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**TO:**
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**FROM:**
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**AUTHORITY**
AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980
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Distribution statement A

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AGAM-P (M) (3 Mar 67) FOR OT

8 March 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
a/s

DISTRIBUTION:
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US Army Ordnance School

DISTRIBUTION NO FOREIGN WITHOUT APPROVAL OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT (ARMY) ATTN: FOR OT UT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
10TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TERMINAL)
APO 96312

AVCA CRB-P-10-00

5 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS GSFOR-65)

TO: Commanding Officer
    124th Transportation Terminal Command
    APO 96312

In compliance with USARV Regulation Number 870-2 submitted herewith is the Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1966, with one inclosure, Capability vs Performance Study.

TEL: CRB 152

2 Incl

GEORGE ZEBBUSEK
LTC, TC
Commanding

I
1. During the period covered by this report there were significant changes in the mission responsibility and in units assigned to the battalion. First, the battalion continued its dual role, that of a battalion headquarters for attached units and that of staffing the headquarters, Port Command (Provisional). The Commanding Officer of the 124th Terminal Command "A" arrived on 5 September with a small advanced party and assumed command of the port shortly thereafter. With the arrival of the balance of his unit, in early October, the role of staffing the port headquarters was gradually assumed by the 124th Terminal Command "A". Secondly, on 1 August, the 36th and 39th Transportation (Truck) Battalions assumed operational control of the five truck companies previously attached to this battalion. This left the battalion with four attached terminal service units. During September two additional terminal service companies arrived, the 410th and the 51st which were attached to the 10th battalion. It is significant to note that both of the new units arrived without any material handling equipment with them or following them. Of further significance is the fact that many men in the 410th arrived without essential individual mess equipment in their possession or steel helmets. This created a temporary problem in feeding the 320 men and in personal cleanliness of the men inasmuch as the area the unit moved into was not equipped with dining or washing facilities. It appears that this unit was staged at one post in CONUS with much of their individual equipment shipped from another post. Certainly an undesirable movement from the standpoint of the receiving command in a combat area.

2. During the second week of August a third pier was opened at Cam Ranh Bay providing berthing space for the discharge of six ocean going...
vessels. The new pier, a product of the DeLong Corporation, is 80 feet
wide by 600 feet in length and provides two fine berths for up to a seven-
hatch vessel each. During the latter week in October a 90 foot by 450
foot DeLong pier was completed for use in the discharge and loading of
ammunition. As of the end of October this pier had not been used because
of channel dredging activities on the approach to the pier. The opening
of the third pier required a re-location of attached units to work the
various piers. Accordingly, in mid-September the 410th Terminal Service
Company started to discharge a vessel at pier side. This unit was untrained
and had never worked together as a unit. The timely arrival during
September of the US Navy Cargo Handling Battalion number 2, permitted the
410th to start on-the-job training under the guidance of the Navy battalion
personnel. The Navy unit consists of the hard skills required for cargo
operations such as winch operators, signalman, fork lift operators, checkers
and hatch foremen, and most important, the Navy unit brought with them
essential fork lifts required to handle pier discharged cargo. The utiliza-
tion of the Navy unit as a training element for the 410th has been most
successful and is nearing completion. The 551st Terminal Service Company
also became operational in September but not as a separate unit. Their
personnel were utilized as fillers or as complete work units, working with
other terminal service units for training and experience. In November the
Navy battalion will commence a training program for the 551st as a complete
unit in the art of discharging and loading of ammunition.

3. During September, 26 Korean nationals provided by the Vinnell
Corporation started stevedoring operations with one of the attached units
of this battalion. At the end of this report period the total number of
Koreans engaged in stevedoring were all in a training status working with American contractor civilian supervisors under the general supervision of the 565th Terminal Service Company. During early August this battalion received a total of 254 TDY personnel from the 90th Replacement Depot and from the 71st Artillery Battalion to assist the attached units who were short personnel, in stevedoring functions. Despite the lack of training the TDY people worked well. All were reassigned or returned to their parent unit by 20 October.

