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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980
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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
7th Psychological Operations Battalion
SUGEP: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970, HCS CSPKR-65 (R2)

THRU: Commanding General
III Marine Amphibious Force
ATTN: Force PSYOP Officer
FPC 96602

TO: Commanding Officer
4th Psychological Operations Group
ATTN: AVGH-C
AFO 96243

1. REFERENCES:
   a. USARV Regulation 525-15, subject as above, April 1968.
   b. 4th PSYOP Group Reg 335-3, subject as above, December 1968.

2. Submitted herewith is the Quarterly Operational Report - Lessons Learned, for the period 1 November 1969 to 31 January 1970, prepared in accordance with the above references.

G. L. JACOBSON
LTC
Commanding

Inclosure
Section I: Operations - Significant Activities

1. The 7th PSYOP Battalion engaged in thirty-one (31) hours of mandatory training during the reporting period. The training included weapon familiarization and CBR refresher training, which were administered to newly assigned personnel as part of the replacement training program. In addition, a briefing was given each new arrival to give him a basic working knowledge of the unit's organization, mission, capabilities, and support role in I Corps Tactical Zone psychological operations effort. During the quarter, the battalion was engaged in 92 days of continuous operations. The unit participated in no troop movement other than the normal flow of replacements and supplies sent to the field detachments. No major operations were where the entire unit was responsible for overall support. On 1 December 1969, the Battalion implemented the recently approved Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) 33-500G. The new TOE will have no great effect upon the organization or operations of the Battalion. It includes an increase in total authorized strength from 174 to 185. The unit's augmentation detachments were inactivated upon implementation of the new TOE. All major items of equipment authorized in the augmentation detachments will now be part of the Battalion's TOE. One additional audio-visual team is authorized, and it has been fielded with Detachment #2, supporting 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). A current organization chart is at Inclosure #1, and a list of the current field detachment locations is at Inclosure #2.

2. Enemy activity continued at a low level during November and December throughout I Corps and increased slightly during January, as expected in preparation for an anticipated Tet offensive. Requests for support of tactical operations decreased while requests for Chieu Hoi exploitation and resource denial support increased. The type of requests reflected a shift in emphasis of the field units in the I Corps area to support of pacification and stabilization of the local populace. The number of ralliers during 1969 increased significantly over 1968 as 5,995 ralliers returned to GVN control in I Corps in 1969, while 5,118 rallied during 1968. In January, 570 enemy rallied to the GVN, a significant increase over January 1969, when 273 rallied.

3. The "High Price of Rice" Campaign, initiated by XXIV Corps in mid-October 1969 and supported by the 7th PSYOP Battalion was concluded on 31 December 1969. The 05 PSYOP, XXIV Corps, is assembling an after-
subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

action report recording the campaign objectives, results, and reactions of target audiences. Copies of this report will be included in a subsequent operations report. During the campaign, which stressed denial of rice to the VC/NVA troops, Allied forces made 393 contacts with enemy rice gathering parties resulting in 414 enemy dead and 70 captured as well as 20,924 pounds of rice captured. Catalog sheets of selected items produced by the 7th PSYOP Battalion are at Inclosure #3.

4. During the Christmas and New Year's truce periods, the 7th PSYOP Battalion, under the direction of the PSYOP Officer, III MAF, continued to disseminate PSYOP items. The items used were of the "soft sell" variety. A list of the items used, as well as selected catalog sheets of the items, are attached as Inclosure #4.

5. On 15 December 1969, Headquarters, I Corps Political Warfare (POLWAR) Block, initiated a campaign entitled "For the People" with the purpose of improving the public image of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. The city of Da Nang was chosen for a test of the campaign which stresses courtesy towards civilians, safe driving, personal appearance, and off-duty conduct. The U.S. units in the area are taking part in the campaign, and the program is being actively supported by the U.S. Armed Forces Police and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam police. Both the 7th PSYOP Battalion and the 10th POLWAR Battalion (ARVN) prepared materials to support this campaign.

6. During the reporting period, the 7th PSYOP Battalion received three (3) new 1250W presses. The addition of these presses increased the Battalion's production capability significantly. The Battalion currently has eight 1250W presses.

7. The Battalion has developed a numbering system for leaflets developed subsequent to 1 January 1970. The new system, which categorizes all leaflets by campaign and theme, is fully explained in the letter attached as Inclosure #5.

8. During this reporting period, the 7th PSYOP Battalion developed and printed posters and leaflets for use by Long Range Reconnaissance and Force Reconnaissance units. The posters and leaflet mixes are targeted at the VC/NVA and are designed to be disseminated in North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong base areas by the reconnaissance units as they exit an area. Catalog sheets of these items are attached as Inclosure #6.

