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<tr>
<td>AD NUMBER</td>
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<td>LIMITATION CHANGES</td>
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**AUTHORITY**
AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (M) (25 Aug 69) FOR OT UT 692297 4 September 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command, Period Ending 30 April 1969

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNN
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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AVCA SGN TC GCPT

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Transportation Command for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)

THRU: Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Saigon
ATTN: AVCA SGN GO
APO 96491

Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
ATTN: AVCA GO 0
APO 96384

Deputy Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHCG-DST
APO 96375

Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR)
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

FOR OT UT
692297

Inclosure
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation Command for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (AGS CSFOR-65)

1. Section 1. Significant Activities

   a. This report of the 4th Transportation Command also contains information about the US Army Terminal Newport. It does not contain information about the other terminals under the jurisdiction of the 4th Transportation Command because that is furnished in the reports of the 125th Transportation Command, 11th Transportation Battalion, 71st Transportation Battalion and 159th Transportation Battalion.

   b. (1) At the start of this reporting period efforts to prepare for the anticipated Tet offensive were intensified at Newport and Camp Davies. Practice alerts were conducted, reaction forces were tested and drilled in their duties, weapons test fired, and all communications checked. Weak spots were reinforced, bunkers built, and firing positions constructed. During Tet no enemy action occurred at Newport and all local nationals employed by the stevedore contractor worked through the period, except on 17 February 1969, when all local nationals celebrated their holiday.

   (2) The emphasis on security paid off on 23 February 1969 when Newport went on yellow alert for five hours. Throughout the rest of the quarter yellow and red alerts were frequent at the port and troops of the 71st Transportation Battalion stationed at Long Binh went through a difficult period as they were on perimeter defense at night in Long Binh and worked at Newport during each day. Although accidents were anticipated due to the troops being tired, the accident rate went down during the quarter.

   c. On 20 February 1969 Colonel Owen J. Walsh, formerly deputy commander, assumed command from Colonel Archie B. Joyner, who was assigned to the US Army Transportation Center at Fort Eustis, Virginia. See Incl 1.

   d. As previously reported in the ORLL for the period ending 31 January 1969, this headquarters was experiencing difficulty in assuming complete responsibility for the operation of Camp Davies without benefit of additional personnel and equipment. In order to accomplish the mission a provisional unit was established (Det #5) drawing upon resources within the command for the required personnel and some of the required equipment. This was done pending the preparation of a MTDA authorizing the spaces and equipment. Total requirement is for 96 spaces.

   e. A darkroom was completed in late February which has aided the Information Office in the timely release of photographs to news media. Photographs are now processed in two days whereas, throughout the facilities which were previously used, processing time was 10 to 14 days. This facility has greatly increased our efficiency and expanded our ability to do jobs in the information field which previously we were unable to accomplish.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation Command for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)

f. Replacement of all telephone cables from the Camp Davies switchboard was completed on 1 March 1969. Replacement was required to eliminate the poor telephone service experienced during the two previous rainy seasons. Customer service has increased 35 percent since the new cables were installed. A great improvement over last year is expected this monsoon season due to the elimination of bad splices, water leaks and worn cables.

g. On March 6-7, 1969, USAT Newport, underwent its annual general inspection by Saigon Support Command Inspector General team. A satisfactory rating was achieved. The team stated they were impressed with the overall operation of the port. Minor deficiencies noted have been corrected.

h. Project Skills I was initiated for military personnel and has three subdivisions: Alpha, Bravo and Charlie. Skills I Alpha provides for the indoctrination and orientation of all newly arrived officer personnel and is conducted down to battalion level. Skills I Bravo involves formalized training courses. Major courses of instruction initiated during the period cover care and use of TO&E weapons, operation and maintenance of the rough terrain forklifts, and swimming fundamentals. Skills I Charlie provides for formalized on-the-job training in critical Military Occupational Specialties within the battalion or terminal.

i. On 23 March 1969, the 60 ton floating crane, BD 6239, for unknown reasons experienced a mechanical failure. The boom fell while performing a heavy lift, resulting in structural damage to its members. Additional damage to the boom was sustained when it fell again during tests to determine the extent of initial damage and failure. Repair was beyond in-country capability and the crane was evacuated to Taiwan. Heavy-lift floating cranes are critical to the mission of the terminals and the loss of this crane is sharply felt.

j. Effective 1 April 1969, the 4th Transportation Command assumed responsibility for the operation of the US Army Terminal Vung Tau, all the river ports in the Mekong Delta, and boat operations throughout III and IV CTZ. Thus, the 4th Transportation Command assumed responsibility for all port and boat operations throughout the area of operations of the Saigon Support Command. Simultaneously, the 159th Transportation Battalion (Tml), commanded by LTC Thomas E. Collins, was relieved from assignment to the 53rd General Support Group and assigned to the 4th Transportation Command to operate the aforementioned facilities and perform various support missions throughout the Mekong Delta area.

k. On 2 April 1969, US Army Support Command, Saigon, directed reorganization of 4th Transportation Command based on a reorganization concept previously submitted to and approved by 1st Logistical Command. Basically, this reorganization will standardize command and control elements operating the four major deep-draft water terminals under the operational control of the 4th Transportation Command. Under the reorganization concept, each
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation Command for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)

terminal will be operated by a battalion composed of units, by type, required to perform the functions peculiar to the particular terminal operated by that battalion. The action will necessitate reorganization and realignment of units assigned to each subordinate element of the command. The reorganization will be implemented on 25 May 1969. The details of actions taken and changes made, by unit, will be included in the ORLL for the period ending 31 July 1969.