4. During the reporting period the battalion was engaged in operations for a total of 92 days on a two shift, twenty hours a day, seven day a week basis. Mandatory training was held in the 116th, 155th, 565th and 870th Transportation Companies (Terminal Service) each month for the period of this report. The 410th and 551st Transportation Companies (Terminal Service) held mandatory training during the month of September and October. Subjects covered were Military Courtesy, Interior Guard, Command Information, Venereal Disease Control and In-country Orientation. During the month of September and October the 551st Transportation Company (Terminal Service) and 410th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) were undergoing on the job training. The 410th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) was training with the Naval Cargo Handling Battalion Number 2, and the 551st Transportation Company (Terminal Service) was training with the 155th and 116th Transportation Companies (Terminal Service).

5. Elements of one attached company, the 155th Terminal Service Unit, moved to Tuy Hoa and Vung Ro Bay during September as a part of a task force to discharge the equipment of a 4th Infantry Division Brigade. The operation known as Operation Robin was successfully completed during October. The personnel of the 155th remained at Vung Ro Bay to discharge cargo in support of the 4th division's operation in that area, and to discharge cargo
SECTION II
PART I - OBSERVATIONS

Personal

Item: Non-Commissioned Officer Armor Corp replacements to fill Transportation Corps TOE-117D NCO positions.

Observation: During this report period the attached terminal service units received a substantial number of ex-Armored Corps NCO's who attended an officers stevedore course at Fort Eustis and were sent to Vietnam to satisfy NCO MOS requirements peculiar to TOE-117D. From the standpoint of this battalion this has been a most successful and most welcome program. The NCO's received to date are a distinct asset to their units and are certainly welcome for their past military experience and non-commissioned officer abilities. The results of their training received at Fort Eustis is evident in their professional approach to stevedoring operations.

Operations:

Item: Pilferage to Post Exchange security cargo.

Discussion: There is much evidence of substantial pilferage to sensitive PX cargo such as liquors, cameras, and electronic equipment upon arrival of the vessel at Cam Ranh Bay. Significant quantities of these items arrive poorly boxed and packaged, thus inviting pilferage at loading, intransit and discharge points.

Observation: Maximum efforts should be made by the shipper to pack sensitive cargo such as this in locked CONEX boxes even at the expense of renting commercial security containers. As a minimum, such cargo should be securely and strongly crated with only numerical destination or consignee markings evident.

Item: Semi-Combat Loading

Discussion: On 14 - 16 October this unit discharged unit
equipment belonging to the 30th Regiment of the Republic of Korea’s Whitehorse Division. Accelerated discharge was desired and accomplished however many tons of rations and small arms ammunition was loaded aboard the Hope Victory as separate cargo when it could have just as easily been loaded onto the unit trucks and then loaded into the vessel.

Observation: If the situation permits at the loading port every advantage should be taken to insure that the cargo space in unit vehicles is utilized to the maximum and that separate boxes of rations and small arms ammunition are appropriately palletized to facilitate discharge.

Training and Logistics:

Item: Readiness of the 410th and 551st Terminal Service Companies to deploy from CONUS.

Discussion: The 410th arrived in early September with absolutely no mission training and with no mission essential material handling equipment accompanying or following the unit. The 551st arrived in mid-September partially trained but in the same equipment status as the 410th.

Observation: The urgencies which dictated the movement of these units in their untrained and ill-equipped status is not known at this level. It was and is difficult to effectively utilize these units without at least commercial fork lifts which are so essential to pier-cargo operations. It would appear most prudent to apply AR 220-1 criteria to deploying service units as well as to combat units. The assignment of a RDCAT 1 and achievement of a REDCON 1 for terminal service units prior to deployment would certainly ease the burden of the gaining command and provide the command with the flexibility of having received a unit ready to perform its intended mission.
Item: Equipment used by commercial stevedore companies to load cargo at CONUS ports.

