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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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THRU: Commanding General
United States Army Support, Thailand
ATTN: THOP-OP
APO SF 96233

Commander in Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-DT
APO SF 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D.C. 20310

1. SECTION 1, OPERATIONS: Significant Activities.

a. The basic missions of the 519th remain unchanged. The battalion moves all perishable Class I cargo in country and clears the ports of Sattahip of all special and sensitive cargo, and all cargo that exceeds the movement capability of the Express Transport Organization (ETO). One significant item during the past quarter has been the increase of retrograde cargo from forward Air Force Bases. In many instances, the amount of retrograde has exceeded the amount of forward moving cargo, and it has been necessary to move empty trailers into the forward areas to handle this retrograde. To allow more flexibility in the distribution of specific missions, the 250th Transportation Company has begun assisting the 53rd Transportation Company in clearing cargo from the ammunition port at Vayana. Formerly this mission was handled exclusively by the 53rd.

b. The last ORL discussed the shifting of all reefer requirements to the 313th Transportation Company in Bangkok. In conjunction with this, all reefer vans not belonging to the 313th, i.e. those on the property book of the 291st Transportation Company in Kort, have been hand receipted to the 313th to facilitate maintenance, control and accountability.

c. During the period 13-29 May, the 313th supported the U.S. Embassy Trade Center 6th Touring Exhibition in Northern Thailand. The support

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consisted of 3 each 6 ton vans and one S&P trailer pulled by 5 ton tractors. Two bobtail tractors were supplied and one mechanic went along to provide a capability for on the spot repairs. The exhibition was held at Chiang Mai and at Nakhon Sawan.

d. During the month of May, another step was taken toward increasing the security of local distribution loads. An agreement was reached with the 635th Support Squadron at Utapao RTAFB and the 562d Maintenance Company at Vayama whereby they assist us in insuring that cargo consigned to them from Deep Water Port or the Depot reaches them in a reasonable amount of time. The 635th is responsible for the Redistribution and Marketing Point at Utapao and also for Warehouse # 11, which is the main storage facility there. The 562d is our main consignee at Camp Vayama. A call is placed to each of these consignees by the local dispatcher at the port or the depot when the load leaves. An estimated arrival time is given to the consignee. The consignee then notifies the dispatcher when the cargo arrives. If the cargo does not arrive shortly after its ETA, the dispatcher is notified of this, and steps are taken to determine what happened to the cargo. A further procedure instituted at Utapao during the first week in June requires all local distribution tractors to report to the Base Transportation Movement Office to be logged in. A representative of that office then gives instructions to the driver on where the load is to be delivered. This assists both the Air Force and the 519th to better control cargo consigned to Utapao. All of these procedures are intended to supplement, and not replace the normal TMO REPISHIP procedures.

e. Early this year a considerable amount of work was done and considerable funds were expended beginning construction on a new Trailer Transfer Point at the Deep Water Port. The ultimate aim was to move the TTP serving the Sattalip area, from its present location at Camp Vayama, to the Deep Water Port. This would allow a more efficient operation by placing the TTP at the center of the port activity. Because of funds problems, work was delayed a number of times, and finally ceased. The TTP at the Deep Water Port is now being used to stage empty trailers only. There is only a gravel surface on the TTP and after 2 days or rain, it becomes a quagmire. The outer edges of the area have been washed away to such an extent that a man can walk under the surrounding fence into the TTP. The abandoning of this construction project has cost this battalion an opportunity to significantly increase the efficiency of its operation.

f. Two new fire fighting procedures were adopted during the month of May.

(1) Fifty each five gallon water cans have been issued to each of the line haul companies in the battalion. These are carried on tractors in convoy. The water is particularly valuable in cooling overheated brake
systems, something a dry type fire extinguisher can't do.

