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AUTHORITY

Per OAG, d/a ltr, dtd 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
IN REPLY TO AGDA (M) (17 Dec 70) FOR OT UT 703182 22 December 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Corps (Group) Artillery, Period Ending 31 July 1970

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
(ARMY) ATTN FOR OT UT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
EACIAT-C 14 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Gp) Artillery for the Period 1 May - 31 July 1970, RCS CS for -65 (RI) (U)

Commanding General
I Corps (Group)
ATTN: EACICT-T
APO 96358

1. (U) Section 1. Operations, Significant Activities.

   a. The organizational structure of I Corps (Gp) Artillery is shown at Inclosure 1.

   b. The following changes of command occurred during the reporting period:

      (1) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Corps (Gp) Artillery:

         (a) BG Wilbur H. Vinson, Jr. was absent on leave 13-26 July 1970.

         (b) COL Clarence W. Cyr served as Acting Commander, 13-26 July 1970.

         (c) COL Charles W. Whittington arrived in this command and was assigned as Deputy Commander of I Corps (Group) Artillery 18 July 1970.

         (d) COL Clarence W. Cyr departed this command 27 July 1970 and was reassigned as Professor of Military Science at La Salle University, Philadelphia, Pa.

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(2) 3d Battalion, 81st Artillery: LTC Donald E. Lauzon assumed command of the battalion from LTC Bruce E. Patterson on 15 July 1970.

c. This headquarters participated in the I Corps (Group) CPX Opposing Fires, 24 - 27 June 1970. 2d Battalion, 76th Artillery and the 6th Battalion, 12th Artillery also participated.

d. Secretary of the Army, Stanley R. Resor, visited this headquarters on 10 July 1970. Battery "C" 2d Battalion, 76th Artillery presented a demonstration of an 8" self-propelled howitzer battery in a firing position, and Battery "B" 3d Battalion, 81st Artillery demonstrated the emplacement of a Sergeant firing section.

e. 1st Battalion, 17th Artillery:

(1) This battalion received a Satisfactory rating on the USARPAC TPI conducted on 1 May 1970.

(2) Battery "A" received an Unsatisfactory rating on the I Corps (Gp) CMMI conducted on 5 May 1970. The battery received a Satisfactory rating on the reinspection conducted on 12 June 1970.

(3) Battery "C" received a Satisfactory rating on the I Corps (Gp) CMMI conducted on 13 July 1970.

(4) Battery "B" received an Unsatisfactory rating on the I Corps (Gp) CMMI conducted 14 July 1970.

(5) Batteries "A", "B", and "C" received Satisfactory ratings on Battery ORTs conducted on 23, 16, and 15 June respectively.

(6) The battalion participated in a Command Readiness Exercise (FASTPACE) conducted by I Corps (Gp) on 24 June 1970.

f. 1st Target Acquisition Battalion, 25th Artillery: Each battery received a rating of Satisfactory in the I Corps (Gp) CMMI. The dates of the inspections were 11 May, 17 June, and 7 July 1970.

(2)
for Battery "A", Battery "B", and Headquarters and Headquarters Battery respectively.

g. 2d Battalion, 76th Artillery:

(1) An I Corps (Gp) Nuclear Surety Inspection was conducted from 19 - 21 May 1970, and the battalion was rated Satisfactory.

(2) The battalion was rated "Combat Ready" in the Semi-Annual Battalion ORT which was administered by I Corps (Gp) Artillery on 11 - 12 June 1970.

(3) On 26 June 1970, while in the field, the battalion conducted the Quarterly Nuclear Accident/Incident Control Plan (NAICP) Test Exercise.


(5) During this period, the battalion has participated in four NST exercises with the 6th ROK Corps Artillery.

h. 3d Battalion, 81st Artillery:

(1) The CMMI Team from I Corps (Gp) Artillery and I Corps (Gp) inspected Headquarters and Headquarters Battery on 4 and 14 May 1970, respectively. Rating was Satisfactory on both occasions.

(2) A rehearsal of OPLAN 2 - 70 (Emergency Evacuation) was conducted on 6 May 1970.

(3) The battalion was rated Satisfactory on a USARPAC Nuclear Surety Inspection conducted 5 and 6 May 1970.

