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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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13 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Transportation Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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UNCLASSIFIED REPORT
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  US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
  US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
  7th Transportation Battalion
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (7th Transportation Battalion) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR 65 (R-2)

THRU: Commanding Officer
68th Transportation Group (MT)
APO 96491

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES.

a. COMMAND.

(1) Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Porter assumed command of the 7th Transportation Battalion (Truck) on 11 December 1969, vice Lieutenant Colonel John D. Bruen.

(2) The following unit change of commands occurred during the period:

(a) Captain Davis H. Loftin assumed command of the 120th Transportation Company on 16 November 1969, vice Captain Charles D. Posta.

(b) Captain Michael L. Goddard assumed command of the 563d Transportation Company on 18 November 1969, vice Captain Haruo Shigezawa.

(c) Captain Jack B. Olsen assumed command of the 62d Transportation Company on 29 November 1969, vice Captain Walker N. Marx.

(d) Captain Jerry G. Hall assumed command of the 10th Transportation Company on 9 December 1969, vice Captain James O. Sample.

(e) Captain Harley S. Bishop Jr. assumed command of the 534th Transportation Company on 2 January 1970, vice First Lieutenant Robert E. Johnson.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (7th Transportation Battalion) for Period Ending 31 January 1970. RCS CSPOR 65 (R-2)

(f) Captain John R. McGarrahan assumed command of the 534th Transportation Company on 22 January 1970, vice Captain Harley S. Bishop Jr.

(3) Annual General Inspection and Command Maintenance Management Inspection data are at inclosure 1.

b. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE, AND DISCIPLINE.

(1) Personnel:

(a) The enlisted personnel posture continued to receive command interest throughout this period; the shortage of drivers hampered the 7th Transportation Battalion in the performance of its mission. Replacement personnel were received during the latter part of January and this alleviated the driver shortage; the majority of these replacements possessed 11B MOS's.

(b) Within this period, the 7th Transportation Battalion underwent a major change of unit commanders. This changeover has no noticeable affect on the battalion's mission accomplishment. Improvements continue to be made in all units and staff sections.

(2) Assignments: The 7th Transportation Battalion has been assigned the following officers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Asst S-3, Asst S-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(5) Co Commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>LT</td>
<td>Platoon Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>WO</td>
<td>(1) Unit Supply Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Co Maintenance Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Awards and Decorations: During the reporting period, the following Awards and Decorations were presented:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AWARD</th>
<th>OFFICER</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star &quot;V&quot; Device</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal &quot;V&quot; Device</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Purple Heart 0 0 4
Driver Award Certificate 0 0 186
Certificate of Achievement 0 0 25

(4) Casualties: During the reporting period, the following casualties were sustained:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Hostile Action</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in Hostile Action</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Battle Casualties</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Non-Hostile Action</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Disciplinary Action: During the reporting period, the following court-martials were held:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Court-Martial</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Court-Martial</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Court-Martial</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Major Improvements completed were the establishment of a battalion spot paint shop, two unit picnic areas, and relocation of the 120th Transportation Company motor pool from Can Tho to Binh Thuy.

(7) Projects completed during the reporting period were the construction of a defensive tower and resurfacing and improving the motor parks of all units.

c. OPERATIONS.

(1) Mission.

(a) The 7th Transportation Battalion's primary mission during this period was to provide line-haul, heavy-lift, retrograde and refrigerated motor transport services throughout the III and IV Corp Tactical Zones. Additionally, Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) transportation operations were conducted at Newport.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (7th Transportation Battalion) for Period Ending 31 January 1970. RCS CSPOR 65 (R-2)

(b) Units supported by the 7th Transportation Battalion during the reporting period were: The 1st Infantry Division at Dai Khe, Di An, Dau Tieng, Minh Thanh, Quan Loi; the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) at Phuoc Vinh, Tay Ninh, Song Be, Quan Loi, Phu Loi, Bear Cat, Long Thanh, Bien Hoa; the 25th Infantry Division at Cu Chi, Tay Ninh; the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Quan Loi, Xuan Loc, Bien Hoa; the 199th Light Infantry Brigade at Long Binh; the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division at Ben Luc, Tan An, Dung Tam; the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Task Force at Bear Cat; the 1st Royal Australian Task Force at Nui Dat, Vung Tau; Vung Tau Sub-Area Command at Vung Tau; the 164th Aviation Group at Can Tho; Binh Thuy, Bac Lieu, Ca Mau, Vi Thanh, Rach Gia, Long Xuyen, Chau Phu, Chi Lang, Tri Ton; the 29th General Support Group at Can tho, Long Binh; US Army Depot at Long Binh; the 4th Terminal Command at Saigon; Newport, Tay Ninh; the 8th Aerial Port at Tan Son Nhut Air Base; and the 159th Engineer Group at Xuan Loc, Langa River, Gia Kim.