INCL 2
On 18 December 1969, Colonel Vinh, I Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PP), and his advisor, Colonel Fisk, were briefed by the 7th PSYOP Battalion on its capabilities to support and exploit the successes of RF/PP and Popular Self-Defense Forces (PSDF). The colonels were given leaflet catalogs and samples of items in stock available from this unit. They are selecting items to be prestocked at I Corps Headquarters and hand-disseminated by RF/PP and PSDF. Additionally, a calendar and a Tet booklet were produced in conjunction with 10th PCLWAR Battalion (ARVN) for distribution to RF/PP and PSDF.

During the reporting period, a revised version of the Battalion's "Rallier Guide" was developed by the Propaganda Development Center (PDC). This booklet is intended to serve as a guide to field PSYOP personnel in the techniques to be employed in exploitation of a Hoi Chanh. The old Rallier Guide was somewhat troublesome to fill out, since it contained many superfluous questions to be asked of the rallier which were not actually needed for Hoi Chanh exploitation. Also, it was felt that instructions given concerning the use of ralliers in photographs needed improvement. A copy of the new Rallier Guide is attached as Inclosure #7. A Vietnamese version of the Rallier Guide is planned for production in the near future and will be distributed to RVNAF units throughout I Corps.

The format of the PSYOP Orientation Seminar that this unit conducts in conjunction with III MAJFSYOP to acquaint newly assigned PSYOP officers with their jobs has been changed to tailor the presentation more to the needs of the participants. The participants have been of two types: one, officers assigned to line units whose principal duty is PSYOP; and two, officers assigned to support units who are more interested in PSYOP support for civic action, or where PSYOP is only an additional duty. Two separate seminar formats have been prepared that tailor the presentation to the individual requirements of the participant. In November, two seminars were held, one for each type of participant, and one seminar was held in December. No seminars were held during January, since most units in I Corps were preoccupied with preparations for Tet. In the future, seminars for the two types of participants will be held in alternate months.

Three (3) new programs were initiated during this reporting period by Detachment #1, in support of the 1st Marine Division. The first is a combined operations program with the 10th Political Warfare (PULWAR) Battalion and its 102nd and 104th PULWAR Companies. Whenever the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) PULWAR teams are available, Detachment #1 requests a companion team to participate in combat loudspeaker
and audio-visual missions. The objective of this combined operations program is to Vietnamese and increase PSYOP credibility. The second program shifted all audio-visual movie showings to night operations in preselected contested Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES) rated "C" and "D" hamlets. By making this shift, the Detachment hopes to increase the percentage of young people and adults attending movie showings. The third program shifted combat loudspeaker and audio-visual team broadcast emphasis to face to face communications when working in support of the ordnance turn-in/rewards and pacification programs. Standard type combat loudspeaker and audio-visual rewards broadcasts only invite Viet Cong (VC) retaliation on those local populace who turn in or point out ordnance. By emphasizing face to face communications in the rewards program, the local populace are approached on a person to person basis, and are less apt to fear VC reprisals, thus resulting in increased cooperation and participation by the local populace. Since initiating this program in December 1969, Combat Loudspeaker Team #12 has collected 311 pieces of ordnance.

13. In the continuing effort to develop demand data for printing and graphic expendable supplies that will allow this unit's local direct support supply and maintenance unit (DSU) to fill requisitions for these items, it has been determined that this unit has received approximately 10% of the quantity of expendable items placed on requisition since July 1969 from the direct support unit servicing the 7th PSYOP Battalion. This represents a 21.5% fill of the total number of line items requisitioned. With further development of demand data, it is anticipated that these percentages will increase; but, at this time, it is inconceivable that this unit can be supported solely by the DSU. Without the additional printing and graphic expendable supply support rendered by the 4th PSYOP Group, this unit would be crippled.

14. During this reporting period, this unit's tape and leaflet catalogs have been revised and republished. All 1968 leaflets were removed from the leaflet catalog and those items from 1968 which are still suitable for dissemination were given 1970 leaflet numbers. A complete set of the catalog sheets of all standard air and ground tapes is being distributed with the tape catalog. Although this information has been distributed before, a number of field units do not have copies of file. Both catalogs were updated each month after initial distribution to reflect changes which occurred during the previous month, and copies of the update were distributed to each using unit within I Corps Tactical Zone.
AVGN-7C
15 February 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

15. This unit's Joint Propaganda Development Center developed propaganda material for numerous campaigns during the reporting period. The most significant campaigns participated in are as follows:

   a. The Communists are fond of citing political and military teaching points arranged in groups of three. For example, "Three firsts" taught to every Communist soldier include: "First in combat, first in training, first in discipline." The Joint Propaganda Development Center (JPDC) developed material to "mimic" these VC/NVA phrases with Pro-GVN items. One of the JPDC developed propaganda items read as follows:

   "First in loving Peace and Justice, first in hatred of false propaganda, first in longing for a chance to rally."

