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**AUTHORITY**

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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AGDA (M) (20 Feb 70) FOR OT UT 694015

27 February 1970

SUBJECT. Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6th Transportation Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1969

SEE DISTRIBUTION

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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UNCLASSIFIED REPORT
DISTRIBUTION NO FOREIGN WITHOUT APPROVAL OF
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT
(ARMY) ATTN FOR OT UT. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 31 October 1969, ECS CSFOR-65 (R2).

Thru: Commanding Officer
48th Transportation Group (MT)
APO 96491

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, DC 20310

Section I
Operations: Significant Activities

1. Command:
   a. Command: No change.
   b. Annual General Inspections and Command Maintenance Management
      Inspections: Inclosure 1.

2. Personnel, Administration, Morale, and Discipline.
   a. The personnel posture within the 6th Transportation Battalion
      has shown a slight increase during the last quarter. During this period, nine (9) officers departed and ten (10) arrived in the command, representing 23% and 26% respectively of the authorized battalion officer strength. The nine departures included two key staff officers, three platoon leaders, and four maintenance officers.

Inclosure

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THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS CANCELLED 31 OCTOBER 1972.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (K2).

b. A critical shortage of qualified personnel exists in the MOS 64B, Heavy Truck Driver. The battalion is authorized 720 driver personnel and has assigned 608. The battalion is short 16% of its authorized strength of drivers. The previous quarter showed the battalion operating with a 25% shortage of its authorized strength in MOS 64B.

c. A shortage of experienced non-commissioned officers and warrant officers exist within task units assigned to the battalion. Critical shortages exist at the platoon and squad level. Particularly critical are Motor Maintenance Sergeants (MOS 63G40) and qualified Supply Sergeants (MOS 76140).

d. The driver posture has followed a favorable trend during the report period. Gains during August, September, and October 1969 were 177, 150, and 149 respectively. Losses during the same period were 165, 74, and 146 respectively.

e. During the report period, this battalion suffered the following personnel losses, casualties and missing as a result of ambushes and enemy actions conducted on truck convoys:

   (1) Killed in Action: 0
   (2) Wounded in Action: 1
   (3) Missing in Action: 0

f. Awards and decorations earned by members of the battalion during this reporting period include:

   (1) Bronze Star for Valor: 0
   (2) Bronze Star for Service: 17
   (3) Bronze Star for Achievement: 1
   (4) Army Commendation Medal for Valor: 2
   (5) Army Commendation Medal for Service: 39
   (6) Army Commendation Medal for Achievement: 4
   (7) Purple Hearts: 1
   (8) Safe Driving Awards: 124

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INCL 2
The decrease in disciplinary action is directly related to the reduction in driver fault accidents which was brought about by increased emphasis on defensive driving programs. In addition to this there has been less traffic violations and fewer violations involving "off limits" areas. The average strength of the battalion during the report period has been slightly under 1000 officers and enlisted men. The following statistics should serve as an index to the disciplinary posture of the command:

**PUNITIVE ACTION**

| Article 15, UCMJ | 16% |
| Summary Courts-Martial | 0% |
| Special Courts-Martial | 0.005% |

b. Status of morale and welfare remains at a high level despite the present personnel shortages and increased work loads. Continued emphasis has been placed on improvement of troop facilities and the battalion is now showing two (2) movies per day to afford the night personnel an opportunity to see a movie.

