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<td>TO: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.</td>
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<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 15 AUG 1969. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 20301.</td>
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<td>AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980</td>
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THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d Civil Affairs Company, Period Ending 31 July 1969

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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Commandant of the Marine Corps

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT
DISTRIBUTION NO FOREIGN WITHOUT APPROVAL OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT (ARMY) ATTN FOR OT UT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

Reproduced by the CLEARINGHOUSE
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1. Section I: Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

a. The 2d Civil Affairs Company was fully operational during the entire 92 day period. The Company and its assigned generalist platoons engaged in civic action coordination throughout provinces in III CTZ and portions of IV CTZ with emphasis on the functional areas of Civilian Supply, Refugee Assistance, Commerce and Economic Development, Agriculture, Public Health/Education, Public Safety, Public Administration and Public Works with a total of 67 projects coordinated. During this reporting period the unit operated with 13 CA platoons in direct support of province senior advisors in III CTZ and 3 CA platoons in direct support of province senior advisors in IV CTZ's Khanh Hoa Province. (See Inclosure #1)

On 13 June 1969, the 11th, 15th and 17th CA Platoons, totalling 6 officers and 12 enlisted men, were fully attached for all purposes to the 29th Civil Affairs Company in I CTZ, by authority of USARV G0 20066, dated 13 June 1969. The 16th and 17th CA Platoons were placed under operational control of the 5th AI Platoon, all operating in direct support of the FSA, Khanh Hoa Province. Likewise, the 13th CA Platoon was placed under operational control of the 2d CA Platoon, both operating in Khanh Hoa Province. This method was found to be more desirable for the following reasons: The 5th and 2d Platoons operate from the province headquarters, whereas the 14th, 18th and 19th operate at district level. Platoons operating at province level are closer to the decision-making officials and they have a broader grasp of the overall pacification program. It further facilitates the following objectives:

(1) It simplifies coordination.
(2) The PSA's civil affairs functions are tasked to one platoon commander.

(3) Platoons operating at province level can keep the platoons at district level appraised of immediate requirements and future plans.

(b) More effective civil affairs resources are combined and a more effective CA program is realized.

To further facilitate command and control, the 11th, 18th and 16th AA Platoons are commanded by 11ts with rating and supervisory function being performed by captains, who command the 2d and 5th CA Platoons. Since the Company has traditionally experienced a shortage in its authorized strength of 23 captains (usually 3 to 4 below authorized strength), it is expected that this concept will continue to operate effectively without any major difficulties.

b. There are no morning report-preparing units assigned or attached to this organization.

c. During this reporting period the Company saw a need to gradually orient its effort to tasks involving broader aspects of civil affairs as opposed to primary civic action. This concept of operation was prompted for the following reasons:

(1) The Village Self-Development Program is a Vietnamese program and must involve people's participation and community spirit. As such, military civic action must complement rather than compete with local GVN programs.

(2) Many functions which were traditionally civic action and self-help functions have been undertaken by village self-development funds and village initiative.

(3) U.S. initiated projects and programs must be geared toward all the GVN programs to work. Accordingly, platoons of the Company have been directly involved in coordinating the completion of civic action projects initiated by or totally supported by US/FWMAF units. Activities during this period have been devoted to:

(a) Assisting in establishment of elected local village government.

(b) Providing, planning and organizational assistance to GVN and civilian agencies in support of pacification objectives.

(c) Assisting in programs involved to improve governmental services to the people, such as, public health, agricultural programs, social welfare, youth activities, education, economic development, and increased participation in support of priority pacification objectives.
(1) The Village Self-Development Program requires close monitoring by provincial Community Development Officers to insure that village plans and programs are complete and all available GVN resources are integrated in these plans/programs prior to committing any US/FMNAF material resources into the village. CA platoons have been most active in complementing CDO's efforts in monitoring and supporting village governmental programs. This can best be done when platoons and/or teams are located at district level, where four to six villages would constitute the maximum number of villages that each platoon/team would monitor and support.

d. Maximum effort was made during this period to place CA teams down to district level and retaining the platoon headquarters at the provincial capital. Under this concept, organic resources would have allowed CA teams to live and operate effectively in 43 of the 52 districts in III CTZ. This concept would accomplish two major support functions to pacification and development:

(1) It would allow the CA platoon to monitor and support, where needed, the Village Self-Development program.

