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PREPARATION
AND UTILIZATION OF
MILITARY ASSISTANCE OFFICERS

The American University
CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS
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ABSTRACT

The objective of this report is to ascertain through a survey of the relevant literature the tasks and functions performed by U.S. military advisory personnel and to determine the impact of certain cultural factors on the achievement of advisors' missions. The study organizes the problems and recommendations of previous studies on a number of key problem areas. The two appendixes, appearing in foldout form, present these problems and recommendations in table form with references to pages in the text.
FOREWORD

The report that follows is the result of a literature search of what was originally con-
ceived to be an exploratory study intended to ascertain the impact of counterinsurgency ad-
visory activities on the career orientation of army officers. However, prior to initiation of
the research the objectives were revised in cooperation with the work unit sponsor, Deputy
Chief of Staff of Personnel (DCSPER) in order to place emphasis on the nature and scope of
preparation of U.S. Army officers for military advisory duty.

The research task was redesigned to be approached in three phases:

(A) A survey of relevant literature;

(B) An intensive data gathering phase in which experienced American mili-
tary advisors were to be reached and questioned either through inter-
views or by means of specially designed questionnaires;

(C) An analysis and synthesis phase.

Concurrent with the literature survey, an army board known as the "Haines Board" rec-
ommended, among other things, an integration of training facilities and programs for foreign
area training specialists, civil affairs, and psychological operations. This activity, known as
recommendation number 40, was not immediately favorably considered by the army. In
March 1967 a new study group known as DCSPLR Study Group Number 40 was asked to re-
examine the problem. Early in 1968 this group rendered its report, which included a recom-
mendation for the establishment of a new career officer program that would combine training
and activities covering such heretofore diverse fields as civil affairs, psychological opera-
tions, and related operations. These recommendations were approved by the Army Chief of
Staff on 26 April 1968.

These events, overtaking the progress of the study, along with the research interrup-
tions, contributed to a decision by CRESS to terminate the research activities with an "administrative
report" in June 1968.

A review of the material contained in the administrative report resulted in a judgment
that it could be of value to those individuals concerned with the implementation of the new
career program, now known as the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP), as well as
those agencies and schools concerned with the preparation and assignment of military person-
nel for MAAG's and missions. This resulted in a judgement to publish the material as a
technical report.

Because of limitations outlined above, this publication should not be interpreted as at-
tempts to serve as a definitive report on the problems investigated. The bibliography
append to the body of the report reflects an analysis of the literature that was reviewed.
Because no original field research was undertaken, the problems highlighted in this paper are
only those described in the work of others. What the paper does do, however, is to organize
the thoughts and conclusions of previous studies on what appears to be a number of key problem areas mentioned in the literature. In the normal course of research those conclusions would of course have been tested through accepted social science techniques had the study proceeded to a normal closure. The present report should therefore be interpreted as an analytical approach to the problems and the research, and policy recommendations of the author should be viewed as tentative and subject to further research.

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CHAPTER 1

SUMMARY

PROBLEM

To ascertain through a survey of relevant literature the tasks and functions performed by U.S. military-advisory personnel and to determine the impact of certain cultural factors on the successful achievement of an advisor's mission are the purposes of this study.

FACTS

In reviewing the literature concerning U.S. Army military advisory officers, an attempt was made to organize and describe the then existing state of knowledge on the subject. The works that were reviewed indicated a wide difference in levels of academic approach; utilization of research methods; completeness of historical references; emphasis on specific countries; and whether or not overt hostilities were involved. In spite of such shortcomings, information was found on almost all of the major areas of concern, in addition to discussions of major problems, and some proposed solutions. There was considerable repetition of commonplace observations and recommendations in the literature about advisors.

A literature survey such as this one, which depends solely on bibliographic material, can at best identify the important problems that exist and hopefully can point the way to further action and research for solving these problems. This report contains statements of the problems identified in the literature with some recommendations for remedial actions that might be taken to resolve them.

Some previously published recommendations, particularly those based on empirical research, are repeated in this study because they appear to deal with current problems. In view of the complex relationships between advisors and host-country officers, it was not possible to limit consideration of problems and recommendations to military advisory officers alone. Rather, it was found that certain problems attributed to such advisors may also be problems for other military assistance officers and for host-country officers. (See Appendices A and B.)

The principal problem areas and solutions indicated are identified as follows:

Research Needs

It is recommended that research studies be carried out to provide bases for policy decisions on the personnel problems involved in the management of military assistance officers. Much of what is called "research" in the literature seems to be based only on subjective judgments made by informal interviewers. What is said to be relevant often is presented in the total absence of any evidence to support conclusions and recommendations.
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Language Needs

Discussions of the importance of an advisor's knowing the language of the country to which he is assigned have been published from time to time. Language training for advisory officers usually is discussed in terms of needs and costs. The effectiveness of interpersonal communications between a U.S. advisory officer and an officer of a host country also can depend on the host officer's command of English, or on the availability of an interpreter. The cost/effectiveness considerations concerning foreign-language training depend on length of duty tour and on the number of overseas assignments that will be made to areas that use the language in question. It has been established innumerable times that properly selected U.S. officers can accomplish their advisory missions abroad without knowing the language of the host country. But there also are opinions expressed that knowledge of the host country's language has valuable side effects (for example, improves rapport, helps with understanding the culture, and with the monitoring of interpreter-counterpart conversations).

Cultural Differences

Culture training and language training are often dealt with as two areas of major importance. However, language training to a reasonable degree of fluency is much more expensive and time consuming than is cultural orientation. As Hausrath said (see p. 24 of this report), most advisors feel that cultural orientation is necessary and that it can be more important to advisory success than knowledge of the language of the host country. Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine from the literature whether or not present cultural training for U.S. advisory officers—except in the case of foreign area specialists—is adequate for their needs in all overseas locations. One of the gaps in the literature concerns what advisory training, if any, is provided to officers below the rank of major who are assigned to duty in countries other than the Republic of Vietnam.

Not all social science research on cross-cultural interaction is necessarily relevant to the problems of U.S. military advisors; some cultural research is business oriented and some is academically oriented (written objectively with a view to observing and recording phenomena).

Training

The literature search revealed that there has been considerable activity in the area of cross-cultural training in recent years. The amount of empirical research that has been accomplished in support of the development of such programs was found to be very small in comparison to the need. Additionally, there is no evidence of an attempt to evaluate the outcome of military assistance training or to determine its relation to university cross-cultural and international affairs training programs.

The review reveals that many improvements in current programs are feasible. The first major requirement is for a comprehensive appraisal of the educational philosophy, purposes, and objectives of the training programs. For example, there appears to be an implicit belief that if we have adequate training we can develop any competent military officer into a successful military assistance advisor. There is no hard evidence to support the belief.

Most articles in the literature deal with training considerations from the viewpoint of a single type of environment. But training problems are derived from peaceful, or insurgent,
or overt hostility situations. Problems also concern command or staff officers, combat or technical support officers, junior or senior grade officers, and counterpart advisory or purely administrative officers.

**Careers**

A number of writers have discussed the efficient use of advisors' training and experience. Also to be found in the literature are discussions of the effects of advisory assignments on officers' careers. There are to be found differences of opinion about the way in which advisors should be programmed for recurrent assignments. A tendency was apparent for writers to offer general conclusions presumably applicable to all kinds of advisory assignments, but their observations were often based on a limited sample of advisory assignments and locations. In addition, the substantial differences between advisory duty requirements and military occupational specialty specifications have been largely ignored. Attempts at generalization also ignored differences among tactical, technical, and administrative roles, between advisors working in combat and noncombat situations, and between regular and reserve officers' motivations and career requirements.

**Duties and Functions**

Military advisors in general have some problems and duties in common. But a psychological stereotype apparently exists that implies the existence of an advisor who is responsible for all the functions performed by a military assistance advisory group. The existence of this stereotype tends to limit thinking about different kinds of advisory officers and thus fails to provide us with an adequate understanding of the nature and scope of individual functions and duties. Definitions in the literature of the functions and duties of an advisory officer tend to be generalizations of the responsibilities of chiefs of MAAG's or of army sections, or of the duties of sector advisors, or of Special Forces A Detachment commanders. In each of the above cases the commanding officer has responsibility for activities concerned with internal defense operations, civil affairs, psychological operations, intelligence, supply, communications, and so forth. In contrast to the duties performed by the stereotype advisor, however, are the duties of the majority of advisors who function as technical military consultants in over 40 military occupational specialties. The search of the literature revealed that the term "advisor" is used to cover a multiplicity of functions that do not necessarily have anything in common. For example, one advisor might work with highly technical electronic matters, during which time he rarely sees a host-country counterpart. A combat unit advisor, however, might serve in combat and thus be in immediate day-to-day contact with his commander-counterpart. Such differences must be taken into account if we are to understand the requirements for advisors. As Preston, 1962, p. 231, said:

But until we know the various jobs in terms of their required behaviors, we shall never have a sound basis for personnel selection, training, assignment, or evaluation, and we shall spend countless man-years or man-centuries in speculation about over- or under-selection, over- or under-training, rotation and hardship tours, the need or lack of need for special career fields, and similar topics.
Many writers recorded observations suggesting that certain personality characteristics are primary causes of failure among military assistance officers. These traits were said to include an inability to adapt to foreign cultures; ethnocentrism; a lack of empathy in dealing with host-country personnel; and an indifference or negative motivation for the assistance assignment. Differences in the effect of extroversion on cross-cultural communications also were noted.

The basic causes for the success or failure of a military assistance officer are not known. It is possible that an officer will perform in a superior fashion in one setting and in an inferior or mediocre manner in a different assignment.

Personality retraining to solve the above problems is a difficult, long-term process from which we can expect only limited results. It would be highly desirable, therefore, to re-examine attitudes concerning the values of advisory training programs. Training courses are certainly important aids to an officer who is otherwise qualified to perform advisory duties effectively. It is not realistic, however, to conclude that training courses can alter the personality of one who is temperamentally unsuited to living and working in an alien environment and to performing in an advisory role.

In order to minimize the probability that unsuitable officers will be assigned to military assistance duties, a program of psychological personnel assessment is needed. It appears desirable to find ways to eliminate those who do not want such assignments. Voluntary entry into and participation in a preassignment assessment program would help to eliminate those who are likely to be unsuitable in military assistance assignments abroad.
CHAPTER 2
FUNCTIONS OF U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY ELEMENTS

The history of U.S. military advisory operations presented by Hermes, 1965, pp. 3-8 shows that it goes back much further than is generally realized. He pointed out that military officers from the United States were selected by direction of Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, commanding general of the U.S. Army, to serve as military experts in the Egyptian military service from 1869 to 1882. In time, 50 officers went to Egypt. These officers were not then on active duty. Many had asked to be relieved from active duty to accept the assignment and thus to broaden their military experience. [Hesseltine and Wolf, 1961.] Another unofficial military mission assisted the Korean government from 1887 to 1896. However, the first official U.S. Army military advisory efforts appeared in the Philippines and in Cuba following the Spanish-American War (1902). While the U.S. Army was in an occupation status in both, army personnel trained indigenous constabulary forces to suppress brigandage and insurrections and generally to preserve law and order. The Cuban constabulary (Rural Guard) was thus transformed into an army between 1906 and 1909 by U.S. Army officers while the U.S. Army was for the second time in occupation of the island. U.S. military personnel served as advisors to Cuban army commanders down to the regimental level.

Following the Spanish-American War the practice of establishing indigenous constabulary forces in developing nations was continued by the U.S. Marine Corps in other countries of Central America and in the Caribbean area. In 1926 Congress gave President Calvin Coolidge authority to detail U.S. Army personnel as military advisors to governments in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean islands, Hermes, 1965, p. 6.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur retired from the U.S. Army in 1935 in order to become the chief military advisor to the Philippine Comnonwealth government. While there, he drew up and began to put into effect a plan for a Philippine national army, Hermes, 1965, pp. 8-10.

In keeping with a "good neighbor" policy, Presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt curtailed the functions of U.S. military missions in Latin America from 1929 to 1940. In 1938 there were only two U.S. missions with a total of five advisors in all of Latin America. The neutrality acts of 1935 and 1936 forbade the grant, loan, or sale of arms to belligerents. After the German invasion of France in 1940, the U.S. government began to provide arms to the major Latin American countries. By 1941, military staff agreements were in effect between the United States and all the Latin American countries except Argentina, Hermes, 1965, pp. 6-7. The U.S. Army also equipped and helped to train the Brazilian division that fought in Italy during World War II, Hermes, 1965, p. 32.

By December 1941, other military assistance missions had been put into operation in the Soviet Union, Great Britain, North Africa, Iran, and China, Hermes, 1965, p. 12. Missions in Iran were set up to train the gendarmerie to maintain internal security, and to aid the Iranian army in the task of repelling a possible German invasion. An American "liaison net" for two Chinese divisions that fought in Burma against the Japanese was extended down to the battalion level. Later a U.S. Army liaison system was provided for the whole Chinese army, from the regimental level to the general staff level, Hermes, 1965, pp. 23-25.
The period immediately after World War II saw the initiation of missions to Greece, Turkey, and other countries that were threatened from within by Communist insurgencies and from without by Communist armies. Beginning in 1947 U.S. advisors, from general staff down to the battalion level, were assigned to the Greek army for the duration of the Communist insurgency in Greece. In Turkey, U.S. military assistance personnel attempted to improve the armed services and logistic facilities, Hovey, 1965, pp. 4-6.

In Korea after World War II a new constabulary, organized and advised by U.S. Army personnel, was gradually transformed into the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. During 1949 the military advisory group that had been left behind after the departure of U.S. combat forces became the U.S. Army Military Advisory Group, Korea (KMAG). The advisors used a counterpart system that ranged from the general staff to the battalion level.

When the Philippines became independent in 1946, they were provided with U.S. military assistance for the purpose of defense against external aggression, but the conventional tactics of this force were of little use in controlling Hukbalahap guerrillas. In order to regain the initiative for the Philippine forces, the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) recommended that the direction of the counterinsurgency effort be given to the Philippine Department of National Defense and that the size of the constabulary be reduced. JUSMAG was instrumental in the development of anti-guerrilla tactics after 1950, Hermes, 1965, pp. 36-38.

U.S. military assistance to Thailand began in 1950. In the same year, Japan organized a police reserve that was sponsored, trained, and equipped by the U.S. Army. The police reserve was reorganized in 1954 into an army called the Ground Self-Defense Force, Higgins, 1962, pp. 56-57.

Military assistance to Europe, begun in 1948, was curtailed sharply after 1957 as a result of Europe's astounding economic recovery, Hovey, 1965, p. 77.

The Cuban revolution gave the Communists a base in the Western Hemisphere during 1959. The mission of U.S. military advisors in Latin America, therefore, was changed from merely administering military materiel aid programs to actively assisting Latin American countries in preventing and combating Communist insurgencies, Hovey, 1965, pp. 56-58.

According to Hovey, 1965, p. 29, the United States provided military materiel assistance to French forces in Vietnam from about 1949 until 1954. Starting in 1955, South Vietnam began receiving U.S. materiel, training, logistical, and transport support. This effort now involves a major national effort on the part of the United States.

In short, history shows that U.S. Army military advisory assistance to other nations has grown from one small, unofficial advisory group of about 50 officers into a major and continuous military operation involving thousands of active-duty officers and men. The present extent of the advisory effort is worldwide, with 47 military assistance advisory groups (MAAG's), mission and military group (MILGP) elements assigned to countries in Europe, the Near East, Equatorial Africa, Asia, South America, and Central America.

A study and review of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) was conducted in 1959 by the President's Committee to Study the U.S. Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee).
In the letter to the President found on p. 1 of its Second Interim Report, it stated:

... [the] scope and purpose of our Military Assistance Program have changed markedly since the program was begun some ten years ago as a hastily instituted series of measures to meet communist aggression in particular areas. Our programs have now grown to include assistance to nations which are clearly threatened with aggression or subversion. From mere reaction to overt actions our policy has developed into one of anticipation of threatened events and the building of collective security. It has thus become a basic portion of the defense structure of the free world and a bulwark of the long range security interests of the United States.


Our military forces overseas also include Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Military Missions. Through these agencies the United States Army is contributing to the battle readiness of allied forces that comprise some 80 percent of the Free World's armies. They represent the equivalent of approximately 200 divisions. While some of these forces are far from achieving their full combat potential, substantial progress is being made. We must never ignore the fact that by assisting our allies to improve their own security, we are contributing to our security. We are giving substance and meaning to our policy of collective security. We are, in reality, projecting the defense of the United States far from our shores.

Of particular importance now is the improvement of our capabilities—as well as those of selected countries—to meet subversion, insurgency, and guerrilla actions. This is primarily an Army job.

According to Gen. Harold K. Johnson, 1965, p. 11, one mission of the U.S. Army is to engage in activities promoting stability and progress in the modernization of emerging nations. Derived from this mission are such tasks as combat support, combat service support, advisory operations, civic action, civil affairs activities, and peace-keeping operations. He said that the successful carrying out of this mission

... lies beyond the reach of military means alone. Success also requires concerted political, economic, and social action [and] involves support and advice to the security forces of threatened governments so that they can prevent or defeat insurgency or subversion.

