast a long shadow over Asia. Not unnaturally, the vitality of a Japan and the stability of the Soviet Union and the degree of American presence in Asia will all have direct bearing on the over-all Chinese posture and the attitude of China's neighbors. But one constant aspect of various types of military scenarios should be borne in mind. China under any regime will continue to develop her nuclear arsenal and delivery capabilities. A significant increase in her conventional military capabilities, one which would place China in the category of a great, modern military power is, however, doubtful.

Third World Cross-Currents

Western expectations of the development process in the Third World were, in general, mirror reflections of their own political and economic experience in nation-building. A less popular view has argued that a variety, if not a confusion, of forms will characterize such efforts and that cultural heritage would be a more decisive factor than political or economic forms and experience. This view holds that the Third World is in for troublesome times unique to it and having little relevance to the rest of the world.

Many of the young states comprising the Third World, particularly those which were formed from territories reflecting colonial holdings rather than indigenous cultural, economic or political groupings, were born with serious structural defects and internal tensions. The new corporate states and their largely Westernized leaders promised to build or create new nations, not on existing "communal nations" or other indigenous forces, but on the notion of "atomistic individualism" and anonymous collectivism. This conflict between communal nationalism and a superimposed state sovereignty has contributed to a crisis in identity and authority that has profoundly unsettled the peoples of Asia and Africa and has become one of the most important phenomena of our age.

Prospects for an even, not to speak of a rapid, pace of development are bleak. Only in East Asia has there been successful and even brilliant efforts to adapt to the imperatives of the modern age. Elsewhere there has been a loss of confidence in development and a (perhaps necessary) regression to political obscurantism and nativization. Current leaders tend to reflect genuine forces in their countries to a better degree than did the first generation of leaders; even if they exhibit decidedly less sophistication and understanding of the complexity of building a viable state. In general the models of "Asian communism" or of a Castro may be more relevant and efficacious for the Third World rather than the Japanese-Forensa model.
PART II POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTS: THREE EXERCISES IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND POLITICAL MODEL BUILDING

Introduction

In its research and study of Basic National Security Policies, the Hudson Institute has been able to identify more than thirty themes, major conceptions of what fundamental policies should be. Almost all the participants of various Hudson seminars have been able, without doing undue violence to their convictions or views, to accept one, two or three of these themes or a blend of them as a reasonable statement of their policy position. We thus consider them to be broadly representative of the recurring differences among Western analysts. They are labeled (1) Prudential Internationalist, (2) Austere Pragmatic Interventionist, and (3) Aggressive Democrat. The value of this procedure is not only that it explicates some reasonably important policy viewpoints, but it also makes Issues, "theories," interpretations, syntheses and assumptions, very explicit and, finally, provides the kind of enlightenment which can only come from comparative analysis.

We also feel that these three positions will encompass the range of debate within President Nixon's administration. Not unexpectedly, all three perspectives overlap in important areas. Indeed, a composite of varying hues could easily reflect the broadly held assumptions underlying the current national consensus and the major policy outlines held by the two major political parties throughout the postwar period. It is precisely these assumptions or sets of beliefs which in greater or lesser degree are challenged in the course of the socio-intellectual confrontations or crises detailed in Chapters IV and V of Part III. Depending, therefore, on the outcome of this "value crisis," these perspectives may or may not be those in contention in the America of 1975-1985.

The Complex Ambiguity of Trends

Not unlike our caveat from The Year 2000 cited at the beginning of our overview, the endless complexity of human ventures and the inevitable incalculable event limit by definition our powers of prediction and the validity of any future political construct. The most superficial of backward glances at the history of the last fifteen years will suffice to verify this truism.

Our present is clearly rooted in this period as will the Year 2000 period be rooted in the events of today. It gives pause to thought when one recalls that in 1950, hardly anyone would have predicted the Austrian Peace Treaty, or the Belgrade Declaration or the Secret Speech, or, for that matter, the intensity of the East European events in 1956, not to mention Suez. While most of the development in weapons systems, a goodly mean of the economic predictions, as well as various technological developments could have been projected, almost certainly they would have been subject to enormous underestimation.
Having said the above we shall discuss below the future in terms of our three "reasonable" and "representative" perspectives of change. Our choice was dictated, of course, by the desire to offset or eliminate as many of the "uncertainties" as possible (and they may be precisely for these reasons wrong). But for the type of analysis we are doing they provide the only workable limits.

**Observations on the Three Perspectives**

Defining the general philosophy of the Prudential Internationalist as the first of the Three Perspectives, one can say that he is the most *eclectic*. He is an inveterate "borrower" from other points of view and attempts to retain a maximum amount of flexibility as to the acceptable means for attaining desired goals. He shares with the Austere Pragmatic Interventionist a healthy degree of skepticism in regard to "Grand Designs," but supports clearly defined and well-planned political and material goals. He may propound narrow national interests in one sector or under conditions of time and circumstance advocate an "enlightened tolerance" in others. He is appreciative of the difficulties in moving men, nations and events in desired directions. Conversely, the Prudential Internationalist is keenly aware that international influence is most often in direct proportion to political strength as well as to the clarity of the perceived future.

The Austere Pragmatic Interventionist, while not subscribing to a full-blown concept of "neo-isolationism," shares the view of many adhering to this latter notion that the United States has been unwisely as well as overly involved in the affairs of others. Vietnam is a typical example. Here was a clear case where the tangible interests of the U.S. were minor, but the risks considerable. The Austere Pragmatic Interventionist rejects wholesale condemnation of the U.S. role in the Cold War or the political efficacy of interventionism per se. He too is somewhat eclectic in his approach to international problems but would recommend a basic restructuring of the order of priorities. The primary attention, according to this view, would be addressed to the hostile (China and the Soviet Union) and the powerful (Japan and Europe). This policy position also harbors more than a little skepticism as to the ability of any one nation—no matter how powerful—to influence the lives of other nations in any significant way. Thus, he prefers to consider international relations through the prism of power politics; ideology, in this scheme of things, is definitely secondary in importance. It follows, then, that the Austere Pragmatic Interventionist views the possible impact of communism on the Third World with some detachment; nationalism, not doctrinaire ideology, is the clearer and stronger motivator of men. Finally, containment of forces inimical to the vital interests of the United States, not conversion to a U.S.-imposed model, should be the lode star for U.S. foreign policy makers.

The Aggressive Democrat would differ sharply with the two views advanced above. Contrary to the emphasis placed on power political considerations by the Austere Pragmatic Interventionist, the Aggressive
Democrat stresses the crucial weight of ideology as a primary determinant of a nation-state's vitality and behavior. According to his own close analytical survey of the communist world, the Aggressive Democrat concludes that no matter how serious the differences are between communist states they will always unite against the "enemy"—the democratic, pluralistic West. The communist movement in this view thus has an undeniable cohesion.

Compared to the dynamism of communist countries, the Aggressive Democrat would argue, the Western democracies come off a poor second indeed. He takes a stern view of the "excessive pluralism" currently permeating Western societies. Moreover, the intellectual "relativism" increasingly characteristic of Western elites fosters a climate of accommodation rather than confrontation which could lead to concessions to the communists.

Some Typical Characteristics

The Prudential Internationalist tends to believe that he no longer faces a dynamic, disciplined, totalitarian communist ideology. Contrary to those who still hold to the converse (e.g. the Aggressive Democrat), the Prudential Internationalist endorses a more critical "morale," one appropriate to peace rather than the "cold war" climate of the past. Hence détente is desirable and peace and prosperity policies take precedence. Crises within the camp of the enemy are thus to be handled with prudence and a variety of policies and deeds should underline the West's credibility as regards the desirability of a reasonable accommodation with the Soviet Union and other nations of the world. One of the major elements of such an accommodation would be, of course, a security arrangement which would lessen the danger of nuclear war, contain international violence, encourage European unification and foster international monetary health. The over-all view of the Prudential Internationalist is generally shared by most European and American policy thinkers. Not unnaturally, Europe's impressive economic and cultural vitality—not her political or military "power"—are given significant weight in this view as a resurgent and magnetic model for communist states and less developed countries.

This view is, thus, an optimistic one, underpinned by the belief that many international problems are susceptible to "ameliorative social engineering." It assumes additionally that unless the anticipated gradual progress toward a more sane accommodation by the world commonwealth of nations occurs, the disintegrating forces of technology and politics will lead eventually to a catastrophe. Internationalism along these optimistic lines is necessary despite the fact that more Americans than at any other time since the end of World War II are shifting toward less, not more international involvement. Thus, it would appear that the general philosophy of the Austere Pragmatic Interventionist is gaining additional adherents at the expense of the Prudential Internationalist consensus.

One other aspect of communism as an international phenomenon considered significant by the Prudential Internationalist is the incredible degree of contempt with which the young and avant garde of the world hold
communists and communist parties, both ruling and non-ruling. There is, moreover, violent rejection of the classical Marxism of Stalin by the "humanist left." In regard to the Soviet Union the Prudential Internationalist would offer four main observations: (1) the Soviets remain relatively prudent and primarily defensive; (2) but they are committed to rivalry with the United States; (3) there are increasing signs of intellectual dissidence and internal stress reminiscent of Tsarist Russia; (4) East European strivings for independence will ultimately succeed and their unsettling impact on international politics represent a relatively serious problem for U.S.-Soviet relations.

In considering China, the major contender of the Soviets in the communist world and increasingly a political/military problem for the Soviet state, the Prudential Internationalist continues to characterize this Asian giant's behavior (both historically and current) as "remarkably prudent." This is particularly true of foreign affairs, and he would stress the notion that China's foreign policy must be considered a failure. Internally, Chinese politics have traditionally been subject to widespread violence and not a little "fantasia." The most important (and unknown) determinant of Chinese actions in the near future is the actual status of the "cultural revolution," i.e., the status of the internal power struggle.

The general philosophy of the Austere Pragmatic Interventionist, as noted above, appears to be gaining adherents at the expense of the post-World War II consensus as represented by the Prudential Internationalist. This is due largely to disillusionment with American power to effect comprehensive change in international affairs and in the ultimate destinies of states which the United States thought to be in its vital interests. This view is thus somewhat representative of an "Inward-Looking World," sobered by a new awareness of the strength of obdurate nationalism and an overcommitment to too many foreign policy objectives, both large and small. It is also more "traditional" than "modern" in the sense that it seeks to orient the country's policies to tangible and real centers of power. Hence, the Austere Pragmatic Interventionist's skepticism as regards the reach and influence of ideology as opposed to vital nation/state interests.

While the Austere Pragmatic Interventionist would share in the view outlined above as to the decline in ideological dynamic of communism as an international force, Marxism and its Bolshevik variants have left an indelible imprint on the political, cultural and economic life of the Russian peoples. Not only has this political philosophy been largely negative in genuine accomplishment, its very theoretical tenets as practiced by the successive Soviet leaders have effectively prevented it from becoming a dynamic and attractive force both internally and externally. Its appeals of legitimacy as an historically inevitable modernizer of Russia and as a progressive model for the rest of the world are by definition beyond its capacity. It follows then that the ruling communist system is inherently unstable, suffers from an obsolete system incapable of reforming itself but remains strong enough to prevent the emergence of
A viable alternative. A Soviet Union in disorder and decline during the period under review is a basic assumption of the Austere Pragmatic Interventionist.

A second fundamental characteristic of this policy approach is the assumption that Europe moves toward meaningful unity with a corresponding increase in political and military potential. A Western Europe so organized could become a third superpower, enjoying a relative invulnerability to nuclear threats and duress. It would, moreover, command an inexorable attraction on East Europe which would further exacerbate the external and internal dilemma of the Soviet Union. The Austere Pragmatic Interventionist would, under these circumstances, press for an acceptable resolution of the German problem under the general assumption that dynamic powers like Germany and Japan must find appropriate and respected status in the world commonwealth if anything approaching a stable world order is to be reached and maintained. Although open to argument, this view tentatively holds that the Soviet Union may, for reasons of expediency, be prone to enter into major international agreements in the next fifteen years.

Sharply divergent with the two policy approaches described above is that of the Aggressive Democrat. This is a view which concedes to the communist states and Marxism/Leninism as a political philosophy an impressive dynamism. It despairs of what it feels to be an erosion of Western commitment to its own ideals and purports to see an increasing Western vulnerability to ascendant communism. Given the natural conflict of national interests and the inevitability of ideological competition and confrontation, the world body politic in a state of disarray is viewed by the Aggressive Democrat as "normal." The Aggressive Democrat cites China as prima facie evidence. Accordingly, the paramount consideration as regards China is that it is united and under the control of a centralized communist regime; 700 million people have been harnessed to the chariots of Communist Chinese expansionism. Given its dynamic ideology and the relative inexperience of its leaders with the modern world, China could easily embark or merely threaten to embark on a course of confrontation and coercion vis-à-vis her neighbors which could politically paralyze them. Not even Japan would be immune to this kind of political blackmail. The Aggressive Democrat would thus insist on comparing the relative dynamism of China to the "status quo-ism" of the U.S. The validity of the anticipated scenario would be strengthened immensely under circumstances of a U.S. "defeat" in Vietnam.

The Aggressive Democrat would also deny the notion of a Soviet Union in "disorder and decline." In his view the Soviet Union continues to be effective in turning back any and all challenges to its internal and external security. It has with impressive force demonstrated once again its determination to maintain its position in the heart of Europe. Moreover, it has denied and will continue to deny German reunification on any but communist terms. This adamant Soviet rigidity is slowly but surely sapping the élan and morale of West German democracy. Once again, the Aggressive Democrat would point to the dynamism of communism (e.g. Ulbricht's German Democratic Republic) and the patent impotence of the West
to achieve a European security system with an acceptable resolution of the German problem.

Finally, the Aggressive Democrat would argue vigorously that the West’s principle of "non-intervention" in the Third World in support of elements favorable to the West simply obviate the need for wars of liberation. Communist states labor under no such qualms. Even under conditions of "competition," one or the other communist power will attempt to insert itself or expand communist influence at the expense of the West should political instability in the Third World offer an opportunity. Thus, more not less involvement in the affairs of nations believed to be threatened by communism is the leitmotif of the Aggressive Democrat.

PART III MILITARY PERSPECTIVES, IMPLICATIONS AND ROLES: DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

We shall focus in Part III on the analytical concepts and methodological techniques directly affecting the United States military establishment in the short and long term, domestically and internationally, in terms of technological change as well as the psychological context within which military planning will take place. Many new issues and attitudes have emerged in the recent past and might well reach full maturity in the period under review. They are likely to imply new and in some cases controversial dimensions for Department of Defense consideration. They included problems of domestic turmoil, dissent, protest and even an active legal and illegal resistance to certain U.S. military policies. It would appear then that an enhanced comprehension of the various trends moving the American society will be as much a part of the requisite "skills" of the military planner as is a mastery of the ramifications of new weapons systems on military strategy.

Economic Possibilities 1975-1985

An axiom of futurist methodology is to treat demographic trends and the rate of growth of the Gross National Product (GNP) with enormous respect. For while non-economic variables "dominate" crises, economic variables set the basic structure and framework. Of course, other variables, such as political will, internal discipline, military capability, etc., are in part most difficult to measure or quantify, but, inevitably, must be included for a sophisticated and meaningful model.

Applying just these two considerations to projections for the period 1980 (and on to 2000), it can be fairly safely predicted that significant demographic differences will have been removed between the two superpowers but substantial advantage in terms of GNP will accrue to the United States. By 2000 Japan will also have outstripped her contemporary European rivals and will be second only to the U.S. Only Canada can expect something approximating Japan’s spectacular 50-year accomplishment. Italy, West Germany, France and other modern societies will experience relative increases in real income during the period under review; Chinese and Indian real income growth will be relatively slower due to population increase.
Monetary and Trade Environments

The monetary system hammered out in Bretton Woods 25 years ago broke down in the 1960's. Various schemes have been advanced to replace this system but it is likely that a continuance, in modified form, of fixed exchange rates will obtain. It is to be expected, however, that 1975-1985 will witness renewed pressure for reform in the direction of more flexible exchange rates.

The growth and continued maintenance of the growth of goods exchange is a source of constant concern of the economist and politician alike. Aside from the emergence of Japan as an economic superpower, the most interesting aspect of trade in 1975-1985 is the degree of participation of the underdeveloped world in international trade. While the less developed world has maintained a fairly constant 25% of the world's total exports, these are concentrated in relatively few goods. Nor are prospects bright for an improvement. Future trends will favor industrial countries even more due to greater concentration of service industries as opposed to heavy industries, the increasing use of raw material substitutes, and because of the low degree of consumer responsiveness to goods from the developing world. Moreover, only ten per cent of world goods exchange is carried between developing countries. Finally, developing countries are extremely vulnerable to restrictive monetary measures.

Economic and Military Power

As pointed out in Part I of this report, the period under review and certainly the Year 2000 will see a broad spectrum of nuclear (plus C&B) weapons and delivery capability available to a surprisingly large number of nations. As noted, this will be due primarily to the growth in GNP and the employment of generally available scientific knowledge. Communist (totalitarian) nations, e.g., China already in 1965, will have the added advantage of a greater elite control of resource allocation even when they are less wealthy in terms of GNP.

Other economic issues of interest in the 1975-1985 period will be the likelihood of increasing agricultural efficiency on a world-wide scale and the widespread use of new wheat and rice strains. Major breakthroughs may also come in the exploitation of the sea and seabed while rational use of outer space is subject to too many unknowns at this writing for useful prediction.

Military/Technological Possibilities

It goes without saying that the swift advance of military technology makes predictions relative to the '70's much easier than those relative to the decade of the '80's. Noteworthy also is the previous observation that not only will military technology proliferate but that in some instances the superpowers will be technologically outstripped by smaller nations. Weapons proliferation and advances in military technology also
underline the assumption that issues and policy options arising from these phenomena will tend to become more complex and urgent (time lag now is about five years). Military technology also undergoes rapid qualitative and quantitative change (kiloton to megatons, MIRV's, etc.).

Specifically as to the 1970's it may be expected that MIRV's will be operational on both the U.S. and Soviet side. We would concretely recommend that more attention in terms of R&D be devoted to anti-submarine warfare, and that early consideration be given the strategic military and political ramifications of the technically possible nuclear-powered transport which (in addition to being airborne Polaris') would give to planners and politicians the troop and material deployment capabilities of ocean vessels at jet speeds. Laser technology but not manned satellites will be very much on the scene in the late '70's. The general advance of technology will also allow for the evolution of a variety of counterinsurgency techniques.

1975-1985: A Transitional Period to the World of the Year 2000

The period depicted in this section suggests that qualitative changes in the military posture of a number of countries are quite possible and even probable. This projection appears to be "surprise-free" even if the first and second thirds of the 20th century brought revolutionary and unexpected events and change.

But radical change due to "traditional causes" among "old nations" are confidently ruled out. Of major significance, however, is the projected emergence of "post-industrial" societies which will be profoundly different from industrial societies as the latter were to the agrarian societies which preceded them. Some countries now making the transition from industrial to "mass consumption" societies to post-industrial societies are U.S., Japan, Canada, Scandinavia, France and West Germany. Verging on post-industrial status at the turn of the century would be such countries as the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Israel among others. Criterion for this categorization would be a per capita income (1965 dollars) of $10,000 for post-industrial, $5,000-$10,000 for near post-industrial, $2,000-$5,000 for mature industrial, etc.

The salient point to be made here is that the anticipated increased affluence of nations, the advances of generalization of technology plus the political will to allocate resources allows the prediction that 50 to 100 nations will have access to significant portions of nuclear technology and capabilities of the 1960's as well as some "doomsday" capabilities. It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that an increase in the probability of nuclear war is likely. The study states:

...By the year 1975, and particularly in some of the contexts we will discuss below, there will likely have been no nuclear weapons exploded in war except for the two used against Japan in 1945. Thus, at the beginning of this period, we can assume
that the world will have experienced 30 years of non-use of nuclear weapons, and by the end--1985--this period may well have extended to 40 years. By then, no matter how large the supply of weapons, and no matter how threatening the rhetoric of arms controllers or how large the existing military establishments, at the level at which most people react there would be little or no active sense of immediate or serious threat of nuclear war. This could be true even if there had been a number of "ostensible" nuclear crises, or even if the "rhetoric" of public discussion is replete with references to nuclear Armageddons.

The sixth nuclear power is likely to be Japan, current Japanese attitudes to the contrary. This dramatic reversal of the results of World War II can be expected to create great pressures in West Germany to follow suit. Then, Italy, Switzerland or Sweden or some other medium-sized, technologically advanced power could be the next. Thus, in the world of 1975-1985 the U.S. will probably be concentrating its efforts on both "active and passive defenses" at a rather advanced technological level and at relatively great expense. This factor is as apt to dampen the arms race as to exacerbate it.

A Socio-Political Perspective

There are several characteristic attitudes comprising what we at Hudson consider to be part of a long-term, multifold trend which are assuming increasing importance for the present and which, we believe, will become even more influential in the period under review. Some of these attitudes such as pacifism, anti-establishment militarism and growing disaffection with government in general have, of course, a direct bearing on military planners and other officials. Indeed, if these particular characteristics continue to move to the forefront of domestic attitudes at the rate of the 1960’s and there is no major external challenge or major change in policy, they may well become the dominant ones for minority but very influential societal segments in the next two decades. While there is understandable disagreement on the causes for the phenomena discussed in this section, it is essential for the sake of rational argument that an agreement be reached on the fact that such a process is occurring and a reasonable consensus posited on the likely consequences of the process.

The above appeal to an eight- or nine-hundred-year trend may appear to be an all too easy way to explain current changes but it is one which is used to depict almost any historical development in serious studies of law, family or government, etc. The prediction as to the coming post-industrial era may appear somewhat more controversial. But here again the "weight of evidence" of the multifold trend clearly points to such a development. Moreover, it would also appear that our multifold trend in certain crucial aspects will find its culminating point in the next two or three decades and that "things" are progressing more rapidly today than ever before. One cannot understand the nature of the currents of change unless one appreciates the rapidity of the whole process. As Hudson pointed out in The Year 2000, the mean-free time for "doubling" has tended
to decrease over the last seven or eight centuries so that today it is often in the neighborhood of a decade or so. It is this concept which lies behind Hudson's argument that the 1975-1985 period may fruitfully be viewed as the transition period between the postwar era and the Year 2000 era.

What Is 'Progress'?

In the period following the Great War many of the basic assumptions underlying European societies were subjected to intense questioning. The Germans and the French particularly sensed failure in the concept of the nation-state and in the functioning of their governments. Not all of the values in the system were rejected, however. Technology and science were still viewed by the vast majority as holding some yet to be exploited potential for the alleviation of mankind's ills. The experiences of World War II and the post-war development of the H-bomb with its potential of destroying man's basic environment have now made serious inroads into this belief, particularly among the five to twenty per cent of the population concerned or "worried" about such problems. Since they are virtually synonymous with the country's elites or the "establishment," such concerns become the major preoccupations of society. One must add to the above issues others which will contribute increasingly to the distrust of science and technology as harbingers of "progress." Computerized government and administrations, "1984" invasions of privacy and potential and real genetic manipulation of man himself all embellish the threatening "de-humanization" of society. Since government and bureaucracy, science and technology tend to be lumped together, they become inevitably central components of a syndrome of hostility as well as anxiety. This attitude thus implies at the very least a qualified rejection of what is, presumably, the crowning jewel of our modern culture.

America's Image Abroad

If the logic of the argument presented above is accepted, then certain aspects of America's image abroad becomes more understandable. If there is a growing revulsion against modern science, technology and the administrative apparatus imperative to the effective functioning of an advanced industrial society, then America, which is the embodiment of these characteristics, will find its policies and claims to prestige more and more open to challenge. This reaction also has repercussions on the American domestic scene. This seeming ingratitude and lack of appreciation of the United States among foreign nations reinforce tendencies toward disillusionment, frustration, anger, annoyance and, of course, non-isolationism.
The "Liberal Crisis"

The marked mobility of public opinion in advanced countries is leading to decline in establishment politics of all hues. Indeed, the nature of the change in Western societies—modern liberal societies all—may represent a turning point in the social, economic and political evolution which began in the 17th Century. Two main views are considered. The first submits that only a "political re-orientation" is involved affecting in the main the political parties and their definition of contemporary issues. A second sees a profound "crisis," a qualitative political transition in the offing.

U.S. "liberalism" may also be described as being in a state of disarray. This is due primarily to its inability to resolve or even formulate adequately domestic and foreign crises.

In Europe as well there is clear change and "post-parliamentary" trends represent a challenge to established value systems. Will this mean revolution in the traditional (French, American) sense or attempts at "national rebirth" à la the fascist coups of the thirties? In this regard a distinction may be made between rebelling against external forces or an abuse of internal institutional power and a repudiation by a society of "not what it is forced to be but what it is."

Looking forward to 1975-1985, a collapse of this social ferment or a culmination appears likely. Much depends on such variables as the lasting imprint of the "Vietnam" precedent, instability of the Third World, a general economic crisis, etc. Crucial is the ability of advanced societies to institute broad and meaningful reform quickly enough. If not, the author submits that contrary to Kahn's thesis of tolerable coexistence, the differences between the "humanist left" and the "responsible center" could escalate to a "savage confrontation." In this scenario the liberal establishment would resort to (temporary) repression and totalitarian government, provoking opposition (both left and right) and serious revolutionary acts. The author, however, expresses confidence in contemplated reforms of the liberal society and argues, conversely, that Communist-ruled societies might be better candidates for this type of scenario than advanced Western societies.

"A Social Trend"

Intellectuals play and will continue to play a significant part in intensifying and even creating many of the social phenomena discussed above. This increase in influence represents a distinct social trend. An intellectual may be defined as one who forms his judgment on the basis of indirect experience and who works with ideas rather than things. He is also subject to certain inevitable tendencies. The first is towards relativism, to explain things in terms of ever-increasing complexity and to subject society's norms to constant reinterpretation. And with reason: only if issues can be made complex enough through reinterpretation can he be made to appear indispensable to society.
A second tendency is toward pacifism. Since all problems are relative to an intellectual there can be no just reason for taking a man's life. Surely an acceptable compromise can be found; a negotiated peace is surely better than a hot war. And here again the intellectual is aware that his influence is relatively greater in time of peace. The third inevitable tendency is toward radical reform or egalitarianism provided inequalities based on intellect prove the exception to the rule.

Given these dominant characteristics, the intellectual needs causes and goals for which to work even if he tends ultimately to drive them into a void, diluting the value system of the community they ostensibly serve. Intellectual reactions to this state of affairs also fall into three general categories: withdrawal to self-constructed ivory towers, rejection or retreat into radical mysticism, and the elevation of social reform to an absolute which brooks no opposition. In the latter instance the intellectual, of course, sees his greatest chance for influence and power.

The first two-thirds of the 20th century suggest that value ferment is a general and inevitable condition rising and falling usually in terms of outside events. As such it will always be close to the surface and very much present in 1975-1985 unless intellectuals are reversed by a shock--contrary to the surprise-free-world projection--on the magnitude of World War II.

The Importance of Ideology

In considering the long-term, multifold trend and the increasingly dominant characteristics of skepticism and secular humanism, it is useful to be reminded of the role ideology has played in history and its continuing importance as a motivating factor in the contemporary confrontation between East and West. If anything, ideology has been in the forefront of much of the development of the world as we know it today. And those who have attempted to ignore it have usually done so at their peril. Moreover, there have, historically, been no "draws" in the struggles between two competing political and ideological power blocs. True "coexistence" has only been possible when one or the other side had won a series of convincing victories and established persuasive dominance over its opponent.

To those who would point to the obvious disarray of the communist world as an indelible sign of weakness, a pertinent note is taken of the dissension and heretical internal conflicts afflicting both the Muslim and Christian worlds at the times of their respective crests of power and influence. Nor did trade and "cultural" exchanges suffer fundamentally because of these conflicts. Drawing once again on the thousand-year struggle between the Christians and Muslims, numerous instances are cited where the conflict itself produced this type of contest.

In historical perspective, then, the crucial issue is not whether an ideology is united in a monolithic front, but how dynamic it is as an
Ideology. How much support today can one communist expect and get from another in confrontation with the West? The practical, pragmatic, relativistic, cosmopolitan Westerner sharply underestimates the importance of this kind of semi-religious ideology in the world today. While it is true that communism as an ideology has suffered significant erosion in the recent past, Western democracy as an ideological force is also losing its former vigor.

Military Planners and a New Domestic Milieu

Are the United States military establishment and American society entering into a qualitative new era or can the emergent controversy surrounding the military establishment more aptly be termed a reversion to the pre-war status of all the armed services? It is a topic subject to some controversy in the Institute. The argument in essence is whether the main thrust of the long-term, multifold trend as it has been defined at the Hudson Institute is valid and, if so, how much and which aspects will affect the military establishment and, particularly, the role of the military planner.

Since 1945 the U.S. military establishment has been treated very well indeed. But there have, of late, been portents of a change in the status of the military in American society. One such indicator was the debate on Civil Defense. It clearly aroused the political passions and was subject to much arbitrary interpretation by both its detractors and supporters. But the main aspect of the debate which should be considered at this writing and borne in mind when the 1975-1985 period is considered was the irrational character of much of that discussion. It will be the main thesis of this chapter that the U.S. military is in for tough and troublesome times. In an age which is neither "patriotically religious" nor "patriotically heroic" one can hardly expect anything else, especially when the vast majority of Americans cannot perceive an external challenge which would threaten America's vital interests. And once again there is this distinct quality of irrationality surrounding the current controversy over the present and future role of the United States Armed Services.

Moreover, new problems will most certainly plague the relations of the United States with much of the world, traditional allies not excluded. This may affect the posture and activity of the military. This is in part a "healthy" reaction to new ratios of power in the world, but, inevitably, some of these tendencies will overshoot their mark causing friction and ill-feeling. An important repercussion of this trend could be a kind of "righter-as-indignation" on the part of domestic public opinion reinforcing tendencies toward neo-isolationism.

Role of Mass Media

Complicating as well as reinforcing anti-military attitudes in the U.S. today is the mass media, particularly television. We live essentially in a humanist culture and, by and large, most of the journalists
and commentators working in mass media accurately reflect this bias. The Vietnam war coverage is dominated by this attitude. Often-times this is also compounded by inept and poor military policy such as an emphasis on "body count" which is not only objectively obscene, but, not unexpectedly, increases pacifist and anti-military feelings in the population at large. Also, bureaucratic procedures as well as inept attempts of some military echelons to conceal news events which by the very nature of things cannot be concealed are immensely harmful to the government's (and the military's) reputation for credibility which is, in any case, in fairly precipitous decline dating from the unfortunate U-2 incident and proceeding through Vietnam and such incidents as the Pueblo.

Impact of Vietnam

One can hardly underestimate the impact of the Vietnamese war on the value ferment in America today. Contrary to all other conflicts in which the U.S. has found itself, it has become virtually impossible in the give and take of public debate to support the government position. And if one adds to this controversy those affecting poverty, civil rights, environmental pollution, etc., in the face of obvious confusion and indecision of the "establishment" world, it is a virtual invitation to the various dissenting elements in society to mount an attack on the entire value system which has so successfully governed the public and private domain for over a century and a half.

General permissiveness has played a decisive role. Youth today may simply have lost all "feel" for what is "right" or "wrong" and in general frustration have moved toward the simplest of positions under the circumstances: "We reject the current system....It is not up to us to justify...a new (and better) system. We simply assert that it clearly has to be." Needless to say all of the above factors figure prominently in the ubiquitous "generation gap." It may be conjectured that the present differences in perceived "values" are much more serious than were the differences separating immigrants from their American-born children. Viewing the secure and permissive and "instant-gratification" worlds from which a majority of American youth originates, the frustration of "reality-testing" in a hostile world saddled with the endemic problems of most modern societies (and those of the U.S. in particular) may very likely be the constant which will ensure the forceful continuity of dissent and challenge to the current system, at least through the 1975-1985 decade.

This view is not shared by all and this portion of the report ends with a debate on the permanence of these phenomena.

The Responsible Center and Humanist Left

The "surprise-free world" without major upheavals will obtain in the period under review, a situation which will encourage current trends of dissent, diversity and pluralism, all of which add up to a "mosaic society."
The young will continue to negate and question; the old to be concerned. Intellectuals will assume the posture of eternal critics of establishment values and practices. This situation will be a disturbing but tolerable change in the attitudes of crucial societal segments and will in time become an accepted "norm."

Considerations on the part of the military establishment and associated businesses will likely be dominated by this new domestic situation. In the absence of perceived international threats, military programs such as the draft will become unacceptable. Various alternatives such as volunteers, relaxed deferment policies, or substitute national service programs such as VISTA or "Peace Corps" might be acceptable and (even in a neo-isolationist America) could, conceivably, "coexist" with well-trained, highly educated and motivated, specialized (para-) military groups engaged in a variety of constructive tasks in the developing world.

The inherent problem of the military is only reflective of the larger one facing the supreme civilian leadership. In fact, the Kennedy Administration was involved in a similar value conflict. It applied highly rational criteria to government action and exhibited a laudable concern with the quality of human life while pursuing an ambitious conception of America's world role and purpose. Men of this persuasion such as a Kennedy or a McNamara could be characterized as forming the "responsible center," a category which also includes the author of this essay and others "who...are without a strong conviction about where humanity should be led but are deeply committed to the pragmatic analysis of each step taken."

