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<td>FROM:</td>
<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Critical Technology; 02 SEP 1970. Other requests shall be referred to Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Attn: FOR-OT-PT, Washington, DC 20310. This document contains export-controlled technical data.</td>
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<td>AUTHORITY</td>
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AD874258

(11 Aug 70) FOR W.I. 702152 2 September 1970

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970

This report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with previous written orders. Information of actions initiated as a result of this report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OP/G within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate entries in the file from lessons learned during current operations and to expedite their use in developing training material.

Sincerely yours,

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

Commandants:
PS Army War College
PS Army Command and General Staff College
PS Army Armor School
PS Army Aviation School
PS Army Civil Affairs School
PS Army Engineer School
PS Army Field Artillery School
PS Army Infantry School
PS Army Institute for Military Assistance
PS Army Intelligence School

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT
DISTRIBUTION: NO FOREIGN WITHOUT APPROVAL OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT (ARMY) ATTN: FOR OP/G, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
I. OPERATIONS - Significant Activities Headquarters, 4th PSYOP Group:

a. Command of the 4th PSYOP Group changed on 13 March 1970. Ceremony was held on the Cruz Compound and was attended by Colonel Stabler, Chief MACJ3-11, Colonel Misbet, ACofS, G5, USARV, Captain Chin, ROK Forces, Vietnam, J5 and others. Colonel Katagiri departed for his new assignment at the Office of the Chief of Information, Department of the Army. Colonel Jones, the new commander, came from the 96th Civil Affairs Group, Ft Lee, Virginia. During the course of the ceremony, Colonel Katagiri was awarded the Legion of Merit for his outstanding meritorious service while in command of the 4th PSYOP Group.

b. During the reporting period a total of 231 awards were presented Group-wide. Of these 89 were Bronze Stars, 112 were Army Commendation Medals, 21 were Air Medals, 5 were Purple Hearts, 4 were Legions of Merit and 2 were RVN Honor Medals, First Class.

c. Two casualties occurred during the period: Specialist Four James Pastore, 7th PSYOP Bn, died on 9 April as a result of wounds received while engaged in a loudspeaker operation. Specialist Four R C Bryan of the 8th PSYOP Bn was seriously wounded during a mortar attack on Nha Trang, the 6th of April.

2. PSYOP DEVELOPMENT: The following major activities occurred during the reporting period:

a. The major activity during the reporting period concerned progress toward establishment of the Joint Military PSYOP Development and Coordination Center. A formal Work Request was initiated for construction of two (2) quonset type buildings on the RVNAF PSYWAR Department Compound. This request received the support of MACJ3 and has been expedited throughout its processing. Engineer drawings were completed and the project has been approved

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Inclosure
at intermediary review boards. At the present time, the construction request is at USARV Headquarters. If approved, an appropriate engineer command must be tasked with the project and a priority established to complete the construction.

b. A major accomplishment was the completion of color filming of RVNAF training and operations. US and Vietnamese personnel combined efforts to photograph operations at three (3) various national training centers and activities of forces such as Marines, Rangers, Infantry, and RF/PF. The RVNAF PSYWAR Department coordinated the operation on the Vietnamese side. At this time the respective agencies are conducting reviews of the slides and preparing scripts and making selections of final slides. The 4th PSYOP Group offered assistance procuring multiple copies once the final slide shows are selected.

c. A library of sound effects tapes was procured by the Development Section and reproduced for retention at the Group Headquarters. Catalogs of all available sound effects were prepared for all potential users.

d. Standardized PHOENIX posters and RF/PF posters were developed based on evaluations procured from all battalions. The underlying object was to prepare an item which may be acceptable throughout all corps areas and could be mass produced by the Group facilities. A standardized poster acceptable in all areas was not completely realized. However, during this period emphasis on PHOENIX efforts and enhancing the image of territorial forces has grown immensely.

e. During this period a special interrogation format was prepared by the Testing and Evaluation Branch and over 200 interrogations were accumulated at the Bien Hoa PW Compound. This material was reduced to a statistical and qualitative form which was prepared in the form of a report for the assigned battalions. An effort was made in this interrogation to attain more information on the values of the NVA and his basic ideological feelings.