(4) 8th U.S. Army CMMI Team inspected Battery "A" on 15 June 1970. The rating was Satisfactory.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Gp) Artillery for the Period 1 May - 31 July 1970, RCS CS for -65 (RI) (U)

(5) The battalion conducted a Nuclear Accident/Incident Control Plan (NAICP) rehearsal on 29 June 1970.

i. The 6th Battalion, 12th Artillery successfully completed its Operational Readiness Test with a rating of 'Combat Ready' in all areas.

2. (U) Section 2. Lessons Learned; Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations: None

c. Training: None

d. Intelligence:

(1) Observation: During a recent inventory, it was discovered that an amount of controlled drugs which were to remain under lock and key were missing.

(2) Evaluation: Upon investigation, it was found the padlock on the cabinet had been cut at a point that would not be noticed at a casual glance, nor by a downward pull on the lock.

(3) Recommendation: All padlocks securing sensitive or controlled items should be thoroughly inspected. Check under the retaining chain clamp, especially, to make sure the lock hasp has not been cut and concealed by the chain clamps.

e. Logistics:

(1) Construction Contracts:

(a) Observation: New construction contracts are given to Korean contractors without regard to the importance or the security requirements of the new construction. As a case in point, the contract for the construction of a high security fence for MSA 81 was awarded to the Chon 11 Enterprise Company, a Korean organization. The construction of the fence proceeded in a haphazard manner.

As a result

(4)
of numerous construction deficiencies, this battalion had to contend with an insecure MSA for a period of more than two months.

(b) Evaluation: The Korean construction workers were poorly supervised and performed with a complete lack of urgency. The construction company displayed no responsiveness to US Military Security requirements. On site, construction did not improve until I Corps (Group) detailed a senior engineer NCO to supervise the construction on a full time basis. The Chon II Enterprise Construction Company proved itself incapable of coping with the construction project on its own. A platoon of American Military Engineers could have accomplished the same project in less than one sixth of the time the contractor took (the contractor exceeded his time limit by more than three months). A platoon of engineers supervised by a qualified lieutenant would not have had construction deficiencies such as bad welding, poor cement mixing, and a general failure to meet specifications. Furthermore, American engineers would be more responsive to supply economy and the large waste of government materials would have been avoided. If American engineers had built the Security Fence for MSA 81, the US Government would have saved considerable time and expense, and the battalion would not have been faced with an insecure MSA for such an extensive length of time.

(c) Recommendation: That in the future, all high-security and high-priority construction projects be given to American engineer units.

(2) Personal Clothing and Equipment:

(a) Observation: Many enlisted personnel wear substandard items of personal clothing in Korea.

(b) Evaluation: Many man hours are spent at the unit level completing paperwork and traveling to and from distant supply points to obtain personal clothing that is often not available for direct exchange or issue. Items, such as the proper size boots, are not available for excessive periods of time requiring the individual soldier to get along with less than the authorized issue of clothing.

(c) Recommendation: That an additional amount of clothing be authorized for issue in Korea, especially boots and work uniforms. If this is not possible, it is suggested that quartermaster clothing sales
store be made available with the necessary stock of personal clothing and equipment for sale or issue to the individual soldier as he needs it.

(3) Repair Parts for Tracked Vehicles:

(a) Observation: Essential repair parts are not immediately available to maintain the M548 tracked vehicle as well as the M107, 175MM gun in an operational status.

(b) Evaluation: Essential repair parts for tracked vehicles in comparison with other type vehicle parts, take long periods of time to arrive at the unit after requisition. These parts are not available on the shelf at support facilities which causes a delay while the part is shipped from a source out of the country.

(c) Recommendation: That low density essential repair parts be stocked at direct support and higher levels in Korea, on a continuing basis, for these tracked vehicles.

(4) Centralized Battalion Prescribed Load List (PLL):

(a) Observation: A Battery was unable to maintain its PLL in a satisfactory manner.

(b) Evaluation: This battery experienced a critical shortage of qualified PLL clerks and personnel familiar enough with PLL procedures to train and supervise battery PLL clerks in each battery motor office.

(c) Recommendation: When batteries are co-located, have all PLL clerks, their records and their parts (separately contained) in one central location to be trained and supervised by the Battalion Motor Officer and Property Book Officer. The following benefits can be gained from this organization:

(i) The Battalion Motor Sergeant, Property Book Officer, Battalion Automotive Maintenance Technician, and Battalion Motor Officer are close at hand to advise, direct, observe, assist, inspect, and evaluate when needed. All clerks can be dealt with at one time which eliminates the necessity of making several time consuming
trips each week to the different battery locations. The quality of the work improves as the clerks are more closely supervised and have someone knowledgeable close at hand to answer their questions and to aid in their problems.