Discussion: From the tight and close storage of bulky and heavy packaged cargo arriving in Vietnam, it appears that some commercial stevedore companies are using specialized forklifts having an articulated fork capability and an excellent heavy lift capacity. This apparent capability on the part of the vessel loader results in cargo being stored in such close confines so as to render it impossible to remove at the discharge point without using the technique of "snatching" which generally results in damage to the package or the contents.

Observation: It would appear prudent for the Department of the Army to expedite a study of equipment utilized at CONUS loading points and if specialized equipment is used - provide appropriate specialized equipment to terminal service units engaged in discharging the cargo in Vietnam.

SECTION II
PART II - RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Personnel: None
2. Operations: None
3. Training and Organization: None
4. Intelligence: None
5. Logistics: None
6. Other: Unit Readiness:

Recommendation: It is recommended that the readiness criteria contained in AR 220-1 be applied to terminal service companies prior to deployment to any combat area.
1. Branch of Service: Transportation Corps.

a. Transportation Terminal Service Company, TOE 55-117D.

(1) Unit designation and location:
   (a) 116th Transportation Company (TS), Cam Ranh Bay
   (b) 155th Transportation Company (TS), Cam Ranh Bay
   (c) 410th Transportation Company (TS), Cam Ranh Bay
   (d) 551st Transportation Company (TS), Cam Ranh Bay
   (e) 565th Transportation Company (TS), Cam Ranh Bay
   (f) 870th Transportation Company (TS), Cam Ranh Bay

(2) Expected Capability:
   At full strength, operating on a 20 hour per day, 2 shift basis or on a 10 hour per day, 2 location basis, at established terminal, or over beaches, the transportation terminal service companies can perform the following:
   (a) Discharge one standard five-hatch ship at the average rate of 720 S/T of general cargo daily (21,000 S/T monthly) or,
   (b) Load one standard five-hatch ship at the average rate of 500 S/T of general cargo daily (15,000 S/T monthly).
   (c) Sort cargo by technical service and load the cargo on an initial mode of transportation at the pier or at the waterline in a beach operation.
   (d) Prepare transportation documents for all cargo handled by the unit.
   (e) Account for the cargo handled.

(3) Planned Basis of Allocation: One Terminal Service Company per each 720 short tons of cargo to be discharged or 500 short tons
of cargo to be loaded for each 20 hours of daily operation.

(4) Actual performance:

(a) Tonnage handled is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>116th</td>
<td>15,444</td>
<td>17,299</td>
<td>20,079</td>
<td>19,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155th</td>
<td>25,990</td>
<td>31,094</td>
<td>20,199</td>
<td>35,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>565th</td>
<td>24,872</td>
<td>30,687</td>
<td>18,210</td>
<td>22,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>870th</td>
<td>29,998</td>
<td>32,687</td>
<td>24,550</td>
<td>20,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410th</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>13,331</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The 565th was augmented by Vietnamese Contract Civil labor, varying from 4 to 10 gangs over a 24 hour period.

(b) As indicated by the above figures, the majority of the units are generally exceeding expected capabilities in spite of the fact that the units are hampered by deadlined MHE, shortages of MHE and recently, an influx of untrained people. Variables adversely affecting tonnage figures are personnel strength and availability of MHE equipment as indicated below:

1. Personnel strength (% present for duty)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUGUST</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>116th</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155th</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>565th</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>870th</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410th</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. 10th Transportation Battalion is authorized a total of 19 fork lifts per terminal service unit. Data for report period is as follows:
![Image]

### Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<th>AUGUST (on hand - operational)</th>
<th>SEPTEMBER</th>
<th>OCTOBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>116th</td>
<td>5-3</td>
<td>4-2</td>
<td>7-5</td>
<td>6-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155th</td>
<td>9-5</td>
<td>7-4</td>
<td>10-7</td>
<td>12-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>565th</td>
<td>11-6</td>
<td>8-5</td>
<td>14-7</td>
<td>14-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>870th</td>
<td>10-6</td>
<td>7-4</td>
<td>10-6</td>
<td>9-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410th</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>551st</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0-0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Conclusions: Units in general actually exceeded their expected capability, except for the 116th during the entire reporting period and the 155th and the 565th during the month of September. The 116th is a relatively new unit at Cam Rahn and was assigned primarily to working ammunition ships in the stream when it arrived. There was a severe lack of electric fork lifts on these ammo ships which made it necessary to "snake" much of the cargo to the square of the hatch, which is a very slow process when handling ammunition. Also, for the period 15 to 26 August, after the 116th had moved onto the new Delong pier only 3 hatches could be worked due to the fact that the pier had yet to be completed.