f. During this period the Development Branch produced contingency leaflets relative to the deteriorating situation for NVA in Cambodia. This material was not directly related to the allied operations which followed subsequently. However, they provided a basis for recommendations concerning nationally produced items once the operations commenced. Themes mainly dealt with uncovering the true communist objectives, disappearance of supply bases, and the will of the Cambodian people for VC and NVA forces to leave Cambodian soil.

g. Revision was made to three (3) 4th PSYOP Group Guidelines. These dealt with production of tapes, production of leaflets and handbills, and the steps in the propaganda development cycle. This material is being reprinted for distribution to assigned battalions and the field forces.

3. Operations - 4th PSYOP Group Headquarters:

a. During the quarter, the 4th PSYOP Group Hqs printed a total of 313,232,000 6” x 3” leaflet equivalents. Leaflets were distributed as follows:
b. On 15 April the 4th PSYOP Group completed its reductions in support of Phase III Redeployment.

c. Pleiku Radio Station: On the 2 of February 1970 an antenna team from Okinawa arrived to construct a 250 foot tower at the Radio Station. Construction was completed on 19 February 1970. Commencing with the evening broadcast on 22 February all broadcasts were made on the new antenna at high power. The field fix antenna which had been in use at low power since 5 December 1969 was taken down. The Radio Station has now broadcast over 3800 hours of Vietnamese and Montagnard programs, over half of which has been at high power.

During the quarter significant progress was made in improving Radio Site security. The inner perimeter fence was rebuilt and two new bunkers were constructed for use by Radio Team Personnel. ARVN personnel, with the assistance of the Radio Team, placed claymore mines around the whole outer perimeter and completed four bunkers for ARVN personnel. There was a change of ARVN personnel assigned to defend the Radio Site on 3 March 1970. The 120 RF Company was replaced by the 162 RP Company.

On 23 April 1970 the Radio Site was hit with five 60MM mortar rounds. There were no casualties or damage as a result of the attack. This was the only hostile act directed at the Radio Site during the quarter.

On 23 March 1970 the billeting area for Radio Team personnel was relocated from Camp Schmidt to Artillery Hill. Co B, 8th PSYOP Bn moved with the Radio Team.

4. Logistics:

a. Critical Shortages

(1) Cotton Pads: Expected delivery for 192 cases on QRF is early May. ICCV has 700 additional cases on requisition from CONUS.

(2) Gevacopy Plates: CCIL branch at USAICCV continues to have difficulty with this item. No definite delivery date available.

(3) Lithographic blanket wash: Shipments expected from Korea and Thailand. CCIL branch following up.

b. New Equipment:

(1) Addressograph Multigraph Model 1485 Platemaker: Five of these
sophisticated machines were received. One was sent to the 8th Bn and one was sent to the 10th Bn for an evaluation of the machines' capabilities.

2. Robertson "Comet II" Copy Camera: One each of these new cameras was shipped to the 7th and 8th Battalions. The utilization of these machines enables the Battalions to make use of the 3M "R" Process plate making process. This process is hoped to further increase the quality of the printing effort at the Bn level.

3. Nuarc Platemaker: The 7th and 8th Bns also received one each of this machine. It is used in conjunction with the Robertson Camera in the "R" Process.

c. Significant Activity: During the quarter the 4th Group was authorized to order paper for printing operations directly from USAICOV. This paper will be shipped from sources in CONUS directly to the 4th Group and its subordinate units. The new procedure is expected to vastly improve the paper supply system.

II. LESSONS LEARNED, OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Personnel: None

2. Intelligence: None

3. Operations:

a. Use of Field Expedient Antenna for Radio Team Operations:

(1) Observation: Due to the problems encountered while installing a new 250 foot tower for the AN/TRT-22 at Radio Pleiku it is felt that a study should be conducted for a simple antenna for use in a mobile environment.