(2) The 505th Transportation Company in Vayama has obtained 2 ton gallon-pressurized water-type fire extinguishers from the Sattahip Area Fire Department. These extinguishers, when properly filled and pressurized with compressed air, will discharge a stream of water approximately 15 feet for a period of about 45 seconds. Special mounting brackets for these extinguishers have been fabricated by the 562d Maintenance Company to allow them to be mounted on the rear of the cab. They have been fabricated in such a manner as to allow their quick removal and installation, so that they can easily be transferred from one tractor to another. These devices are expected to greatly enhance the fire fighting capability of 505th convoys. Thirty of these devices have been placed on requisition.

g. The 291st Transportation Company and the 254th Transportation Detachment in Korat acquired additional real estate in May. The motor pool previously occupied by the 133d Medical Group now belongs to the 291st. This allows for the expansion of the TTP at Korat, providing segregated areas for north bound and south bound cargo. This has significantly increased the efficiency of the TTP operation in Korat.

h. In September, the battalion concurred with a recommendation from the TMD in Bangkok that it (the 519th) be authorized and issued 5 low boy trailers. During the month of June, authority was granted by USARUSTHAI to issue 5 each 25 ton low boys to the battalion. A maintenance inspection of the low boys available at the U.S. Army Depot, Thailand revealed only 2 trailers that were in an acceptable state of repair and serviceability. These trailers were picked up and are now being used to haul cargo.

i. A new parking area has been provided at Udorn RTAFB for convoys travelling to Sakon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom. The new area is a concrete ramp between base supply and the TMD, capable of holding 25 trailers. The area formerly used has been rendered less than adequate by the heavy rains in the Udorn area. In case of larger convoys, the Air Force blocks off a street near the ammunition dump and allows trailers to be parked there. This can accommodate another 50 trailers.

j. On 14 June, a reconnaissance was made of route #213 from Sakon Nakhon to Naka Sarabham. The road surface is excellent and the running time from Korat to Sakon Nakhon would be reduced by 2 hours over the present route of using route #2 to Udorn and then route #22 to Sakon Nakhon. The three major problems in using this route are the lack of a refueling facility anywhere along the route, the winding road through the mountains and the questionable security of the area. At this time there are no plans to initiate the use of this road for convoy traffic.
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k. On 22 June, the battalion started moving liquid oxygen trailers from various Air Force bases to Utapao. The liquid oxygen producing facility at Utapao is non-operational and the air base is being resupplied from other points in country.

l. During the last week in June, the Thai police placed route # 31 off limits to all vehicles 5 ton and larger between the hours of 1500 and 1900 on Saturdays, Sundays and Thai holidays. Route #31 is part of the normal convoy route from Sattahip to Bangkok. A reconnaissance of route #3 from the intersection of routes # 3, 314 and 31s, west into Bangkok was made on 30 June. This portion of route #3 was found acceptable to convoy traffic and will be used during the times that travel is restricted on route #31.

m. The U.S. Army Depot, Thailand has placed officers at the ration distribution points at both Udorn and Sakon Nakhon. This is particularly important at Udorn, where there have been offloading delays in the past. There is now a night QM on duty at the Udorn RDP, to provide a contact for reefers arriving after duty hours and prevent offloading delays. The 519th liaison NCO to the Air Force for convoy coordination, has been given additional responsibility of coordinating with the RDP all reefer shipments into Udorn. This procedure has gone a long way toward eliminating some of the problems that existed in the past with reefer shipments.

n. On 25 June, the 519th had its 27th birthday. This anniversary was celebrated on 27 June in the form of an Organization Day. The day began with an awards ceremony and addresses by the Commanding General, USARSUP-THAI, and the Commanding Officer of the 519th. The themes for the day were fun and competition between the companies. A driving rodeo was conducted in the morning to test the driving skill and knowledge of selected drivers from each unit. The afternoon was packed full of food, beverage and athletic competition. The 53rd Transportation Company proved to be the most versatile of the companies by accumulating the most points in the various contests and won the trophy for Organization Day.

o. On 28 June, the Stool Rover discharged 2 U.S. Army MILVAN's at the Port of Sattahip. The vans came in stuffed with cargo for the U.S. Army Depot, Thailand. They are the first of their type to arrive in Thailand. They were taken on tour to Bangkok, Korat and to 5 Air Force bases and were demonstrated to all interested personnel. The purpose of the demonstrations was to acquaint all future users of MILVAN with its capabilities and characteristics. LTC Vidrick, the battalion commander, was the narrator for the Bangkok demonstration. Captain Carroll, the commanding officer of the 138th Trailer Transfer Detachment took the vans on tour throughout the rest of the country. During the moves to and from the
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various demonstration sites and during the demonstrations, the adaptability of the MILVAN to the 5 ton tractor was tested.

p. On 30 June, the 291st completed a TDY commitment at Sakon Nakhon that started on 18 April. The mission was to provide 5 tractors and 10 trailers TDY to support the 809th Engineer Battalion construction effort on route # 22 from Sakon Nakhon to Nakhon Phanom. The trucks moved materials needed for construction as directed by the engineers.