The above approach conflicts with that of the "humanist (new) left" which not only gives humanist values primacy but exhibits a hostility toward technocracy—toward any system organized around a criteria of efficiency, rationality, to material organization and production.

A Comment on the "Domestic Milieu"

The entire discussion of the military-civil relationship contained in the foregoing sections are not only misleading but they may very well be inappropriate. The military is, after all, an instrumentality of civilian political authority whose activity is clearly in the external rather than the domestic sphere. The services are in fact subject to the evolution of political opinion and political will of domestic society. It is the conviction of the view elaborated in this section that "the American military services and the American people are (not) and will (not) be in relationship of severe estrangement or even mutual hostility" as the preceding arguments imply. To accept such an implication suggests the assumption that there is a basic trend in the U.S. away from values indispensable to "serious government and serious international policy."

To juxtapose popular attitudes associated with World War II to those associated with Vietnam is invidious and is thus of doubtful validity. This is not to argue that there are not distinct secular trends in U.S.
society. One must, however, object to the definition of the problem as one of the confrontation of the vanguard of a secular multifold trend in conflict with an "establishment" or military community which is stubbornly adhering to less "progressive" or older, more traditional values.

It is, moreover, an incautious analysis which seems to ignore the distinct and differing qualities of the preceding generations and the "value conflict" with established norms in which these generations allegedly found themselves. Youth of the 1920's were "pacifist," those of the '30's radical and the generation of the 1950's was universally described as "passive" or "conformist." The main point here is that these so-called dominant attitudes were temporary in nature and proved to be quite "reversible" when the issues or challenge to society changed. Nor is Vietnam the first "controversial" war fought by this country. One has only to recall the Spanish-American war or the war with Mexico, both of which were hotly disputed. This leads to the observation that unpopular wars in a democratic society are by definition subjects of sharp controversy. It is equally valid to observe that the military is apt to become the scapegoat for civilian authority. In the main, this is precisely what is happening in the wake of America's most unpopular war—Vietnam.

Viewed historically, political authorities have always had to educate public opinion to such portentous developments as war. Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt were successful; President Johnson was not. He bowed to popular and majority disapproval, however, not to the "new left," not to the dissenting intellectual, not to radical youth. Finally, these latter groups as well as the mass media are only effective as critics and important as political forces to the degree that they stand for major popular constituencies in this country. Given an issue as compelling as Nazism or Japanese imperialism or Soviet aggression against Western Europe, this country would demonstrate again the same conviction and unity as in the mid-1940's. Thus, there seems no more reason to project the present anti-military mood into the future as an accelerating trend, than there was reason, a decade ago, to believe that the nation's mood of support for very large military forces was a fixed fact in the national scene, unrelated to the international conditions of the day.

Two Possible Alternatives

1. If current trends intensify, one can anticipate a marked decline in public support for the armed forces and an activist anti-communism. This state of affairs also assumes a growing and intensely hostile gap between a rather large and articulate societal segment and the military. In this anti-interventionist environment, the military (probably under strapped financial circumstances) must prove to be a super-efficient machine with the ability to accomplish assigned missions with a minimum of men, equipment, and publicity. Even then strong popular pressure of the President for a cease and desist order is to be expected. Significance: Hard times ahead for the military.
2. A second situation is envisioned where an aroused and determined U.S. leadership persuades a viable electoral majority that the politics of confrontation with the communists is more persuasive than is the logic of detente. Thus, international crises are assumed normal and alternative actions are coolly weighed against the dangers of inaction.

PART IV MILITARY PERSPECTIVES, IMPLICATIONS AND ROLES: INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Most of the problems covered in the final portions of this report have been around for quite a long time. We expect in the decade under review that some of these problems would have yielded to at least a partial solution while others, naturally, will have assumed other dimensions. Among the most important of such disputed issues by far will likely be a strategic arms agreement between the two superpowers. While this event is to be greeted as a significant step toward a world made somewhat safer from the massive environmental damage which a nuclear exchange between these two powers would bring, technological advance and the expansion of economic capabilities of much smaller powers will carry with them the likelihood of nuclear capability. This aspect of strategic weapons systems poses yet another set of possibilities that the military planner must take within the purview of his contingencies. As in the past, new approaches to regional arrangements which might help control this eventuality may usefully be considered. And once again stress is given to the unique role Japan could potentially play in an Asian nuclear regional arrangement.

The discussion of the domestic milieu for the military planner is further extended in Part IV in the sense that contrasting views and estimates of military policies and capabilities during the 1975-85 period are projected in terms of assumed military budgets and differing U.S. policy assumptions.

Other chapters of Part IV include an examination of the special bilateral defense issues associated with our traditional allies, and some of the possible military crises which could occur in areas such as the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America are included in our considerations.

Not to be overlooked are the extensive discussions in the concluding portions of Part IV which are devoted to arms control measures, likely tactical and strategic issues, and the role and missions of the U.S. Armed Services, plus the advantages of long-range military planning.

A General Point of Departure

The general international milieu for 1975-1985 may be approached most efficaciously by stressing our 'surprise-free' projection in which the current detente atmosphere remains dominant. It is assumed that, outside of the world of Afro-Asia, there is likely to be relative peace and an absence of
intense confrontations, in particular nuclear confrontations, during this
decade. In this picture though the Soviets may have serious problems in
Eastern Europe they will probably manage to maintain order without an
excessive use of force of the sort that alienates the rest of the world.
In addition, there is a kind of pluralistic security community to which
most of the nations of Western Europe belong, and similar pluralistic
security communities covering most of Latin America and North America,
respectively, are reinforced. As a result, within these regions, except for
the smaller powers and rather special situations (particularly in the
Caribbean and Central America) war is more or less unthinkable.

For Afro-Asia, conversely, there is much turmoil, particularly among
the armed services, possibly even leading to a number of bloody civil wars
more or less on the Nigerian model rather than that of Vietnam. One may
expect, however, a certain degree of intervention by the Americans, the
Soviets, the Chinese and, even occasionally, the Europeans. The main
characteristic of this period is that of transition to the period of the
world of 2000. Thus, one must be prepared for the likelihood that weapons,
nuclear weapons in particular, become relatively inexpensive. The mind can
only boggle at the many possibilities for the proliferation of such weapons
systems, at the ramifications of new technologies, and at the new varieties
of international crises that could be associated even with some of the
peacetime technologies. Moreover, there will be a proliferation of law-and-
order issues which will likely be characteristic of the early post-industrial
culture and the waning decades of the 20th century. In particular, one may
expect a sharp increase of open challenge to international law by all kinds
of groups, individuals, small nations, and occasionally even some of the
larger nations. For example, such acts as piracy in international airspace
are a typical indicator of a growing tendency and passion towards terror and
the unofficial, clandestine use of violence for political and other ends
confluence to create recurring strained and even hectic conditions of inter-
national relations.

It is likely that the nations will, however, be able to live with these
situations in much the same way that civilized individuals live reasonably
comfortably with the general mayhem and destruction caused by automobiles.
And while the casualty rate is severe, people have lived with high death rates
before. And indeed it is almost impossible to imagine that in terms of actual
injury and death that all of this last kind of international disorder could
be even a small but significant fraction of that caused by the automobile.
Nevertheless, it is always likely to be very prominent, very spectacular, and
affect greatly people's attitudes towards various countries and toward the
free movement of people and goods. In fact, it would not be at all surpris-
ing if there were not extreme restrictions placed on these as a counter to
such problems of widespread loss of authority and the creation of interna-
tional law and order type problems.

On the other side of the house, it would not be surprising if this
decade did not see the serious beginnings of practical, comprehensive arms
control, in particular the creation of attitudes towards the possession and
political or physical use of nuclear weapons. One can easily imagine, for
example, the widespread acceptance of a concept that nuclear weapons are
simply and absolutely immoral and taboo, that the only reason the various powers stock them is to have the guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons by other powers, and that aside from this purpose of balancing each other off, they have no real use or utility in normal or even extraordinary international relations. Given the general inability of the United Nations to assume effective control of the international behavior of nation-states, the moral force of this attitude is crucial in moving nations to accept regional arrangements and international accords with even innovative control and punitive mechanisms. Of special note in this regard is the nuclear retaliation theory of lex talionis as well as the unique role Japan could play in Asian regional arrangements and in reinforcing this world trend toward absolute moral rejection of the first use of nuclear weapons as a means to attain political advantage. The theory of lex talionis is briefly outlined in the report as follows:

One very realistic possibility... would be to reinstitute the law of lex talionis. This could be either in the form in which it appears in Exodus, which talks about an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth (most readers do not realize that this is not only a counsel of "at least" but also "at most") or in a form which is found in the Code of Hammurabi, in which equals are punished by tit-for-tat, but inferiors by several "tits" for a "tat."

It should be realized that lex talionis is in a very real sense a peacekeeping measure, indeed in much the same way that U.N. peacekeeping attempts to induce peace. Usually when the U.N. enters a dispute it does not ask who is right, but simply tries to stop the violence. Almost every tribe which does not have a functioning government to maintain law and order has discovered that it is almost impossible to stop the violence when the violence has been asymmetrically one-sided; but relatively easy, at least most of the time, when the violence has been evened up by some appropriate retaliatory exchange. Americans and Europeans, of course, tend to think of lex talionis as a violence-breeding measure, and it often does act that way. But even more often, it seems to have worked as a violence-dampening measure, hence its widespread use in the past—particularly in situations where there is no enforceable law. One of the main possible purposes for the regional arrangements suggested above would be to arrange for such tit-for-tat response to occur in a reliable and perhaps semi-automatic fashion. (It might be mentioned that making a distinction between a tit-for-tat response and escalation sharply simplified many of the command and control problems for so-called multilateral forces.)

One could easily imagine a situation in which the following international customs became widely accepted.

1. Widespread acceptance of the immorality of the first use of nuclear weapons and

Chapter I of Part IV, pp 4-6, 4-7.
2. Acceptance of a concept that any nation has both the right and to some degree the obligation to punish such first use, particularly if there is no appropriate regional or other force available and capable to do so.

3. As a result of the above there is general de-emphasis of nuclear weapons, possibly even the denuclearization of world politics in which the nuclear status of a nation has little or no relationship to its influence, prestige, and status. Under these conditions there would be no automatic escalation as a result of nuclear use. In fact, there would be great pressures for a satisfactory de-escalation right after the tit-for-tat. "Equals" would thus be punished by the tit-for-tat response and unpopularity. If possible, the inferiors would be disarmed and, if not, possibly suffer several tits for a tat.

This "surprise-free" projection would, then, assume that the operational funds for the military would run about 5% of the GNP or $75 billion (1.5 trillion 1965 dollars). The military establishment would be smaller and be manned by a sufficient number of volunteers--about half--to maintain central war and general purpose forces. The rest of the force would be supplied through national selective service. As indicated, international commitments and operational capabilities would be heavily influenced by domestic considerations. Superbly conceived, organized and executed operations would be the order of the day. Barring central war, special services of various types might well dominate operational arms. Alternative special and elite programs might be expanded and staffed with well-trained, highly educated and highly motivated groups for world-wide intervention (political, military, economic, disaster, etc.). Alternative (paramilitary) tasks of such special forces could be augmented to include all kinds of hazardous and/or humanitarian or scientific, exploratory or development activities. The diversity and creativity of this approach toward duly designated objectives of these armed forces could establish a potentially viable link between them and an increasingly mosaic American society.

The antithesis of the view outlined above is, of course, that of the Aggressive Democrat whose international world is fraught with tension and which would not exclude the possibility even of a nuclear exchange (not necessarily between the superpowers) during the decade under review. The outcome of such an event would, of course, have a profound effect on the governance of nuclear weapon possession and use. For this view, too, the "tit-for-tat" aspects of lex talionis assumes great importance.

In any case, continuous international tension allows this perspective to assume a gigantic military budget of some $400 billion per annum or 10-15% of the gross national product. This "military fact" alone would be enough to lend impetus to or harden an existing polarization of U.S. society. Inevitably, increased surveillance internally and at external control points would be the "norm"; tension between armed forces and large segments would
suggest the use of highly trained, highly paid professional special services or even a "foreign legion" army to maintain sufficient military credibility.

Issues and Allies

"Conflict environments" are not necessarily restricted to hostile nations and areas. The maintenance of alliance morale and effectiveness requires as much time, energy and creativity as any other challenge to the military planner. France has partially defected; the United Kingdom is undergoing the acutest of all ancien regime pains—relative deprivation; and Germany remains exclusively dependent on the NATO Alliance in a shifting, changing world. Japan's leaders must face up to rising internal dissent as regards her post-war (military) ties to the United States and this country's posture on the corrosive (explosive?) question of Okinawa. The decisions which lie within the powers of these friendly countries are first rank and can, during the 1975-1985 period, profoundly alter the strategic and tactical posture of the United States in significant spheres of international relations.

Our concern with the United Kingdom involves a traditional "special" relationship, her withdrawal from strategic outposts of the former British Empire, strategic weapons systems, and, closely connected with this bilateral aspect, the possible military technological ramifications of a likely British entry into Europe. Given the likely perspective that Japan may go "nuclear" during the 1975-1985 period, the mere fact of two nuclear powers—the U.K. and France—of the same size and general interest as Germany in the same political, military and economic alliance could create an irresistible pressure on the entire alliance as well as within Germany either to allow a unilateral strategic German deterrent or to accommodate understandable German demands for "equality" in some kind of independent European nuclear force. Britain's eventual association with Europe may further complicate our own problem areas. Thus, her strategic role in Asia, the special relationship with the United States and, finally, England's role as the leader of a unique commonwealth of nations may be forced to undergo substantial change.

The constant flux in the relative fortunes of nations is occasionally footnoted in wry and ironic ways. Summer and autumn of 1969 witnessed the demise of a towering French political personality, a resuscitated British Labour Party and an historic changing of the guard in Germany. Once again these shifts—relative though they might be—should have found military planners prepared to review once again basic assumptions related to NATO. It would be rash indeed to assume that a France without de Gaulle would not be a "Gaullist" France. But one may at the very least expect a change of style under quite rapidly evolving changed political conditions on the Continent and elsewhere. After the May upheavals, a post-de Gaulle France may yet have a difficult internal furrow to turn.

Japan and West Germany will probably nullify by 1980 the results of World War II in all major areas affecting a nation's prestige and influence.
While reunification (Restoration) appears out of the question, the recent assumption of the reins of government by the German Social Democrats may bring movement even into this critical area. Be that as it may, the U.S. can harbor justified hope that Japan will increasingly play a stabilizing role in Southeast Asia not only in nuclear affairs, but also in partly filling the political and economic vacuum which a planned retrenchment of U.S. power will inevitably create in the area.

Miscellany, Crises, Scenarios

The object of this part of our report is to emphasize the complexity of the world facing the military planner. From the point of view of contingency planning the "small" problem may be just as complex and time-consuming and potentially as dangerous as the large strategic question. And quite candidly, the post-war record bespeaks ill of our record for anticipating and preparing for the situations this country has had to face militarily. Our patent nuclear superiority in the late fifties lulled the country into a sense of false security and we were as ill-prepared to fight in Korea as our Korean experience prepared us for combat conditions in Vietnam. In any event this report attempts to touch at least lightly on the major problem areas.

Europe: The European continent is the only world point where the U.S. and the Soviet Union are materially and militarily vitally engaged. But even here the engagement is indirect— as long as each superpower stays in his own well-established area. A "Berlin crisis" is considered a deadly serious affair in Washington. An attempt on the part of the U.S. to intervene in the Czechoslovak crisis could easily have escalated into a major confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It may be that by 1985 the Europeans will have evolved to a kind of "superpower" status in their own right—politically, economically and militarily. The effect might be to push the other two superpowers apart. While partially settling one aspect of East-West relations, it may be setting the stage for yet another complex range of perspectives and alternatives. East Germany has been mentioned often in this report but rarely in an exclusive way. Suffice it to observe here that by 1985 the ancient Kingdom of Prussia may be the last major "colony" in the world—surely an unnatural state of affairs. But this might be said to be equally true of the relationship of all other East European countries to the U.S.S.R.

Asia: It is customary to view future Asian crises and conflicts primarily within the context of Sino-U.S. relations. This overlooks the rather simple fact that China is surrounded by either superpowers or potential superpowers and other political, ideological and economic competitors. Current events in Asia act more to obscure rather than enlighten at the moment, but U.S. efforts could be efficaciously directed toward erecting an indigenous balance of power, using those nations feeling themselves threatened by a seemingly unstable and perhaps aggressive China. The Soviet Union is, of course, specifically—if not in principle—excluded
in this scenario. Indeed, note should be taken of similar efforts on the part of the Soviet Union in this regard. Nuclear regional arrangements discussed elsewhere in Part IV may be usefully recalled here also.

Middle East: There are some who only a little facetiously believe that the Middle Eastern crisis began with Genesis and will only end with Armageddon. While the crisis itself seems endless, it may not be a major U.S. security problem. Of course, if Israel would acquire and/or use nuclear weapons the situation could conceivably escalate into a superpower confrontation. But as things stand now there is a military stalemate coupled with a political deadlock. And it may remain so for the foreseeable future. Both the U.S. and the Soviets seem to prefer this situation to the difficult, risky, and perhaps impossible task of pressing their client states to negotiate a treaty which might sow simultaneously the seeds of bloodier future wars.

Africa and Latin America: At least until 1980 Africa and Latin America appear to pose no significant crisis of a military nature to the U.S. This major assessment aside, the example of Biafra points to considerable internal political and military flux in Africa as opposed to Latin America for the period under review. And precisely in these two areas and in response to this type of local disturbance or major disaster or various other "unique" problems could the United States employ the types of special and/or elite troops which might form a major operational component of the 1980 U.S. Armed Forces. In general, then, Africa and Latin America represent the two areas in which the military forces may be the only effective agency of the U.S. government that can "get the job done" but where the "job" may turn out to be quite unmilitary in nature.

This section concludes with a detailed scenario on a U.S. withdrawal from Thailand in the late seventies. It is recommended that military planners give this effort close study since it is an attempt on the part of the author not only to illuminate a potential crisis area but to illustrate the methodology of scenario composition, analysis and projection.

The Nuclear Club

The strenuous efforts of the superpowers notwithstanding, it appears today that a significant number of new nuclear powers will be on the scene by the end of the period under review and almost certainly as we enter the era of the year 2000. Thus, yet another dimension will be added to the political and military discipline of nuclear strategy and tactics—second-, third-, and even fourth-rate nuclear powers may emerge.

Motivations for the acquisition of nuclear weapons are both simple as well as subtle and complex. And even after acquisition, the process of political adjustment and effective deployment of the weapons in politics
and diplomacy, as the French and Chinese examples suggest, is equally ambiguous.

We can classify possible objectives of the nuclear forces into four groups as listed below:

I. Improve Deterrence Against Attack by Superpower
   A. Proportional deterrence ("tear an arm off")
   B. Add strength and reliability to an alliance guarantee (e.g., prevent "miscalculation" that guarantor power's nerve will collapse)
   C. Trigger an allied or even a "neutral" superpower's or other response
   D. Deterrence by uncertainty (or threshold)

II. Improve Situation if Such Deterrence Fails
    A. "Quality weapons" for national defense
    B. Survive-the-war sanctuary
    C. Neutrality preserving
    D. Further other wartime national objectives

III. In Confrontations with Other (Non-Superpower) Countries
     A. "Equality" with other nuclear powers
     B. Potential use as "quality weapons" if war occurs
     C. Also a good deterrent--both Types I and II and helps provide escalation assurance
     D. May even be a "compellent" under some circumstances

IV. Some Basically Peaceful (i.e., Relatively Non-Military) Objectives
    A. Prestige and status
    B. Vote in alliance or negotiations
    C. Technology, knowledge, and experience
    D. Blackmail and coercion (pro or con)
    E. A prudent precaution (a flexible base)
    F. Morale
    G. Factional advantage (internally)

None of the above objectives are hypothetical. Not only did various French military analysts and Gaullist spokesmen make each of them explicit, but one can find other Europeans and Japanese (and, increasingly, other nationalists) who would seriously stress one or the other of the objectives, or some combination of them, as primary.

Many, if not all of the objectives are self-explanatory but as indicated above, the conditions of tactical implementation may vary considerably. And while contingency planning is absolutely imperative, new nuclear powers may find it expedient not to be too explicit as to their use or even deliberately "plan" to "muddle through." In any event the notion of "proportional
deterrence," the first objective listed, is among the most important. The significance is simple and straightforward: it is clear that a second- or third-rank nuclear power is unable to destroy a superpower. But it is equally clear that the distinct possibility exists that low-level but unacceptable damage could be inflicted on a superpower if it were to threaten or be tempted to use nuclear weapons to force overwhelming vital concessions from a weaker opponent. Moreover, the conflict between a superpower and a less powerful country may not be of the order of magnitude to justify crossing the nuclear threshold by the former. Hence "proportional deterrence."

There are additionally important non-military advantages, both tangible and intangible, accruing to a member of the nuclear club. These are as ambiguous and complex as are those advantages associated with military capability. They are listed above, and in the case of at least three potential members--Germany, Japan and Israel--such a status could conceivably substantially alter the course of the future.

**Tactical and Strategic issues**

In many ways, some of the most important questions considered in this report are raised under this rubric. If one considers the military history of the United States, there are certain recurring issues that are likely to be raised again in one form or another. For example, the Civil War posed the central problem of leadership--no matter how superior the Union forces were to the Southern forces, they were unable to win the war until Lincoln found or in effect developed three new generals--Grant, Sheridan and Sherman.

The basic lesson of World War I was that it was possible for the greatest military minds on both sides to be completely baffled by a new development--trenches, barbed wire and machine guns. This development appeared to be totally unexpected even though a Polish banker, a Mr. Bloch who was an expert on war, had predicted in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* that this stalemate would develop. Today, of course, any second lieutenant can deal with trenches, barbed wire and machine guns. These are not serious obstacles to the movement of an army. But if one had argued so in 1917 he would have looked like a fool since there were five million dead people to prove him wrong. Nevertheless, by 1917 both sides "knew" how to deal with this obstacle. Rather interestingly, in the Allied case, they developed a new technology--the tank--but had not learned how to use it appropriately for the first two years of its availability. And yet Colonel Swinton, the developer of the tank, had described in a memo almost exactly the tactics that had been developed at the battle of Cambrai, making plausible--if not persuasive--a dynamic war of movement as opposed to a static war for position.

Courage to pursue tactical innovation of "classic" principles of warfare to a logical conclusion is the lesson indicated by the German World War I experience. They had developed the so-called "hedgehog" or storm-trooper attack and the "hedgehog" defense. In fact, however, the idea was not really theirs. A Frenchman, a Captain Laffargue, had developed it but was not able to persuade the Allies of his ideas. He
wrote and published a pamphlet which fell into General Ludendorff's hands, who recognized its importance, tried the ideas out at Riga on the Eastern front, discovered they worked very well, and had a German field manual written around the new ideas as the basis for the 1918 offensive, which was the most successful offensive the Germans had in the entire war. A lack of faith in these new battle tactics and strategy prevented the Germans from fully exploiting this advantage.

Conversely, a return to "classic" tactics combined with new military technology enabled General Ridgway to reverse spectacularly the course of the Korean War. Let us, for the reason of underlining the main point of this discussion, leave aside a summary of the problems associated with strategic deterrence and make the following observation: It is almost impossible to discuss in a serious way many major strategic and national policy issues without a thorough analysis of current tactics and their alternatives in a creative, detailed and expert fashion. This applies equally to the coupling of technology with classic tactics of conventional warfare and counterinsurgency as well as to the recognition that future guerrilla warfare will probably include the use of sophisticated military technology. Moreover, the U.S. must decisively reject the notion of the "powerlessness of the powerful." That the weak have proven to be "strong" is quite often due to the fact that the powerful had not thought through new problems. In the absence of such discussions, study, stock-taking and simple exercise of the trained intellect, a startling number of this country's problems are going to founder or be inadequate for one or a combination of the reasons listed above. Many would argue that Vietnam is merely a validation of the observation that (military) history repeats itself.

Some Roles and Missions

A qualitative difference between the 1975-1985 time period and the 25-30 postwar years is likely to occur if there is a situation in which the U.S. has lost a great many of its operational bases and its ability to utilize allies in almost every portion of the world but still feels a great necessity to intervene. In this case there will be a great need for such things as floating bases, Fast Deployment Logistics ships, relatively long-legged tactical aircraft and the like. In such a situation the image that the U.S. has of itself, and that others--allies, neutrals and enemies--have of it, will be a decisive factor in determining many of these roles and missions. For example, in the 19th century the British stopped the slave trade for no particular reason other than that they had the ships and if it were not they who did it, who would? To a great extent the U.S. current and past role as world policeman was based on an attitude much like this. But this could change very sharply and, in fact, it shows real signs of changing. Another set of issues around which the roles and missions can be much affected is the relative strength of the two blocs, assuming that the 1975-1985 time period still focuses on the communist-free world confrontation. But in this case it might be a relatively disunited communist group against a completely fragmented free world group. Or the other can be true: the escalating strains within
the communist bloc could really escalate to the limit, but a disunited West would not possess the necessary cohesiveness to exert any influence on this situation.

There may be very great requirements for very specialized missions, and in particular for the ability to do surgical operations rapidly, efficiently, effectively and with a minimum of political disturbance. It seems almost certain that there will be continuing needs, despite current "neo-isolationist" tendencies, for military advisory groups and military and economic aid. In fact, it seems quite likely that the role of the armed forces as mentor and liaison to various indigenous forces of the world will be largely maintained if not increased. This role will be combined with a much greater unwillingness to intervene on a large scale. The model might well be a kind of Chinese Gordon "operation" rather than the current Vietnamese experience.

Long-Range Perspectives and Policies

We want in this final discussion to attempt to achieve a greater sense of the long-range perspectives. In our report we have used a scenario for the rapid diffusion of battleships at the end of the 19th and the early 20th centuries which goes as follows:

1907 Brazil ordered two dreadnoughts, "Minas Geraes" and "Sao Paulo"

1908 Argentina ordered two 1,000-ton gunboats

1909 Chile ordered two dreadnoughts
Uruguay ordered cruiser
Peru purchased 6,000-ton cruiser from France
Venezuela purchased gunboat from U.S.
Equador purchased torpedo boat

1910 Cruisers built for Turkey, Chile and China
Turkey bought two old German ships
Turkey ordered two dreadnoughts, "Reshadieh" and "Reshad-I-Hamiss"

1911 Argentina ordered two dreadnoughts

1913 Brazil ordered super-dreadnought, "Rio de Janeiro"
Greece ordered two battle cruisers - one named "Salimis"
Turkey bought the "Rio de Janeiro" from Brazil, renamed "Sultan Osman I"
Greece bought battleships "Idaho" and "Mississippi" from U.S., renamed "Kiliis" and "Lemnos"
Greece bought new cruiser, "Tie Hung," from Japan, renamed "Helle"

Using this as a model, we argue that one of the more likely scenarios for the diffusion of nuclear weapons might go as follows:
1945 - "1955": Five victors of World War II either initiated programs or achieved a blast

"1955" - 1970: "Gestation" for proliferation to non-victors

1970 - 1979: Japan in the early seventies, West Germany about 4 or 5 years later soon followed by Italy. Other possibilities are Sweden and Switzerland or Australia and India

1980 - 1989: Argentina-Brazil-Mexico, Egypt-Israel, and/or Pakistan seem likely; Yugoslavia, Rumania, South Korea, and Taiwan are good possibilities

1990 - 1999: "Everybody"

Now we needn't stress that this seems to be quite dangerous. At the very least there is widespread agreement that one wishes to prevent or inhibit such a sequence if at all possible, and to initiate a discussion of several alternative methods of International law, order and custom which might be developed to handle the problem of the use of force, both nuclear and conventional, towards the end of the century. These efforts could be both a positive or negative force during the 1975-1985 time period. Some of these alternatives are also exhibited on the various chart pages. Some of the general possibilities are indicated by the following list:

1. Minor modification of the current system

2. All-out war system withers away
   a. universal deterrence—e.g., "Gallois worlds"
   b. rule of law
   c. pluralistic security community
   d. rule of fait accompli (internal war)
   e. instrumental wars (rational self-interest restraints)
   f. agonistic wars (limited by absolute rules)
   g. potlatch wars (space, foreign aid, "showy" systems, etc.)
   h. other substitute for central war.

3. Other basic change in the system
   a. bloc systems (with restraints and rituals)
   b. community sanctions (e.g., no first use by anyone)
   c. condominiums (U.S.-S.U., collective security?, U.N.?)
   d. concert of (large or small) powers
   e. "World government"
   f. world empires (or empires)
   g. disarmed, but "uncontrolled" nations
   h. elimination or control of weapons of mass destruction by agreement or revulsion following a large setback to civilization
In the final analysis the thrust of this discussion is that we all increasingly seem to feel that we are living under some kind of Sword of Damocles but one that is held up by reasonably strong and tough threads. There is much that can be done to make the situation safer, and it will be most important to exploit the 1975-1985 time period to get these programs under way. Otherwise many valuable, plus possibly irrevocable, opportunities may be lost. On the other hand, we have tried to suggest that the kind of hysteria with which many approach arms control issues is probably misplaced, both in terms of the estimate of the danger and in the likely unproductive character of this attitude.
Sources of Stability/Instability in the Current International System

Some Important General and Basic Properties of the Current International System

Chart 1 points out that the nation-state system is complex. Thus, while sometimes it is considered a "war-making system," it might just as well be characterized as a "peace-making system" since it produces both states of affairs, and it is not clear how well various alternatives would perform. In fact Chart 2, which amplifies line 10 of Chart 1, points out that under current conditions an extraordinary number of the past causes of war have disappeared or decreased almost to the vanishing point.

Chart 3 points out that we should not overestimate Chart 2.

Charts 4, 5 and 6 refer in various ways to the fact that the structural factors are not at all favorable; indeed the world is really becoming very small and running out of Lebensraum. It would be impossible for an American President to go on radio or TV today and refer to any quarrel as being "in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing."

Chart 5 reminds us that many people at many times have made loose remarks about approaching catastrophe. However, as indicated on Chart 6, some of the current remarks are being made by much more serious people who are thinking much harder about the subject.

Some Specific Political and Strategic Issues

Those who accept Charts 7 and 8 often not only believe that in the fifties the world was rather dangerous, but that our relatively peaceful traverse of this period represents as much good luck as structural stability. In any case there is a relative consensus that in the early and mid-sixties, the world was relatively safe, almost independent of any likely policy choices by various nations. (Chart 7 is now about six years old, and one makes this last comment with decreasing certainty and emphasis each year.) It should also be noted that the fourteen reasons on Chart 8 on why it is so difficult to write plausible scenarios for nuclear war will presumably not all hold as reliably in the future.

Chart 9 amplifies line 8 of Chart 8, indicating some of the reasons why many analysts believe the Soviet Union is not so aggressive, dynamic, challenging, or self-confident as it used to be.

Charts 10 and 11 try to summarize briefly the basic political environment and the other important political factors. We have already mentioned the first line on Chart 10. It is probably also worth noting the second point on the chart. Instead of the classical attitudes toward government--as an oppressor or deliverer of benefits-- people everywhere in the world increasingly look upon government as unnecessary, immaterial, idiotic, or on a "corrupting system."

Chart 12 lists several possible turning points which could occur in the next few years which could have a decisive impact on amplitude and direction of the political trends discussed on Chart 11.
Sources of Stability/Instability in the Current International System

(This page folds out.)
SOURCES OF STABILITY/INSTABILITY IN THE
SOME IMPORTANT GENERAL AND BASIC PROPERTIES OF THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

1. THE BASIC SYSTEM

1. NATION STATE AS BASIC UNIT CHARACTERIZED BY
   TERRITORIALITY
   SOVEREIGNTY
   CENTER OF LOYALTY AND PROTECTION
   SOME SELF-DETERMINATION
2. ABOUT 150 STATES--OF WHICH MORE THAN HALF ARE "SERIOUS"
   NATION-STATES
3. EACH STATE MORE OR LESS THE JUDGE OF ITS OWN CAUSE
4. SOME LIMITED INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY--SOME LIMITED
   "GREAT POWER" AUTHORITY
5. SOME BIPOLARITY; SOME MULTIPOLARITY
6. DILEMMA OF COMPETITION AND COOPERATION
7. BOTH BALANCING AND DISRUPTIVE PROCESSES
8. MUCH SELF-RESTRAINT AND SELF-DETERRENCE
9. THE WAR SYSTEM--INCREASINGLY CONSIDERED ABNORMAL,
   INCREASINGLY UNUSABLE, AND YET ALWAYS THERE
10. HOWEVER "FORCE" AND MILITARY CALCULATIONS DO SEEM IN
    INCREASINGLY LESS RELEVANT

2. SOME "CLASSICAL" REASONS WHY MAJOR VIOLENCE
   MAY STILL OCCUR

MISCALCULATIONS OR UNINTENTIONAL ESCALATION
SHOCKED, HYSTERICAL, OR IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR
DELIBERATELY (MOST LIKELY AS A RESULT OF DEFENSIVE REACTIONS,
BUT EVEN THIS IS NOT CERTAIN)
A REVIVAL OF IDEOLOGICAL ZEAL IN RUSSIAN OR OTHER CP'S
A TASTE FOR VIOLENT IDEOLOGIES (CRYPTO-FASCIST AS WELL AS
CRYPTO-COMMUNIST)--PARTICULARLY IN THE THIRD WORLD AND AMONG
THE YOUNG
DEVELOPMENT, IN AFRICA, AS A DESIRE FOR REVENGE AGAINST
THE E-IMPERIALISTS
AN AFRICAN DRIVE AGAINST RHODESIA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND/OR
PORTUGAL, OR EVEN AGAINST THE WEST GENERALLY, ETC.
CLAIMS AND PRESSURES OF CHINA, U. S. A., JAPAN, ETC.
OTHER REVISIONIST TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL CLAIMS IN CENTRAL-
EUROPE

3. HOW HORRIBLE, FANTASTIC, INCREDIBLE IT IS
   THAT WE SHOULD BE DIGGING TRENCHES AND TRYING ON GAS
   MASKS HERE, BECAUSE OF A QUARREL IN A FAR
   AWAY COUNTRY BETWEEN PEOPLE OF WHOM WE KNOW
   NOTHING. (ITALICS ADDED)

   CHAMBERLAIN
   SEPTEMBER 27, 1938

4. IF IN THIRTY YEARS WE SHALL NOT HAVE SUCCEEDED
   IN REORGANIZING THE WORLD IT WILL INEVITABLY
   RELAPSE INTO BARBARISM...