(2) It would allow the platoon to become thoroughly familiar with the area of operation.

(3) It would reduce time-consuming commuting time from province to district each day.

This concept has met with minimal success with only 15 teams being able to relocate to district level. The major factor affecting this concept was lack of adequate billeting space at district advisory compounds. This problem is expected to be a continuous one and will affect the full realization of this overall concept.

e. Civil Affairs Functional Area Specialist Team: The 2d Civil Affairs Company has found that it does not have sufficient officers trained in certain functional areas, crucial in Vietnam, to provide the necessary trained personnel to each of our sixteen platoons. The crucial functional areas where the impact of this personnel shortage is felt to be the greatest are: The areas of food and agriculture, public administration, public education, public safety and refugee work, engineering, small home industry development, language and cultural affairs. To enable the platoons to assume more of a civil affairs role by providing them with expert technical advice, which the platoons could pass on to the Vietnamese personnel they work with, The Civil Affairs Functional Area Specialist Team (CAFAST), was created out of the current assets of 2d Civil Affairs Company. The team is to be composed of five officers (U.S.) and two Vietnamese NOD interpreters.

(1) Organization (See Inclosure #2)

(2) The primary mission of CAFAST is to provide technical expertise in the above mentioned functional areas to the civil affairs platoons. The secondary mission of CAFAST is as follows:

INCL
(a) To provide liaison with the appropriate sections of MACV, CORDB and W/AD to more closely integrate our activities and to improve our ability to plan the future use of our platoons.

(b) To provide a special survey capability in the various functional areas for which the platoon has specialized skills.

(c) To provide a basic orientation to all officers and senior NCO's arriving in-company.

(d) To maintain reference libraries on the various functional areas for reference by both team members and members of the generalist platoons. This organizational concept will greatly enhance the capabilities of the generalist platoon in accomplishing their missions.

f. Public Health Team: On 20 July 1969, the Company was assigned a doctor (MC). For the first time in 23 months the unit was able to activate its Public Health Team, which consists of a doctor (O-3) and one each public health specialists E-5 and E-4. The team will undertake the coordination of civil affairs public health programs with the CORDB public health advisors and the training of assigned platoon medics in public health functions. An additional task will be to assist in developing a medical training program that will be designed to up-grade the capability of corpsmen in RF/FF, RD Cadre and PoDF.

g. Administration:

(1) During the past quarter the 2d Civil Affairs Company saw one change of the command, the arrival and departure of a new executive officer and the change of seven platoon commanders, due to rotation, reassignment and unit reorganization. On 5 June 1969 a change of command saw LTC Shannon arrive from his previous job as Operations Division Chief, G-5, II FFORCEV to take over from LTC Griffith, who departed to become the Assistant Liaison Officer to the Royal Thai Division, Bearcat, Vietnam. LTC Griffith had been in command since 1 March 1969. MAJ Buckingham, Company Executive Officer since 15 May 1968, departed on 28 May 1969 for the 35th ADA Bde, Ft Meade, CONUS. MAJ Brown was reassigned from Assisting CA Division Chief, G-5, II FFORCEV, to Company XD. He then departed on 10 Aug 69 for CONUS and his new job with BCT at Ft Bliss, TX. At present the company is without an executive officer; however, a replacement is expected by 29 Aug 69.

(2) The next sixty days will see a 20% turnover in the Company, due to rotation. This includes the Supply Officer, Motor Officer and three platoon commanders. Present shortages continue to exist of E-7, QM/EL interpreters and trained E-6, 95th MHP's. Especially critical is the need for a 76th MHP Supply Sergeant.

(3) In an effort to establish a reliable mail and distribution system, an area in which problems have existed, a full time administrative clerk was tasked. So far, results have been good.
(h) Our awards and decorations program continues to be emphasized with thirteen Army Commendation Medals, twenty Bronze Stars for meritorious service and one Purple Heart going to personnel of the 2d CA Co. Other administrative functions such as R&R, leaves, promotions, etc., have continued to be handled expeditiously with no major problems encountered.

h. Company Supply: For the past 92 days the supply section has been updating all previous supply records. It has realigned the supply distribution system so that all requisitions for material from platoons are properly processed and items tagged for distribution to platoons. Continuous efforts are being made to upgrade the priority of the PLL status on the unit so that the maintenance section can increase its stock load. The section has also strived to improve its storage capacity within the unit headquarters so that the platoons in the field can request items directly from the supply room.

