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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980
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AGDA (M) (11 Jun 70) FOR OT UT 701315 17 June 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 519th Transportation Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970

SEE DISTRIBUTION

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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1 Incl

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This document is subject to special export controls and cannot be transmitted to foreign governments or foreign nationals without prior approval of Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (Army) ATTN: FOR OT UT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 519th Transportation Battalion (Truck)
APO San Francisco 96232

INTB-SC 13 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 519th Transportation Battalion for Period
Ending 31 January 1970, ROS-03 For-65 (R1), UIC: WFSQIA

Commanding General
USARSUPTHAI
ATTN: THOP-MH
APO SF 96233

1. SECTION 1. OPERATIONS: Significant Activities:

a. On 10 November Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Vidrick assumed command
of the 519th Transportation Battalion. Colonel Vidrick came to the battalion
from OPD, Transportation Branch at DA, and replaced Lieutenant Colonel William
H. Mantooth who was reassigned to MTHTC.

b. The basic missions of the 519th remain unchanged. The Battalion has
the responsibility for clearing the Deep Water Port of Sattahip and the Ammm-
nition Port at Vayama of all special or sensitive commodities, and all cargo
that cannot be handled by ETO (Express Transport Organisation). ETO is the
civilian transportation enterprise in Thailand and gets first offering on
all cargo requiring movement. Certain commodities cannot be moved by ETO;

(1) Project 972 cargo is a specially packed, highly explosive, munition
that must be moved by U.S. Army vehicle. The need for special monitoring
of this cargo during its entire movement and the necessity for securing it
against any possible pilferage or mishandling, preclude its movement by non-
military vehicles.

(2) Project ZAB cargo must move by Army truck. All of this is destined
for the Air Force at Takhl and regardless of the commodity, is manifested
simply as ZAB. Much of this cargo is moved via RO-RO and a minimum of handl-
ing is necessary prior to delivery to Takhl.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 519th Transportation Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1970, R03-03 For-65 (R1), UIC: WFSQAA

(3) Class VI special commodity cargo is moved exclusively by Army truck. The majority of this is whiskey and is consigned to the Thai Lockor Fund in Bangkok. Due to its sensitivity, this cargo moves from Sattahip to Bangkok with Thai police escort.

(4) U.S. Mail is moved exclusively by government vehicle. Mail is flown into Don Muang Airport in Bangkok and is then moved overland to Sattahip and to Korat. Mail going out of country from both of those points is also trucked to Bangkok. Mail moves in vans, secured by double lock, and accompanied by a mail guard from the APO.

(5) The 313th Transportation Company (Reefer), a subordinate unit of the 519th, moves all chill and freeze overland. These perishables are delivered to troop messes, commissaries, ration breakdown points and any other facility that requires chill and freeze.

c. Five of the six units that compose the battalion are straight line haul companies. As mentioned above, the 313th is a reefer unit. Two of its platoons are located in Bangkok and one platoon is located at Sattahip. The principal mission of the Sattahip-based platoon is clearance of the Port of Sattahip whenever a reefer ship is on berth. Refrigerated cargo destined for the cold storage plant in Sattahip is moved by ETC because of the short distance involved. Refrigerated cargo destined for Bangkok or Korat is moved directly from shipside to those destinations by the 313th.

d. The month of December was especially good from a statistical standpoint. The 937,054 total miles and the 3,692,029 ton miles were both the second highest ever achieved by this battalion. The 972 loads and a good deal of ZAE to Takli were the main contributing factors. See inclosure 1 for a more complete statistical breakdown.

e. Line haul procedures were further refined in November with the institution of a system whereby convoys originate from the Deep Water Port of Sattahip. Formerly, all cargo destined for up country destinations was cleared out of the port to the TTP at Camp Vayama, and convoys departed from there. Security at Vayama was less than desirable and it meant moving the cargo 20 miles prior to its move north. Security at the trailer holding area of the port is vastly superior and control of the convoys is improved since the port is approximately 15 miles closer to the battalion headquarters than is the TTP at Vayama.

f. On 10 November, the routing for transportation of mail from Sattahip to Bangkok, and vice versa, was changed from the Inland Road to the Coastal Road. A 30 day test was conducted to determine what advantages might accrue from such a switch. Detailed reports were received from the 505th Transportation Company, which does the transporting, and from the 9th Base Post Office at Sattahip. The following advantages were realized and the route was approved for continued use.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 519th Transportation Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS-CS For-65 (RI), UIC: WFSQAA

(1) The new route requires 3/4 hours travel time versus 5/2 hours for the old route.