(2) Problem areas can be solved with all battery PLL clerks at one time and information can be coordinated without the necessity of phone calls or visits to the batteries.

(3) The PLL clerks are able to discuss areas of concern and help one another when small problems arise. The clerks improve themselves through a pooling of knowledge and experience. If one clerk experiences a problem in some area, each clerk can immediately check to see if he has the same or similar problems.

(4) Parts runs (the picking up of parts from the direct support maintenance unit) can be made by one man instead of five. By bringing all parts to one location and having all the PLL clerks present (each knowing what he has requisitioned and what he has due-in) the parts can be separated quickly and deftly.

(5) More time and effort is saved in repairing "deadline" equipment immediately. When one battery has a needed part on hand, it can be transferred to another battery PLL and the vehicle repaired. As a result, many vehicles are kept off "deadline" status through this close coordination.

f. Communications: S01 Control of Radiosonde Frequencies:

(1) Observation: While operating simultaneously, different metro stations sometimes use the same radiosonde frequencies.

(2) Evaluation: In Eighth Army, radiosonde frequencies are not controlled by an S01, but rather their selection is left to the discretion of each individual metro section. This condition has in some cases resulted in two different metro stations tracking each others radiosondes. In such cases, the data transmitted from the rawin set to the recorder is erroneous, thus making the metro message invalid.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Gp) Artillery for the Period 1 May - 31 July 1970, RCS CS for -65 (RL) (U)

(3) Recommendation: The selection of radiosonde frequency by various metro stations be governed by SOI.

W.H. VINSON, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

1 Incl

1- CG, EUSA, ATTN: EAGO-MH, APO 96391
2- CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96358
DA, Headquarters I Corps (Group), APO 96358

TO: Commanding General, Eighth US Army, ATTN: ZAGO-3H, APO 96358

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of I Corps (Group) Artillery. The following comments supplement the report.

a. Reference item concerning Intelligence, page 4, paragraph 2d. Concur. In addition to the actions taken, it is recommended that a list be maintained to indicate that the combination was repaired. This list should include date of initiation and completion of repairs.

b. Reference item concerning Construction Contracts, pages 4-5, paragraph 2e(1). Concur. Concurrence is indicated subject to the availability of engineer troops. Insufficient engineer troops are available in Korea to accomplish all construction required in and adjacent to high security areas. The proposal to place American engineer units on high security construction projects will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

c. Reference item concerning Personal Clothing and Equipment, pages 5-6, paragraph 2e(2). Nonconcur.

(1) In order that an additional amount of clothing be authorized for issue, a change to DA Regulation 700-84 would have to be effected. Contact with KORSCOR SP 39 revealed this situation to be true only for boots in sizes 6 and 7. Except for these items, any item not on hand can be obtained in approximately two weeks. Further contact with the S4 at I Corps (Gp) Artillery revealed that this problem was not chronic and applied only to isolated cases. A clothing sales store is located in the Yongsan area. KORSCOR SP 50 operates a mobile clothing sales van. This van is dispatched to the various unit areas within I Corps (Gp) to include Camp Saint Barbara.

(2) Since the date the recommendation was submitted, KORSCOR support units have simplified clothing direct exchange procedures in addition to defining and liberalizing fair wear and tear criteria. Additionally, Class X clothing should be issued and worn in accordance with the procedures established by the Eighth US Army Supplement to AR 700-84.

d. Reference item concerning Repair Parts for Tracked Vehicles, page 6, paragraph 2e(3). Concur. Further recommend that units make and submit a survey of specific items which cause vehicle down time that are not stocked. This survey should list critical items by FSN and abbreviated nomenclature. This would be a more practical approach to the recommendation submitted instead of applying the recommendation as a blanket proposal for all parts.
e. Reference item concerning Centralized Battalion Prescribed Load List (PLL), pages 6-7, paragraph 2e(4). Concur. Centralization of PLL stocks and records is authorized by Eighth US Army in accordance with EA Message, ENGL-EC, dated 13 Aug 70, Subj: Location of Prescribed Load Stocks and Records. It should be noted that concurrence is not indicated for consolidation of PLL. It is further suggested that those battalions centralizing their PLL maintain separate parts trailers since each battery will still be accountable for their own parts. Past experience has revealed that battalions employing PLL centralization, without maintaining separate parts trailers, fall below acceptable standards in the area of PLL during C2M2I inspections and PLL audits.

