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<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Critical Technology; 10 MAY 1970. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (Army), Attn: FOR-OT-UT, Washington, DC 20310. This document contains export-controlled technical data.</td>
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<td>AUTHORITY</td>
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA (M) (17 Sep 70) FOR OT UT 702153 24 September 1970


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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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(ARMY) ATTN: FOR OT UT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2)

   Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-O, APO 96384
   Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVBQC-DST, APO 96375
   Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310


   a. Reorganization: During this period, the organizational structure of the Depot was changed to increase the efficiency of operations.

      (1) The Quality Assurance Office, Management Office and Safety Office were combined into the Directorate for Management. Later in the Quarter the safety functions were moved to the Troop Command, S-1.

      (2) The Directorate for Services was formed from the old Troop Command S-4.

      (3) The Directorate for Administration was formed from the old Troop Command S-1.

      (4) During the reporting period a Security Guard Company was formed and at a later date the 2nd Security Company (Prov) was added. These two (2) companies have reduced the drain of manpower on the Directorates by pulling all guard duty as well as supplementing storage.

Inclosure
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon for Period
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b. Facilities Division: During the period of 1 February through 30 April 1970, this division constructed two (2) buildings, one (1) maintenance bldg (26' x 170') and one recoup building (60' x 80'), 15000 man hours of R&U work and processed over 5,000,000 gallons of water.

c. Property Book Division: During this period the Property Book Division updated all hand receipts, processed 24 reports of survey, 503 non-expendable and 715 expendable requisitions and turn-ins.

d. Operating Equipment Division: (1) During this reporting period the OED expanded its maintenance capabilities. This expansion encompassed the establishment of two separate maintenance facilities for the performance of operators and organizational maintenance. The operators maintenance area, although not complete, is in operation. When completed this area will include inspection of equipment, lubricating, steam cleaning, battery and tire changing, minor repairs, dispatching and parking of equipment, both organic and non-organic.

(2) The organizational maintenance area has been reorganized to expedite organizational maintenance repairs for automotive and MHE equipment, evacuation of equipment to support facilities and to maintain control on acquisition and usage of repair parts. Also during this reporting period there was approximately an 8% increase of parts on hand. The record of demands increased approximately 15% and the number of line items stocked increased approximately 7%. In addition a comprehensive program was initiated to increase the effectiveness of the OED maintenance program by establishing a thorough TI of equipment prior to dispatch. Two programs were initiated to decrease deadlined rates and unsatisfactory ratings on roadside OSH spot checks:

(a) Instruction courses were designed to make supervisors and operators more aware of their responsibilities and proper care of vehicles.

(b) A Material Readiness Evaluation team made roadside safety checks of all vehicles assigned to USAD, QN.

e. Directorate for Transportation:

(1) Linehaul: During February, March, and April, the backlog of goods for linehaul increased from 920 S/T on 1 February to 3231 S/T on 1 May 1970. A total of 37,681 S/T were moved via linehaul during this period. Additional locations are now being served by motor that were formerly surface (water) transportation locations. Tuy Hoa and Chu Lai are regular linehaul locations and Da Nang has received some motor transportation from this location. The increased backlog is a result of this increased requirement on the resource.
(2) Water movement: During February, March, and April, the backlog of cargo booked for sea movement decreased from 490 S/T on 1 February to 312 S/T on 1 May 70. During this period a total of 19,394 S/T were moved.

(3) Local Haul: Local unit pick-up of cargo is working quite satisfactorily. There was an adjustment period immediately following the pick-up requirement for units within a 25 mile radius of Qui Nhon.

f. Class I Division: During the past quarter the Class I Division has established a shipping point and receiving point making it much easier to control both shipping and receiving. It was noted during the past quarter that many pallets of supplies received were broken and had to be re-palletized due to the use of non-metallic strapping instead of metallic strapping. It has been recommended to Directorate of Food, HQ, 1st Log Cond. that the use of non-metallic strapping be discontinued and the use of metallic strapping be continued giving the palletized supplies much better support. The Class I Division has completed the Long Range and Short Range Goals. In the month of April, two (2) warehouses were emptied of supplies to be turned over to the Officers' and NCOs' Association for the purpose of moving out of Camp Granite. Twelve (12) reefer boxes were turned over to the ARVN's for removal from the Class I Division.

g. Customer Assistance:

(1) The procedures of the hand carry system were reviewed thoroughly by the Customer Assistance Branch of Stock Control. This was due to the abuse of the system by MRE and Liaison personnel. The processing of hand carry requisitions was designed to assist units in obtaining mission essential items which were unobtainable through normal supply channels. MRE and Liaison personnel had been hand carrying many items which were not mission essential and obtainable through normal supply channels. The Director of Supply initiated the policy of allowing MRE and Liaison personnel to submit twenty hand carry requests per day and receiving ten material release orders. Since that time the Director of Supply has lowered the number of material release orders to five.

