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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 48th Transportation Group, Period Ending 31 January 1970

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAN
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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UNCLASSIFIED REPORT
PROTECTIVE MARKING CANCELLED WHEN SEPARATED FROM INCLOSURE.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 48th Transportation Group (MT), Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R-2)

THRU: Commanding Officer
US Army Support Command, Saigon
APO 96491

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 20310


a. Under the command of Colonel Robert H. Schwarz, the 48th Transportation Group has the mission of providing general support motor transport service in III and IV Corps. In addition the Group is responsible for providing perimeter security for its assigned sector of Long Binh Post.

b. Headquarters 48th Group exercises command and control over the 6th and 7th Transportation Battalions (Truck) and the 261st Transportation Company. (Organizational chart - Inclosure 1). The only change in the Group's organization since the last reporting period has been the deactivation of the 352nd Transportation Company (Lt Trk) on 10 December and the concurrent activation of the 233rd Transportation Company (Hvy Trk). The 233rd Transportation Company continues to operate with the equipment and mission of the 352nd Transportation Company until heavy trucks and equipment are issued.

c. In performing its motor transport mission, the Group engages in several specific types of operations, the most prominent of which are listed below:

(1) Line Haul Operations: The Group continued to provide line haul support to tactical forces in the Republic of Vietnam. Primary destinations for convoy operations included Tay Ninh, Dau Tieng, Cu Chi, Quan Loi, Phuoc Vinh, Lai Khe, Song Be, Vung Tau, Can Tho, Tan An, Dong Tam. (See Time-Distance chart at Inclosure 2).
AVCA SON AB CO

10 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 48th Transportation Group (MT), Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS GSPCR - 65 (R-2)

(2) **Local Haul Motor Transport Service** is provided within a 25 mile radius of the Long Binh Post area. This mission involves multi-service support on a 24 hour per day basis.

(3) **Port and Beach Operations** were conducted as directed by the 3rd Transportation Center (MCC), Saigon Support Command. A commercial truck contractor, PERIL, has the primary mission of port clearance in the III Corps area. The 48th Group has been tasked to provide back-up port clearance to supplement the commercial contractor.

(4) **Retrograde Transportation Operations** are conducted incident to both line and local haul operations. Retrograde equipment is picked up in convoy areas (See Inclosure 2) and returned through Long Binh for salvage, re-issue or retrograde out of country.

(5) **Driveaway Operations** are conducted by the Group as directed by 3rd Transportation Center (MCC), Saigon Support Command. Driveaway operations include both wheeled and track vehicles, and involve the movement of equipment from Newport to first destination.

(6) **The Trailer Control Agency** is charged with the accountability of the 48th Group's total fleet of 977 trailers in the III and IV CTZ. The Group also operates two line haul Trailer Transfer Points (TTP) at Long Binh and Tay Ninh and three local haul TTP's in support of port and beach operations.

d. The following major developments have occurred during the reporting period:

(1) Line haul operations continued to require the bulk of the Groups transportation capability. The end of the rainy season brought increased commitments for line haul destinations. Specific increases were realised for pentaprime, cement, asphalt and lumber. Overall operations to line haul destinations showed 147,115 short tons of cargo moved; requiring the performance of 8,882,959 ton miles.

(2) The primary local haul development was increased activity at the Bien Hoa "Hot Cargo" ramp. The ramp is used as a Class V receiving and staging area for air shipments to outlying areas. These shipments are in response to Special Mission Airlift Requests (SMAR's) from throughout III and IV CTZ. The rapid reaction time necessary to support the ramp has required increased supervision of the operation and close coordination with the Air Force.

(3) The Group engaged in a variety of port and beach clearance missions during the reporting period:

Incl 2
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 48th Transportation Group (MT), Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR - 65 (R-2)

(a) In October, the Group was given the mission of port clearance in the Saigon/Newport area. The assets necessary to accomplish this mission fluctuated in the first weeks of operation. As the reporting period progressed, consistent operations became possible. On a daily basis, (45) 5 ton tractors are being provided for day operation and (30) for night operations. The operation has a total of (100) 12 ton trailers dedicated for its use, seventy percent of which are new trailers. The high trailer availability in the system assists in minimizing build-up of highway compatible cargo in the port. The use of USATSA non-refrigerated vans has been effective for the movement of chill and freeze cargo. These vans maintain desirable temperatures for Class I and have expedited loading and unloading procedures.