1. Detachments 2, 2A and 4, US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam, were attached to this command on 9 April 1969. With the attachment of these units this command assumed a direct support marine maintenance mission for both attached and external units. The mission assigned to this command from the US Army Support Command, Saigon, was amended to add the following functions:

   (1) Operate a shore based maintenance facility, to include a mobile team, at Saigon, Vung Tau and Dong Tam. Perform scheduled and unscheduled maintenance and emergency repairs to US Army marine craft within III and IV CTZs as required.

   (2) Assist units having US Army marine craft assigned in performing organizational maintenance in emergencies or when approved by US Army Support Command, Saigon.

   (3) Provide technical assistance and advice to US Army marine craft units within III and IV CTZs.

   (4) Maintain an authorized stockage list (ASL) for class III, IV and IX items for US Army marine craft.

   (5) Provide on-site inspections and repair teams for US Army marine craft within III and IV CTZs when required by economical, safety, or operational conditions.

   (6) Maintain records to reflect current prescribed load lists (PLL) for all supported units having assigned US Army craft within III and IV CTZs.

   (7) Maintain records to reflect current assignment and status of each named or numbered US Army marine craft employed in III and IV CTZs.

m. Changes in Units: (1) Effective 15 April 1969, the 402nd Transportation Company (Terminal Transfer) was relieved from attachment to the 71st Transportation Battalion (Tml) and attached to the 11th Transportation Battalion (Tml). This action was taken to provide single responsibility for operation of the ammunition system on the Nha Be and Dong Nai Rivers.
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Prior to this action, the 11th Transportation Battalion was responsible for ammunition ship discharge/backload operations at Cat Lai and movement to the ammunition barge discharge sites, while the 71st Transportation Battalion was responsible for operation of the ammunition barge sites. Under the new concept, the entire ammunition system will be under the control of one unit, the 11th Transportation Battalion. The 402nd Transportation Company will continue to occupy billets at Camp Camelot and is attached to the 71st Transportation Battalion for rations, quarters, and logistical support.

(2) Also effective on 15 April 1969, Detachment #3 TD Augmentation to 4th Transportation Command P5 WCJ199-01 (Marine Services Activity) and 28 separate TO&E floating craft detachments were relieved from attachment to the 11th Transportation Battalion and attached to the 125th Transportation Command (Tmil A). This action was taken in conjunction with the impending reorganization because: (a) the floating craft are physically located in Saigon Port and operate in the Saigon Port complex under the operation control of the 4th Transportation Command Harbormaster; (b) the detachment headquarters element and the 28 TOE units will be formed into a provisional harbor craft company; (c) it places the unit in much closer proximity to its parent headquarters, thereby easing the burdens associated with administration, logistics, and control; and (d) it tends to equalize the span of control for each battalion size element.

n. During the month of April three vessels, LT 1952, 100-foot tug; and ST 2111 and ST 2120, 65-foot tugs, scheduled for annual overhaul, had to be postponed for an undetermined period of time. With a total of four 65-foot tugs and one 100-foot tug presently in shipyard for annual overhaul, the requirements for tugs in the command has necessitated that tugs scheduled for annual be postponed until some in shipyard return.

o. At the end of the current reporting period the 4th Transportation Command is at 72% of its officer, 89% of its warrant officer and 74% of its enlisted personnel authorized strength. A breakout by command is shown in the table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>Auth</th>
<th>Asgd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>WO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC 4th TC</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125th TC</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det #1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71st Bn</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Bn</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159th Bn</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det 511 &amp; 783</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation Command for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)

p. Since the last reporting period the Mortuary and the Movements Control Center have been reassigned from the HHC of the 4th Transportation Command.

q. Civilian Personnel: The current number of civilian personnel authorized and employed is as follows:

(1) DA Civilians:
(a) Authorized 1
(b) Pending Authorization 2
(c) Assigned 3

(2) Local Nationals:
(a) Authorized 1746
(b) Assigned 1358

r. The decrease in the number of serious incidents and AWOLs and the reports from the Character Guidance/Morale Councils, suggest a noted improvement in troop morale. Another factor attesting to this is the rise in the command reenlistment rate and extensions of tours in Vietnam.

s. Church attendance and number of services held during the reporting period were 7,527 and 452 respectively. Each of the five chaplains assigned have been actively engaged in extensive civic action projects varying from construction of churches and homes, to providing food and clothing to those deserving displaced Vietnamese.

t. (1) During the period February - April 1969 the command's accident rate declined considerably. The average rate for the period covered was 3.4 for motor vehicle accidents and 25.0 for disabling injuries per million miles driven.