(c) 7th Transportation Battalion Organization Chart: See Inclosure 2.

(2) Operational Data accumulated during the reporting period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TONS</th>
<th>MILES</th>
<th>TON-MILES</th>
<th>Pax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>59,809</td>
<td>697,863</td>
<td>2,590,671</td>
<td>7,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>62,707</td>
<td>517,008</td>
<td>2,643,778</td>
<td>6,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>60,956</td>
<td>504,657</td>
<td>2,660,882</td>
<td>6,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>183,472</td>
<td>1,719,528*</td>
<td>7,895,331</td>
<td>20,799</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Includes load miles and deadhead miles.

(3) Highway Operations:

(a) On 14 November 1969, the 7th Transportation Battalion operated its fourth Song Be convoy. This convoy consisted of two serials. Serial one consisted of two officers and 62 drivers and control personnel, 50 stake and platform (S&P) loads of Class I, II and IV, and V (12) cargo. This was the first resupply convoy of Class V to Song Be. Serial two consisted of 44 vehicles from the 62d Engineer Battalion. This convoy was well coordinated and adequate security provided. The convoy returned without incident on 15 November 1969.

(b) On 22 November 1969, the 7th Transportation Battalion was again tasked to operate the Song Be convoy. The convoy consisted of three serials two US and one ARVN. The 7th Transportation Battalion element were

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in the first serial. This element consisted of three officers, eighty drivers and security personnel, five control personnel, twenty-eight S&P loads of Class I, II and IV supplies, twenty-one S&P loads of Class V, one lowboy trailer with a rough terrain forklift; fifty-four 5 ton tractors and two ten ton tractors. Elements of the first and second serial were ambushed on 22 November 1969 at 1300 hours. Thirty-one vehicles from the 7th Transportation Battalion were damaged, of which nine tractors had to be abandoned. Casualties were 1 KHA and 7 WHA, of which 4 WHA were member of the 7th Transportation Battalion. The convoy returned on 23 November 1969.

(c) On 13 December 1969, the 7th Transportation Battalion provided one officer, 15 drivers and security personnel, two control vehicles and eight 5 ton tractors with seven S&P trailers for a daily peneprime resupply mission from Long Binh to Langa River. This daily operation was completed on 20 December 1969 which was ahead of the projected completion date of 31 December 1969.

(d) On 17 December 1969, the 7th Transportation Battalion was tasked to provide one officer, 22 drivers and security personnel, two control vehicles and sixteen 5 ton tractors with 14 S&P trailers in direct support of the unit move of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division from Minh Thanh to Lai Khe. The convoy returned without incident on 18 December 1969.

(e) On 27 December 1969, the 7th Transportation Battalion was again tasked to operate the Song Be convoy. This was entirely a US Army operation. The 40th Transportation Group convoy element consisted of 4 officers; 60 drivers and security personnel; 6 control vehicles; thirty-eight 5 ton tractors with 18 S&P loads of peneprime; seventeen loads of Class V and one pole trailer; two 10 ton tractors with one lowboy trailer loaded with a rough terrain forklift. Armored security was provided by the 1st Cavalry Division. The convoy had an additional mission of retrograding the 5 ton tractors and S&P trailers which were left at Bunard and FSB Buttons during the 22 November 1969 ambush. The convoy returned without incident and successfully retrograded one 5 ton tractor and five S&P trailers.

(f) On 31 December 1969, the 7th Transportation Battalion provided one non-commissioned officer, eleven drivers and security personnel, one control vehicle and eight 5 ton tractors with seven S&P loads of unit equipment in direct support of the 335th RR Company from Di An to Can Tho. The convoy returned without incident on 3 January 1970.