3. OPERATIONS:

a. During the period ending 31 October 1969, the truck companies attached to this battalion were engaged in Line Haul, Port and Beach Clearance, Drive-away, Retrograde, and Throughput motor transport missions providing combat and combat service support to the 1st, 9th, and 25th Infantry Divisions; 1st Air Cavalry Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force and the Royal Australian Task Force. Port and Beach Clearance missions included port clearance of Class I and general cargo and barge site clearance of Class V. Inter-depot motor transport in the Saigon/Long Binh area comprised the Local Haul service rendered. All elements of the 6th Transportation Battalion were actively engaged in support of the combat forces during all 92 days of the report period.

b. Motor transport performance summary for the period is indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TONS</th>
<th>MILES*</th>
<th>TON MILES</th>
<th>P.X</th>
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<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>74,223</td>
<td>397,312</td>
<td>1,659,232</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>108,622</td>
<td>364,285</td>
<td>1,612,761</td>
<td>819</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>98,574</td>
<td>483,996</td>
<td>1,893,911</td>
<td>2,497</td>
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<tr>
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<td>281,819</td>
<td>1,245,593</td>
<td>5,165,904</td>
<td>10,316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INCL 3

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 31 October 1969, HCS CSFLR-65 (R2).

* Includes loaded and empty mileage

c. Tonnage transported by this battalion increased from 278,329 reflected in the previous quarterly report, to 281,819 tons for this report period. The primary factor contributing to the increased tonnage during this report period was a significant increase in available vehicles and drivers for movement of cargo. A second factor was the increase in Line Haul and Fort and beach tonnage during the period.

d. During the report period, a mixture of sixteen (16) 5 ton lights with drop side beds and twelve (12) 5 ton tractors with forty (40) 12 ton S&F trailers were utilized in the Cogido Barge Site clearance operations. Forty (40) new S&F trailers were introduced into the system during the report period. The Cogido operation has received increased command emphasis at battalion and company level to insure that maximum utilization is being made of personnel and equipment committed to the operation.

e. Discharge of ammunition through the Bien Hoa Barge Site has been sporadic during the report period. This operation reverted from a pure fleet of fifteen (15) 5 ton light cargo trucks with drop side beds to a straight truck operation utilizing six (6) 5 ton tractors with 12 ton S&F trailers. This is a twelve (12) hour operation which has not proven to be 100% efficient because of a lack of a steady flow of cargo.

f. On 18 September, 6th Transportation Battalion received formal notification that it would assume the Saigon and Newport port clearance mission on 1 October 1969. Immediately, plans were made, companies tasked with the mission and trailer transfer points established at Newport and Long Binh Depot. On 26 September ten (10) 5 ton tractors and twenty (20) 12 ton S&F trailers were committed to the port system to test the operating procedures which had been formulated. Additional assets were committed to the system on a daily basis and a high of forty (40) tractor and eighty (80) trailers was reached on 29 September. During the month of October, non-refrigerated van type US/SA trailers were introduced into the port system to determine the feasibility of their use for short hauls of freeze and chill supplies. Initial reports indicate that the use of the vans expedites loading and off-loading procedures. In conjunction with the port operation, maximum utilization of vehicles is being made by backhauling retrograde loads from C&S to Newport.

g. The 319th Transportation Company (Lt Trk) concluded preparation for redeployment to CONUS in accordance with keystone Eagle directives and were deployed on 13 August 1969.
4. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

a. During the report period, the 543rd Transportation Company (Lt. Trk) was gained by the battalion. This company was converted to a Medium Truck company utilizing the assets of the 172nd Transportation Company gained from the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command.

b. During the months of September and October this battalion implemented an intensive defensive driving program. This program is designed to emphasize the importance and principles of defensive driving and to reduce the number of accidents within the command. Favorable results have been achieved as a result of this program.

5. INTELLIGENCE: There were four (4) reported incidents of enemy related action during the reporting quarter. Two (2) incidents involved ambushes and two (2) involved sniper fire and mortar rounds. The more serious incidents were:

a. On 20 August 1969, at 1115 hours, the Quan Loi convoy took enemy mortar and small arms fire approximately seven (7) kilometers south of An Loc. Convoy personnel reacted well, increased their speed and interval, and moved through the impact area without casualties or significant vehicle damage.