q. In late June and early July, the project of turning in all M-14 rifles, drawing M16A1 rifles and conducting qualification firing on the new weapons was completed.

r. During the latter part of June and through the entire month of July, the battalion reduced its personnel level to slightly below authorized strength, as a result of the phased reduction of U.S. Forces in Thailand. Prior to this reduction, the battalion was as much as 170 personnel over strength. Throughout this period, only minor problems were encountered. Considering the amount of personnel involved and the short period of time in which to process these personnel, the job performed by the 256th Personnel Service Company was commendable. The result of the approximately 170 personnel rotating, coupled with the normal DEROS of personnel in August and September, is a shortage of mechanics, clerical personnel and Non Commissioned Officers (E-6/E-7). It is anticipated that the months of August, September and October will serve as "fill" months for this battalion.

s. On 1 July, Major James F. Sellar arrived from Fort Eustis, Virginia to assume the duties of Executive Officer. He replaced Major Oreal L. Brown who returned to CONUS for an assignment with MMFS.

t. On 6 May, a recommendation was made to the Director of Transportation Movement Control Center that a study of tonnage reporting procedures employed by both this battalion and the 3 TMO's in country be made, to try and eliminate the unacceptable variances in figures being reported. The study was made and recommendations were adopted by this battalion. On 1 July the new procedures were initiated. The most significant change was the elimination of the 519th use of the term "initial ton" which, to the best of our knowledge, does not exist anywhere else in the Army's transportation system. The term was instituted when the battalion first arrived in country and originally served as a tool for comparing this battalion's work load to ETO's. In the past year, the term proved to be more trouble than it was worth and as of the beginning of July it was no longer in use. A comparison of the 519th statistics for July and the combined figures of the three TMO's shows that the new system works. The figures are close enough to be acceptable. The difference is minor enough to be written off as "spillage".
On 1 July, a change in the concept of delivering perishable cargo to Sakon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom was implemented. Prior to this, Udorn and Sakon Nakhon stockpiled a 10 day level of perishables. With the exception of dairy products, reefer cargo was delivered to these locations every 10 days. Nakhon Phanom was supported from the ration distribution point at Sakon Nakhon. As of 1 July, Sakon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom both had the capacity for stockpiling a fifteen day level of perishables. This eliminated the need to resupply Nakhon Phanom from the RDP at Sakon Nakhon and reduced the reefer runs from Korat to these 2 locations from every 10 days to every 15 days. This is similar to the system that was adopted in February for Takhli and Ubon. If it were not for the need to deliver dairy products to Nakhon Phanom, and reefer cargo to the B Company, 809th Engineer Battalion base camp, halfway up route # 22 between Sakon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom, the reefer van, that is now IDT to Sakon Nakhon, could be removed. Under the present contract with Foremost Dairy, deliveries by Foremost will not be made further east than Sakon Nakhon until the road to Nakhon Phanom is completed. This is not expected until 31 December. Udorn does not yet have sufficient storage facilities to go from a 10 day to a 15 day stockage level. The possibility of moving all reefer cargo to Udorn by rail is also being considered. The Depot people have no objections to this and the feasibility of adopting such a concept is dependent on the availability of rail reefer assets. Periodic rail shipments to Udorn are now being made.

On 10 July, the battalion started hauling 4th class mail from Bangkok to Utapao. The mail moves on Air Force U63-L pallets covered with large plastic sheets. The pallets are loaded on highside S&P trailers for the move to Utapao. There are currently 4 trailer loads per week of this type of cargo. A GI driver or assistant driver is furnished with each truck. There is no requirement for a postal guard on this type of mail.

A reduction in personnel, experienced by the Korat Storage Activity, has hampered that activity's ability to handle inbound reefer cargo. The KSA is now capable of only offloading one reefer per hour. The battalion tries to send reefers to Korat in groups of 3 or 4, for security purposes. If 4 of them arrive at the same time, at least one of them is going to run for a minimum of three hours waiting to be offloaded. A reduction of personnel also limits their ability to operate on a 24 hour basis to receive cargo when this becomes necessary. The long range ramification of this is increased running time on reefer units, further aggravating the reefer maintenance problem.