i. Civilian Supply: The Civilian Supply Team vigorously continued to support generalist platoons with civic action commodities in an effort to complete on-going civic action projects that had been initiated prior to the Village Self-Development Program. Sources of supplies came primarily from voluntary agencies, normal supply channels, voluntary contributions and recovery of salvaged material. In addition, the use of a major portion of II FFORCEV HQ's 500,000 $VN a month civic action fund, significantly boosted civilian supply's effort. Maximum use was made of civilian supply's organic 2½ ton trucks to transport commodities to the widely dispersed platoons. Air lifts to several isolated platoons were made available. Civilian Supply commodities distributed to the CA platoons are listed in Inclosure #3.

j. Maintenance:

(1) Vehicle maintenance is a continuing problem, particularly with the bulk of our 59 vehicles being scattered in 16 platoons located throughout III and IV CTZs. The motor pool is presently staffed by an Ordnance Motor Officer and NCO with two mechanics by JEO and aspirant OJT mechanic. The PLL is also being maintained by an OJT parts clerk. Several of the platoons receive maintenance support from outlying support units, while the majority of the vehicles are brought to the motor pool for maintenance service. A number of positive programs have been initiated by the motor pool to improve operator maintenance of the platoon vehicles, which has resulted in less deadline time of the equipment involved.

(2) The first program initiated was a vehicle technical inspection schedule, which required the platoon commanders to send a specific vehicle to the motor pool along with its operator and log book. The motor pool inspected each vehicle and pulled any 2d echelon maintenance, while the operator pulled his 1st echelon maintenance; the log book was also inspected and any needed changes were made. This visit also enabled the parts clerk to requisition any parts found unserviceable during the inspection.
(3) Maintenance visits to the platoon locations by motor pool personnel also enabled the platoons to get better maintenance service, while it gave the headquarters greater opportunity to monitor the platoon preventive maintenance programs. These two programs saw an improved maintenance profile for the company and made for a better motor pool - platoon relation.

(b) Since some platoon commanders do not have a maintenance background, a Platoon Commanders’ Maintenance Checklist and an Instruction Sheet on Operator DA Forms were initiated; these are required in the Platoon Continuity File and are ready reference for questions which may arise for a platoon commander. The DA Form Instruction Sheet should prove most useful in assisting the platoons when submitting their Equipment Serviceability Criteria and the DA Form 2108-3 (Record of Organisational Maintenance) quarterly.

(5) In early May our maintenance support was shifted from the 140th HEM Co to the 378th Maint Supt Co, which has resulted in better support and relations for the motor pool.

(6) Overall, the last quarter proved to be very successful in improving maintenance of both the headquarters and platoon vehicles; the maintenance management program has progressed substantially, which means better support for the platoons.

2. Section II. Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:


(1) Observation: This company is authorized by MOS 95B40, in grade E6. Presently there are only ten assigned, four of whom are E6.

(2) Evaluation: This MOS must be filled by competent personnel in the authorized grade to be an asset to the 2d Civil Affairs Company. Lack of qualified personnel or of sufficient grade, injures their ability to coordinate with their contemporaries and many of the U.S. agencies with whom they come in contact.

(3) Recommendation: Only 95B40’s with the rank of at least E6 be assigned to the 2d Civil Affairs Company.

b. Operations:

(1) Enhancement of the GVW image during detention of civilians, resulting from large military operations.

(a) Observation. Frequently during large military operations, many civilians are detained for questioning. These detentions vary from just a few hours to several days.

(b) Evaluation. The detention of these civilians is a necessity. The adverse effect on the image of the GVW with respect to innocent detainees can be mitigated by providing them with food at meal times and with activities to occupy their time.
(c) Recommendation: Prior to the execution of large scale military operations, provision should be made for feeding and keeping active the detainees during their detention. A MEDCAP team and a Psyops and Cultural Drama Team should be obtained.

(2) Acceptance of IR-8 Rice:

(a) Observation: With the introduction of the new IR-8 Rice in Phu Giao District, there was a considerable amount of apprehension concerning the local Vietnamese acceptance of the rice in their daily diet. The Vietnamese are slow to accept changes and many times will not even consider sampling a new or different type of food.