(2) The decrease in the command's accident rate to a level below expectancy can be attributed to the continued stress on safe driving through information letters, bulletins and posters which are published and distributed to all units. Safety publications such as "Lessons Learned" bulletins are read to troops to provide them with factual information as to cause of all accidents and the means to avoid recurrences.

(3) The timely reporting of all types of accidents by safety personnel from units and work sites is strictly enforced. Information received pertaining to any serious accident is maintained on file for statistical
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation Command for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)

purposes and the facts are used in the accident prevention program to prepare "Lessons Learned" information bulletins.

(4) The command's safety program also included a safety award program which provides an incentive to personnel to drive and operate boats and equipment in a safe manner.

u. The R&R Program has continued at about the same pace during this period. While the command has more people requesting R&R (out of country) than quotas received, only 90% are utilized. This stems from the over-subscription for the more desirable areas, i.e., Australia and Hawaii. The in-country R&R quotas range from 4 to 6 per month and are always used. The initiation of Project Ton Trong (Pride First) has stirred a considerable interest because the winning units, those with the least offenses during a month, are eligible to send 20 men per month for a 3 day "in-country" pass to Vung Tau to be hosted by the 159th Transportation Battalion.

v. Construction at Newport continued throughout the quarter.

(1) The waterline to Newport was completed on 21 March 1969. Construction of the water tower footing commenced and installation of chlorinator line test, and activation of the water system, at city pressure 28 PSI, by-passing the incomplete water tank, is scheduled for late April.

(2) The Newport highway interchange grading, paving and fencing was almost completed during the reporting period. The Newport traffic plan has been revised in accordance with the new roads and the entire project should be completed in early May.

(3) During the period 2-inch exterior lighting conduit was observed to have shifted from 3 feet below the ground to above the ground in many places throughout USAT Newport. Due to the area being all filled land, the heavy loads carried over road and yard areas caused this conduit to rise. Efforts are being made to re-bury the conduit and secure it. Hopefully, with the new roads, further stabilisation will occur and this problem will correct itself.

(4) Also noted during the period was the deterioration of the underground telephone cable. Repeated leaks and breaks in the cable resulted in the 69th Signal Bn plan to abandon the underground phone cable and install 300 telephone pairs into Newport on poles.

w. Considerable change in the appearance of the command was noted during the reporting period. Starting with a massive clean-up program, instigated by the CG, USAUSPACOM, Saigon, all areas were freed of accumulations of trash. Various shacks and unsightly structures were demolished and painting of buildings was accomplished.
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x. A study of cargo cleared to inland points and trans-shipped to in-country destinations was made covering the period Feb - April 1969. The study showed the following consignee distribution of cargo passing through Newport:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Area</th>
<th>Total Short Tons</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long Binh</td>
<td>90,132</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECMA 206, Long Binh</td>
<td>20,958</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu Duc (RMK)</td>
<td>18,042</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa AB</td>
<td>18,930</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>13,164</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td>10,536</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>171,762</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

y. Equipment deadlines continued to hamper port operations at Newport. At one point only two forklifts were available to work a ship a deep-draft berth 4 and only three available at deep-draft berth 1. The loss of all 40-ton cranes required adjustment of the backloading of the Seafarist Puerto Rico. The terminal was required to substitute 170 pieces of equipment weighing 10 short tons or less for the many heavier pieces booked for the ship. Lease of forklifts from the stevedore contractor allowed cargo operations to continue, though at a reduced pace.

z. The number of ships, craft and barges handled at Newport showed an overall decrease from previous periods. The only increase was in barges backloaded caused by increased retrograde vehicles loaded at Newport for ships berthed in Saigon.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug - Oct 68</th>
<th>Nov 68 - Jan 69</th>
<th>Feb - Apr 69</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disch</td>
<td>Backload</td>
<td>Disch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deep-Draft Ships</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSTs</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCU/LCMs</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barges</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation Command for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)

aa. Cargo tonnage handled during the period was up 24,824 short tons from the previous quarter. Although for half the period the two military deep-draft berths were down in tonnage because of personnel shortages, a series of ships carrying full loads of cement and asphalt helped increase tonnage handled. Also noted during the period was a large influx of vehicles and equipment consigned to ARVN. One discharge record was set when the stevedore contractor off-loaded 3,375 short tons of cement with 6 gangs over a ten-hour period from a single ship, and an all-time monthly record was established in March when a total of 189,727 short tons was handled.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discharge</th>
<th>Backload</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>149,787</td>
<td>39,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>133,279</td>
<td>37,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>128,577</td>
<td>35,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>411,643</td>
<td>112,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>171,292</td>
<td>28,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>129,938</td>
<td>37,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>163,431</td>
<td>24,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34,641</td>
<td>100,324</td>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>155,603</td>
<td>34,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>116,122</td>
<td>30,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>233,872</td>
<td>24,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40,598</td>
<td>99,340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes 41,137 short tons discharged and 1,319 short tons loaded to ammo barges. This function performed by 402nd Transportation Company was transferred from 71st Transportation Battalion to 11th Transportation Battalion on 15 April 1969.