The last ORLL discussed the collapse of a bridge on route # 23 to Ubon which curtailed line haul activities of the 519th to that location. On 10 July, a reconnaissance was made of that route. The bridge over the Lam Chi river has been repaired and is now in use. The 2 bridges on route
# 23 just west of Ubon that were under construction have been completed. A load of cargo destined for Ubon was sent over the bridges on 13 July and no difficulty was encountered. The battalion is now accepting commitments to Ubon and using route # 23 all the way into Ubon.

The project of consolidating all property books under the battalion S-4 was completed in July.

On 21 and 22 July, a reconnaissance was made of a possible new route from Bangkok to Takhli. The reconnaissance team followed route # 1 west out of Takhli to its intersection with route # 311, south on 311 to Sing Buri where it intersects route # 309, then south on 309 to its intersection with route # 1 midway between Saraburi and Bangkok. The road is excellent, much better than the route presently being used. There is little congestion and a minimum of traffic. However there are two areas which would preclude its use on a regular basis for convoy traffic. The first is route # 311 as it passes over the Chao Phya dam just south of Takhli. This appears to be some sort of sight seeing spot or tourist attraction and there would most likely be some objection to military convoys going through the area. The second problem area is the old capital of Ayutthaya. Route # 309 passes directly through the center of the city and the extreme congestion and narrow streets make movement of convoys through the city a near impossibility. A reconnaissance was also made of route # 3202 from Bankapi to its intersection with route # 304 at Minburi. This road is acceptable for convoy traffic and this might assist in gaining the approval to use route # 304 west of Chachoengsao that was requested in April. Minburi is approximately 10 miles east of the intersection of routes # 304 and # 31. Convoys could turn southwest at Minburi onto route # 3202 and hit the Bangkok bypass at Bankapi, then proceed to route # 31 north of Bangkok and on to Takhli. This reduces by approximately 10 miles the amount of route # 304 that we are asking permission to use.

2. **SECTION 2, LESSONS LEARNED:** Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

   a. **Personnel:** None.

   b. **Intelligence:** A Review of the Provisions of AR 604-5 is needed.

      (1) **OBSERVATION:** The criteria for granting a limited access authorization to classified material for LN's is a bit unrealistic.

      (2) **EVALUATION:** On 26 February, a request for a background investigation on a key LN in this headquarters was submitted. The ultimate aim was to grant her limited access to FOOU and CONFIDENTIAL material. The request
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was returned without action on 17 March because the provisions of paragraph 2-5b, AR 601-5 could not be met. One of the provisions of that paragraph is that access must be necessary in the interests of national security. It is difficult to imagine a case where granting this access to any LN could be shown to be necessary in the interests of national security, and there must certainly be LN's in Thailand who do have this access. It is doubtful whether or not the granting of a security clearance to many GI's is necessary in the interests of national security. There is no problem in controlling the material that this LN would have access to since this battalion handles very little classified material and the LN in question is under the direct supervision of the S3. On 27 May this problem was discussed with the USAR-SUPTHAI Director of Intelligence.

3) RECOMMENDATION: That the stringent criteria for granting an LN a limited access authorization, particularly the one discussed above, be reviewed.

c. Operations:

1) MILVAN May Pose Problems.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the MILVAN tours and demonstrations a number of potential problem areas came to light.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of MILVAN's with the 5 ton tractors that this battalion has, will require an extensive training program for drivers. Prior to taking the vans on tour, 2 all GI crews practiced coupling and uncoupling the vans for days. The first untrained crew that tried to couple the vans could not do so. When backing one van up to the other for coupling, they must be perfectly lined up or the connection will not be made. It takes much practice to line the vans up perfectly. The MILVAN has a high center of gravity which could be even higher depending on the type of cargo that it is stuffed with and the manner in which it is stuffed. One MILVAN, uncoupled, improperly loaded, could be highly susceptible to tipping over while on the road. This susceptibility is practically nil when running coupled. The MILVAN is capable of a 20 ton payload. If two vans are stuffed to capacity, the total weight is more than a 5 ton tractor was designed to pull. On 18 July, a tractor pulling an empty MILVAN was involved in an accident near Khon Kaen. The driver might have avoided the accident had it not been for the strange behavior of the MILVAN once the brakes were applied suddenly. Upon application of the brakes, the van jackknifed very sharply and caused the driver to lose control of his vehicle. The possibility of any empty trailer jackknifing in such a situation is always present, but it is felt that the light weight of the empty van (4,100 lbs) prevented it from holding the road better than it did. Certainly none of these problems are insurmountable but some thought should be given to them prior to
the insertion of MILVAN into country in any great quantity.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That these points be brought to the attention of all potential users of MILVAN.