   ALFRED NOBEL
   JANUARY 7, 1893

5. "THE GREAT GLOBE ITSELF IS IN A RAPIDLY MATURING CRISIS--A CRISIS
   ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE FACT THAT THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH TECHNOLOGICAL
   PROGRESS MUST OCCUR HAS BECOME BOTH UNDERSIZED AND UNDERORGANIZED...
   IN THE FIRST HALF OF THIS CENTURY... THIS SAFETY... WAS ESSENTIALLY
   A MATTER OF GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL LEGENDARY: AN EVER BROADER
   GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE FOR TECHNOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES, COMBINED WITH AN EVER
   BROADER POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF THE WORLD. WITHIN THIS EXPANDING
   FRAMEWORK IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ACCOMMODATE THE MAJOR TENSIONS CREATED BY
   TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS.

   NOW THIS SAFETY MECHANISM IS BEING SHARPLY UNHITCHED, LITERALLY
   AND FIGURATIVELY, WE ARE RUNNING OUT OF ROOM. AT LONG LAST, WE BEGIN TO
   FEEL THE EFFECTS OF THE FINITE, ACTUAL SIZE OF THE EARTH IN A CRITAL
   WAY.

   THE CRISIS DOES NOT ARISE FROM ACCIDENTAL EVENTS OR HUMAN
   ERRORS. IT IS INHERENT IN TECHNOLOGY'S RELATION TO GEOGRAPHY ON THE
   ONE HAND AND TO POLITICAL ORGANIZATION ON THE OTHER... IN THE YEARS
   BETWEEN NOW AND 1960 THE CRISIS WILL PROBABLY DEVELOP FARTHER THAN ALL
   EARLIER PATTERNS, WHEN OR HOW IT WILL END--OR TO WHAT STATE OF AFFAIRS
   IT WILL YIELD--NOBODY CAN SAY.

   JOHN von NEUMANN
   FORTUNE, JUNE 1955
SOME SPECIFIC POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ISSUES

1. Recovery of Europe and Japan
2. Weakness of Germany (and Japan)
3. Holding of Africa, Middle East, Chinese Rim & L.A.
4. Weakness of underdeveloped nations
5. U.S.-S.U. detente: growing belief in stability
6. Increased crisis inculculty
7. Combination of U.S. strategic superiority over S.U.
8. Soviet Thermidorean loss of enthusiasm and/or N. NER

IN STRATEGIC ARE:
10. Organizational & technical safeguards--arms control
11. Controlled response and crisis management policies
12. Nuclear inculculty (N.W. arc is unthinkable)

IN LIMITEV WAR ARE:
13. Few power vacuums

IN TECHNOLOGY
15. Expense & complexity of strategic weapons, system
16. New strains of rice and wheat

THE BASIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Feeling of both relative safety & disinterest in territorial arrangement within "old nations":
General distrust and/or dissolution in government--appearance of anarchistic & nihilistic movements relatively strong, but probably weakening, sanctions against nuclear diffusion:
U.S.-S.U. detente--two-way deterrence--almost no power vacuums
Sino-Soviet split--NATO--warlike pacts in "disarray"
Complex mixture of bipolarity, polycentricity, multipolarity, and obsolescent sovereignty:
Increasing nationalism and regionalism generally, but European nation-state system in flux:
"Extremes" and "nationalistic" behavior in Franco, Germany, China, Cuba, and many places in the Third World but not yet West Germany, Japan, Canada, Poland, Brazil, etc.
Limited retrogression of U.S.—growth of ad hoc groups
Many old hostile motions (nationalist, racial, creeds, vengeful, ambitious, etc.) partly eroded but mostly coerced, restrained, diverted or supplanted
Many new hostile motions

SOME GENERAL POLITICAL TRENDS

The current small world is getting smaller and leading to:
1. Worldwide welfare state
2. "Urban" indifference
3. A disappearance of Lebensraum--maneuver space--safety factors

FRUSTRATED EXPECTATIONS:
1. Re-raise social order vs. social justice issues
2. Exacerbate domestic divisions
3. May tend to increase existing envy, racial, nationalist, class conflict, and messianic movements
4. Are turning U.S. toward neo-isolationism

May have tendency toward a lack of assurance (or ancien regime morale) in dealing with "progressive" and/or alienist left revolutions or even criticals

New political issues and groupings and religions--or quasi-religious movements

Gradual erosion of political, moral, and morale legacy of World War II, colonialism, and even the cold war

BILTV

DATE OF RECEIPT

CE AAR--AT

POLITICAL ISSUES AND GROUPINGS AND RELIGIONS--OR

SOME SPECIFIC REASONS WHY THE WORLD SEEMS RELATIVELY SAFE

IN GENERAL:
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Some "Year 2000" Issues which affect the 1975-1985 Time Period

(This page folds out.)
There is a basic, long-term, multifold trend towards:

1. Increasingly sensate (empirical, this-worldly, secular, humanistic, pragmatic, utilitarian, contractual, Epicurean or hedonistic, etc.) cultures
2. Bourgeois, bureaucratic, "meritocratic," democratic (and nationalistic?) elites
3. Accumulation of scientific & technological knowledge
4. Institutionalization of change, especially research, development, innovation and diffusion
5. World-wide industrialization and modernization
6. Increasing affluence and (recently) leisure
7. Population growth
8. Urbanization and (soon) the growth of megalopolises
9. Decreasing importance of primary (and recently) secondary occupations
10. Literacy and education
11. Increasing capability for mass destruction
12. Increasing tempo of change
13. Increasing universality of the multifold trend

Some of the reasons why Americans (and eventually Europeans) might reject current work-oriented, achievement-oriented, advancement-oriented attitudes:

1. Why not (John Adams quote)
2. Besides anyone can make $10-$25,000/annum by coasting
3. There will be a minimum income guaranteed by the government--other free and welfare benefits
4. It will be easy to obtain an additional $1-$10,000/annum from relatives or friends
5. The marginal utility of money will go down
6. Society will feel it can afford slackness & deviation
7. Effects of changed child-rearing patterns
8. Excessive reactions--intellectual & beatnik--against "bourgeois," "managerial," "bureaucratic," "industrial," "puritanical," "pre-affluent" values--advancement of the idea of the sheer indecency of getting richer--of miserly behavior

Some "Year 2000" Issues which affect:

1. Continuation of basic, long-term trends
2. Emergence of "post-industrial"
3. World-wide capability for modem warfare
4. High (1 to 10%) growth rates in some of the world's less developed nations
5. Increasing emphasis on "meaning" in the "new" and "trializing" nations
6. Much turmoil in the "new" and "trializing" nations
7. Some possibility for sustained or other mass movement
8. Second rise of Japan (to being or perhaps actually, the third world)
9. Some further rise of Europe and the Third World
10. Emergence of newIntermediate PAKISTAN, INDONESIA, EAST GERMANY
11. Some decline (relative) of U.S.
12. A possible absence of stark "left and economic issues in the "old"

"...my sons ought to study Mathematics and philosophy, geography, natural history and naval architecture, in order to give their children a right to study painting, poetry, music, architecture, statuary, tapestry and porcelain..."

John Adams
ISSUES WHICH AFFECT THE 1975-1985 TIME PERIOD

FINAL THIRD OF TWENTIETH CENTURY
(LIVELY APOLITICAL AND SURPRISE-FREE PROJECTION)
RATION OF BASIC, LONG-TERM "MULTIFOLD TREND"
ENCE OF "POST-INDUSTRIAL" CULTURE
WIDEN CAPABILITY FOR MODERN TECHNOLOGY
FOR WORLD-WIDE "ZONING ORDINANCES" FOR CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY, POLLUTION, TRADE, AND OTHER AREAS
(1 TO 10%) GROWTH RATES IN GNP/CAP
USING EMPHASIS ON "MEANING AND PURPOSE"
TURNOIL IN THE "NEW" AND POSSIBLY IN THE INDUSTRIZING NATIONS
POSSIBILITY FOR SUSTAINED "NATIVIST," "MESSIANIC," "HER MAJESTY'S MOVEMENT"
RISE OF JAPAN (TO BEING POTENTIALLY, NOMINALLY, WAPS ACTUALLY, THE THIRD LARGEST POWER)
FURTHER RISE OF EUROPE AND CHINA
ENCE OF NEW INTERMEDIATE POWERS: BRAZIL, MEXICO, INDONESIA, EAST GERMANY, EGYPT, ETC.
DECLINE (RELATIVE) OF U.S. AND SOVIET UNION
IBLE ABSENCE OF STARK "LIFE & DEATH" POLITICAL ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE "OLD NATIONS"

THE POST-INDUSTRIAL (OR POST-MASS CONSUMPTION) SOCIETY
1. PER CAPITA INCOME ABOUT FIFTY TIMES THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL
2. MOST "ECONOMIC" ACTIVITIES ARE TERTIARY & QUATERNARY ("SERVICE"-ORIENTED) RATHER THAN PRIMARY OR SECONDARY (PRODUCTION-ORIENTED)
3. BUSINESS FIRMS NO LONGER THE MAJOR SOURCE OF INNOVATION
4. THERE MAY BE MORE "CONSENTIVES" (VS. "MARKETIVES")
5. EFFECTIVE FLOOR ON INCOME AND WELFARE
6. "EFFICIENCY" NO LONGER PRIMARY
7. MARKET PLAYS DIMINISHED ROLE COMPARED TO PUBLIC SECTOR AND "SOCIAL ACCOUNTS"
8. WIDESPREAD "CYBERNATION"
9. "SMALL WORLD"
10. TYPICAL "DOUBLING TIME" BETWEEN THREE & THIRTY YEARS
11. LEARNING SOCIETY
12. RAPID IMPROVEMENT IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES
13. EROSION (IN MIDDLE CLASS) OF WORK-ORIENTED, ACHIEVEMENT-ORIENTED, ADVANCEMENT-ORIENTED VALUES
14. EROSION OF "NATIONAL INTEREST" VALUES?
15. SENATE, SECULAR, HUMANIST, PERHAPS SELF-INDULGENT CRITERIA BECOME CENTRAL

THEMATICS AND 
HISTORY AND 
ICATION, POETRY, 
APESTRY 

4 AN OVEREMPHASIS ON FORMAL EDUCATION CAN RESULT IN:
EXPANSION OF THE ADOLESCENT SUBCULTURE
MANDARINISM (INTELLECTUAL AS "FATHER & MOTHER OF HIS COUNTRY")
HERITOCRACY
OVEREMPHASIS ON "BOOK LEARNING" (CONCEPTUAL WORLD & DOCUMENTED INFORMATION RATHER THAN EXISTENTIAL WORLD & PERCEIVED OR ORALLY TRANSMITTED INFORMATION)
"TRAINED INCAPACITY"
INTELLECTUAL AND/OR EDUCATED PAROCHIALISM
ALIENATION FROM ONE'S OWN CULTURE OR SUBCULTURE
OTHER ALIENATION FROM THE PRACTICAL WORLD

WHY "TRAINED INCAPACITY"
1. CLASSIC TENDENCY TO EXERCISE FAVORITE OR ACCUSTOMED MUSCLES (SKILLS OR FORMULATIONS)
2. NORMAL PAROCHIAL PROFESSIONALISM AND EMPHASIS
3. ARBITRARY OR EVEN BIASED BUREAUCRATIC OR ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS
4. MISPLACED GLAMOUR OR INCENTIVES
5. IDEOLOGICAL BIASES
6. SHEER LACK OF IMAGINATION, COURAGE, EXPERTISE OR OTHER REQUIREMENT FOR USEFUL INNOVATION
Changing Values and Objectives

(This page folds out.)
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF "THE CURRENT SYSTEM"

URBANISM
INDUSTRIALISM
BUREAUCRACY
CAPITALISM
SECLARISM
RATIONALISM/PRAGMATISM
 MATERIALIST VALUES
 ORIENTED TO PROFIT, POWER, WEALTH, COMFORT, AND SAFETY
EGALITARIAN IN OPPORTUNITY

MASS EDUCATION AND MASS CONSUMPTION
DEMOCRACY OF CULTURE AND VALUES ("LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR")

GREAT SOCIAL MOBILITY ("ROOTLESSNESS")

UNDERMINED TRADITIONAL ELITES AND STANDARDS (OF PUBLIC SERVICE, HIGH CULTURE, SOCIAL CLASS AND INHERITED WEALTH)
RELATIVELY INSECURE AND MOBILE NEW ELITES (OF MERIT, WEALTH, FASHION)

POLITICAL LIBERALISM (COMPETITION OF INTERESTS--"VOTE-ORIENTED" CRITERIA)
ECONOMIC LIBERALISM (INDIVIDUAL AND PRIVATE COMPETITION--MARKET-ORIENTED CRITERIA)

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL "DISENFRANCHISEMENT" OF THOSE WHO CANNOT OR WILL NOT COMPETE ON THE ABOVE TERMS OR IN THE ABOVE SYSTEM

PSYCHIC TENSIONS WITHIN MODERN WESTERN SOCIETY

EXCESSIVE FREEDOM FROM CONSTRAINTS AND LEVERS (E.G., THE FIRST TEN ITEMS ON CHART 3): INCREASINGLY THE BUSINESS OF SOCIETY IS TO DESIGN A SOCIETY AND INCREASINGLY THIS "PROJECT" SEEMS TO HAVE MUCH LESS CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS SET ON IT. THE CORRESPONDING UNCERTAINTIES, RAPID CHANGES, LOSS OF OLD VALUES--EVEN IDENTITY, ETC., ALL CONTRIBUTE TO THE ISSUES LISTED BELOW.

A SEARCH FOR "MEANING AND PURPOSE" ("EXISTENTIAL DREAD"):

ROOTLESSNESS: THERE IS UNPRECEDENTED SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL MOBILITY AND UNPRECEDENTED WEAKNESS IN FAMILIAL, CULTURAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC TIES

STRANGE: MUCH MODERN WORK, AND EVEN OTHER DAILY ACTIVITIES, APPEARS FRAGMENTARY, UNCREATIVE OR MEANINGLESS, PROVIDING NO RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE RESULT OR ANY OTHER ENDURING SATISFACTIONS

FEAR OF: NUCLEAR WAR, OTHER ARBITRARY (MEANINGLESS) WAR, CIVILIAN VIOLENCE, EROSION OF STANDARDS, GROWTH OF ANARCHISTIC BEHAVIOR AND NIHILISTIC SENTIMENTS, OTHER UPSETTING CHANGES--EVEN TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS NO LONGER SEEMS VERY BENEFICIAL

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES MAY EMPHASIZE

IMPULSE

REASON

CONSCIENCE

TRANSCENDENCE

GOOD'S WILL

(LEADING TO, AT BEST)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

FREEDOM
RATIONALITY
LOYALTY
SPIRITUALITY
REVEALED TRUTH

SPONTANEITY
MODERATION
DEDICATION
PERSPECTIVE
ABOLITION

CREATIVITY
THOUGHTFULNESS
TRADITION
PAN-HUMANISM
SALVATION

PERCEPTIVENESS
MELIORISM
ORGANIZATION
IDEALISM
RIGHTS

PARTICIPATION
FLEXIBILITY
ORDER
ALTRUISM
ESCHATOLOGY

SENSORY AWARENESS
CALCULATION
OBEDIENCE
MYSTICISM
WORSHIP

SELF-ACTUALIZATION
PLANNING
SELF-SACRIFICE
DETACHMENT
AGE

JOY AND LOVE
PRUDENCE
JUSTICE
REVERENCE
SUBMISSION

(BUT WITH A CORRESPONDING POTENTIAL FOR PATHOLOGICAL)

PERMISSIVENESS
ABSTRACTION
AUTOCRATICISM
FATALISM
BIGOTRY

IMPULSEIVENESS
THEORY
RIGIDITY
PASSIVITY
FANATICISM

ANARCHY
RATIONALISM
RIGHTS
MYSTICISM
RIGHTS

LAWLESSNESS
INDECISION
DESPOTISM
NAIVETE
DOGMATISM

CHAO
DEHUMANIZATION
SADO-MASOCHISM
UNWORLDLINESS
HYPOCRISY

NIHILISM
SCIENTISM
PUNITIVENESS
SUPERSTITION
SUPERSTITION

MAJOR LEFT-VIRUS

VARIUS SUBVERSION, INSIDIOUS OPERATIONS

AMORAL, BUREAUCRATIC, DEP?

URBAN, RACIAL, AND POVERTY

POLICE BRUTALITY (OFTEN SEEN AS BRUTALITY)

"MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX"

REAL OR IMAGINARY ACTIVITY

CONTINUATION AND GENERAL CURBING POLITICAL DETENTE

RISE OF RACIALISM IN BROAD ATTITUDES IN U.S.

LAGGING OR INADEQUATE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE

EASTERN MARXIST DISCOVERY OF SLOVAKIA WHILE UNCERTAIN MANY, FRANCE, ITALY)

CONTINUED FAILURE OF DEVELOPMENT ELSEWHERE

SOCIETY FELT TO BE INCREASING WITH ORDER TO PROVIDE MORE FOR THE PEOPLE ORНИМ USED TO ENSHRINE TARIANISM
ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH ADS, GROMT, Y O.GICAL PROGRESS, SATISFACTIONS, RELATIONSHIP, JUSTICE TO FAMILY, COMPANIONSHIP, AFFECTION AND LOVE, HAVING AND SHARING SPIRITUAL, LOSSES, PHYSICAL WELL-BEING, EARNING, PHYSICAL POWER, PHYSICAL ATTITUDES, RESPECT AND RECOGNITION, CHANGE, SATISFACTION, REVENGE, WORLDLY IMPERATIVES, BEING AN ARISTOCRAT, MARRIAGE, FATHERHOOD, PRIDE, HEROISM, PATRIOTISM, BEING AN ACHIEVER, PHYSICAL AND/or EMOTIONAL INJURY, PROFIT, BEING A GENTLEMAN, BEING A HUMAN BEING (NEO-EPICUREANISM OR FAMILIAL MOTIVATIONS), SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY (NEO-STOICISM), SPECIAL PROJECTS OR PROGRAMS THAT NOTE GENERAL OR SPECIFIC ESPIRIT, ELAN, PRIDE, EXCITEMENT AND/or CHAUVINISM, BEING AN ARISTOCRAT, BREAD AND CIRCUSES, PROTEST, REVOLUTION, AND VIOLENCE, RESPECT AND RECOGNITION (COMPETITIVE AND MUTUAL), HAVING AND SHARING SPIRITUAL, ECONOMIC, EDUCATIONAL, ARTISTIC, SCIENTIFIC, INDUSTRIAL, AND/or TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS, ACHIEVEMENT (GAINING AND USING SKILLS, MEETING CHALLENGES), PHYSICAL POWER (OVER THINGS--TERRITORIALITY?), EGOISTIC IMMORALITY (RECOGNITION), LOYALTY TO OR SUBMISSION IN FAMILIAL (SHARED FATE, COMMON COMMITMENT, EGO-IDENTIFICATION) STRUCTURES, POLITICAL POWER (OVER PEOPLE AND COMMUNITY DECISIONS), LIBERTY--PERSONAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, ETC., PRAISE, REASSURANCE, ATTENTION, ETC., JUSTICE TO BE DONE AND/OR MORALITY TO BE MADE MANIFEST--E.G., APPROPRIATE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS FOR "GOOD" AND "BAD" BEHAVIOR, PHYSICAL WELL-BEING (SAFETY, HEALTH AND COMFORT), SENSUAL SATISFACTION (FOOD, SEX, MUSIC, ART, AESTHETIC AND PLEASANT SURROUNDINGS AND EXPERIENCES), ADVENTURE, EXCITEMENT, DANGER, FRIENDSHIP, COMPANIONSHIP, AFFECTION AND LOVE (TO GIVE AND/or TO RECEIVE), ENLIGHTENMENT AND UNDERSTANDING, PLAY, SPONTANEITY AND SELF-EXPRESSION (BEING ONESELF), HAVING AND SHARING SPIRITUAL, MYSTICAL, AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES, CODES AND/or FULFILLMENT, SATISFACTION OR FEELINGS OF ANGER, REVENGE, OTHER HOSTILE EMOTIONS, "PERVERSIONS" (MASOCHISTIC, SADISTIC, NIHILISTIC, ETC.), ASSURANCE AND CONFIDENCE ABOUT ANY OF THE ABOVE.

MAJOR LEFT-WING ISSUES LIKELY TO PLAGUE THE SYSTEM 1975-1985

VARIABLES SUBVERSION, INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS, AMORAL, BUREAUCRATIC, DEHUMANIZING INSTITUTIONS (ESPECIALLY UNIVERSITIES), URBAN, RACIAL, AND POVERTY CRISIS & OTHER CIVIL STRIFE, POLICE BRUTALITY (OFTEN SEEN AS CALCULATED PUNITIVE BRUTALITY), "MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX" FELT TO BE TOO POWERFUL, REAL OR IMAGINARY ACTIVITY OF CIA IN WORLD AT LARGE, CONTINUATION AND GENERAL STATUS OF NATO (NATO SEEN AS CURBING POLITICAL DETENTE EAST & WEST), RISE OF RACIALISM IN BRITAIN, CONTINUATION OF MANY RACIAL ATTITUDES IN U.S., LAGGING OR INADEQUATE UNIVERSITY REFORMS IN U.S. AND/OR EUROPE, EASTERN MARXIST REDISCOVERY OF LIBERAL TRADITION (CZECHOSLOVAKIA) WHILE UNCERTAIN LIBERALS FIND EARLY MARX (GERMANY, FRANCE, ITALY), CONTINUED FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY IN GREECE AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE, SOCIETY FELT TO BE INCREASINGLY MODIFIED & REGIMENTED IN ORDER TO PROVIDE MORE CONSUMER GOODS & JOB SAFETY, AND THESE IN TURN USED TO JUSTIFY MORE HIERARCHY AND AUTHORITARIANISM.

MAJOR RIGHT-WING ISSUES LIKELY TO PLAGUE THE SYSTEM 1975-1985

Some Elements for a "Mosaic Pattern" for Life-Styles

(This page folds out.)
**SOME ELEMENTS FOR A "MOSAIC PA**

### 1. DESIRABLE QUALITIES FOR A SUCCESSFUL:

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<td>(TECHNICALLY AND VOCATIONALLY COMPETENT)</td>
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### 2. SOME IMPORTANT (AND REASONABLY UNIVERSAL) "MIDDLE CLASS" VALUES

1. CONCERN ABOUT CONSEQUENCES (E.G., DEFERRED GRATIFICATION VS. IMPULSE OR SPONTANEITY)
2. RESPECT FOR PARENTS (AND OFTEN OF ELDERLY BY YOUNG), LAW, TRADITION, GOVERNMENTAL AND ELITE ESTABLISHMENT, THE COMMUNITY'S MORES AND VALUES, AND THOSE WHO PERSONIFY OR REPRESENT THESE MORES AND VALUES
3. ADHERENCE TO GROUP NORMS AND VALUES
4. HEROIC OR ARDUOUS EFFORTS TO PROTECT OR FURTHER 1 TO 3 ABOVE, OR OTHER DEMONSTRATION OF LOYALTY TO "THE SYSTEM" (OR TO ONE'S OWN IDEOLOGICAL OR IDEALIZED BUT ACCEPTABLE VERSION OF THE SAME)

### 3. COMMENTS ON THE (GREEK) CYNIC OUTLOOK

1. Diogenes (who followed Antisthenes) chose to lead a "Cynic" (like a dog) life: his father was a counterfeiter and it has been conjectured that he wished to show that the whole world was also counterfeited.
2. This "total" rejection of Greek values took place at the same time as the conquest of "the world" by Alexander the Great (i.e., by Greeks and Macedonians).
3. Has other important resemblances to both the sermon on the mount and the current hippies.
4. The Cynic school was an important predecessor of the Epicureans and Stoics—for our purposes the two most important subsequent schools of Greek philosophy.

### 4. THE (GREEK) EPICUREAN OUTLOOK

1. Based on emphasizing sensation, emotions, pleasure of the individual soul
2. Criterion of good and evil is sensation, i.e., "pleasure"
3. Power and public life disturb the soul
4. When the body dies it returns to atoms; when the soul leaves, the body has no "sensations"
5. There should be no fear of death, gods, or natural laws

### 5. MASS MOVEMENTS OFTEN FIND CONVERTS AMONG THOSE WHO ARE:

- Alienated from society
- Leading meaningless and purposeless lives
- Anxious to "escape" from themselves (perhaps by surrendering themselves to an all-embracing ideal—a movement which requires the submerging of personality to its unity of purpose and action)

These often include: rootless or restless adolescents; the newly poor, frustrated but ambitious and/or confident classes or minorities; various kinds of misfits and outcasts; nihilists and egoists; paranoids and opportunists; and other alienated groups

### 6. "SOCIAL FORCES" TENDING TOWARD

1. Current tendencies toward caes
2. Greater capabilities for surve
3. Increasing desire for mental and safety (social engineering)
4. Likely increase in violence and for counteractions
5. Possibility of organized extr

SOME ELEMENTS FOR A "MOSAIC PA"
ITS FOR A "MOSAIC PATTERN" FOR LIFE-STYLE

1. TRADITIONAL U.S. NATIONAL CHARACTER AND STYLE

BOURGEOIS vs. MILITARISTIC
DEMOCRATIC vs. ARISTOCRATIC
ROLETARIAN vs. PEASANT-LIKE
FAUSTIAN vs. MAGIAN
EMPIRICAL vs. MYSTICAL
PRAGMATIC vs. APOLLOIEN
SENSATE vs. DIONYSIAN
MORALISTIC vs. IDEALISTIC
LIBERAL BENTHANITE vs. REALPOLITISCH

2. A DEFINITION OF A "GENTLEMAN"

1. HAS MANY SKILLS AND ATTAINMENTS
2. ALL OF WHICH ARE DIFFICULT
3. IN ALL OF WHICH HE EXCELS (OR HE WOULD NOT BE WELL-ROUNDED)
4. NONE OF WHICH ARE USEFUL
5. BUT ALL OF WHICH CAN BE FUN TO EXERCISE
6. AND SUCH "FUN" IS TAKEN PLAYFULLY AND SERIOUSLY (NOT GRIMLY, INTENSELY, OR LIGHTLY)

IF HE ADOPTS A SENSE OF CLASS AND NOBLESSE

3. SOME OTHER POSSIBLE REACTIONS TO A POST-INDUSTRIAL, AVOCAT-ORIENTED WORLD

1. EUROPE PRESUMABLY RETURNS TO THE TRADITION OF THE GENTLEMAN--ELITIST, HUMANISTIC, TRADITIONALISTIC
2. JAPAN WILL PROBABLY SEARCH FOR PRESTIGE AND STATUS
3. SOVIETS & CHINESE MAY BOTH TURN INWARD & PROSELYTIZE--MAINLY FOR INTERNAL MORALE
5. U.S. NEGROES WILL PROBABLY CHOOSE BETWEEN PASSING, NEGRO POWER, ACCEPTANCE OF LOWER STATUS, NEGROITIQUE, BLACK MUSLIM-TYPE ASSIMILATION, BLACK POWER, CULTURE OF POVERTY, PROFESSIONAL AGITATION, EFFECTIVE MILITANT OR EXTREMIST NATIONALISM, OR A MILITANT OR FUNDAMENTALIST RELIGION
6. OTHER U.S. MINORITIES ARE LIKELY TO ASSIMILATE AND/OR EMPHASIZE PARTICULARISM
7. THE UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD & INDUSTRIALIZING WORLD WILL HAVE CHOICES "SIMILAR" TO U.S. MINORITIES EXCEPT THAT NEW IDEOLOGIES & MASS MOVEMENTS ARE LIKELY TO DEVELOP AS WELL

4. "SOCIAL FORCES" TENDING TOWARD AUTHORITARIANISM

CURRENT TENDENCIES TOWARD CAESARIAN AND TECHNOCRACY
GREATER CAPABILITIES FOR SURVEILLANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
INCREASING DESIRE FOR MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH AND SAFETY (SOCIAL ENGINEERING)
LIKELY INCREASE IN VIOLENCE AND TENSION AND NEED FOR COUNTERACTIONS
POSSIBILITY OF ORGANIZED EXTREMIST AND VIOLENT DISSENT AND NEED FOR COUNTERACTIONS

5. LIKELY CHARACTERISTICS OF "RESPONSIBLE CENTER" ELITES

1. STYLE
2. PRAGMATISM
3. EXPERTISE
4. OPTIMISM
5. MODERATION
6. EMPATHY
7. CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION
8. RESPONSIBILITY (PERHAPS EVEN NEO-STOICISM)
9. BUT NO OBJECTION TO NEO-EPICUREAN OR GENTLEMAN SO LONG AS THEY HAVE A MINIMUM DEDICATION

6. "THE (ROMAN) STOIC OUTLOOK"

1. THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES ARE: WISDOM, JUSTICE, COURAGE AND TEMPERANCE
2. BUT FORTITUDE AND INDIFFERENCE TO PAIN AND SORROW ARE ALSO IMPORTANT
3. ONLY SUCH VIRTUE JUSTIFIES POWER
4. BUT VIRTUE IS ITS OWN REWARD--EACH MAN SHOULD DO HIS DUTY FOR ITS OWN SAKE
5. EVEN A SLAVE CAN BE VIRTUOUS
6. THERE IS A BASIC NATURAL LAW GOVERNING MANKIND
7. UNDER THIS NATURAL LAW ALL MEN ARE BASICALLY EQUAL

8. DUTY FOR ITS OWN SAKE
Intellectuals and Politics

(This page folds out.)
INTELLECTUALS

1. General Conditions

An intellectual is one who forms his judgments chiefly on the basis of indirect experience; and in life works with ideas rather than things. Intellectuals growing in numbers. Indirect influence of intellectuals on decision-making continues to increase in spite of temporary and apparent set-backs. Always establishment intellectuals, but the decisive influence is that of the general intellectual community.

2. Inevitable Intellectual Tendencies

(Not restricted to intellectuals: often correct)

a. Relativism - questioning values and institutions
   There are many systems of truth - in time & space complexity precludes sharp judgment, clouds moral issues.
   Self-serving motivation for these arguments: if things are complex enough only the intellectuals can comprehend.

b. Pacifism
   No right for one man to take the life of another - particularly since values are relative.
   Empathy makes all deaths death of self.
   All positions can be compromised: solved by talk: reconciliation.
   Self-serving motivation: people of the pen have relatively greater power in times of peace.

c. Social Reformism (egalitarianism)
   Justifications for most inequalities ring hollow.
   Especially: inherited qualities (inequalities based on intellect are, however, often proposed and supported by intellectuals).

3. Background for 1950's

a. World War I provided -
   Vindication of pacifist & relativist critique of established socio-political structure.
   Depression supported reformist critique & gave power to intellectuals.

b. Hitler, Stalin and World War II
   Undermined the appeals of pacifism, relativism, & violent reformism.
   Nevertheless, 1948 Wallace movement provided example of American intellectual reassertion of those views.
   McCarthyism prospered partially because of low morale of intellectuals.
   1950's intellectuals fell back on their own specialties; and students responded to the attitude of their teachers.

4. By the 1960's

World War II experience & less - there was revitalized relativism never seen as good for own.
Civil rights and poverty.
Nuclear weapons and Vietnam.
Inevitable political defeat & revitalized elitism &... (McCarthy phenomenon was a part of the forces brought together generally the popular appeasement: much smaller than the Hungarian movement.)
INTELLECTUALS AND POLITICS

A PARADOX OF INTELLECTUAL LIFE

Intellectuals need causes for which to work: while their minds drive them toward an intellectual void, their relativism also breaks down the non-intellectual community around them.

THUS, SOME INTELLECTUALS:

a. Confine their lives to purely intellectual goals, methodology for methodology's sake; facts for their own sake.

b. Or they reject the whole intellectual package in a general confession/repression (thus, fascism, nazism, some religious conversions; often the most dissolute are closest to this solution).

c. Or, in action lift social reformism well above pacifism and relativism in importance, allowing "no enemies to the left," assuming an intellectual role as "vanguard of the revolution" often are non-democratic, self-serving motivation; rejection and action both give intellectuals greater chance for political power than maintenance of purely intellectual position.

BY THE 1960'S

War II experience & lesson had receded into past; we were revitalized relativism/our system was no longer seen as good for own sake.