(b) Evaluation: The 19th AA Platoon with the Vinh Hoa Village Council and various agricultural advisors discussed the problem and its many possible solutions. The simplest solution to be found was that of a public banquet, sponsored by the Vinh Hoa Village Council at which the newly-harvested IR-8 Rice would be prepared and served to all interested inhabitants of the area. The banquet was a complete success and removed any doubts the Vietnamese may have had concerning the edibility of the new rice.

(c) Recommendation: Whenever a new agricultural product is being initially introduced into an area, the same village council sponsored banquet may be utilized. The mere fact that it is an all-Vietnamese prepared event will foster increased enthusiasm among the other inhabitants of the area and the true worth of the new product will be more subjectively judged.

(3) Sanitary Facilities:

(a) Observation: The sanitary facilities in many schools and orphanages are inadequate.

(b) Evaluation: In many schools and orphanages, sanitary facilities are either not properly installed or not properly maintained. These inadequate facilities are not only a health hazard, but also detract from efforts to instill in the children a proper attitude toward hygiene.

(c) Recommendation: Before installing any sanitary facilities, consult an expert to insure proper installation, and as a pre-condition of installation, require the directors of schools and orphanages to be somewhat knowledgeable concerning hygiene and the maintenance of sanitary facilities.

(D) Dental Care Program:

(a) Observation: The only real dental care which the Vietnamese receive, is performed on infrequent basis and usually consists of extracting teeth. Yet a continuous dental care program is greatly needed.

(b) Evaluation: A continuous dental care program, including cleaning and filling of teeth, would greatly improve the overall health standards of the Vietnamese.
(c) Recommendation: Where dentists are available, set up a schedule of DENTCAP to be held (it would seem preferable to hold them all at a static location, such as the district health station). Publicize the schedule and have the people come in from the outlying locations. Where possible, use the program to train Vietnamese, after gaining the approval of the Province Medicine Chief.

(5) Proper Utilization of Rebar:

(a) Observation: Vietnamese frequently use small pieces of rebar to tie together rebar, when erecting columns and supports in cement construction projects.

(b) Evaluation: Rebar is expensive and in short supply. Regular barbed wire, concertina, or number ten gauge wire, are in abundant supply through salvage channels and can serve the same purpose at less cost.

(c) Recommendation: Use salvaged barbed, concertina or ten gauge wire to tie rebar together in construction projects.

(6) Construction Collapse:

(a) Observation: Projects undergoing construction during heavy monsoon rains are subject to collapsing.

(b) Evaluation: Vietnamese masons have a tendency to continue cement construction projects until the daily monsoon rains force them to take shelter. Consequently, the most recently laid bricks and cement become wet and much of the construction effort may tumble to the ground.

(c) Recommendation: During the monsoon season, concrete construction should cease around 11:00 hours to allow sufficient time for the cement to dry, prior to the daily afternoon rains. To avoid overpaying the masons, hire them during the monsoon season, by the job and not the day.

(7) Prevention of Wind Damage to Aluminum Roofing:

(a) Observation: A great number of roofs constructed with aluminum roofing sheets, suffer wind damage during the rainy season.

(b) Evaluation: The people constructing these roofs do not anchor the roofing sheets properly.

(c) Recommendation: When issuing roofing sheets for repair or new construction, the builders must be made aware of how to properly anchor the roofing sheets.

(8) Use of Pre-fabricated Buildings:
(a) Observation: Pre-fabricated buildings are greatly needed in many areas. Quonsets are available.

(b) Evaluation: The quonsets available are generally those designed for cold climate conditions.

(c) Recommendation: To adapt the quonsets to Vietnamese climate, modifications must be made in the design. Recommend modifications as follows: 'Take an opening extending the length of the building by bending up the second row of tin; cover the opening with screen and make louvers above the doors on the end panels by using excess pieces of tin included in the kit. (See Inclosure #4).

9) Dam Construction:

(a) Observation: In many coastal areas, valuable crop land is inundated by salt water during the monsoon season.

(b) Evaluation: Where permanent dams are not under construction or are planned more than one planting season away, use can be made of salvaged fifty-five gallon drums to erect temporary but effective dams. Self-help labor can fill the drums with earth, cement the tops and arrange them two deep. Where no bulldozer is available, erect embankments.

(c) Recommendation: Use salvaged material whenever possible.