bb. The existing pass control system and identification of local nationals is continually under evaluation to measure effectiveness and detect shortcomings. Pass control for direct hire employees and daily hire personnel is effective. Emphasis has been placed on having other personnel (i.e., representatives of shipping lines agents, river pilots, and contractor employees) obtain permanent passes, thus decreasing the
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need for recurring temporary passes. There is some reluctance on the part of these individuals to make out the necessary applications; however, progress is evident in this area.

cc. Assistance was given to the 18th Military Police Brigade for a physical security class of 32 enlisted men. Orientation on physical security in port areas was given. Included was a tour, both of land facilities and water ways, to enhance understanding of the peculiar requirements that exist in port and waterway security.

dd. Examination of gate logs revealed that a variety of locally printed forms, blank paper and journal books were being utilized. A standard form was designed for this purpose and processed for a form control number. This form is now in use at all installations of the 4th Transportation Command.

ee. A training program was prepared for security guard personnel assigned to Camp Davies. This program consisted of 48 hours of instruction and practical exercises intended to better qualify those personnel. Upon completion of this course, the personnel formed the nucleus of the security guard force. Training continues for the security guard platoon on an OJT and in-service basis.

ff. The monitoring of physical security surveys, inspections and visits, and crime prevention surveys has enabled the Provost Marshal to better assist the units of this command in scheduling follow-up surveys and inspections. Additionally, the frequency of inspections and deficiencies noted on each inspection resulting from this close monitoring have more clearly shown areas requiring emphasis. This pinpointing of areas for emphasis has been of decided value, considering the various headquarters and units performing physical security surveys, inspections and visits on installations of the command.

gg. A traffic survey was made at Camp Davies. Results of this survey indicated that certain changes in traffic flow and control measures were required. A circulation and control plan was formulated which better served the present organization of Camp Davies. New traffic signs were constructed and are being installed. A smoother, more realistic flow pattern for traffic will result from these changes.

hh. Command policy on issue, control and handling of weapons, together with pertinent requirements which must be accomplished when a weapon is lost, stolen or recovered or when the unauthorized discharge of a weapon occurs were published as 4th Transportation Command Circular 190-1. This circular also contains a comprehensive list of regulations, letters and other correspondence dealing with weapons and their control. Its use should prove to be a definite aid to subordinate unit commanders.
The density of rough terrain forklift trucks assigned to the command increased during the quarter from 30 to 57. Ten of these are due to the attachment of the 159th Transportation Battalion; the balance of the increase results from release of 10,500 lb. converted scoop loaders as substitutes for the 10,000 lb. rough terrain forklift. Issue of the scoop loader substitute has been sufficient to fill prior shortages and replace wash-outs in the DOG program. At present only 26 of the 52 6,000 lb. rough terrain forklifts authorized are on hand. For commercial forklift trucks, the density has decreased from 186 to 175 on hand, with 254 pieces authorized. The major shortages are in 4,000 lb. electric forklifts which decreased only one in density to 28 but remain 20 below the 48 authorization. For 6,000 lb. GED forklifts, density decreased by 12 to 35 against an authorization of 65. The decreases in density resulted from wash-out action without compensating issue of replacements.

The status of 40-ton crawler cranes has become critical with the increased retrograde workload (See paragraph y). The command previously was authorized six of these cranes, one per terminal service company organized under TOE 55-117D. Four companies under the G series TOE and one was deactivated and replaced by a terminal transfer company, resulting in a decreased authorization for 40 ton cranes to only one. Three of these cranes remain assigned, but only one against tabular authority. The requirement exists for five 40 ton cranes, which have been included in the proposed TDA for USAT, Newport to support the heavy lifts for the retrograde workload.

The deadline rate for commercial forklifts remained slightly above the MACV tolerance level of 20 percent during most of the reporting period, ranging from 21 to 24 percent during the quarter. The rough terrain forklift deadline rate increased 10 percent in January to 29 percent in April, as a result of a large number of these items being nominated for wash-out action. "DOGS" that require continual repair and for which repair parts are not available are retrograded as rapidly as possible. Significant maintenance manhours have been saved by early discovery of those that qualify as a "DOGS". On-site technical inspections by field maintenance personnel to declare them as retrograde have eliminated the requirement to perform organization maintenance normally required in preparing them for field maintenance. Another step taken to improve the forklift maintenance posture has been accomplished by conducting operator classes. During the period 3 March to 5 April 1969, a field technician from the US Army Mobility Equipment Command conducted operator and operator maintenance classes on the newly introduced 10,500 lb. rough terrain scoop loader-forklift. A total of 42 military personnel and 22 Vietnamese Nationals graduated from these classes.