Civil rights and poverty causes revitalized reformism

Arms weapons & vietnam war revitalized pacifism

Table political defeats of intellectual causes revitalized elitism and violence

This phenomenon was a particular one in terms of forces brought together around one issue; generally, the popular appeal of intellectuals is smaller than seemed the case in the McCarthy movement.

CONCLUSIONS

a. The value ferment and student ferment we see today is a general condition which rises & falls in importance according to outside events, but always is close to the surface.

b. Pacifist, reformist and relativist ideas will tend to grow in influence in America & Euro-America until arrested & temporarily reversed by another major shock such as World War II.
The BNSP Approach

(This page folds out.)
THE BNSP APP.

A BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (BNSP) ATTEMPTS:

TO ASSESS CURRENT CAPABILITIES, EXPLICATE AND ASSESS
VALUES, OBJECTIVES, AND ASSUMPTIONS AND THEN BY USE OF
PROPER TACTICS, STRATEGIES AND POLICIES TO EXPLOIT
NATIONAL CAPABILITIES TO FURTHER THE NATIONAL GOALS
AND OBJECTIVES. IN PARTICULAR IT ATTEMPTS TO SYNTHESIZE
PAST, PRESENT, AND 'FUTURE' ASPECTS OF AREAS IV TO X
OF THE POLICY ISSUES PROJECT, I.E.:

IV. SELECTED RELEVANT CULTURAL, PHILOSOPHIC, OR OTHER
BASIC TOPICS
V. FOREIGN POLICY
VI. MILITARY AND DEFENSE POLICIES
VII. ARMS CONTROL POLICIES
VIII. DOMESTIC POLICIES
IX. FUTURIBLES
X. CONTEXTS AND SCENARIOS

1. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SYSTEMATIC AND INTENSIVE U.S. PLANNING

I. COSTS
   A. AGGRAVATION OF DISSENSION
   B. DISSIATION OF SUPPORT
   C. UNDERMINING OF MORALE
   D. UMPIEANESS
   E. DIVERSION OF RESOURCES
   F. RIGIDIFICATION OF RESPONSES

II. BENEFITS
   A. USEFUL CURRENT PLANS
   B. A PRE-CRISIS IMPROVISATION BASE
   C. DILUTION OF COSTS THROUGH ROUTINIZATION

2. SOME REASONS FOR USING THE BNSP FORMULATION

1. FACILITATES AN INTEGRATED AND OVER-ALL CONSIDERATION
   OF SPECIFIC ISSUES
2. FACILITATES A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF A RANGE OF BNSP'S
3. PROVIDES INSIGHTS INTO VARIOUS WELTSANSHAUNGEN
   (IDEOLOGIES)
4. PROVIDES BOTH DESCRIPTIVE LANGUAGE AND USEFUL METAPHORS
5. PROVIDES A VERY GOOD PEDAGOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL
   CONTEXT FOR A RETHINKING OF ONE'S OWN VALUES, ASSUMPTIONS,
   AND CALCULATIONS AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SECOND ORDER
   AGREEMENT WITH OTHERS
6. MAY HELP FACILITATE INTER- AND INTRA-DEPARTMENTAL
   COMMUNICATION, ADMINISTRATION, AND INTEGRATION
7. MAY HELP IN DRAWING UP AN NSC-I

3. RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES

HUMANITY, UNITED NATIONS, ETHICAL AND MORAL ADVISORS
A MIXTURE OF LEVELS ONE AND THREE
THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND VARIOUS PRESSURE GROUPS
AND ELECTORATES
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND ASSOCIATED
ORGANIZATIONS
STATE, DEFENSE, AID, TREASURY, ETC.
OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND THEIR OPERATING DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES,
VARIOUS LEADERS, ELITES AND ORGANIZED SPECIAL
INTERESTS.
JUST ABOUT EVERYBODY

7. SEVEN LEVELS OF ANALYSIS FOR U.S. POLICY RESEARCH

RELEVANT EXPERTS

MORALISTS, PHILOSOPHERS, THEOLOGIANS, AND PROPHETS
MIXTURE OF 1 AND 3
BEYOND THE U.S.
THE NATIONAL (ENLIGHTENED)
THE (NARROW)
BASIC POLICY
OVER-ALL PURPOSE
DEPARTMENTAL
CAPABILITIES
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION
CAPACITIES, IN
OR BASIC ISSUES

5. BNSP'S TEND TO DIFFER ABOUT

1. SERIOUSNESS OF "PROVISIONAL CATASTROPHISM" U.S. FACES
2. INTENSITY WITH WHICH U.S. VALUES CAN OR SHOULD BE
   PURSUED AS GOALS FOR ALL PEOPLES
3. CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE NATURE OF COMMUNIST
   CONFRONTATION
4. DEGREE AND EXPLOITABILITY OF VARIOUS COMMON INTERESTS
5. FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF SUCCESSFUL U.S.
   INTERVENTION
6. COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES
7. STABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
8. TIME PERSPECTIVES-HOW FAR AHEAD IS IT USEFUL TO LOOK,
   OR DANGEROUS NOT TO LOOK
9. EMPHASES
10. PERSONAL STYLES AND VIEWPOINTS
THE BNSP APPROACH

1. THE BNSP APPROACH

2. CONSIDERATION

3. THE BASIC POLICY MAKING DICHOTOMY

4. VARIOUS ASPECTS OF ANY POLICY OR PLAN
   (INCLUDING A BNSP):

5. JURALITION

6. PLANNING TO MUDGLE THROUGH

7. 'MEANS-ENDS' DICHOTOMIES

8. DEFINITIONS OF SEVEN LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

9. "BASIC" POLICY MAKING

10. BASIC POLICY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES (NSC)

11. OVER-ALL PURPOSES, REQUIREMENTS, AND CRITERIA

12. DEPARTMENTAL AND AGENCY PLANNERS

13. NATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND SYSTEMS (AREA AND
    NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS)

14. CAPACITIES, RESOURCES, WEAKNESSES (SPECIFIC
    OR BASIC ISSUES AND PROBLEMS)

15. BEYOND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: IDEALS, OBJECTIVES, AND
    HOPES FOR VARIOUS HUMAN COMMUNITIES BEYOND U.S. NATIONAL
    INTERESTS NARROWLY DEFINED.

16. THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND THOSE WHICH LIE BEYOND THE
    NATIONAL INTEREST.

17. THE NATIONAL INTEREST AS MEASURED BY THE WELL-BEING AND
    PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.

18. THE NATIONAL INTEREST AS AN INTIMATE MIXTURE OF
    CONSIDERATIONS OF TACTICS AND STRATEGY WHICH ATTEMPT TO
    CONVERT THE NEXT THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS INTO ADVANCING THE
    ABOVE THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS (THOUGHT OF AS MEANS).

19. THE "IMMEDIATE" PURPOSES, REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA OF THE
    VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.

20. THE VARIOUS OVER-ALL OPERATING
    ORGANIZATIONS, THEIR RESPECTIVE TECHNICAL
    CAPABILITIES AND WEAKNESSES, AND THE (AGGREGATED)
    ISSUES WITH WHICH THEY DEAL.

21. THE BASIC SPECIFIC NATIONAL AND AREA CAPACITIES AND RESOURCES
    ON WHICH THE VARIOUS "ACTORS" CAN DRAW IN PURSUING THEIR
    PROGRAMS AND THE WEAKNESSES WHICH THEY MUST ALLEVIATE OR
    GUARD AGAINST (OR WHICH CAN BE EXPLOITED).
Thumbnail Description of the Thirty BNSP Themes

(This page folds out.)
A. PAX AMERICANA

1. HEGEMONIAL
2. SPECIFIC OR CONSENSUAL

These themes emphasize the universality of American values. The political and other values that inspire Americans are thought to be widely shared, and to point a way to the ultimate well-being of mankind, and at the least to lead to a more just and workable social order than Communism.

The advocates of the "hegemonial" theme envisage long-term American leadership to give effect to American—or America's universal—values. The U.S. might be the predominant leader (or even ruler) of the non-Communist world and eventually extend its influence and authority to countries presently under Communist rule. The second theme is a milder version of the first: American leadership would be limited to certain specified activities, or limited by the extent of others' consent to a partnership or "special relationship" with the U.S.

Both themes urge going beyond "liberalism," a term they find "unattractive" and "hostile." They both suggest that the U.S. is powerful enough to add a moral perspective to the world order. The "hegemonial" theme emphasizes the universality of American values. The "specific or consensual" theme maintains that the U.S. is powerful and secure, and that the U.S. should offer assistance to existing themes of American system.

B. U.S.-S. PARTNERSHIP OR JOIN

1. HEGEMONIAL
2. SPECIFIC OR CONSENSUAL

These themes emphasize the use of American power and influence in the world to achieve its goals. They include: dampening the arms race, securing a favorable environment for Chinese, German and Japanese interests, and working for peaceful resolution of international conflicts.

Both themes urge going beyond "liberalism." The "hegemonial" theme emphasizes the universality of American values. The "specific or consensual" theme maintains that the U.S. is powerful and secure, and that the U.S. should offer assistance to existing themes of American system.

C. ALTRUISTIC REFORM

17. CRUSADE FOR DEVELOPMENT
18. LEGAL
19. UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT AND PACIFICISM

These themes maintain that the U.S. is powerful and secure enough to build a better world without concentrating on narrow national goals. Proponents may also argue that this is a way of creating a world environment favorable to peace and the long-run survival of the American system.

Propaganda of "Crusade for Development" urge that a high proportion of U.S. resources should be put forth to accelerate economic development. Major social and political benefits are expected from increases in productivity. The "Legal Altruism" emphasizes the development of effective international law. Those who favor Unilateral Disarmament and Pacifism generally emphasize the morality of this policy, but often urge its value on instrumental grounds as well.

A distinct characteristic of these themes is the argument that what should be done is "for its own sake—but it will have rewards." The implication is that policy can and should be disinterested, and in particular that the U.S. should offer assistance to existing adversaries as well as allies.

D. ALTRUISTIC COOPERATION

20. DIPHTHOMATIC TOLERATION
21. WORLD-COMMUNITY BUILDING

These themes envisage the possible international order by the effect of security, trust, and willingness to cooperate in solving problems. The themes cited here are to be distinguishable from traditional "Crusade for Development" themes. The "Altruistic Cooperation" theme envisages a reversion to indifference and distrust.
AIL DESCRIPTION OF THE THIRTY NISP THEMES

S.-S.U. PARTNERSHIP OR JOINT CONTROL
1. HEGEMONIAL
2. SPECIFIC OR CONSENSUAL

These themes emphasize the common goals of the U.S. and the S.U. to power to achieve them by acting cooperatively. The common goal is to dampen the arms race, preventing nuclear holocaust, a favorable environment for domestic goals, and restraining German and perhaps Japanese ambitions. The U.S. and the S.U. have about half the world's GNP or about one trillion dollars (approximately ten times that of the nearest competitor), and economic and military strength and their political influence combined cooperatively. It is calculated that they could induce or world-wide agreement on the points they are vitally interested in.

C. ACTIVE ANTI-COMMUNISM
5. GEOPOLITICAL
6. PSYCHOLOGICAL

Proponents of this theme perceive Communism as still the main threat to the well-being of the U.S. and other countries, and as the major factor of international disorder. The current detente is seen as a relatively superficial phenomenon. Although it might contribute to Western demoralization, the detente is not expected to last for more than a few years.

Reducing Communism to impotence is advocated as the primary goal of the U.S. and a broad coalition of countries. Opportunities for a "rollback" should be sought, and psychological and moral pressures to thwart Communist should be stimulated on a global scale. Either the geopolitical or the psychological aspects of this struggle might be emphasized.

Proponents of this theme might vary somewhat in their estimates of the degree to which the Soviet Union, or Communist China, or the transnational Communist movement presents the major threat. They might also emphasize either political, military and psychological "confrontation," or attempts to set in motion some far-reaching processes of change within the Communist orbit.

ATLANTIC COMMUNITY
1. Pax Atlantica
2. Pragmatic
1. Atlantic Union
2. European Union

These themes stress the potentiality of coordinating and even "paxful" U.S. and West European policies. The Atlantic alliance went a common front to the rest of the world. Such a U.S.-S.U. combination would have the strength to achieve major goals that heretofore remain mere aspirations, and might be regarded as y for international arms control and European defense.

Empathetic cooperation
1. Empathetic peace-building
2. World-community building

These themes envisage the possibility of a peaceful, humane order by the effect of sympathy or empathy. War, in I hatred and many other problems are typically diagnosed in a self-fulfilling prophecy of war. By unilateral initiat, e U.S. might inaugurate a spiraling process of trust and 1. The emphasis might be on building up an environment of peaceableness, or on a less workful policy of "live and Leave" or on various measures to bring about the social and precondition for world federation. The world community here is to be distinguished from the more "activists" of altruistic reform. This theme estimates that a world tronomic order might be developed as long as the U.S. and other countries achieve in their current efforts toward that end, and give up that tend to be divisive. The goal is similar to that of "Social order" in world law as well as "Provisional, but the prognosis is much more optimistic.

Non-isolationism
10. Fortresses America
11. Indifference

These themes call for a renovation of America's earlier isolation. There might be an effort to create a "Fortress America" under contemporary technological conditions, or there might be a return to indifference and distrust of the outside world.
The "Prudential Internationalist" Perspective

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SUMMARY OF "PRUDENTIAL INTERNATIONALIST" BNSP

1. RELATIVELY ECLECTIC--BUT SOME IDEOLOGY; RELATIVELY PRAGMATIC--BUT SOME PROGRAMS
2. MELIORIST--NOT RADICAL (THE POLITICS OF GRADUAL CHANGE AND THE LESSER EVIL)
3. PLAN ON MUDDLING THROUGH BUT PLAN THE MUDDLING THROUGH (THE PRE-CRISIS IMPROVISATION)
4. BNSP MORE THAN BNSP
5. POLITICS--BUT ALSO POLICIES
6. SKEPTICAL OF GRAND DESIGNS--BUT CONCERNED WITH THE LONG-TERM STABILITY OF THE SYSTEM (AUSTERE PRAGMATIC PROVISIONAL CATASTROPHISM)
7. SYSTEM BARGAINING AND A SENSE OF THE RULES
8. EXTENDED DETERRENCE? ARMS RACE? PROLIFERATION?
9. NATIONAL INTEREST IN AMELIORATING THREAT-SYSTEM
10. DETERRENT OR DETENTE? BOTH--AND NEITHER

STARTING POINTS: WHERE ARE WE?
(THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM)

1. NATION STATE AS BASIC UNIT CHARACTERIZED BY
   TERRITORIALITY
   SOVEREIGNTY
   CENTER OF LOYALTY AND PROTECTION
   SOME SELF-DETERMINATION
2. MORE THAN 100 NATION STATES
3. EACH NATION THE JUDGE OF ITS OWN CAUSE
4. LIMITED INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY
5. SOME BIPOLARITY; SOME MULTIPOLARITY
6. DILEMMAS OF COMPETITION AND COOPERATION
7. SOME BALANCING PROCESSES
8. SOME SELF-RESTRAINT AND SELF-DETERRENCE
9. THE WAR SYSTEM

THREE BASIC VIEWS OF THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER

1. BASICALLY STABLE--MODIFICATIONS ONLY
2. BASICALLY UNSTABLE--DISRUPTIVE CHANGE LIKELY
3. EITHER/OR (PROVISIONAL CATASTROPHISM--RELATIVELY UNSTABLE BUT EVOLUTION POSSIBLE)

HOW STABLE IS THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM?

1. WHAT IS A CHANGE?
2. HOW BIG A DISTURBANCE IS NEEDED FOR SUCH A CHANGE?
3. HOW LIKELY IS SUCH AN EVENT?
4. HOW SOON?
5. WHAT THEN?

DIRECTIONS: HOW DO WE BEGIN?

A. BROAD CONSENSUS:
1. REDUCE THE CHANCE OF ACCIDENTAL WAR
   (AND DECREASE DETERRENCE)
2. INCREASE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF THE WORLD
   (AND INCREASE WITH COUNTRIES)
3. STRENGTHEN THE RULE OF LAW
   (AND ACCEPT DISADVANTAGES)
B. REASONABLE COMPROMISES:
1. DISCOURAGE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
   (AND live WITH ALLIANCE PROBLEMS)
2. ENFORCE EUROPEAN UNITY
   (AND RISK A SPLIT ALONG THE ATLANTIC)
3. COOPERATE IN U.S.-S.U. DETENTE
   (AND HASTEN POLYCENTRISM ON BOTH SIDES)
C. HARSH CHOICES:
1. U.S.-S.U. PARTIAL CONDOMINIUM ("NO FIRST USE")
   (AND DECREASE THE PROTECTION OF EUROPE)
2. INCREASE WEST GERMAN STRENGTH
   (AND RISK VIOLENT RE-UNIFICATION)
3. PRESERVE U.S. "DAMAGE-LIMITING" OPTION
   (AND CONTINUE THE ARMS RACE)
A'S EGOTISTICAL "PREFERENCE" IN A SYSTEM'S BARGAINING SITUATION

1. A "CHEATS," BUT NOBODY ELSE IS INDUCED TO CHEAT BY HIS EXAMPLE.

2. A CHEATS, AND ONLY VERY FEW ARE INDUCED TO CHEAT BY HIS EXAMPLE.

3. NOBODY CHEATS.

4. OTHERS CHEAT, BUT IF A WERE TO JOIN THEM, THIS PARTICULAR PRECEDENT WOULD ENDANGER THE STABILITY OF THE SYSTEMS, SO A DOES NOT CHEAT.

5. EVERYBODY CHEATS.

6. EVERYBODY CHEATS BUT A.

DESTINATIONS, ROUTES, DIRECTIONS, AND STARTING POINTS

A. STARTING POINTS: WHERE ARE WE? (I.E., CURRENT STATUS) WHERE ARE WE GOING NOW? (I.E., CURRENT TRENDS)

B. DIRECTIONS: HOW DO WE BEGIN? (I.E., POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS)

C. ROUTES: HOW DO WE GET THERE? (I.E., PLANS, PROGRAMS, AND PROJECTIONS)

D. DESTINATIONS: WHERE DO WE WANT TO GO?--OR WHAT DO WE WANT TO AVOID?

ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM ENDPOINTS: HOW WILL ESCALATION BE HANDLED IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? WHAT WILL BE THE ROLE OF FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM?

1. MINOR MODIFICATION OF CURRENT SYSTEM

2. ALL-OUT WAR SYSTEM WITHERS AWAY

A. UNIVERSAL DETERRENCE--GALLOIS WORLDS
B. RULE OF LAW
C. PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY
D. RULE OF FAIT ACCOMPLI (INTERNAL WAR)
E. INSTRUMENTAL WARS (RATIONAL SELF-INTEREST RESTRAINTS)
F. AGONISTIC WARS (LIMITED BY ABSOLUTE RULES)
G. POTLATCH WARS (SPACE, FOREIGN AID, "SHOWY" SYSTEMS, ETC.)
H. OTHER SUBSTITUTE FOR CENTRAL WAR

3. OTHER BASIC CHANGE IN SYSTEM

A. BLOC SYSTEMS (WITH RESTRAINTS AND RITUALS)
B. COMMUNITY SANCTIONS (E.G., NO FIRST USE BY ANYONE)
C. CONDOMINIUMS (U.S.-S.U., COLLECTIVE SECURITY, U.N.)
D. CONCERT OF (LARGE OR SMALL) POWERS
E. "WORLD GOVERNMENT"
F. WORLD EMPIRE (OR EMPIRES)
G. DISARMED, BUT "UNCONTROLLED" NATIONS
H. ELIMINATION OR CONTROL OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY AGREEMENT OR REVULSION FOLLOWING A LARGE SETBACK TO CIVILIZATION
The "Austere Pragmatic Interventionist" Perspective

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THE "AUSTERE PRAGMATIC INTERVENTIONIST" POLICY

1. CONFLICT IS INHERENT IN THE SOCIAL ORDER.
2. POLITICS IS THE ADJUSTMENT, CONTAINMENT, RESOLUTION, OR PROSECUTION OF THIS CONFLICT BY A VARIETY OF MATERIAL ENDS.
3. THE NECESSARY GOALS OF POLITICAL POLICY THEN ARE MULTIPLE, LIMITED, AND TRANSITORY—NOT GENERAL AND PERMANENT.
4. POLITICAL ACTIONS MUST BE SUBJECTED TO SPECIFIC MORAL JUDGEMENTS, BUT CONFLICTS OF MORAL VALUES ONLY PARTIALLY AND TRANSIENTLY COINCIDE WITH THE CONFLICTS OF POLITICS.

WHAT FOREIGN POLICY CAN ACCOMPLISH

MAKE WAR
CONTAIN CONFLICT, DISORDER
SECURE AGREEMENTS OF COOPERATION, COLLABORATION
SECURE ADJUSTMENTS OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS AND AMBITIONS
HARM OPPONENTS THROUGH ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND PROPAGANDA MEASURES
SUPPORT FRIENDS

RUSSIA
POWERFUL, DISORIENTED, ERRATIC, CONSERVATIVE—IMPELLING "CRISIS OF IDENTITY"

CHINA
RHETORICALLY RADICAL, CONSERVATIVE IN POLICY, LIMITED IN POWER, REACTING TO WESTERN SOCIO-CULTURAL DISRUPTION, HUMILIATIONS

THIRD WORLD
CULTURALLY DISORIENTED, REACTIVE, SUSCEPTIBLE TO HYSTERICAL POLITICS, IMMUNE TO INTERNATIONAL DISCIPLINE

EUROPE
POWERFUL, SECURE, BRILLIANT, DANGEROUS
PRAGMATIC INTERVENTIONIST Perspective

1. Requirements for a Sound Policy

- Attainable, unemotional goals
- Serious, unemotional assessments of conditions
- A sense of irony

2. The Purpose of Foreign Policy

- To ensure its safety from external danger
- To secure the conditions in which the excellence of the society itself may be sought

3. What Foreign Policy Cannot Accomplish

- Make eternal peace
- Make the world democratic
- Make other societies:
  1. Just
  2. Politically competent
  3. Industrially, economically adept
  4. Self-respecting, self-confident
- Make our own society "great," happy

Toward a New Policy

1. Not more--"Emotional disengagement"

- Primary American interests and national security
- Decision, toughness, efficiency
- Ambitions, expectations
- Primary balance of power among nations
- Age or welcome local strengths, local assumptions
- Possibility, political pluralism
- Normalizations--Substitution of political for military constraints
- Erode power as "strategic reserve" devoted to
- Yearning balanced plurality of power in the world
- Tand foreign aid as (1) in specific situations, (2) in general,
- N, charitable obligation
- Existing conventions and institutions of order
- Hypothetical reforms of the future

Some Immediate Objectives of "Austere Pragmatic Interventionist" Policy

1. Soviet military power contained, limited to Soviet territory, by--
   a. U.S. military parity or superiority;
   b. European deterrent forces;
   c. Central European political settlement which provides realistic security guarantees to the U.S.S.R.

2. European stability promoted by--
   a. German reconciliation with France, U.K., Italy;
   b. Problem of German unity given conditional solution;
   c. Withdrawal from Europe of U.S. and Soviet troops.

3. Chinese aggressions contained, but--
   a. Chinese assertions of hostility and quest for influence met without hysteria;
   b. Autonomous regional countervailing powers forced to take responsibilities for their own interests.

4. Third World disorders defined as of primary interest to the United States only when they jeopardize international balance of power.
The "Aggressive Democrat" Perspective

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In fact, the twenty-two-year era of the revolution and the Napoleonic Empire labored more forcefully than the era of Louis XIV for the unity of the White World. It had at its disposal the magic formula of social upheaval, with its aid, France declined more and more, and in the end produced a rejuvenated military power that towered above those of her continental adversaries. By the same means, she also generated an ideological power which multiplied her material strength many times over. Just as the magnetic mountain in the legend draws the iron parts from a ship, causing it to collapse, so French propaganda disrupted the ideological forces on the other side. Napoleon understood how to wield this propaganda, and the bouquet of revolutionary achievements looked all the more alluring in his grasp for being well arranged and firmly rounded. There was not a country in which the new empire did not find a powerful body of supporters.


Communist countries during the detente

Much independent economic activity and even better quarrels among themselves.

Inroads of Western music, poetry, etc.

Democracy is still the "enemy" to these governments, not so much as a driving force which motivates invasions from abroad, but internally.

Little visible pressure on fellow communist governments in favor of political concessions to the west (much pressure from China to be harder on the west).

No record of siding with the west in confrontations anywhere against a fellow communist (even after sino-soviet split, Russia would not register opposition to China for its invasion of India).

Communist governments "legitim化ized" at home and abroad.

The disappointment over the foreign policy of the democracies also influences the value judgment on democracy as a form of government. You argue among yourselves while the Russians act... this was the repeatedly heard reaction in East Germany, to foreign policy bundesstag debates which were also carried over the last German radio... such remarks do not constitute a writing off of democracy. However, it would be dangerous to overlook the (apparently) greater effectiveness of the Eastern form of a state that is almost definitively important to human beings who are so immediately touched by the conflict between East and West. The perpetual activity, aggressiveness and the great victory in the French Sino-Soviet conflict of the Communist led opposition in the largest part of the world, the pressure of the large populous of the latter to action, not to estimate the future outlook in the West. That is, after something will happen in the East, and to make it work out whenever possible, whenever it is all that is worth doing, to act against, it is in the interest of the Western powers to make it clear now that this time this is wrong.
THE "AGGRESSIVE DEMOCRAT" PERSPECTIVE

1. REVOLUTION AND REBELLION: IN THE ERA OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, IT HAD AT TIMES ADVANCES WITH ITS MILITARY POWER ADVERSARIES, BY LOGICAL POWER WHICH OVER, JUST AS THE IRON CURTAIN BLOCKADE, NAPOLEON NOT ALWAYS SO IN THE RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN NATIONS. EXTREMISM VS. INOFFENSIVE REASONABLENESS

2. CHOLARLY EXCHANGES PLAYING UP DEFICIENCIES OF NONCOMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS, NKIAN COUP

3. IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED STATES, IGNORING THE IRON CURTAIN FROM ALL THAT IS HAPPENING IN VIETNAM WE MUST, THEREFORE, OF NECESSITY DRAW CONCLUSIONS AND ASK OURSELVES THE ALARMING QUESTION IF ALL THIS COULD NOT HAPPEN IN A DIFFERENT FORM IN OUR COUNTRY.

4. MILIEU OF CURRENT CONFRONTATION

5. THE DETENTE

6. EFFECTS ON MORALE: PREVALENT AMONG ALL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, SCHOLARLY EXCHANGES OF HERETICAL MOVEMENTS

7. EFFECTS ON MORALE: IGNORING ASPIRATIONS OF DEMOCRACIES WHILE BEING SUCCESSIONS OF "LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS" OF COMMUNISTS

8. ONE-PARTY GOVERNMENTS VS. MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACIES

9. COMMUNISM VS. "REALISM","DETENTE INITIATIVES," ETC.

10. OPTIMISTS VS. PESSIMISTS

11. EXTREMISM VS. INOFFENSIVE REASONABLENESS

12. "RESOLVE" VS. "ANCEIN REGIME MORALE"?

13. "PROGRAM" VS. NO PROGRAM

14. "REVISIONISM" VS. STATUS QUO

15. UNITED NATIONS SYNDROME

16. GOOD CITIZEN OR ABDICATOR?

17. DETENTE POLICIES -- WHICH SIDE DOES POLITICAL EVOLUTION OCCUR FASTER?

--ALEXIS DE TOUCHEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

ONE-PARTY GOVERNMENTS VS. MULTIPARTY GOVERNMENTS

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DETENTE POLICIES -- WHICH SIDE DOES POLITICAL EVOLUTION OCCUR FASTER?
Communism, China and Russia: A Typical Perspective of the Prudential Internationalist

Chart 1 records the belief that there will be an intense erosion of the cohesive communist mentality and enthusiasm that pervaded the communist movement since the first third of the twentieth century. Even more than in the past national communist parties will see an advantage in going their own way and there will be little remaining élan in the Marxist movement. This will be true not only in Europe and Asia but in other areas of the Third World. The significance of this in operational terms is that the communist hierarchy will lose its unity as schismatic movements develop, not only among the intellectuals where communism will become "square" but also amongst the workers. One reason for the loss of morale of communist movements will be their inability to compete politically, economically and technologically with the Western and even the non-Western democracies.

Chart 2 takes a look at the Soviet Union. It is still the dominant communist power in terms of military capabilities, and therefore can be said to maintain some position of leadership. On the other hand it is being challenged by other communist powers. The Soviet Union's response to that challenge is damaged by its poor "image" in a number of areas. For example, the expansion of the Soviet economy is relatively slow and there is an obvious need for reform which thus far has not been institutionalized. Agriculture also is in a sorry state. At the same time the Soviet population is asking for more consumer goods. There are signs of increasing discontent among the population and among the intellectuals. Altogether the Soviet Union is losing enthusiasm and its imperial nerve and is in a condition of low morale.

Chart 3 reminds us that the Russia of today and of the future will bear little relationship to the Russia envisaged by Lenin at the time of the Russian revolution.

Chart 4 makes the point that communism in many parts of the Third World will be less Marxist and Soviet oriented than "nationalistic." That is to say that the communist parties will not subordinate themselves in the direction of Moscow or even Peking but will become autonomous movements in each country.

Chart 5 depicts Communist China as a major contender to the primacy of the Soviet Union in the international communist system. China is seen as a nation in disarray: It is therefore cautious and its more assertive positions and statements are largely ones of rhetoric. Although it has a growing nuclear capability, Chinese foreign policy remains at a low key in terms of independent initiatives. The long term results of the cultural revolution remain in doubt. Although China may eventually join the ranks of the great powers, this will not occur in 1975-1976.
Communism, China and Russia:
A Typical Perspective of the Prudential Internationalist

(This page folds out.)
1. **Communism as an international movement and ideology**

1. Schismatic movements increasingly likely.
2. Even when in doctrinaire agreement, much independence, polycentrism, and/or nationalism often overrides ideology. Increasing belief that a doctrinaire view of such areas as the economy, agriculture, science, arts, etc., is not an advantage in competitive terms.
3. Losing political and ideological dynamism (few successes since 1960). Economic dynamism, technological innovation far more pronounced in West than in "soviets bloc." (But aggressive democrat would note that politically and ideologically communist states have higher morale and elan than the West.)
4. Increasingly Asian, many communist movements in Asia exist at subnational level; unity among them increasingly difficult to achieve.
5. Increasingly young turn to romantic post-Marxist movements often hostile to U.S.S.R.
6. "Old Left" communism increasingly dated (even "square") in view of political avant-garde throughout the world.

2. **U.S.S.R. - Still the leading**

1. Powerful in absolute terms and improving a broad spectrum of Communism.
2. Record and tradition of relative dangerous foreign adventures. Its huge historic expansion is in mind and temper.
3. Foreign policy a success in select influence; a failure in ideological expansion.
4. Yet very powerful, very talented, enduring.
5. And committed to rivalry with ideology and the dynamics of our world.
6. Dramatic challenges in internal merit (China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia) two convert to communism since Vietnam--some would also include parts of Laos and South Vietnam.
7. Repeatedly humiliated (China, Arab-Israeli war, bombing of Hanoi dissident, Cuba Thaw). Communist wholly losing up risk of new fiascos.
8. Losing enthusiasm and perhaps?
9. Expansion of economy relatively comparatively resistant to repet.
10. Agriculture inefficient. New economic?
12. Increasing signs of an existing disillusion--through the dampen this.
13. Accommodating to revisionist agriculture, national planning, within the bloc, while suppressing internal politics and cultural discipline generally.
14. Increasingly internal stress is of latter-day Castroism vs. unimaginative bureaucratic policies. (See below)

3. **Third World revolutionary communism**

2. Mostly autonomous movements. No important third world party subordinates itself to Soviet or Chinese direction. The equality of national parties is strongly stressed by Cubans, Vietnamese, others at international gatherings.
3. Current brethren doctrine of intervention in "socialist commonwealth" arouses much animosity.
4. Indigenous castrismo does not seem to "take elsewhere in Latin America. Successful "Viet" forms are not springing up outside Vietnam. Although there is some mutual support among the various communist movements, the ideological basis of communism is declining rapidly, especially since the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
5. An important political and moral influence on students and the left in Europe and America. Was recycled in the West the question of violent revolution.
6. Hot ties with sympathetic, moral and various militant U.S. movements, but these may be of very limited if any significance.
COMMUNISM, CHINA AND RUSSIA: PERSPECTIVE OF A PRUDENT INTERNATIONALIST

U.S.S.R. - STILL THE LEADING COMMUNIST POWER

Powerful in absolute terms—and currently rapidly improving a broad spectrum of military capabilities.

Record and tradition of relative prudence in 'dangerous foreign adventures,' it seems, despite its huge historic expansion, ultimately defensive in mind and temper.

Foreign policy: a success in securing Russia's defenses, influence; a failure in ideological proselytizing and expansion.

Yet very powerful, very talented society, patient and enduring.

And committed to rivalry with the U.S. by both ideology and the dynamics of our geopolitical relationship.

Dramatic challenges in international communist movement (China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Romania) and only two converts to communism since 1950 (Cuba and North Vietnam—some would also include Tibet, Zanzibar, parts of Laos and South Vietnam).

Repeatedly humiliated (China, Cuba, Congo, Romania, Arab-Israeli war, bombing of North Vietnam, etc.).