Thus, one function of military assistance is to help the host country prevent and defeat insurgency and to contribute to the basic nation-building process. But, General Johnson contended, such assistance goes beyond military advice and the training of indigenous personnel: it includes political, social, and economic activity that will support the security and stable progress of a nation.

An official statement concerning political objectives is given in U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual 41-10, "Civil Affairs Operations," p. 39:
The political objective is the establishment, maintenance, or preservation of a government which can operate effectively under law to meet the needs and aspirations of its people. Military objectives and tactical operations conducted to achieve them must be compatible with the support of the political objective.

One of the most important military advisory functions is the training of host-country military personnel within the country. According to Hovey, 1965, p. 173:

These military assistance advisory groups have as part of their function the administration of the military aid program, from determining what equipment is to be given to making sure it is properly utilized. However, the substantial size of these missions or military assistance advisory groups is primarily attributable to the fact that most of the personnel in them are assigned to the training of foreign military personnel within the country. For example, in fiscal year 1964 training personnel were about 90 percent of total military personnel assigned to the military assistance advisory group in Korea, 75 percent in the Republic of China, 56 percent in Iran and 30 percent in Greece. These training personnel who are permanently assigned to military assistance advisory groups may carry out roles as unit advisors (actually stationed with their units), headquarters advisors or as managers of the training effort responsible for assisting local officials involved in training and providing training manuals and similar materials.

The efforts of the military assistance advisory groups are supplemented by United States mobile training teams which are called upon for special skills not normally within the competence of persons permanently assigned to foreign countries. Such teams are usually composed of senior enlisted and junior officer skilled military personnel. Typical examples of the work conducted by mobile training teams are counterinsurgency advice in the Far East, use of armored tactics in Greece or utilization of new air force concepts in Latin America.

Aside from contributions made directly to training within existing host-country schools, training schools were established by U.S. personnel in Egypt before 1882, Hesseltine and Wolf, 1961, p. 1, and in 1936 in the Philippines, where training schools were established for the new army with U.S. Army instructors conducting the initial training.

Furthermore, during World War II, a combat training center was set up by U.S. officers in India for two Chinese divisions that had retreated from Burma. For the entire Chinese army, U.S. "liaison" personnel established the Chinese Training Center and Chinese Combat Command to conduct military schools, and unit and troop schools, Hermes, 1965, pp. 23-24, 28.

The efforts made by U.S. advisors in preparing the Greek army to fight a guerrilla war were reported by Curtin, 1949, p. 35.

The Greek Army is now well supplied with arms and ammunition and is undergoing an intensive training program supervised by American officers, emphasizing offensive action by small units for typical guerrilla operations in mountainous regions.
According to Sawyer, 1962, p. 79, "Before the establishment of the KMAG American military advisors had set up eight military schools in South Korea." Howze, 1955, p. 563, described later developments in Korea as follows:

As soon as the Communist offensive ground to a halt at the Pusan perimeter, KMAG's plans for the training of a new Korean Army were placed in operation. Replacement Training Centers, with Korean cadres and American officers and enlisted men as advisors, were set up. Branch and Service training schools, most of which had suspended operations during the Communist onslaught, were re-activated.

Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway's plan for rebuilding the ROK Army based on the following goals was reported by Sawyer, 1962, p. 176:

1. The establishment of a replacement training and school command to supervise the ROK Army's schooling and training.
2. The establishment of a U.S. Army-type military reservation, and a centralization of ROK Army training installations for the combat arms.
3. An increase in the number of U.S. Army personnel at ROK Army training installations.
4. An intensive leadership program for the ROK Army.
5. More training for ROK officers in U.S. Army service schools.
6. Pressure on the Republic of Korea Government to insure disciplinary measures against incompetent, corrupt, or cowardly ROK officers and government officials.
7. A rehabilitation program for all ROK infantry divisions.
8. The development of service units for a ten-division ROK Army.
9. An increase in the number of automatic weapons, artillery, and tanks in the ROK Army, as units demonstrated an ability to absorb and use additional equipment.

Conner, 1960, pp. 37-38, described the development of a comprehensive military school system for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN):

Serving the Vietnam armed forces is an integrated military school system, based to a small degree on the American pattern, which carries out a continuing program of instruction for personnel of all ranks. It includes refresher courses at unit level and a ten-month course at the Command and General Staff College. Branch schools of every army and service offer courses ranging from advanced individual training to company commander courses. An NCO [noncommissioned officer] academy handles over a thousand students annually, and Army officer candidate schools graduate 600 second lieutenants each year.

According to Lentz, 1964, pp. 16-18, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Engineer School has trained officers, noncommissioned officers (NCO's), and other enlisted personnel in the techniques and methods of military engineering since 1955. U.S. advisors are responsible for assisting the school commandant and his staff. In addition to military engineering and counterinsurgency training, the school also engages in a military civic action program.
Hovey, 1965, p. 172, described other U.S. facilities for training foreign military personnel:

To minimize the costs associated with extensive travel of trainees to and from the United States from geographically distant nations, the United States has utilized United States schools established for the use of United States personnel in foreign countries and special schools established solely for the military aid program to train foreign students. The major schools utilized for this training are Fort Gulick and Albrook Air Force Base in the Canal Zone. As of March 15, 1964, a total of 21,825 Latin American personnel had attended these schools. Instruction for Air Force, Army, and Navy personnel is given in counterinsurgency and civic action. Instruction is conducted in Spanish.

Some personnel from the Far East are trained in United States military installations in Okinawa and some from Europe in the schools utilized by United States forces in Germany.

Some major differences among U.S. advisory groups were discussed in Kroeger, 1957, p. 134.

There are two types of Military Assistance Advisory Groups. One is logistics and the other is training, with considerable overlap between the two types in activities. Those devoted primarily to training work directly with the military units of the host country. The logistics group remains somewhat aloof from participation in the operations of the army of the host country, but provides materials and supplies to them and instructs them in its use.

And Williams, 1961, p. 2, added that:

No two Military Assistance Advisory Groups are exactly alike. In some countries MAAG may be charged primarily with programming, receiving and distributing equipment, and then making periodic checks to see that the equipment is being maintained properly. In other countries MAAG may be charged with that duty and, in addition, with organization and training of the troops.

It was noted in Hermes, 1965, p. 82, that:

The situations faced by military advisors in China, Korea, and Vietnam were quite different from the Philippines. It is true that all four had internal security problems sponsored by communist elements, but the conditions in the three mainland countries were far more complex from an American advisory viewpoint. Here the Americans came up against the differences in language, culture, and religion that still are but imperfectly understood. In all three countries there was a lack of technological development and the advisor had to conquer the problem of teaching jet age mechanics to offspring of an ox cart civilization.

It could therefore be said that the role of U.S. military advisors varies with the degree of military sophistication of the recipient countries.
CHAPTER 3
RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF ADVISORS

The wide variation in functions and emphasis on functions that is found among military assistance advisory groups suggests that there must be important differences among them in terms of both problems and duties. Moreover, as Hoehn, 1966, p. 1, said:

The functions which the advisor should perform are quite different from those commonly called for within the U.S. military. The mission of advisors is not to perform the work of the host military, nor is it restricted to providing technical expertise. Rather, the job is to induce development and improved performance capability on the part of the host military organization and its personnel.

Hausrath, 1957, p. 13, gave a comprehensive account of advisory responsibilities in the U.S. Army Military Advisory Group, Korea (K MAG) during the Korean War, saying:

K MAG advisors had a number of duties that can be considered typical of those that occur in MAAG and in some military missions to foreign countries, particularly in underdeveloped countries like those that may be found in Asia.

(a) Advisors are responsible for the requisitioning and/or the delivery of U.S. equipment and supplies.

(b) Advisors are responsible for the training of local nationals in the proper maintenance of equipment.

(c) Advisors are to guide and supervise training in the use of U.S. equipment and military doctrine.

(d) Advisors are responsible for getting information across to their counterparts in spite of the language barrier.

But on page 17 he also noted that K MAG advisors themselves saw their responsibilities somewhat differently.

From interviews it was determined that the K MAG advisor saw his major responsibilities to be:

(a) Most importantly, providing experience and training to his counterpart. He did this both by giving counsel derived from his own background and by seeing to it that his counterpart gained experience and training of his own.

(b) Safeguarding proper and economical utilization of the materiel furnished to the ROKA [Republic of Korea Army] by the U.S. government.

(c) Keeping his U.S. superiors informed of the realities of the situation as he saw it.
It will be noted that KMAG officers conceived their mission to include the safeguarding of U.S. equipment and supplies, even though this aspect of their mission was not stated in the "Advisor's Procedure Guide." Responsibility for U.S. equipment seems to have been impressed on advisors through other means, including the procedural requirement for them to sign all requisitions for materiel.

During the hostilities (which minimized opportunities for training and briefing new advisors), the chief of KMAG prepared and issued a set of concepts regarding the mission and job of the combat unit advisor, Hausrath, 1957, pp. 15-16.

"Ten Commandments" for KMAG Advisors

As Advisor to a ROK Army Unit, I will:

1. Take the initiative in making observations and rendering advice. Without waiting to be asked, I will give advice for such corrective action as I would take if I were the unit commander.

2. Advise my counterpart forcefully, yet not command his unit.

3. Follow up to insure that advice has been acted upon. If it has not, take it up with next higher KMAG-ROK Army Echelon for decision and action. (In ROK Divisions with U.S. Corps, take up with U.S. Corps Commanders.)

4. By sound advice and follow-up:
   (a) Develop fully the combat power of all units of the command.
   (b) Coordinate and control elements of the command so as to gain the greatest effectiveness in destroying the enemy.
   (c) Restore promptly any part of the command which may have been lost or destroyed.
   (d) Insure efficient use of supplies and equipment furnished the command.

5. Keep abreast of the tactical situation by frequent personal contact with all units of the command, using the presence of myself and my counterpart to motivate the troops and give them confidence. A minimum of my time will be spent in the unit command post. (This applies particularly to Senior Advisors and G2, G3 Advisors.)

6. Give special attention to the training of Reserve elements, with emphasis on realism and correction of deficiencies developed during combat.

7. Report all tactical information promptly to the next higher KMAG level regardless of reports initiated through ROK Army channels.

8. Report deficiencies promptly to the next higher KMAG level; follow up on necessary corrective action. (Corps Senior Advisors will keep Chief, KMAG, personally informed of existing deficiencies and necessary corrective action within their purview in order that failure may be prevented rather than corrected.)

9. Devote particular attention to the welfare of the individual and to the maintenance of high morale and professional standards in my KMAG Detachment.
(10) Be responsible for good order, discipline, housekeeping and efficiency, not only in my own Detachment, but in all KMAG Detachments advising ROK elements subordinate to the command I advise.

I realize that I stand or fall with my counterpart. I share in credit for his success and in blame for his failures.

Dr. Ralph Sanders, in addressing a class at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, September 24, 1962 (pp. 23-25), identified the following eight specific goals the U.S. government may seek to achieve in a developing country that has requested assistance in countering potential insurgency:

1. Induce the elite to launch needed reforms.
2. Prompt the people to identify themselves with the national government.
3. Promote economic and social improvement at a rate fast enough to convey an image of progress.
4. Help provide opportunities for career advancement of all people including those not of the elite.
5. Improve internal security by strengthening the armed forces, intelligence services, and the police.
6. Provide training to the armed forces specifically tailored to combating guerrilla rather than conventional forces.
7. Enlist the sympathy of the people for the armed forces by encouraging military discipline and aiding civic action programs.
8. Improve the motivation and efficiency of bureaucracies.

The members of the U.S. MAAG always work directly under the umbrella of the U.S. country team. While they may seek to implement specific U.S. projects under any of the eight stated objectives, military advisors are more likely to become involved in specific tasks to promote objectives five, six, and seven. But, even with these three, the implementation does not rest solely with the U.S. military element. U.S. military assistance advisory group personnel around the world work closely with the Agency for International Development field personnel in devising and implementing training and civic action programs.

In a country where armed insurrection becomes more than a mere threat to the host-country government, the tasks that fall to the military advisor vary according to the particular stage of the insurrection. In stage one, the U.S. MAAG works through the host-country military forces providing training advice, encouragement, and, at times, logistic support.

In stage two, when the insurgency has reached the point at which pitched battles are fought between the insurgents and host-country military forces, the tasks performed by U.S. MAAG personnel are threefold: (a) to provide advice to host-country field commanders on appropriate tactics as well as training; (b) to help combat forces obtain necessary logistic support; and (c) to provide advice to host-country commanders and men on how to win or retain the support of the people in behalf of the military forces.

Stage three is described as that phase of the conflict when the insurgent forces no longer are able to mount a significant pitched battle against government troops but when there still remain traces of defection and insurrection. In stage three the duties of U.S. military
advisors, along with other elements of the U.S. country team, revolve around the twin problems of reconciliation and reconstruction.

Hermes, 1965, p. 73, noted that within the Unified Commands, the MAAG functions include:

1. Recommendations for military assistance in the host country.
2. Development of plans and programs.
3. Reports on the use of materiel and foreign personnel training programs.
4. Administration of military sales transactions.
5. The provision of advisory services and technical assistance.
6. Receipt and transfer of materiel; and
7. Other duties as are specified in their individual terms of reference.

The duties of a chief, U.S. military advisory assistance group, or of a chief, army section, obviously are extensive and varied. A chief must distinguish between short-term and long-term missions and assign priorities accordingly. While responsible to his own supervisors for the implementation of U.S. policy, he needs to acquire an awareness of the expectations of the host government and of his counterpart, since discrepancies may exist between these expectations and stated U.S. policy and U.S. Army doctrine.

The chief must develop his own resources for administration, training, and logistical and intelligence support. He must obtain information about the military situation, about the political structure and history of the area, and about cultural differences that can lead to success or failure in mission accomplishment. He must determine and provide for training requirements and make recommendations for other military assistance requirements of the area. He plans and develops civic action programs, taking into account geographical assets and limitations, cultural factors, available supply sources, insurgent influence and interference, availability of trained personnel, overall requirements of the area, and his relationship with his counterpart. He and his staff advise on recruiting, military training centers, schools, tactics, chain of command, planning, and checking on progress.

Sector advisors (such as those who have been assigned to provinces of South Vietnam) also have a wide range of duties. They are charged with the implementation of pacification programs, as well as with advising province chiefs on security, psychological operations, civil affairs, and the use of popular and regional forces. Another function of the sector advisor is to work closely with the U.S. Overseas Mission (USOM) in deciding on civil projects to be implemented in the province.

Subsector advisors serve at the district level. Their functions include monitoring all defense and development programs in their areas, reporting on progress, recommending program improvement, advising the district chief on counterinsurgency, going out on operations with the popular and regional forces, and preparing and maintaining basic data on the subsector.

In developing nations, advisors also are attached to conventional force units of the host-country army. The assignments of army unit advisors in Vietnam were described in Hickey and Davidson, 1965, p. 57.
At division headquarters there are staff advisors as well as advisors assigned to the individual regiments and battalions. All field advisors are involved in operations along with their counterparts, and their work includes more tactical responsibilities than do the functions of corps advisors.

At the regimental level, a senior advisor with a staff of several assistants helps the regimental commander in planning and conducting operations, and he is available for advice on tactics when operations are under way. He and his counterpart visit field units and observe operations, reporting back to their respective superiors at division headquarters. They also serve as liaison between division and battalions. Often, a counterpart will call on the regimental advisor for logistical support (usually helicopter and air transport).

The battalion advisor performs functions similar to those of the regimental advisor, but on a lower echelon. He works closely with the battalion commander in planning operations, and he accompanies the unit into the field, often for periods of six to eight weeks.

As recounted in Hickey and Davidson, 1965, pp. 59-64, the role of a Special Forces detachment commander in Vietnam includes advising and assisting a counterpart in the construction of camps for civilian indigenous defense groups, recruitment and training of personnel, camp defense and security, border surveillance and patrolling, pacification and development of the assigned area, interdiction of infiltrators, establishment of internal security nets, training of hamlet militia, civil affairs, and psychological operations.

Under certain conditions, a Special Forces officer may be assigned to a military assistance advisory group to advise a conventional army concerning guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare. But Special Forces detachments usually are sent into the field to operate independently. A Special Forces officer might be required to deal with a host-country Special Forces counterpart, a tribal leader, or a village chief. His training role also differs from that of the conventional forces advisor. Whereas training developed by the latter often can begin at the small unit level (because of the presence of competent noncommissioned training officers in the host armies), the Special Forces officer is more likely to be concerned with individual training. He is also more likely to engage in the setting-up of radio systems, roads, and airstrips. He might also be concerned with the direct employment of civilians to build such things as compounds. Other activities of Special Forces detachments in Vietnam were described in Hickey and Davidson, 1965, p. 64.

In addition to carrying out military operations the A teams conduct programs intended to aid the local populations. Some of these, like the projects of the Joint Province Committee, are of a socio-economic nature. They may include the feeding and housing of refugees or resettled populations, school construction, and efforts to improve water control, crop production, and livestock care. Team medics conduct sick call for the military and their dependents, make house calls to civilians in the surrounding villages, help organize dispensaries, and train local nurses.