(2) Evaluation: Due to the highly mobile configuration of the AN/TRT-22 a more easily erected antenna is required. With the present 250 foot tower it requires a minimum of one week to erect the antenna. This is by a qualified team, which is not a part of the radio team. Just to climb the height of the antenna requires special training. This one week erection time does not include the additional time required to lay the ground radials. This cannot be done while the tower is being erected due to the hazard of equipment that may fall or be dropped.

When the previous antenna was destroyed a field expedient antenna was erected for temporary use. This was made by using four of the old feed lines on the antenna and forming an X-shaped antenna with a 40' main mast and the end of each leg grounded. This antenna worked satisfactorily at low power but problems of arcing developed at high power.

(3) Recommendation: That a similar type of antenna be looked into and evaluated. It is felt that with a self-erecting antenna mast, which is presently in the Army inventory, and testing of the set on the antenna, or one
similar to the present one, that an antenna can be found that could be erected in the 72 hours broadcast time designed for the AN/TRT-22.

4. Organization: None
5. Training: None
6. Logistics:
   a. Critical Repair Parts:
      (1) Observation: The use of POMM 90 numbers and part numbers for critical repair parts.
      (2) Evaluation: POMM 90 numbers are Federal stock numbers which use #90 as the first three digits of the Federal Identification number (FIN). These numbers are not recognized by the army supply system and therefore, requisitions using them must be processed with care to prevent cancellation.
      In addition, many parts use only a part number and a manufacturer's code for ordering purposes. Many times a more complete description is required for the proper part to be sent upon requisition.
      (3) Recommendation: That all parts be listed with as complete description as possible; where no FSN is available a substitute item be found so all parts will have FSN's instead of #90 numbers or parts numbers. This would eliminate many unnecessary delays in requesting items of critical need.
   b. Complete manual for all equipment in set:
      (1) Observation: The present manuals on the AN/TRT-22 are not complete in that they do not list all repair parts for the equipment associated with the transmitter.
      (2) Evaluation: This has been alleviated somewhat by receipt of IM-15P's which give the FSN's; However, these manuals do not have listings for the 75KW or 20KW generators or the tuning boxes, and no illustrations of repair parts and their assembly. The IM's do not use the reference designations found in the POMM's listing of repair parts. All of this makes it extremely difficult to identify the correct repair parts in the manual.
      (3) Recommendation: A manual be developed with illustrations and reference numbers that can be cross referenced to the narrative in the POMM's and repair parts list in the IM-15P's. In order to simplify maintenance and supply system and supply system problems, this should include all associated equipment with the transmitter.
   c. Communications: NONE
d. Material: NONX

e. Other: See Inclosure #1, FST After Action Report

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MICHAEL V. TALMAN
CPT, ADA
Adjutant
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group and concur.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning "Use of Field Expensive Antenna for Radio Team Operations", page 4, paragraph 3a(3): concur. The 4th PSYOPS Group should submit an Equipment Improvement Record (EIR) to USAECOM, Fort Monmouth, N.J. 07703 for development and testing of a self-erecting antenna mast. A new antenna coupler is under field test. This coupler allows loading the transmitter into different impedance antennas and may lead to the development of an improved antenna system. Unit has been so advised.

   b. Reference item concerning "Critical Repair Parts", page 5, paragraph 6a: concur. Additionally, it is recommended that in instances when only #90 numbers or parts numbers appear or that AES or AFS requisitions are used, publication data be shown in the appropriate place on the requisition. Unit has been so advised.

   c. Reference item concerning "Complete Manual for all Equipment in Set", page 5, paragraph 6b: concur. The 75KW and 20KW generators are non-standard items at present, but they are in process of being standardized. Consultation with USAECOM and USAMEDCOM representatives reveals that the Project Manager for the AN/TRT-22 will publish new TMs to include 75KW and 20KW generators. In the interim, if information is required for parts on these generators, the unit should contact the Project Manager for the AN/TRT-22, located at Fort Monmouth, N.J. The ECOM Field Office, Vietnam is following up with a request for item identification on specified parts for 75KW and 20KW generators to the appropriate Project Manager's office. Unit has been so advised.
AVUGC-DST (25 May 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 4th Psychological Operations
Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