(2) Fuel consumption is reduced from 76 gallons to 52 gallons per round trip.

(3) Mail arriving from Bangkok arrives earlier, is broken down earlier, and gets into the hands of the troops earlier.

(4) The mail arrives in Bangkok in sufficient time to meet the air schedules at Don Muang. There is also sufficient time to allow for contingencies such as flat tires, accidents, traffic jams etc.

(5) The mail guard and driver are now getting more rest between runs. This is an important safety consideration.

g. During the period 20-29 December 1969 the battalion moved 106 loads of Project 972 cargo to the 105th Bomb Dump at Ubon Air Force Base. This was the first time that a 972 operation had been conducted since the battalion moved its headquarters and 2 companies out of Phanom Sarakham in August 1969. Because of the relocation of units, a somewhat different concept of operation was required for this exercise. Formerly the TTP at Phanom (Camp Charn Sinthope) was used to switch trailers. For the December run, it was decided to make only one switch, that taking place at Camp Khon Kaen, 145 miles north of Korat. A complete route reconnaissance was made prior to the exercise, to update distances, travel times and checkpoints. The battalion SOP (attached as enclosure 3) was revised and distributed. Two companies were used to move the 972 cargo. The 505th moved the loads from the ASP at Vayama to Khon Kaen the first day, and the 569th moved it from Khon Kaen to Ubon the second day. On 20 December, 22 loads left Vayama. Another 22 loads moved on 22 and 24 December and 21 loads moved on 26 and 28 December. There was only one genuine ring off and it came on the last day, less than 100 miles from final destination. On the evening of 20 December, one container split open in the ammo holding area at Khon Kaen, and had to be destroyed. Because of improvements in the methods of packing 972 cargo, the rash of ring-offs that plagued past 972 operations was not present this time. On runs from Sattahip to Khon Kaen, a midway refueling and maintenance stop was made at Korat. The 291st Transportation Company set up a service station type POL line for refueling and provided transportation into Camp Friendship for the GI's to eat the noon meal. Standby maintenance facilities were also made available. Upon arrival at Ubon, the monitoring team with monitoring devices, the ambulance and the spare fire extinguishers and tarps, were flown by C-130 from Ubon RTAFB to U-Tapao RTAFB to allow these personnel and equipment to be ready to move out on the following day. Support from all military activities and from the Thai authorities was outstanding. Details of 972 operations, along with a list of supporting units, can be found in the attached SOP.

h. During the month of December, the battalion completed an extensive
self-help project in which it erected a communications site at Camp Samsas San, Sattahip. The site sits on top of a 96 meter hill in the center of the camp. A EMARCA AM radio serves as the battalion base station. This is a FMAC 93 commercial set manufactured by Collins. A doublet is the antenna system used. The base station equipment is powered by 2 diesel operated 15 KW generators. The generators are refueled by gravity feed from a 600 gallon fuel tank. Maintenance on the generators is performed by 2 LN mechanics, while maintenance on the communications equipment is performed by the members of the battalion communications section. At each of the company forward locations, (Bangkok, Korat and Khon Kaen) is found an AN/OFRC 106 radio. Units enter the net each morning and remain on the air until released. During normal operations, the net is open from 0730 to 1700 Monday thru Friday and from 0730 to 1200 on Saturday. During special operations, such as the recently completed 972 move, the battalion operations center was able to maintain constant communications with the convoy by placing an AN/OFRC 16 on the hill and a similar radio in the S-3 shop. An AN/OFRC 16 antenna was erected on the hill. All convoy commanders are required to carry an AN/OFRC 106 radio, and command and control of convoys anywhere in country has increased tremendously.