(g) On 6 January 1970, the 7th Transportation Battalion was tasked to provide daily unit move support for the Royal Thai Task Force from Bear Cat to Newport. The Battalion provided one non-commissioned officer; 9 drivers and security personnel and seven 5 ton tractors with seven S&P trailers. This operation was successfully concluded on 10 January 1970.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (7th Transportation Battalion) for Period Ending 31 January 1970. RCS CSFOR 65 (R-2)

(h) On 7 January 1970, the 7th Transportation Battalion was again tasked to provide direct support to the 335th RR Company from Di An to Can Tho. The convoy consisted of one officer, nine drivers and security personnel, one control vehicle and eight 5 ton tractors with seven S&P trailers of unit equipment. The convoy returned without incident on 12 January 1970.

(i) On 24 January 1970, the 7th Transportation Battalion was tasked daily to provide one non-commissioned officer, 15 drivers and security personnel, one control vehicle, eleven 5 ton tractors, and ten S&P loads of asphalt. This convoy made a daily run to Gia Kien. This operation ended on 30 January 1970.

(4) Ambush Incident: On 22 November 1969, at 1300 hours, as the Song Be convoy cleared a point 6 miles South of Bunard Special Forces Camp, the sixth vehicle of the first march unit began receiving small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire. The remainder of the first march unit, the entire second march unit and the lead elements of the second serial were subjected to enemy fire. All convoy personnel immediately reacted and fire was returned. Drivers continued to drive through the kill zone although nine vehicles were later abandoned. Cobra gunships and tactical air strikes were called in. Thirty-one vehicles from the 7th Transportation Battalion were damaged of which nine were rendered inoperable. Casualties were 1 killed by hostile action and seven wounded, of which four were personnel of the 7th Transportation Battalion. 7th Transportation personnel received twenty-six awards for valor.

(5) Sniper Incident: On 29 November 1969, at 0950 hours, the lead tank escort on the Quan Loi convoy received one round of sniper fire at a point 11 miles, North of Lai Khe; mortar fire was called in. No damages or injuries were sustained.

(6) Mine Incidents:

(a) On 27 January 1970, at 1630 hours, a 5 ton tractor was lightly damaged when it struck a concussion type mine at a point 2 miles North of Ap Bau Long. The damages were a bent battery box and running board.

(b) On 31 January 1970, at 1000 hours, a 5 ton tractor was heavily damaged when it struck an anti-vehicular mine at a point 8000 meters from FSB Colorado. Personnel received minor injuries and were treated and released. The vehicle was dragged to Highway QL 15 and towed back to Long Binh.

d. TRAINING.

(1) Drivers Training: The battalion drivers training school for newly arrived replacement personnel was lengthened to seven days for 11B MOS personnel and shortened for 64A and 64B personnel. A safety indoctrination and vehicle familiarization block of instruction was added to the revised course.
SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons Learned (7th Transportation Battalion) for Period Ending 31 January 1970. Memo Order 65 (a-2)

329 drivers were qualified during the quarter. 180 IUs and personnel were trained during the month of January.

(2) Safety Program: Safety films have been added to the safety program in a further attempt to lower the battalion's army motor vehicle accident rate. Safety films are shown prior to the regularly scheduled evening movie.

e. Logistics. The battalion received two 10 ton tractors, forty-one 5 ton tractors, nineteen 2½ ton trucks, three 3/4 ton trucks and eight 1½ ton trucks as replacement issues during this reporting period. This receipt of replacement vehicles has improved the battalion's operational posture to meet increased operational commitments.

2. Lessons Learned: Observation, Evaluation and Recommendations

a. Personnel.

(1) Observation: During this quarter, many IUS qualified personnel rotated to O-2s with the resultant large number of IUS vacancies. This situation created a rotational hump which will reoccur within the year.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) Close coordination must be effected early to infuse and assign personnel into the units to avoid rotational humps.

(b) The rotational hump situation seriously affects the unit's mission accomplishment and increases the unit's non-productive man-hours.

(3) Recommendation: That personnel requisitions be closely monitored and filled as vacancies occur to avoid rotational hump situations.

b. Intelligence. None

c. Operations.

