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AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (15 Jun 70) FOR OT UT 701134 18 June 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 36th Signal Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
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STATEMENT #2 UNCLASSIFIED

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(ARMY) ATTN: FOR OT UT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 36TH SIGNAL BATTALION (CA)
APO San Francisco 96491

SCCPV-SG-CA-0

9 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 36th Signal Battalion (CA),
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Operations: Significant Activities.

a. During this reporting period, the 36th Signal Battalion has extensively planned for relocation and redeployment of supported units within its current sphere of operations.

(1) Song Be: The MACV Compound was relocated to a new location within Song Be Site, thus necessitating the complete relocation of communications facilities. The new bunker complex houses AN/TRC-117, AN/MTC-3, AN/GRC-142, and AN/MGC-19 vans. New buried cable will support most of the local telephones and quality of service should improve.

(2) Lai Khe: The redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division to CONUS, and the subsequent turnover of Lai Khe Base Camp to the 5th ARVN Division has necessitated a complete reevaluation of communications requirements. Present plans call for a significant reduction of communications support. Communications will be available for a MACV Advisory Team, with a completion date of late February.

(3) Hill 837: The 36th Signal Battalion will relocate its relay site at Hill 837 to Nui Tri, 3 miles southeast of Xuan Loc. Hill 837 is inaccessible except by helicopter and frequently cloud cover obscures the Hill precluding landing. This is particularly true in the monsoon season. Logistical problems are complex and radio equipment requires 300% backup in order to insure system reliability when the site is not accessible. Nui Tri is accessible by both road and air and affords excellent communications as a relay site. Estimated date of completion for relocation to Nui Tri is 22 February 1970.

b. Problems associated with the intermingling of both tactical and semi-fixed lines on a common frame have been alleviated by the construction of a 1000 line tactical frame separate from that of the AN/TCC-28 frame at Phuoc Vinh.

c. The 63d Signal Detachment (DCO), consisting of one officer and 25 enlisted men, was activated within the 36th Signal Battalion. The detachment, located at Lai Khe, is tasked with the mission of operating the

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AM/TTC-28, which was installed and is operated by the 36th Signal Battalion, thus providing the 1st Infantry Division with dial telephone service.

2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel: None.

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(1) Proper Engineering of Cable Installation.

(a) OBSERVATION: Numerous changes had to be implemented in cable rehabilitation plans at Lai Khe and Di An after the construction team had arrived and started to work, resulting in confusion and loss of man hours.

(b) EVALUATION: Cable maps have been the sole method used for cable engineering planning. In many instances cable maps do not depict all associated problems involving engineering plans.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Personnel responsible for cable installation should visit the planned installation site and physically plan the installation or rehabilitation while at the site, making sure that enough time is taken in the initial planning stages to eliminate loss of man hours and poor installation.

d. Organization: None.

e. Training:

(1) Inadequate Weapons Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: The overwhelming majority of replacement personnel arriving in RVN have no record of having qualified with the M-60 Machine Gun or M-79 Grenade Launcher.

(b) EVALUATION: It is essential that signal personnel are qualified in the use of the M-60 and M-79 weapons. Virtually all signal troops are assigned the use of these weapons for perimeter guard duty, reaction force and, at times, exterior patrols. There is no range available in Vietnam for qualification purposes. Although all personnel receive familiarization training, their proficiency is questionable and certainly not up to the standards required for good base camp defense.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: This problem can be alleviated by one of two methods. Either qualification for signal personnel in M-60 and M-79 weaponry can be made part of their Southeast Asia orientation training, or qualification ranges can be built in the I and III Corp areas of Vietnam.

(2) Generator Operator's Training for Signal MOS's.

(a) OBSERVATION: Personnel with 31M, 31N, 72B, and 72C MOS's have virtually no knowledge of power systems and simple generator operation.