The Port Steward's Office of Detachment #3 has completed five months operation of supplying their harborcraft subsistence under the monetary ration allowance system. This system was initiated on 1 Dec 68.
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and programmed for a trial period of six months, after which time a complete report analyzing its effectiveness will be submitted to the Food Service Center, Chicago, Illinois, requesting continuance or disestablishment of the system. Two quarterly audits of the ration account have revealed that the monetary system meets the needs of the harborcraft better than any other system employed in Vietnam. The audits also revealed that Detachment #3 has accumulated a considerable rations savings that can be returned to the vessels in the form of more desirable and wider variety of food items. Problems areas encountered are attributed primarily to the fact that Detachment #3 is the first unit in Vietnam to supply harborcraft subsistence under the monetary allowance system. This, coupled with operating personnel being inexperienced in the system, has resulted in under-issues, inaccurate inventories, and weak accounting procedures. These problem areas are being decreased as experience is gained in operating the system. A recent liaison visit to the 159th Transportation Battalion revealed that their current ration procedures using the field ration system is not meeting the needs of their harborcraft. This is due primarily to the fact that their present system was not designed to support harborcraft. Representatives from the 159th Transportation Battalion have visited and observed Detachment #3 procedures and have shown an interest in establishing the same type of system for the 159th Battalion craft. Based on recommendations put forth by the command's Food Advisor and the experience factors developed by Detachment #3, the 159th Transportation Battalion is scheduled to convert to the monetary ration allowance system on 25 May 1969.

The following are the Organizational Changes that occurred within the command during the reporting period. See Inclosure #2 Organizational Chart.

(1) On the 1st of March 1969, Detachment #5 (Provisional), 4th Transportation Command (Terminal C) was organized and assigned to this command for operating and maintaining post, camp and station facilities at Camp Davies, RVN. A copy of 4th Transportation Command, General Order #6 is attached as Inclosure #3.

(2) US Army Support Command, Saigon General Order #310 on 29 March 1969, reassigned the following units to this command:

- 440th Transportation Company (Terminal Transfer)
- 140th Transportation Detachment (Team JR)
- 256th Transportation Detachment (Team JB)
- 563rd Transportation Detachment (Team JB)

General Order #310 is attached as Inclosure #4.
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(3) US Army Support Command, Saigon General Order # 311 published on 29 March 1969, reassigned the following units to this command:

- Detachment #2, US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam (Provisional)
- Detachment #2A, US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam (Provisional)
- 5th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat)
- 231st Transportation Company (Medium Boat)
- 329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat)
- 544th Transportation Company (Medium Boat)
- Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 159th Transportation Battalion (Tml)
- 34th Transportation Platoon (Heavy Boat)
- 474th Transportation Detachment (Reefer Barge)
- 487th Transportation Detachment (Reefer Barge)
- 488th Transportation Detachment (Reefer Barge)
- 492nd Transportation Detachment (Reefer Barge)
- 504th Transportation Detachment (Reefer Barge)

General Order #311, USASUPCOM is attached as Inclosure # 5.

(4) US Army Support Command, Saigon General Order # 339 published on 3 April 1969, assigned the 634th Transportation Detachment (Tug) to this Command.

(5) During the past reporting period, US Army Mortuary (HQ, USASUPCOM, SAIGON) was detached from this command, per US Army Support Command, Saigon General Order # 319 published on 31 March 1969.

(6) US Army Support Command, Saigon General Order # 340 published on 3 April 1969, assigned the following units to this Command:

- 58th Adjutant General Detachment (Army Postal Unit) (Type U)
- 508th Adjutant General Detachment (Army Postal Unit) (Type V)

Further attached to 125th Transportation Command per General Order # 15 this headquarters dated 28 April 1969, which is attached as Inclosure # 6.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation Command for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)

(7) With the reassignment of Units mentioned in paragraphs (2), (3) and (5) above, the 4th Transportation Command assumed the mission of operating the USAT Vung Tau, sub ports at Dong Tam, Binh Thuy, and Vinh Long, and maintaining inland waterway systems in IV CTZ. The 159th Transportation Battalion has been assigned operational control of all 4th Transportation Command units operating at Vung Tau and in the Delta. See General Order #8, 9 and 11 attached as Inclosure # 7.

(8) During the reporting period to consolidate the ammunition system within this command, the 402nd Transportation Company (TT) with subordinate detachments was detached from the 71st Transportation Battalion (Tml) and attached to the 11th Transportation Battalion (Tml). See General Order #10 this headquarters attached as Inclosure # 8.

(9) Effective 15 April 1969, Detachment #3, TD Augmentation unit to the 4th Transportation Command P5 WCJ 19901 (Marine Service Activity) was released from attached 11th Transportation Battalion and attached to the 125th Transportation Command (Tml A).

2. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) ITEM: The levying of personnel who were assigned in unauthorized Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) to fill critical personnel shortfalls.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the last reporting period the strength of this command was reduced to a point where it was necessary for higher commands to divert personnel as fillers in unauthorized MOS. The result was very successful as immediate action was taken to train these fillers to make them proficient as mechanics, equipment operators, stevedores, etc. However, in recent weeks these personnel have been subject to levies by "HAP" and are being reassigned with minimum advance notice.

(b) EVALUATION: Since the flow of replacements is still inadequate to meet this command's needs, it has created a severe hardship to pull these qualified personnel out of their jobs. Normally requests for reclassification action to a new MOS would have been submitted; however, there are restrictions placed by DA in reclassifying personnel in a shortage MOS (primarily 11B in this case) which most of these diverted personnel were carrying as a primary MOS. Unless these personnel are promoted, and subsequently reclassified, there is no way to reclassify the personnel involved.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: When it becomes necessary to assign personnel with shortage MOS not authorized within a command it is recommended that after 30 days on-the-job they be stabilized for the period of time required to bring the command up to the level of strength necessary to accomplish its mission.