Cuba dissident; Congo wholly lost; U.S.S.R. may be setting up risk of new fiasco in Middle East.

Losing enthusiasm and perhaps imperial nerve.

Expansion of economy relatively slow. Economy itself comparatively resistant to reform. Very little actual evidence of such reformability, or of its likely permanence even if achieved. Economic malformations have been incorporated into ideology.

Agriculture inefficient. New crises likely to emerge, increasingly consumer-oriented.

Increasing signs of an existing and growing intellectual disidence—though the Czech occupation may dampen this.

Accommodating to revisionist trends in industry, agriculture, national planning, scientific truth, etc., within the bloc: while suppressing similar trends in internal politics and culture and strengthening internal discipline generally.

Increasingly internal stress is strongly reminiscent of latter-day czarist Russia: restless intelligentsia vs. unimaginative bureaucrats and reactionary secret police. (See below)

RUSSIA TODAY: ONE VIEW

The great hopes and fears that Russia evoked a generation ago are forgotten....Lenin's mausoleum is no different from Napoleon's tomb at the Invalides--another sight to tick off in the guidebook....for he the great fact of modern history had been the Russian revolution.....(yet) a few tired slogans on the walls or building sites are all that attest the fact that one is present at the building of what has once heralded as a 'new civilization.' A tourist could easily forget that this is not just Russia but Soviet Russia. I now think that we shall have to consider the Russian present in quite a different way. We may have to denote the revolution to yet another (Russian) time of troubles.

--Max Beloff, after a return to Russia in 1965

CHINA - THE MAJOR CONTENDER

1. In serious internal disorder; some signs of possible disintegration.

2. Many current phenomena may be more related to traditional and "normal" issues and characteristics than is usually realized. (Historically China has been notably xenophobic and collectivist with much fancy politics and internal disorder.)

3. Record and tradition of relative prudence in dangerous foreign adventures, although expansionist.

4. Foreign policy largely a failure in relation to proclaimed aims ('WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION').

5. External violence largely rhetorical; has stimulated actual violence almost nowhere.

6. Growing nuclear capability, but compared to other four nuclear powers (and the potentialities of Japan) very limited in capability. (But has more advanced H-bomb than France.)

7. Patient and highly talented—will very likely eventually (20 to 50 years?) attain great power status and capability, but not in the 1975-1985 time period.

8. Outcome of Cultural Revolution still in doubt.
Europe and Japan: 
A Typical Perspective of the Prudential Internationalist

Chart 1 shows Europe as a satisfied area, economically strong despite the existence of technological and managerial gaps between Western Europe and the United States, and despite also the economic disparities between the countries of Europe and within individual countries. At the same time it is an increasingly inward Europe with little interest in the developing world. Such a Europe will be increasingly diverging from American leadership and will be uninterested in either the continuing Soviet-American rivalry or in the American interest in containing the expansion of communism outside the European area. There will be a continuing interest in the development of new, more positive, political relations with the nations of Eastern Europe. In such a context NATO will continue in disarray, although the possibility will always be existing that the alliance could be suddenly strengthened should a deep crisis occur. European federalism has not made much progress but it remains a political ideal which some Europeans aspire to and which can be held up as a threat to Soviet hostile aims. Because Europe will not have unified in any real sense it will remain militarily relatively weak although it will also retain the economic and technological capabilities to strengthen its armed forces and develop integrated military commands should such capabilities appear to become desirable because of a renewed Soviet threat.

Chart 2 indicates a series of ways by which Eastern Europe could come into disarray. There is discontent not only among the young and the intellectuals but among other sectors of society. Economically the Eastern Europe bloc no longer holds together and the Warsaw Pact becomes less effective. The position of the communist party within the individual countries suffers as there is mounting discontent with communist orthodoxy. Interest in Western Europe and democratic procedures continues high so that the Soviet Union becomes increasingly worried about developments in Eastern Europe in terms of their potential ability to infect the Russian heartland.

Chart 3 portrays a number of social and political trends which are apparent in Western Europe and are likely to become important in the 1975-85 environment, but which in some cases are also applicable to Eastern Europe. Here we see a general decline of the class society and communalism. There is a "post-parliamentary" trend and a resurgence of the new left as a force in European politics. Although the erosion of the class society alters the established system we nevertheless can expect the persistence of nationalism within individual countries.

Chart 4 enumerates a number of conditions which will effect the national life of Japan. We can reasonably expect that by 1975 Japan will loom large as one of the principal national actors on the international scene. The guilt-feeling following World War II will have passed as a new generation comes into power. Japan will have
finished a fantastic economic growth which will make her one of the richest nations in the world. Tokyo will be playing a larger role in Southeast Asia and although the defense security arrangements with the United States will have been altered they will continue in one form or another. The United States will look upon Japan as a factor of stability in Asia although we probably will have less leverage over Tokyo than in the first postwar decades.
WESTERN EUROPE

1. Relatively rich but many Europeans anxious to relax (to some degree the management and "risk" gaps and to a lesser degree, the technological gap are symptoms of this desire)—also potentially very strong economically, particularly if managerial techniques and incentive structures are revised (and/or gaps are alleviated).

2. Inward-looking (indeed "isolationist"), but influencing U.S. policy. In addition, West Germany is still interested in extra-NATO probing, initiatives in East, and has commercial and cultural representation everywhere in Latin America, Africa, and in much of Asia and Eastern Europe. This is often welcomed by the aggressive democrats but also often seen as a cause of concern by the prudent internationalist.

3. Increasingly anti-U.S. leadership and U.S. policies and to some degree anti-U.S. (but U.S. still more popular superpower.)

4. Indifferent to Cold War in terms of its disbelief in a serious Soviet threat to Western Europe; this is contrary to viewpoint of aggressive democrats towards Soviet threat and interest in Western Europe.

5. Hostile to U.S. involvement in Asia (in terms of the American commitment of military forces.)

6. While NATO is increasingly an empty shell, it is a standing reminder to Soviets and others that it can be revived if there is a renewed Soviet threat. It is also a valuable context for very useful U.S.-West Germany cooperation and many other important and desirable activities.

7. Friendly towards "normalization" and east-west reconciliation even if at possible cost of nonsupport of U.S. or of serving as "honest broker" between U.S. and E.U. U.S. can afford to support that tendency so long as U.S. also believes in détente, evolution in Eastern Europe, and eventual "reunification" of Europe—at least so long as events seem to go in that direction and Khrushchev era seems increasingly obsolete and abnormal.

8. While losing mystique of unification, concept of a "Europe" very clear and widely held—possibility of European unification is an important "counter-threat" if S.U. threatens Western Europe, but in absence of such threat, political unification seems unlikely. However, prudent internationalist will continue to support European unification "in theory."

9. Some possibility of instability, but greater likelihood European nations will be very, perhaps dangerously, weak in a serious crisis.

10. While potentially militarily very strong, this only likely to be realized if unification occurs and/or morale and/or interest in defense is restored. German unification or German integration into a common Europe equally unlikely in near or intermediate term, yet German prosperity, democracy, and cooperation with the U.S. likely to continue.

EASTERN EUROPE

1. Population increasingly reconcile to forms and structures of communist society, but as "Czechoslovakia" discontent with illiberalism, iso dependency.


3. Increasing ideological innovation loss by party of former all-domi
cially in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslav.

4. Much tension between party and yo managers, technicians.

5. Party increasingly superfluous.

6. Position of party potentially pre states except Bulgaria.

7. Increasingly interested in wester
tion, entertainment, etc.; in declining.

8. Developing rapidly by world stand
tential because of i.

9. No longer secure jumping-off zone to west.

10. Zone of ideological contagion for the aggressive democrat would not Europe still remains firmly in th.

SOME CURRENT EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLITICAL

1. The communist parties of Western legitimized and nationalized.

2. The radical (or post-communist or reappeared as a significant force

3. The traditional West European par obsolescence or irrelevance.

4. There is a decline of class in eu

5. The decline of communism in eu

6. There is a "post-parliamentary" t

7. The persistence of nationalism as

8. The expectations of West German in the vitality of the chosen conten foreign policy commitment are in

9. There is an emergence of a new ra
americanism in Europe.

10. A reversal of alliances is not w
EUROPE AND JAPAN:
'PERSPECTIVE OF THE PRUDENTIAL INTERNATIONALIST

2 EASTERN EUROPE

PULATION INCREASINGLY RECONCILED TO FUNDAMENTAL
RMS AND STRUCTURES OF COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION OF
CIETY, BUT AS "CZECHOSLOVAKIA" MADE CLEAR MUCH
CONTENT WITH ILLIBERALISM, ISOLATION, SOVIET
PENDENCY.

PACT REDUCED TO "NORTHERN TIER ALLIANCE" OF
S.S.R., D.D.R., AND POLAND AGAINST WEST GERMANY.

CREASING IDEOLOGICAL INNOVATION (AND SOME SIGNS OF
S.S. BY PARTY OF FORMER ALL-DOMINATING ROLE, ESPE-

CIAH TENSION BETWEEN PARTY AND YOUTH, INTELLECTUALS,
NAGERS, TECHNICIANS.

ITY INCREASINGLY SUPERFLUOUS.

ITION OF PARTY POTENTIALLY PRECARIOUS IN ALL
ATES EXCEPT BULGARIA.

CREASINGLY INTERESTED IN WESTERN EUROPE (IDEAS,
SION, ENTERTAINMENT, ETC.): INTEREST IN U.S.

VELOPING RAPIDLY BY WORLD STANDARDS, BUT LAGGING
IND ITS POTENTIAL BECAUSE OF INEFFICIENT DOCTRINE.

LONGER SECURE JUMPING-OFF ZONE FOR SOVIET PROBES

ONE OF IDEOLOGICAL CONTAGION FOR U.S.S.R., BUT

ATIVE DEMOCRAT WOULD NOTE THAT EASTERN

ope STILL REMAINS FIRMLY IN THE COMMUNIST

CURRENT EUROPEAN SOCIAL, POLITICAL & CULTURAL TRENDS

OMunist parties of western europe are becoming

ITIZED AND NATIONALIZED.

RADICAL (OR POST-COMMUNIST OR HUMANIST) LEFT HAS

ER APPEARED AS A SIGNIFICANT FORCE IN EUROPE.

ADITIONAL WEST EUROPEAN PARTIES ARE EXPERIENCING

OLESCENCE OR IRRELEVANCE.

ERE IS A DECLINE OF CLASS IN EUROPE.

E DECLINE OF COMMUNALISM IN EUROPE.

ERE IS A "POST-PARLIAMENTARY" TREND IN GOVERNMENT.

E PERSISTENCE OF NATIONALISM AS A FORCE IN EUROPE.

E XPECTATIONS OF WEST GERMAN POST-WAR POLICY AND

VITALITY OF THE CHOSEN CONTEMPORARY WEST GERMAN

EN POLICY COMMITMENT ARE IN DOUBT.

ERE IS AN EMERGENCE OF A NEW RATIONALE FOR ANTI-

ICANISM IN EUROPE.

ESALATION OF ALLIANCES IS NOT WHOLLY IMPOSSIBLE IN

4 JAPAN

1. JAPAN SHOULD HAVE FINISHED 25 YEARS OF HIGH GROWTH
RATES, AND BE LOOKING AHEAD FOR 25 YEARS OF MUCH THE
SAME. (HER GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT SHOULD BE MORE
THAN 200 BILLION DOLLARS -- THE THIRD LARGEST BY SOME
MARGINS.)

2. WORLD WAR II WILL HAVE BEEN OVER FOR 30 YEARS AND
THERE WILL HAVE BEEN AN EXTENSIVE REVISIONIST LITERATURE ON
WORLD WAR II -- LITTLE OR NO GUILT FEELINGS WILL REMAIN.

3. MANY NEW DESIRES AND REACTIVATION OF SOME OLD DESIRES--
"THIRD GENERATION" AND "YOUTH" EFFECTS.

4. SOME DESIRE TO "PASS" -- SOME DESIRE FOR CULTURAL IDENTI-
ITY -- GREAT DESIRE FOR INTERNATIONAL STATUS AMONG THE
CONSERVATIVE AND THE OLD -- TO SOME DEGREE AMONG OTHERS
AS WELL.

5. CHANGED INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL CONTEXT -- MUCH CON-
FUSION ON HOW MUCH OLD CONCEPTS AND CONSTRAINTS APPLY--
ON WHAT NEW CONCEPTS AND CONSTRAINTS ARE APPLICABLE.

6. OLD LEFT STILL NATIONALIST, RACIST, XENOPHOBIC, MAR-
IST, DOGMATIC, ETC. -- NEW LEFT IS 7

7. NO STRONG CENTER PARTY -- NO CHARISMATIC LEADER.

8. POLITICS OF COMPROMISE AND Factionalism CONTINUE, BUT
INTENSITY GOES OUT OF SOME OF THE OLD ISSUES.

9. VIGOROUS PURSUIT OF SOME POLICIES -- MODERATELY RANK-
Oriented.

10. "CENTRIST" PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT.

11. NATIONAL EMPHASIS ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (ACHIEV-
ING PLANNED RATE OF PERHAPS CLOSE TO 10%); MODERATELY
EXPANDED DEFENSIVE MILITARY FORCES WITH EMPHASIS ON
TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED EQUIPMENT (NUCLEAR AND MISSILE

12. U.S. SECURITY TREATY EXTENDED -- PROBABLY WITHOUT EX-
Plicit Amendments; U.S. BASES IN STAGED TRANSITION TO
JAPANESE CONTROL WITH STRICTLY QUALIFIED U.S. EMERGENCY
ACCESS, MODERATE BUT STEADY REDUCTION OF U.S. INFLUENCE
JUSTIFIED AS JAPAN'S ASSUMING "PROPER RESPONSIBILITIES"
IN DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. SOME TENSION OVER CON-
TINUED U.S. CONTROL OF OKINAWA.

13. IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH U.S.S.R., INCLUDING PEACE TREATY
AND PROFITABLE JOINT ECONOMIC PROJECTS; CULTIVATION OF
CLOSE RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA, INDONESIA, INDIA.

14. DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF CHINA WITH MODERATE (AND IN-
CREASING) LEVEL OF TRADE. SOME ATTEMPTS TO MEDIATE
BETWEEN CHINA AND WEST.

15. ACTIVE BUT NON-CONTROVERSIAL ROLE IN WORLD DIPLOMACY
PRIMARILY AS SUPPORTER OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING AND AID
PROGRAMS -- "GOOD CITIZEN" AND "HONEST BROKER" ROLES;
PRIMARY INTEREST IN DEFENDING JAPANESE ACCESS TO MAR-
KETS AND FREE FLOW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE.

16. GREAT ATTENTION TO DEVELOPING ASIAN REGIONAL POLITICAL
COOPERATION BUT AVOIDING ANTI-COMMUNIST IDENTIFICATION.

17. EXTENSIVE ECONOMIC PENETRATION OF AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST,
AND SOUTH AMERICA.
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2-29a

The Third World:
A Typical Perspective of the Prudential Internationalist

Chart 1 depicts a Latin America which becomes increasingly stable, affluent and democratic. There is less of a "politics by coup" and more of a system of legitimate political evolution. Within Latin American societies, the managerial or technological class gains in size and influence. One result of this is that the middle class in Latin American countries becomes less hostile to the United States on a purely emotional level. We can expect increasing differentiations between the countries of Latin America as their economic and social systems diverge with some becoming patterned on the European model, while others tend to have greater affinity with the poor countries, and possibly in some cases "Marxist" societies.

Chart 2 shows an Africa which has changed remarkably little from that of its current status. It becomes clear that the African 'moment' in history is yet to arrive. Economic development proceeds at a slow and uneven pace. There is little real political organization in many countries except for those which adopt military governments. In Africa, possibly more than anywhere else, military governments can be seen as the only efficient system to assure social, economic and technological progress. This in turn accounts for a continuing resistance to communism and for a tendency to resist Moscow and Peking's interest in developing their spheres of influence in Africa. The 'white redoubt' continues as a source of great tension between black and white Africa, but the 'civilized' world and United Nations are not really effective in resolving the dilemma of race relations in countries where the whites are only a governing minority.

Chart 3 characterizes India as a country in turmoil. The government in technocratic sense is relatively efficient, but it becomes increasingly unresponsive to the needs of the hard-core poverty of the nation. Underneath the existence of a national government can be found deep racial and religious tensions which potentially cause acute political problems. We see here a country which has both a highly developed atomic energy industry and an inefficient agricultural sector with disastrous waves of famine. India is increasingly inward-looking and obsessed with its own problems. Therefore it has to take less of a role in world affairs.

Chart 4 depicts a Middle East in which the Arab-Israeli confrontation continues but in which the superpowers have worked out a tacit agreement not to allow themselves to come into conflict in the area. Therefore, although opposition to Israel continues among the Arab states, the United States becomes less concerned about the stability of the area because there is less danger of Israel being wiped off the face of the map.
The Third World:
A Typical Perspective of the Prudential Internationalist

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LATIN AMERICA

1. DECREASING EMPHASIS ON POLITICS (AND MOBILITY) BY COUP, AND MORE ON ORDINARY POLITICS, WITH INCREASING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC MOBILITY THROUGH EDUCATION, AND SUCCESS IN BUSINESS, AGRICULTURE, OR THE PROFESSIONS--I.E., MANY TRENDS FAVORABLE TO A MOBILE AND RELATIVELY STABLE DEMOCRACY.

2. STILL LARGELY ELITIST AND ARISTOCRATIC WITH MIXED (SCHIZOPHRENIC) ARCHAIC-MODERN SOCIETY AND POLITICS, BUT IN SOME AREAS NEW MODERN ELITES (TECHNOCRATIC CENTER) TAKING OVER.

3. WHILE IT HAS BEEN LARGELY ANTI-YANKIE, COMPARED TO PAST MAY NOW BE RELATIVELY PRO-YANKIE, POCKETS OF DEEP AMERICANIZATION AND MUCH OF THE ANTI-AMERICAN POLITICALISMS ARE LESS THAN REAL ANIMOSITY.

4. SERIOUS NATIONAL IDENTITY ISSUES IN ALMOST ALL LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS. LESS FOR BRAZIL, MEXICO, COLOMBIA, CHILE, ARGENTINA, BUT SOME OTHERS HARDLY REAL NATIONS AT ALL.

5. ACCEPTS MARXIST FORMULATIONS BUT RESISTANT TO COMMUNISM.

6. WHILE RULING CLASSES STILL RELATIVELY UNAMBITIONOUS, THERE ARE IMPORTANT POCKETS OF ENTERPRISE AND PROPRIETARIANSHIP (I.E., OF CAPITALIST AND/OR ECONOMICALLY NATIONAL OUTLOOKS)--PARTICULARLY IN FIVE LARGEST COUNTRIES, BUT MANY OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL ENTREPRENEURS ARE OF GERMAN, ITALIAN, ENGLISH, JAPANESE, ETC., STOCK.

7. WHILE ON THE RECORD POOR PROSPECTS FOR STABLE PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRACY REMAINS THE IDEAL.

8. ACCORDINGLY THE PRUDENTIAL INTERNATIONALIST WILL REMAIN ATTRACTION TO "GRAIN DESIGNS" FOR LATIN AMERICAN WHICH WILL NOT BE APPEALING TO THE AUSTERE INTERVENTIONIST, HOWEVER, SUCH SCHEMES ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE LIMITED AND PRACTICAL THAN THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS.

AFRICA

1. WITHIN AN OVER-ALL POOR RECORD OF DEVELOPMENT THERE ARE SOME RELATIVE ECONOMIC SUCCESSES.

2. IN GENERAL UNKNOWN PROSPECTS ("THE AFRICA'S CENTURY") BUT IMPORTANT FOR MORAL AND POLITICAL REASONS.

3. MORE DISORDER--BUT LESS IN FORMER FRENCH AND BRITISH EAST AFRICA COLONIES.

4. DRIFT FROM STATISM (AFRICAN SOCIALISM AND ROMANTIC POLITICS) TO MILITARY GOVERNMENTS (TECHNOCRATIC CENTER?)

5. HOWEVER, TREND TO MILITARY GOVERNMENTS MAY ONLY BE TEMPORARY, AND LABELING THESE STRONG MEN OR "JUNIORS" AS MEMBERS OF THE "TECHNOCRATIC CENTER" OFTEN PUSHES THIS TERN TO AN EXTREME.

6. WHILE THERE IS CURRENTLY GREAT RESISTANCE TO COMMUNISM, FUTURE RESISTANCE MAY DEPEND TO SOME DEGREE ON NATIONAL MORALE AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PENETRATION AND SUBVERSION.

7. POLITICIZED GROUPS ARE HYPERNATIONALIST (OR TRIBALIST?)

8. IN ANY CASE ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT REALITY CONTRASTS HOPELESSLY WITH RHETORIC OF PROGRESS AND AFRICA IS NOT GENERALLY PRO-SOVIET OR PRO-CHINA. AFRICAN RACISM NOTICES BOTH U.S., S.R., AND CHINA ARE "WRONG COLOR," MARXISM MORE LIKELY TO DOMINATE THE LANGUAGE RATHER THAN THE REALITY.

9. THE "PROBLEM" OF SOUTH AFRICA, RHODESIA, AND ANGOLA IS LIKELY TO BE AN EVER-PRESENT IRRITANT.
THE THIRD WORLD: CAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE PRUDENTIAL INTERNATIONALIST

1. **India**

1. Government of highly literate, cosmopolitan elite, floating on or detached from poverty-stricken, un-progressive mass, with many serious challenges to central authority (linguistic, etc.). Euphoria which came with the advent of independence has given way to almost total disillusionment. The racial and religious tensions have created fissiparous conditions and otherwise aggravated existing political problems.

2. Pockets of highly developed industry, but the priority given to industrialization over agriculture has resulted in such disastrous occurrences as famines. Economic programs are unable to cope with the rising tide of expectation.

3. Parliamentary democracy has been a success despite the high levels of illiteracy.

4. Communism in serious conflict with indigenous culture, way of life. There are no indications that communism is likely to spread successfully in India or take over the state.

5. India obsessed with Pakistan issue and fearful of China.


7. Has lost former geographic sphere of influence and former prestige in international councils. These were basically ephemeral being based on accidents of time (Cold War and rise of Third World) and personality (Nehru). This creates an opportunity for prudent American support for India.

2. **Israel and the Mideast**

1. The Arab states will maintain their opposition to Israel, raids across its borders, etc., but this constitutes neither a serious threat to Israel's existence nor to U.S. interests.

2. The Arab states will remain excessively xenophobic, only a continued demonstration of U.S. interest and reasonable support will moderate this.

3. A number of conservative Arab states will maintain themselves against the tide of revolution and these will remain supportive of American interests.

4. Communism is contrary to the way of life of the middle eastern states and will not likely spread in that area of the world.
Communism, China and Russia: A Typical Perspective of the Austere Pragmatic Interventionist

Chart 1. The disagreement over the effective internationalism of communism deserves to be judged by results. Can Russia direct and discipline the foreign communist parties, using them--as in the 1930's and 1940's--as instruments of Soviet foreign policy? The Austere Interventionist says No. The shared sense of revolutionary or Marxist identity of these parties is significant but subordinate to national and particular interests in the behavior of the communist governments and parties. By contrast to the Aggressive Democrat, this policy perspective regards the breakup of the communist camp as far advanced.

Charts 2 and 5. Russia must primarily be assessed as a national power, a large and dangerous state. The influence of ideology now is largely disruptive and inhibitory, contributing to important "contradictions" within the Soviet society and economy, and perhaps to a future instability, rather than sustaining a confident and expansive foreign policy. Russia is reactionary, not progressive. It is disturbed, not a "high-morale" society.

Chart 3. For China, Marxism has provided a theory and organizational structure for anti-Western modernization, but in the course of this communism has undergone a decisive sinization. The cultural inheritance of China, chauvinist, xenophobic, isolationist, makes it an unlikely candidate for the roles either of activist superpower or leader of a revolutionary bloc. At the same time, the competence and potential material power of this society itself must not be underestimated.

Chart 4. Third World revolution will be an important factor in the future, but not as a unified movement or even, necessarily, a very successful movement. And its links with the Western New Left are sentimental and largely unilateral.
Communism, China and Russia:
A Typical Perspective of the Austere Pragmatic Interventionist

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COMMUNISM AS AN INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT AND IDEOLOGY

1. This is not one movement but several; the differences are more important for communist behavior than the similarities; intra-communist disputes become very bitter, in part because of the "ideological elan" of communists. The camp is in serious moral disarray after Czechoslovakia.

2. Communism as an important movement in Western Europe now is decisively alienated from the Soviet Union and has little in common with the Chinese. If it remains important it will be as a revisionist Marxist movement; and in recent years it has come closer to accepting in principle the multi-party system.

3. Neither the important third world revolutionary movement nor the Western new left acknowledges Soviet primacy or authority; and they include strong Jacobin and nihilist tendencies. The kinship to facism is often as marked as to orthodox communism.

4. Orthodox communism is almost universally regarded as "square" or boring by the most creative elements among youth within the bloc itself.

U.S.S.R. - STILL THE LEADING COMMUN

1. In spite of apparent absolute power, confrontations with West, often inept in military planning, and with many others.

2. There are no cases of "volunteerist sat" Czecholovak invasion emphasizes Russia rather than communist power.

3. Communist apparatchiks almost exactly W types to manage flourishing consumer ec.

4. Agricultural yields still very low by S developed countries.

5. Present army wholly untested (except SE equipment).

6. The dynamics of internal intellectual do clearly include possibilities for both of dissonance and a massive repression.

7. Recent Soviet ventures seem relatively and ill-advised.

THIRD WORLD REVOLUTIONARY COMMUN

1. Is an allegiance chiefly in name and mutual reassurance; the appeal of Castroism and the NLF--domestically and internationally--is only ranked by their ties to China or Russia.

2. The ideological disarray of the movement can be expected to continue rapidly, communism being outstripped by new forms of nationalism.

3. Is the apparent political and moral influence on students and the American and European left permanent or ephemeral? Thus far the attachments of students for third world rebels has been highly romantic and largely unreciprocated. The West and the third world may or may not both need revolution--but is it really the same revolution?
COMMUNISM, CHINA AND RUSSIA: RESPECTIVE OF THE AUSTERE PRAGMATIC INTERVENTIONIST

U.S.S.R. - STILL THE LEADING COMMUNIST POWER

In spite of apparent absolute power, cautious in confrontations with West, often inept in diplomacy and stary planning, and with many other weaknesses, there are no cases of "vanguardist satellites." Enthusiastic invasion emphasizes Russia as European rather than Communist power.

-1-IST APPARATCHIKI ALMOST EXACTLY WRONG PERSONNELS TO MANAGE FLOURISHING CONSUMER ECONOMY.
-2-URAL YIELDS STILL VERY LOW BY STANDARDS OF ADOPTED COUNTRIES.
-3-ENT ARMY WHOELY UNTTESTED (EXCEPT SELECTED PHRASEMENT).
-4-DYNAMICS OF INTERNAL INTELLECTUAL DISSIDENCE ALREADY INCLUDE POSSIBILITIES FOR BOTH AN ESCALATION DISSIDENCE AND A MASSIVE REPRESSION.
-5-SOVIET VENTURES SEEN RELATIVELY OPPORTUNISTIC ILL-ADVISED.

CHINA-- THE MAJOR CONTENDER:


2. IDEOLOGICALLY, THE CHINESE ARE CERTAINLY LIKELY TO FIND THEIR MARXIST COUSINS IN RUSSIA MORE WORTHY OF APPARATCHIKI ALMOST EXACTLY RIGHT PERSONNEL THAN THE BOURGEOIS WEST.

3. INWARD-LOOKING, PREOCCUPIED WITH QUESTIONS OF DOMESTIC IDEOLOGY, MORALE, ORGANIZATION, LEADERSHIP.

4. GAINING NO ADHERENTS OF ANY SCALE IN AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA.

5. NOT ONLY UP AGAINST TWO HIGHLY ADVANCED THERMONUCLEAR POWERS BUT RUNNING SOME RISK OF STIMULATING JAPAN.

6. IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN POLICY EXCEPT IN SHORT RUN.

7. ALMOST SURELY WILL BE ECLIPSED BY RISE OF A NUCLEAR JAPAN.

RUSSIA AND THE 1975-85 ENVIRONMENT

1. THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS HAS THRUST THE SOVIET UNION BACK INTO A LARGELY NATIONALIST AND REACTIONARY POSITION. ALTHOUGH THEY MAY PERHAPS SUCCESSFULLY MAINTAIN THIS POSITION--AN ARGUABLE VIEWPOINT--THEY ARE MOST UNLIKELY TO MAINTAIN THEIR THREAT AS AN IDEOLOGICAL WORLD POWER.

2. INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES AND DISSIDENCE ALLOW OF NO SIMPLE SOLUTION. RENEWED REPRESSION IS THE MORE LIKELY CHOICE OF AN UNEVENTFUL LEADERSHIP, BUT MAY PRODUCE SEVERE NATIONAL UNREST AND A CRISIS OF MORALE. PARTY'S GRIP ON AUTHORITY IS WITHOUT SERIOUS CHALLENGE BUT AT THE SAME TIME WITH ERODED CONFIDENCE.

3. THE MOST PROBABLE FUTURE IS OF CONSIDERABLE, PERHAPS RESOLVABLE, INTERNAL UNREST AND "CONTRADICTION!" THUS FOR THE EXTERNAL WORLD THERE ARE SERIOUS DANGERS. RUSSIA MAY TURN INWARD, MORIBUND DEFENSIVE OR IT MIGHT ATTEMPT TO SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS BY EXTERNAL ADVENTURE.

4. IN ANY EVENT, ITS 'CONVERGENCE' WITH THE WEST IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL NORMS IS EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL, THOUGH NEGOTIATIONS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, SHARED THREATS MAY BE PERFECTLY POSSIBLE ON EXPEDIENT GROUNDS.

5. HAS CERTAIN SHARED VALUES WITH THE U.S., AND COMMON PROBLEMS WHICH CHALLENGE US WITHIN OUR RESPECTIVE ZONES OF INFLUENCE. WOULD COOPERATIVE "GUARDIANSHIP"--"DUAL HEGEMONY"--NOT SOLVE IMPORTANT PROBLEMS?--A PER- SISTANT TEMPTATION FOR RUSSIA, AND POSSIBLY FOR THE U.S.
Europe and Japan: A Typical Perspective of the Austere Pragmatic Interventionist

Chart 1. The era of postwar passivity in Europe now may be near its end; certainly the willingness of Europe to accept American leadership is ending, though whether a new and independent policy assertion will come from Europe remains an unanswered but important question. There could come either a consciously renewed foreign politics in Europe, existing in some competitive tension with the United States but no necessary conflict; or—alternatively, or coincidentally in separate states—there could be a decline from the present level of stability. Certainly several West European states will before 1975 experience important leadership transitions. Certainly Eastern Europe finds its relationship with Russia increasingly troubled, both rigid and brittle. The German question remains unanswered.

Chart 2. German settlement is indispensable to any fundamental change in the European security system. This chart sketches one possible settlement designed to secure American interests in European security and stability, and—by removing Soviet as well as American troops from the continent—a relaxation of the East European situation. To this settlement should be added a multilateral guarantee of the autonomy of all European states and a guarantee of frontiers. Recent Soviet claims to the right to intervention in foreign socialist societies are incompatible with European settlement, and the Austere Pragmatic Interventionist would insist on guarantees against foreign interference with European governments and social systems, no doubt combined with security guarantees to the Soviet Union.

Chart 3. For Japan, political dissociation from the United States seems inevitable by the decade of interest, although again this need not be a matter for severe tension or for conflict. Japan, though—as it exists today—remains a fairly fragile political society with Western values superimposed on Japanese values. Sharp change must be judged possible, though hardly inevitable. The Austere Pragmatic Interventionist, with international pluralism his goal, would regard an increasingly activist Japan with some equanimity, even if this Japan were not wholeheartedly allied with us—as the other policy perspectives might wish.
Europe and Japan:
A Typical Perspective of the Auster Pragmatic Interventionist

(This page folds out.)
1. **Western Europe**

1. The economic unity of Western Europe is unlikely to be broken: and Eastern Europe will be powerfully attracted, deepening European political tensions.

2. The dynamism of France, Germany, and Britain is likely to impel one or all toward renewed international leadership by means of European leadership or unification; if the rivalry and elements of distrust in their relationship becomes further resolved, Western Europe can be a potential challenger of both Russia and America, and certainly a rival to Russia for Eastern European influence.

3. If they do not advance toward unity, the West European states nonetheless will include one or more states with aggressively independent conceptions of their international role, perhaps restoring a lesser multipolarity to Europe's own affairs, possibly reintroducing alignments which are at odds with the present East-West division of the continent. The most dangerous version of such a "disarray" Europe could see Western Germany isolated or estranged, attempting to reclaim a fully autonomy on hostile terms to the rest of Europe.

4. For the intermediate term, neither the U.S.S.R., the U.S., nor England nor France, is likely to want German reunification or a nuclear West Germany, but each could face the temptation to bid for German alliance by offering one or the other, there might, by 1975-1985, be a resolution of the problem by European settlement, probably including some nuclear or political restraints on Germany for a specified term. There could also be a deeply unstable Europe by 1975, with the following decade one of crisis.