1. During the month of August, 10 trailers were set aside to be used exclusively for ammo port clearance and local distribution runs. During the past quarter, these trailers were returned to the general fleet to allow greater flexibility in the use of 8P trailers.

2. On 15 January, the 569th Transportation Company at Khon Kaen and the 33rd Transportation Platoon (Reefer) at Korat stood down as the first phase of Operation Banner Star. The missions of both of these units have been assumed by the 291st Transportation Company at Korat. This assumption of extra missions has tripled the LOC of the 291st. Whereas its original mission was line haul from Korat to Khon Kaen, the 291st now must move cargo all the way to the forward air bases of Ubon, Udorn and Nakhon Phanom. In an attempt to assist the 291st in supporting the area north of Korat, the 260th and 505th Transportation Companies were committed during January to moving cargo all the way from the port complex at Sattahip to the forward bases. This has the advantage of giving the battalion greater flexibility by familiarizing more units with the northern portion of the battalion LOC. It has the disadvantage of keeping tractors and trailers away from the Sattahip area longer than is desirable.

3. A number of new innovations were instituted during the past quarter in an attempt to improve security of cargo and equipment, particularly that cargo which does not move in convoy, i.e. local distribution. A GI assistant driver is now placed on all tractors working local distribution. The responsibility of the GI is to insure that cargo gets to its destination. The patrolling of the local distribution routes by platoon leaders, platoon sergeants and squad leaders has been increased. A dispatcher has been placed
at the Deep Water Port of Sattahip to log out all tractors leaving for delivery to local consignees. This dispatcher must also annotate the trip ticket of each of these tractors with the TCMD number and the number of the trailers being pulled. When the driver turns his trip ticket into his operations section at the end of the day, it reflects how many TCMD’s he should turn in and what the numbers of these TCMD’s are. Future plans are to place a jeep with radio at the port, at the Thailand Army Depot and at U-Tapao RTAFB, the latter two being our principal local consignees. At the present time, sufficient jeeps are not available to allow this. Physical security plans for all unit motor pools were reviewed and revised in an attempt to reduce what had been an unacceptable level of thefts of vehicles and equipment. A complete evaluation of the revised procedures will be made on the next ORLL.

1. The 53rd Transportation Company at Sattahip has a mission which is exclusive to it. The 53rd clears the ammunition port at Vayama. Because of the narrowness of the piers (one is a Delong pier) and the related safety peculiarities, the 53rd is the only unit committed to ammo port clearance. The unit has been doing this for some time and its LN drivers are accustomed to maneuvering in the narrow confines of the ammo piers. This mission, together with the requirements for transportation capability to conduct local delivery, has kept the 53rd from conducting line haul operations. This has caused some problems. All line haul convoys travel with both driver and assistant driver. In most cases one LN and one GI work together on the same vehicle and travel together on up country runs. The normal companionship generated by such an arrangement is prevalent among the other line haul units. (The 569th at Khon Kaen is an exception in this case, since it is a type A unit and has no LN drivers.) Until recently, no assistant was required on local runs and none has ever been required on tractors working a port clearance commitment. Therefore, the natural fellowship that developed in other units did not develop in the 53rd and problems between GI and LN began cropping up. Another peculiarity of the 53rd’s operational concept is the fact that they operate both a day shift and a night shift because of the need to clear both ports on a 24-hour basis. This deprives the LN drivers of the overtime that drivers from other units earn. Not conducting any line haul operations also deprives the 53rd of their share of the TDI that is earned by the units line hauling to points north. All of these factors generated considerable morale problems, led to a deterioration of Thai-American relations and invited an unacceptable amount of pilferage in the 53rd. In order to rectify this situation, local delivery commitments are now being widely distributed among the two other units in the Sattahip area and the 53rd is beginning line haul operations. A complete evaluation of the results of this change in procedure will be included in the next ORLL.