The activities of Special Forces detachments in Vietnam were described by Deerin, 1965, p. 9.

The primary mission of the Special Forces units based in camps strung along the western border from a point just south of the 17th parallel to the
Gulf of Siam, is border surveillance. Its patrols attempt to interdict supplies and troop replacements for the Viet Cong moving over the Ho Chi Minh Trail and jungle corridors leading from Laos and Cambodia.

In addition to purely military operations, Special Forces units in some areas engage in civic action programs with the objective of winning "the hearts and minds of the people." They attempt to do this first by providing military security and then by such civic action projects as school construction, operation of dispensaries, building of Buddhist temples and other churches, introduction of improved agricultural methods, and other programs to improve the living conditions of a primitive and neglected people.

Pickerell, 1966, p. 53, quoted Major Hai, a district chief in South Vietnam, who felt that there were five main features to his job: "political development, education (to include all types of propaganda), social welfare, economic development, and military security." The relative importance assigned to each of these functions varies from area to area.

In the same article by Pickerell, 1966, p. 52, a U.S. Army subsector advisor, Capt. Robert D. Evans, was quoted as saying: "I'm a soldier, but my job here has little to do with military affairs. It is seventy-five percent political." Other advisors, however, do not have time for political work. As Hovey, 1965, p. 178, said:

The task of improving supply and logistics systems and training to use new sophisticated military equipment is itself a formidable one, and much of the money spent for military assistance training is devoted to it. This training is designed to increase military capabilities—the primary purpose of the military aid program. Devotion to these purposes is sufficiently time-consuming so that many officers responsible for training in any country and for determining what equipment will be provided to the country do not have the time, or perhaps the inclination, to go beyond those jobs and perform essentially political work.

In some situations advisors feel that they do very little "advising." Captain Evans is quoted once again in Pickerell, 1966, p. 58: Speaking of his Vietnamese counterpart, "Major Hai knows what is needed and how to request the things he wants. My job is to see that he gets what he asks for." In his student thesis at the Army War College, Carlisle, Pa., Boggs, 1960, p. 12, emphasized a need for a flexible advisory approach:

The experience and training factors which we have developed in the United States for planning and programming United States forces are not generally applicable to the development of the forces of those countries receiving assistance through the Military Assistance Program. Great variations in native skills, degree of mechanical development and aptitude, physical capabilities, national customs and morals, organizational ability, military aptitude, and the will to resist are often unknown or unpredictable factors which must be anticipated or compensated for by the Army officer in developing the armed forces and the economic resources of the country receiving military assistance.

Pickerell, 1966, p. 53, pointed out the need for adaptable doctrine in Vietnam:

When we arrived there were few SOP's [standard operating procedures] for the subsector advisor, and there still aren't many. In the early days
no one was sure what could be done, but they recognized that the work would vary greatly, depending on the conditions in a given district, and that advisors should be given a great deal of flexibility.

Concerning conventional unit advisors, Cushman, 1966, p. 25, said:

From painful experience with the strategic hamlet plan, we Americans suggested that the new concept be carried out slowly, and that realistic goals be established. The Division was inventing a new kind of operation for which a detailed doctrine and organization did not exist, and which we were all going to have to develop as we went along.

Hermes, 1965, p. 81, noted the effect of fighting on advising:

Vietnam demonstrated that the advisory role usually expands when the fighting begins and in times of crisis reaches into the realm of operations. Thus, at any given time, the American advisor can be a simple purveyor of technical advice in one country or a complex soldier-statesman-psychologist figure in another, depending on the local conditions.

According to Froelich and Kiores, 1965, p. 9, who studied advisory problems in the Chinese army (Taiwan), differences were found between advisors, depending on their officer rank. Based on a survey of 72 U.S. advisory officers, approximately 76 percent of all problems reported occurred in three classes: command responsibility (32 percent), maintenance (24 percent), and supply (20 percent). The remaining 24 percent of problems were distributed among seven different classes. Table 1 shows that, for captains and below, the principal problems were in maintenance and supply, whereas, for majors and above, the principal class of problems was command responsibility.

Another responsibility of an advisor is to establish a self-sustaining program which will be able to function without U.S. assistance. If the program set up by the advisor and his counterpart is not self-sustaining and is not acceptable to the people, even though it may be an efficient, well-organized system, it eventually will disappear, thereby nullifying the advisory effort.

A general goal of military advisors was stated by Swett, 1964, p. 37.

I believe the real challenge facing the Army "missionary" in Latin America is the impact he must make on the military leaders with whom he deals. It becomes his responsibility, as one of just a few advisers on this not only new, but little-explored frontier, to make the proper impact on his military hosts. And the proper impact, as I see it, implies the awakening of an awareness of the menace of communism to virtually all Latin American nations. It means the stimulating within all ranks of a firm realization of the military capability that must be developed to withstand the threat, and the fostering of a determination that this capability will not be used to abuse or oppose constitutional authority.

It was contended by Preston, 1962, p. 230, that: "The various assignments in the Military Assistance Program are not all alike even though they may have the same job title."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Problem</th>
<th>Problem *</th>
<th>Rank of Advisor Reporting</th>
<th>All Responses</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 (N=67)</td>
<td>4 (N=54)</td>
<td>5 (N=45)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>28 20 20</td>
<td>30 20</td>
<td>34 13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>12 33 17</td>
<td>16 24</td>
<td>25 14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>0 4 5</td>
<td>6 7</td>
<td>5 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between Countries Agreements</td>
<td>6 2 5</td>
<td>6 14</td>
<td>2 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Use of Equipment</td>
<td>5 4 2</td>
<td>8 0</td>
<td>3 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Value Differences</td>
<td>5 4 2</td>
<td>3 7</td>
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<td>3 0 5</td>
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<td>1 2</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>3 0</td>
<td>3 14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>10 13 13</td>
<td>17 7</td>
<td>8 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>5 5 7</td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>3 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total—Command</td>
<td>32 33 44</td>
<td>25 21</td>
<td>16 50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1 is problem judged most important by respondent, 2 is problem judged 2nd most important, etc.

The following factors may be considered as sources of differences among military advisory assignments: (1) combat or insurgency conditions, (2) type of force advised, (3) economic level of host country, (4) military sophistication of host army, (5) existence of military schools, (6) attitudes of populace toward the United States, (7) receptivity of counterpart to advice, (8) language barriers, (9) educational and technical level of soldiers, (10) military occupational specialty of advisor, (11) cultural idiosyncrasies.

Thus, far from representing a single, homogeneous duty assignment, the position of "military advisor" actually involves many different kinds of problems and duties arising from many different situations.
A number of writers have attempted to place foreign language fluency in military advisory work in what is thought to be its proper perspective. Thus, for example, Thebaud, 1963, p. 7, commented on this subject by quoting the work of three prominent writers:

The language barrier on MAAG duty is a problem recognized at all levels, from the lowest ranking adviser to presidential committees. [Report of the President's Committee to Study the U.S. Military Assistance Program, Vol. I, p. 169.] The ability to use and understand the local language is of unquestionable value; but, like other skills, its value is not absolute. It is relative to the other types of skill and understanding identified later as also being required for the particular assignment. [Harlan Cleveland, Gerard Mangone, and John Adams, The Overseas Americans, p. 293.]

According to Joyce and Williams, 1967, p. 181: "We tend to dwell on the language barrier as if it were the whole culture gap whereas it is only a significant aspect of it." But Guthrie, 1966, p. 29, stated that: "Ability to converse in a common language is the single most important requirement for effective military assistance." However, a contrary opinion about the effectiveness of an advisor who does not know the language of those he advises was set forth by Warner, 1963, p. 174, who said of a young Special Forces captain: "Without a word of the montagnards' language and with no interpreter, he taught them everything from the use of basic weapons to the more complex techniques of scouting." And the effectiveness of advisors who lacked knowledge of Korean was illustrated by Sawyer, 1962, p. 75, who said: "The Americans sometimes delivered their lectures without the aid of interpreters, using drawings and sign language to get their messages across—a surprisingly successful feat."

After visiting many advisory elements throughout the world, Joyce et al., 1967, p. 36, came to the conclusion that:

The importance of knowing the language of the host country can be overstressed. It is not vital. Examples abound of officers who were effective advisors despite inability to communicate with their counterparts without an interpreter. It may be observed, however, that they probably would have been even more effective had they been able to communicate directly.

On the basis of a careful study of experiences in Korea Haurath, 1957, p. 44, concluded:

The experience of KMAG advisors, and also of their ROKA counterparts demonstrated that it was possible for US personnel to operate successfully as advisors even though they knew practically no Korean. However, the task was more difficult, frustrations more frequent, and distaste or even intense dislike for their assignment much more common among the group of KMAG advisors who made no effort to learn the local language.
In short, facility in the indigenous language was an asset to the KMAG advisor, but it was possible to operate successfully without it.

It was further observed by Hausrath, 1957, p. 44, that:

In spite of the problems created by the language barrier, advisors did not universally agree that training in the Korean language should be made a prerequisite for KMAG duty. The majority of the advisors questioned believed the advisor needed no training in Korean or only a cursory acquaintance with basic terms and phrases.

In considering a Peace Corps group, Preston, 1962, p. 224, noted the following:

Our incident data certainly indicate that fluency in the local language and dialect is most important in interpersonal relations. But they also indicate certain other abilities which help in meeting this requirement. These are: (1) a willingness to use a variety of communication vehicles; (2) an ability to reduce abstract ideas to concrete terms; and (3) the ability to determine when a counterpart or other indigenous persons do or do not understand what the American is trying to convey. Our incidents show that effective Americans rely to a considerable extent on meaningful gestures, demonstration, and on the simple kinds of visual aids and physical models to convey ideas—somewhat as an elementary school teacher might improvise for the classroom, but used with a dignity appropriate to the status of adults involved.

Denno, 1965, p. 28, pointed out that it is not always command of a language that is needed, but only knowledge of a few words for the sake of rapport with a counterpart.

The first step for an advisor is to determine a desirable solution to a military problem. The second is to communicate the solution accurately, completely (and persuasively) to his counterpart. Obviously, command of the native language is highly useful here. Most experienced advisors stress the importance of learning at least a few phrases of the counterpart's language—not only to facilitate communication but also to make a convincing display of the advisor's desire to communicate better.

Joyce et al., 1967, p. 36, attempted to relate need for language fluency to the type of advice being given and the educational level of the counterpart:

It appears that ability to speak the language is desirable in proportion to the level of advice; i.e., the infantry weapons instructor needs it least, the advisor to the minister of defense most. Or it might be stated that it is less a handicap in strictly training activities than in strictly advisory relations. In training, sensitive matters seldom need be discussed. The presence of an interpreter is not inhibiting.

Consideration of the factors influencing a need for a foreign language in advisory work was presented by Hausrath, 1957, pp. 116-118:

There are four principal spheres of KMAG operation: (a) headquarters (i.e., administrative and housekeeping), (b) combat and security units,
(c) replacement training centers and ROKA schools, and (d) technical service and support units. The language problem existed to some degree in each one of these areas, but it was more serious in some. Within KMAG Hq, Taegu, the great bulk of communications in 1952-1953 were reported by KMAG staff officers to be between Americans; the less frequent interchanges with Koreans (compared with 1951-1952) were adequately accomplished either in direct English-language conversation with equally high-ranking Korean officers—generally well-educated, cultured, and understanding some English—or with the assistance of ROKA interpreters. The nature of the problems generally discussed (administrative problems, liaison details, planning and programming) was such that they could be satisfactorily dealt with...

In addition to KMAG Hq itself, but allied with it and in its immediate geographical vicinity, was the ROKA Hq, to which KMAGers served as advisors (the prime job of an advisory mission). These officers reported that the language barrier constituted something of a problem for them. Of the 26 such KMAGers who responded to ORO [Operations Research Office] questionnaires, 10 reported specific difficulties because of the language barrier.

The language problem was a recognized obstacle to effective communication in such noncombat KMAG activities as advising in the operation of ROKA service schools and training centers, and in logistic or support activities. At the CGSC [Command and General Staff College], for example, instruction was given entirely in Korean. There was in this school no barrier to understanding on the part of the student officers. Rather there were difficulties for the KMAGers, who found it “hard to keep up with what is going on.”

It was noted by Thebaud, 1963, p. 5, that French is generally accepted as an important cultural and technical language in Southeast Asia. An important point about the relative desirability of using the colonial or the local language was made by Yarborough, 1962, pp. 53-54.

While French, the second language in Vietnam, is widely used by army members there, and would be considerably less difficult to learn, use of the native tongue by American soldiers is preferred because it helps establish rapport with the Vietnamese and underscores appreciation of the Republic of Vietnam as a sovereign and important nation.

One important aspect of the language barrier has nothing to do with whether or not an advisor knows the language of those whom he teaches, according to Hermes, 1965, p. 82.

To explain the workings of a machine gun or a jeep to a peasant who had never before seen one and whose vocabulary included no technical terms was a task that often taxed Yankee ingenuity to the full. To surmount the language barrier the American advisor had to be an inventive teacher, combining enthusiasm and knowledge with patience and tact.

Sawyer, 1962, p. 65, emphasized problems with the technical vocabulary of the Korean language by saying:

The alternative to the confusion and disagreement attendant upon the invention of a Korean military language, as General [William L.] Roberts...
suggested, would have been the acceptance of English as the universal language of the ROK security forces. Many Koreans, especially among the officer corps, already knew some English, and the language had up-to-date military terminology and literature easily available. In addition, the task of the U.S. advisors would have been greatly simplified if their charges had all learned English.

A conclusion reached by Thebaud, pp. 5-6, was that:

Today, the average military adviser must fall back on a knowledge of another language or resort to the use of an interpreter. In Southeast Asia, the ability to speak French is a tremendous advantage; it establishes an important common bond between the adviser and his counterpart as well as other civilian and military contacts. Also, because of the absence of military expressions and terms in the native language of this part of Asia, French, or even English, is often used by native commanders in issuing both oral and written orders to their troops. [John H. Heintges, Interview, November 1962.]

According to Sawyer, 1962, p. 63, attempts to develop a Korean technical vocabulary led to the development of descriptive statements such as "gun-that-shoots-very-fast" (for machinegun) rather than to single words. Furthermore, such statements varied widely and were virtually impossible to standardize. Language problems overseas were not always severe, however, according to Joyce et al., 1967, p. 34:

In U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), because most of the MAAG advisors and personnel of the mobile training team (MTT) resource units and all the instructors of the School of the Americas speak Spanish, the communication portion of the cultural gap has virtually been closed. Rarely is there a need for interpreter support to bridge it. An MTT from the 8th Special Forces Group is equally effective in Chile, Guatemala, or Ecuador. Consequently the flexibility in the assignment of advisors and trainers and the ready communication between them and their counterparts and trainees—favorable factors almost unknown in the other regions—contribute inestimably to the effectiveness of the SOUTHCOM advisory effort.

There is only a small amount of empirical evidence in the literature that can be used to evaluate the many individual opinions and impressions about language needs that were found. In a study written by Hauersath, 1957, p. 128, it was related that: "KMAgers reached by questionnaire were queried as to their views on the question of learning Korean to do their work more efficiently." Their responses are given in Tables 2 and 3.

The conclusion reached by Hauersath, 1957, p. 40, was that:

The consensus of advisors' opinions on this subject, and observations of working relations in the field, indicate that a moderate amount of properly selected area or culture information adequately presented was needed and that both culture and language knowledge would be helpful but advisors could get along without language knowledge.

The conclusion supported by this study is that KMA advisors can succeed without knowledge of the Korean language better than they can without knowledge of Korean customs and culture. . . .
**TABLE 2**

KMAGer RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ABOUT NEED FOR LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions and Responses</th>
<th>Percent of 204 Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should someone doing your present work be given instruction in the Korean language before starting the job?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If your answer is yes, should the person be trained to:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluency?</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Converse with ease?</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Converse, though not fluently?</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand basic terms and phrases?</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would your relation with your counterpart be affected if you could speak Korean?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would help</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More effective</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would hurt</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less effective</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would have no effect</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>104*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Adds up to more than 100 percent because of possibility of multiple responses.


**TABLE 3**

NECESSITY FOR LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need</th>
<th>Percent of 255 Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enough to understand basic terms and phrases</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enough to converse, though not with ease</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enough to converse with ease</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enough to converse fluently</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hausrath, 1957, p. 45.
In a survey of 72 U.S. officers who advised Chinese counterparts on Taiwan, Froelich and Klores, 1965, p. 12, noted that only 10 percent reported that language difficulties retarded solution of problems. It is important to note, however, that only 2 percent of those who were above the rank of major so reported. A somewhat larger minority of those below the rank of captain reported that they were handicapped by a language barrier (16 percent).