(2) In accordance with 1st Log Reg 711-16, the Field Stock Record Support Program has progressed considerably over the past three months. Many units have been added to the program and all units are being advised as to the proper procedures. Units which are eligible under field stock record support are being notified the program is available at USAD QN.
(3) Retrograde thru-put procedures have been revised to acquire disposition instruction for 1st Log units on a stepped up basis. Disposition instruction for excess items received from 1st Log units are being sent directly to the units from USAD QN. Divisional units continue to receive disposition instructions by normal thru-put procedures.

h. Location Survey: A phase location survey of USAD Qui Nhon was initiated 9 Feb 70. The survey will be completed by 8 June 1970. There are 8 cycles in the schedule with a cycle beginning every 15 days. In each cycle approximately 17,000 to 20,000 FSN-locations will be surveyed. Reliability checks are performed by Quality Assurance to measure the accuracy and reliability of the survey performed. The minimum acceptable level of accuracy has been established at 95%. The survey is proceeding 27 days ahead of schedule.

i. Special Inventories: Special inventories were conducted and data furnished to Stock Managers in a timely manner. Some difficulty has been encountered in researching items in Areas 44, 45, 48, and 91 due to unidentified locations and stock. 5,494 lines were inventoried since 1 February 1970. Percentage of recounts have averaged 1.5%.

j. Denial Inventories: Material Release Denial (MRD) (DD1348-1) processing by L&I was discontinued on 2 Mar 70 and reassumed by Storage Operations, however the weekly S76A (Denial Inventories) continue to reflect a high rate of "Finds". Over 50% of "Finds" have been identified in stock locations which were recently added to the Master Locator printout, but not posted to the Master Locator tape.

k. Cyclic Inventory:

(1) Project Count completed two lots during the period. A third lot was suspended after completion of 1st and 2nd counts for preparation of Project Cross-Count. Lot C was completed in January 1970, but management data (Over/Under Listing) was not available at the time of report preparation.

(2) The average length of freeze period has been 30 days and is attributed to the low priority for machine time (priority 5) which results in late receipt of output. One consequence of the low priority is that scheduling of Project Count is impractical. Also it hindered attempts to control extreme work fluctuations, distorting planned internal work schedules and planned personnel utilization.

(3) Personnel in Project Count have been utilized in location surveys, which has resulted in that phase proceeding far ahead of schedule. Additionally personnel have been utilized on exception processing and special inventories.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 30 April 1970, ECS CSFOR-65 (R-2)

1. 506VB: 21,892 exceptions (6NA, 6NL and 6 LL) were processed during the period. 6NL and 6LL exceptions averaged 800-900 lines per week during January and early February. However that number has declined by 50%. The following are results of exception processing to date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Available</th>
<th>No Location</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Available</th>
<th>No Location</th>
<th>No FSN</th>
<th>Errors</th>
<th>Replenishment</th>
<th>Duplicate</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6NA</td>
<td>7486</td>
<td>3837</td>
<td>3630</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6NL</td>
<td>4005</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>4296</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6LL</td>
<td>6091</td>
<td>1039</td>
<td>5038</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

m. Locator Service: Locator service has been timely and is provided on a priority basis as follows: Red Ball, customer hand-carried and ICCV released requisitions, update of Master Locator (ZLI), customer liaison requests for location surveys and location requests for special inventories.

Personnel status of the depot as of 1 February and 30 April 1970 is as indicated below:

(1) 1 February 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers &amp; WOs</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>2094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA Civilian</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Nationals</td>
<td>1202</td>
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</table>

30 April 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORIZED</th>
<th>ASSIGNED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers &amp; WOs</td>
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<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Nationals</td>
<td>1202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above assigned figures include all personnel assigned to the Depot.

(2) Additional authorizations are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>90th HMS Co.</th>
<th>2nd SCD Co.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVCA-QND-CN
10 May 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon for Period
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(3) The following authorized spaces were surrendered to US Army Support
Command, Qui Nhon for their use:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>PDO</th>
<th>Security Company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CC&amp;S</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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As in the past, the depot was visited by many distinguished persons. Prominent visitors during the period were:

(1) Lieutenant General Joseph M. Heiser, DCSLOG, DA.
(3) Major General Walter J. Woolwine, CG, 1st Logistical Command.
(4) Brigadier General Albert E. Hunter, CG, US Army Support Command, QN.
(5) Brigadier General Hugh A. Richeson, DOG, 1st Logistical Command.
(6) Brigadier General James C. Smith, ADC, 101st Airborne Division (Air).