b. On 5 September 1969, vehicles of the 48th Transportation Group and the 64th Quartermaster Battalion, in two march units, departed Long Binh Post enroute to Quan Loi on a tactical resupply mission under the control of an officer from this battalion. The convoy security consisted of one (1) tank and one (1) APC positioned at the head of the convoy, and one (1) V-100 armored car with the trail party. The remaining tactical vehicles were distributed one (1) per four (4) convoy vehicles. At approximately 1330 hours, in the vicinity of coordinate XT766720, the convoy was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force. The lead elements of the convoy received Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG), mortar, small arms and automatic weapons fire from both sides of the road. The tactical escort immediately engaged the enemy with organic weapons. This allowed the convoy to continue to move through the kill zone and proceed to destination without casualties and with minimum equipment damage.

c. At 0640 hours on 6 September 1969, the Quan Loi convoy departed Long Binh Post in two march units on a tactical resupply mission. The convoy joined a tactical escort at Lai Khe consisting of four (4) tanks, twelve (12) APC's and four (4) V-100 armored cars. Of these vehicles, two (2) tanks and one (1) V-100 were placed at the head of the convoy. One (1) APC was placed every five (5) vehicles in the first march unit.
One (1) tank and one (1) V-100 were placed at the rear of the first march unit. The second march unit was led by one (1) APC and one (1) V-100, with one (1) APC placed every six (6) vehicles. The trail party was escorted by one (1) tank and one (1) V-100. The first march unit of the convoy proceeded to Quan Loi without incident. The second march unit received small arms and automatic weapons fire from the west side of the road in the vicinity of coordinate XT765691. The march unit continued to move and the shotguns returned fire. The tactical escort immediately engaged the enemy with organic weapons. One (1) 5-ton S&P of this battalion was damaged and the driver received a minor neck wound.

6. LOGISTICS

a. During this report period, continuation of the equipment serviceability and classification program, resulted in the loss of the following numbers and types of task vehicles for salvage or rebuild actions:

1. Truck, tractor, 5-ton M52A2 - 69
2. Truck, Cargo, 5-ton M54A2 - 9
3. Truck, Cargo, 2½-ton M35A2 - 50
4. Truck, Cargo, 2½-ton M35A2C - 40
5. Truck, Utility, 1-ton M151 - 17

b. During the same period, the following numbers and types of replacement vehicles were received:

1. Truck, tractor, 5-ton M52A2 - 54
2. Truck, tractor, 5-ton M52A1 - 51
3. Truck, cargo, 5-ton M54A2 - 3
4. Truck, cargo, 2½-ton M35A2 - 6
5. Truck, utility, 1-ton M151 - 9

c. Current shortages of task vehicles, control vehicles, and recovery vehicles as of the end of this report period include sixteen (16) 5-ton tractors, one (1) 5-ton cargo, and three (3) wreckers, and six (6) ½-ton vehicles.

d. During the period, units did not sustain any combat losses.

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e. Vehicle deadline percentages for this report period have fluctuated from a high of 3% organizational deadline for 5-ton tractors during the month of October 1969 to 1% organizational deadline and 8% direct support deadline at the end of the report period. Deadline percentage for 5-ton cargo trucks has varied from 0% organizational deadline and 0% support deadline in October 1969 to 5% organizational and 5% direct support deadline as of the end of the report period. Support deadline percentages for 5-ton tractors have remained at a fairly high percentage as a result of power steering malfunctions on the new trucks and engine/clutch repair parts shortages. There also existed a shortage of transmissions and transfer cases that increased the waiting time for 5-ton tractors from direct support maintenance. In the area of organizational maintenance, all of the deadline is a result of parts not being available from supply channels. There was a critical shortage of direct exchange parts; specifically batteries, starters and regulators. Another item that has become increasingly scarce as the reporting period closes, is tires and tubes. An evident upswing in deadline is presently being seen with no available relief. One can foresee that in the near future, these two items could result in lessening our operational capacity.

f. During this report period, this battalion has again undertaken a minimal base development program to further improve living conditions and areas of responsibility. As a result of the personnel shortage becoming more critical and the limited support from the installation engineers (PA&L), the base development program has been supported by each individual assigned working one extra hour per day on area improvement. Projects include repair of latrines, showers, renovation of boardwalks, troop billets and bunkers. One major significant project of interest presently in progress by RMK-HIJ contractors is the construction of new maintenance sheds and grease racks for all units in the battalion.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2).