(1) Song Be convoy ambush 22 November 1969.

(a) Observation: The Song Be convoy ambush of 22 November 1969 was directly attributable to inadequate security.

(b) Evaluation:

(1) The tactical security elements provided the convoy were insufficient and inadequate i.e., lack of armored vehicles.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (7th Transportation Battalion) for Period Ending 31 January 1970. ANS CORP 65 (A-2)

(2) Large convoys present a lucrative target and compound the security and control problems.

(3) Close coordination must be effected to insure that all tactical and convoy elements are thoroughly aware of all necessary convoy and security procedures.

(c) Recommendations:

(1) That more and improved tactical security be provided for future Song Be convoys i.e., MANV's, tanks, gunships.

(2) That tactical security personnel be briefed on the march unit and serial concept of convoy operations, and the integration of security vehicles within the convoy.

(3) That the tactical security personnel be briefed on ambush procedures which will be taken by convoy vehicles.

(4) That improved security coordination be established between US tactical forces and MANV elements when MANV elements provide ground security.

(5) That an element of the security force be required to remain with the convoy trail party at all times.

(6) That a 50 - 100 meter area be cleared of all growth on both sides of the road.

(7) That convoys to Song Be be not more than 50 - 60 vehicles.

(2) 120th Transportation Company Convoy Operations in the IV Corp Tactical Zone.

(a) Observation: 120th Transportation Company convoys frequently are operated without adequate security.

(b) Evaluation:

(i) The 120th Transportation Company convoys must depend on MANV convoy security escort to destination.

(ii) The convoy security provided varies between the tactical area of responsibility.

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SUBJECT: Operational report - Lessons learned (7th Transportation Battalion) for Period ending 31 January 1970. \#\# \#\# 65 (w-2)

(3) Some convoys are cancelled due to the lack of security.

(c) Recommendations: That adequate and clearly defined convoy security arrangements be established for the 12th Transportation Company convoys.

d. Conclusion: None

e. TRAINING. 11B MOS Driver Personnel.

(1) Observation: More than 180 11B MOS personnel have been trained as 64820 Heavy Vehicle Drivers.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) 11B MOS personnel have been assigned to units to fill critical driver slots.

(b) 11B MOS personnel have been trained and licensed within a seven day training cycle by the battalion driver school personnel.

(c) Attrition among 11B MOS personnel has been minimal.

(3) Recommendation: That 11B MOS personnel be assigned to other units and cross trained to fill other MOS positions (where shortages do exist).

f. LOGISTICS.

(1) Observation: Repair parts and replacement parts are difficult to obtain and hamper unit operations.

(2) Evaluation:

(a) Valid requisitions were on-hand at each unit.

(b) The use of the Commanders Critical Item List (CCIL) has assisted in obtaining some of the parts.

(c) Tires, tubes, hot patches, and batteries are continually in short supply.

(d) Higher supply requisition priorities must be used to obtain repair parts.
9 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (7th Transportation Battalion) for Period Ending 31 January 1970. AGS G3/FO 45 (a-2)

(3) Recommendations:

(a) That all serviceable items turned in during unit redeployments be utilized to fill requisitions and parts used to remove equipment off deadline.

(b) That the DSU maintain an adequate ASL of critical repair parts for radios and motor vehicles i.e., squelch elements, modules, receiver elements, matching unit cables, radiators, and brake shoes.

g. COMMUNICATION. None

h. MATERIAL. None

i. OTHER. None

Robert C. Porter
LTC, TC
Commanding

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AVAO SGN AB CO (9 Feb 70) 1st Inf

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 7th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R-2)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 48TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT), APO 96491
15 February 1970

THRU: Commanding Officer, US Army Support Command, Saigon, APO 96491

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Attention is invited to paragraph 2 c(1) concerning the Song Be convoy ambush of 22 November 1969. Direct coordination with the 1st Cav Division has resulted in adoption of the following procedures for Song Be convoys:

      (1) The size of the convoy will be limited to not more than 50 vehicles.

      (2) Preplanned artillery support along the route will be provided.

      (3) Tracked security vehicles will be integrated among task vehicles in sufficient numbers to provide adequate security.