2. SECTION 2, LESSONS LEARNED: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

   a. Personal:
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 519th Transportation Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS-CS For-65 (RI), UIC: WPSQAA

(1) Observation: The planned cut-back in military units and government funds is causing considerable unrest among LN employees.

(2) Evaluation: There is a feeling among many of the Thai employees that the military effort in Thailand has reached a peak and is beginning to decline. Many see this as a threat to their future economic stability and this has allowed a "gangster" element to creep into the system. As a result, added precautions must be taken to safeguard supplies and equipment, as some employees seek to make a "quick kill" by delivering into unauthorized hands cargo destined for consignees. This is especially true in local areas and has necessitated the increased security measures mentioned in section 1. A well organized ring appears to have established itself with numerous connections within the units. Threats against the lives of some employees have thwarted efforts to uncover this ring. Bringing in more military personnel might help to slow down the thievery but could deepen the fear of unemployment among Thai employees. In some instances, there is a reluctance by the better, more qualified personnel to fill vacant leadership positions because of the possibility that they may be approached to participate in illegal activities. Efforts to raise the morale of one particular unit (53rd Transportation Company) by giving its people the opportunity to earn more money by accumulating its share of overtime and TDY should help considerably.

(3) Recommendations: Every effort should be made at all levels to inspire confidence in the stability of the military effort in Thailand and to protect the LN employees by rooting out the mafia-type organization which evidently exists.

b. Operations:

(1) Sub topic # 1. Prior coordination for 972 convoys.

(a) Observation: The 972 operation in December was perhaps the smoothest that has ever been conducted by this battalion.

(b) Evaluation: The ability of all units involved in the exercise to begin planning early, make maximum use of past reports and foresee all possible problem areas resulted in a practically problem-free exercise. There were a few people in the battalion who had been involved in past 972 runs and they were grilled extensively on problem areas during these past 972 runs, and recommendations for eliminating the same problems on the upcoming mission. Two Lieutenants in particular played extremely vital roles in preparation for the exercise. Eighty trailers were set aside a week before the ship carrying the cargo arrived and these were put through an extensive maintenance check and inspection to prevent a refusal by the ammunition inspector at the ammco loading point. The trailers were loaded at shipsite in the same configuration that was required for movement up country. They were then stored at the Ammunition Storage Area until ready for final move-
Detailed, exact coordination with every activity supporting the operation was affected and absolute maximum cooperation was received from anyone who had anything to do with the exercise. Using mobile units and the communications setup discussed in section 1, allowed the most effective communications system yet employed. It was discovered that communications was poorest during the early morning hours prior to daybreak. Since all convoys departed at 0500, communications was very poor and sometimes non-existent during the first hour of each day's run. Billeting at Phan presented a slight difficulty because of a severe shortage of government billeting facilities, however this did not seriously affect the mission.

Another minor problem was numerous "false" ring-offs caused by the electrical connections breaking loose as a result of trailer vibration. Whenever one of these occurred, the convoy had to stop to check for a possible genuine ring-off. It ordinarily took just a few moments to ascertain that a loose connection was responsible. Overall, the esprit de corps and enthusiasm displayed by everyone concerned with 972 was outstanding.

(c) Recommendation: More 972 convoys or similar operations should be conducted. The training and experience gained by everyone in all facets of convoy operations was extremely valuable. The training provided by the operation of the radio equipment by junior officers and NCO's cannot be matched under any simulated conditions. Also recommend some improvement be made in the wiring system of the monitoring devices to prevent the connections from breaking loose during movement.

(2) Sub topic # 2. Clearance of refrigerated cargo from the Deep Water Port of Sattahip.

(a) Observation: Advance shipping information (cargo manifests, stow plans) on reefer ships is not sufficiently accurate to allow adequate planning for the utilization of reefer vans to offload the ships.