4. Reference item concerning "National level policy guidance", Inclosure 1, page 3, paragraph 5a: Concur with the basic recommendation with the following exception: Sixty days will not provide enough time to coordinate the program at the national level. Ninety days should provide sufficient time to issue prior to actual initiation of the campaign. Application and coordination of this recommendation should be handled by the local commanders and Headquarters, USAHV. Unit has been so advised.

e. Reference item concerning "Offshore Production of Material", Inclosure 1, page 3, paragraph 5b: Concur with the recommendation. Local commanders should coordinate this recommendation with supported units. Unit has been so advised.

f. Reference item concerning "Chieu Hoi Symbology on TET Material", Inclosure 1, page 4, paragraph 5e: Concur. The request to print Chieu Hoi symbology on all items was required by MACV. The ORL of the 7th PSYOPS Battalion has been forwarded to MACV concerning the same problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
4th PSYOPS Gp

[Signature]
L. E. MICHELS
Assistant Adjutant-General
GPOP-DT (25 May 70)  2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Psychological Operations Group for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558  20 JUL 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

P.D. CLINE
LT. AGG
Asst AG
AVGM-C

SUBJECT: TET 70 After Action Report

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. References:
   a. Letter, this, headquarters, subject as above, dated 19 December 1969 (Inclosure 1).
   b. Reports from each of the four battalions subordinate to this headquarters. These reports are on file in the S3 office and available for reading on request.

2. National Level Planning and Development of TET 70 PSYOP Material:
   a. Planning for the TET 70 PSYOP Campaign was initiated at a Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) conference held in early August 1969. Representatives from US Military units and civilian agencies having principal responsibility for the planning and conduct of PSYOP activities in the Republic of Vietnam attended the meeting. Principal topics of discussion focused on the problem areas and significant accomplishments of previous TET PSYOP campaigns in order to maximize adherence to these lessons learned in the planning and execution of the TET 70 campaign.

   b. Throughout the August and early September planning period, it was noted that the Ministry of Information (MOI) rather than the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was going to prepare a policy guidance for TET 70. On this basis it was decided that US elements would defer the development of a wide range of material to support the campaign until the extent of the projected MOI support could be firmly established.

   c. In mid-September a meeting was called at JUSPAO to discuss two main points. First, a draft copy of the MOI TET policy guidance was discussed, with notation that when it finally was issued it would be accepted as policy by JUSPAO and MACV. The second point concerned the development of multi-color items for offshore and in-country printing by US assets. A firmer tasking of the development requirement was made later in September.

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d. The 4th PSYOP Group was verbally tasked, in late September, by MACJ3-11 to develop several leaflets, posters, handbills, and novelty items to include pocket calendars, school book covers, and various "cut and paste" items. JUSPAO also undertook the development of similar items. The understanding was that both JUSPAO and 4th PSYOP Group developed material would be distributed to Assistant Province Advisor (APA) PSYOP personnel at province level as well as to the four PSYOP battalions in each Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ).

e. All items developed by the 4th PSYOP Group for offshore printing were approved and prepared in final layout form, to include material for color separation and positive black/white contacts. This was accomplished in time for shipment to the 7th PSYOP Group for programming with October 1969 offshore support requests. It was requested that production of the items be programmed with a Required Delivery Date (RDD) in Vietnam of 31 December 1969. Furthermore, it was specified that certain items should have the Chieu Hoi symbol added to the layout prior to printing. These items were delineated by number designation, such as 4-82-69 and 4-83-69 and so on.

f. The few items, mainly posters and handbills, to be printed in-country by the 4th PSYOP Group, were completed and shipped to both JUSPAO and the PSYOP battalions by early January 1970. This was slightly later than originally planned due to the fact that one of the multi-color presses at this headquarters was not operational during most of the month of November. Tasking of in-country production was not adjusted to remedy this delay.

g. Subsequent to the preparation of artwork layouts and the initiation of production of the printed material for TET 70, the planning agreements noted in paragraphs 2c and 2d were significantly altered.