(2) ITEM: Excessive delays and difficulties are experienced in accomplishing essential reorganization and reallocation of personnel assets.

(a) OBSERVATION: An inordinate amount of time is required to justify and obtain approval to reorganize units in this theater. A minimum of 12 to 18 months elapse between the time a MTCG or MTA is submitted and final approval or disapproval of the requested change is received. A typical example of the time lag involved is the MTCG for a solely required marine maintenance element which this headquarters submitted 9 September 1968 and which, as of 16 April 1969, had not yet left the theater. The situation is further compounded by antiquated authorization documents which contain the technical service organizational concept as opposed to the O" concept of functionalization. This headquarters is organized under one of these documents, TCP 55-1110. A chaotic situation is created in trying to reassign assets authorized under this document to accomplish the mission. Many of the technical services
positions are not required, and as such, are not filled. The implementa-
tion of Program 5/6 Civilization added to the chaos by designating specific
nonessential technical service positions to be civilianized.

(b) EVALUATION: The procedures to accomplish required reorganizations
under a constantly changing combat situation are far too cumbersome and slow,
and have an overall adverse effect on the efficiency of operations at all
levels of command in this theater of operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That authority be vested in USAF or MAC to ap-
prove essential reorganizations in this theater within established personnel
ceilings. Subsequent to approval, necessary documentation related to approved
reorganizations can be forwarded to DA as revisions to the Army force structure.

3) ITEM: Military Police/Security Guard Personnel

(a) OBSERVATION: The quality of personnel provided by the direct support
military police units is generally excellent. The quantity of personnel pro-
vided, however, has been less than required for necessary security in port
areas. The direct support military police unit has advised that the personnel
strength, particularly within the Infantry MOS used for security guards, has
dropped, and sufficient replacements are not being received. A mutual concern
in this area exists, and both the direct support unit and port security off-
icers are evaluating commitments to insure each is a definite need and is not
just nice to have. Efficient use of personnel is being exercised.

(b) EVALUATION: Port security is maintained at an acceptable level.
Military police/security guard personnel are provided on shifts of 12 hours,
7 days a week, and little time remains to afford additional time off. This
fact has not reduced the individual's efficiency to any apparent extent. How-
ever, present indications are that the personnel shortage will continue to
present a problem which may become worse, and this will have an effect event-
ually on efficiency.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That military police units providing direct support
to port facilities be maintained at a strength level sufficient to meet the
security personnel requirements existing in port installations.

b. Operations:

(1) ITEM: To develop cost per revenue ton for various commodities dis-
rached from a ship by a military unit and compare these costs with the stoe-
dores contractor commodity rate to determine the most economical manpower
source for discharge or loading of ships.

(a) OBSERVATIONS: A study of this subject was made at the request of
AVC: SGN TC GCPT

10 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation Command for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)

CG, USASUPCOM, Saigon. Following is a summary of military versus contractor cost per ton by commodity:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Mil. cost per ton</th>
<th>Cont. cost per ton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>$3.64</td>
<td>$.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boats</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile cranes</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) EVALUATION: For all commodities except vehicles, tanks, boats and other heavy lift items, the contractor commodity rate is cheaper than the military cost to discharge the same commodities.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That vehicles and heavy lift items be discharged by military personnel when possible and the contractor commodity rate for heavy lifts and vehicles be revised downward during next contractor negotiations.

(2) ITEM: Rapid discharge of LSTs can be accomplished providing the loading port stows the cargo and vehicles to expedite off-loading.

(a) OBSERVATION: LSTs 47 thru 491 are equipped with elevators that are very slow. When heavy vehicles are placed on the weather deck of these LSTs, the tank deck must be cleared prior to discharge of the weather deck. However, if heavy vehicles are placed in the tank deck and 1 ton vehicles, 3/4 ton vehicles, small trailers, and boxed TAT are placed on the weather deck they can be discharged with 20-ton cranes at the side of the LST simultaneously with the discharge of the tank over the bow ramp.

(b) EVALUATION: The above method is the fastest method of discharge and requires loading ports knowledge of receiving ports discharge capabilities.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Port Facilities Guides be widely publicized and used in order that loading port can expedite the discharge at the receiving port.

(3) ITEM: Unit moves must be carefully coordinated not only regarding tides, port capability and highway transport but also care must be taken to insure that convoys can close in destination and return to their base camp during daylight hours.

(a) OBSERVATION: When troops are to be convoys from ships arriving at
Newport, the trucks are usually supplied by the 168th Highway Transport Group. With a late ship arrival i.e., 1400–1500 it could be difficult for the 168th Group vehicles to arrive at destination and return to their home base at Long Binh prior to road closure caused by the insecurity of roads after sundown.

(b) EVALUATION: Planning for troop movements must take into consideration all facets of the movement, to include arming of convoys and special protective measures, prior to decision to dock and debar from ships.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That full coordination be effected prior to discharge scheduling for troop moves inland.