   The catalog sheets of Anti-VC Mix #6, comprising JPDC's efforts in this program, are included as Inclosure #8.

   b. The 7th PSYOP Battalion has begun working with the III MAF PSYOP Intelligence Section to develop a special campaign directed against the 31st NVA Regiment in Quang Nam Province. III MAF PSYOP is interested in such a campaign both to target an important enemy unit and to initiate a system by which US field units can more effectively identify and target psychological vulnerabilities of NVA troops. Themes used in the past in the NVA campaign have had little apparent effect; fewer than four hundred NVA soldiers rallied in 1969 in all of South Vietnam, though PW interrogation reports show that Allied propaganda efforts do have some deleterious effect on NVA morale. The special campaign against the 31st Regiment will target ideological weaknesses in propaganda that makes special reference to unit personalities. Three leaflets were developed especially for use against the unit before and during TET, and other items will be produced for use later in February.

16. A program of officer classes was instituted within 7th PSYOP Battalion Headquarters during the month of November. These classes are conducted periodically and cover subjects which are both instructional and informative. Subjects covered to date include:

   Maintenance procedures - Vehicles and weapons
   Enlisted promotion systems and elimination from service
   PSYOP campaigns being conducted in I Corps
   Organization and capabilities of the 10th POLWAR Battalion
   Revised Uniform Code of Military Justice and Search and Seizure procedures
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15 February 1970
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Career development and the Officer Assignment Preference Statement
Leadership and discipline
Property accountability
Conduct of reports of survey
TOE 35-600G, PSYOP Battalion

17. JPDC Development for period ending 31 January 1970 is as follows:

a. Leaflets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Hoi</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-GVN</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Denial</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewards</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-VC</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-NVA</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-VC/NVA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVCI</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Handbills:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Hoi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-GVN</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Denial</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewards</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-VC</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Replace</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Posters:

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chieu Hoi</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-GVN</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Denial</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewards</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-VC</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Replace</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVCI</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Newspapers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ban Tin</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6
SECTION II LESSONS LEARNED

1. Personnel: None

2. Intelligence: New Type of Chemical Fuze

   a. OBSERVATION: Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel of 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, have informed Detachment #1, 7th PSYOP Battalion personnel of a new chemical delay-type fuze being employed by the VC.

   b. EVALUATION: The fuze consists of a blasting cap into which is attached a short, flexible capsule. The capsule contains a corrosive substance. To arm the grenade, the capsule is squeezed releasing the acid. The delay from the time the grenade is armed until the acid corrodes through the primer can be short or as long as eight hours. The chemical pencil fuze is about three inches long. It is placed into the top of the Chicom grenade and then fastened in so that it cannot be removed safely. After the acid corrodes through the retainer, a spring-loaded firing pin is released, exploding the grenade. This type of fuze can be used to explode any number of different pieces of ordnance, and, thus, field teams should carefully check each purchased ordnance item with extra care.

   c. RECOMMENDATION: All personnel engaged in collecting ordnance for the rewards program should be made aware of this fuze and the hazards it may pose. A sketch of this fuze is at Inclosure #9.

3. Operations:

   a. Single Rally Point:

      1. OBSERVATION: That fixed rallying points do not achieve the successes planned.
2. EVALUATION: During an operation conducted by the 1st Airborne Division, a fixed rallying point, identified by a column of smoke and advertised by aerial broadcasts and leaflets showing a map of the area resulted in no ralliers, and several rounds of mortar fire impacting in or near the rallying point.

3. RECOMMENDATION: That such operations conducted in the future utilize a road or stream bed as the rallying area rather than a small specific area, thus broadening the locale the enemy must take countermeasures against.

b. Audience Interest:

1. OBSERVATION: The arbitrary employment of PSYOP broadcast themes more often than not results in counterproductive audience reaction.

2. EVALUATION: Throughout Thua Thien Province, Detachment #4 deals with a great variety of intelligent and informed Vietnamese. Because of the varying degrees of awareness and pacification, it has been found that discrepancies exist between what detachment personnel thought the people were interested in and what they really want to hear.

3. RECOMMENDATION: On a periodic basis (quarterly) a comprehensive survey of changing audience attitudes and preferences would greatly assist broadcast teams in providing themes which can produce desired results in targeted audiences. This command is currently employing this technique to improve program effectiveness.