(b) The Cogido Ammunition Pier Site is a 24 hour per day operation involving the movement of Class V from three piers at Cogido to 3rd Ordnance Battalion, Long Binh Post. Barges are loaded from vessels at Cat Lai and moved up stream to Cogido for discharge. Seventeen 5 ton tractors, forty S&P trailers and sixteen 5 ton light trucks shuttle from the Cogido discharge point to the 3rd Ordnance Battalion. During the period, two significant changes in operational procedures have occurred. First, S&P trailers have been boxed with headboards and sideboards along one side to reduce ammunition spillage. Secondly, standard loading diagrams for various types of ammunition have been formulated in an attempt to reduce the damage to landing legs caused by improper distribution of loads. Total tonnage moved in the Cogido system during the quarter was 138,025 short tons. December accounted for the best tonnage production with a total of 51,743 short tons transported.

(c) In conjunction with the Cogido operation which handles Army Class V cargo, the Bien Hoa Barge Site discharges Air Force Class V. This is a 12 hour per day operation which has increased in magnitude during the past reporting period. The barge site requires the static dispatch of 5 ton tractors and 12 ton S&P trailers. Frequent surges in the operation have required flexibility in support of the site. Excess capability can be quickly applied to other local haul missions.

(d) During the past quarter the Group supported several unit moves operations including Operation Keystone Cardinal. The 48th Group supplied twenty-five S&P's and one van on a daily basis in support of this operation for a period of 35 days. During January the Phillipine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) equipment was transported from Tay Ninh to Newport. An average of fourteen S&P's daily were provided for this retrograde operation lasting a period of thirty-five days. Operation Keystone Bluejay is now in progress and is expected to terminate by mid April. Average support for this operation is twenty S&P's daily. This quarter has also marked the beginning of an increasing number of unit moves. As a result of the projected number of unit moves,
AVCA SGN AB CO
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 48th Transportation Group (MT), Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R-2)

moves involving Group assets, this headquarters has established a special commitment procedure. The procedure provides increased supervision on all special operations to monitor vehicle utilization and to provide responsive support. Related to unit moves is a growing number of retrograde loads that are being transported from line haul destinations to Long Binh Post. An increase has also been experienced in the number of items of retrograde that are moved from Long Binh to the port for shipment out of country.

e. The continued performance of the 48th Group's mission has resulted in the provision of combat service support to 1st, 9th, 25th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 199th Light Infantry Brigade, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force and the Royal Australian Task Force. In providing this support, the Group moved 537,755 short tons during this period and compiled a total of 14,058,672 ton miles. (Statistical summary - Inclosure 3.)

f. Enemy action remained light during the period.

(1) Ambush Incidents: The Quan Loi convoy was subjected to minor small arms fire on 11 November, while returning to Long Binh. Firing from a covered position approximately 50 to 75 meters to the west side of the road, the enemy failed to cause casualties or damage. On 22 November, a convoy of sixty vehicles from the Group was ambushed enroute to Song Be. The convoy, hauling Class I, II, IV, and V in support of the 1st Cavalry Division, proceeded from Long Binh to Phuoc Vinh where it was joined by two other serials of ninety vehicles from the 31st Engineer Battalion and one hundred and twenty ARVN vehicles. The convoy involving two hundred and seventy-five vehicles moved to a point 6 km south of Tienard Special Forces Camp, where the lead vehicle received small arms fire from both sides of the road. Forming a 400-600 meter "kill zone", the NVA directed mortar fire at the convoy from a position 400 meters to the left of the road. Convoy vehicles increased speed and moved through the kill zone, returning fire with organic weapons. The convoy closed into Song Be late in the afternoon with thirty trucks damaged by ambush. Four men from the 48th were wounded and evacuated, including the convoy commander. The convoy completed its mission and returned to Long Binh on 23 November 1969 without further incident.

(2) Sniper Incidents: On 14 Nov at 1540 hours, the Quan Loi convoy was engaged by sniper fire approximately 500 meters north of LT 76488135. Convoy personnel reacted appropriately and no casualties or vehicle damage was sustained. On 18 Nov at 1615 hours a single 5 ton tractor received two bursts of automatic weapons fire in the village of Cu Chi XT 65501419. There were no casualties or vehicle damage as the rounds impacted forward of the vehicle. On 29 Nov at 0950 hours, the lead task escort on the Quan Loi convoy received one round of sniper fire at a point 11 miles north of Lai Khe. Mortar fire was called in and no damages or injuries were received.

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(3) Mine Incidents: At 1630 hours on 27 January, a 5 ton tractor was lightly damaged when it struck a concussion type mine at a point 2 miles north of Ap Bau Long. Damages consisted of a bent battery box and running board. On 31 Jan at 1000 hours, a 5 ton tractor was heavily damaged when it struck an anti-vehicular mine at a point 6,000 meters from FSB Colorado on QL 15 between Vung Tau and Long Binh. The driver received a minor injury and was treated and released. The vehicle was towed back to Long Binh.