(b) Evaluation: The port of Sattahip is, 99% of the time, the final port of call for reefer ships crossing the Pacific. Earlier ports of call usually take what they want and leave what they want. The manifests and stow plans are very seldom adjusted and when the ship arrives, it is not known until the hatches are opened, exactly what on the ship is destined for Sattahip cold storage and what is destined for Bangkok. Advance planning for utilization of the 313th reefer vans narrows down to little more than an educated guess. Because of loading time and travel time to Bangkok (approximately 6 hours) the vans have sometimes arrived in Bangkok in the middle of the night. Some advance notice is required to arrange for night work crews at the warehouses in Bangkok. When vans arrive in Bangkok and no crews have been laid on, the vans must run all night until the day crews start work. The related maintenance problems associated with this use of vans as temporary storage facilities are astronomical.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 519th Transportation Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS-CS For-65 (RI), UIC: WFSQAA

(a) Recommendation: That all reefer cargo be offloaded directly into Sattahip cold storage and later moved to Bangkok on a programmed basis. This would assist significantly in reefer maintenance and would allow the vessel to be offloaded almost twice as fast. The reduced time that the ship would have to remain in port would be reduced along with the corresponding berth costs. Loading a reefer van from a storage facility takes much less time than over the side loading. The van remains open approximately one half the time when loading from the storage facility and the cooling unit is not required to work as hard to keep the temperature down.

(3) Sub topic # 3. Moving of ZAE cargo on RO-RO ships using USATSA trailers.

(a) Observation: The best tonnage accumulated by any unit in this battalion is the result of ZAE cargo moved on USATSA trailers.

(b) Evaluation: The high ton-mile figure accumulated by the 260th Transportation Company in December (983,031 ton miles) was due mainly to the amount of ZAE cargo moved on USATSA trailers. These trailers come in loaded to maximum capacity and are already blocked and braced. The preparation for movement of this cargo is minimal, and the handling of cargo is reduced to practically nothing. The use of USATSA's also makes available for other commitments, a greater number of the trailer assets of the battalion.

(c) Recommendation: That USATSA trailers continue to be used for ZAE cargo and that consideration be given to using pre-loaded USATSA's for as much other cargo as possible.

c. Training:

(1) Sub topic # 1. Junior Officers Training Program.

(a) Observation: A Junior Officers Training Program was conducted during a portion of the past quarter. Classes were given on Tuesday evenings, on a variety of subjects.

(b) Evaluation: The program is worthwhile if the selection of topics is made carefully, with a view toward presenting material which is beneficial to the officer in his present job performance. The presentation of material that may help the officer in some future assignment is a waste of time. He will tend to disregard what is being presented to him and even if he does pay attention, he will probably forget the majority of what he has been told. Another critical item is careful selection of instructors and proper preparation by instructors. If an officer is going to be required to sit in a classroom, he has the right to expect that the instructor be qualified in his subject matter and that he has enough concern about the class that he will make an honest effort to properly prepare himself.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 519th Transportation Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS-CS For-65 (RI), UIC: WFSQAA

(c) Recommendation: That topics be intelligently selected, that instructors be carefully chosen and that classes not be held at night.

(2) Sub topic # 2. Communications training.

(a) Observation: Proper communications procedures are very seldom known and practiced.

(b) Evaluation: Assumption that junior officers and NCO's were familiar with proper radio-communication procedures proved erroneous when 972 convoys were run in December. The infrequent usage of the equipment prior to the 972 operation contributed to the lack of training in its use.

(c) Recommendation: All units should use their communications equipment at every opportunity. If a unit is about to engage in an important exercise, requiring the use of infrequently-used equipment, a short training program should be set up to train its people.

d. Intelligence: None.

e. Logistics:

(1) Sub topic # 1. Fabrication of PSP lowsides.

(a) Observation: Lowsides made from solid metal planking are considerably more durable than those made from PSP.