(2) Procedures for Use of Routes Need Firming Up.

(a) OBSERVATION: There does not appear to be a clear cut method of obtaining permission to use various routes in Thailand.

(b) EVALUATION: For 5 months this battalion has been trying to get a new convoy route to Takhli. The present route is longer than it need be and does not include the best roads that are available. In April, a better and shorter route was found. Permission was requested to use the route. The last ORLL, submitted in May, reiterated the request. The first endorsement to the ORLL, dated 25 June 1970, stated that action was being taken at USARSUPTHAI level to obtain permission to use the route. In July, a modification of the requested route was suggested, to possibly simplify obtaining the permission. No status on the progress of this action has ever been received by this headquarters and there does not appear to be a clear cut procedure to follow in accomplishing this type of action.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That if no clear cut procedure for requesting approval to use new routes exists, one be established. That this battalion be advised of the status of its request.

(3) A Program of Educating Consignees on the Working of the Transportation System Appears to be in Order.

(a) OBSERVATION: The lack of knowledge of the transportation system demonstrated by most users in Thailand is appalling.

(b) EVALUATION: There are a number of recurring problems plaguing the military highway transportation system that are caused by consignees and users. Many users do not know the proper channel for requesting transportation. This battalion constantly receives direct requests for transportation. Some people do not know who or what a TMD is. The consignee is responsible for clearing dunnage and blocking and bracing from the trailer after his cargo has been offloaded. This is seldom done. The consignee is also responsible for replacing sideracks on the trailer. This is seldom done. Rapid offloading of cargo at destination would allow a rapid return of transportation assets to the system. Trailers often sit loaded for days unless the consignee is constantly pushed to get them offloaded. And at least once a week, a consignee, somewhere in country, will refuse to accept a load or a portion of a load because it is damaged or he no longer needs it.
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In many cases, it may be simply that the consignee does not know how the system works or what his responsibilities are. THO II in Korat has taken great pains to correct this in the northern part of the country by publishing 2 excellent newsletters in the past couple of months.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Publish USARSUPTHAI Regulation 55-355, which has been in draft form since August 1969.

(4) The Repair of USATSA Trailers is a Problem.

(a) OBSERVATION: The deplorable condition of trailers coming off of a RO-RO ship causes maintenance problems while the trailers sit in the port.

(b) EVALUATION: In the past, the 138th Trailer Transfer Detachment maintenance team has performed some maintenance on USATSA trailers sitting in the port on a favor basis. The capability to do this is evaporating. A memorandum for agreement, signed on 24 June, tasks the 519th with maintenance on the trailers while they are in transit. Custodial responsibility is transferred upon receipt of the TMD. Every time a RO-RO ship comes in, the same question arises. Who is going to pull maintenance on USATSA trailers sitting in the port? The port has no FILL to support a maintenance program on USATSA trailers, and this battalion does not have a sufficient FILL to support a maintenance program on both its own trailers and on USATSA trailers.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a USATSA liaison team or maintenance contact team be placed at the port with the necessary parts and equipment to perform this maintenance.

d. Organization: None.
e. Training: None.
f. Logistics: None.
g. Communications: The General Electric Communications Net is Still not Operational.

(1) OBSERVATION: The new communications net that was mentioned in the last ORL is still not operational.

(2) EVALUATION: In April, negotiations to obtain the mobile communications sets previously used by the 538th Engineer Battalion, were begun. These are General Electric manufactured items and were to be used to control local distribution operations. Due to a seemingly endless number of
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problems, the net is still not operational. The PRC for the funds to maintain the sets was submitted in April. It was approved in May and the sets were picked up in May. The request for frequency approval was submitted in May and approved on 3 June. Then began a hassle over a $500 fee for the installation of the equipment. This was approved in late June but a transfer of the whole project from one company to another caused further delays. On 26 June Major Forclor, battalion S-3, discussed the situation with Mr. Herb Crommett, sales and service manager for Intelect Inc., the company handling the project. Mr. Crommett stated that because of various types of problems in other areas that took priority and because of a shortage of technically qualified personnel, it would probably be 15 July before installation of the equipment could begin. On 27 June, Mr. Crommett inventoried the equipment, which is secured in the Headquarters Detachment Arms Room. A week later, the equipment was again inventoried by Mr. Crommett and Mr. Frederick A. Graham, Assistant to the Resident Manager for the American Trading Company, Vietnam, who is somehow involved in all of this. Mr. Graham stated that installation of the equipment would begin on 27 July. On 28 July, the technical representative arrived to begin installation of the equipment, only to discover that he did not have the proper hardware to install the mobile sets or the base station. He determined that 7 of the portable units could probably be used if we charged the batteries on them. He then left, saying that he would return when he had the necessary hardware to finish the job. He has not been heard from since. The 7 portables are being used at the present time. Repeated attempts to contact Mr. Graham or Mr. Crommett have failed. The complete unprofessionalism and lack of concern for this project that has been shown thus far is dismaying.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That this firm be given an ultimatum to complete installation of the equipment by 31 August or face cancellation of the contract.