(d) Tonnage for the month of September was generally below TOE capability due to the fact that there was a lack of ships on the piers. The 155th was only working one and two hatches for the period 8-12 September. The 565th had a total of 4 berths open for 24 hour periods. The 116th also had 4 berths open for 24 hour periods.

(5) Basis of Allocation recommended: No changes recommended.

(6) TOE Variations: During reporting period, 565th was augmented with from 4 to 10 gangs of local hire Vietnamese Civilians daily. Average capability of a Vietnamese hatch gang is approximately 40 S/T.
In addition, the companies were augmented with the following numbers of TDY personnel from the 90th Replacement Battalion:

(a) 870th - 34
(b) 155th - 8
(c) 565th - 52
(d) 116th - 60

While these people were not trained stevedores, they did help to increase the capability of the units.

2. Recommendations and comments:

a. Recommendations:

(1) Recommend that the terminal service units be kept at full strength.

(2) Recommend that the remainder of the new fork lifts due this battalion under the modernization program be expedited and that at least four commercial fork lifts in each unit be of the low mast type to enable movement within the cargo compartments of ships to facilitate discharge of cargo.

b. Comments:

(a) Considering fluctuations in personnel strengths, equipment availability, a mixture of pier and stream operations, and various types of cargo handled, the TOE figure of 720 S/T per day per unit is a reliable average. The units covered in this report had an overall average of 809 S/T per day.
AVCA CRB-P-2 (5 Nov 66)  1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
        (ROS CSFOR-65)

HQ, Cam Ranh Bay Port (Prov), 124th Trans Tnl Comd, APO 96312, 12 Nov 66

TO: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, CRB, APO 96312

1. The inclosed operational report submitted by the commander of
the 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) adequately reflects the
activities of that unit for the period indicated.

2. I concur fully in the commander's recommendation.

Incl

SMITH
Colonel, TC
Commanding

AVCA CRB-SPO (5 Nov 66)  2nd Ind

HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY, APO 96312  16 NOV 1966

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, APO 95307
       Commanding General, US Army, Vietnam, APO 96307
       Commander-in-Chief, US Army (Pacific), APO 96558

TO: Department of the Army, The Pentagon, ATTN: ACOPSFOR, Washington,
    D.C. 20310

1. The attached report is objective and factual with the exception
of Section I, Item 5 which refers to the completion of Operation ROBIN
in October.

2. Operation ROBIN was completed on 8 November 1966.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: CRB 231

MOORE
Major, AGC
Adjutant General
AVCA 00-0 (5 Nov 66)  2d Inf
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RAS CSFCR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 1st Logistical Command, APO 46307
21 NOV 1966

TO: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, APO 46312

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) forwarded by your headquarters is returned for the following reasons:

a. The total number of days during the reporting period that the unit engaged in training, troop movements and/or operations was omitted. (USARV Regulation 870-2, paragraph 5(1)(b)).

b. Comments concerning problem areas were made without a statement as to what action is being taken or initiated by the command to correct them or to initiate corrective action by higher headquarters. This omission pertains to the following items: page 5, items concerning pilferage and Semi-Combat Loading; page 6, item concerning readiness of the 410th and 551st Terminal Service Companies; page 7, item concerning commercial stevedore companies.