(1) The MOI TET policy guidance transmitted on a countrywide basis in November 1969 was not available for distribution in English until early January 1970. Due to the lateness of transmission to key US elements involved in planning and executing support for the TET 70 campaign, this policy guidance could not affect the choice and content of material already produced for the campaign.

(2) In mid-December 1969 it was learned that JUSPAO would not provide any of its TET material to the PSYOP battalions for dissemination through the latter's resources. Rather, all JUSPAO produced material was sent directly to APA PSYOP personnel. Field elements of the PSYOP battalions were able to obtain JUSPAO materials from local APA PSYOP offices. The change in distribution of JUSPAO materials to the field did not cause a serious shortage of items available for dissemination at the PSYOP battalions, but rather created a more scattered source of supply for the battalions and their Field Teams.

3. Final Coordination and Execution of the TET PSYOP Campaign. During the period of approximately 1 November 1969 through the actual execution of the TET campaign in early February 1970, the main efforts of both this headquarters and its subordinate battalions were focused upon completing
the programmed production of PSYOP material and the distribution of this material to the field for dissemination.

a. A complete list of items produced by the 4th PSYOP Group headquarters is attached as Inclosure 2. Although the bulk of the material printed in-country was sent to JUSPAO for distribution, all of the items done offshore were shipped to the PSYOP battalions for dissemination. The offshore printed items are listed in Inclosure 2.

b. A summary discussion of material produced by the four PSYOP battalions in support of TET 70 is in Inclosure 3.

5. LESSONS LEARNED. The significant problem areas, or lessons learned, in regard to planning and executing the TET 70 PSYOP Campaign, are similar to those encountered in previous TET campaigns. In this regard, a reiteration of these lessons learned has merit. It is essential that closer consideration be given to these points in the planning, not only of future TET campaigns, but the planning of any national campaign projected several months in advance and requiring offshore support.

a. National level policy guidance:

(1) Observation: A statement of national level policy guidance was not transmitted to key US elements responsible for planning and executing support for the TET 70 PSYOP Campaign at the local level until mid-January 1970.

(2) Evaluation: The late receipt of national level policy guidance at the local level resulted in a myriad of local plans being devised. Generally, these plans stressed varying themes and required several different types of support. As a result, in some cases nationally-developed PSYOP material was not appropriate for use in support of certain local objectives. In addition, being unaware of the scope of national objectives, local elements could not adequately prepare a full-scale campaign at that level. This lack of coordination between the two levels resulted in a PSYOP campaign which was not uniformly executed.

(3) Recommendation: That national level policy guidance for future TET campaigns be fully coordinated, approved and issued at least sixty (60) days prior to actual initiation of the campaign (Phase I).

b. Offshore production of material:

(1) Observation: A recurring problem in planning the conduct of PSYOP campaigns is allowing sufficient lead time for production and shipment of offshore support material to in-country destinations.

(2) Evaluation: Although the bulk of this material arrived in-country in mid-January 1970 and was disseminated by the end of the TET celebration period, the late delivery of offshore material precluded a lengthy pre-TET program. Also, the late arrival of leaflets hampered the orderly targeting and
dissemination of material in pre-planned areas. Another factor to consider is that shipments of offshore material often are misrouted and considerable time is consumed in the process of trying to locate and tranship this material to correct delivery points.

(3) **Recommendation:** That to allow the PSYOP battalions and other field elements sufficient lead time for targeting purposes, and sufficient time to conduct pre-TET leaflet drops, offshore-produced material be programmed to arrive in Vietnam not later than forty-five days prior to the TET celebration period (Phase II). This early shipment also will provide a reasonable time frame within which misrouted materials can be located and sent to correct destinations.

d. Utilization of air assets:

(1) **Observation:** In some instances, primarily in IV CTZ, adequate air assets were not available for timely dissemination of TET leaflets.