A survey by Fiks and McCrary, 1963, pp. 4-9, of 97 advisory officers who had spent between one and two years as advisors in Vietnam between 1960 and 1962 reported that 75 percent said that they and their counterparts used English, 56 percent felt that they could have advised more effectively had they known more Vietnamese, and 40 percent did not think it would have improved their advisory effectiveness. Misunderstandings between advisor and counterpart due to language were reported by only 13 percent. The authors stated that, "Despite some apparent utility, responses to the questionnaire present a rather consistent picture of a nearly complete lack of Vietnamese language capability on the part of this group of U.S. Officers." [P. 9.] No information was presented about the use of French. Moreover, Hovey, 1965, p. 146, thought that lack of language instruction was not too important:

Foreign language training for military officers being assigned to military assistance advisory groups abroad has not been common. Such training is furnished where considered absolutely necessary, but most officers sent to advise local personnel do not know the local language. The effects of this lack of training are less than might be expected because in most countries where the United States has a large military assistance program, foreign military personnel at senior levels have received English language instruction in preparation for taking military schooling in the United States. However, the lack of training undoubtedly does reduce the effectiveness of the United States advisory effort. For that reason the Draper Committee also recommended that expanded language training be made available to military assistance personnel.

Furthermore, Hausrath, 1957, noted that Korean counterparts desired to learn English.

Even though American personnel demonstrated resistance or reluctance to learning Korean, all evidence in the form of observed relations and interview information indicated that even a modest effort to learn the Korean language paid rich dividends to those advisors who made the attempt. It is probable that rudimentary knowledge of the language facilitated communication, but, however slightly it may have done so, the effect on the Koreans was to stimulate them to even more strenuous efforts to learn English. Moreover, rapport was apparently strengthened, and its by-product seemed to be greater responsiveness to the advisor's suggestions. [P. 45.]

The scope and depth of area, culture, and language knowledge needed by advisors need further consideration. Advisors differed on the amount of knowledge needed; the range was from those who advocated a special 3- to 12-month preparatory course in the Korean language and culture to those who thought any instruction of this type was needless or even detrimental. One KMAG official commented on these conflicting views as follows: "... there is little advantage in training an officer with a smattering of area and language knowledge. Either the officer should have a rather thorough and lengthy training to a high level of competence or he is better off with practically no training in this line." [Pp. 39-40.]
It was common for ROKA commanders to study English. Many of them could grasp simple statements spoken in English; some could speak English well enough to converse. Almost all high-ranking Korean officers down to division commanders, and a considerable number below that level, particularly in technical units, training centers, and schools, were able to converse in English. [P. 68.]

Considerable difference of opinion concerning the uses of interpreters can be found in the literature. According to Kroeger, 1957, p. 142:

There is a great deal of skepticism among the officers working with the Military Assistance Advisory Group program as to the value of the language training. Unless the officer has a natural facility for the language, or a deep motivation to learn it, he does not become fluent enough to use the language freely in the field, particularly when he must explain highly technical matters to foreign nationals. They point out that the host government can furnish interpreters that are satisfactory.

But a number of other writers disagree. For example, Denno, 1965, p. 29, said:

Interpreters, although useful, have many drawbacks. Not only do they introduce inevitable inaccuracies into conversations but they discourage the frank exchange of views often permitted by a private talk between a counterpart and his advisor.

Moreover, Thebaud, 1963, p. 6, said:

Major General C. J. Timmes, then Deputy Chief, MAAG, Vietnam, at a briefing in Saigon in February, 1962, indicated that one of the biggest problems that the MAAGs of Southeast Asia have is providing sufficient, qualified, reliable interpreters to work with the advisers. Even when available and qualified, the use of interpreters often results in lost motion and wasted time. Injecting a third party between the adviser and the advisee does not contribute to the rapport so necessary in adviser activities. In many instances, interpreters are completely lacking in military background and, consequently, through inadvertent error, may misinterpret. Further, Lt. General Samuel T. Williams, USA Retired, warns, "Conceivably, he might be a Communist agent; they infiltrate all activities."

In addition, Thebaud, 1963, p. 7, goes on to point out that:

From strictly a long-range job security standpoint, the interpreter realizes that the American will leave in a matter of months, but the native local commander will be there indefinitely. Under such circumstances, it is not too difficult to understand why most interpreters so scrupulously avoid offending the advisees. [John Heintges, interview with author, November 1962.]

Cushman, 1966, p. 27, described work on the pacification problem by a division training team as follows:
The texts of instructional material were bilingual. Some lesson plans were written in Vietnamese and translated into English; others took the opposite route. The review board used both languages. Although we had officers of both nationalities who were bilingual, it still turned out that the interpreter was the man most familiar with the entire project.

Several writers have advocated that advisors be given information about how to choose an interpreter. For example, on the subject of interpreters, Hickey and Davidson, 1965, p. 77, contended that:

Learning a difficult language such as Vietnamese is a time-consuming task, however, and only a beginning can be made in brief training courses. It is therefore of particular importance that students be given as much orientation as possible in the selection, training, and use of interpreters, in methods of detecting and dealing with misunderstandings, and in the significance of nonverbal cues.

In their study, Fiks and McCrary, 1963, pp. 4-8, found that 72 percent of 97 advisory officers from Vietnam rated their interpreters' accuracy as "good" or "fair." However, only 21 percent indicated that they usually needed an interpreter.

Hausrath's 1957 survey of advisory officers who served in Korea produced information about interpreters. (Tables 4, 5, and 6.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions and Responses</th>
<th>Percent of 204 Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you trust your interpreter from the standpoint of security?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you trust his accuracy in interpretation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you trust his honesty?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 4

**KMAGer RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ABOUT INTERPRETERS (Continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions and Responses</th>
<th>Percent of 204 Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are your interpreter's weak points?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English generally poor</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't understand military terms or situations</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afraid of ROKA officers</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>133*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate your interpreter's ability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adds up to more than 100 percent because of permissibility of multiple responses.*

Source: Hausrath, 1957, p. 121.

### TABLE 5

**KMAGer RESPONSES TO QUESTION ABOUT WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question and Responses</th>
<th>Percent of 204 Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does your ROKA interpreter tell you things your counterpart does not wish you to know?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, always</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, frequently</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, from time to time</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hausrath, p. 126.
TABLE 6
SERIOUSNESS OF PROBLEM OF DISTORTION BY INTERPRETERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seriousness of Problem</th>
<th>Percent of 255 Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very serious</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not too serious</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not serious at all</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hausrath, p. 71.

Thus it would appear from the published opinions and facts about military advisors that there is no clear-cut agreement about the value of knowing a counterpart's language. There is, in fact, no general agreement as to what the values are, if there are any to be gained from such knowledge, how much training is needed or at what level, or in what situation it is important. Any attempt to draw conclusions concerning the value of knowing the language of one's counterpart, however, is severely hampered by the fact that published information concerns only a few countries, different wars, and different training for advisors. For most advisors, however, their effectiveness depends more on their knowledge of the culture and on the particular personalities of their counterparts than on their language skill.
CHAPTER 5
CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

In recent years there has been a considerable amount of research on cross-cultural activities of U.S. personnel overseas. In The Overseas Americans by Cleveland et al. (1960), the authors described the activities and qualities necessary for success, rather than the problems that they encountered. In their book The Ugly American, Lederer and Burdick (1959) noted the naïveté of many Americans who work abroad, but they did not address themselves extensively to the problems encountered by U.S. personnel overseas. Spector and Preston (1961), however, gathered several thousand reports of actual problems and experiences of Americans working abroad and used them to develop a manual for Peace Corps volunteers. A theme which runs through the examples is that one can "get into trouble" in another culture by doing what seems to be the sensible, reasonable thing by American standards. In his handbook for Americans working overseas, Foster, 1965, p. 5, refers to "the assumption that our way is the natural way." He gives examples of resistance to innovation that may arise from cultural factors or from environmental factors.

According to Guthrie, 1966, p. 30: "In addition to language, differences in role behavior may greatly complicate a working relationship between individuals from two different cultures." A discussion of how cultural differences can limit and distort communication between advisor and counterpart is found in Joyce et al., 1967, p. 34:

Between North and Latin Americans approximation of values and judgments flowing from the common Christian and European heritage facilitates mutual understanding, but no such approximation exists between a North American and an Arab, a Hindu, an Ethiopian, or a Thai. The U.S. advisor and such counterparts tend to stereotype each other, to misconstrue each other's motives, and to comprehend each other less even if they speak a common third language. The danger here is that the advisor will impute needs (within his own Western scale of values of material progress and social equality) that are irrelevant to the counterpart.

Sawyer, 1962, p. 61, provided an example of how necessary it is for advisors to understand the cultural differences between them and their counterparts:

And sometimes, as in the case of discipline, where Korean methods were often at complete variance with those practiced in the U.S. Army, it turned out that the Korean officers' approach was the method best understood by Korean soldiers. Oriental ways of exacting military discipline were in every sense of the word punitive, but many former advisors to Korean security forces agree that, if not carried to extremes, they probably worked best with Korean troops.
The above point was echoed by Hermes, 1965, p. 83:

Hand in glove with the problem of "face" goes an understanding of the Oriental concepts of rank and discipline. The advisor has to cope with the sharp delineation between senior and junior personnel at all levels and the fact that seniors will not accept advice from their juniors. Juniors in turn are extremely reluctant to admit failure to their superiors, since they lose "face" in the process. By American standards, Oriental discipline can be physically brutal, but quite acceptable according to their way of life.

In a cross-cultural situation, according to Stewart, 1966, p. 296, in The Journal of Communication, various dimensions represent assumptions and values. One may be called perception of the self and the individual. In American culture the dominant perception is of an autonomous self which is apart from other people and apart from the world. The American's perception of the world is separate from his perception of the individual. In spite of glaring exceptions, Americans tend to see others as basically equal, and indirectly, because of this perceived equality, often consider others in a depersonalized manner. The dominant form of activity for most Americans is doing, in contrast to the being or, being-in-becoming that typify the Oriental or the Latin American.

Some "American shortcomings" are enumerated in Joyce et al., 1967, p. 41, as follows:

(a) Incomplete understanding of host-country customs, mores, ways of thinking and behaving; social and ethical values (i.e., what is important to them, and what is not important); degrees of respect, authority, and discipline; and limitations on the individual's freedom of action and his motivation for military service.

(b) Unwillingness to accept less than the U. S. standard of performance.

(c) Overestimation of counterpart and host-country capabilities.

(d) Underestimation of the time required to achieve desired results.

(e) Tendency to set up a "mirror-image" U. S. system.

(f) Insufficient follow-up to assure retention and proper application of U. S. advice.

Learning how to work with a given counterpart is not sufficient to solve an advisor's cross-cultural problem in its entirety. As Froelich and Kiores, 1965, pp. 22-24, point out:

... An advisor seldom succeeds in bringing about change by influencing only his immediate counterpart. For such proposed changes to be successfully implemented, approval must be secured from the counterpart's superior. Consequently, existence of a channel of communication between advisor and counterpart's superior is important as a means of making implementation more feasible.

It is likewise important that a channel of communication exist between the advisor and the counterpart's subordinates, since it is the latter who primarily will be engaged in the actual work of implementing changes. Indifference, lack of information, or hostility to the changes on the part of the subordinates can significantly reduce the chances of success.
Understanding the values of another, however, does not necessarily mean that one must share them. Hence, Guthrie, 1966, p. 24, admonished that:

"It must not be inferred that the military advisor and his counterpart have to hold the same values and make similar interpretations of the problems which confront them. Indoctrination and training programs within a single culture seek to achieve such standardization, but the challenge of the cross-cultural encounter is to understand the other fellow's values in order to make sense of his interpretations. Only when this is achieved is it possible to teach him to take the steps necessary for him to achieve the goals which both agree are important."

Hermes, 1965, pp. 83-84, emphasized advisors' problems in motivating indigenous people by saying:

"The national government usually makes its impact upon the village through the levying of taxes, food requisitions, and draft requirements. Under such conditions there is small inclination on the part of an uneducated peasant to support a superstructure that affects him mainly in a negative fashion. Without considerable indoctrination and education the concept of national unity and its handmaiden, patriotism, is above the peasant's ken. He can only understand the direct threat to his family or village. The advisor, therefore, has the problem of trying to provide inspiration for people whose standards and values are quite unlike his own. One avenue of approach is through the civic action program which affects both the military unit and the village directly and promotes good relations and an improved Army image vis-a-vis the peasants."

P. H. King, 1966, p. 223, commented on cultural problems as follows:

"Many training missions abroad are short in duration and depend upon close, intensive interaction between the American advisor and his counterpart. These requirements make it necessary for the American to establish rapport quickly and to communicate effectively with his counterpart. Job and language skill is not enough; the American must also be skilled in the other person's customs, habits, taboos, mannerisms, and gestures. Traditional preparation, via lectures of "area studies" are inadequate—knowing what to do is not the same as doing what you know."

The same author, P. H. King, 1966, pp. 223-224, noted also that today's military stability operations are markedly different from yesterday's mass sweeps over clearly delineated battlelines, and that the soldier's role has changed correspondingly.

Instead he is in close, daily contact with native peoples. These persons are often his counterparts and do the actual fighting, leaving the military man in an advisory or guiding role. What these native people do and think is vitally important; thus the modification of attitudes and motivations of the native personnel is as crucial as the proper employment of weapons or the execution of battlefield tactics. Second, this new, quasi-political role of the military man indicates a wholly new approach to his training. In addition to his technical specialty he should have a firm ideological base, an expert knowledge of insurgency, and an equal understanding of the culture, goals, and aspirations of the people with whom he is working."
The magnitude of the training problem was described by Hickey and Davidson, 1965, p. 67, as follows:

Nearly all social research bears in one way or another on the problems faced by American military advisors. Ideally, existing knowledge in such fields as small-group behavior, mass phenomena, attitude formation, cognition, social change, and a multitude of others should be made available to them in a form that will assist them in their relationships not only with their counterparts but also with indigenous populations and others with whom they work or come into contact. Some materials are, of course, more relevant than others. Most directly related to the advisors' tasks are studies concerned with communication and cross-cultural communication, social analysis of foreign societies, related cross-cultural programs, and counterinsurgency and internal war.

But the literature reveals a generally favorable consensus among authors concerning the value of formal cross-cultural training for advisory officers. For example, according to Kroeger et al., 1957, p. 144:

Most officers contacted in the preparation of this report were of the opinion that all officers should be trained in the characteristics of the country to which they are assigned before they are sent out. Officers who have been on foreign missions particularly stress the importance and need of such training.

It is generally recognized that cultural training requirements should be tailored to the country in which the advisor is to function. For example, Guthrie, 1966, p. 37, commented on the work of Spector and Preston (1961) as follows:

Since they [Spector and Preston] do not differentiate among foreign areas they are not able to make clear the meanings of situations to the non-American participants. Of course this raises the question of how meaningful it is to talk about working relationships with non-Americans in general since there are great differences for example between Egyptians and Chinese and Nigerians.

In spite of the uniqueness of particular cultures, however, an effort to develop cultural training that has worldwide utility has been advocated by Stewart, 1965, p. 9, in the Military Review:

The primary objectives of the area trainer should not be limited to coping with information about the many different countries to which military personnel may be assigned. Rather, he should concentrate upon the development of concepts and principles that will help the student first to understand his own cultural pattern and then be able to translate it satisfactorily into the patterns of any country to which he may be assigned.

Hoehn, 1966, p. 2, saw a need for developing and teaching general concepts of culture for the use of advisors on their jobs.

Most advisor training is directed to a particular country or culture. Appropriate expansion in advisor training should probably include not only...
country—or culture—specific information, but also provision for teaching conceptual frameworks that have generality across cultures, and that provide general schemas in terms of which the advisor can structure his information and observations and by reference to which he can organize his thinking and planning as he goes about his job in the cross-cultural setting.

The possibility of developing a training course that would emphasize general cultural concepts, however, will not eliminate the need for possession of detailed country information on the part of advisory officers. Some of the results of Hausrath's research on advisors in Korea are found in Tables 7, 8, and 9. According to Hausrath, 1957, p. 38:

Almost one-half the present advisors said that briefing on Korean customs and habits was desirable, and nearly as many said that it was necessary. Only 2 percent considered it unimportant. Their rationale was obvious from interview data. The new advisor is placed among people he does not know who have a way of life different from his own. He is expected to exert a high degree of influence on these people. To accomplish this he needs to be given information that will enable him to adjust to these people and act so as to induce optimum results. He also needs to be made aware in advance of the problems and frustrations he is certain to encounter in dealing with local nationals, so that he will be better prepared to cope with them and bear up with less feeling of discouragement or despair.

### TABLE 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Percent of 255 Respondents*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Customs and habits of Korean people</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure, organization, and functions of ROKA</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biographic information about counterparts</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and sanitary conditions in Korea</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about ROKA units (combat records, history, etc.)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean history and geography</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean government and politics</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources and economy of Korea</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adds up to more than 100 percent because most respondents checked more than one item.