10) Obtaining Water (Potable) for the Vietnamese:

(a) Observation: Many wells are being dug, but supplying water which is not potable to the Vietnamese.

(b) Evaluation: For the well to supply usable water to the Vietnamese, it must be properly located. Such things as terrain features, location of latrines, drainage and elevation, must be planned for in locating wells.

(c) Recommendation: Before selecting a site for a well, assist the Vietnamese in performing a survey to determine the most favorable site.

11) Loss of Commodities:

(a) Observation: Frequently between the time commodities are delivered and the time they are used, there is a high rate of loss.

(b) Evaluation: The loss of commodities between delivery and use can be attributed to two causes: (1) Negligence on the part of the Vietnamese handling the commodities; and (2) Exposure to the weather.
(c) Recommendation: Require strict supervision on accountability for the commodities in the logistics system.

c. Training: None
d. Intelligence:

(1) Vietnamese Hitchhikers:

(a) Observation: Often Vietnamese will attempt to hitch rides with Americans. Frequently they will appear to be Vietnamese soldiers.

(b) Evaluation: The hitchhiker could be a VC/NVA attempting to by-pass a NPF check point. The VC/NVA have even been known to dress in ARVN uniforms. The individual could also be AMDL or a deserter attempting to get as far away as possible from his unit as quickly as he can.

(c) Recommendation: Do not pick up Vietnamese hitchhikers, soldiers included, unless you know them personally.

e. Logistics: None
f. Organization: None
g. Other: None

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2 ea - G3, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
3 ea - G3, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC (DL-T), APO 96375
4 ea - G3, II FFORGEV, ATTN: AVFBE, APO 96266
2 ea - G3, II FFORGEV, ATTN: AVFBE, APO 96266
2 ea - G3, USOONARC, ATTN: ATOPS-SW/CA, Ft Monroe, Va
1 ea - AA Platoon
1 ea - 29th CA Co, ARC 96319
1 ea - 11st CA Co, APO 96350
AVFCG-Ex-H (4 Sep 69) 1st Ind


DA, H, II FFUCG, APC San Francisco 96366

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVFGC-OIT, APC 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPAC-JT, APC 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report—Lessons Learned of the 2d Civil Affairs Company for the period ending 31 July 1969, with the following comments:


   Subpara (a), line 2: Change cement to concrete.

b. Para 2b(6):

   (1) Subpara (b), line 1: Change cement to masonry. Line 3: Change cement to mortar.

   (2) During the monsoon season masons should be furnished with some type of covering (plastic, canvas, etc) to protect newly constructed masonry from the effects of the heavy rains.

For The Commanding:

[Signature]

AGC
1st Ind
AVHGC-DST (15 Aug 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Second Civil Affairs Company for Period
Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco
96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 2d Civil
Affairs Company.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Assignment of Personel", section II
page 6, paragraph 2a; nonconcur. Grade E6 is a critically short enlisted
grade throughout USARV with the command presently at 75% of authorized
strength. Shortages exist in all MOS's at this grade level. Records at
this headquarters confirm the shortage in MOS 95B40 in II Field Force
Vietnam with the unit slightly below the USARV average of 85%. Action
is being taken to bring the unit up to the USARV average.

b. Reference item concerning "Dental Care Program", section II,
page 7, paragraph 2b(4); nonconcur. The US Army Dental Corps does
not have sufficient personnel to carry out such an extensive program.
Many medical detachments (dental) are conducting courses in oral hygiene
at local schools in an effort to improve the oral health of the Vietnamese.
Considering the limited time available to a dental officer for the DENTCAP
program, this appears to produce the greatest results.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:
2d CA Co
II FFV
GPOF-DT (15 Aug 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 2d Civil Affairs Company for Period
Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

L. Short
AGC
AG

13
Area of Operation and Locations of AA Platoons of 2d Civil Affairs Company
C A F A S T

Platoon Commander (03)

Cultural & Language Section
2 ARVN Area Specialists (E6)

Economic Development Section
1 Food & Agricultural Officer (02)
1 Economic Development Officer (Eng) (02)

Public Assistance Section
1 Public Administration Officer (02)
1 Public Safety Officer (02)
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Louvres made with excess small pieces of tin

1 sheet tin bent up
Screen

Concrete Floor

Loc 4
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 2d Civil Affairs Company

A. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.

CO, 2d Civil Affairs Company

15 August 1969

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A