2. Request your headquarters review USARV Regulation 870-2 and forward the corrective action indicated in paragraph 1 above to this headquarters NOT 30 Nov 66.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

TKL: Lynk 782/930

1 Inc.

Genn A. Novy
Cpr. 4 BnG

13
AVCA GLO-P-10-61 (5 Nov 66) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 October 1966 (ROCS GR15-P-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 10TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TERMINAL), APO 96312
28 November 1966

TO: Commanding Officer, Cam Ranh Bay Port (Provisional), 124th
Transportation Terminal Command, APO 96312

1. The units of the 10th Transportation Battalion (Tn) were
engaged in training troop movements and/or operations for the following
numbers of days during the reporting period:

a. HHD, 10th Trans Bn (Tn)
   (1) Training - 3 days
   (2) Troop movements - negative
   (3) Operations - 92 days

b. 116th Trans Co (Tn Svc)
   (1) Training - 3 days
   (2) Troop movements - negative
   (3) Operations - 92 days

c. 155th Trans Co (Tn Svc)
   (1) Training - 4 days
   (2) Troop movements - 2 days
   (3) Operations - 92 days

d. 410th Trans Co (Tn Svc)
   (1) Training - 11 days; 30 days on-the-job training
   (2) Troop movements - 21 days
   (3) Operations - 62 days
AVCA CEB-P-10-81 (5 Nov 66) 3rd Ind 28 November 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 October 1966 (ROS CEBOp-65)

e. 551st Trans Co (Tal Svc)
   (1) Training - 31 days preparation for unit move and POM,
       10 days training, 52 days on-the-job training.
   (2) Troop movements - 9 days
   (3) Operations - 52 days

f. 565th Trans Co (Tal Svc)
   (1) Training - 3 days
   (2) Troop movements - negative
   (3) Operations - 92 days

g. 870th Trans Co (Tal Svc)
   (1) Training - 3 days
   (2) Troop movement - negative
   (3) Operations - 92 days

2. All problem areas commented upon have been referred to 124th
   Transportation Terminal Command for corrective action.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: CEB 141

JAMES L. RIVARD
LIT, TC
Adjutant
GPOP-OT (5 Nov 66) 10th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (msgs CSFOR-65), HQ 10th Trans Bn (Terminal)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 15 FEB 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

1 Incl
nc

G. L. McMullin
CPT, AG
Asst AG
AVCA CRB-P-2

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCB CSFOR-65)

HQ, Cam Ranh Bay Port (Prov), 124th Trans Tel Comd, APO 96312, 29 Nov 66

TO: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, CRB, APO 96312

Forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: CRB 451

DONALD L. SMITH
Maj, AGC
Adjutant
AVCA CRB-SPO (5 Nov 66) 5th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CBFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY, APO 96312 30 NOV 1966

TO: Commanding Officer, 124th Transportation Command (Tml A), APO 96312

1. Reference paragraph 1, 3rd Indorsement, 10th Transportation Battalion. All that is required here is the number of days that the battalion was engaged in training, troop movements, and/or operations. For purposes of this report, the battalion was engaged in operations for the entire period of the report. If the battalion had arrived sometime during the reporting period then the time before departure from CONUS would have been considered training, the time in transit would have been considered troop movement, and the time after arrival would have been considered operations. Individual companies need not be reported.

2. Paragraph 2 of referenced indorsement stated problem areas mentioned in 1st Logistical Command's 2nd Indorsement were referred to your headquarters for corrective action. However, no comment is made in your own 4th Indorsement to this headquarters.

3. Request that the number of days that the battalion was engaged in training, troop movements, and/or operations be reported as indicated in paragraph 1 above and that the problem areas mentioned in 1st Logistical Command's 2nd Indorsement be commented on by either the 10th Transportation Battalion or your headquarters. Request return to this headquarters NLT 2 December 1966.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

TEL: CRB 231

WILLIAM R. JENKINS
CPT AGC
ASST AG
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, Cam Ranh Bay Port (Prov), 124th Trans Nat Comd, APO 96312, 2 Dec 66

TO: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, CRB, APO 96312

1. The 10th Transportation Battalion was engaged in operations during all 92 days of the reporting period as stated in paragraph 4, Section I.