5. In any case, Europe is likely to defend itself against any renewed Soviet threat. Moreover, the historical record and current vitality of Europe hardly suggests that it would be weak in a crisis. Certainly the European nations are likely to make their own interpretations of what is—and what is not—worth creating or escalating into a crisis; they are almost certain to resist arbitrary or imposed U.S. leadership and/or definitions.

6. External crisis could also be less important than internal crisis, as the liberal postwar leadership and public hands over to a new leadership which has not experienced war, or—directly—totalitarianism, the success or failure of reform measures in Italy and France, the formation of a national coalition or the revamping of the major parties in Britain, the character of post-Gaulist government—all of these are in prospect before 1975. Additionally, Spain and Portugal are likely to experience political crises; perhaps East Germany and Poland; probably Greece. Europe could split internally on new issues, left/right liberal/liberal— or major European nations could undergo domestic crises or even rebellion.

2. **A "Possible" German Peace Treaty**

1. A conference of the Allied powers leading to—

2. A treaty of peace calling for—

3. A division of Germany into two states for a term of 20 years;

4. A general acceptance of the Oder-Neisse minor adjustments in East Germany;

5. The incorporation of Berlin, all zones under international guarantee, also for 20 years;

6. Free access between East and West of the two Germanies and Berlin, limitation of the parties to hold immigrants for a term of 20 years;

7. Both Germanies to forego the acquisition of Pots, for a term of 20 years;

8. Both Germanies to contract no alliance (economic) for a term of 20 years;

9. Non-interference in the internal polishing German states by external powers, by Germanies themselves;

10. Both Germanies agree to forego force achieving an earlier unification or frontier;

11. All powers guarantee the two Germanies frontiers;

12. West Germany to maintain an army of 100,000;

13. Adequate inspection, for a term of 20 years;

14. A phased withdrawal of foreign forces (French) from the territory of the period of three years;

15. At the conclusion of 20 years, the free city of Berlin may negotiate terms as are mutually agreeable, with by external powers. Acquire such we they desire, and contract such alliances;

16. NC indemnities.
A "POSSIBLE" GERMAN PEACE TREATY

A CONFERENCE OF THE ALLIED POWERS OF WORLD WAR II LEADING TO:

A TREATY OF PEACE CALLING FOR:

A DIVISION OF GERMANY INTO TWO STATES, WEST AND EAST, FOR A TERM OF 20 YEARS;

A GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE ODER-NEISSE FRONTIERS, WITH MINOR ADJUSTMENTS IN EAST GERMANY'S FAVOR;

THE INCORPORATION OF BERLIN, ALL ZONES, AS A FREE CITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE, ALSO FOR A TERM OF 20 YEARS;

FREE ACCESS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANY, AND BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANY AND BERLIN, LIMITED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES TO HOLD IMMIGRATION TO STRICT QUOTAS, FOR A TERM OF 20 YEARS;

BOTH GERMANY TO FOREGO THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, FOR A TERM OF 20 YEARS;

BOTH GERMANY TO CONTRACT NO ALLIANCES (OTHER THAN ECONOMIC) FOR A TERM OF 20 YEARS;

NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL POLICIES OF THE TWO GERMANY STATES BY EXTERNAL POWERS, AND BY THE TWO GERMANY THEMSELVES;

BOTH GERMANY AGREE TO FOREGO FORCE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING AN EARLIER UNIFICATION OR RECTIFICATION OF FRONTIERS;

ALL POWERS GUARANTEE THE TWO GERMANY'S SECURITY AND FRONTIERS;

WEST GERMANY TO MAINTAIN AN ARMY OF 20 DIVISIONS, EAST GERMANY 10;

ADEQUATE INSPECTION, FOR A TERM OF 20 YEARS;

A PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES (soviet, u.s., uk., french) FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE TWO GERMANY OVER A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS;

AT THE CONCLUSION OF 20 YEARS, THE TWO GERMANY AND THE FREE CITY OF BERLIN MAY NEGOTIATE A UNION ON SUCH TERMS AS ARE MUTUALLY AGREEABLE, WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM EXTERNAL POWERS, ACQUIRE SUCH WEAPONS SYSTEMS AS THEY DESIRE, AND CONTRACT SUCH ALLIANCES AS THEY DESIRE;

No INDEMNITIES.

1. ONE POSSIBILITY IN JAPAN'S FUTURE: "PROGRESSIVE" COALITION GOVERNMENT OF ELEMENTS FROM SOCIALIST PARTY, LEFT-WING CONSERVATIVES, INDEPENDENT LEFT AND EX-COMMUNIST Factions.

ENLARGED MILITARY FORCES; NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT OPTION MAINTAINED.

FOREIGN POLICY OF ASSURING "RESPONSIBILITY" IN A WORLD GOVERNED BY NATIONAL SELF-INTEREST. WITH JAPAN, GREATLY REVISED ASSESSMENTS OF THE LEGITIMACY AND "INEVITABILITY" OF PRE-WAR POLICY.

2. A CONSERVATIVE JAPAN, UNDER CONTINUED LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC RULE, WOULD NOT DIFFER GREATLY FROM THE ABOVE, NOT EXCLUDING THE ASSUMPTION OF "RESPONSIBILITY" IN THE WORLD WITH AN INCREASINGLY FRANK DISSOCIATION FROM THE UNITED STATES.

3. BUT A CRISIS JAPAN (AND JAPAN IS PECULIARLY VULNERABLE TO WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS) COULD BE VERY DIFFERENT, PROBABLY WITH AN AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISORDER AND RESISTANCE. YET SUCH A JAPAN SEEMS NONETHELESS A FAIRLY IMPOSSIBLE CANDIDATE FOR AN ADVENTURIST OR EXPANSIONIST FOREIGN POLICY.

4. JAPAN'S WILLINGNESS TO EXERCISE ITS NUCLEAR OPTION IS— IN ALL THESE CASES—PROBABLY MORE DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL THAN INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS. A CRISIS WHICH STARKLY DRAMATIZED JAPAN'S VULNERABILITY, INORDIBLY MILITARY DEPENDENCE ON THE UNITED STATES, OR THE RISK INVOLVED IN THAT DEPENDENCE, COULD BE DECISIVE: AND IN THAT CASE OTHER STATES WOULD FOLLOW JAPAN'S LEAD.

5. AND ALL THESE JAPAN WOULD LIKELY REMAIN DEEPLY DRAWN TOWARDS CHINA—FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES, BUT ALSO FOR OTHER AND LESS EASILY CALCULATED REASONS AS WELL. A SUBORDINATION OF JAPAN TO CHINA IS HARDLY THINKABLE; SO IS ANY JAPANESE ATTEMPT TO SUBORDINATE CHINA; BUT THE RELATIONSHIP SEEMS VERY LIKELY TO DEEPEN FOR A VARIETY OF OFTEN-CONTRADICTORY MOTIVES, LARGELY OF JAPANESE SOURCE.
The Third World:
A Typical Perspective of the Austere Pragmatic Interventionist

Chart 1. Latin relations with the United States seem inevitably troubled; a certain tension persists which has cultural and geopolitical sources and is unlikely to be eradicated. The ideological manifestations of this—Peronism, Castroism—are important only if they lead to alliance of a Latin American state with a major national opponent of the United States.

Chart 2. Africa's situation in this period is likely to be extremely troubled, with foreign involvements—by any outside power—ultimately futile. There may be pressure for essentially humanitarian or "police" interventions (as in the Congo and Nigeria in the recent past) which, if they are understood as such, and preferably are multilateral, may serve the stability of the region. If interventions are made in a cold-war or competitive framework they risk further disruption. In itself, Africa will not be an area of independent power or significant great-power advantage in the decade of interest.

Chart 3. The Austere Pragmatic Interventionist discounts the long-range importance of communism or "people's war" in Southeast Asia although acknowledging that the Vietnam war—having been made into a major international issue—inevitably will have major consequences. Southeast Asia, moreover, cannot avoid geopolitical pressures to "neutral" status, "tribute" to China on the traditional pattern, and this would seem tolerable so long as these remain a matter of diplomatic relationships and not of internal transformation. Thus a neutral Thailand or Burma seems— to the Austere Pragmatic Interventionist—acceptable. An ideologically communist regime in either state is something else. But the policy maker must acknowledge the limits of American competence to affect internal developments in these societies. The Austere Pragmatic Interventionist would keep a power of presence in the area and consider intervention against conventional aggressions, inordinate foreign pressures on local governments, etc. He would avoid attempts at social or political "engineering" for reasons noted in the chart.
The Third World: 
*A Typical Perspective of the Austere Pragmatic Interventionist*

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LATIN AMERICA

1. The renewed emphasis on politics by coup or violence is true of most of the world outside Europe, North America, and Oceania.

2. Various democratic and constitutional institutions and organizations growing in strength.

3. Deep difficulties of true national identity in Latin America, largely worked out on the basis of domestic rather than international considerations.

4. Resistant to communism although not to authoritarianism on the one hand and Jacobinism on the other.

5. A failure of reform will likely produce only stagnation, not a dynamic policy hostile to the U.S.

6. For U.S. security, it is not necessary for Latin American states to be pro-United States provided they are not united in opposition to U.S.

AFRICA

1. In spite of some economic success, many areas likely to relapse into a more or less "permanent" stagnation.

2. Although there may be some moral causes for intervention in Africa, if it declines as expected, these should be restricted to cases that are morally clear and that do not even provide a rationale for charges of American imperialism or power politics. America likely only to lose from unilateral interventions.

3. Could chronic disorder inspire a reimposed colonialism—great power or international "guardianship"? This could be one outcome of South African/Rhodesian/Angolan racial uprisings or white/black interstate struggles.

4. Communist movements, if any, likely to be Africanized out of recognition. (In some sense it may be 50 years before Africa is ready for communism—or any sophisticated and disciplined political doctrine.) Also geographically isolated from real center of communist power.

5. Efforts by the S.U. or by China to intervene in Africa will fail, particularly if the U.S. does not exacerbate the contest by its own interventions.

6. The political importance of Africa itself and of any seeming success there of China or U.S.S.R. can easily be overstated—any African commitment to either of these rivals is likely to be superficial.

7. The third world a typical perspective of the austere part.
ANY AREAS LIKELY TO REMAIN STAGNATION, SEES FOR INTERVENTION EXPENDED, THESE ARE MORALLY CLEAR VIEWS FOR CHANGES INTEGRIC, AMERICA INTERVENTIONS.

APOSED COLONIALISM, RHODESIAN/AFRICA/INDIA INTERSTATE

TO BE AFRICANIZED IT MAY BE 50 YEARS --OR ANY SOPHISTICATED SOLUTION.-- OR NOT OF COMMUNIST INTERVENTIONS IN AFRICA DOES NOT EXERCISE ITSELF AND NOT EXERCISE.

1. THE IMPACT OF THE VIETNAM WAR IS LIKELY TO REINFORCE REBELLION AND DISSIDENCE THROUGHOUT THE AREA--WHICH ALREADY INCLUDES MUCH UNREST OF COMMUNAL, RACIAL, REGIONALIST, AND (IN INDIA) ECONOMIC ORIGIN.

2. BUT THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF SUCH MOVEMENTS DEPENDS ULTIMATELY ON LOCAL FORCES AND THE DYNAMISM OF A PARTICULAR INSURGENT MOVEMENT IN CAPITALIZING ON ESSENTIALLY NON-IDEOLOGICAL SOURCES OF DISCONTENT.

3. THUS "PEOPLE'S WAR" IS NOT A VALID INSTRUMENTALITY FOR ONE NATION'S AGGRESSION AGAINST ANOTHER. THE SHARED IDEOLOGY OF THAI AND VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS IS OPERATIONAL LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THAI AND VIETNAMESE SOCIETY. THAILAND'S INSURGENTS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL TO THE DEGREE THAT THAI SOCIETY ITSELF PROVIDES--AS IT NOW DOES NOT--A MOTIVATION FOR LARGE-SCALE REBELLION. FOREIGN AID TO THE REBELS--WHETHER FROM VIETNAM OR CHINA--CAN AS EASILY BE CONTRAPRUDENT AS HELPFUL.

4. NOR IS THE LIBERALISM OF A GOVERNMENT, ITS FORMAL DEMOCRACY, OR THE PACE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT A DETERMINING FACTOR IN AN INSURGENT SITUATION. THE "LEGITIMACY," THE NATIONALISM, OF A GOVERNMENT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO ITS ABILITY TO HOLD THE ALLEGIANCES OF ITS PEOPLE.

5. FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS IN SUPPORT OF A GOVERNMENT MAY NOT ONLY BE HARMFUL, UNDERRATING THE AUTHENTICITY OR LEGITIMACY OF THE AIDED GOVERNMENT IN THE EYES OF POPULATIONS WHICH REMAIN HIGHLY XENOPHOBIC.

6. THE FUTURE OF THE AREA CERTAINLY WILL INCLUDE MUCH INSTABILITY, BUT PROBABLY NO MORE "VIETNAMS." THE INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL INSTABILITY WILL DEPEND ON SEVERAL VARIABLES, ONE OF WHICH IS THAT MAJOR FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS DO NOT TAKE PLACE.

7. THE QUESTION OF MAJOR DIRECT CHINESE AGGRESSION IS QUITE SEPARATE, ALTHOUGH IT IS JUDGED UNLIKELY DUE TO THE SEVERITY OF MATERIAL LIMITATIONS ON CHINESE POWER AS WELL AS INTERNAL FACTORS WITHIN CHINA.

8. INDIA PRESENTS A UNIQUE PROBLEM OF INTERNAL DISINTEGRATION. THE DEMOCRATIC ACHIEVEMENT OF INDIA REMAINS PROFOUNDLY IMPRESSIVE; BUT IF IT FAILS BY THE 1975-1980 PERIOD, A POSSIBILITY ALTHOUGH NOT A PROBABILITY, THERE WOULD SEEM LITTLE USEFUL THAT OUTSIDE POWERS MIGHT DO, AND THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD SEEM LIMITED TO INDIA ITSELF.

9. INDIA'S EXTERNAL PROBLEM OF DEFENSE AGAINST CHINA PROVIDES AN EXAMPLE OF CONGRUENT U.S.-SOVIET INTEREST, AND THIS IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE.

10. BUT INDIA IS UNLIKELY TO ASSUME ANY SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE DEFENSE OR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE SOUTH ASIAN REGION AS A WHOLE, AN INCREASINGLY LOOKING AND "NATIVIST" INDIA MUST BE ANTICIPATED. TO A LESSER EXTENT, THIS MUST BE EXPECTED TO BE TRUE OF ALL THE SOUTHEAST AND SOUTH ASIAN STATES, POSSIBLY EXCLUDING THAILAND AND SINGAPORE.
Communism, China and Russia:  
A Typical Perspective of the Aggressive Democrat

Chart 1 indicates that Communism will have substantial dynamism as an international movement and ideology. Indeed, Communism may be more united in purpose on a world-wide basis than the democracies and therefore it will be able to act more efficiently and with greater purpose in a confrontation with the West. Among the Western countries the pursuit of "realism" will lead to a fragmented and isolationist viewpoint among policy-makers. This may even lead to the danger of a rising Communist appeal in Western Europe. Despite the past close ties across the Atlantic, many European countries may feel a greater sense of participation in world politics through an entente with Moscow than through attempting to maintain a somewhat deteriorating and stale relationship with Washington. Communism may become increasingly appealing amongst the young, both in Europe and in Asia and in Africa.

Chart 2 shows how the Soviet Union may still be a strong aggressive power and leading nation in the Communist movement. In strategic weaponry, the Soviet Union is likely to maintain a high level of competition with the United States and may be unwilling to accept in the long run a position of less than nuclear parity. If we look at the Soviet domestic scene we may find that the current reforms, limited as they may be, may nevertheless make a substantial contribution to strengthening the Soviet economy. Similarly, the Soviets may make rapid increases in agricultural reform, so that past indications of failure in the farming sector cannot be necessarily read as an indication of future developments. In the military sector, the Soviets adopt an increasingly professional and technical attitude toward force planning and research and development, making fewer mistakes than in the 1950's. Looking at the intellectual milieu we find a decrease in dissidence as the Soviet Union mellows. This should not be taken as an indication that Russia is losing its imperial nerve. On the contrary, it is simply able to act in a more astute and self-opportunistic manner.

Chart 3 suggests that in the Third World revolutionary Communism will make considerable headway. In spite of the dissidence of some intellectuals the appeal of Communist ideology will continue among many students. The Soviet Union and China will continue to be seen as examples to be emulated by Third World countries for these two leading Communist powers will be seen to have made fantastic progress in relatively short time periods. This is exactly what is likely to most influence the underdeveloped nations. Thus it will be too early to conclude that nationalism in the Third World will take precedence over Communism. A Communist victory in Vietnam would add much to the prestige and mystique of revolutionary Communism. Similarly, we must recognize that there are students and other leftist movements in both the United States and in Western Europe which would have their assumptions reinforced by the success of "revolutionary" Communism in Southeast Asia. Further successes in the Third World
for Communism would reinforce leftist groups in the West and the success of anarchic and nihilistic movements in the West would in turn reinforce the prestige of Communism in the Third World.

Chart 4 depicts a China which is strong, aggressive, and a considerable challenge to the United States. Once the internal disorder of the mid-1960's has been put under control—and there is no reason to believe that this would not happen—China is free to pursue its revolutionary causes abroad. Thus China may become less cautious in its foreign policy, particularly if an American withdrawal from South Vietnam leaves the entire of Southeast Asia ripe for Peking-led subversive activities. She may also increase the appeal of her type of Communism among students and dropouts in the West. We can expect that China will be a substantial thermonuclear power and that her strategic threat will cast a shadow over all of Asia. Although this strategic threat will not appear credible at all times, it will nevertheless gain for China a substantial political leverage in the international politics of Asia. It is true that the rise of Japan will offer competition to Communist China, but barring serious internal problems or a civil war China may be able to match that competition and overcome it. Furthermore, Japan may also be vulnerable to the Chinese-sponsored internal subversion and Communist-led civil war.

Chart 5 portrays a powerful Soviet Union which is not reluctant to undertake interventionist roles and missions around the world. The military posture of the Soviet Union will have changed from one of cautious and defensive emphasis to one based both on a strong strategic position and a capability to undertake conventional intervention missions. Thus the Soviet Union will have broken out of its "land animal" condition through the expansion of its navy and marine forces. At the same time, acquisition of a first-strike capability as against the United States and the possible continued disintegration of NATO could increase Soviet assertiveness and lead to a possible transition in the world balance of power.

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1. Communists demonstrate greater ideological elan (they care) than west—and on fundamental issues may be united against west or even if disunited still in opposition to west.

2. More likely to be united in a confrontation with the west or the u.s. than is the west bloc, especially with respect to economic relations, political confrontations, and positions within the u.n.

3. May not lose as much dynamism as a "realist" or isolationist west and of course communist success in vietnam, or other successes, may revive some of the dynamism, especially noteworthy is the support of the general population for the soviet action in czechoslovakia and the lack of reaction within the university elites.

4. Increasingly attempting to appeal to underdeveloped and nonwhite groups; and these new factions, whatever their differences, still share important basic views hostile to u.s. soviet danger to western europe, and particularly to germany, increasing, correct metaphor the czech coup of 1968. the french communist party, after first opposing soviet acts in czechoslovakia, then praised the moscow agreements. if the soviet adventure in czechoslovakia is made to work, there may indeed be an increasing european communist movement with great elan.

5. Not considered passe ("square") in africa or asia or among many young europeans, even where youth movements refer to old-line communists as "creeps," they view themselves as vital new forces within the general communist movement. a young turk movement within the soviet union might even be able to capitalize upon these sentiments; and in any event the opposition to the west is greater than the opposition to the east.

2. U.S.S.R. — still the leading com

1. May have greater weapons compete strategic analysts are willing to be irrelevant to note that the czechoslovakia occurred at a time achieving nuclear parity with the u.s.

2. The new pluralism in communism is more attractive to join while reviving its strength greatly—at least otherwise, this pluralism may devise and soviets do care about a lot.

3. Current reforms and innovations difference in the economic strum management.

4. Is becoming increasingly efficient may learn much from past failures.

5. Seems to be doing a much better "technical" job on central war than is considered particularly fleet.

6. Dissidence from intellectuals s recently. lack of university invasion.

7. Is not losing enthusiasm and in as the "realist" and neo-isolat may have been more intervention forces than the u.s.s.r.—at a communist world and especially but recently we seem both passi of events, while the soviet se vive and expansive.

8. Seems to be able to salvage a g of their apparent "fiascos"—f.o. east and mediterranean. so far out of the czechoslovak crisis western europe seems extremely american response. it is to be although tending the soviet act illegal, gave the s.u. its supp.

9. While military emphasis has been now equipping itself with fleet forces on the american model; with the "land animal" tradition self-image as world power; make against west germany and human.

10. Deeply disturbed by foreign pol ications of czechoslovak lib pean c.p. revisionism, east ge could begin to tighten control.

11. Party has resources of repression unavailable to czars, and no intellectual challenge to mark impossible now in this society discipline but it probably is; communist bloc is faced only be losing resolve at a much faster.

12. The czech crisis and lack of a divergence between communist interests of the satellites of exploitability by u.s.

13. If the s.u. acquires a not in capability against the u.s., if nato continues to disintegrate acquire a momentum that leads world balance of power and the aggressiveness enormously.
Communism, China and Russia: A Critical Perspective of the Aggressive Democrat

U.S.S.R. - Still the Leading Communist Power

May have greater weapons competency than many Western strategic analysts are willing to grant. It may not be irrelevant to note that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia occurred at a time when the Soviets were achieving nuclear parity with the U.S. asked -

The new pluralism in communism may make the movement more attractive to join while not necessarily weakening its strength greatly - at least for some issues. Moreover, this pluralism may decline with Czech invasion and Soviets do care about unity and discipline a lot.

Current reforms and innovations may still make a big difference in the economic structure in spite of bad management.

It is becoming increasingly difficult in agriculture - may learn much from past failures.

Seems to be doing a much better "professional" and "technical" job on central war forces. Naval expansion considerable, particularly in the submarine fleet.

Dissidence from intellectuals seems to be declining recently. Lack of university protest of Czechoslovak invasion.

Is not losing enthusiasm and imperial nerve as much as the "realist" and neo-isolationist West. America may have been more interventionist and bold in the fifties than the U.S.S.R. - at least in the non-communist world and especially when we are asked - but recently we seem both passive and the prisoner of events, while the Soviets seem relatively aggressive and expansive.

Seems to be able to salvage a good deal out of many of their apparent "fiascos" - for example, in Middle East and Mediterranean. So far the U.S. has come out of the Czechoslovak crisis very well, while Western Europe seems extremely concerned by the American response. It is to be noted that Cuba, although tending the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia illegal, gave the U.S. its support.

While military emphasis has been on defense in past, now equipping itself with fleet and intervention forces on the American model, deliberately breaking with the "land animal" tradition to fulfill a new self-image as world power; making disturbing threats against West Germany and Romania.

Deeply disturbed by foreign policy and domestic implications of Czechoslovak liberalization, West European C.P. revisionism, East Germany's isolation, U.S.S.R. could begin to tighten control or contact all around. Party has resources of repression, internal discipline, unavailable to C.Z.S.R. and no serious fundamental intellectual challenge to Marxism-Leninism. It may not be possible now in this society to reimpose Stalinist discipline but it probably is unnecessary. Today the communist bloc is faced only by a West which appears to be losing resolve at a much faster pace than the communist world.

The Czech crisis and lack of new pro-semites reflects a divergence between communist interest and national interests of the satellite which may be increasingly exploitable by U.S.

If the U.S. acquires a not incredible first-strike capability against the U.S.S.R., as it well might and if NATO continues to disintegrate, the U.S. may acquire a momentum that leads to a major change in world balance of power and that increases Soviet aggressiveness enormously.
Europe and Japan:
A Typical Perspective of the Aggressive Democrat

Chart 1 shows us that Western Europe could become a still weaker continent in military terms than it is today. Europe may lose all its interest or sense of involvement with respect to Asia. It may fear the renewal of cold war in central Europe and yet be unwilling to part from the long-established policy of detente. NATO becomes an increasingly weak alliance.

The most important weakness of Europe, however, exemplified by Germany, is one of loss of morale and political cohesiveness in the face of Communist pressures of all kinds. This weakness stems to some degree from our (and West Europe's) preoccupation with the detente theory of the future of East-West relations. The question of German nuclear armaments is always at the forefront of German politics and strategic thinking. There is admiration in Europe for American managerial methods and technical know-how but little inclination to follow the United States in cultural and political trends.

Charts 2-5 are alternative Japans within the context of the Aggressive Democrat viewpoint. These alternatives range from a pro-American Japan to one that is conservative-nationalistic to one that is leftist-nationalistic and to a range of less plausible but yet possible Japans. In Chart 2 we find a Japan which is more conservative than leftist and which desires to maintain the close relationship with the United States. The security treaty with the United States is maintained and there is a range of active cooperation between Japan and the United States. This includes the establishment of a collective security arrangement possibly including a multilateral nuclear force. Under such an arrangement Japan may contribute to decreasing the requirement for the United States to maintain the forces in Northeast Asia and Japan may truly become an important aspect of a balance-of-power arrangement in the region.

Chart 3 portrays a more conservative-nationalistic Japan in which the security treaty with the United States is revised or has been terminated. Although relations with the United States remain on a fairly acceptable level, there is a great deal of unofficial criticism of the United States within the Japanese government. The military succeed in having the government purchase a somewhat increased level of forces which has a presumed defensive emphasis. Nevertheless, such forces give Japan a suitable offensive capability. They might include a deployment of ballistic missile defenses. Japan remains an important trading nation but engages in more trade and development projects with the Communist world. This leads to a somewhat tentative and guarded political approachement with China, and a modus vivendi develops between these two nations.

Chart 4 suggests a leftist-nationalist Japan which has a general aura of hostility to the United States. The security treaty with the United States has been renounced and there is a general tendency to depend on Japanese weapons and forces for national security. Indeed, there is a general hostility to most forms of Western interests and ties. At the same time, a peace treaty is signed with the Soviet Union, and Tokyo recognizes Peking. The result is that there is a great increase in economic, cultural and political communications between Japan and Soviet
Union and Communist China. On the international scene, Japan takes a far more active role, seeking to be in a position of leadership among the Afro-Asian neutralist countries. The example of an economically and militarily successful Japan is appealing to many nations of Africa and Asia so that irritation is caused in Japan's relations with China by the greater appeal of Japan to many Asian and African leaders. These leaders feel that they can work with Japan without having to follow the ideological guidelines of the Communist countries. Chart 5 gives us another range of Japanese, all of which seem possible if not plausible. We note here that one should not overlook the possibility of a Communist Japan which is aggressive, competitive, efficient and militarily ambitious. Such a Communist Japan could be an active contender with Peking and Moscow for leadership of the world Communist movement. At the other end of the extreme we can imagine a completely non-ideological Japan which is implicitly anti-Western and develops a great sense of Asian consciousness.

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WESTERN EUROPE

1. It may be significant that "American methods" are increasingly admired and copied. Also relevant is the decrease in U.S. "puritan ethic" on the one hand, and on the other, the increasing economic strength of Japan. But some doubt if underlying "pleasure-orientation" will not interfere with economic progress.

2. A stronger France and Britain would improve stability only with respect to Europe; less in Asia and elsewhere. If American policy is passive the European influence will be such that the U.S. will be increasingly shut out from the political activities of Europe while Eastern European influence increases.

3. Even if Vietnam were not seriously damaging to European attitudes toward U.S. (which is doubtful), there are new and persuasive reasons for anti-Americanism. Only vigorous American policies will reverse this decline in American influence.

4. Europe may really be afraid of renewed Cold War.

5. Western Europe may not only negative toward U.S. or others' involvement, but willing "if necessary" to "surrender" Asia.

6. NATO is cause for irritation and friction because it is an empty shell. Only a reinvigorated NATO or an independent Europe with "nationalism" or a strong belief in democracy, or something to motivate it, can resist the communists.

7. Although there are forces in Western Europe that naturally give rise to acceptance of detente and of the consequences flowing from it, American policy exacerbates these forces. It does so both by appearing to confirm the assumptions on which it is based and also by convincing others that the U.S. is striving for a condominium with the S.U. at the expense of Europe, thus leading to irritation as well.

8. While it does not necessarily dissipate nationalist tendencies without political integration, there is a large and growing degree of de facto integration and intra-European exchanges including travel, communications, student movements, popular and cultural movements and trends, etc.

9. The possibility of a weak and ineffective Europe in a crisis is increased by the policy of detente which sacrifices democratic European interests to the will of the Hop-Soviet-American common interests. (Czechoslovak crisis seems to substantiate this to many in Europe and elsewhere).

10. Possibilities of German-American cooperation themselves deter Soviet provocation. Great danger of German nationalist reaction and possibility even of deal with the Soviet Union unless the U.S. acts boldly to create a framework for German cooperation either in NATO or in an independent Europe. Since Czechoslovakia's Ulbricht is apparently the "most powerful" German, he might start a left-wing nationalism which will take hold in both East and West Germany.

JAPAN

1. Continued conservative Parliamentarianism plus socialist and leftist parties.

2. U.S. security treaty continued active cooperation with U.S. in programs in rivalry with China.

3. Moderately improved, "correct" sizable aid program, primarily active role among Afro-Asian anti-including tolerance of some cont of goals held in common with U.S.

4. Pressure for partnership role in nuclear armament and perhaps even U.S. of need to maintain (or even the rest of Asia).

5. A Pacific Collective Security: Japan, Australia, Canada, New Zealand. Could also include South Korea, South Vietnam or South China.

6. Some increased degree of military capability--perhaps under umbrella agreement (following an Indian/
EUROPE AND JAPAN:
TYPICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE AGGRESSIVE DEMOCRAT

2. JAPAN
(PRO-AMERICAN)

1. CONTINUED CONSERVATIVE PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT; WARTING SOCIALIST AND LEFTIST PARTY STRENGTH.
2. U.S. SECURITY TREATY CONTINUED OR STRENGTHENED, ACTIVE COOPERATION WITH U.S. IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMS IN RIVALRY WITH CHINA.
3. MODERATELY IMPROVED, "CORRECT" RELATIONS WITH U.S.S.R. SIZEABLE AID PROGRAM, PRIMARILY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ACTIVE ROLE AMONG AFRO-ASIAN ANTI-COMMUNIST STATES INCLUDING TOLERANCE OF SOME CONTROVERSY IN SUPPORT OF GOALS HELD IN COMMON WITH U.S.
4. PRESSURE FOR PARTNERSHIP ROLE--PERHAPS INCLUDING NUCLEAR ARMAMENT AND PERHAPS EVEN AN OFFER TO RELIEVE U.S. OF NEED TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN NORTHEAST ASIA--OR EVEN THE REST OF ASIA.
5. A PACIFIC COLLECTIVE SECURITY PACT INCLUDING U.S., JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, NEW ZEALAND AND PHILIPPINES. COULD ALSO INCLUDE INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, THAILAND, SOUTH VIETNAM OR SOUTH KOREA.
6. SOME INCREASED DEGREE OF REMNUNICATION OF MILITARY CAPABILITY--PERHAPS UNDER UMBRELLA OF U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT (FOLLOWING AN INDIAN GUARANTEE?)

3. JAPAN
CONSERVATIVE NATIONALIST

1. CENTER-RIGHTIST COALITION GOVERNMENT; SOME RESTRICTION ON COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST ACTIVITY; CONSTITUTION REWRITTEN.
   NATIONAL EMPHASIS ON TRADE IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF RESTRICTIVE REGIONAL GROUPS; MODERATE RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (5-6%) WITH CYCLICAL INSTABILITIES REFLECTING INTERNATIONAL RESTRICTIONS; DELIBERATE FOSTERING OF ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY PROGRAMS PROMOTING JAPANESE NATIONAL PRESTIGE; LESS EMPHASIS ON CONSUMER PROSPERITY,
   SUBSTANTIALLY EXPANDED MILITARY FORCES, NOMINALLY DEFENSIVE BUT WITH NUCLEAR SUBMARINE PROGRAM, MISSILE DEVELOPMENT, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION--POSSIBLY A ABM PROGRAM.
2. U.S. SECURITY TREATY GREATLY REVISED OR TERMINATED, MUCH UNOFFICIAL CRITICISM OF U.S. OCCUPATION POLICIES, COLD WAR ROLE, BUT OFFICIAL GOOD RELATIONS MAINTAINED.
3. MANY JOINT ECONOMIC PROJECTS WITH U.S.S.R., RECOGNITION OF CHINA WITH EXTENSIVE TRADE AND JOINT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS; GUARDED POLITICAL APPROACHMENT WITH CHINA, WITH BOTH SIDES EXPECTING EVENTU AL DOMINATION OF THE OTHER, VIGOROUS ROLE AS OPPONENT OF ALL "FOREIGN" POLITICAL INTERVENTIONS IN ASIA AND PROMOTER OF AFRO-ASIAN TRADE GROUPINGS; FORMAL DEMANDS FOR RETURN OF OKINAWA AND KURILES.