(b) Evaluation: The last ORLL explained a new procedure for fabricating lowsides for S&P trailers using PSP instead of wood. The reason for this was that PSP lasted longer and, in the long run, money was saved because less man hours were expended in constructing replacement lowsides. Eventually, even the PSP lowsides incur considerable damage. It has been determined that the use of solid metal planking has produced a heavier, more durable sideboard. However more heat is needed for the welding than is produced by the acetylene welding unit that is mounted on a unit's 5 ton wrecker. A much faster, more efficient job is done by use of an arc welder. The 53rd Transportation Company uses these lowsides in shuttling ammunition from the port at Waima to the ASP, a distance of approximately 3 miles. Experience has shown that the lowsides are sufficient to hold the ammunition on the trailer over this short distance and no bonding or tie down material is needed. This increases tremendously the utilization of the vehicles.

(c) Recommendation: MTOE's for all units have been revised for submission. Arc welding equipment has been included on the MTOE's. Recommend that the addition of this equipment be approved.

(2) Sub topic # 2. Use of Conex Containers.
THTB-SC 13 February 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 519th Transportation Battalion for Period
Ending 31 January 1970, RC3-CS For-65 (RI), UIC: WPS/44

(a) Observation: It has been observed that all units within USARSOYTHAI
are utilizing conex containers for storage purposes.

(b) Evaluation: The use of conex containers for storage purposes within
units creates a shortage at the port and terminal sites where they are needed
to transport supplies and equipment. The presence of conex containers within
units creates and encourages the hiding of excess equipment and they become
a "catch all" for everything that units do not want displayed or found.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that a directive be published
requiring all units to turn in conex containers not required for either
the storage of weapons or ammunition. It is further recommended that all
conexes within units be accounted for on property book records.

(3) Sub topic # 3. Class V basic loads.

(a) Observation: The basic loads of Class V for units located at Camp
Samae San are stored at the Vayama Ammunition Storage Point.

(b) Evaluation: The distance between Vayama and Samae San is approxi-
mately 20 miles. During readiness tests or in the event of hostilities it
would be impossible to get to this ammunition in time for it to do any good.

(c) Recommendation: That a safe and secure area for the storage of basic
loads be constructed at Camp Samae San.

f. Communications:

(1) Observation: Use of communications equipment leads to better mainte-
nance of that equipment and also allows better control of subordinate units.

(2) Evaluation: The battalion communications net that was established in
December has forced units to familiarize themselves with the equipment and
has also led them to pay careful attention to the maintenance of this equip-
ment. The requirement to use it on a daily basis has forced attention to
equipment that, in many cases, has lain dormant in some supply room or other
storage facility. Instant communications with distant units has allowed quicker
dissemination of policy matters and instructions for daily operations. Radio/wire
integration using the AM net is extremely efficient.

(3) Recommendation: All units having communications equipment should use
it to the maximum extent possible.

g. Organization:

(1) Observation: The 53rd Transportation Company is in need of a 3rd
platoon.
13 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 519th Transportation Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS-CS For-65 (RI), UIC: WFSQAA

(2) Evaluation: The 53rd has been put on line haul operations to assist the 260th and 505th Transportation Companies in moving cargo to northern destinations. The 53rd has only 2 platoons, having been cut one platoon in March 1969. The need for this third platoon is becoming more evident and will become a critical item by the end of the next quarter.

(3) Recommendation: The 53rd be brought up to strength by the addition of one LT platoon leader, one SPC platoon sergeant, one SSG assistant platoon sergeant, two SGT squad leaders and twelve drivers. Local National augmentation can fill the other positions. The unit must also be given twenty 5 ton tractors.

h. Safety:

(1) Observation: The safety awards program has been the major contributing factor in the outstanding safety record accumulated by this battalion.

(2) Evaluation: During the past quarter, the battalion has averaged less than 7 recordable accidents per million miles. During the month of January, the rate was 3.0, which is .5 below the USARPAC goal. Safety awards are given for 5,000 to 30,000 accident free miles. These range from a Certificate of Achievement to a transistor radio. The battalion wants to give a cash award for 40,000 accident free miles but is unable to obtain authority to do so. It is believed that every effort should be made to keep the program strong. The savings realized in less injuries and reduced cost of damages easily justifies the investment.