TABLE 8
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF USEFUL ORIENTATION INFORMATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance to Advisor of Information in Table 7</th>
<th>Percent of 255 Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Necessary</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desirable</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unimportant</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 9
INFORMATION NEEDED BY U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL TO WORK WITH KOREAN MILITARY PERSONNEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>255 KMAG Advisors (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History and geography</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and sanitation</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources and economy</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure, organization, and functions of ROKA</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat records of ROKA unit</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about counterpart</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Four suggestions for contributing information to the training of military advisors were given by Guthrie, 1966, p. 33:

1. Participant observation.
2. Factor analytic and other multidimensional procedures.
3. Identification of prevailing values of host country.
4. Analysis of person-to-person patterns of the host country.
Four other suggestions also were given in order to increase efficiency of military advisors (p. 31):

1. Identification of central values of the United States.
2. Identification of central values of the cooperating nation.
3. Identification of differences in implicit personality and behavior theories.
4. Design of techniques to increase sharing of frames of reference.

The above problems of effective cultural training were discussed in Hoehn, 1966, p. 3:

While the study of conceptual frameworks, the learning of a considerable body of job-relevant information, and the acquisition of linguistic skills can be significant components of advisor preparation, they do not, taken by themselves, provide an adequate training program. An advisor may have a command of linguistic skills but not know what to say. Information and conceptual frameworks do not translate directly into decisions and into communication acts. It has become increasingly clear that advisor training, to have any major payoff, must be directed toward the learning of decision-making skills and cross-cultural interaction skills, including, of course, the understandings and sensitivities, perceptions and attitudes, methods and strategies which are necessary supports to these high-order skills.

The necessary interaction skills are essentially skills in human relations in situations where sharp cultural differences are prominent sources of difficulty in communication.

While Foster, 1965, p. 4, pointed out that:

The basic goal of such training is to create an awareness in the trainee that both he and his indigenous co-workers act on assumptions that are critical factors in his work accomplishment; and that what seems to him to be good, moral, or natural is dependent on his cultural background. This concept, of course, does not mean that all values or assumptions are equally effective in fighting a war or getting a road built, or that any American should change his values when he is in Rome. It does mean, however, that his effectiveness will be maximized when he becomes aware of his own assumptions, feelings, and attitudes, and when he attempts to understand the indigenous people's feelings and point of view rather than passing judgment upon them in terms of his own values.

In suggesting research to strengthen the political component of training programs, Hickey and Davidson, 1965, p. 85, asked, "How can they help the personnel with whom they are working develop a sense of national purpose? What training would assist them to do this?" They also suggested additional research as follows:

The effectiveness of training courses for military advisors could be increased by additional research among graduates of these courses. In this way, for example, one might learn to what extent training can develop the multicultural personality, reinforce cultural empathy, and provide a basis for accelerated learning in the field. Why do some advisors continue
language study after reaching their post while others do not? Why do some attempt to shut themselves up in a simulated American environment while others learn to operate effectively in the local society? [P. 82.]

The state of research and publications on cross-cultural information was summarized by Stewart, 1966, p. 291, in the Journal of Communication as follows:

The treatment in the literature of the cultural influences on cognitive processes is often found in scattered sources, and in anecdotes. The balance of the systematic analyses are likely to coalesce among the general topics of cultural epistemology or philosophy, and meta culture. Since the frame of reference is usually broad and general, little systematic attention has been given to the effects of socio-cultural factors on the individual engaged in interpersonal relations. A practical consequence is that behavioral guides supported by cross-cultural research are not available for American advisors overseas. Yet, the lack of systematic knowledge and the scantiness of research on the interactions between members of different cultures cannot be due to an absence of practical importance. Americans by the thousands are abroad each year engaged in advising, teaching, and in giving training.

Cultural differences have generally been seen as sources of distortion in communication, as misconstruction of counterpart's motives, as overestimation of counterpart's and his country's capabilities, and as otherwise complicating factors in the working relationships. There does not appear to be a general consensus concerning the kinds of cultural information and training that advisory officers should receive. Furthermore, conclusions on these matters by authors quoted herein are based on individual observations and subjective judgments. No generalizable empirical research on the cross-cultural problems of military advisors was found in the literature.
CHAPTER 6
ADVISORY OFFICER TRAINING

Efforts that have been made to meet the training needs of military advisory officers include language-training programs and courses designed to provide military, administrative, and cultural information. The principal sources of advisory training for U.S. Army officers (as of June 1968) are described below.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE INSTITUTE (MAI)

The Military Assistance Institute operated under contract to the Department of Defense to train senior military advisors for duties in selected countries. According to the MAI Program of Instruction, 1967, p. 1:

The objective of the instruction given at the Military Assistance Institute is to prepare the student for the effective execution of duties peculiar to a MAAG assignment, and for rapid adjustment to the environment within which he will live and work.

A description of the MAI program was given by Joyce et al., 1967, p. 87, as follows:

Officers designated for MAAG assignments ordinarily attend the Military Assistance Institute (MAI) in Washington for 4 weeks of orientation and instruction. The students are divided into two groups. Those whose duties will be primarily administrative or in the planning, programming, and implementation of the MAP [Military Assistance Program] in the country of their assignment are known as the "planners" and are given 17 extra hours of detailed instruction in these phases of the MAAG's activities. Officers whose principal duty will be to advise host-country personnel are put into the "advisors" group and receive 17 extra hours of specific instruction and practice on those aspects. Both groups receive instruction in each field and in the "general background" and "country studies" parts of the curriculum.

The group class-sessions are necessarily generalized because each 4-week session includes officers going to widely separated parts of the world. But each officer student is given a large block of hours (56 of the total 160 hours) to devote to his own study of the country of assignment.

With respect to general background, MAI briefings were given on (Agency for International Development) AID/MAAG field cooperation; the Communist bloc; economic and military aid; worldwide intelligence; MAAG functions, organizations, and relationships; the international youth movement; meeting the appeal of communism; general matters of military assistance; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); public safety; the role of civic action under MAP; U.S. Information Service (USIS) functions and relations to MAAG; legal matters; the
role of the MAAG officer in counterinsurgency; national policy; and other matters, MAI Program of Instruction, 1967, pp. 1-4.

Country study covered U.S. objectives in the host country, U.S. policies designed to attain the objectives, and related treaties and other agreements. In addition, political, economic, and sociological influences in the host country that significantly affect military assistance and the MAAG officer were discussed. The mission, role, composition, and organization of the host country's armed forces, paramilitary forces, and police were also covered.

Briefings and lectures were presented on planning construction program requirements; grant aid planning and programing; the MAP management process; MAP strategic guidance; MAP support levels and cost reduction; utilization of the Military Assistance Manual; foreign military sales; military assistance training; requisitioning procedures; planning at the MAAG level; transfer, recovery, and disposal of materiel; and unified command planning and programing.

Advisors' training covered techniques of advising and gaining rapport, utilization of grant aid equipment, employment of host-country personnel trained with MAP funds, and problems of training host-country armed forces. In addition, material was presented on the advisor's role in civic-action, communicating with foreigners, relationships with interpreters, language problems (a guide for self-study), materiel utilization and management, the missions and functions of MAAG advisors, organizing the advisory effort, special responsibilities of the MAAG officer, and relationships with counterparts.

According to Hovey, 1965, p. 146, who discussed the MAI:

The Draper Committee recommended that all officers being assigned to military assistance duties be required to attend this school, but this recommendation has not been implemented.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING ADVISOR (MATA) COURSES

Four MATA courses, Précis of MATA Courses, 1967, p. 7, are offered to officer advisors at the Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Georgia. These courses provide a general knowledge of military and nonmilitary programs, and an introduction to the people of the Republic of Vietnam. The content of each course is directed at a specific assignment situation, and attention is given to the causes and organization of the Vietnamese insurgent movement. Doctrinal principles, tactics, and techniques designed to counter insurgency and to stabilize government are taught. Special emphasis is placed on the mechanics of day-to-day advisory operations.

Corps/Division Course

The corps/division course includes language training, review of relations between civil agencies and military organizations, briefing on the Revolutionary Development Program, intelligence, psychological operations, weapons, communications, demolitions, tactics, and a background on factors involved in advisory duty in Vietnam at the corps/division level of operations, MATA Program of Instruction Corps/Division Course, 1967, p. 2.
The Sector/Unit Course

The sector/unit course contains the same subjects as those listed for the corps/division courses, but orients them to the needs of officers who will serve in a lower advisory echelon. MATA Program of Instruction, Sector/Unit Course, 1967, p. 2.

The Psychological Operations Orientations Course

The psychological operations orientations course contains the same subjects as the two courses above, except that intensive psychological operations (PSYOP) training is substituted for language training. The role of psychological operations and the PSYOP advisor in the Republic of Vietnam is emphasized, as well as PSYOP organizations, internal and external Communist political warfare strategy and tactics, cross-cultural communications methodology, and current psychological operations. MATA Program of Instruction, Psychological Operations Orientations Course, 1967, p. 2.

The Civil Affairs Advisor Course (Vietnam)

The civil affairs advisor course provides a basic working knowledge of civil affairs/civic action theories, functions, and operations applicable to the role of the civil affairs advisor in Vietnam. It supplements the student's knowledge of the government, society, and economy of the Republic of Vietnam with information on civil affairs and civic action operations. Courses include instruction in environmental factors, civil affairs functions, military organization and operation, psychological operations, intelligence, government and civilian agencies, and planning and programming. Program of Instruction, Civil Affairs Advisor Course, 1965, pp. 1-3.

Thebaud, 1963, p. 37, recommended that the MATA course be expanded to permit the attendance of all officers assigned MAAG duty in Southeast Asia who are unable to attend the MAI.

DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE (DLI)

According to Sinaiko, 1966, p. 27, the Defense Language Institute was established in 1963 to provide training in foreign languages. DLI established its own schools and, in addition, established centers at command schools and by contract with commercial schools and universities. In all of these cases, the technical control is under DLI, although it does not determine the student's language-training objectives; this is done by the military services. The Defense Language Institute gives courses that are potentially useful for military advisors.

Language training in Vietnamese also is offered in conjunction with the military assistance training advisor courses at Fort Bragg. Yarborough, 1961, p. 33, described it as follows:

Language study is perhaps the single most important aspect of the MATA course. Students are taught the fundamentals of the Vietnamese language. About 75 percent of them develop up to a 1200 word vocabulary after 36 hours of formal training.

The current MATA introduction to Vietnamese is more extensive than the above statement would suggest. The corps/division course now has a 120-hour Vietnamese section, and the
sector/unit course offers 100 hours of Vietnamese. Approximately 50 percent of the students in the corps/division course receive an additional eight weeks of language training. Up to 75 percent of them in the sector/unit and psychological operations orientation courses receive an additional twelve weeks of Vietnamese–language training.

The problems and considerations involved in the cross-cultural training of military advisors were considered in the previous chapter. The current advisor training programs reflect the experience of former advisors, but little in the research literature was found to support their curriculum contents, training methods, time allotments, or general applicability to various geographical areas. The literature provides no technical evaluations of the advisor training programs, and occasionally expresses misgivings about their efficacy. Kraemer and Stewart, 1964, p. 16, had this opinion:

It would be naive to suggest that an area training program lasting only a few weeks could make an American soldier something of an expert in diplomacy, cultural anthropology, and human relations, in addition to furnishing him with the necessary area information. A good portion of any area training program, however, could profitably be devoted to providing him with a better understanding of his own culture and behavior. Many of the problems described in this report are due to conflicts in cultural values and norms of behavior between indigenous and United States personnel, which would be lessened if the Americans were able to see their own culture and their own behavior from a more objective point of view.

The present system of preparing officers for advisory duty also has been called into question by Joyce et al., 1967, p. 45, who said:

Modifications in career development policies should be considered to allow almost all officers to begin developing an area competence at the outset of their careers without unduly disturbing branch career patterns. Area-oriented electives in branch school and Command and General Staff College curricula would enable officers to improve their area knowledge as they progress through the Army school system. Area specialization might even begin at the Military Academy and in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) in the universities. Young officers could be given a special period of leave—and perhaps assisted financially—to spend a month in the area of specialization under MAAG supervision. In this way many advantages of the Foreign Area Specialist Training (FAST) program could be made available in some measure to all officers. Such a program might be optional, with progressive steps and with accomplishment reflected in a graduated scale of qualification for advisory duty on officer records.

Although current officer advisor training programs show the influence of experience gained in actual advisory situations, there appear to be some large gaps that need to be filled. The MATA sector/unit course supplies the needs of junior officers who go to Vietnam, but there is no similar training available for those junior officers who are assigned elsewhere. MAI-type training for all senior MAAG and missions administrative officers also appears to be a goal that has not yet been attained.
Hickey and Davidson, 1965, pp. 75–76, discussed officer classification procedures with respect to the personal attributes they believe to be required for success as a military advisor.

The present military screening process is rigorous when it comes to physical toughness and technical competence, but it provides few indications with regard to cultural empathy and aptitude for cross-cultural communication. Observers overseas have frequently been impressed by the tremendous range of differences among American military personnel in the ability to adapt to a foreign environment. Some show an almost incredible facility for learning other languages and understanding other peoples, while others are highly ethnocentric and find it difficult to deal successfully with any foreign nationals.

Determining whom to assign and train for advisory duty presents a problem that differs from other personnel problems. The primary difference appears to be that certain non-military requirements are emphasized more for advisory duty than for other assignments. For example, a difference (as applied to MAAG chiefs) was described by Kroeger et al., 1957, pp. 134-135, as follows:

The chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group must primarily be a soldier. Yet he must be able to deal diplomatically with his counterparts in the host country, civilian officials of the host country, the Ambassador, and his own superiors in the three major services of our military system. In addition to his official duties, he attends many social functions. He is a man who is known and watched by many citizens, politicians, and molders of public opinion in the host country. He must conduct himself in an exemplary fashion, bring credit to his country, and inspire confidence in our friendly intentions, our efficiency, and our ability.

Such responsibility requires the selection of the best possible person available for the position. Keeping in mind that the person must first of all be a soldier, the problem is to find one who can also be a diplomat.

In view of the national importance of the behavior of advisors, it is generally considered necessary to filter out those who are unsuitable for such assignments. Torre, 1963, p. xviii, noted that:

It has never been easy to define the extent of this problem, that is, to find the exact number of people out of the very large groups involved who do fail in their tasks, but the number is certainly considerable. Apparently total failure, which demands the withdrawal of the consultant or specialist officer, is relatively rare. Indirect evidence, however, shows that a considerable number of others have in fact not been successful in
their mission, even though no official request for their removal was ever made by the country in which they were appointed to serve.

Hausrath, 1957, p. 92, discussed failures among advisors in Korea, as follows:

Some failures did occur in KMAG. They were more easily dealt with than the somewhat greater number of men who were near-failures, or not quite good enough for the job. Many of the most disgruntled comments and the most adverse criticisms came from these two groups. "Getting worthless advisors relieved was easy. Poor advisors presented a greater problem." [Interview with former KMAG officer.]

Foster, 1965, p. 3, who catalogued examples of cross-cultural interactions of Americans, made a similar observation:

There is evidence that those who are least effective in their relationships with national counterparts and who demonstrate little insight into their overseas experience are the ones who claim no difficulties in their personal relationships and who tend to minimize the importance of the cross-cultural dimensions. Consequently, despite the importance of the human factor, it is not surprising that it is often difficult to make the trainee aware of the importance of the cross-cultural aspect of his work. If he is a technician, he is especially likely to be concerned with the adequacy of his technical proficiency even though his technical specialization frequently exceeds the demands of the job.

Thebaud, 1963, p. 24, made an effort to find a reliable estimate of the rate of failure of military advisors. He said:

Analysis of other sources such as Congressional hearings and reports of the Draper Committee indicate through positive praise and lack of criticism that, as a whole, the U.S. advisers in Southeast Asia are effective and are contributing materially to the MAP.

In May, 1959, Mr. Draper, in testimony before a congressional committee, had this to say: "We found or heard of individual cases that could be criticized, as to personnel, but we agreed unanimously that 90-odd percent of the personnel were doing the best job they could, and that a very large majority were doing a good job." In the spring of 1962, Major General John H. Heintges, an officer with the rare experience of two MAAG assignments, testified before the Stennis Committee that in his opinion, slightly over 90 percent of the personnel assigned to the MAP met the high standards required.

Thebaud, 1963, p. 25, concluded:

It is generally agreed that, by far, the greatest majority of officers assigned to the MAAGs do a fine job, but at the same time, the remaining 5 to 10 percent that slip through the personnel sieve should never be there. Their action, be it personal conduct, relations with the civilian population, professional

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*U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Draft Legislation to Amend the Mutual Security Act, Pt. 2c, p. 724.
incompetence, or lack of desire, negates the outstanding work of their fellow officers and does much harm to the overall effort. It is this minority that provides the basis for much anti-American propaganda.

This rate of 10 percent faulty duty assignment in this field implies that hundreds of officers now overseas are performing inadequately as advisors. Moreover, very few descriptions of the kinds of inadequacies involved are to be found in the literature.

Guthrie, 1966, p. 39, described what happens when an advisor fails to adapt to a different culture:

In the absence of incidence data and other documentation we are obliged to offer a description of culture fatigue based on observations and scattered anecdotal accounts from the literature. Criticalness and impatience appear to be the common indications that an advisor is having difficulty. These do not as a rule appear at the outset but rather begin several months after arrival. The generally negative attitude toward host nationals spreads to include almost all aspects of the society so that the afflicted one comes generally to dislike everyone and to be unable to conceal his attitudes. Nor do fellow Americans escape, for the attitude of hostility and dissatisfaction can also be directed toward fellow assistants. The generally pessimistic evaluation of the situation leads to a vicious circle in which associates respond unfavorably, eliciting further negativism from the one who is undergoing the ordeal.