4. JAPAN
LEFTIST NATIONALIST

1. NEO-SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT WITH SOME KO SEOITO AND COMMUNIST PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT (INTRA-COMMUNIST PARTY SPLITS ON NATIONALIST-INTERNATIONALIST LINES).
   NATIONAL EMPHASIS ON EXPANDED WELFARE PROGRAMS (BUT OTHER RELATIVELY LIMITED CONSUMPTION), PLANNED ECONOMIC GROWTH, AUTARCHIC TENDENCIES; ACTUAL 3-5% GROWTH RATE WITH SOME SECTORS NEARER STAGNATION; SERIOUS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, PRO-NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM; REDUCED CONVENTIONAL FORCES; EVENTUALLY WHOLLY DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POSTURE.
2. U.S. SECURITY TREATY RENOUNCED, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO END FOREIGN (AMERICAN) INFLUENCES ON JAPANESE POLITICS, ECONOMY, CULTURE.
3. PEACE TREATY SIGNED WITH RUSSIA, PARTIAL RESTORATION OF TERRITORIES; RECOGNITION OF CHINA; ACTIVE PROGRAMS GREAT TO EXPAND SOVIET AND CHINESE TRADE.
   INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF AFRO-ASIAN NATIONALIST LEADERSHIP, IMPLICIT RIVALRY WITH CHINA; PROGRAM TO MOBILIZE AFRO-ASIAN NATIONS AS LEFTIST ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BLOC RIVALING ESTABLISHED GREAT POWERS. SELECTIVE AID PROGRAMS TO "PROGRESSIVE" AFRO-ASIAN GOVERNMENTS DESIGNED TO DEVELOP EXCLUSIVE MARKET AND TRADE ZONE, CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF INCREASING TRADE RESTRICTION.

5. OTHER JAPANS

KOMETO JAPAN: NEUTRALIST, REFORMIST, INTOLERANT, COLLECTIVIST (WELFARE-ORIENTED); MUCH DOMESTIC CONTROVERSY--NAIVE, INSTABLE REGIME; PROBABLY WITHOUT CONSISTENT FOREIGN POLICY OF MAJOR CONSEQUENCE ALTHOUGH A FACTOR FOR INSTABILITY IN THE WORLD SYSTEM,
NEOIDEOLOGICAL: RELATIVELY COLLECTIVIST SOCIETY WITH DRAMATIC, SOPHISTICATED, IMPLICITLY ANTI-WESTERN IDEOLOGY--POSSIBLY WITH UNIVERSALIST OR PAN-ASIAN CLAIMS; PROBABLY A RESPONSE TO MAJOR INTERNAL OR INTERNATIONAL CRISIS,
REACTIONARY-MATIVIST: MILITARIST AND PROBABLY ISOLATIONIST; MUCH DOMESTIC INSTABILITY; POSSIBLY RACIST (ANTI-WHITE); POSSIBLY DETRIMENTAL ECONOMICALLY IN ENVIRONMENT OF WORLD TRADE RESTRICTION OR DEPRESSION,
COMMUNIST: NATIONALIST, POLITICALLY EFFICIENT AND (POLITICALLY) AGGRESSIVE, HYPED-COMPETITIVE AND A CONTENDER FOR WORLD COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP--MILITARILY AMBITIOUS, DANGEROUS, AGAIN PROBABLY PLUSHIBLE, CHIEFLY AS REACTION TO INTERNAL OR WORLD CRISIS (PROBABLY ECONOMIC, POSSIBLY POLITICAL),
The Third World:
A Typical Perspective of the Aggressive Democrat

Chart 1. Latin America. There may be a great deal of wishful thinking in Latin America. Simply because Castro has not yet penetrated Latin America, and because Latin America was successful in capturing Che Guevara, we may attribute to them a degree of resistance to Communism that is out of all proportion to what they really have. Even a relatively minor depression, a minor collapse in quantity prices, might induce incredible strains in Latin America. It may still turn out that a defeat in Vietnam or riots in North America disillusion Latin Americans without capabilities, strength of purpose, attachments, and the like.

A second "Cuba" in Latin America with success could really start a whole chain of dominoes going, particularly if its creation involved a more or less shameful humiliation of the United States. Basically, of course, we cannot keep the Russians out of Latin America, once the Latin American nations start to recognize the Soviet Union, which they now seem increasingly prepared to do. Possibly the worst nightmare of all, a major civil war or Communist takeover in Brazil, is in no sense ruled out under today's conditions. Furthermore, declining U.S. aid to Latin America may well exacerbate many of these issues, perhaps to the point of explosion.

Chart 2 shows an African continent which is no more appealing to most Americans than what may be happening in Latin America. The relatively small number of economic and political reforms undertaken in the 1960's do not have any lasting effect in subsequent decades so that the general economic picture is poor. Thus many countries are faced with varying levels of civil disorder, famine, and chaos. This leads to a still increasing number of military coups d'états but unlike military juntas in some other countries, these military leaders are perfectly willing to work with "socialistic" and "Communist" governments. Thus Africa becomes an important locale for great-power rivalry, particularly between the Soviet Union and the United States and Communist China (and possibly Japan). Such competition might get embroiled into the white versus black problem and the United States is forced to consider the necessity of eventually intervening on a massive scale in the "white redoubts" of South Africa and Rhodesia in order to avoid large-scale fighting and racial genocide.

Chart 3 shows that India, in contrast to Latin America and Africa, may turn out well for the United States. With the gradual growth of nationalism, India begins to develop the unity which makes it possible for it to develop economically and politically. This unity is strengthened in part by the continuing threat of Communist China and a Pakistan which remains aligned with Peking. The agricultural sector is reasonably prosperous and is sufficiently encouraging for the United States to continue its aid program as is necessary. Thus India appears to be on the plus side of U.S. policies.
since World War II. The Communist party remains influential in Kerala but otherwise is unable to gain positions of power. This does not estrange the Soviet Union from India, since the Soviet Union sees the advantage of backing New Delhi in order to counter Communist Chinese influence in Asia. Thus India, having at one time sought a position of "neutrality," now does a full circle and finds itself in the happy position of having de facto guarantees from both the United States and the Soviet Union against Communist China.

Chart 4 suggests that the Middle East will remain an area of difficulty if not indecision for American policy-makers. Although we will remain committed to the continuation of Israel as a national state, we will not wish to lose our already diminished influence among the Arab countries. Arab anti-Americanism will be perplexing for American policy-makers but will have to be dealt with by Washington in an "understanding" manner.

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LATIN AMERICA

1. There are many cases of military regimes succeeding ephemeral democratic regimes—e.g., Brazil, Peru, Argentina; in other cases democracy itself seems superficial or the trends seem exaggerated.

2. In Argentina, Paraguay, Peru, Bolivia and almost all of Central America regressive regimes hold office that could become the focus of radical change in the absence of aggressive American policies.

3. Much public criticism of U.S. world role and policies: Much student hostility to U.S.—criticism by others is often withheld because of diplomatic reasons (and fear of jeopardizing aid). Cities only superficially "Americanized" and many elites (e.g., students and professors) highly anti-U.S. politically even if Americanized in living patterns.

4. The proper attitude to take towards possible serious upheaval in these as yet unsolidified countries creates a crisis for American foreign policy which if not resolved could lead to considerable continental opposition to American policies.

5. Fascism is not wholly dead and new humanist left movements likely to make a big, perhaps even successful, appeal to radical anti-American movements.

6. Even though most successful entrepreneurs are of European or other stock, these ethnic economic elites cannot unseat Latin political (and conservative) ruling groups or even see to it that technical and economic criteria are used effectively. For these reasons required political reforms are unlikely to occur in the absence of American intervention.

7. Democracy not ideal among Marxist-minded students, crypto-fascist military, and perhaps even the new humanist left and technocratic center movements. In any case not necessarily democratic in U.S. style nor necessarily, even if democratic, aligned with U.S. on foreign policy.

AFRICA

1. Those few economic successes which have likely to have some serious setbacks in decade or so, and general economic picture there are important social changes in African countries (Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia) ultimate significance for development is not yet clear.

2. While apparent importance may be a matter and novelty which is "weary of" in a simply be abandoned if chaos, civil disunity or conquest become imminent.

3. Perhaps disorder can be increased or decreased various "large power" policies.

4. Even if the various military governments are unattached, they can be used by Moscow in situation of alert American policies.

5. The current Algerian government demonstrates to which such new governments are useful to the international Communist bloc.

6. Both Communists and humanist left (after Amarchistic latter group is led to speed by the former) will try to use hypernationalistically there is also potential fascism in some form. This second possi actually be more serious in some cases.

7. While only ideologically "Marxists" today may make a difference to future politics if it permeates the schools, in any case possible locale for Soviet vs. China vs.

8. If uprisings against the whites should bring chaotic conditions and foreign or interventions.

ISRAEL AND THE ARABS

1. The Arabs need to win only once, (if they to occupy all of Israel, rather than a few Saini, etc.) This is contrary to Arab policy if it means the Middle East is solidly is against everybody's interest if it means for the Jews.

2. Arab anti-Americanism is in part a pro-American gestures of aid and friendly may moderate their anti-Americanism if firmness.

3. The conservative regimes will meet in reaction from the left and the right, support for these conservative regimes will anti-Americanism.

4. American support of Israel tends to undo American relations and the stronger the more difficult the problem becomes.
1. NATIONALISM IS STILL A GROWING FORCE; AND HAVING LASTED TWENTY YEARS INDIA BEGINS TO LOOK LIKE A LOSING CONTEST. FURTHER, CONSIDERABLE UNITY IN THE FORM OF THREATS FROM CHINA AND PAKISTAN, INDIA PLAYS A GEOPOLITICAL ROLE USEFUL TO THE AMERICAN POSITION.

2. AGRICULTURE IS NOW GIVEN TOP PRIORITY AND THE GRAIN HARVEST THIS YEAR IS 100,000,000 TONS--15,000,000 MORE THAN THE BEST PREVIOUS YEAR (1965). IT IS URGENT THAT THE U.S. HELP INDIA WITH THESE PROBLEMS; WHILE THERE ARE SERIOUS PROBLEMS, INDIA WILL PROBABLY SOON BE SELF-SUFFICIENT IN FOOD, AND THE ECONOMIC RATE OF GROWTH IS ON THE INCREASE.

3. THE SUCCESS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY INDICATES THAT AMERICAN POLICIES IN INDIA HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND IT IS URGENT TO CONTINUE THEM IN ORDER TO ENSURE CONTINUED SUCCESS.

4. THE COMMUNIST PARTY CONTROLS KERALA, DOMINATES THE ADMINISTRATION IN WEST BENGAL, AND MAY BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT PARTICULARIST AND COMMUNAL ISSUES IN OTHER AREAS.

5. PROPERLY SEEKING PROTECTION IN DE FACTO JOINT U.S.-S.U. GUARANTEES RATHER THAN IN SELF-DEFENSE.

6. SLACKENING U.S. AID AND U.S. UNWILLINGNESS TO HELP IN INDIA'S MAKING MAY ARREST ANY DECLINE IN ANTI-AMERICANISM.

7. UNLESS INDIA RECEIVES AMERICAN SUPPORT, MUCH OF THE BLAME FOR INDIA'S DECLINE WILL BE ASSOCIATED WITH AMERICAN POLICIES AND INDIA WILL TURN TOWARD THE S.U.

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4. ISRAEL AND THE ARABS

1. THE ARABS NEED TO WIN ONLY ONCE. (IF TO "WIN" MEANS TO OCCUPY ALL OF ISRAEL, RATHER THAN JUST RETAKING THE SAIN, ETC.) THIS IS CONTRARY TO AMERICAN INTERESTS IF IT MEANS THE MIDDLE EAST IS SOLIDLY PRO-SOVET. IT IS AGAINST EVERYBODY'S INTEREST IF IT MEANS GENOCIDE FOR THE JEWS.

2. ARAB ANTI-AMERICANISM IS IN PART A PRODUCT OF CONFUSING AMERICAN GESTURES OF AID AND FRIENDLY POLICIES. THEY MAY MODERATE THEIR ANTI-AMERICANISM IF THE U.S. SHOWS FIRMNESS.

3. THE CONSERVATIVE REGIMES WILL MEET INCREASING OPPOSITION FROM THE LEFT AND FROM THE RIGHT. AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THESE CONSERVATIVE REGIMES WILL INCREASE ANTI-AMERICANISM.

4. AMERICAN SUPPORT OF ISRAEL TENDS TO UNDERMINE ARAB-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE STRONGER THE ARABS BECOME, THE MORE DIFFICULT THE PROBLEM BECOMES.
The Pace of Military Technology in the Past

(This page folds out.)
THE PACE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

1. LAST TECHNOLOGY

- B-50 and B-36 form backbone of U.S. SAC
- Experimental aerial refueling
- Initial production of B-47
- First flight of AB-52
- Manual air defense system started
- Air defense has F-80, F-94, F-86, F-104
- Production order for Nike-A
- Nuclear-powered airplane under development
- Third or fourth generation atomic bombs
- Russians have: Tu-4, Il-28, Yak-17, Mig-9, Mig-15, and have tested three nuclear weapons
- Air research and development command, Lincoln laboratory, RAND corporation, etc., established

2. 1955 TECHNOLOGY

- Last B-47 produced
- B-52 and AC-135 phased in
- B-56, Snark, and X-20 (Martin/Seamaster) fly
- Regulus I in service
- Atlas, Titan, and Thor in crash programs
- Century series of fighters phased in
- Nuclear-powered plane still under development
- Nuclear rocket under development
- Nuclear-powered submarine launched
- Inexpensive, flexible atomic bombs
- Third-generation thermonuclear bombs
- Russians have: Badgers, Bears, Bisons, M有些人's (SS-3), H-bombs, Mig-15, Mig-19, Yak-25, SA-7 (Guideline)

3. 1961 TECHNOLOGY

- Arms control (techniques and polices)
- Satellites (Vanguard, Pioneer, Tiros, Transit, Nimbus, Mercury, etc.)
- Soft Atlas and soft Nimbus's DEP.
- 25+ PSI Atlas, 100+ PSI Titan, S-50 phased in
- Crash program on Minuteman guidance (inertial) breakthrough
- B-47E, B-52G and H, B-58 form B bombers: operate alert and deploy partial missile-matter partial bomber and have being phased
- Nike-Mercuries, F-100, 101, 102, service
- Cheap civil defense
- Inexpensive, efficient versatility weapons
- There are four nuclear couterate
- Goose, Maynard, Regulus II, F-10, canceled
- Russians have: Blinders, Ash's "nigger," "kitchen," "hangar" (SS-6), Iron (SS-4), Mig-21, (Guideline)

4. SOME EARLY FIFTIES ISSUES

1. Aerial refueling vs overseas bases for bombers
2. Active and passive defense systems
3. Deterrence by nuclear strategic bombing vs "detriot"
4. Role of mobilization bases (pre- and post-attack)
5. Presidential command and control over nuclear weapons
6. Role of NATO, WEU, U.N., peacemaking, etc.
7. Role and value of such methodologies as game theory, linear programming, cost-effectiveness, operations research, systems analysis, etc.

5. SOME MID-FIFTIES ISSUES

1. Typical attitudes toward nuclear war
2. What is a thermnuclear war?
3. How might it start?
4. Where are the objectives?
5. How do you go about analyzing a deterrent system?
6. What is deterrence?
7. What is a good deterrent?
8. How do you go about analyzing a deterrent system?
9. How might it end?
10. What are typical results?
11. What are the long-run implications?
12. What are the current choices for the U.S.?
13. For others?
14. How do these affect long-run prospects?

6. EARLY AND MId-SIXTIES ISSUES AND TACTICALS

1. Distinctions between various deterrence
2. Deterrence vs defense and attacks
3. Controlled response and counter strategies
4. Multilateral nuclear force
5. Atmospheric testing
6. Damage limitation vs assualtion
7. Cost effectiveness, strategy and "whiz kids" move from Pentagon
8. Program planning, budgeting
9. Other increased "civilians" in research, development, operations, doctrine and etc.
10. Chinese nuclear weapons
11. Inexpensive civil defense
1961 TECHNOLOGY

CONTROL (TECHNIQUES AND POLICIES)
ROLLED RESPONSE (TECHNIQUES AND POLICIES)
LINES (VANGUARD, PIONEER, DISCOVERER, BOS, TRANSIT NOTUS, MERCURY, ETC.)
ATLAS AND SOFT IBAU'S DEPLOYED
I ATLAS, 100-PSI TITAN, BNEV'S, AND MILARS PHASED IN
PROGRAM ON MINUTEMAN
ICE (INERTIAL) BREAKTHROUGH
B-52G AND M, B-58 FORM BULK OF SAC AS OPERATED ALERT AND DISPERSED
AND MISSLE MASTER PARTELLY DEPLOYED
A AND MARK BEING PHASED IN
HERCULES, F-100, 101, 102, 104 IN BVECE

CIVIL DEFENSE

RESISTANCE, EFFICIENT & VERSATILE NUCLEAR ARMS

ARE FOUR NUCLEAR COUNTRIES
I, NAVHO, REGULUS II, F-108, ETC., NELLED

AND HAVE: BLINDERS, ASH'S ("KENNEL," "KITCHEN," "KANGAROO"), ICBM (SS-5), IABM (SS-4), MIG-21, SU-9, SA-2 GUIDELINE

1965 TECHNOLOGY

INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENTS PRACTICAL
"LIMTS" OF BOMB TECHNOLOGY
MINUTEMAN III AND POLARIS A3

SOPHISTICATED SATELLITE PROGRAM
BMEWS-8, MIDAS-8, SAGE B, BOMARC A AND C, HIE-GEOS A AND B, HAWK B, F-108, B-568, B-70, NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRCRAFT OR ROCKET, AND DYSPAR OD TECHNOLOGICALLY POSSIBLE
BULK OF MEGATONS ON "IMPROVED" B-52, B-47, AND B-58

PROTECTED COMMAND AND CONTROL
INEXPENSIVE, RELIABLE RESEARCH MISSILE
SUPER GUIDANCE

ASTRONAUTICS

RUSSIANS HAVE: SLBM (SARK, SEAR), ICBM'S (SS-7, SS-6, SS-9, SS-11), IABM'S (SS-4, "SCAMP," "SCORPIO" (MOBILE), YAK-28, MIG-23, STOL + VTOL TECHNOLOGY, SA-3) (GDA), MOBILE SAM (GEMET, GAINFUL), GRIFFON, GALOSH (ABM)

1970 TECHNOLOGY

PRECURSOR PRESSURES (AND PREPARATIONS) FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR "NEUTRALS" AND LOSERS OF WORLD WAR II
FB-111, SREB, SCD

SOPHISTICATED MEASURE/COUNTER-MEASURE AND PENETRATION SYSTEMS

LOW CEPE HEADS

HALY (MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT AIR-ENTRY VEHICLES)

POSEIDON

SENTINEL AND OTHER BMD SYSTEMS

SUPERHARD SILOS

AIRBORNE DOPPLER SHIFT RADARS AND OTHER SOPHISTICATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS

MULTIPLE APPLICATIONS OF LASERS UNDER SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT

C-5 TYPE LOGISTIC AIRPLANES

VARIOUS MILITARY USES OF SATELLITES INCLUDING DEVELOPMENT OF LASP (LOW-ALTITUDE SPACE PLATFORM) AND HASP (HIGH-ALTITUDE SPACE PLATFORM)

DECISIONS ON AMSA, ICM, ULA?

ALSO NEW TECHNIQUES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE, E.G., BARRIERS, TECHNOLOGY, SO- PHEISTICATED GUN SHIPS, COMPUTERIZED POPULATION CONTROL, NIGHT VISION AND OTHER DETECTORS, ETC., AND MOST IMPORTANT, A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE "CLASSIC" PRINCIPLES OF PATROLS, AMBUSHES, NIGHT OPERATIONS, PURSUIT, POLICE OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE, USE OF INDIGENOUS FORCES, ETC., SO THAT INDIGEN TECHNOLOGY IS USED TO AID THE OPERATIONS RATHER THAN TO FIGHT AND SUPPLEMENT THEM.

PERHAPS ALSO NEW TECHNIQUES IN INSURGENCY

RUSSIANS HAVE: FOB'S, MAY'S, THIRD-GENERATION SLBM ("SAFETY"), SOLID-FUEL ICBM, MOBILE ICBM'S, SOME ARM, HELICOPTER CARRIERS, AND NAVAL INFANTRY

EARLY AND MID-SIXTY ISSUES AND FORMULATIONS

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN VARIOUS KINDS OF DETERRENCE

DETERRENCE VS DEFENSE AND/or OFFENSE

CONTROLLED RESPONSE AND CIVIL-AVOIDANCE STRATEGIES

MULTI-LATERAL NUCLEAR FORCES

ATMOSPHERIC TESTING

DAMAGE LIMITATION VS ASSURED DESTRUCTION

COST EFFECTIVENESS, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, AND "WHITE KIDS" MOVE FROM THINK TANKS TO PENTAGON

PROGRAM PLANNING/ BUDGETING

OTHER INCREASED "CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE" (IN RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, PROCUREMENT, OPERATIONS, DOCTRINE AND WAR PLANS)

CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

INEFFECTIVE CIVIL DEFENSE

MID-LATE SIXTY ISSUES

1. BMD VS ASSURED DESTRUCTION

2. NPT VS ALIANCE SENSITIVITIES

3. OTHER U.S., S.U. DISCUSSIONS ON ARMS CONTROL

4. CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE OPERATIONS OF A WAR

5. BMD FOR BAND A BMD FOR CITIES

6. THIN COVER BMD VS THICK

7. ESCALATION IN SYR

8. B-52'S IN A LOCAL WAR

9. CHINESE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

10. SUPERIORITY VS SUFFICIENCY VS PARITY

11. AMPSA VS F-111 VS B-52

EIGHTY SEVENTY ISSUES

1. MORE SERIOUS CONSIDETATION OF MANY OF THE EARLY ISSUES AND ESPECIALLY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF PRACTICAL NON-USE OF LONG-TERM CONTROL OF THE ARMS RACE

2. AT THE SAME TIME THERE SEEMS LIKELY TO BE A LESS RATIONAL AND MORE EMOTIONAL LEVEL OF DEBATE AND DISCUSSION

3. FOCUS ON REDUCING CO-LOCATIONS OF BASES AND CITIES

4. SUPERIORITY VS PARITY VS "SUFFICIENCY"

5. GREATER RELIANCE ON FEAR OF "KICKING THE GOAT" AND LESS ON EXPERT CAPABILITIES

6. GENERAL DE-EMPHASIS ON CREATION OF "HOLY GROUND" AND "BEYOND REACH" FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITIES AND OTHER EMPHASIS ON GENERAL USE OF ESCALATION AND GRADUATED RESPONSES

7. LESSER DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN BASES

8. RE-EMPHASIS ON NUCLEAR ARMING ISSUES, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL AND PLANNING

9. NEW EMPHASIS ON NUCLEAR GUARANTEES AND NUCLEAR FREE ZONES FOR NEUTRALS
The Pace of Military Technology in the Future

(This page folds out.)
ONE SCENARIO FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

1945 - "1955: Five victorious of World War II either initiated programs to achieve a blast -1
1955 - 1960: 'Deception' for proliferation to non- 

1970 - 1975: Japan in the early seventies, West Germany 

1980 - 1985: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, Israel,

1990 - 1995: "EVERYBODY"

THE NEXT DECADE OR TWO

EARLY 70'S: Super sophisticated in weapons & missiles. "EARLY" BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, EFFECTIVE SHORT-RANGE ARMS CONTROL, BUT INDIA, JAPAN, WEST GERMANY, ISRAEL, & OTHERS WILL HAVE PEACEFIND & MILITARY PROGRAMS THAT MAKE MUCH SIMPLER THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS & EVEN ADVANCED DELIVERY SYSTEMS; PREPARATORY MOVES TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

LATE 70'S: NEW AEROSPACE OFFENSE & DEFENSE SYSTEMS (PERHAPS USING LASERS OR NUCLEAR-POWERED VEHICLES), LATE 1980 & EARLY 1990 TECHNOLOGY WIDELY DIFFUSED, MANY NON COUNTRIES AND/OR EXTENSIVE ARMS CONTROL THAT IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN SUCH THINGS AS THE CURRENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TREATY AND TEST BANS

EARLY OR MID-80'S: FRANCE, GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE LIKE WILL HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR AT LEAST A POST-NETWORK A TECHNOLOGY

(POTENTIALLY)

CHINA, BRAZIL, MEXICO, EAST GERMANY, ITALY, & SO ON, WILL HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR AT LEAST A MODERATE TECHNOLOGY

POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVED MODEL F TECHNOLOGY GENERALLY AVAILABLE (IN PERHAPS FIFTY COUNTRIES)

U.S. & S.U. COULD HAVE MASSIVE SPACE CAPABILITIES...TWO DEFENSIVE & OFFENSIVE...EFFECTIVE AEROSPACE DEFENSE (AT LEAST AGAINST MODEL F & A THREATS)...EXTRAORDINARILY FLEXIBLE, RELIABLE, & ENDURANCE CAPABLE REAL TIME COMMUNICATION, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION, AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS...ELABORATE AND FLEXIBLE WORLD-WIDE LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES...Etc.
FACE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY IN THE FUTURE

LEAD TIMES FOR
CENTRAL WAR SYSTEMS

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IN THE LAST DECADE OR TWO OF THE 20TH CENTURY
RESULT OF ORDINARY IMPROVEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, SIMPLE-ARMED, LONG-RANGE VEHICLES WHICH ARE VERY WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO EVEN VERY SMALL STATES, ANOTHER SMALL POWERS, ANY OF THE STATES MIGHT AND MORE OF THE SMALL POLITICAL GROUPS IS ABLE TO OWN AND MAINTAIN, SAY, 500 MISSILES WITH, SAY, CURRENT "MISSILE CAPABILITY" OR BETTER FOR ONE OR TWO BILLION DOLLARS OR LESS OR AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY:
NEW KINOS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
VARIOUS KINDS OF LASER OR OTHER "DEATH RAYS"
A MENU OF STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE CHEMICAL AND OR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IN VARIOUS APPLICATIONS
NEW KINDS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE AGAINST RELATIVELY SMALL OFFENSE FORCES OR AGAINST FORCES WHICH USE UNSOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY AND OR TACTICS
SIMILAR DEVELOPMENTS FOR AIR DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE THREATS
WELL-UNDERSTOOD DOOMSDAY MACHINES (OR NEAR-DOOMSDAY MACHINES)
TSUNAMI (TIDAL WAVE) PRODUCERS
CLIMATE CHANGERS, EARTH SCORCHERS, OR OTHER WAYS TO MODIFY OR DAMAGE THE ENVIRONMENT ON A LARGE SCALE
NEW FORMS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL, OR EVEN DIRECT MENTAL, WARFARE THE INVENTION OF A "NUCLEAR SI-60" TECHNOLOGY OR AT LEAST THE DEVELOPMENT OF INEXPENSIVE & WIDELY AVAILABLE VERSIONS OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES OF THE 20TH CENTURY
ON THE DEFENSES OF THE LARGE POWERS & THE SUPER-
ACES "TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL DETAILS"), THESE WEAPONS MAY PROVE TO BE "EQUIVALENT" TO THE GALLIUS OR "AMERICAN DREAM," OR THEY MAY ALLOW FOR A DEFINITE HIERARCHY OF POWERS IF NOT, CLOSURE OF THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND THE LITTLE THREATS AS WELL AS PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS OR PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS & EXTREMIST POLITICAL GROUPS.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY MAY BE POSSIBLE FOR INSURGENCY AND OR TERRORISTIC ACTIVITIES AS THE LATTER COULD ALLOW EVEN RELATIVELY SMALL GROUPS TO EFFECTIVELY, EASILY AND EFFECTIVELY, ALMOST mRNA OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGY WITH THE POSSIBLE BECOMING OF ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIAL CONTROLS, A HIGH-EDUCED OR TERRORISM DIFFICULT OR LIMIT ITS EFFECTIVENESS.

NOW WILL ESCALATION BE HANDLED IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

1. MINOR MODIFICATION OF CURRENT SYSTEM
2. ALL-OUT WAR SYSTEM INCREASED

A. RULE OF LAW
B. PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY
C. RULE OF FAIR RECOMPENSE (INTERNAL WAR)
D. INSTRUMENTALITIES (NATIONAL SELF-INTEREST RESTRAINTS)
E. AGONISTIC WARS (LIMITED BY ABSOLUTE RULES)
F. POOLING WARS (SPACE, FOREIGN AID, "SHOCK" SYSTEMS, ETC)
G. OTHER SUBSTITUTE FOR CENTRAL WAR

3. ELIMINATION OR CONTROL OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY:
A. AGREEMENT OR PRIVACY
B. LARGE SETBACK TO CIVILIZATION
4. OTHER BASIC CHANGE IN MILITARY
A. BLOC SYSTEMS (WITH ARMS LIMITS AND BALANCE)
B. CIVILIAN FRACTIONS
D. CONCERN OF (LARGE OR SMALL) POWERS
E. "WORLD GOVERNMENT"
F. WORLD EMPIRE (OR EMPIRES)
G. DISARMED, BUT "UNCONTROLLED" NATIONS
In this chart page we attempt an overview of the Hudson Year 2000 study. We tried in this study to create a framework and context for further speculation by ourselves and others. One perspective by considering what a "surprise-free" projection (a quantitative or qualitative projection of what may happen in the next thirty-three years based on the assumption of a continuation of the general direction and nature of the present and past with corrections for any "theories" that may be believed).

Charts 1, 2, and 3 list features of the first third of the century. This period then furnishes some points of comparison. From this point of view perhaps the most striking characteristic of the period was the national self-satisfaction, optimism, and faith in the future of most Western or Westernized people. Chart 2 notes that in contrast to the expectations listed in Chart 1, the first third of the twentieth century brought some dramatic and mostly unexpected events.

The next third of a century experienced still more unexpected changes and disturbing events, as shown in Chart 4. The first item on Chart 2 and the last on Chart 4 emphasize a new Asian perspective—the century began with a non-white nation's successfully beating a white nation on its own ground and the second third of the century ended with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by another non-white nation. Chart 3 shows the Indochinese reaction to this new perspective. It may be noted that many of the items of Charts 2 and 4 would probably not have been predicted by any individual or policy research group "speculating about the next thirty-three years," in either 1900 or 1933.

Looking now at Chart 5, we can consider the final third of the century using only a "relatively apolitical and surprise-free projection." The reader will see what we mean by comparing Chart 5 with Charts 2 and 4. Taking the contrasts between 5 and those of 2 and 4 seriously suggests that our projection of the final third of the century may be unreliable as an indicator of what actually will happen, yet it is the freedom from specifically unpredictable surprises that makes the projections useful as a takeoff for discussion and elaboration. Specifically, the "surprise-free" projections rule out major changes in the old nations that might be caused by possibilities such as those listed in Chart 6 of such magnitude as to disturb the projection.

Some of the basic trends of Western society, most of which can be traced back as far as the 12th or 11th centuries, can be seen as a part of a common, complex trend of interacting elements. For analytical purposes this trend may be separated into thirteen rubrics, shown in Chart 7. If the basic, long-term multifold trend continues or is accelerated during the rest of the century, and there are no
surprising (but not-impossible) disruptions of the sort mentioned in Chart 6, then a "post-industrial" society seems likely to develop in affluent parts of the world. Chart 8 lists some possibilities often associated with this concept.

Charts 9, 10, and 11 show three typical "surprise-free" economic projections of GNP per capita for the U.S., Ten Major Countries, and Japan. These projections assume that something like present trends continue without great interruption.
1. Year 1900:

One world (Western-dominated), though with many unassimilated, traditional cultures

Industrial, colonial, of protected societies

Declining United Kingdom, France-Erasing Germany, United States, Russia and Japan

Parliamentary government and (imperialism)

Basic feeling in almost all classes of the elite race (g in many non-white) of optimism, security, progress, order, physical and all supremacy of Western culture, & a belief in national and moral domestic and foreign politics. & perhaps most important of all, a relative absence of guilt feelings

Intellectual acceptance of the ideas of Adam Smith, Darwin, and the Enlightenment

Final third of twentieth century

(Relatively apolitical and surprise-free projection)

1. Continuation of basic, long-term multilet trends
2. Emergence of post-industrial culture
3. World-wide capability for modern technology
4. Need for world-wide 'zone' ordinances for control of arms, technology, pollution, trade, and other areas
5. High (1 to 10%) growth rates in many areas
6. Increasing emphasis on meaning and purposes
7. Much turmoil in the 'new' and possibly in the industrializing nations
8. Some possibility for sustained 'Reformist', 'messianic', or other mass movements
9. Second rise of Japan (to being potentially, nominally, or perhaps actually, the third largest power)
10. Some further rise of Europe and China
11. Emergence of new intermediate powers: Brazil, Mexico, Pakistan, Indonesia, East Germany, Egypt, etc.
12. Some decline (relative) of U.S. and Soviet Union
13. A possible resurgence of stark 'life/goal' political and economic issues in the old nations

U.S. GNP per capita: 1869-2000

(1965 dollars)

First third of twenty-first century

Russian-Japanese war

La Belle Époque (1901-1913)

Mexican (1910) and Chinese (1911) social and racial revolutions

World War I - slight lightly devastating

Five major 'zones' (Hunzolt, Hapsburgs, Romanovs, Manchu, and Turkish) terminated

Emergence of elite status as electoral power

Soviet, Fascist, and Democratic world and practice rise of communism and Soviet Union

Great Depression

Rise of Fascist ideologies & five or dictatorships

Upsetting impact of new intellectual concepts (Borges, de Broglie, Einstein, Freud, Schrödinger, etc.)