(3) Recommendation: That authority be granted to give a cash award of $10.00 to a GI driver who accumulates 40,000 accident free miles and an equivalent number of baht for an LN driver achieving the same.
THOP-OP (31 Jan 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 519th Transportation Battalion for
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2), UIC WPSQAA

DA, Headquarters United States Army Support, Thailand, APO 96233

THRU: Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington D.C., 20310

Operational Report of the 519th Transportation Battalion has been
reviewed and is forwarded with the following comments:

a. Reference para 2a(2 and 3). Concur with the recommendation.
The ability to maintain 100% strength by grade and MOS is hampered by
tour length (12 months) which increases personnel turbulence. The
Provost Marshal and the Thai police are cognizant of the situation and
are doing all within their power to alleviate this mafia-type activity.

b. Reference para 2b(2), Nonconcur with the recommendation. The
basic problem with clearance of refrigerated cargo from the deep water
port of Sattahip is a result of reefer cargo being layered stowed rather
than block stowed. Assistance in this matter has been requested from
HTMT. The off loading of all reefer cargo directly into the Sattahip
cold storage area, and later moved to Bangkok on a programmed basis,
is considered impractical.

Reference para 2e(2). Nonconcur with the recommendation. The
use of CONEX's for temporary storage is recognized and authorized by
this and higher headquarters. However, the authorization is held to
the absolute minimum consistent with mission accomplishment. The
commander's directives concerning the use of CONEX's are considered adequate.

d. Reference para 2g. Recommended personnel is based on the as-
sumption that one additional platoon will be authorized. Every effort
to fill created positions will be made if augmentation is approved. The
twenty 5-ton tractors requested should be provided immediately upon
approval of the additional platoon. All other equipment needed in
augmentation to the platoon is available for utilization.

e. Concur with all other comments. Appropriate action will be

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

R.G. WHEELEAVER
Major, USAF
AVOMOTIVE CENTRAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 519th Transportation Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2), UIC WFSQAA
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 24 APR 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

D.D. CLINE
2LT, AGC
Asst AG
### 519th Operations Report

**Assigned Vehicle Days**: 23173  
**Available Vehicle Days**: 16089  
**Date**: 1 Nov 69 - 31 Jan 70  
**Unit Reporting**: 519th Trans Bn

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<td>4,961</td>
<td>14,136</td>
<td>5,711,804</td>
<td>604,243</td>
<td>554,585</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,158,828</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Haul (2)</td>
<td>4,034</td>
<td>44,121</td>
<td>1,861,847</td>
<td>65,131</td>
<td>155,520</td>
<td></td>
<td>220,651</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reefer Cargo (3)</td>
<td>1,418</td>
<td>4,739</td>
<td>1,179,586</td>
<td>174,825</td>
<td>181,919</td>
<td></td>
<td>356,744</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>2,837</td>
<td>35,231</td>
<td>5,671</td>
<td>5,952</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,623</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL (Bulk) (4)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>17,185</td>
<td>1,829</td>
<td>3,089</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,918</td>
<td>335,000</td>
<td>Total of gals moved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driveaways (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No of tanks moved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overhead Support (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>339,852</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals (7)</td>
<td>10,962</td>
<td>71,396</td>
<td>8,806,153</td>
<td>851,699</td>
<td>901,065</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,092,616</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
519TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TRUCK)

COMMANDING OFFICER

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

SERGEANT MAJOR

S-1

ADMIN

PERSONNEL

Q DET

S-3

OPNS

CONC

S-4

PBO

RMO

53rd Trans Co (1st Trk-Cco)

313th Trans Co (2nd Trk-Cco)

291st Trans Co (3rd Trk-Cco)

69th Trans Co (4th Trk-Cco)

508th Trans Co (5th Trk-Cco)

260th Trans Co

53rd Trans Det (1st Trk-Reser)

313th Trans Det (2nd Trk-Reser)

291st Trans Det (3rd Trk-Reser)

69th Trans Det (4th Trk-Reser)

508th Trans Det (5th Trk-Reser)

260th Trans Det (5th Trk-Patrol)
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 519th Transportation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.