4. Organization: None

5. Training: None

6. Logistics: None

7. Communications: None

8. Material: Carrying Cases for Fragile Equipment

a. OBSERVATION: It has been observed that sensitive electronic equipment is being damaged by shock because a protective carrier for this equipment is not an issue item.
b. EVALUATION: The AN/UH-6 Public Address System and the Sony TC 800A tape recorder do not have a protective carrier as an issue item. The combat loudspeaker teams using these items travel to and from mission sites in a 3/4-ton truck, and the equipment is subject to severe road shock due to the condition of the roads. The equipment is also susceptible to pilferage since it is not enclosed in boxes. It is therefore necessary that a protective carrier be constructed for each of these sensitive items. See Inclosure #10.

1. Materials required for the construction of the UH-6 protective carrier are: a footlocker PSN 8460-234-3234, styrofoam, glue, and light weight wood or press board. A layer of foam is cut in the bottom of the footlocker and the speaker is inserted. The remaining space is filled with layers of styrofoam. Holes are then cut for the remaining items composing the UH-6. The holes may be lined with light wood or pressboard to ease insertion and removal of the equipment. After the holes are cut and the fit is satisfactory, the styrofoam can be glued together and to the footlocker. The cables which are part of the UH-6 may be wrapped around the speaker drive units on the speaker throat. The footlocker can be locked and chained to the vehicle. (The footlocker can be obtained through supply channels. The styrofoam may be obtained as waste from Air Force units dealing with bomb fuses. Two such boxes are required for each AN/UH-6 set. See illustration 3 and 4.)

2. Materials required to construct the protective carrier for the tape recorder are: Plywood, a hasp, a pair of hinges, nails, a web strap for carrying, and styrofoam. The inside dimensions of the box are 5x11x14 inches. Recessed holes are drilled in the bottom whose centers are 8 3/4 x 6 5/8 inches apart for the TC 800A's feet. The styrofoam is placed around the TC 800A to hold it securely when the box is closed. As can be seen in the photograph, the recorder rests on the lid. This allows access to the recorder controls without removing it from the box. The web strap allows the recorder to be carried over the shoulder during field operations.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That protective carriers such as described above be constructed for these items of equipment.

9. Others: None
AVGM-C (1 March 1970) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970

Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group, APO 96243 30 March 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion.

2. Reference item concerning a New Type of Chemical Fuze, page 7, paragraph 2, Section II; concur. This information will be disseminated to battalions for their field teams.

3. Reference item concerning a Single Rally Point, page 7, paragraph 3a, Section II; non-concur. The evaluation is inadequate. First the enemy must be induced to rally; then become predisposed to rally; finally he must have the freedom to rally. By advertising, an unsafe environment is in effect created. It is unsafe for the rallier who could not go to the designated place because the advertising also acquainted the hard core cadre with the purpose and location of the point. It is also unsafe for the personnel waiting for the ralliers, as they have just as effectively given their position away; a lesson that should have been learned long before this. Other attempts at fixed, mobile or pin-point rallying places have met with similar results; failure. Unfortunately, it is necessary to resurrect the cycle occasionally. Rather than limiting or restricting where, when or how to rally, an open arms approach must be used enabling the enemy to rally to any friendly organization, agency, or individual at any time. In that I CTZ is an area of high NVA concentration, the inducement to rally psychologically becomes an obstacle in that you are actually asking a professional soldier to become a traitor. It is more feasible to induce him to surrender for the POW status will protect him and his family from recriminations. Once again, the NVA soldier should have the opportunity to surrender at any time, any place, to any friendly element.

4. Reference item concerning Audience Interest, page 8, paragraph 3b, Section II; non-concur. This is not a periodic requirement, it is a continuing daily requirement and the very heart of field team operations. If the detachments are having trouble analyzing their audience, then the Research and Analysis section of Battalion Headquarters should provide this service. Assistance should also be requested from CORDS, province advisors, VIS and the POLWAR Battalion.