Several key personnel changes took place during the period:

(1) Lieutenant Colonel Paul E. Hack was reassigned from Directorate for
Retrograde to the newly formed Directorate for Management on 17 February 1970.

(2) Lieutenant Colonel William E. Denison was assigned as Director of
Retrograde on 17 February 1970.

(3) Lieutenant Colonel Albert W. Davis was assigned Troop Commander on
11 April 1970, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Edward T. Flash who was reassigned
to 593rd GP Logistical Support Activity at An Khe.

(4) Lieutenant Colonel Coyle H. O'Neal Jr., Depot Executive Officer,
departed for CONUS on 14 Feb 70.

(5) Lieutenant Colonel Henry J. Holden, Troop Command Executive Officer,
departed for CONUS on 8 Mar 70.

(6) Lieutenant Colonel Ralph L. Back, Deputy Troop Commander for Trans-
portation departed for CONUS on 7 Mar 70.

(7) Major Charles B. Russell was assigned as Director of Administration
on 12 Mar 70.
(8) Major Loy J. Zanbrowicz was assigned as Troop Command Executive Officer on 15 Mar 70.

(9) Major Carlton H. Moore was assigned as the S-2/3 officer on 10 Apr 70.

(10) Major Richard B. Goudie, Chief Qui Nhon Storage Branch, departed for CONUS on 25 Feb 70.


(12) Command Sergeant Major Robert Lunceford was assigned as the Depot Command Sergeant Major on 25 April 1970.

2. Lessons Learned: Commanders observations, evaluation and recommendations:

   a. Personnel:

      (1) Personnel Supervision:

         (a) Observation: A strong chain of command within Directorate for Services did not exist. Immediate supervisors were lax in supervision of their personnel.

         (b) Evaluation: This ineffective leadership resulted in a poorly organized operation with little control of their personnel.

         (c) Recommendation: An effective and definite line of responsibility has been established. Officers and NCO's must continue to strive, aggressively for better supervision of their men. The end results of this being a high standard of discipline and morale. Each officer and NCO must continue to take an interest in the morale and welfare of their personnel to accomplish a high standard of discipline, morale and respect.

      (2) Local National Survey Teams:

         (a) Observation: Local National (LN) survey teams have proven to be a valuable asset to the Location & Inventory Division (L&I) in repetitive type work.

         (b) Evaluation: LN survey teams were implemented with a supervisor-worker ratio of 1-3 during the initial phase of training and instruction. Initially work progress was very limited and slow; through constant supervision, instruction and examples they are making a significant contribution to this branch. Generally they are quite accurate with continual supervision. Most significant result is that questions are asked.
AVCA-QND-GM
10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2)

(c) Recommendation: That local national personnel continue to fill the gap created by the loss of military personnel. However a generally high supervisor-worker ratio of 1-6 must be maintained.

(3) LN Personnel Management,

(a) Observation: In early January, 20 LNs were transferred to the Location and Inventory Division to assist in phase location surveys, maintenance of the Master Locator printout and to assume some clerical positions.

(b) There were 37 LNs assigned to this division without meaningful workload to fully justify or utilize the personnel. Seven employees were returned to Storage Division and meaningless clerical positions, such as assistants to exception processing clerks, were abolished. Interviews were conducted with selected LNs to identify those qualified or having potential for clerical positions, such as typist. Four employees have thus far completed English Courses sponsored by Civilian Personnel Office (CPO). However, the enthusiasm and desire of employees to gain knowledge has at best been minimal.

(c) Recommendation: Local National employees showing most interest and initiative will be recommended for CPO sponsored courses that are applicable to the work performed in this division.

(4) Strength of Personnel.

(a) Observation: Current strength of the L&I Division is: 2 Off, 1 Civ, 62 EM and 29 LN. The authorized (MTDA P5W030AA03, dtd 2 Dec 69) is: 1 Off, 1 Civ, 103 EM, and 46 LN. The projected loss through 31 Jul 70 is 1 Off and 17 EM. The most serious loss will be two key NCOs in grade E-7 and E-6, leaving one E-6 for the entire division.