(2) **Evaluation:** The above problem evolved primarily from the lack of prior planning and coordination at the national level regarding the quantities of leaflets available for air dissemination. In addition, leaflets often were shipped to locations other than where air dissemination assets are based. The result was that leaflets either arrived too late to be disseminated or were stockpiled in such large quantities during the latter stages of the campaign that effective results could not be obtained if they were dropped.

(3) **Recommendation:** That, in conjunction with efforts to program the production of leaflet items so they will begin arriving at air dissemination points in-country at least forty-five days prior to the TET celebration period, the total production projected and arrival dates at dissemination points be more closely monitored. Also, the number and type of aircraft available to disseminate leaflets should be an influencing factor in the planning of quantities of items to be air dropped as well as population characteristics of the intended target audiences.

e. Chieu Hoi Symbology on TET Material:

(1) **Observation:** Chieu Hoi symbology was placed on all material printed offshore in support of TET 70. One of the items printed offshore for this campaign was blank stationery with a border design. It was intended for use by province chiefs and local level government officials to send messages and greetings to the civilian population.

(2) **Evaluation:** The inclusion of Chieu Hoi symbology on the blank stationery greatly reduced its usefulness in that the added message content had to be limited to a single theme. The Chieu Hoi symbology, however, was added subsequent to forwarding of final layouts to the 7th PSYOP Group for printing. The blank stationery was forwarded with several other TET items under the cover of an explanatory letter outlining which items should be printed with
the added Chieu Hoi symbology and which items, including the stationery, would be printed without it. Through an error, all of the items were printed with the Chieu Hoi symbology. Since in most instances the stationery could not be used for the intended purpose, the PSYOP battalions in the four Corps Tactical Zones were required on short notice to print their own stationery. This placed an undue strain on the already over-burdened printing capability of these battalions.

(3) Recommendation: That upon preparation of final layouts to be sent offshore for printing, no additional alterations be made unless they can be added to the layout prior to its shipment to the offshore printing facility

f. Planning of local TET requests:

(1) Observation: At the outset of the campaign local printing support was available on request. However, as the TET celebration period itself neared, an increased number of support requests were received by the PSYOP battalions. In some instances this resulted in a severe backlog of printing requests.

(2) Evaluation: It appears that lack of prior planning on the part of requesting agencies was the primary cause for the increased number of support requests as TET neared.

(3) Recommendation: That to properly program and provide requested support, a cut off date for submission of TET requests be established and strictly adhered to.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PLANNING OF TET 71 PSYOP CAMPAIGN.

a. National level policy guidance: To allow Corps level elements sufficient time for planning TET campaign activities, a more coordinated national level planning effort is required. In this regard a meeting similar to the one at MACV in August 1969 should be held. The meeting should be scheduled at least seven months prior to the TET holidays and should follow a set format. Participants should include key MACJ3-11 personnel, representatives from the 4th PSYOP Group and its subordinate battalions, selected JUSPAO personnel and Vietnamese counterparts at all levels. The Corps level representatives should be required to present at least a concept of how they intend to conduct the TET 71 campaign. The ensuing discussion should focus on outlining a national level policy guidance, with N01 being tasked to issue a final guidance at least sixty days prior to actual initiation of the campaign (Phase I). To permit material programmed for completion offshore to be developed, produced and shipped to Vietnam with sufficient lead time to allow for adequate targeting and dissemination, initial guidance and general themes must be established not later than one hundred twenty days prior to the desired receipt date in-country.

b. Production and distribution of material:

(1) Offshore material: Offshore produced material should be prepared in final layout and sent to production locations with sufficient lead time to
insure arrival at in-country dissemination points not later than forty-five days prior to the TET celebration period (Phase II).