Torre, 1963, p. xvii, also felt that success in an advisory assignment involved adaptation to a foreign culture. He said:

... The successful individual in international service is the person who, in addition to having the technical skills necessary to perform his job effectively, also has the ability to adapt and adjust to new life and work situations—for example, a different climate, a different language, different concepts of time, a different value system.

Foster, 1965, p. 3, noted:

... Living and working in a new environment with different rules and unfamiliar ways of thinking is a difficult and emotionally demanding task. It is not surprising that investigators who have undertaken to evaluate the performance and problems of Americans overseas have concluded that it is usually the human problems associated with working in a different culture that are likely to be critical in the success or failure of their assignments.

Kroeger et al., 1957, p. 137, concluded:

Thus, it can be seen that the military is concerned about the very important problem of adaptability of its personnel to the country. This is a complex problem, but it is vital to the success of the military mission. It involves the customs and religions of the people of the host country, the climate, and the environment. Some officers who would be excellent in most respects are unable to reconcile themselves to the customs and conditions encountered in foreign countries.
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Descriptions of the types of behavior that make for success or failure in the advisory function are to be found widely scattered throughout the literature. Table 10 lists the kinds of behavioral performances of Americans working overseas that were mentioned by the authors indicated. The statements attributed to Preston are based on an analysis of Peace Corps advisors' performance incidents. The remaining descriptive statements apply to military advisors, but are based on the subjective evaluations of their respective authors.

TABLE 10
RECOMMENDATIONS OF DESIRABLE PERFORMANCE BEHAVIORS FOR AMERICANS WORKING OVERSEAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavioral Performance</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emotional Stability</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not negative with host-country nationals</td>
<td>Guthrie (1966)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not critical of others' efforts</td>
<td>Guthrie (1966)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patient with indigenous people</td>
<td>Guthrie (1966) and Williams (1961)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not lose his temper</td>
<td>Williams (1961)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepts frustration without becoming bitter</td>
<td>Denno (1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Persistence</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeps on trying after failure and frustration</td>
<td>Thebaud (1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not pessimistic about the situation</td>
<td>Guthrie (1966)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overcomes environmental difficulties</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursues goal relentlessly and forcefully</td>
<td>Denno (1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teaching</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled as an instructor</td>
<td>Thebaud (1963) and Kroeger (1957)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leading</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspires his counterpart to effective action</td>
<td>Denno (1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiates programs and procedures to substitute for lacks</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Induces others to act or to allow him to act</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receptive to ideas of host-country personnel</td>
<td>Thebaud (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivates others with appropriate incentive rewards, threats, and punishments</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gains counterpart's trust and confidence</td>
<td>Denno (1965)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 10
RECOMMENDATIONS OF DESIRABLE PERFORMANCE BEHAVIORS FOR AMERICANS WORKING OVERSEAS (Continued)

### Organizing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creates organizations that can continue to be run by locals.</td>
<td>Thebaud (1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makes efficient use of available human and material resources</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyzes situations for opportunities to plan and take action.</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognizes situations which can benefit or handicap him.</td>
<td>Denno (1965)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Adapting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foregoes advantages and comforts available to Americans.</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alters his habits without becoming disorganized.</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resists culture fatigue or shock.</td>
<td>Guthrie (1966)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adapts to unaccustomed ways of doing things</td>
<td>Thebaud (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adapts socially and professionally to the customs, characteristics, and culture of the host country and its people.</td>
<td>Boggs (1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusts to indigenous customs</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerates discomfort, inconvenience, and unfamiliarity</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquires familiarity with indigenous culture and traditions.</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Diplomacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is a diplomat</td>
<td>Kroeger et al. (1957)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiates differences</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaches compromises</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placates and reassures hurt individuals</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apologizes and shoulders the blame</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acts in accordance with political implications and consequences</td>
<td>Thebaud (1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursues goals persuasively and diplomatically</td>
<td>Denno (1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overcomes ill will and interpersonal conflict</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shows respect for the needs, feelings, and opinions of indigenous persons</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Fraternizing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develops and shares interests with indigenous persons</td>
<td>Preston (1962)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shows an interest in indigenous people</td>
<td>Thebaud (1963)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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TABLE 10
RECOMMENDATIONS OF DESIRABLE PERFORMANCE BEHAVIORS
FOR AMERICANS WORKING OVERSEAS (Continued)

Fraternizing (Continued)

Renders personal aid or service to indigenous persons. . . Preston (1962)
Establishes and maintains good social relationships with indigenous persons . . . . . . . . . . . Preston (1962)
Develops friendship and goodwill . . . . . . . . . . . Preston (1962)

Guthrie, 1966, pp. 46-48, noted that: "The problem of selection is further complicated by the fact that there is little agreement on the criteria of good performance..." and that, in general, "only a small number of studies have been carried out concerned with the effectiveness of the technical assistant while he is on the job." No research studies concerned with on-the-job performance effectiveness of military advisors were found.

Danielian and Stewart, 1967, p. 211, discussed performance criteria that could be predicted by personnel means:

Generally, criteria have been used which, though possessing a kind of face validity, have on further analysis proved to be insufficient and sometimes misleading. Take, for example, superior's or supervisor's ratings. In both military and nonmilitary settings, when ratings are made through the usual administrative channels, there is a degree of risk that missions or organizational goals are really being rated, rather than specific individual performances.

This is not surprising in view of the fact that any physical description of the day-to-day behaviors of personnel engaged in paramilitary missions is relatively unrevealing: how many times they meet with their counterpart, what terms they use to address him, how many times they go out into the field, the number of civic action projects initiated. Each of these activities may be indicative of something significant between an American and the indigenous persons with whom he works, but unless they are meaningfully interpreted into a pattern of behavior which can logically or empirically be shown to contribute to a successful mission, they remain isolated fragments—mere tantalizing tidbits of behavior.

Guthrie, 1966, p. 47, described a general attempt to develop selection measures for overseas personnel:

The most extensive study of selection methods for overseas employees was carried out by the U.S. Civil Service Commission (1953). Directed by Mandell, the study had the ambitious purpose "to develop valid and practical methods which may be administered by agencies of the Federal Government to help them select employees for all overseas posts and all types of positions. This includes American citizen employees but not native employees." The emphasis in the study was on the measurement of personal characteristics rather than on intelligence, information, or special aptitude. Data
were obtained from samples of employees who were already on the job overseas. At the same time criterion ratings of the effectiveness of these employees were obtained from their supervisors. A self-description inventory and an inventory of activities, interests, and preferences showed highly satisfactory correlations with the criterion ratings. It was not possible to take the next step and administer the inventories to applicants.

Joyce et al., 1967, p. 85, summarized the current procedures governing assignment of officers to advisory duty. They said:

Officer positions on the JTD [Joint Table of Distribution] are filled by the Officer Personnel Directorate (OPD) of OPO [Office of Personnel Operations]. In addition to the detailed requirements specified in the JTD and the MAAG requisition, the following general criteria set forth in OPD/OPO's Operating Instructions 614-30 govern the selection of officers for MAAG assignments:

- Personal conduct is most important. Suitability of dependents for this kind of assignment must be considered carefully;
- Special consideration must be given to professional qualifications, knowledge of appropriate language, adaptability to foreign people and customs, ability to conduct effective instruction;
- No officer will be assigned to a MAAG for his last tour of duty before retirement, or whose record of personal conduct is blemished, or who has been passed over for promotion;
- Each selected officer must have graduated from the school courses appropriate for his grade and length of service, be qualified in the MOS in which being assigned and meet requirements for handling SECRET information;
- Each officer must be qualified physically for general service in the country to which assigned and he and accompanying dependents must take final-type physical examinations;
- Officers who will be working at the tactical level with indigenous troop units in countries with an actual or potential threat of insurgency will be graduates of an approved counterinsurgency course.

But Thebaud, 1963, p. 22, noted that such instructions are not absolute:

It should be pointed out, however, that the criteria in the case of many officers cannot be and is not completely adhered to. As an example, comparatively few U.S. officers speak a foreign language; and, in the case of Southeast Asia, only a handful have fluency in the indigenous tongues. In this specific regard, present DA [Department of the Army] policy is predicated on the development of an English-speaking capability among the indigenous officers and the use of indigenous interpreters; this, rather than attempting to teach so many officers difficult languages for such short periods of utilization, Waldo W. Brooks, interview with author, November 1962]. Additionally, other criteria are not followed in certain instances, for varying
reasons, but primarily because of the lack of sufficient numbers of highly qualified personnel.

Joyce and Williams, 1967, p. 183, categorically stated the problem as one of need for a systematic approach to personnel assignments:

The systematic program within the Army to select, train and qualify officers for advisory assignments to MAAGs requires further improvement. [It is a weakness inherent in the present system that an officer sometimes is] assigned to a MAAG largely because he is available without having volunteered for advisory duty, or for duty of any type in the country or even the region in which the MAAG is located.

Thebaud, 1963, p. 22, summarized his review of advisor selection procedures:

The system presently employed for selecting officers has provided many outstanding individuals, but it has also permitted the assignment of many unfit to assume the responsibilities of this particular duty. Since the role of each American military adviser in Southeast Asia is of such import, action should be taken to preclude the assignment of those who are unqualified.

Mention of personal qualities that are thought to be related to the performance descriptions listed in Table 10 were scattered throughout the literature. The only research evidence concerning personal characteristics was provided by Hausrath, whose results are summarized in Table 11.

### TABLE 11

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDES DESIRABLE IN KMAG ADVISORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Percent of 255 Respondents*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patience</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tact</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional stability</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendliness and good humor</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perseverance</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thoroughness</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good personal appearance</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignity and reserve</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-reliance</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liking for foreign nationals</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorruptibility</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperate drinking habits</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adds to more than 100 percent because respondents checked more than one quality. They were asked to check five.

Source: Hausrath, 1957, p. 28.
It is interesting to note that there are important differences between the qualities listed by experienced advisors (Table 11) and those hypothesized by authors who merely write about advisors. Table 12 presents the qualifications that various authors emphasized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualifications Required for Advisory Assignments</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Job dedication</td>
<td>Cleveland (1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational ability</td>
<td>Hickey &amp; Davidson (1965) Cleveland (1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political sensitivity</td>
<td>Cleveland (1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourcefulness</td>
<td>Cleveland (1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buoyant personality</td>
<td>Thebaud (1963) Cleveland (1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language interest</td>
<td>Thebaud (1963) Cleveland (1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputation for high moral standards</td>
<td>Boggs (1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional military or technical qualifications.</td>
<td>Boggs (1960) Hickey &amp; Davidson (1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to conduct effective instruction</td>
<td>Boggs (1960) Kroeger et al. (1957)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of language of the host country</td>
<td>Boggs (1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualified dependents</td>
<td>Boggs (1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to communicate directly</td>
<td>Joyce (1967) Hickey &amp; Davidson (1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social skill</td>
<td>Hickey &amp; Davidson (1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Hickey &amp; Davidson (1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership ability</td>
<td>Hickey &amp; Davidson (1965)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The literature contains only a few perfunctory discussions of the technical aspects of the psychometrics and personnel psychology underlying accurate classification of officers for advisory assignments. For example, Hickey and Davidson, 1965, p. 73, described efforts to develop selection techniques for overseas personnel in general.

A large number of selection techniques have been devised in efforts to discover and measure desirable and undesirable qualities. Most common are interviews, self-report inventories, psychiatric screening, and batteries of psychological tests. In addition, various experiments have been conducted with group-interaction situations, in which a person's behavior is observed while he is in an environment that closely resembles the one he will encounter on the job. Some group-interaction situations are known as "house party" tests, in which the subject lives and works with a small group for several days in an isolated location. The Peace Corps and several other agencies have experimented with using nationals of the country to which a person is to be assigned to help determine whether he is qualified for the job.

Kroeger et al., 1957, p. 137, discussed the problem of selecting appropriate families as well as qualified officers, saying:

It is now the practice to send questionnaires to acquaintances of the officer and his wife inquiring about their character, handling of finances, drinking habits, morality, poise, and personality; and requesting a recommendation as to their fitness to represent the United States in a foreign country.

Hickey and Davidson, 1965, p. 74, concluded:

The work done on selection thus far suggests a number of general observations that would apply to most organizations working overseas. One is that skill cannot be separated from motivation.

Danielian and Stewart, 1967, p. 211, contended that "lack of knowledge of what constitutes successful performance as an advisor is a major barrier to developing appropriate training techniques and valid classification procedures."

The absence of a systematic program to assign, train, and otherwise prepare U.S. Army officers for advisory duty has resulted in failure to implement and adhere to policies governing assignment procedures. Failure to carry out present policies stems from the lack of research on how to assess personnel for assignment and how to evaluate actual performances in this kind of duty. Moreover, a lack of research on what constitutes successful and unsuccessful advisory duty is a fundamental barrier to the development of a program of appropriate assessment procedures. Up to 10 percent (hundreds) of assigned military advisory officers were said to be performing on a substandard basis. Many of these were undoubtedly assigned without having volunteered for advisory duty. Even among officers eligible for advisory assignments, there is a negative attitude about its career value. This persists even though it is known that general officers look favorably on such experience for their men.
CHAPTER 8

ADVISORY OFFICERS' CAREERS

Any consideration of the problems in preparing officers for military advisory assignments must cover the needs of the service as well as the needs of the officers. There is considerable discussion in the literature of how officers can be used most effectively as advisors and of the effects of advisory assignments on officers' careers. A comprehensive understanding of the problem also requires knowledge of the long-range historical trends in the use of U.S. officers in military assistance advisory assignments. For example, Hermes, 1965, p. 80, said:

In retrospect the role of the U.S. military advisor has not undergone an orderly historical evolution during the past quarter century. For the most part the role has been dependent upon the circumstances in each country receiving military assistance. Conditions of war or peace, domestic tranquility or internal insurgency, crisis or non-crisis—these are the factors that have generally determined the scope of the advisory role.

Joyce et al., 1967, p. 195, attempted to imagine the future trends in U.S. military assistance efforts, saying:

These activities for all services represent only a fraction of the MAP budget—a mere 6 percent. This includes the cost of grant-aid, continental U.S. (CONUS) school training, of mobile training teams, and of MAAG advisors. It is therefore conceivable that overall MAP dollar projections could trend downward steeply because of cutbacks in the materiel program in the next decade, while the number of officers required for MAAG advisors and trainers in-country remains the same or increases. The determining factor will be the demand of the developing countries. U.S. policy will probably continue to be responsive to their training and advisory needs despite cutbacks in the materiel program.

Boggs, 1960, p. iii, indicated a need for long-range planning for personnel development for MAAG's.

One of the important factors in implementing the long range commitment to military assistance is the effectiveness of the individual officer in the Military Assistance Advisory Group. Officer selection and development under current personnel policy is not fully responsive to the requirements of the long range program. The policy does not utilize or develop the maximum potential and effectiveness of the individual officer. An officer normally serves only one tour with an advisory group, and then this experience is allowed to remain undeveloped. Field experience is not directly related to subsequent staff assignments in higher headquarters which are concerned with military assistance. Officer utilization and development has
remained on a short range basis. Experience gained in military assistance is not utilized to advantage, nor is it developed to provide for subsequent utilization.

Thebaud, 1963, p. 30, in a paraphrase from the Draper Committee report, concluded that: Despite the publicity given to MAAG work, a feeling still prevails among many army officers that an assignment to a MAAG is a waste of time from a career standpoint—a necessary evil of the system.* Joyce and Williams, 1967, p. 15, noted that there is "a belief held by many officers that a tour of duty with a MAAG on an officer's record does not particularly catch the eye of promotion boards." Joyce et al., 1967, p. 43, talked with advisory officers overseas. They reported that:

Under the present officer career-advancement pattern, MAAG assignments are not favorably regarded by many officers. MAAG duty is looked on as a deviation from the normal or ideal combination and succession of school, staff, and command billets that lead to promotion. Some officers consider MAAG tours a waste of time—even a retrograde step—from a career standpoint.

On the basis of his survey of advisory officers in Korea, Hausrath, 1957, p. 102, said:

When tours longer than a year were in question, another factor was mentioned. This was the feeling that although KMAG service might be interesting and valuable, it was a sideline with respect to a career in the Army and hence should not be too prolonged.

Thebaud, 1963, p. 38, suggested that the opinions of general officers are at variance with the commonly held attitude:

The individual U.S. adviser, considered by Lt. General [Samuel T.] Williams as the "backbone" of the MAAG, bears responsibilities in these under-developed nations that, in the opinion of CINCUSARPAC [Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific] cannot be overestimated. General [James E.] Collins also feels that being an adviser in this area is probably one of the most sensitive, difficult, and important assignments that officers can be given. These opinions, expressed by senior officers experienced in MAAG duty, coupled with the emphasis placed on the subject by the Draper Committee, indicate that assignment as an advisor to the underdeveloped countries is as important to the national interest of the United States and the Free World and as challenging, professionally, to the individual as any peacetime role that has ever been given the U.S. soldier.