(b) Evaluation: Initially guard commitments greatly hampered operations, but the establishment of the Provisional Guard Company has partially eliminated the draw down of manpower. Reassignment of functions, responsibilities and consolidations will partially offset manpower loss and still be able to perform the mission. Local National employees are being cross trained as much as possible to assume positions vacated by military personnel lost through normal rotation.

(c) Recommendation:

1. Continual evaluation of personnel utilization.
AFCA-QH8-1H

10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 30 April 1970, ECS CSFOR-65 (R-2)

1. That the provisional Guard Company assume all guard commitments (Tank Farm #1).

2. Superior Performance awards are considered for 2 LNs in recognition of outstanding performance and as goal for others to reach.

3. Continual praise and reward such as a full day off for extra-ordinary performance of duty.

(5) 3SVN.

(a) Observations: The majority of soldiers assigned to this depot are young and inexperienced in supply procedures. Their only training has been the short supply courses offered at Ft. Lee, Va. In rare instances this depot does receive personnel who have, in addition to having been assigned at Ft. Lee, gone through the Depot Training course at the Atlanta General Depot, Forest Park, Ga. This training serves as a catalyst in applying fundamental supply procedures to practical application. Nevertheless helpful, the aforementioned training is hardly sufficient to prepare the newly assigned personnel as item managers at depot level. In addition, the 3SVN system is unique to Vietnam; therefore, it takes new personnel four to six months to become competent in his position.

(b) Evaluation: This prior training is not sufficient to prepare depot supply personnel for the work loads assigned them in this rapidly moving combat zone.

(c) Recommendations:

1. That more stateside depots take on the courses offered at the Atlanta General Depot to prepare military personnel (Officers and enlisted men) for complete depot operations and procedures.

2. That the Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command set up a central two week training course in the 3SVN system to train all new arrivals to be assigned in Depot positions in South Vietnam.

b. Operations:

(1) Motor Stables

(a) Observation: Lack of interest and supervision caused an inefficient operation for motor stables.

(b) Evaluation: Officers and NCO's who are immediate supervisors of equipment operators did not show any interest in the overall maintenance performed.
Recommendations: Supervisory personnel having operational control of equipment are now responsible for insuring that motor stables are performed.

(2) Hand Carry Requisitions

(a) Observation: MRE and Liaison personnel detract from the overall Depot efficiency and in cases have proven to be a detrimental force acting upon the Depot.

(b) Evaluation: Although MRE and Liaison personnel solve some of the ills of their own units, the problems they create for USAD, QN, are numbering rapidly.

1. Their counts are not always accurate.

2. They sometimes count items that have been inventoried by L&I, the commodity manager, or added to the ABF by Central Receiving. This causes many multiple inventories.

3. They sometimes pick up stock already committed to other units.

4. They fail to use the normal supply system in obtaining supplies.

5. Some MRE and Liaison tend to use depot as a storage activity.

(c) Recommendation: To improve depot efficiency and overall efficiency and responsiveness, Depot should try to do away with the post-post procedures and go to pre-post as much as possible. It has been noted that with a decrease of hand carry requisitions, an improvement in the accuracy of the ABF can be seen, and greatly decreases the amount of exceptions, as well as decreasing the MBD rate. Hand carries should be used only for mission essential items unobtainable through normal channels and combat essential items where time is a factor.

(3) Location Survey.

(a) Observation

1. Deterioration of locator accuracy is directly attributable to improper storage procedures by the warehouseman in failure to prepare location add/delete cards on receipt and/or movement of stock.

2. Area Locator Files have not been maintained by all storage areas and add/delete suspense files are not maintained.
3 Bin replenishment practices are not uniform nor are the notification
tags properly placed on the bin locations resulting in distortion of the
locator file.

4 SO6VB is an extremely valuable tool to gauge the accuracy of the
warehouseman in adding and/or deleting entries from the Master Locator File.

(b) Evaluation:

1 Indications that locator files are not updated or maintained are:

a The large number of 6NA exceptions. In January 1970 33,654 6NA
exceptions were generated of which 48.7% FSN-locations contained assets. On
5 Apr 70, 51,252 exceptions were generated of which 7,486 were processed. Of
the 7,486 exceptions that were reconciled, 51.3% FSN-locations contained assets.

b The large number of additions and deletions prepared during location
surveys. Of 19 areas surveyed 29,790 deletions and 34,634 additions have been
made to the file from a total of 128,751 FSN-locations surveyed.

2 Establishment of a Master Location system and adherence to proper
replenishment procedures will greatly reduce the number of exceptions from
SO6VB as well as increase the accuracy of the locator file.