f. Reference item concerning SOI Control of Radiosonde Frequencies, pages 7-8, paragraph 2f. Concur. Further investigation of this problem reveals that the origin of the interfering signals cannot be identified by the metro stations. Since metro stations are organic to both US and ROK Artillery support organizations throughout South Korea, the scope of this problem is not within the capability of I Corps (Gp) to effect appropriate corrective action. Due to the significance of "mission accomplishment" by these metro stations, it is recommended that the Radiosonde Frequencies for all US and Korean units be controlled by Eighth US Army SOI.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Donald R. Reed
Brigadier General, CS
Chief of Staff
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and forwarding indorsement. The following comments supplement the report.

2. Reference item concerning Intelligence, page 4, para 2d; and 1st Ind, page 9, para a. Concur.

3. Reference item concerning Construction Contracts, page 4, para 2e(1); and 1st Ind, page 9, para b. Concur with comment contained in I Corps (Gp) indorsement.

4. Reference item concerning Personal Clothing and Equipment, page 5, para 2e(2); and 1st Ind, page 9, para c. Concur with comment contained in I Corps (Gp) indorsement.

5. Reference item concerning Repair Parts for Tracked Vehicles, page 6, para 2e(3); and 1st Ind, page 9, para d. Nonconcur. Current stockage policy (DA Cir 700-18) calls for items to be stocked on a variable demand basis so that ASLs remain within the guidelines established by DA. In addition, I Corps (Gp) Artillery units can requisition these parts needed to remove a vehicle from deadline using a high priority requisition.

6. Reference item concerning Centralized Battalion Prescribed Load List (PLL), page 6, para 2e(4); and 1st Ind, page 10, para e. Concur. Eighth Army message cited in 1st Ind informs commanders that they may centrally locate the prescribed load stock and records at organization level. Although prescribed load stocks and records of these units may be centrally located, they cannot be consolidated. Each PLL will be maintained separately.

7. Reference item concerning SOI (Signal Operations Instructions) Control of Radiosonde Frequencies, page 7, para 2f; and 1st Ind, page 10, para f. UNC/USFK/Eighth Army SSI (Standing Signal Instructions) Number 80 specifically states that no radio frequency emitting devices may
EAGO-MH (14 Aug 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of I Corps (Gp) Artillery for
the Period 1 May - 31 July 1970, RCS CS for-65 (R1) (U)

be used in the Republic of Korea without the approval of,
and specific frequency assignments by, the UNC/USFK/Eighth
Army Frequency Coordinator. UNC/USFK/Eighth Army SSI
Number 83-2 outlines the procedures to be followed in the
event of radio frequency interference or jamming. The
Signal Officer, I Corps (Gp), once specific frequencies
have been obtained for this purpose from the UNC/USFK/
Eighth Army Frequency Coordinator, would be responsible
for the promulgation of the necessary SOI items to con-
trol their use. It is recommended that I Corps (Gp) sub-
mit their request for frequencies in the format contained
in UNC/USFK/Eighth Army SSI Number 80.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B. E. ROSSING
ILT, AGO

Copies furnished:
CG, I Corps (Gp), ATTN: EACICT-T, APO 96358 (Ind only)
CG, I Corps (Gp) Arty, ATTN: EACIAT-C, APO 96202 (Ind only)
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, HQ I Corps (Gp) Artillery, for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 16 OCT 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. R. McLAUGHLIN
COL, AGC
Adjutant General
CORPS ARTY

XXX

TOE 6-501 E
HQ BTRY
HHB, ICA
GO 842 USARPAC
Dtd 16 Dec 68

TOE 6-445 E
8th HCN (SP)
1st Bn, 17th Arty
2nd Bn, 76th Arty
GO 839 USARPAC
Dtd 16 Dec 68

TOE 6-555 G
SQT MSL
3rd Bn, 81st Arty
GO 461 USARPAC
Dtd 6 Jun 69

TOE 6-436 E
175mm GUN
6th Bn, 12th Arty
GO 752 USARPAC
Dtd 20 Nov 68

TOE 6-575 E
TGT ACQ
1st Bn, 25th Arty
GO 753 USARPAC
Dtd 20 Nov 68
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1 Corps Artillery (Group)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May to 31 July 1970.

CG, 1 Corps Artillery (Group)

14 August 1970

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310