6. Perimeter Security. The 49th Transportation Group operates and maintains one of the four Defense Sectors on the Long Binh Post defensive perimeter. This is a two and a half mile sector which encompasses 21 tower/ground bunkers, 17 of which have recently been rebuilt. In addition to the bunkers, two 60 foot towers, "INDIA" and "JULIET", are manned by the Group. Included in the perimeter defense mission is the internal and external security of the critical installations within the Sector. These installations include USARV Headquarters and Heliport, 1st Logistic Command Headquarters, and the General Officers’ Quarters. To perform this mission the Group has four defensive subsectors under its operational control. The 6th Transportation Battalion has operational control over the elements of 306th Depot Troop Command which is billeted within its area of responsibility. The 7th Transportation Battalion has responsibility for the two primary gates "Alpha" and "Bravo" for access and egress into the sector. The 71st Transportation Battalion is also a defense subsector as is the USARV Special Troops. In addition to the maintenance of the perimeter bunkers, the sector must equip, train, and maintain a Sector Reaction Force and Battalion Reaction Forces. The mission of these elements is reconstitution and augmentation of the perimeter defense forces during periods of enemy activity. Weapons training and monthly Reaction Force training exercises are scheduled and conducted by the Sector Operation Center (SOC) as directed by the Commanding Officer of the 49th Group. In addition, the SOC conducts periodic Command Post Exercises to evaluate the responsiveness of the Subsector Operations Centers to enemy action. All matters pertaining to perimeter security are relayed to the SOC for evaluation and coordination with the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) operated by the Long Binh Post Headquarters.
2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.
   a. Personnel. None.
   b. Intelligence. None.
   c. Operations.
      (1) The use of partially boxed trailers for the transport of ammunition.
         (a) OBSERVATION: Trailers boarded on three sides have been used at the Cogido ammunition barge site in recent weeks.
         (b) EVALUATION: Partially boxed trailers reduce the droppage of ammunition due to rough roads and shifting loads. The combined use of sideboards and chain and binders in the Cogido System has resulted in higher operational efficiency due to less cargo droppage.
         (c) RECOMMENDATION: That 3/4 boxed S&P trailers be used to transport Class V in order to maintain a low degree of ammunition droppage.
      (2) The use of USATSA non-refrigerated vans for port clearance of Class I (chill and freeze) cargo.
         (a) OBSERVATION: Non-refrigerated vans for the movement of freeze and chill items were in use throughout this reporting period.
         (b) EVALUATION: Non-refrigerated vans can be used effectively for the efficient movement of chill and freeze items for short distances. Reduced cost of operation and speed of discharge makes them superior to reefer vans. No adverse affects on cargo have been encountered.
         (c) RECOMMENDATION: That non-refrigerated vans be used for the movement of chill and freeze items for short distances (up to 20 miles) for maximum economy and efficiency.
      (3) The use of schematics for loading of Class V on S&P trailers.
         (a) OBSERVATION: That a large number of S&P trailers hauling Class V were being deadlined as a result of damaged landing legs.
         (b) EVALUATION: That landing legs on the current fleet of trailers were unable to support the maximum weight capacity of the S&P under standard loads. By formulating special loading schematics for various types of ammunition, maximum tonnage could be hauled without severe
damage to landing legs. The theory involved was to place minimum tonnage over the landing legs and the majority of the tonnage over the rear wheels. The special schematics reduced load stress on the landing gear and legs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That schematics be formulated by units involved in the transport of Class V to reduce trailer deadline due to damaged landing legs.

(4) Operation of the Song Be convoy.

(a) OBSERVATION: The ambush of the Song Be convoy was directly attributable to inadequate security.

(b) EVALUATION: The convoy security forces consisted of eighteen 1/4 ton trucks, four mounted with 106 mm recoilless rifles and fourteen mounted with M-60 machine guns. In addition, military police supported with ten 1/4 ton trucks mounted with M-60 machine guns. The tactical security element lacked armored vehicles with off-road mobility. The large convoy presented a lucrative target with a minimum ground threat to NVA forces.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That armored vehicles be provided for movement with a convoy on the basis of one tactical vehicle for every five task vehicles. That an element of the security force be required to remain with the convoy trail party at all times. That line haul convoys not exceed more than 50-60 vehicles.

d. Organisation. None.
e. Training. None.
f. Logistics. None.
g. Communications:

(1) Inadequate telephonic communication between Trailer Control Agency (TCA) and 3rd Transportation Movement (MCC) representatives at convoy destinations.