3 An accurate locator file will decrease the number of denials, special
inventories, exceptions and provide a firm data base on which all supply action
of USAD is dependant. Regardless of the number of complete surveys and re-
surveys, locator accuracy will deteriorate without conscientious follow up
and strict adherence to proper storage procedures by the warehouseman.

(c) Recommendations:

1 That proper location procedures be emphasized to the warehouseman.

2 That each storage area supervisor perform a selected location survey
of their areas upon receipt of the weekly updated Area Locator printout and
additionally purge the add/delete suspense files.

3 That the frequency of complete surveys be continued until the minimum
acceptable level of locator accuracy is achieved, then the frequency may be
reduced to once every 60 days as prescribed in 1st Log Comd 3SVN.

4 That location surveys be continued by L&I; however, Quality Assurance
(QA) Reliability checks be performed in an expeditious manner so that the
results of survey can be provided C/Storage for review and necessary action.
AVCA-QND-GM

10 May 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R-2)

(4) Cyclic Inventory

(a) Observation:

1. Cyclic inventories continue to fall behind schedule due to low priority for machine time. The freeze of lots D and E continued for 30 days as a result of delays in machine processing time and receipt of output from ADP.

2. Physical inventories are hampered by non-recognition of the freeze group by warehousemen and non-compliance with basic storage procedures relative to closed inventories.

3. Inventory reliability checks are not performed following lot inventories as prescribed in 1st Log Comd 3SVN.

(b) Evaluation:

1. Substantial delays have resulted from the lack of machine time due to low priority (priority 5) for Project Count. The initial output for lot F was received 3 days after the effective freeze date.

2. Extended scheduling of Cyclic Inventories are impractical due to the low priority for machine time.

3. Non-recognition of FSC groups undergoing inventory (warehouses 53, 54, and 55) and non-compliance with basic storage procedures relative to closed inventories can only result in distorted inventory balances and final data base. Document Control has yet to receive suspended MROs (for designated FSC groups undergoing inventory) from warehouses during a freeze period. Back logged MROs, prepared prior to the effective freeze date, continue to be stock picked and inventory balances have been distorted.

(c) Recommendation:

1. That cyclic inventories have a higher priority for machine time to establish meaningful extended schedules for planning, coordination, personnel utilization and controlling internal work fluctuations. The result will be accurate counts with minimum freeze periods.

2. That QA perform inventory reliability checks.

3. That as a minimum the storage activity perform the following action prior to inventory start date:
a. The Central Receiving facility must suspend all receipt document processing for the designated FSC group.

b. Receipts for subject FSC group should be held in a predesignated staging area. Should it prove impractical to stage some receipts, e.g., large SeaLand shipments, they may be forwarded to the appropriate storage area.

c. It is the responsibility of the Central Receiving facility to mark each individual container "NEW RECEIPTS, DO NOT INVENTORY-VOID AFTER ___________", for subject FSC group.

d. Cease all warehousing for subject FSC group immediately.

e. Completely identify each item to be inventoried by insureing that bin tags and location placards are legible and correct.

f. Police the stock locations and discard all empty boxes.

g. Insure that new receipts for the FSC group are marked "NEW RECEIPTS, DO NOT INVENTORY-VOID AFTER ___________", and are placed in a separate holding area.

h. Flag all stock locations (3x5 card or wood Red Arrows) to identify that stock is frozen.

i. Stock pick all Material Release Orders.

j. On the effective freeze date forward remaining MRO's for subject FSC group to Document Control Branch.

k. Red Ball and high priority requisitions, authorized by the Chief, Stock Control Division, will be processed throughout the freeze period.

l. Complete processing of all ZLI add/delete cards.

m. All cards must be forwarded to ADP 2 days prior to effective freeze date.

(3) Denial Inventories.

(a) Observation: Stock finds for suspected denials averaged 23.3% during the reported period.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2)

(b) Evaluation: When MRD (DD1348-1) were being processed by L&I it was determined that the major reason for denials was the failure to properly search recorded stock locations, indicating possibly a failure to transfer MRDs. Additionally up to 50% of finds were found in stock locations which were recently posted to the Master Locator printout (ZLI).

(c) Recommendation: That all MRD (DD1348-1) be screened across the Master Locator printout prior to final disposition as a denial. The L&I Branch will release all DD 1348-1 to the warehouseman on the day received.

(6) Red Ball Referrals:

(a) Observations: The processing time for Red Ball referrals has improved considerably during the reporting period. A steady decrease in processing time has resulted from increased emphasis and an increase in Red Ball personnel. All referrals received are now being processed in less than twelve hours and status is made available to ADP for transceiving to the USAICCV prior to the close of business each day.