SECTION II

LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. PERSONNEL: None

2. INTELLIGENCE: None

3. OPERATIONS:

   a. Item 1: Use of non-refrigerated vans for movement of freeze cargo.

      OBSERVATION: Experiments with non-refrigerated vans for transporting Class I freeze from Newport to Long Binh Army Depot indicate that the use of vans is feasible for moving freeze cargo from port to depot and/or local destinations. Prior to experimentation with the vans freeze cargo was transported from the port to destination utilizing conex containers. This method was time consuming because the conexes were hand packed and unpacked. A forklift was required to load the conex onto the S&P trailer. The most adverse factor was that the cargo was partially thawed upon arrival at destination. The use of the non-refrigerated van significantly reduced the loading/off-loading time as well as pilferage. This method allows the frozen cargo to arrive at destination in excellent condition. Loading can be done by forklift utilizing four (4) way pallets or can be hand stacked utilizing rollers.

      EVALUATION: The use of non-refrigerated vans for transporting Class I freeze from the port to a local destination is superior to the method utilizing conex containers for the following reasons: (1) it significantly reduces loading/off-loading time, (2) allows cargo to arrive at destination in excellent condition, (3) reduces the possibility of pilferage, (4) increases the amount of cargo hauled per trip.

      RECOMMENDATION: That non-refrigerated vans be favorably considered for use in port and beach operations involving the movement of freeze cargo from port to a depot and/or a local destination.

   b. Item 2. Use of S&P trailers with tarps for movement of chill cargo.

      OBSERVATION: In conjunction with item 1, S&P trailers with tarps were used to transport chill cargo from port to depot and/or a local destination. Philco Ford corporation had previously used S&P trailers with sideboards to move chill cargo. This battalion found this method...
too time consuming due to the handling of the sideboards. To expedite the movement of cargo, this battalion implemented the S&P trailer/tarp method and obtained favorable results.

EVALUATION: The S&P trailer is loaded with a forklift, the cargo is covered with a tarp and banded. The handling of sideboards is not required. This method was found superior to previously used method for the same reasons as indicated in item 1.

RECOMMENDATION: That the S&P trailer tarp method of moving chill cargo be favorably considered for use in port and beach operations involving the movement of chill cargo from port to a depot and/or local destinations.

4. ORGANIZATION: None

5. TRAINING: None

6. LOGISTICS: None

7. COMMUNICATIONS: None

8. MATERIAL: None

9. OTHER: None

2 Incl
Inspection Reports
Organizational Chart

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9
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPOR 65 (R-2)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 48TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT), APO 96491
9 November 1969

TO: Commanding Officer, US Army Support Command, Saigon, ATTN: ACofS SP&O, APO 96491

1. The Operational Report – Lessons Learned 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. The task driver assignment posture, MOS 64B Heavy Truck Driver, referred to in paragraph 2b, is of major concern to this headquarters. Although driver assignments have shown a favorable trend in recent weeks, continuing emphasis must be maintained to assure an adequate number of task drivers to perform assigned missions.

   b. Reference Section II, paragraph 3, the use of non-refrigerated vans for transporting freeze cargo from the port to a local area depot has proved feasible. It must be emphasized, however, that expedited processing of required documentation for the load and local area deliveries are necessary factors. Documentation procedures which require trucks loaded with freeze to wait for extended periods prior to dispatch and deliveries to destinations in excess of 25 miles would require the use of refrigerated vans.