Insight into the conditions that may shape attitudes about service as an advisor was provided by Hausrath, 1957, p. 93, concerning Korea. He said:

During the early period of advisory duty in Korea (1948–1950), following the occupation and prior to open hostilities, assignments in Korea were regarded as not very desirable duty and perhaps not very important duty. Officers with good combat records or with long periods of overseas duty during WWII were rewarded with "home" assignments. Thus until the

Korean War started in mid-1950 there was no great significance in assignments to PMAG [Provisional Military Advisory Group] or KMAG. When the war began, KMAG suddenly became a critical element in keeping the Korean forces in the war, and had to be rapidly expanded with whatever personnel could be rushed to Korea.

In spite of generalized fears about the matter, however, army officers are not widely resentful of advisory duty assignments, either from the standpoint of satisfaction or in terms of their effect on career development. What are the attitudes of former military advisors? An empirical study was found that presented data on such attitudes. In 1957 Hausrath provided the following information from advisors during the Korean War. (Tables 13, 14, and 15.)

**TABLE 13**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value of Assignment</th>
<th>Percent of 255 Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More valuable than any other</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very valuable</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valuable</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful value</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not particularly valuable</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**TABLE 14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect on Army Career</th>
<th>Percent of Respondents in Various KMAG Assignments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Of 83 Hq and Staff Advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helped</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Made no difference</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindered</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


55
TABLE 15
WAYS IN WHICH ARMY CAREER WAS JUDGED TO BE
AFFECTED BY KMAG EXPERIENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ways career was helped</th>
<th>Percent of 255 Respondents*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gained military experience and training; opportunity to operate at higher level than rank would usually permit</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience in working with foreign armies, learning how Oriental mind works, problems of dealing with foreign peoples, better understanding of Korean people and problems of ROKA</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality development experience; learned patience and tact</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal satisfaction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ways career was hindered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will hurt future, hurt chances of promotion, assignments</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn’t learn as much as would have learned in U.S. units</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adds up to more than 100 percent because a few respondents named more than one respect in which their careers were helped or hindered.

Source: Hausroth, p. 110.

A number of writers have commented on the question of whether or not officers should be kept for longer periods in advisory work. Kroeger et al., 1957, p. 138, reached the following conclusion:

None of the services make a practice of keeping officers or men in advisory work, nor do they appear to think this is desirable. The regular service rotation in and out of foreign service is adhered to. Officers who have had Military Assistance Advisory Group assignments are not given preference for reassignment because of the experience. It is believed that the career of the officer is primarily military and not diplomatic. Therefore, it is more important to have him returned to experience or training that will keep him current in his military skills. The only exception to this is that officers who have special language abilities may find themselves alternately assigned in and out of the country.
Boggs, 1960, p. 31, provided a comprehensive discussion of the need for recurrent assignments:

One of the most costly aspects of current policy is the lack of any program to provide for recurrent assignments to military assistance duty in a particular country or area. Such a policy means that in almost all cases the officer serving with a Military Assistance Advisory Group is on his initial assignment in that country, and that this is his initial experience in this type of duty. To prepare the officer for an initial assignment the Army must provide him costly training and orientation in the United States. Even with this training and professional competence the officer is not prepared to immediately operate as a fully effective member of a Military Assistance Advisory Group in a foreign country. Orientation in the area, the development of the confidence of his counterparts in the host country's armed forces, his ability to conduct effective negotiations with his counterparts with a full understanding of the implications of what takes place; these are all elements of the officer's development at his new station which take months to achieve. On the other hand, the officer who has served a prior tour in the country will be infinitely more effective on his second tour. His period of adjustment in the area will be relatively brief, and in a minimum of time he can assume a full advisory responsibility.

Boggs, 1960, concluded that failure to reassign trained and experienced advisory officers is a wasteful practice:

Area training, language training, and the experience gained in the country in which the initial tour was performed is for the great part wasted if no subsequent advantage is to be taken of the officer's experience. The benefit to the Army and to the host country, if an officer could be given recurrent assignments with the Military Assistance Advisory Group in which he performed his initial tour, would far surpass the benefit which would accrue from an officer performing his initial assignment in the country. [P. 20.]

The general practice of one-time Military Assistance Advisory Group assignments should be reviewed in terms of the monetary savings resulting from the increased and more immediate effectiveness of the officer serving a second tour in the area as compared with the present one-time tour concept. An added advantage which would accrue to the Army as a result of a policy of recurrent tours would be the development of qualified area specialists capable of working with the armed forces of these countries in time of war. [Pp. 31-32.]

If assignment to advisory duties were made recurrent in order to increase economic efficiency and MAAG effectiveness, then new problems concerning career patterns would be introduced. After considering the requirements for advisory duty assignments, Boggs, 1960, p. 13, concluded that: "Officers qualified to meet such varied and geographically specialized requirements cannot logically be expected to develop from the standard career development pattern." In terms of a solution to the problem, he noted that:

Army career planning is sufficiently broad in scope and latitude to permit the incorporation of a program which would provide for the progressive training and development of officers for assignment in the field of military assistance. [P. 37.]

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Hausrath, 1957, p. 25, quoted one experienced advisor as saying, "One of our most critical needs in the (U.S.) Army today is an officer corps which is trained or naturally able to deal with foreign peoples"; and further Hausrath, himself, said, "This study supports the view that special qualifications are needed for MAAG-type duty, but suggests that qualified officers may be drawn from the officer population of the Army as needed without setting up a MAAG career expressly for continuous MAAG duty."

Boggs, 1960, p. iii, agreed. He saw the problem as being one of needing to redevelop present career patterns to include advisory assignments:

There is no requirement to develop a separate career program for military assistance with a highly specialized corps of officers. However, there is a need to provide for more professionalism and competence, and for more effective utilization of officer personnel. Present career planning policies can be adapted to incorporate a program of progressive development in military assistance within the established branch career patterns.

Joyce et al., 1967, p. 43, explored the career pattern problem with MAAG officers, and concluded:

The suggestion that the Army should incorporate advisory service into the officer career pattern deserves serious attention. One radical alternative is to establish a permanent military advisory service corps, a sort of military counterpart to the U.S. Foreign Service. When it was discussed with officers serving in MAAGs, opinion was firm that the present generalist pattern of career advancement must be maintained. Nevertheless, if optimum use is to be made of the Army's personnel resources to exert the best influence abroad, some modifications in the present system are essential. There is clear recognition that unsuitable officers and men are being assigned to MAAG and mobile training team (MTT) duties, and they eventually have to be relieved.

If current career patterns were adapted to cover recurrent advisory assignments, then it would be expected that assignments in the United States would be in the officer's primary military occupational specialty (MOS). If, however, a military advisory service corps were established, the question of suitable assignments in the United States would become more complex. Since there would also be a requirement to keep their knowledge current in their MOS, there would be only personal reasons for career advisors to spend extended amounts of time in the United States. In addition to troop command and staff duty in the United States, however, there are other assignments that are related to advisory duties, such as instructor duty at service schools or civilian component duty. Hausrath, 1957, p. 27, surveyed advisors in Korea about useful previous experience and reported that:

A quarter of the advisor respondents believed that experience in dealing with the National Guard, the ROTC, the Reserve, or similar civilian components of the U.S. Army was useful experience for a KMAGer. The rationale behind this, as stated by one advisor with National Guard experience, was that the officer who deals with civilian components is handling men who, like the ROKA counterparts, are not formally under the absolute command of the officer in question. Dealing with civilian components was regarded as good training in asserting the leadership that derives from personality and experience rather than from direct command and absolute authority. In addition
it gives practice in imparting training. "National Guard duty (Advisor to National Guard) helped me in Korea—got into same problems."

The reverse is also true. Service as a KMAG adviser was found helpful in later assignments as National Guard advisor. After being assigned as a National Guard advisor, one former KMAG advisor reported that: "It's the same kind of duty in the National Guard. You have to accomplish your job by advice and persuasion."

In short, military experience of the following types was considered most important for advisors. These are listed in order of importance:

(1) For tactical advisors:
   (a) Combat experience
   (b) Command experience above company level
   (c) Training command or National Guard advisory experience;

(2) For technical and service advisors:
   (a) Command experience above the company level
   (b) Combat experience
   (c) Training command or National Guard advisory experience.

Joyce et al., 1967, p. 45, advocated greater use of officers who had specialized in an area. They said, "As the young officer develops area competence, it should be exploited by assignments (not necessarily to MAAGs) in the area. When he is ordered to advisory duty, his assignment within the MAAG should capitalize on his competence." Boggs, 1960, p. 30, suggested other assignments abroad for area specialists:

Personnel policies for military assistance should be expanded to include all military assistance assignments, rather than limited to only Military Assistance Advisory Group duty. Staff assignments for military assistance duties in the unified commands and at the departmental level should be included as components of a single personnel program. By expanding the program to include these assignments a more experienced and practical point of view would be available to both the operating and supervisory echelons.

A key question that is not answered in discussions of the career aspects of advisory duties is: How recurrent must "recurrent assignments" be in order to increase MAAG and personnel effectiveness? Other related questions are: How long would each tour of duty be? Would dependents be sent abroad to join the advisors? Would the career programs apply equally to army officers from all arms and services? In seeking answers to the above questions, it would be well to note HauSrath's, 1957, p. 109, statement:

However, it is well to keep in mind that 81 percent of KMAG officers were Reserve officers called back into active duty from civilian life. It may be assumed that Reserve officers, whose careers are oriented toward civilian rather than military life, would not be too concerned with the long-range effect of KMAG experience on a career in the Army.

The policy of not reassigning advisory officers is wasteful of money, of training effort and facilities, and of officers' time and effectiveness abroad. At the same time officers must be kept current in military experience and training.
Decisions concerning the need for recurrent assignments, career patterns, and advisory emphasis depend on future policy and accurate forecasting of needs for military advisors. If needs diminish due to policy changes and reduction of world tensions, then it will not be necessary to institutionalize the role of military advisor, although a continuing demand for a small number of trained MAP administrators who are area specialists may remain.

Although the favorable attitudes of general officers about advisory duty differ from those of officers in lower grades, the generally negative attitude toward military advisory duty assignments of any duration reduces the number of potential volunteers who would be motivated to perform effectively.
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Preston. See: Lybrand.


APPENDIX A

RESEARCH PROBLEM AREAS AND RECOMMENDATIONS PREPARATION AND UTILIZATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE OFFICERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROBLEM AREAS</th>
<th>Test Page Reference</th>
<th>STUDY RECOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

GENERAL
1. UTILIZATION OF OFFICERS IN ADVISORY ASSIGNMENTS HAS BEEN HINDERED BY A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR DUTY FUNCTIONS, PERSONAL REQUIREMENTS, AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS.

SUSTAINMENT
Selection and Classification
2. THE GREAT NUMBER OF "TOP PRIORITY" JOBS THAT NEED TO BE FILLED WITH HIGHLY QUALIFIED OFFICERS LIMITS THE NUMBER WHO ARE AVAILABLE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE ASSIGNMENTS. THE QUALIFICATIONS NEEDED FOR SUCCESSFUL MILITARY ADVISORY SERVICE, HOWEVER, ARE NOT NECESSARILY IDENTICAL WITH THOSE NEEDED FOR OTHER CRITICAL POSITIONS. ABOUT TEN PERCENT SEVERAL HUNDRED MILITARY ASSISTANCE OFFICERS ASSIGNED OVERSEAS AT ANY ONE TIME HAVE BEEN ESTIMATED TO BE ENTIRELY UNFIT FOR SUCH DUTIES. IT IS NOT KNOWN HOW ACCURATE THIS ESTIMATE IS, OR IF THE CAUSES OF FAILURE ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE RELATED TO STANDARDS PERFORMANCE WITH OTHER KINDS OF MILITARY UNITS.

Job Structure
3. SOME ASSIGNMENTS IN THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WITH THE SAME DUTY TITLES ARE NOT NECESSARILY ALIKE. OTHER ASSIGNMENTS APPEAR TO BE COMPOSED OF DUTIES DESCRIBED UNDER TWO OR MORE MILITARY OCCUPATION SPECIALTIES (MOS'S). FOR EXAMPLE, THE LINE BETWEEN PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION AND TRAINING IS DIFFICULT TO DRAW, ESPECIALLY IN THE CASES OF PERSONNEL IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS WHO MAY CARRY OUT BOTH FUNCTIONS. IN OTHER CASES, ASSIGNMENTS MAY BE CARRIED OUT UNDER MOS'S THAT ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE ACTUAL DUTIES PERFORMED. IN ADDITION, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING ADVISORY POSITIONS AND OTHER MILITARY ASSISTANCE DUTY ASSIGNMENTS IS NOT CLEAR. EFFORTS TO DESIGN APPROPRIATE TRAINING PROGRAMS AND SELECTION TECHNIQUES HAVE BEEN HAMPERED BY A SERIOUS LACK OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE NEEDS, CONCEPTS, AND PROCESSES OF ADVISOR DEVELOPMENT. REPORTS OF INTERVIEWS ON ADVISOR EXPERIENCES HAVE EXPOSED PROBLEMS, BUT THEY HAVE NOT PROVIDED SOLUTIONS. DATA NEED TO BE SYSTEMATICALLY COLLECTED AND SCIENTIFICALLY ANALYZED, SO AS TO PRODUCE THE REQUIRED FACTS ABOUT MILITARY ASSISTANCE DUTY FUNCTIONS.

Career Development
4. MANY OFFICERS APPEAR TO CONSIDER ADVISORY SERVICE DISTINGUISHING TO THEIR CAREERS AND THIS ATTITUDE REDUCES THE NUMBER WHO VOLUNTEER OR WILLINGLY SERVE IN ADVISORY DUTY ASSIGNMENTS.

DISTRIBUTION
Emergency Advisor Sources
5. MILITARY ADVISORY DUTY OVERSEAS APPEARS TO BE TREATED AS ENTIRELY SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM OTHER DUTY ASSIGNMENTS, INCLUDING HEADQUARTERS STAFF ASSIGNMENTS.

TRAINING
Languages
6. ANY ATTEMPT TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE REAL VALUE OF KNOWING A COUNTERPART'S LANGUAGE IS SEVERELY HAMPERED BY THE FACT THAT THERE IS LITTLE LANGUAGE RESEARCH EVIDENCE AVAILABLE. FURTHERMORE, THE AVAILABLE...
STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. SYSTEM OF MILITARY ADVISORY RESEARCH BE PLANNED THAT WILL
   ENABLE SCIENTIFIC STUDIES OF PROBLEMS IN THE AREA OF SELECTION,
   JOB ANALYSIS, CAREER PATHING, TRAINING, PERFORMANCE
   AND EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

2. TECHNIQUES DESIGNED TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE
   FOR SKILLED ADVISORS SHOULD BE ANALYZED AND
   CURRENTLY ONCE A YEAR SHOULD BE REPORTED.
   THE Research SHOULD RESULT IN A MEANINGFUL AND
   EFFECTIVE ADVICE PERFORMANCE. THE KNOWLEDGE THUS
   OBTAINED SHOULD BE USED TO IMPROVE THE CLASSIFICATION AND ASSIGNMENT PRO
   FOR THE BETTER QUALIFIED MILITARY OFFICERS ARE PUT IN CRITICAL
   INVOLVE THE PRESTIGE AND FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED

3. INSIDE, WORLDWIDE TIME AND ACTIVITIES JOB ANALYSIS BE MADE
   CURRENT ADVISORY DUTY MOS'S. DUTY FUNCTIONS IN ALL KINDS
   INCIDENTS TO BE ANALYZED AND DESCRIBED IN DETAIL.
   CULLED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SKILL, FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALL
   ADVISORS, AND ABOUT THE CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES REQUIRED.
   IN KNOWLEDGE, NEW MOS'S APPROPRIATE TO THE MAJOR CLASSES
   SKILLS ACTIVITIES MIGHT CORRESPOND WITH, AND NEW SPECIALIZED
   MIGHT BE DEvised. MOS TITLES COULD BE MADE TO SERVE AS
   CODED FOR A STAND-BY INFORMATION BASE FOR EMERGENCY
   RIEVAL OF SKILLED ADVISORY PERSONNEL FOR RECURRANCE
   SKILL MOS DESCRIPTIONS MIGHT OCCUR UNDER THE FOLLOWING
   ADVISORY TITLES:

   - HEADQUARTERS (E.G., MAAG CHIEF)
   - MILITARY AND SUPPLY OFFICER
   - TRAINING STAFF OFFICER
   - TRAINING OFFICER (UNIT DIVISION)
   - AFFAIRS OFFICER (SECTOR CORPS)
   - MILITARY SERVICES OFFICER

4. MADE OF OFFICERS' CAREER MOTIVATIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
   SERVICE, SAMPLING OFFICERS ELIGIBLE FOR ADVISORY ASSIGNMENTS
   AND PROMOTION BOARDS. THE INFORMATION GATHERED THAT
   UNDERSTANDING THE VOCATIONAL ASPECTS OF ADVISORY DUTIES
   BE DIVERTED INTO A PAMPHLET THAT DESCRIBES WHAT AND HOW THE
   EM CONTRIBUTES TO U.S. SECURITY, THE ATTITUDES OF HIGHER
   CONCERNING IT, AND ITS VALUES AND RELATIONSHIPS TO CAREER

5. SOURCES
   - MADE TO DETERMINE THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FOREIGN
     ENMENTS AND ASSIGNMENTS AS ADVISOR TO CIVILIAN COMPONENTS
     EDUCATIONAL INSTRUCTOR DUTIES, AND TO THE HEADQUARTERS
     APPEARS TO BE A COMMONALITY OF REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING
     ABILITY TO ADVISE SKILLFULLY THAT COULD BE CODED FOR
     TATION FOR EMERGENCY ASSIGNMENT USE, AND COMMON ADVISORY
     RANKS COULD BE DEVELOPED FOR RELATED ASSIGNMENTS.

6. SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON THE LANGUAGE PROBLEM BE
   MADE WORLDWIDE BASED. THE RESEARCH SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO
   WHAT DEGREE FOREIGN LANGUAGE SKILLS AFFECT MISSION

PROBLEM AREAS (continued)

RESEARCH EVIDENCE IS RESTRICTED TO ONLY A FEW COUNTRIES, TO WARFARE
SITUATIONS, AND IT CONCERNS ADVISORS WITH DIFFERENT KINDS OF TRAINING OR
NONE AT ALL.

2. CURRENT U.S. ARMY LANGUAGE TESTS ARE PAPER AND PENCIL TESTS OF EITHER
   FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITY OR OF LITERACY. THEY DO NOT MEASURE THE CONVERSATIONAL PROFICIENCY THAT IS NEEDED BY MILITARY ADVISORY PERSONNEL.

Advisory Training

8. MANY NONMILITARY ADVISORY MOS DUTIES, PROBLEMS, SELECTION, AND TRAINING ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF MILITARY ADVISORS, BUT THEY ARE TREATED DIFFERENTLY AND SEPARATELY. AS A RESULT, DUPLICATION IN TRAINING, INEFFECTIVITY OF ADVISORS, AND OTHER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS HAVE ARISEN (RELATED TO PROBLEM 5, ABOVE).

9. U.S. ADVISORS AND THEIR COUNTERPARTS OFTEN TEND TO STEREOTYPE EACH OTHER AND TO MISINTERPRET EACH OTHER'S MOTIVES. LITTLE GENERALIZABLE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE THAT DEALS WITH THE ALTERATION OF SUCH PRECONCEPTIONS AND ASSUMED VALUES OR WITH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES THAT UNDERLIE THEM IS AVAILABLE. THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPERATIVES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE NOT ALWAYS APRECIATED AND RESPONDED TO BY U.S. PERSONNEL OVERSEAS.

10. ALTHOUGH TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR MILITARY ADVISORY OFFICERS HAVE EXISTED FOR MANY YEARS, LITTLE IS KNOWN CONCERNING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THEY MEET THE NEEDS OF, AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE MILITARY ADVISORY PROGRAM. TRADITIONAL PREPARATION VIA LECTURES ON "AREA STUDIES" MAY NOT BE ADEQUATE TO ENABLE AN ADVISOR TO ADAPT HIMSELF QUICKLY, AND TO COMMUNICATE EFFECTIVELY WITH HOST-COUNTRY PERSONNEL. JOB AND LANGUAGE SKILL IS NOT ENOUGH: KNOWING WHAT TO DO IS NOT THE SAME AS DOING WHAT YOU KNOW
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<td>S = N</td>
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<td>7. THAT STANDARD FOREIGN LANGUAGE CONVERSATION PROFICIENCY TESTS BE DEVELOPED THAT INCORPORATE EMPIRICALLY IDENTIFIED VOCABULARY NEEDED FOR SUCCESSFUL DUTY PERFORMANCE—IN PARTICULAR MILITARY ADVISOR ASSIGNMENTS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advisory Training</td>
<td>COUNTRIES TO WARFARE ENTAIL KINDS OF TRAINING OR PENAL TESTS OF EITHER DO NOT MEASURE THE CONCENTRATION OF THE PERSONNEL. AS SELECTION AND TRAINING ADVISORS, BUT THEY ARE NOT DUPLICATION IN TRAINING, EL MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS TO STEREOTYPE EACH OTHER GENERALIZABLE SCIENTIFIC OR PRECONCEPTIONS AND IDEAS THAT UNDERLIE THEM ARE VITALS OF DEVELOPING NEED TO BY U.S. PERSONNEL CIVIL OFFICERS HAVE EXISTED TO WHICHS THEY MEET MILITARY ASSISTANCE ON &quot;AREA STUDIES&quot; MAY NOT LEAD QUICKLY, AND TO COMMUNICATION AND LANGUAGE SKILLS IS AS DOING WHAT YOU KNOW.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DUTIES TO VERIFY OR DENY CURRENT STEREOTYPES ABOUT FOREIGN GROUPS IT IS &quot;ALL ORIENTALS ARE CONTINUOUSLY INVOLVED WITH SAVING FACE&quot;. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH SHOULD ALSO BE CONDUCTED ON THE RANGE AND VARIABILITIES OF FOREIGN PEOPLES' CULTURAL INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES, AND AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO DISCOVER GENERAL CULTURAL INTERACTION PRINCIPLES, WITH EMPHASIS ON SCIENTIFICALLY IDENTIFIED FACTS OF CULTURE THAT CAN HELP ADVISORS TO UNDERSTAND THEIR OWN CULTURAL PATTERNS, AS WELL AS THOSE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS. ALTHOUGH SOME INFORMAL INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE AND IS INCORPORATED INTO AREA HANDBOOKS, THERE IS NEED FOR SCIENTIFICALLY BASED FACTS OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES ON WHICH TO BASE MILITARY JUDGMENTS, POLITICAL DECISIONS, AND ADVISORY ACTIONS. WE NEED TO KNOW ALSO WHAT FORCES AND CONDITIONS ALTER THE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL LAWS OR PRINCIPLES. SUCH KNOWLEDGE CAN ONLY BE ACQUIRED BY CONTROLLED, BASIC RESEARCH ON INTERPERSONAL AND INTERGROUP INTERACTIONS, USING PROPERLY SELECTED, REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES.</td>
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| 10. THAT EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH EVALUATIONS OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAMS BE MADE TO DETERMINE THEIR EFFICIENCY AND NEED FOR IMPROVEMENTS. SPECIAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE TRAINING OF ADVISORS IN THE FIELD AND TO THOSE ASPECTS OF TRAINING THAT OFFICERS ACTUALLY USE IN THEIR ASSIGNMENTS. TRAINING FOLLOWUP FIELD STUDIES SHOULD BE MADE ON A WAVE-INDEX SAMPLING BASIS IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ADVISORY TRAINING UNDER ALL RELEVANT CONDITIONS. THE STUDIES SHOULD DETERMINE WHAT CONDITIONS LIMIT ADVISORS' ACCOMPLISHMENTS FROM ASSIGNMENT TO ASSIGNMENT, AND THEY SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO DETERMINE HOW SUCH LIMITATIONS CAN BE OVERCOME. HIGH PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO EVALUATIVE RESEARCH ON CONTENT, METHODS, AND RESULTS OF TRAINING ACQUISITION OF SKILLS.

APPENDIX A

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### IMPLEMENTATION OF PROBLEM AREAS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### PROBLEM AREAS

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#### GENERAL

1. Allocation of Officers to advisory duties is hampered by lack of a systematic program for their selection, training, and assignment to appropriate worldwide military assistance elements.

#### SUSTAINMENT

Selection and Classification

2. Nearly all social research bears in one way or another on the problems faced by military advisors, but most advisors have only limited experience in the social sciences. Many advisors concerned with institutional building activities are not prepared to understand host-country personnel's premises, mores, folkways, and values, or their motivations for military service. Advisors often tend to overestimate their advisees' capabilities, and are unwilling to accept less effectiveness than is expected from U.S. personnel.

3. A considerable amount of advisors' language training might be unnecessary, for example. A student officer in an advisor course has studied French in high school and in college. He might now be trained to fluency in Vietnamese, sent to Vietnam, and assigned to a counterpart who speaks either English or French, or both.

#### CAREER DEVELOPMENT

4. Nonrecurrent assignments as a military assistance officer are wasteful. A systematic program is needed for recurrent assignments to military assistance duty in a particular country or in area training, language training, and in-country advisory experience. The optimal recurrence of assignment for advisors of each kind is not known.

#### DISTRIBUTION

Emergency Advisor Sources

5. The scope of advisory efforts varies in the historical course of events, and the need for trained advisors varies accordingly. How can a continuing long-range, worldwide advisory effort be reconciled with a short term, localized combat-oriented effort?

---

**APPENDIX B**

**IMPLEMENTATION OF PROBLEM AREAS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

**PREPARATION AND UTILIZATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE OFFICERS**

**PROBLEM AREAS**

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<td>Distribution</td>
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**GENERAL**

1. That a comprehensive reevaluation be made. The aim of the reevaluation effort for selection, classification, training, and assignment officers.

**SUSTAINMENT**

Selection and Classification

2. That preconditions for attendance of officers destined to fill key, long-term, or operational positions, and behavioral science made available to them through the student officers. There are differences to be presented in education for overseas assignments supplemented later with brief orientation about the specific country. Selection should include relevant data about the mores, values, and motivations, as well selection, level of education and social characteristics of their counterparts.

3. That U.S. advisory officers be assigned background and fluency complement overseas duty tours are involved.

**CAREER DEVELOPMENT**

4. That a policy for recurrent reassignments be developed in terms of the special duties or foreign missions as overseas advisor should be established to increase the desirability of advancing. A new worldwide military assistance effort in decision-making.

**DISTRIBUTION**

Emergency Advisor Sources

5. That a standby information base of officers overseas is extended a (or the designated standby personnel), and related personnel, aiding to the needs of the immediate situation.

b. That a planned standby capability resources of indigenous interpreters...
DATIONS
OFFICERS

STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS

WE REEVALUATION OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT POLICIES BE.
RE REEVALUATION SHOULD BE TO DEVELOP AN IMPROVED SYS-
CLASSIFICATION, TRAINING, AND ASSIGNMENT OF MILITARY

Languages

6. LANGUAGE TRAINING IS VERY EXPENSIVE WHEN COSTS INCLUDE IN
SALARY, AND ALLOWANCES, AND WHEN THE TOUR OF DUTY ABROAD
ONE YEAR OR LESS IT IS KNOWN THAT PROPERLY SELECTED OFFICER
CANNOT COMPLETEN THE MISSIONS ABROAD WITHOUT KNOWING THE
HOST COUNTRY.

7. CERTAIN PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE DUTIES
DEGREE OF FLUENCY IN THE LANGUAGES OF THEIR HOST COUNTRY.

Interpreters

10. ADVISORS OFTEN CANNOT USE INTERPRETERS EFFECTIVELY.

11. THE COST OF FULLY TRAINING MILITARY ADVISORS IN CONUS FOR
AREA PROFICIENCY IS VERY HIGH. OVERSEAS DUTY TIME IS LOST
WHILE OFFICERS ARE GIVEN SUCH TRAINING.

Problem Areas (continued)

TRAINING

Languages

6. LANGUAGE TRAINING IS VERY EXPENSIVE WHEN COSTS INCLUDE IN
SALARY, AND ALLOWANCES, AND WHEN THE TOUR OF DUTY ABROAD
ONE YEAR OR LESS IT IS KNOWN THAT PROPERLY SELECTED OFFICERS
SHOULD COMPLETE THEIR MISSIONS ABROAD WITHOUT KNOWING THE
HOST COUNTRY.

7. CERTAIN PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE DUTIES
DEGREE OF FLUENCY IN THE LANGUAGES OF THEIR HOST COUNTRY.

Advisory Training

8. APPROXIMATELY TWO THIRDS OF THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
DIVISIONS IN VIETNAM ARE LIEUTENANTS AND CAPTAINS. MANY OFFICERS
ASSIGNED AS ADVISORS WITHOUT FORMAL PREPARATORY TRAINING
GIVEN AT THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING ADVISOR COURSE.

9. THERE IS NEED FOR AN EXPANDED CURRICULUM IN THE MILITARY
ADVISORY TRAINING AREA. CURRENTLY SUCH TRAINING IS LIMIT-
EXCEPT FOR SPECIAL COURSES FOR SELECTED SENIOR OFFICERS.

Interpreters

10. ADVISORS OFTEN CANNOT USE INTERPRETERS EFFECTIVELY.

11. THE COST OF FULLY TRAINING MILITARY ADVISORS IN CONUS FOR
AREA PROFICIENCY IS VERY HIGH. OVERSEAS DUTY TIME IS LOST
WHILE OFFICERS ARE GIVEN SUCH TRAINING.

Provisional Base Capable of Locating a Force of Trained
Advisors Be Planned for Emergency Deployment of
Advisors from Extended Active Duty (EAD) and Non-EAD Sources.
And By Personnel Would Be Used Only in Emergency Situa-
Personnel Administration Could Be Structured Accord-
F the Immediate Situation.

And By Capability Be Supported by Developing Qualified
Senior Interpreters in Countries of Potential Emergency.

Formalization of Policies to Location a Force of Trained
Advisors Be Planned for Emergency Deployment of
Advisors from Extended Active Duty (EAD) and Non-EAD Sources.
And By Personnel Would Be Used Only in Emergency Situa-
Personnel Administration Could Be Structured Accord-
F the Immediate Situation.
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<td>TRAINING</td>
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<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>6. THAT LANGUAGE TRAINING FOR ALL NONRECURRENT ONE YEAR DUTY TOURS BE LIMITED TO BASIC LANGUAGE TRAINING SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH RAPPORT AND HELP IN UNDERSTANDING THE CULTURE.</td>
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<td>7. THAT ALL CHIEFS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ELEMENTS AND ALL OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO INSTRUCTOR DUTY AT FOREIGN MILITARY SCHOOLS BE PROVIDED WITH THE NECESSARY TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE TO ACQUIRE FLUENCY IN THE LANGUAGES OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advisory Training</td>
<td>8. THAT SUITABLE LANGUAGE, ADVISORY, AND AREA TRAINING BE PROVIDED FOR ALL JUNIOR OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO ADVISORY DUTIES ANYWHERE OVERSEAS. (INITIAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THOSE WHO MUST ADVISE COUNTERPARTS DIRECTLY.)</td>
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<td>9. THAT CURRICULUM STUDIES BE MADE TO DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF BACKGROUND EDUCATION THAT ADVISORS OF VARIOUS KINDS MAY NEED—e.g., IN ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, HUMAN RELATIONS, SOCIOLOGY. FOREIGN AREA EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND PROGRAMS SHOULD BE FORMULATED ON THE BASIS OF LEVEL OF NEED OF THE PARTICULAR STUDENT. AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE BACKGROUND COURSES AT THE UNDERGRADUATE LEVEL SHOULD BE CAPITALIZED UPON. STANDARDIZED EDUCATION PROFICIENCY TESTS SHOULD BE USED TO ESTABLISH THE PRESENCE OF PREREQUISITE INFORMATION FOR ASSESSMENT OF ELIGIBILITY FOR ADVISORY TRAINING PROGRAMS. CLOSER COOPERATION AND INTERACTION WITH UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS SHOULD BE ACHIEVED NATIONWIDE AND WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interpreters</td>
<td>10. THAT ALL MILITARY ASSISTANCE OFFICERS BE TRAINED IN HOW TO CHOOSE AND USE INDIGENOUS INTERPRETERS, INCLUDING METHODS OF DETECTING AND DEALING WITH MISUNDERSTANDINGS, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NONVERBAL CUES.</td>
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<td>11a. THAT INDIGENOUS INSTRUCTORS BE EMPLOYED AT OVERSEAS LOCATIONS TO DEVELOP THE INTRODUCTORY INFORMATION SUPPLIED TO ADVISORS IN CONUS. &quot;THE ASSIGNMENT OF A LANGUAGE AND THE AREA INSTRUCTOR TO EACH MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP WOULD BE A GREAT DEAL MORE ECONOMICAL THAN MAINTAINING THE MEN IN AN UNPRODUCTIVE PERIOD AT A LANGUAGE SCHOOL.&quot; (KROEGER 1957).</td>
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<td>b. THAT INSTRUCTORS BE INTRODUCED INTO ALL SIZEABLE MILITARY ASSISTANCE ELEMENTS TO PROVIDE U.S. PERSONNEL WITH AREA AND LANGUAGE TRAINING.</td>
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APPENDIX B
Preparation and Utilization of Military Assistance Officers

Technical Report

Warren R. Graham

September 1969

The objective of this report is to ascertain through a survey of the relevant literature the tasks and functions performed by U.S. military advisory personnel and to determine the impact of certain cultural factors on the achievement of advisors' missions. The study organizes the problems and recommendations of previous studies on a number of key problem areas. The two appendixes, appearing in foldout form, present these problems and recommendations in table form with references to pages in the text.
Unclassified
Security Classification

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