2. Reference paragraph 2 of 2d Indorsement, the following corrective actions have been initiated by this headquarters:

   a. The problem of pilferage of PX cargo has been discussed with the Port Provost Marshall; he has arranged to provide security guard details to be on board when hatches are opened on PX cargo ships. Claims personnel are also on hand in the event cargo is discovered damaged. In addition, coordination has been effected with Cam Ranh Bay Exchange Depot to forward letters through Exchange System channels when specific PX cargo has been received damaged. It is anticipated that this action will be the basis for alerting CONUS suppliers of inadequate packaging procedures and thus preclude reoccurrences.

   b. The item concerning semi-combat loading of vehicles involved ROK units, and a large percentage of these vehicles were in fact loaded. Current directives require US units to accomplish combat loading of vehicles. However, the matter will be brought up at the next commanders' conference in order to give the matter broader consideration.

   c. The problem reference the overseas readiness of the two transportation companies discussed was met by requesting the assistance of a US Navy Cargo Handling Battalion cadre with its material handling equipment (MHE). The cadre was used to train company personnel to bring them up to required skill levels for independent operations. Some TOE operating equipment has since been furnished as a result of supply action; some equipment had to be made available by reallocating MHE from other units in the command.

   d. The problem of differences in equipment used in CONUS and RVN ports will be scheduled for discussion at the forthcoming commanders' conference with the object of finding the means to establish equal capabilities in both areas.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: CRB 451

DONALD L. SMITH
Maj, AGC
Adjutant
AVGA CRB-SPO (5 Nov 66) 7th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY, APO 96312 3 - DEC 1966

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96307

Your attention is invited to the 6th Endorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: CRB 231

WILLIAM R. JENKINS
CPT AGC
ASST AG
TO: Deputy Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHC-DH, APO 96307

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by the 10th Transportation Battalion for the quarter ending 31 October 1966 is forwarded herewith.

2. Reference paragraph 2, Section I, page 2: The ammo pier is 120'x450' and not 90'x450', as stated.

3. Reference paragraph 1a(4)(b)2 and 2a(2), Section II, Part I, and Section II, Part II: The shortage of material handling equipment throughout Vietnam should be relieved considerably with the arrival of equipment during Phase II of the MHE standardization program. Low mast electric fork-lifts have been programmed to provide cargo discharge capabilities from ship compartments.

4. Reference paragraph 2a(1), Section II, Part II: The objective of DA is to maintain all units at 100% of authorized strength. Variable factors such as unprogrammed losses, mal-utilization, and replacement shortfalls prevent various units from achieving the desired strength postures.

5. Concur with the basic report as modified by the comments contained in the preceding indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LYNX 782/430

2 Jan 1967
AVHOC-TH (5 Nov 66) 9th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CSFOR-OT
APO 96307

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons
   Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 10th
   Transportation Battalion (Terminal) as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:
   a. Reference Part I, Section II, Item: Unit Readiness, Page
      6; Paragraph 6, Part II, Section II, Page 7; and Paragraph 2c, 6th
      Indorsement: Concur, in principle, that units should be fully trained
      and equipped prior to deployment; however, this headquarters is aware
      that exigencies of the situation in RVN must occasionally preclude this.

   b. Reference Part I, Section II, Item: Commercial Stevedore
      Equipment Used in CONUS, Page 6; Paragraphs 1a(4)(c) and 2a(2), Capa-
      city versus Performance Study TOE 55-117; Paragraph 2d, 6th Indorse-
      ment; and Paragraph 3, 8th Indorsement: Concur with Headquarters, 1st
      Logistical Command in regard to the favorable impact of the PMT stan-
      dardization program concerning this problem. AMC has appointed a pro-
      ject officer to study the total materials handling aspects of military
      operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

STANLEY E. SCHULTZ
Major, AG
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl
nc
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 10th Transportation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 Aug to 31 Oct 66.

CO, 10th Transportation Battalion

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8. ABSTRACT