(b) EVALUATION: Non-availability of generator mechanics on site when a power failure occurs often leads to outages of longer than necessary duration. In many cases simply starting a backup generator and switching loads is all that is required to resume site power. Signal MOS personnel have had no schooling in power systems and simple generator operation. In some cases they are merely shown slides of generators and orientation classes last for only fifteen minutes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Classes including practical exercises utilizing 5 KW, 10 KW, 15 KW, 30 KW, 45 KW, and 50 KW generators should be held in all signal MOS classes. Classes should include generator operation, switch boxes, and paralleling boxes. In-country OJT classes are held for this purpose, but the existing OJT program is heavily absorbed in solving critical MOS shortages.

(3) Patch Panel Orientation for 72B Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: The majority of newly arrived 72B's in Vietnam are unable to effectively operate the organic patch panel configurations in AN/MGC-19 and AN/ MSC-29 vans.

(b) EVALUATION: With a shortage of experienced 72B personnel, it is often necessary to rely on inexperienced operators for shift duty. However, their lack of patch panel knowledge prevents them from effectively testing both on line and backup equipment with back to back procedures through the patch panel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that a block of instruction be included in 72B MOS school for patch panel operations. On the job training once in Vietnam; will serve as effective refresher training.

f. Logistics:

(1) Inadequate Supply Support.

(a) OBSERVATION: Line units of this Battalion have had to resort to the barter system for mission essential equipment and repair parts

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(b) **EVALUATION:** The supply system is not supplying the needs of the operating units. Although this statement may be debated at staff levels, it is a cruel reality to any line unit. The very existence of a red ball or blue streak requisition is an admission that the urgency of need and issue priority system is not as responsive as desired. Not just low volume items are involved here, but rather high density, high volume mission essential items: mosquito nets, truck tires, fan belts, fuel filters, capacitors, and many others. No unit can adequately perform its mission with inadequate supply support. This unit has experienced communications failures directly traceable to inadequate supply support.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** An effort must be made at all command levels to make known the failings of the present system, and to recommend changes to improve it. It is not good enough to "cover it with paper". A valid requisition may please the inspectors, but the troops cannot sleep under a requisition, you cannot substitute a 2765-1 for the tires on a truck, and you cannot perform your mission if all you have is a neat pile of valid requisitions.

(2) Air Conditioning Support.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Maintenance support for air conditioning equipment is inadequate.

(b) **EVALUATION:** This problem has been especially prevalent with dial central office air conditioners. The air conditioning equipment in the AN/TTC-28 seems to be virtually unrepairable, and while they rest in a maintenance yard, significant damage is done to the DCO. No substitutes are available for turned in items, as they are not TO&E authorized. The Di An DCO suffered for several months without air conditioning installation. The support furnished at Di An by PA&E and the post engineer is best typified as, too little and mostly too late.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Air conditioner repair remains a problem that appears to be presently solvable only by command pressure at the highest level. Recommend investigation of the feasibility of establishing a central maintenance float of air conditioners, together with a controlled cannibalization and repair point. Also recommend appropriate actions to attempt to improve PA&E support in this area.

g. Communications: None.

h. Material: None.

SCGPV-SG-CA-0

9 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 36th Signal Battalion (CA),
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (R2)

1. ~~Other~~ None.

C. E. McKnight Jr.

C. E. MCKNIGHT JR.

LTC, SigC

Commanding

~~Incl~~

Organization Chart

Incl wd HQ, DA

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- 1 - CG, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), ATTN: SCGPV-OP-AD, APO 96384
- 16 - CO, 2d Signal Group, APO 96491

SCCPV-SG-CO (9 Feb 70) 1st Ind

26 FEB 1970.

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 36th Signal Battalion (CA),
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA, Hqs, 2d Signal Group, APO SF 96491


TO: Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade, ATTN: SCCPV-OP, APO SF 96384

1. Subject report is forwarded in accordance with 1st Signal Brigade Supplement 1 to AR 525-15.

2. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and offers the following comments.

a. Page 1, Para 1a, (3), last sentence in paragraph should read: Completion for relocation to Nui Tri is dependent upon MACV approval of a move to Nui Tri.

b. Concur with the remainder of the report as written.