(b) Evaluation: This decrease in processing time is due to increased command emphasis and assistance and the Red Ball Branch being brought up to its authorized strength in personnel.

(c) Recommendation: The Red Ball Branch should maintain full strength in order to perform the mission properly.

(7) O2 Hi-Fri Referrals

(a) Observation: Red Ball Branch has been tasked to initiate a system where-by O2 priority referrals are expedited in the same manner as a Red Ball referral.

(b) Evaluation: No written guideline has been established and the system is being set up by Red Ball personnel to conform to established Red Ball procedures. This system could be initiated and handled by the Document Control Branch.

(c) Recommendation: The O2 referral program should be shifted to the Document Control Branch after a transition period to allow one clerk from DCO to be trained by Red Ball personnel. This would realign the two branches into their respective duties.
Subject: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2)

(8) Stock Management Branch:

(a) Observations: All supply records are maintained on microfilm which requires the use of microfilm readers for all daily operations. The electrical power supply and type of building used by Stock Management is not conducive to efficient operations.

(b) Evaluations: The building available for use by Stock Management is a barracks type, with upper half, both sides covered with screening for ventilation. If boarded solid (as stateside) the combination of heat and humidity would make for unbearable conditions. The semi-open state of the building allows for a large amount of dust to be blown into the interior, collecting on machinery and office type furniture. This necessitates wasted hours of cleaning, dusting and maintenance of office machinery. In addition the building was constructed as a troop type building with inexpensive electrical wiring and a low power transformer. To facilitate for increased lighting demands many neon, two tube lighting fixtures were added which drains the electrical output. Each microfilm reader requires 115 watts of power; as each one is operated the available current wattage drops 5 watts. The combination of environmental conditions and low electrical output under the mechanized system cuts the operating efficiency of the stock management branch by at least one third.

(c) Recommendations: That the required technicians (electricians and microfilm reader maintenance personnel) be required to survey Bldg #TH608 for requirements necessary for efficient mechanized operations.

(9) Retrograde of Project Fringe assets to Okinawa:

(a) Observations: The Directorate for Retrograde shipped 15,578 lines of Project Fringe excess during the reporting period, utilizing both Sea Land vans and RG/RG trailers. Difficulty in MRO control was experienced although coordination with the D/Sup resolved all problems. The most significant problem encountered was the delay involved in shipment of supplies from the Storage Staging area to the Retrograde packing shed.

(b) Evaluation: The delay in shipping time to the Retrograde packing shed was due to the fact that a considerable number of lines involved were either stored in two or more locations or were packed both in warehouses in broken lots and also in open storage areas. Since only one MRO was cut for each line, needless delay, and often loss of the MRO resulted.

(c) Recommendations: That in the future, for all excess runs such as Project Fringe, a separate MRO for each location be cut by D/ADP.

(10) HBO Distribution:

(a) Observations: In the past, the number 7 copy of the HBO was placed inside the shipping containers originating in the Retrograde yard.

(b) Evaluation: Quite often the number 7 copy is not legible, and since this copy is used by the receiving activity to account for the supplies, both the FSN and quantity could be erroneously recorded.

(c) Recommendations: The number 2 copy which is very legible is now placed inside the shipping container and the number 7 copy is secured to the exterior. By utilizing this method, if all copies of the HBO but the number 2 copy are lost, the correct FSN and quantity will still be recorded correctly on the receiving activity records, utilizing the number 2 copy only.

(11) Troop Command:

(a) Observation: Tactical Operation Center for all elements of Depot, Troop Command, Security Police and Compound Complex Delta have been consolidated in one location.

(b) Evaluation: Present system of consolidation is most efficient since it instantly provides a central command control element to all units under the command of the CO, USAD QM but still is not protected from small arms or indirect weapons fire.

(c) Recommendation: In order to comply with current directives, the Tactical Operation Center should be hardened, however this cannot be accomplished until a system of fans and/or air condition units are installed.

c. Training:

(1) Observation: All training is conducted on an OJT basis through all levels of supervision and is continuous.

(2) Evaluation: Standard procedures have been completed for all operations and activities within L&I. Changes to procedures and instructions are meted out through proper supervisory chains insuring uniform practices.

(3) Recommendation: That proper utilization of levels of supervision for training and instruction be continuous. That all procedures be bilingual.

d. Intelligence:

(1) During this reporting period enemy activity has been exceptionally light.
AVCA-QND-GM

10 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-2)

(a) The Long My installation sustained four (4) incidents of sniper fire.