3. Concur with the basic report.

TEL: LB 3676

ROBERT H. SCHWARZ
LTC, TC
Commanding
AVCA GSN GO S (1 Nov 69) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 31 October 1969, (RCS CSPOR 65) (R2)


TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-MH, APO 96384

1. Reference Section I, paragraph 2b, page 2. CONCUR. USASUPCON, GSN is presently at 76% of personnel in MOS 61B. The 6th Trans Bn is at 82% of personnel in MOS 61B. This headquarters is aware of the driver problems in the 48th Trans Group, and has given priority assignment of personnel in MOS 61B to the 48th Trans Gp and will continue to do so until the driver situation is alleviated.

2. Reference Section I, paragraph 2c, page 2. CONCUR.

   a. The shortage of warrant officer refers primarily to maintenance warrants, MOS 631A. USASUPCOM, GSN is currently at 76% of authorized strength in maintenance warrants. The 48th Trans Gp has 76.9% of their authorized 631A warrants. 1st Logistical Command is aware of the shortage and will provide replacements as they become available.

   b. NCO's - MOS 63C40 and 76Y40 within USASUPCON, GSN are at 82% and 90% respectively. The 48th Trans Gp is at 53% in MOS 63C40 and 90% in MOS 76Y40. The personnel situation in these MOSs is recognized. This headquarters will monitor the assignment of personnel in the above MOSs in an effort to alleviate the problem.

3. Reference Section I, paragraph 6e, page 7. CONCUR. Tubes for 11 x 20 tires are now available. Serviceable tires have been issued to units from CC&5 as an interim measure until the 14,000 5 ton tires due in arrive.

4. Reference Section II, paragraph 3a and 3b, page 8. CONCUR. The use of vans for transporting freeze items from the port to the depot has tremendously increased the efficiency of the depot's Class I receiving operation. Similarly, the use of S&P Trailers with tarps for moving chill items from the port has accelerated receiving and has reduced exposure of sensitive items to the elements.

5. Lessons Learned, observations and recommendations are concurred in by this command with the exceptions above. A copy of this indorsement

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AVCA SEN CO S
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 31 October 1969, (RCS C3POR 65) (R2)

has been provided the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LEN 2604

MICHAEL D. HUSTON
CPT AGC
ASST AG

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 6th Transportation Battalion for period ending 31 October 1969

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHHC-OST
APO 96375.

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 6th Transportation Battalion for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow: Reference items concerning movement of subsistence, page 8, paragraph 3a and 3b. Concur with recommendations for use of non-refrigerated vans and S&P trailers to move freeze and chill cargo. This field expedient is necessary because of a shortage of reefer vans and inadequacies in those which are on hand. Although acceptable, the use of non-refrigerated vans and S&P's with tarps should not be substituted when reefers are available for use.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

CF: USASUPCOM, SGN
46th TC Gp
6th TC bn

[Signature]

C. D. STAFFORD
1st, AGG
Asst Adjutant General
AVHEC-3ST (1 Nov 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS GSPOF-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 17 JAN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GSPOF-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck) and concurs with the report as endorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
C. E. MICHELS
MAJ, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

cy fam:
6th Trans Bn
1st Log Comd
GPOP-DT (1 Nov 69) 5th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 27 JAN 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
INCLOSURE 1 (Inspections) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck), Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (r2).

1. Command Maintenance Management Inspections: None

2. Annual General Inspections:

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<td>4-5 September 69</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>321st Trans Co (Mdm Trk)</td>
<td>11-12 September 69</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
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Inclosure 2

21 October 1969, 3rd Company (MTK) 3rd Transportation Battalion, 6th Transportation Battalion

Detachment甩: 3rd Transportation Battalion, 6th Transportation Battalion

Inclosure 2 (Organizational Chart) to Operational Report of the 6th Transportation Battalion (MTRK) for Quarter Period Ending 31 October 1969.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 6th Transportation Battalion

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug 69 to 31 Oct 69.

CO, 6th Transportation Battalion