5. Reference item concerning Carrying Cases for Fragile Equipment, page 8, paragraph 8, Section II; non-concur. The AN/UIH-6 is a rugged and durable system that has withstood over a year of being driven over rough
AVCM-C 1 March 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological Operations
Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970

roads mounted on vehicles, back packed into remote areas, utilized in
rice paddies and monsoon rain. While not perfect, it would take more
than just a "shock" to ruin it. The Sony TC 500A, if properly secured in
a vehicle, has also proven to be dependable. The difficulty with the
plastic case has been recognized and light weight padded canvas carrying
cases are being procured. The problem can be easily solved by properly
securing equipment, not by constructing protective carriers.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JAMES M. RILEY
MAJ, Armor
Adjutant

Copies furnished:
CO, 7th PSYOP Battalion
PIO, 4th PSYOP Group
AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 6 APR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

C.y. furn: 4th PSTOPS Gp
7th PSTOPS Bn

Cy analyst:
4th PSTOPS Gp
7th PSTOPS Bn

Assistant Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 10 APR 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

D.D. Clint
2LT. AGC
ASST AG
FIELD DETACHMENT LOCATIONS

Detachment 1
Hq Co, Hq Bn
G5, 1st Mar Div (REIN) FNM
FPO 96602
(Danang)

Detachment 2
HHC, S5, PSYOP
1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)
APO 96477
(Quang Tri)

Detachment 3
HHC Americal Div
ATTN: G5 PSYOP
APO 96374
(Chu Lai)

Detachment 4
HHC 101st Airborne Div
ATTN: G5 PSYOP
APO 96385
(Camp Eagle)
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) of 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division, has informed Combat Loudspeaker Team #12, Detachment #1, of a new type of chemical fuze as shown above being used by the VC. It is one that all other detachment teams in Vietnam should be informed about for their protection in their rewards programs. The fuze consists of a blasting cap onto which is attached a short flexible capsule. The capsule contains a corrosive substance. To arm the grenade the capsule is squeezed releasing the acid. The delay from the time the grenade is armed until the acid corrodes through the primer can be short or as long as eight hours. The chemical pencil fuze is about three inches long. It is placed into the top of a Chicom grenade and then fastened in so that it cannot be removed safely. After the acid corrodes through the retainer a spring loaded firing pin is released exploding the grenade. These types of fuzes can be used to explode any number of different pieces of ordnance and thus teams should check each item purchased with extra care.

According to the EOD team this is a new type fuze and is extremely dangerous. It should be handled only by EOD personnel.
Protective Carrier for Sensitive Equipment

Observation: It has been observed that sensitive electronic equipment is being damaged by shock because a protective carrier for this equipment is not an issue item.

Evaluation: The AN/UIH-6 public Address System does not have a protective carrier as an issue item. The Combat Loudspeaker Teams using the UIH-6 travel to and from mission sites by 3/4 ton trucks. The UIH-6 is subject to severe road shock due to the poor condition of the roads. The equipment is also open to pilferage since it is not enclosed in a box. Therefore it is necessary that a protective carrier be constructed for this sensitive item.

The Combat Loudspeaker Teams also use a TC-800A. This item does not have a protective carrier as an issue item and travels in the same manner as the UIH-6.

The Sony TC-800A, having a plastic case, is especially sensitive to shock. Therefore to protect the TC-800A a box was constructed using plywood. (See illustration 1&2).

a. Materials required for the construction of the UIH-6 protective carrier are: a footlocker FSN 8460-234-3234, styrofoam, glue and lightweight wood or pressboard. A layer of foam is put in the bottom of the footlocker and the speaker is inserted. The remaining space is filled with layers of styrofoam. Holes are then cut for the remaining items composing the UIH-6. The holes may be lined with light wood or pressboard to ease insertion and removal of the equipment. After the holes are cut and the fit is satisfactory, the styrofoam can be glued together and to the footlocker. The cables which are part of the UIH-6 may be wrapped around the speaker drive units on the speaker throats. The footlocker can be locked and chained to the vehicle.

The footlocker can be obtained through supply channels. The styrofoam may be obtained as waste from Air Force units, dealing with bomb arming as bomb fuses are packed in the styrofoam for shipment. Two such boxes are required for each AN/UIH-6 set. (See illustration 3&4.)

b. Materials required to construct the protective carrier for the TC-800A Sony recorder are: plywood, a hasp, a pair of hinges, nails, a web strap for carrying and styrofoam. The inside dimensions of the box are 5x11 x14 inches. Recessed holes are drilled in the bottom whose centers are 83/4x65/8 inches apart for the TC-800A's feet. The styrofoam is placed around the TC-800A to hold it securely when the box is closed. As can be seen in the photograph the TC-800A rests on the apparent lid. This allows access to the TC-800A's controls without removing it from the box. The web strap allows the recorder to be carried over the shoulder thereby freeing the man's hands.

Recommendation: That protective carriers such as described above be constructed for these items.

AOS12

Inc 10 17
Operational Report – Lessons Learned, HQ, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

CO, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion

**REPORT DATE**
15 February 1970

**TOTAL NO. OF PAGES**
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**PROJECT NO.**
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**ABSTRACT**

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