(b) Company "B" in Qui Nhon received two attacks of indirect weapons fire.

(2) During the period the CCD generated yellow alert conditions from grey on eleven (11) occasions.

(3) There were two (2) practice alerts during which all units responded well.

c. Logistics: None.

d. Organization:

(1) Observation: Assumption of new functions and added responsibilities can be done quickly and efficiently when authority and area responsibilities are properly delegated.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) The early turmoil of assuming functions have been eliminated through establishment of procedures and efficient utilization of NCOs.

(b) Approximately 95% of all additions and deletions to the Master File are made by the storage activity. The Central Receiving activity will be able to process receipts quickly if a current updated file is readily accessible. Potential denials (MRD) may be quickly reviewed across an accessible file. Additionally the activity that is most dependent on the file should control, maintain and have most appreciation for its accuracy.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) That NCO's be utilized efficiently and effectively.

(b) That the Master Locator be maintained by Storage Division.

g. Other: None.

WILLIAM J. WHelan
Colonel, ORD
Commanding
TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA-00-0,
APO 96381


2. Pertinent comments follow:
   a. Reference item concerning personnel supervision page 8, para 2a(1). Concur. Action taken is adequate and no further action is required by this or higher headquarters.
   b. Reference item concerning local national survey teams page 8, para 2a(2). Concur. Reductions of military personnel will necessitate continued utilisation of local nationals.
   c. Reference item concerning local national personnel management page 9, para 2a(3). Concur. CPO should conduct sufficient courses to train local nationals. Additional high skill local nationals will be needed to maintain the supervisor-worker ratio.
   d. Reference item concerning strength of personnel page 9, para 2a(4). Concur. The Provisional Guard Co has assumed all guard commitments at Tank Farm #1.
   e. Reference item concerning 3SVN page 10, para 2a(5). Concur. Training in the 3SVN system could significantly increase the effectiveness of newly-assigned personnel. Comment should be forwarded to higher headquarters for action.
   f. Reference item concerning motor stables page 10, para 2b(1). Concur. Assignment of responsibility should improve maintenance and operations.
   g. Reference item concerning hand carry requisitions page 11, para 2b(2). Concur. Standard supply procedures and pre-post transactions should be utilised to the maximum extent. Hand carry requisitions should be used only for mission essential and combat essential releases.
   h. Reference item concerning location survey page 11, para 2b(3). Concur. Action taken is adequate and no further action is required.
1. Reference item concerning cyclic inventory page 13, para 2b(4).
   Non-concur. The priorities for machine time are established by the Data
   Processing Directorate in accordance with guidance from higher headquarters.
   Further, machine time is available for processing these requirements.
   Recommend closer coordination between elements of USAD, QN. Concur in
   other comments.

j. Reference item concerning denial inventories page 14, para 2b(5).
   Concur. Action taken is adequate and no further action is required.

k. Reference item concerning Red Ball referrals page 15, para 2b(6).
   Concur. No further action is required by this or higher headquarters.

l. Reference item concerning high priority referrals page 15,
   para 2b(7). Concur. No further action is required by this or higher
   headquarters.

m. Reference item concerning stock management branch page 16,
   para 2b(8). Concur. Technical assistance is required. CO, USAD, QN
   has been advised of the proper procedure for obtaining an inspection
   by qualified technicians.

n. Reference item concerning retrograde of Project Fringe assets
   page 16, para 2b(9). Concur.

o. Reference item concerning MRO distribution page 17, para 2b(10).
   Concur. A legible copy of this document is essential when shipping
   retrograde cargo. No further action is required.

p. Reference item concerning troop command page 17, para 2b(11).
   Concur. USASUPCOM, QN regulations and SOP state that TOC's will be
   hardened. This is inspected by the Deputy Installation Defense
   Coordinator. Air conditioning and/or fans are a must. It is the
   responsibility of the unit to initiate a work request. Tactical TOC's
   are priority one for air conditioning.

q. Reference item concerning training page 17, para 2c. Concur.
   Action taken is adequate and no further action is required.

r. Reference item concerning intelligence page 17, para 2d. This
   item should have been placed in para 1.

s. Reference item concerning organisation page 13, para 2f. Concur.
   Clear delineation of authority and responsibility is essential.
3. The report is considered adequate as modified by the above comments.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. E. SHIBLEY
CPT, AG
Assistant Adjutant General

CF:
USAD, QN
AGSFOR, DA w incl
AVCA CO-MH (13 Jun 1970) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon for Period Ending
30 April 1970, RCS CEFOR-65 (R2)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, US
Army Depot, Qui Nhon for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 is forwarded.