      (4) A tactical escort will remain with the convoy trail party.

   b. Attention is invited to paragraph 2 c(2) concerning ARVN security for 120th Trans convoys in the IV Corps Tactical Zone.

      (1) The adequacy of convoy security is evaluated and based upon evidence of enemy activity. There have been no incidents of enemy activity directed against 120th Trans convoys for the last 18 months. ARVN provides two V-100 vehicles as escort for each 120th Trans convoy under normal conditions.

      (2) Security requirements are coordinated through G-3, Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC). DMAC has the responsibility for assessing security requirements and for coordinating security arrangements with ARVN. Security coordination between provinces along convoy routes is a complex problem. This coordination is the responsibility of ARVN. The 48th Group has made numerous inquiries into the problem of coordinating security. DMAC is working directly with ARVN in solving these coordination problems.

///

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15 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 7th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R-2)

(3) Effective 28 February 1970, the 120th Trans Co will be assigned to the 91st CS Bn, located in the Can Tho area. The proximity of the new parent organization to the 120th Trans Co will aid in resolving security coordination problems.

3. Concur with basic report.

ROBERT H. SCHWARZ
Colonel, TC
Commanding
1. Reference paragraph 2f, page 9 and 10. PARTIALLY CONCUR. The broad generalized recommendations are naturally true, but the implications are false. To recommend that serviceable items be utilized implies that they are presently not being utilized, which is totally false. PLL and ASL from redeploying units have been cross-levelled and specific disposition instructions disseminated. In addition, recommending that the DSU maintain an adequate ASL implies inadequate stockage. While it is agreed that improvement could be made in stock levels, it must be remembered that prescribed stock levels are a function of accurate demand data, a unit responsibility.

2. Lessons Learned, observations, and recommendations are concurred in by this command with the above exception.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Tel: LON 2604

[Signature]

MICHAEL D. HUSTON
CO T "AGC
OT AG

Gr:
7th Transportation Bn
AVCA GO-MH (9 Feb 70) 3rd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 7th Transportation Battalion for period ending 31 January 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 2-6 MAR 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC-DST, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 7th Transportation Battalion for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning personnel, page 7, paragraph 2a(1). Concur. Requisitions should always be closely monitored to fill vacancies as they occur in an attempt to avoid excess losses during a certain period. However, replacements are not always available to fill vacancies as they occur. Distributing the DEROS losses during the calendar year would be more beneficial. The evaluation of the problem stated that close coordination must be made to infuse personnel in the units to avoid rotational humps. The provisions of USARV Regulation 614-9 (USARV Controller Infusion Program) should be studied and if applicable an infusion program initiated to preclude future rotational humps.

   b. Reference item concerning 11B MOS driver personnel, page 9, paragraph 2e. Nonconcur. Until such time as replacements in MOS 64B20 (Heavy Vehicle Drivers) are received in sufficient numbers to fill existing vacancies, 11B MOS personnel will continue to be assigned. No forecast can be made as to how long the shortage of replacements in MOS 64B20 will continue. Though it requires additional training to license 11B personnel this is the only practical solution at this time.

   c. Reference item concerning logistics, page 9, paragraph 2f. Concur. ASL items from deploying units are picked up as depot assets and directed to those areas of critical need or held as depot stocks if there are no shortages elsewhere. The DSU ASL is responsive to demands and PLLs of supported units by design. When demands by valid requisition are placed on the system it will respond in direct proportion to availability of stocks in country.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4862

CPT, AGC

Asst AG

CF:

USASUPCOM, SGN
48th Trans Gp
7th Trans Bn
AVHGC-DST (9 Feb 70) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (7th Transportation Battalion) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR 65 (R-2)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 1 APR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 7th Transportation Battalion and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. E. MICHELS
MAJ, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st Log Comd
7th Trans Bn
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 7 APR 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[D.D. Cline]
D.D. CLINE
ZLT, AGC
Asst AG
## Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 7th Transportation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, 7th Transportation Battalion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Title</th>
<th>Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 7th Transportation Battalion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>CO, 7th Transportation Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>9 February 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project No.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
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<td>Contract No.</td>
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<td>Sponsor</td>
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### Distribution Statement

| Distribution Statement | N/A |

### Supplementary Notes

| N/A |

### Abstract

| N/A | |