(5) ITEM: Careful study of overhead road clearance between ports and principle consignees is required if trucking tonnage capability is to be fully utilized.

(a) OBSERVATION: With the introduction of 20-ton Philco–Ford trailers into the highway capability for port clearance it was found that the 20-ton capacity was not being fully utilized. Study of the highway between Newport and the receiver of 65 percent of the port's cargo (Long Binh) showed that there was no overhead obstructions to prevent double stacking Class I packages, beer and beverages. Philco-Ford had no objection to double stacking provided there was no double stack immediately behind the cab for safety reasons. With this information Newport started, on 10 January 1969, to load an additional 4 to 6 pallets per 20-ton trailer. Each extra pallet weighed almost one ton thus increasing the load an average 5 ton.

(b) EVALUATION: Through the end of February an additional 2568 extra pallets weighing about 2568 short tons were loaded double deck on Philco–Ford 20-ton trailers. With normal loading of 12 pallets per 20-ton trailer 1/9 extra trailers would have been required to move the double decked cargo.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units closely scrutinize overhead clearances enroute to prime consignees in order that maximum height and weight can be loaded for full carrier utilization and resultant cost savings to the US Government.

(5) ITEM: Movement of cargo by rail.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the last quarter rail tonnage showed a 557 increase over the previous quarter. This was an increase of 7,736 short tons over the amount shipped during the preceding quarter. This large increase is a direct result of the following factors.

1. An increased amount of cargo was available for movement by rail from port (e.g., steel, lumber, asphalt, wire and cement).
SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation Command for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS GSPR-65)

2. Command emphasis was placed on loading techniques to insure maximum utilization of available railcar assets.

(b) EVALUATION: The major factor in determining tonnage to be shipped by the rail mode is available rail-compatible cargo. Another factor is the availability of railcar assets. The types of cargoes shipped during the last quarter were of the following packing types:

a. Bundle or pre-banded
b. Roll or drum
c. Containerized or sheet

Of the above, 82% of the cargo shipped during this period was on flatcar assets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an increased amount of flatcars be placed into the Vietnamese Railway System. It is estimated that from 30 to 50 extra flatcars are required.

c. Training - none
d. Intelligence - none
e. Logistics:

(1) ITEM: Observations of cargo by security guards.

(a) OBSERVATION: The security of cargo awaiting clearance from pier areas is a constant problem. It was noted that a security guard would have increased visibility over the cargo and better control of the area if he were to be raised 20-30 feet into the air. It was impractical to construct permanent, fixed towers in the pier area, so consideration was directed toward a mobile platform or tower. Initial discussion with design and engineer personnel indicated that a fabricated tower placed on a 14-ton trailer for mobility would be possible.

(b) EVALUATION: Evaluation of use cannot be made at this date. A blueprint drawing has been completed for the trailer-mounted tower, to include provision for a self-contained generator to operate hand-held spot lights. Actual construction of a mobile tower is necessary.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That one mobile tower as designed in prepared blueprints be constructed for use by security guards in pier areas.
ITEM: Shortage of lashing gear for retrograde operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the quarter, increasing difficulty has been experienced in obtaining lashing gear, both for securing retrograde cargo and for barge tie down. Shortages of all types of lashing gear now exist. Formerly, the primary source of lashing gear was that which was aboard incoming ships, but the increased use of palletized cargo has greatly reduced this source. Quantities to meet current operating levels plus contingency reserves are on requisition but requisition fills have been insufficient to meet even adequate current operating levels.

(b) EVALUATION: Only through juggling available resources between the terminals and constant checking of depot stocks throughout Vietnam has this command been able to meet each of its retrograde requirements. A total of 170 requisitions have been passed from units of this command to the ICCV. On 12 March 1969 a liaison visit to the ICC revealed that three options were studied in an endeavor to solve the lashing gear problem which exists at all the ports within South Vietnam. First option is procurement from CONUS. This would entail at least a 9 month lead time. Second option is to have PSTS ship sufficient lashing gear to cover retrograde requirements. Third option is to locally procure substitute items.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Continue follow up action on existing requisition with SSC and 1st Log Comd.

ITEM: Maintenance manhour savings in processing forklift turn-in.

(a) OBSERVATION: Wash-out action has been initiated on many forklifts after they have been accepted by field maintenance. This resulted in a waste of man hours that were required to ready the equipment for support maintenance. To prevent wasting these man hours, work requests were submitted to field maintenance for classification. Maintenance contact teams would then inspect the forklifts on site and make a determination to repair or initiate wash-out action. Every forklift thus designated for wash-out saved many man hours that would have been spent preparing it for field maintenance. An arrangement was also made with the collection and classification activity to turn these forklifts directly into the retrograde yard located at Newport Terminal. Prior to this, the equipment had to be trucked to the Long Binh collection and classification yard and returned by that activity at a later date to the Newport retrograde yard for shipment out-of-country.