We have left out the possibility of major change in old nations due to:

1. Industrialism
2. Civil status and revolution
3. Famine
4. Pestilence
5. Despotism (persecution)
6. Natural disaster
7. Depression or technologic stagnation
8. Development of 'infective' doomsday of near atomic machines
9. Development of nuclear 'Six-Gun' weapons technology
10. A racial, North-South, rich-poor, East-West or other disruptive polarization
11. Economically dynamic China (~ 10% growth)
12. Politically dynamic U.S., U.S.S.R., Japan, W. Germany, Brazil, etc.
13. New religious philosophies among other mass movements
14. Development of U.N. or other multinational organizations
15. Possible regional or other multinational organizations
16. Psychological upsetting impact of new techniques, ideas, philosophies, etc.

Population in millions

Surprise-free projection for the ten major
ST AND ONE FUTURE 33-YEAR PERIODS

| CENTURY |
|---|---|
| 1 |

1. Your humble servant, an obscure student, having had occasion to study new books and new doctrines, have discovered in a recent history of Japan how they have been able to conquer the omnipotent Europeans. This is the reason we have formed an organization...We have elected from young apprentices the most energetic, with great capacities for courage, and are sending them to Japan. For still... Our only aim is to prepare the population for the future.

**Leaflet distributed in Annam, c. 1905**

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<tr>
<th>2</th>
<th>THERE IS A Blast, Long-term, Multifly Trend, Tending:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Increasingly Secular (Empirical, the Scientific, Secular, Humanistic, Pragmatic, Utilitarian, Functional, Epigee) and Domesticistic, etc. Cultures</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Bourgeois, Bureaucratic, &quot;Metropolitan,&quot; &quot;Centric,&quot; &quot;Nationalistic&quot; Elites</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Accumulation of Scientific and Technological Knowledge</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Institutionalization of Change, Especially Research, Development, Innovation, and Diffusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>World-wide Industrialization and Modernization</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Increasing Affluence and (Recently) Leisure</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Population Growth</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Urbanization and (Soon) the Growth of Megalopolises</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Decreasing Importance of Primary (and Possibly) Secondary Occupations</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Literacy and Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Increasing Capability for Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Increasing Tempo of Change</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Increasing Universality of the Multifly Trend</td>
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<th>3</th>
<th>SECOND THIRD OF TWENTIETH CENTURY</th>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Continued Growth of Fascism and Communism</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>World War II - Europe Acc-in Devastated</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Mass Murder &amp; Efforts to Prevent, During &amp; After World War II</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Decolonization</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The Cold War and Anticapitalism in the Third World</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Emergence of S.I.E.R. (U.S., U.S.S.R.), Large Lapsy, West Germany, France, China, L.N., Intermediate Powers (India, Italy, Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Rise and Decline of Italy, Canada, and India</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Decline and Re-emergence of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Decline and Re-emergence of Japan</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Reunification and Centralization of China</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Post-Keynesian, Post-Marxian, and Perhaps Post-Communal and Sophisticated &quot;Development&quot; Economies</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Emergence of Mass Consumption Societies</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>&quot;Second&quot; Industrial Revolution</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Chinese Achieve Nuclear Status</td>
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<th>THE POST-INDUSTRIAL, &quot;CONSUMER&quot; (INCOMING) SOCIETY</th>
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Introduction to Arms Control

Chart 1 lists a series of arms control objectives. It is useful to distinguish between basic ends and objectives which in effect denotes a way of attaining an end as well as the end itself. The objective of reducing the probability of war includes the need to reduce the chance that war occurs as a result of accident, misperception or misinterpretation. But it encompasses also the need to reduce the incentives for deliberate initiation of war by reducing the advantage of a first strike (to both (all) sides) and minimizing the likelihood of large changes in the number of armaments. The limitation of violence when and if war occurs may be achieved by the acceptance of rules which circumscribes the modes and extent of armed violence. Furthermore, the objective is related to the existing capacities for violence and for restraint. The objective of reducing the costs and burdens of the arms race has both a short term and a long term dimension and may be examined both from the perspective of particular national priorities and the wider viewpoint of the stability of the world order.

Chart 2 establishes some useful distinctions between the inclusive concept of arms control and more specific and limited programs of arms control.

Chart 3 focuses on various functions which alternative arms control arrangements may be designed to accomplish. Stabilization, includes improvements in command and control systems and survivability of retaliatory systems. Confidence building may be achieved e.g. by declarations concerning intentions, agreements on non-essential weapons (components), certain deployments and mutual observation agreements, etc. Disengagement refers to agreements to reduce force levels in particular areas or to exclude certain areas from the military competition altogether.

Chart 4 provides a framework for discussion of the kinds of calculation which nations may make in assessing their interest in a particular arms control agreement.

Chart 5 provides a framework for discussion of the interaction between various arms control measures and other issues in international affairs.

Charts 6-8 outline a proposition, which is frequently asserted, about the need to treat arms control as an objective divorced from political considerations in a particular context at a particular moment in history.

Chart 9 presents the major counter-arguments to the decoupling propositions.
Chart 10 outlines a series of questions and caveats which an analysis of the pros and cons of a "decoupling policy" would have to take into account. It is possible that certain bilateral S.U.-U.S. issues may be isolated from the general process of international politics in the interest of the stability of the international order. The consideration of potential arms control regimes for strategic forces may constitute such an issue, but it is not, of course, under present conditions very feasible to separate such issues from e.g., the issue of alliance obligations and guarantees. And the pressures on the latter are certainly sensitive to international political developments. The chart also raises the issue of whether the achievement of some "decoupling" does not presuppose the existence of some kind of permanent institution for the consideration of particular arms control problems. We could think of a permanent U.S.-S.U. strategic force commission (SFC), a multilateral European Security Commission (ESC), etc. The existence of such institutional structures would, of course, have some not insignificant feedback on the process of international politics and the long-term development of the international order.
INTRODUCTION TO ARMS CONTROL

1. SOME OBJECTIVES OF ARMS CONTROL

BASIC OBJECTIVES:
- Reduce probability of war
- Limit scope and intensity of damage if war occurs
- Help facilitate a satisfactory termination
- Reduce peacetime costs, risks, "impropriety," alienation, and other burdens of maintaining arms--prevent or dampen undesirables arms races

Both means and ends:
- Reduce tensions in international relations
- Create or maintain desirable distribution of power
- Maximize "stability" in various other ways
- Provide context for useful negotiations, communications, and education
- Demonstrate that the government has a "proper humanitarian concern" for the issues

2. SOME DISTINCTIONS

ARMS CONTROL IS AN INCLUSIVE CONCEPT REFERRING TO UNILATERAL OR COOPERATIVE MEASURES, FREQUENTLY BETWEEN POTENTIAL OPPONENTS AND EVEN EXISTING ENEMIES TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES OF CHART I FOR BOTH SIDES

IT TYPICALLY INCLUDES MORE LIMITED CONCEPTS SUCH AS:

ARMS FREEZE
- Which refers to measures aimed at preventing qualitative or quantitative increases of certain armaments beyond certain levels

ARMS REDUCTION
- Which denotes the measures or process of reducing the level of certain armaments

DISARMAMENT
- Which implies the reduction of the military establishment(s) to some minimum (low) level

ARMS CONTROL IS NOT LIMITED TO LOWERING THE LEVEL OF ARMS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN SOME CASES (SUCH AS DEFENSIVE EMPHASIS POLICIES OR IN A SITUATION OF VULNERABLE OFFENSIVE FORCES) IT WOULD CALL FOR AN INCREASE OR A CHANGE IN ARMS. IN OTHER CASES (E.G., NOT LINE) IT MAY CALL FOR SOMETHING NEW OR DIFFERENT.

3. SOME OTHER FUNCTIONS (MEASURES OR MEANS) OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

Stabilization
Limitation
Confidence building
Communication
Verification
Other uncertainty reduction
Dismantling
Management
Rule making

4. A'S EGOTISTICAL "PREFERENCE" IN A SYSTEM'S BARGAINING SITUATION

1. A "Cheats," but nobody else is induced to cheat by his example.
2. A cheats, and only very few are induced to cheat by his example.
3. Nobody cheats.
4. Others cheat, but if A were to join them, this particular precedent would endanger the stability of the system, so he does not cheat.
5. Everybody cheats.
6. Everybody cheats but A.

5. THE BASIC INTERACTION MATRIX

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<th>CHANGING STATUS OF CHINA, W. GERMANY, JAPAN</th>
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<td>ISSUES</td>
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6. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT EVEN THE FAMOUS "LAW OF NATURE" IS NOT AN EXACT SCIENCE, WHICH MEANS THAT CONCEPTUALIZING COMPLEX ISSUES IS NOT A "MAGICAL" PROCEDURE BUT ONE THAT REQUIRES A DEGREE OF HUMAN WIT.
INTRODUCTION TO ARMS CONTROL

THE DECOUPLING PROPOSITION:

IT SHOULD BE A "RULE" THAT ARMS CONTROL BE
Sought WITHOUT REGARD TO A SPECIFIC POLITICAL
CONTEXT. ARMS CONTROL SHOULD BE KEPT OUTSIDE
THE FRAMEWORK OF IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION AND
THE NORMAL PROCESSES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS--
even to SOME DEGREE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS.

"...WHAT I WANT TO DO IS TO SEE TO IT THAT
WE MAKE STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS IN A WAY AND AT A
TIME THAT WILL PROMOTE, IF POSSIBLE, PROGRESS ON
OUTSTANDING POLITICAL PROBLEMS AT THE SAME TIME,
FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE PROBLEM OF THE MID-EST, ON
OTHER OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS IN WHICH THE UNITED
STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ACTING TOGETHER CAN
SERVE THE CAUSE OF PEACE."

PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON
AT HIS FIRST NEWS CONFERENCE
JANUARY 27, 1969

AN EXAMPLE OF A DECOUPLING STATEMENT

WE SHOULD NOT TREAT THE TALKS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO DUMP DOWN THE
STRATEGIC ARMS RACE AS AN OCCASION SYMBOLIC OF
POLITICAL HARMONY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES;
NOR SHOULD THIS EFFORT BE SUSPENDED TO INDICATE
OUR DISAPPROVAL OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
OR TO SIGNIFY SOVIET DISAPPROVAL OF OUR ACTIONS IN
VIETNAM. THIS WOULD BE SHORTSIGHTED, AND WHEN IT
COMES TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MYOPIA CAN BE A FATAL
ILLNESS.

MARSHALL D. SHULMAN IN
K. GORDON (ED.)
AGENDA FOR THE NATION, 1969

DECOUPLING - SOME QUESTIONS AND CAVEATS

FEASIBILITY

THERE WILL ALWAYS BE ACTORS WHO REFUSE TO
ACCEPT THE RULES

CERTAIN ARMS CONTROL MEASURES ARE INHERENTLY
POLITICAL; E.G., CURRENT NON-PROLIFERATION
MEASURES

FURTHERMORE THE CONCEPTION SEEMS SERIOUSLY
INCONSISTENT WITH SOVIET AND MARXIST VIEWS
OF CONFLICT WITHIN THE HISTORICAL PROCESS

DESIRABILITY

IT MAY BE USEFUL TO RETAIN THE FLEXIBILITY
OF INSTITUTING OR ADOPTING ARMS CONTROL
ARRANGEMENTS OR STARTING OR CANCELING ARMS
CONTROL TALKS ETC., AS DIPLOMATIC COUNTERS AND
MESSAGES

'-'DECOUPLING' MAY DECREASE THE STABILITY OF
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM DUE TO WEIGHTED
POSSIBILITIES FOR MISCALCULATION AND MIS-
PERCEPTION

ANY SERIOUS DEGREE OF 'DECOUPLING', THAT IS
ACTUALLY ACHIEVED MAY BE ASYMMETRIC IN
PRACTICE OR EFFECTS

'DECOUPLING' MAY (AND PERHAPS INEVITABLY)
BE PERCEIVED AS ACTUAL COUPLING WITH THE
POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF ATTAINING A U.S.-S.U.
DOULTY (INTERNATIONAL)

COMMENT

MAY IT BE A USEFUL CONCEPT FOR CERTAIN
KINDS OF ARMS CONTROL ONLY. IT MAY BE
DESIURABLE TO VIEW MOST ARMS CONTROL MEASURES
AS INTEGRAL ELEMENTS OF A POLITICAL SETTLE-
MENT INSTITUTING COUPLING

IF I ACCEPT THE ABOVE POSITION, THEN WHAT
KINDS OF ARMS CONTROL MEASURES ARE 'DECOUPLING'
U.S.-S.U. STRATEGIC ARMS ISSUES) WHAT
PROCEDURES AND INSTITUTIONS WOULD SERVE TO
INITIATE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS FROM OTHER
POLITICAL ISSUES (e.g. PERMANENT FORUM OF
U.S.-S.U. DIPLOMACIES)
Some Important Issues Raised by the Interaction of Arms Control and Other Policy Areas

The matrix provides a framework for consideration of some potential interactions between arms control and other basic national security policy issues. It constitutes a useful device for the illustration and discovery of potential interactions and policy implications. The elaboration serves heuristic purposes and is suggestive rather than exhaustive. It is not designed to present a point of view as much as to highlight some important policy issues.

Feedbacks from e.g. the NPT and/or a possible strategic weapons arms control (SWAC) agreement to internal U.S. politics are likely to be particularly important in terms of their influence on public perceptions of what the political line-up and issues in world politics are. NPT would tend to focus attention on those who refuse to cooperate; and prevalent among such states are likely to be the World War II adversaries of the U.S. Any arms control arrangements are likely to structure the popular attitudes towards the cold war, force, and the Soviet Union. Certain kinds of "technical" intra-war arms control arrangements are unlikely to stir up much public interest, but their reflection of a rationalist approach to problem solving may increase the communications gap to those who represent more romantic, anti-rationalistic trends in American society. Such interactions are, however, extremely tenuous.

A visible pattern of cooperation and coordination between the two superpowers may generate expectations and fears of a superpower condominium. Those who have found protection in the balance of power of a competitive U.S.-S.U. relationship may scramble for new patterns in a situation characterized by an emergent cooperative U.S.-S.U. relationship. It is, furthermore, possible that an atmosphere of cooperation and apparent relaxation may provide opportunities for manipulative diplomacy and lead to a less cautious estimate of the risks involved in pressing for unilateral advantages. Propensities of this kind are likely to be symmetrical in the U.S.-S.U. competitive relationship.

Interactions with U.S. alliance politics are in many ways the opposite side of the coin to the interactions with U.S.-S.U. politics. The possibility of a superpower concert may produce important pressures for alliance reconstruction. Certain war management measures may, like the NPT, amplify and exacerbate some of the problems of alliance consultation, particularly in regard to nuclear weapons.

Arms race issues are not treated in detail here since specific evaluation of these issues must be made with reference to a particular agreement. We have, however, attempted to identify some possible sources of general uncertainty and potential conflict.
The major uncertainties associated with the potential impact of various arms control measures on future European security systems are connected with estimates of Soviet priorities, objectives and opportunities for the assertion of exclusive influence. Some arms control measures, or the diplomacy to reach agreement, may serve as catalysts for political realignments in Europe, in many instances realignments which would be inconsistent with the realization of the arms control objective in question. We have seen some tendencies in connection with the NPT and a process of expanded arms control diplomacy may strengthen such, still rather latent, tendencies.

The NPT would have the effect of enhancing the status of China as a nuclear power by ostensibly closing the door for other powers. It is more than problematical that two of the emerging giants were the principal losers in World War II. The Nuclear Club would in effect be composed of the victorious powers of World War II who are also formally recognized as the preeminent powers in the United Nations structure. It may be less than fortunate thus to have the possession of nuclear weapons formally linked with recognized great power status.

The NPT is unlikely to affect U.S. and U.S.S.R. war-fighting capabilities except in an indirect way as a consequence of pressures from the non-nuclear weapon states to limit the acquisition of arms. The effects of a SWAC arrangement could be more dramatic; but their nature and scope cannot be identified in the abstract.

Even if the NPT obtains almost universal ratification, we are faced with the issue of what will be the "normal" posture of a country which decides not to acquire nuclear weapons. Will the typical posture be one of complete abstention from nuclear weapons programs or will it be common for non-nuclear weapon states to implement measures permitting them to acquire nuclear weapons relatively quickly when and if the need arises? Hence, the issue remains as to what kinds of interactions might take place in an environment where many countries maintain a rapid acquisition posture. The interactions might under pressure from political conflicts generate incentives for eventual acquisition.

In terms of the long-term (year 2000) issues we are analytically interested in (1) how particular arms control agreements might affect the probability of certain changes taking place in the international system, and (2) how the same arms control arrangements would affect the ability of the U.S. to cope with an environment in which certain basic or marginal changes have taken place.
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<td>Attitudes towards: Nuclear weapons Cold war force Former (world war II) enemies</td>
<td>Joint responsibilities: Political manipulation of Western deterrents</td>
<td>Disruption fear of U.S. hegemony Barter to aspirations fear of U.S. &quot;sellout&quot; &quot;intolerable&quot; hierarchy</td>
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<td>DEPENDS ON KIND OF AGREEMENT IMPROVED &quot;MILITARIZATION BAS&quot;</td>
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<td>ESCALATION ISSUES ROLE OF FORCE &amp; VIOLANCE PROPORTIONAL ADVISORY DAMAGE LIMITATION</td>
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Potential Interactions Between Arms Control Arrangements

This matrix constitutes a framework for integrating various arms control policy perspectives. It is useful to view the impact of one particular kind of arms control measure on the prospects and implications of other measures. We want to be able to assess both the cumulative and systems impacts of arms control arrangements.

We have no particular time sequence in mind so that the comments in the various cells of the matrix do not assume that e.g., the measure indicated in any row precedes the measure indicated in a corresponding column. The reader may "enter" the matrix from any direction. The comments and items in the various cells identify issues which require analysis and only in a few instances do the comments suggest a particular perspective on the issues raised.

It is clear that there exists a formal link between the NPT and S.U.-U.S. strategic force agreements in that the language of the NPT has been interpreted as committing the superpowers to hold such talks, presumably as a concession to the insistence from several non-nuclear weapon states that there be a certain balance in the obligations and concessions made under the treaty. We should note, however, that certain kinds of SWAC (particularly agreements involving low ceilings on strategic forces) may generate incentives for proliferation should they e.g. reduce the requirements for "catching up." Hence it may be necessary to cast a SWAC arrangement not only in terms of U.S.-S.U. relations but also with respect to its impact on and responsiveness to the challenges from potential superpower aspirants.

Any system of strict arms transfer limitations (arms embargos) would when superimposed on the NPT run the risk of generating widespread resentment against what will increasingly be perceived as a concerted great power overlordship. Such resentments might produce potent incentives for cooperative efforts aimed at a greater degree of autarchy, possibly including nuclear weapons.

From the point of view of Western Europe it will be very important how the U.S. will handle the problem of the Soviet MRBM's-IRBM's in any SWAC agreement with Moscow. There is, of course, a measuring problem here of finding a relevant equivalence, but there is also a political issue involving the management of what may be perceived as an asymmetrical hostage situation.

It is widely expected that following NPT an international convention covering the activities on the sea-bed will be next on the arms control agenda and that such a convention would involve a commitment to demilitarize the sea-bed. Hence there may be an important link with NPT in terms of the political importance of maintaining momentum in the arms control efforts. To the extent that the sea-bed regimes were to exclude various bottom-based sensor systems, they may
potentially exclude the procurement of a possible infrastructure for information transfer in a war or during a crisis and thus prevent certain war-fighting understandings as well as complicate the exercise of command and control. ASW barriers might conceivably constitute a means for reciprocal signalling or the deliberate transfer of information communicated by the observation of submarine movements. Such barriers could also serve as a means of verifying disengagement in a crisis to the extent that such an arrangement would involve the removal and redeployment of submarines.

The objective of being able to arrive at certain war-fighting understandings with Moscow, in e.g. a central war, may have important implications for the kind of capabilities and flexibilities which ought to be maintained within a SWAC arrangement. It is possible, for instance, that the possibility of treating cities as sanctuaries presupposes the development of a sophisticated MIRV capability (providing high accuracy and less megatonnage). Similarly certain zonal arrangements in e.g. Europe in connection with a wider settlement may provide potential focal points for disengagement in a possible war in the European environment (cfr. the DMZ in Vietnam).

A SWAC arrangement will tend to affect the options available in the realm of nuclear weapons doctrine as well, and this perspective ought to be kept in mind. Here we are faced with issues such as the potential value of maintaining a first-strike option, the relative emphasis to be accorded counterforce and countervalue missions, and, perhaps most important of all, the basic choice between a posture emphasizing deterrence based on reciprocal capacities for assured destruction or, alternatively, a defensive emphasis posture.

The problems of command and control interact with most arms control measures in terms of the expected opportunities for 'outside' powers to interfere with U.S. decision-making, both in terms of catalytic objectives and in terms of access to U.S. decision-making on a cooperative basis. The command and control problems are, of course, also associated with the issues involved in war-fighting understandings and the choice of nuclear weapons doctrine.

(This page folds out.)
### Potential Interactions Between Arms Controls

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**SANCTIONS**

- Nuclear Targeting Zonal Arrangement
- Categorization, Warning & Notification
- Monitoring Targeting Collateral Issues
- Deployment Restrictions
- Extranordi Nuclear Seabed Problem
- Joint or Similar Is Nuclear
- The Latter for U.S. and E.V.
### Interactions Between Arms Control Arrangements

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Some Long-Range Alternative System Endpoints

This page sets out some alternative ways in which the international system as a whole might affect, and be affected by, various developments, particularly those related to possible proliferation or likely in the field of arms control. Chart 1 provides a general framework for this discussion, and the following charts elaborate four of the possibilities mentioned here.

In the first model, we have assumed that the major items of the current arms control agenda are achieved without any major structural change in the system; i.e., without any crucial alterations in the distribution of power within the existing system or in the institutions governing that distribution. Chart 2 outlines some characteristics of the international system which such a series of events might produce. One important element is that if one projects the existing tendency for arms control to flow primarily from superpower agreement, the ensuing system is strongly hierarchical and will tend to create resentments and counterpressures to deal with this. Here, the optimism of the model is reflected in the fact that these resentments and pressures do not take radically disruptive forms, but are assumed to be channeled into such institutions as a non-nuclear club and a more active United Nations. Another important feature is the last mentioned on the chart, namely that although there is no structural change in the model of the system, it may be dominated by other "non-structural" features such as the general attitude to nuclear war and to the use of force. These attitudes may be of greater importance in restraining the number and character of future wars than any structural changes we could envisage. Chart 3 provides a scenario through which such a system endpoint might be reached. The reader will note that the model is explicitly described as optimistic in that it includes success in such currently contentious areas as a formal declaration banning the first use of nuclear weapons and some sort of progress in the field of strategic nuclear forces.

The second model on the chart page also avoids assumptions of any major structural change but chooses to emphasize the more pessimistic possibilities for arms control. Chart 4 stresses again the importance of perceptions and other non-structural features in any international system. In this pessimistic projection, the widespread expectation that proliferation and other types of weapons procurement will follow the technical capabilities of nations may be as ominous for arms control as the actual acquisition of weapons by any particular nation. A further implication of this chart is that the development of the German nuclear weapons program might not only have destabilizing consequences in the narrow military field, it might also permanently wreck any hopes for European unification. In particular, Chart 5 reflects the view of some observers that whatever one may think of the substance of the pending non-proliferation treaty, its defeat at this late date would be a major setback for arms control.
The chart notes that perhaps because of the Nixon Administration's inclination to "couple" political and technical arms control considerations, a major crisis in the political area (such as a renewed Czech uprising) could have disastrous effects on the effort for superpower arms control.

The third major alternative considered here is one in which the effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons is largely a failure. Chart 6 reflects the widespread belief that contrary to the views of General Gallois, a world of wide nuclear spread will be a very unpleasant one. But an interesting implication of this model is that it may lead to greater rather than diminished interaction between the superpowers, if only to protect themselves against the worst features of such a system. Chart 7 notes again the importance of the U.S. lead in this field, although there is no claim here either that U.S. ratification of the treaty will by itself stop proliferation, or that the U.S. failure to do so will necessarily provoke a rapid and explosive proliferation.

A fourth model considered here involves another major structural change, in which the focus of international relations shifts from the individual nation-state to the larger unit of the bloc or regional institution. Chart 8 notes in particular that in a world where the major components of the system are larger than the nation-state, there may be a rather pervasive trend to the possession of nuclear forces by these blocs, even in that case noted below where the bloc system itself arose out of progress in a field of regional denuclearization. Chart 9 outlines some alternative scenarios through which such a system could arise. It will be noted that this development could ensue either from the positive desire of nations to build such institutions or simply from their desire to avoid the worst features of a world in which nationalism, especially in its military aspect, seems to be rampant.
1. ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM ENDPOINTS: HOW WILL ESCALATION BE HANDLED IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? WHAT WILL BE THE ROLE OF FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM?

2. ALL-OUT WAR SYSTEM WITHERS AWAY
   A. UNIVERSAL DETERRENCE--GALLOIS WORLDS
   B. RULE OF LAW
   C. PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY
   D. RULE OF FAIR ACCOMPLISH (INTERDEPENDENT WAR)
   E. INSTRUMENTAL WARS (RATIONAL SELF-INTEREST RESTRAINTS)
   F. AGONISTIC WARS (LIMITED BY ABSOLUTE RULES)
   G. POTLATCH WARS (SPACE, FOREIGN AID, "SHOWY" SYSTEMS, ETC.)
   H. OTHER SUBSTITUTE FOR CENTRAL WAR

3. OTHER BASIC CHANGE IN SYSTEM
   A. BLOC SYSTEMS (WITH RESTRAINTS AND RITUALS)
   B. COMMUNITY SANCTIONS (E.G., NO FIRST USE BY ANYONE)
   C. CONDITIONAL SUI GENERIS COLLECTIVE SECURITY, U.N.?)
   D. CONCERT OF (LARGE OR SMALL) POWERS
   E. "WORLD GOVERNMENT"
   F. WORLD EMPIRE (OR EMPIRES)
   G. DISARMED, BUT "UNCONTROLLED" NATIONS
   H. ELIMINATION OF CONTROL OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY AGREEMENT OR RESOLVING FOLLOWING A LARGE SETBACK TO CIVILIZATION

4. SOME PLAUSIBLE CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS SYSTEM
   AS IN PREVIOUS MODEL, NON-STRUCTURAL FEATURES DOMINATE.
   WIDESPREAD EXPECTATION OF PROLIFERATION, U.S. EXPLOIT, FASHION OF "WE BUILD WHAT WE CAN" IN STRATEGIC-EMPLOYMENT
   IN FRANCE, A FEAR OF GERMANY DESIGN, PLAN FOR HEAD IT OFF, OR FOR INCORPORATING WITH IT IF IT MATERIALIZES
   MISSILES DEPLOYED ON CONTINENTAL SHELF
   U.N. LARGELY INACTIVE AS ARMS CONTROL MECHANISM

5. A SCENARIO FOR THIS PROJECTION
   U.S. SENATE DEFENDS NPT 1969, ALL SIGNATURES VOICED
   WEST GERMANY, ISRAEL REQUESTS FOR NEW GUARANTEES ARE REFUSED BY U.S.
   SOVIETS CRUSH CZECH UPRISING, U.S. BREAKS OFF MISSILE TALKS
   U.S. CHARGES SOVIET NEW FORCES VIOLATE OUTER SPACE TREATY; U.S. DECLARES ITSELF NO LONGER BOUND BY TACT
   THE GANDHI-GOV'T GOVERNMENT FAILS, PRO-NUCLEAR FACTION TAKES "MAINTAINED ROLE IN NEW INDIAN GOVERNMENT"
   ISRAELI "9-SEMENT BOMB" WIDELY BELIEVED
   TALIB System UPGRADED FOR MD
   SENTINEL DEPLOYED, U.S. HEAVY SYSTEM EXPECTED
   U.S. MISSILES FULLY DEPLOYED
   INCREASED NATO EMPHASIS ON TAC NUCS TO HEAD OFF GERMAN BOMB

6. SOME PLAUSIBLE CHARACTERISTICS OF A BLOC SYSTEM
   THREAT TOWARD INTEGRATED NUCLEAR FORCES (THIS COULD BE TRUE EVEN AS LAST SCENARIO ABOVE)
   ATTRACTION OF INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR FORCES
   RETURN TO CLASSICAL MULTI-POLAR BALANCE OF POWER FEASIBILITY
   STRONG INTRA-BLOC REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES
   THREAT TO A FEDERATION OF BLOCS, POSSIBLY REACTIVATING U.N.
   PROLIFERATION OF INTRA-REGIONAL MILITARY AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
   INTRA-BLOC FREE TRADE AREAS, PROTECTIONISM V. OTHERS
LONG-RANGE ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM ENDPOINTS

AN "OPTIMISTIC" ARMS CONTROL PROJECTION WITHOUT MAJOR STRUCTURAL SYSTEMIC CHANGE

7) SOME PLAUSIBLE CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS SYSTEM

TRIANGULAR HIERARCHICAL

THIS CONTROL IS "IMPOSED FROM ABOVE" AFTER SUPERPOWER AGREEMENT

GUARANTEE SYSTEM MAY EXTEND SUPERPOWER REACH INTO LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS

RESTRICT TO FORMAL NON-NUCLEAR CLUB

EVEN STRENGTHEN IN THRESHOLD NATIONS OVER SECOND-CLASS STATUS

CREASE INTRA-EUROPEAN COOPERATION TO GAIN LEVERAGE ON SUPERPOWERS

ACTIVE GUARANTEE SYSTEM WOULD INCREASE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTIVITY, COULD STRENGTHEN WHOLE UN INSTITUTION (BUT: FAILURE TO MEET FIRST TEST COULD RUIN WHOLE SCHEME)

INT li STRUCTURAL FEATURES (E.G., NUCLEAR SELF-DETERRENCE, GENERAL RELUCTANCE TO USE FORCE IN A MAJOR WAY) MAY DOMINATE.

A SCENARIO FOR THIS PROJECTION

NPT RATIFIED BY BIG THREE, PLUS ALL CURRENT THRESHOLD NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTS SOVIET-AMERICAN GUARANTEE RESOLUTION

JOINT U.S.-S.U. GUARANTEE TO INDIA SUPPLEMENTS RESOLUTION

ADDITIONAL PRIVATE U.S. GUARANTEE TO WEST GERMANY, ISRAEL

BIG THREE MAKE FORAL MID-USE DECLARATION

DE FACTO SELF-RESTRAINT BY SUPERPOWERS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

FORMAL AGREEMENT BANS MASS-DESTRUCTION WEAPONS ON SEA-BED TACTICAL AGREEMENT LIMITS OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC FORCES

MAJOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE: WIDESPREAD PROLIFERATION

MAJOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE: A BLOC SYSTEM

ON A BLOC SYSTEM

ARMS VOIDS

ARMANTES ARE OFF

ARRMS OFF

OR: THERmon SPACE BOUND BY PACIFIC

ARRMS OFF GERMAN

A SCENARIO FOR THIS PROJECTION

AS ABOVE, U.S. SENATE DEFEATS NPT, TREATY FAILS

ISRAELI, GERMAN REQUESTS FOR NEW GUARANTEES ARE REFUSED BY U.S. IN MIDDLE OF POST-VIETNAM RETRENCHMENT

POST-GANDHI GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES MILITARY NUCLEAR PROGRAM

U.S. SUCCESSFULLY USES TAC NUCES AGAINST NORTH KOREAN ATTACK

U.S. CUTBACK OF EUROPEAN-BASED FORCES PROMPTS GERMAN ANNOUNCEMENT OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

1970 - 1979: JAPAN IN THE EARLY OR MID-SIXTIES, WEST GERMANY'S STRATEGIC WEAPONS

ABOUT 4 OR 5 YEARS LATER SOON FOLLOWED BY ITALY, OTHER POSSIBILITIES ARE SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND OR AUSTRALIA AND INDIA


1990 - 1999: "EVERYBODY" (See Page 8 Chart 5)

7) SOME PLAUSIBLE CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS SYSTEM

EXPECTATION THAT PROLIFERATION WILL FOLLOW SPREAD OF TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES

UNEVEN, ASYMMETRICAL SPREAD

MANY PRIMITIVE, POORLY CONTROLLED, VULNERABLE FORCES

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MADE, MARKETED BY PRIVATE INDUSTRIES

HEAVY DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENTS IN U.S., S.U.

EFFORTS TO FOLLOW SUIT IN ALL BUT WEAKEST NATIONS; POSSIBLE INCENTIVE FOR REGIONAL DEFENSE PRODUCTION COOPERATION

GENERAL U.S. FOREIGN POLICY RETRENCHMENT

INCREASED SUPERPOWER EFFORTS TO REDUCE DANGER OF CATASTROPHIC WAR THROUGH ANONYMOUS ATTACK

SELECTIVE SUPERPOWER TECHNICAL AID TO WEAK COUNTRIES, TO AVOID WORST FORMS OF PROLIFERATION

6) SOME POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR THIS PROJECTION

BREAKTHROUGH IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION AFTER DE GAULLE

OR: INTEGRATION OUT OF FRUSTRATION WITH HIERARCHICAL SYSTEM ABOVE

OR: DEFENSIVE INTEGRATION OF DEVELOPED NATIONS IN A DETERIORATING WORLD

OR: OUTGROWTH OF REGIONAL DE-NUCLEARIZATION PROGRESS: LATIN AMERICAN PRECEDENT BECOMES INSTITUTIONALIZED

TENSION V. OTHERS