(2) In-country material: Material produced in-country should be shipped to dissemination points at least three weeks prior to the beginning of the phase for which it is intended. All special and novelty items should arrive at least thirty days prior to the intended dissemination date.

c. Utilization of air assets: Planning for the TET 71 campaign should consider the possibility of additional redeployment of US aircraft utilized to disseminate PSYOP material. Specifically, the quantity of material produced for air dissemination should be determined in light of the air support that will be available, to include RVNAF aircraft. Population density of the intended target audiences should also be given closer scrutiny.

d. Programming of Corps level support requests:

(1) Preprinted handbills and leaflets: Preprinted handbills and leaflets have been widely used during TET campaigns. The handbills generally are utilized to send greetings and morale boosting messages from province and district chiefs to the local populace. The leaflets have been used mainly for quick reaction Chieu Hoi appeals during the TET period. Whether printed offshore or in-country, the production of these preprinted forms should be planned so they will arrive at the PSYOP battalions not later than forty-five days prior to the beginning of Phase I of the campaign.

(2) Locally printed material: Supported elements in each Corps Area should be notified by the PSYOP single manager of a cutoff date for all TET requests. This will allow the PSYOP battalions to better program TET material for timely distribution to requesting elements. It also will enable the battalions to have sufficient free press time immediately prior to and during the critical TET celebration period to produce truly quick reaction material.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES M. RILEY
MAJ, Armor
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
A
D
AVGM-PDS 19 December 1969

SUBJECT: TET 1970 - After Action Report

SEE DISTRIBUTION:


2. This report should address itself to both problem areas and significant accomplishments connected with the TET Campaign. The time period concerned should begin with the planning stages, as early as August 1969, and follow through the dissemination phase.

3. Problem areas should be discussed in the following manner:
   a. Identification of problem area.
   b. Evaluation.
   c. Recommendations.

4. Request reports be submitted to this headquarters, ATTN: PDS, NLT 20 February 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/
R. K. HARRIS
MAJ, FA
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
CO, 6th PSYOP Bn
CO, 7th PSYOP Bn
CO, 8th PSYOP Bn
CO, 10th PSYOP Bn
S3, 4th PSYOP Group

A TRUE COPY:

JAMES M. RILEY
MAJ, Armor
Adjutant
Incl 1 to Incl 1
TET Material Developed by the 4th PSYOP Group Headquarters

1. Items Printed in-country:

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-108-69</td>
<td>&quot; and Puppet</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>JUSPAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-115-69</td>
<td>Flexagon</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3508</td>
<td>Leaflet (a JUSPAO item)</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>Battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leaflet Blanks</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>8th Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poster Blanks</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>8th Battalion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All items, except 4-106-69 and 3508, were completed and shipped to receiving elements prior to 31 December 1969.

2. Items printed offshore:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>DISTRIBUTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-81-69</td>
<td>Blank Stationery</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td>Battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-82-69</td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-83-69</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-84-69</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-85-69</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-86-69</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-87-69</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-88-69</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-89-69</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-90-69</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-92-69</td>
<td>Pocket Calendar</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The planned 31 December 1969 RDD was not met. Although most of the offshore material did arrive prior to the beginning of TET, there were a few instances in which the material arrived after the TET celebration period.
TET Material Developed by PSYOP Battalions

1. Material developed by the 6th Battalion: Although the 6th Battalion received no requests for special TET material, they did produce several million items utilizing the pre-printed leaflet and handbill forms produced both offshore and by 4th Group headquarters. The message content of these items included mainly Chieu Hoi appeals and messages from province and district chiefs.

2. Material developed by the 7th Battalion: The 7th Battalion allocated a block of eight million impressions, to be spread over a three month period from November 1969 to January 1970, in support of TET 70. Several aerial tapes also were locally produced.

3. Material developed by the 8th Battalion: The 8th Battalion received and printed a total of 55 requests for TET material. The bulk of this material included message and greetings from province chiefs, entries selected from a Corps-wide poetry contest and quick reaction Chieu Hoi rally appeals.

4. Material developed by the 10th Battalion: The 10th Battalion produced and disseminated a variety of items in support of TET 70. These included: over a-million leaflets; two posters; two aerial tapes; and several TET greeting cards and letters.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 4th Psychological Operations Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.

CO, 4th Psychological Operations Group

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12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

13. ABSTRACT

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