2. Due to closing of this headquarters, comments can not be staffed. Normal
staffing will be done by Headquarters, USARV.

[Signature]

JOHN B. RITTER
CPT, Ordc
CO, 15th MHD
AVHGC-DST (10 May 70) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon for Period
Ending 30 April 1970, RCS GFOR-65 (R-2)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96575 6 JUL 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFCP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
   for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, US Army
   Depot, Qui Nhon and comments of inquiring headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "3SVN7", page 10, paragraph a(5): Concur:
      Training and experience of insetting replacements continues to be a problem
      for command depots. The subject has been presented to the Department of the
      Army IG Team during a recent inspection of the 1st Logistical Command.
      Correspondence has been exchanged on numerous occasions at command level on
      this subject and will continue. Until the problem is solved and adequate
      courses are established at CONUS training locations, emphasis must be
      maintained on OJT and class room training at SUPCOM and/or depot level.
      Action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

   b. Reference item concerning "Cyclic Inventory," page 13, paragraph
      2b(4): Nonconcur. The higher priorities must be limited to the basic ADF
      mission - the efficient operation of the Standard Supply System (3S) including
      the production of basic supply cycles. After the 3S ADF requirements are met
      the Support Command and Depot commanders are able to complete other require-
      ments such as cyclic inventories. It is in this area of scheduling where the
      depot commander must exercise extreme care to insure that applications are
      produced in the order of their importance to the command. ADF applications
      which are unique to the USAD and Support Command, Qui Nhon and which are
      placed ahead of cyclic inventory should be compared to determine their
      relative importance. Unit has been so advised.

   c. Reference item concerning "Retrograde of Project Fringe Assets to
      Okinawa," page 16, paragraph g(9): Nonconcur. The recommendation noted in
      paragraph g(9)(c) would not be practical, considering the method of bulk
      storage employed by three USARV Depots, to include USAD, Qui Nhon. The
      technique of noting each location within a bulk storage site for a particular
      stockage item, is not considered compatible with the recommendations made.
      The locator tape indicates as many as 107 locations in some cases for one PSN,
      when in reality, only one to three physical storage sites are being utilized.
      Additionally, numerous locations are consumed due to the bulk of the item,
      i.e., napkins, tires, toilet paper, etc. The recommendation contained in
      paragraph g(9)(c) would result in numerous unnecessary ARO's being generated.
by AIP sections. It would also create additional control problems and produce misleading logistical information and statistics to commanders evaluating depot performance and capabilities. MRO's for Retrograde items must continue to be generated by AIP section as established by the present system, and intense coordination must be maintained by both Retrograde and Storage Divisions. The control of Retrograde Division open MRO's must be maintained by the Storage Division in accordance with the capabilities of Retrograde Division to process and prepare stock for shipment. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C. J. Winter
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CF:
HQ, USA Spt Cmd, Qui Nhon
HQ, USA Depot, Qui Nhon
GPOP-DT (10 May 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Depot, Qui Nhon, for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 13 AUG 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed with the following comments.

2. Reference paragraph 2a(5), page 10: The recommendation that more stateside depots take on the course offered at Atlanta General Depot - Concur with recommendation; however, efforts in the past to expand the program to all short tour areas have not been successful. On 10 Jun 70, a letter was submitted to DCSPER DA requesting expansion of this program to Korea, but to date no reply has been received. Difficulty has been experienced in keeping this program going for a number of reasons such as:

   a. The gaining command must fund for TDY costs of the personnel while at school.

   b. DA has had considerable difficulty in obtaining realistic requirements from USARV in order to insure proper input to the class.

   c. All personnel completing the course do not end up in depots upon arrival in USARV.

   d. The program is restricted to certain enlisted parts specialist MOS's and does not cover all facets of depot operations.

3. Recommend that CONARC fund for TDY costs rather than the gaining command. This headquarters will follow-up on this subject with USARV.

4. Regarding recommendation that 1st Logistical Command establish a central 2-week course in SVN, USARV did not comment on this recommendation. However, information indicates subject course has been and still is being conducted in USARV, but is under consideration for discontinuance due to current

There may be a lack of communication by operating personnel in-country or the course may have been recently discontinued. Correspondence will be initiated to determine current status of the course.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

D.D. CLINE
2LT, AGC
Asst AG
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Depot, Qui Nhon**

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.

CO, US Army Depot, Qui Nhon

**REPORT TITLE:**

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Depot, Qui Nhon

**DATE:** 10 May 1970

**NO. OF PAGES:** 29

**SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY:**

DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310