EDWARD D. MEARES
Colonel, SigC
Commanding

SCCPV-OP-AD (9 Feb 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 35th Signal Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1970, AOs CSFOR-65 (A2)

DA, HQ, 1st Signal Brigade (USASMA/COM), APO 96384 7 March 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. Subject report is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.
2. The following comments are made:

a. Reference item "Generator Operator's Training for Signal MOS's", Para 2e(2), Page 3: Training on such a wide range of generators would not be feasible for 72B personnel. Brigade does concur that at the Fort Gordon Signal School, a block of instruction should be devoted to training on 30 kW and 60 kW generators. Each student should be required to perform operator's maintenance and have the ability to properly start and stop generator units.

b. Reference item "Patch Panel Orientation for 72B Personnel", Para 2e(3), Page 3: Brigade fully concurs, such training is more critical in today's swift mobile tactical communication complexes than ever before. This not only applies to Vietnam but throughout the free world. This training should be required and/or recommended for all 72B students at the Fort Gordon Signal School for all types of communication facilities, regardless of size or configuration.

c. Reference item "Inadequate Supply Support", Para 2f(1), Page 3:

(1) The supply system is responsive to requests which have been properly prepared and submitted. The inadequate response as outlined in this comment is traced to improper preparation of requests coupled with the abuse of the IPD. Further observation of units reveals that poor response to supply requirements is caused by the unit in that requests are not generated into the supply channels with order and ship time being considered.

(2) Supply problems are further compounded by the experience of the individuals and observation reflects that most personnel do not have the initiative for self education within the supply field.

(3) Units must maintain a PLL and post demand data as requirements occur, reorder items in a timely manner, not just when there is a zero balance.

SCCPV-OP-AD

7 March 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 36th Signal Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

d. Reference item "Air Conditioning Support", Para 2f(2), Page 4: The maintenance of tactical and van mounted air conditioners is not the responsibility of PA & E. The Direct Support Unit has the responsibility of providing maintenance support for these air conditioners. This headquarters has brought this matter to the attention of the appropriate agencies involved and is actively engaged in attempting to solve the problem of air conditioning maintenance support.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



O. V. LONERANZ
Major, AGC
Adjutant General

CF:

Commanding General, U. S. Army Strategic Communications Command,
ATTN: SCC-OPS-RT, Ft Huachuca, Arizona 85613
Commanding Officer, 2d Signal Group, APO 96491
Commanding Officer, 36th Signal Battalion, APO 96491

AVHGC-DST (9 Feb 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 36th Signal Battalion
(CA), Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 29 MAR 1970

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Communications
Command-Pacific, APO 96557

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 36th Signal Battalion (CA) and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "Generator Operator's Training for Signal MOS's", page 3, paragraph 2e(2); concur. All operators of signal communications equipment should have training in the power generation equipment associated with their particular MOS. Operators must know not only how to start and stop the generator but also how to perform daily maintenance. Formal training for signal MOS's should also be expanded to include instruction on the larger generators such as the 15 KW, 30KW, 45KW, and 60KW. Recommend this matter be addressed by USCOMARC.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



L. D. MURRAY

CPT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st Sig Bde
36th Sig Bn


SCCP-OP3 (9 Feb 70) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 36th Signal Battalion
(CA) Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Strategic Communications Command -
Pacific, APO San Francisco 96557 24 APR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. Subject report is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.
2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

for 
FRANK C. MAHIN
COL, GS
Chief of Staff

CF:
CG, USARV, APO 96475 (wo incl)
CG, 1st Sig Rde (USASTRATCOM), APO 96384 (wo incl)
CO, 2d Sig Gp (USASTRATCOM), APO 96491 (wo incl)
CO, 36th Sig Bn (USASTRATCOM), APO 96491 (wo incl)

GPOP-DT (9 Feb 70) 5th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 36th Signal Battalion (CA) for
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 27 APR 70

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Strategic Communications Command,
Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D. D. Cline

D. D. CLINE

2LT, AGO

Asst AG

CF:

DA, ACSFOR

CG, USASTRATCOM-PAC

SCC-PO (9 Feb 70) 6th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 36th Signal Battalion (CA) for
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army Strategic Communications Command, Ft Huachuca, AZ 85631

4 MAY 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

for 
W. Q. POLSTON
Maj, AGC
Asst Adj Gen.

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