h. Material: There is a Definite Need for a Variety of Equipment in a Battalion of this Type.

(1) OBSERVATION: This battalion has received commitments over the past few months which has required a great variety of cargo carrying vehicles.

(2) EVALUATION: Twelve ton vans to haul mail, 6 ton vans to haul Trade Center goods to Chiang Mai and TRE goods to the forward bases, lowboys to haul heavy engineer equipment and a 10 ton tractor to pull a trailer carrying a 14 ton generator. These are some of the commitments and requirements that have been laid on the battalion since the beginning of the year. This is in addition to requirements to move cargo using its authorized S&F trailers and 7½ ton reefer vans. Being the only military highway transporter in country, it is convenient and sometime essential that we have the capability to move different types and sizes of cargo. For this, a wide variety of equipment is needed.
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(3) RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to augmenting other truck units operating independently, with various types of equipment, affording them a wider lift capability.

1. Other: None.

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Organization Chart

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Commanding
The Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 519th Transportation Battalion is approved with the following annotations:

a. Para 1f(1), (page 2): The cooling of an overheated brake assembly with water will cause expansion of the drum, consequently cracking the brake drum. Factors that cause overheating are incorrect brake adjustments and improper down-grade vehicle operation. Requisitioning of the thirty fire extinguishers is a costly method of avoiding required vehicle maintenance by the organization and necessary operations and checks by the operator.

d. Para 2c(2), (page 8): This headquarters has requested USARPAC to obtain MILVAN technical assistance for Thailand prior to and/or concurrent with the arrival of the first shipment of MILVAN containers. It is anticipated that this assistance will provide guidance on the operating characteristics of MILVANs, as well as maintenance standards and guidelines.

e. Para 2c(3), (page 9): The request for a new convoy route to Takhli is currently at MACTHAI being prepared for submission to the Thai Supreme Command Forward. The procedure for changing convoy routes is for USARSUPTHAI to submit the request to MACTHAI, which in turn submits the request to Thai Supreme Command Forward for approval.
THOP-OP (13 Aug 70) 1st Ind

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system in Thailand. Because of the high rotation rate during the summer months, many consignees are not familiar with the system. The October Transportation Seminar should help rectify this situation.

g. Para 2c(4), (page 10):

(1) This headquarters agrees with the recommendation. A USATSA liaison team or maintenance contract team should be furnished from the USATSA Agency located on Okinawa. The team should be located at the port with the necessary parts and equipment to perform maintenance. An alternative would be to have the USATSA Agency repair the vehicles to a serviceable condition prior to shipment to this command.

(2) It is recognized that responsibility for maintenance of USATSA trailers is not clearly defined, and that neither the 519th Transportation Battalion nor the Terminal Command have the capability to perform this maintenance.

h. Para 2g, (page 10): The delay in the installation of the General Electric commercial radios was attributable to the changeover of sub-contractors for GE in Thailand. Effective 15 July 1970, the American Trading Company, Thailand, LTD, assumed maintenance responsibility, replacing Intellect, Inc., the previous sub-contractor. The new contractor is more responsive than the last and the GE equipment was installed by 8 September 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

T.L. Estes
LT, AGG
Asst AG

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 519th Transportation Battalion (Trk)
for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558       13 OCT 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Developments, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D.D. CLINE
2LT, AGC
Asst AG
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 519th Transportation Battalion**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May to 31 July 70.

CO, 519th Transportation Battalion

**Report Date**

13 August 1970

**TOTAL NO. OF PAGES**

19

**NO. OF REPS**

703193

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