(a) OBSERVATION: MCC, SUPCOM plays an important role in the control of 48th Group trailer assets. MCC's role is to telephone information to TCA daily regarding trailer status at convoy locations. Telephone communication has been very poor and unreliable.

(b) EVALUATION: By placing a TCA "trailer agent" at the communications base stations of Cu Chi and Lai Khe for a three day period each week, contact can be made with convoy destinations more reliably. This agent
is able to visit one of the convoy destinations each day and report trailer status from the base station. His presence in the convoy area has provided better trailer management and control.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units with similar operations adopt the use of a "trailer agent" for better trailer management and more accurate trailer control.

h. Material. None.

i. Other. None.

3 incl as

Cy And:
2. GRUS/USARC, ATTN: GPOP-DT
3. USAIR, ATTN: AVHOC-DST

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1. Reference paragraph 2c(2), page 6. CONCUR. The use of non-refrigerated vans for port clearance has proved effective; however, adequate refrigerated vans are available for the movement of chill and freeze to all other locations. Concurrence is given only for the use of these vans for port clearance.

2. Reference paragraph 2c(4), page 7. NONCONCUR with OBSERVATION; CONCUR with RECOMMENDATION. The OBSERVATION that the ambush of the Song Be convoy was directly attributable to inadequate security is a conclusion that is unsupported by the narration of the ambush given in paragraph 2c(4)(b). The ambush was directly attributable to the VC/NVA force. Concur with the RECOMMENDATION that "line haul convoys not exceed more than 50-60 vehicles." In the areas where a high probability of an ambush exists, convoys should be limited to 50-60 vehicles to provide only a fleeting target to the enemy.

3. Lessons Learned, observations, and recommendations are concurred in by this command with the above exception.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 2604

Michael D. Morton

ATTN: AVA GO-4NH

48th Trans Op
AVCA GO-MN (10 Feb 70) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 48th Transportation Group for period ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 26 MAR 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 48th Transportation Group for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow: Reference item concerning transport of ammunition, page 6, paragraph 2c(1). Concur. Sideboards are sufficient for an operation utilizing local haul but other tie down equipment still must be used, especially in line haul operations.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: FBM 4362

M. C. CLARK
CPT, AGG
Asst AG

CF:
USASUPCOM, SCN
48th Trans Grp
AVHGC-DST (10 Feb 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 48th Transportation Group (MT),
Period Ending 31 January 1970, MACVSFOR - 65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 9 APR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for
the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 48th
Transportation Group (MT) and concurs with the comments of indorsing
headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

D. J. WINTER
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st Log Comd
48th Trans Gp
GPOD-DT (10 Feb 70) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 13 APR 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

D.D. CLINE
2LT, AGC
Asst AG
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
10 February 1970

48th T Op (Mtr Trans)  
MTOT 55-12FP21

6th T Bn (Trk)  
MTOT 55-16FP20

261st T Co (Lt Trk) 5T  
MTOT 55-17GP24

7th T Bn (Trk)  
MTOT 55-16FP20

86th T Co (Hdm Trk Cgo)  
MTOT 55-18GP20

506th T Det (TTPO) in GF  
MTOT 55-300FP27

10th T Co (Hdm Trk Cgo)  
MTOT 55-180FP20

361st T Co (Hdm Trk Cgo)  
MTOT 55-18GP26

508th T Det (TTPO) in GF  
MTOT 55-300FP27

62nd T Co (Hdm Trk Cgo)  
1 Hvy Lift Flt  
MTOT 55-180FP20

223rd T Co (Hvy Lift) 10T  
MTOT 55-280FP01

120th T Co (Lt Trk) 26  
MTOT 55-170P21

446th T Co (Hdm Trk Cgo)  
MTOT 55-180FP02

379th T Co (Hdm Trk Rfr)  
MTOT 55-180FP20

543rd T Co (Lt Trk)  
MTOT 55-170P21

534th T Co (Hdm Trk Cgo)  
MTOT 55-180FP20

572nd T Co (Hdm Trk Cgo)  
MTOT 55-180FP02

563rd T Co (Hdm Trk Cgo)  
MTOT 55-180FP20

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10 February 1970

Distances and Times to Convoy Destinations

(This schematic supersedes undated schematic based on data to 15 Mar 69.)

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* These are planning data based on operational averages and current routes (to 10 Jul 69) from LONG Binh.
TONNAGE HAULED FOR THE QUARTER ENDING 31 JANUARY 1970

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TOTAL FOR ALL TYPES OF OPERATIONS: 537,755

TON MILES FOR THE QUARTER ENDING 31 JANUARY 1970

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TOTAL FOR ALL TYPES OF OPERATIONS: 14,058,672

Incl 3

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15
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 48th Transportation Group

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.