(b) EVALUATION: Classification of forklifts on site by field maintenance contact teams and direct turn-in for wash-out equipment into the Newport retrograde yard has resulted in a saving of maintenance man hours. In addition, transportation requirements were lessened by not requiring washed-out forklifts.
10 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation Command for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS 05/28/69)

to make the trip to the Long Binh retrograde yard which is over ten miles distance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: On-site classification of forklifts and delivery of those selected for wash-out directly to the retrograde yard at Newport be continued in order to save valuable maintenance man hours and transportation.

(4) ITEM: Delay of vessel shipyard repairs.

(a) OBSERVATION: The excessive amount of time vessels spend in shipyard for annual overhaul and repair has caused operational difficulties. The delays in pickup and delivery time are also excessive and greatly add to the overall time vessels are not available for use. Some vessels have spent over a year in shipyard for annual overhaul. It has not been uncommon for a vessel to wait three months for tow to or from shipyard.

(b) EVALUATION: Because of these delays shipyard overhaul schedules cannot be met. Vessels scheduled for annual overhaul must be kept in country until a replacement vessel returns from shipyard. Thus, continual deferment of scheduled overhaul will result in increased vessel deterioration. This causes unscheduled, lengthier and more costly repairs.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: Set times, within realistic guidelines, must be made for the amount of time each type vessel spends in shipyard, and every effort made to keep within the time frame. This will result in an annual vessel overhaul schedule that can be met, resulting in smoother operations and fewer costly repairs.

OWEN J. WALSH
Colonel, TC
Commanding
AVCA, SGN GO S (30 April 1969) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Transportation Command for Period Ending 30 April 1969. (1) CSFOU-65 (HI)

HI, US Army Support Command, Saigon, AIO US Forces 96491

1 JUN 1969

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO 0 /10 96384

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 4th Transportation Command for the Period Ending 30 April 1969 is forwarded in accordance with NTC 525-15.

2. Reference Section 1, page 5, paragraph 1.m. CONCUM. The expeditious repair of floating craft is a matter of command interest at both this headquarters and 1st Logistical Command. The 1st Logistical Command is working with 2d Logistical Command and USACAOC in an effort to expedite repairs on vessels in the shipyard and to establish a program which will provide the shortest possible turnaround time. As an intermediate solution, additional contract help in the Saigon area is being requested for the establishment of a second in-country overhaul facility. If approved, this will greatly reduce the time a vessel is lost to the using unit.

3. Reference Section 1, page 7, paragraph 1.v. (1). CONCUM. The waterline to new port is in and functioning effective 17 May. Further chlorine residual tests will continue to be conducted through 24 May.

4. Reference Section 1, page 7, paragraph 1.v. (2). CONCUM. The highway interchange was officially opened 17 May.

5. Reference Section 1, page 7, paragraph 1.v. (3). CONCUM. FAB is re-burying the conduit. If the stabilization mentioned does not in fact occur, 4th TC intends to request an overload distribution system be installed.

6. Reference Section 2, page 15, paragraph 1.a. (1). CONCUM. The types of personnel referred to were primarily Combat Arms. While a period of stabilization after OJT would be desirable, it is recognized that combat units have priority over support units. In the future, when personnel of this type are levied on short notice, USACAOC, SGN recommends that the flow of replacements be increased to compensate for these losses.

7. Reference Section 2, page 16, paragraph 2.a. (3). CONCUM. Obviously "austerity" is the name of the game when viewing the personnel picture. However, a potential problem has been identified. One can only limp for a limited period of time before the other foot gives out and this is what will happen to port security if an effective manning level of physical security personnel is not maintained. This has been brought to the attention of 1st Logistical Command via letter signed by Chief of Staff, USACAOC, SGN.

8. Reference Section 2, page 17, paragraph 2.b. (2). CONCUM. A Port Facilities Guide is published and distributed by LST - Far East and includes all RVN forts. 1st Log Comd also is in the process of publishing a Port Facilities Guide for RVN Ports. The Dir of Trans, USACAOC, SGN will approach 1st Log and request they include in their Guide some guidance concerning loading and discharge of the older, elevator type, LSTs.
9. Reference Section 2, page 17, paragraph 2.b. (3). CONCUR. The return of 48th Group trucks to home base each evening, no matter what the mission, is of utmost importance to the following day's capability and is very closely monitored by S-3, 48th Group, MCC and this Hq. Special emphasis is placed on troop moves, especially vessel debarkation. Since this type move is infrequent and usually of high command interest, full and exacting coordination must be made prior to discharge.

10. Reference Section 2, page 18, paragraph 2.b. (4). CONCUR. This observation will effect a substantial cost savings and will be passed to 3rd Trans Center (NC) for close monitoring and maximum dissemination to all shipping points to insure maximum utilization of contractor vehicles.

11. Reference Section 2, page 18, paragraph 2.b. (5). CONCUR. A continuing effort is being made to increase rail utilization. A meeting is planned with TMA in an attempt to make more rail cars available when rail compatible cargo is at ports for movement.

12. Reference Section 2, page 19, paragraph 2.e. (1). CONCUR. Construction of the mobile tower is being directed to the 4th Trans Command as a self-help project.

13. Reference Section 2, page 20, paragraph 2.e. (2). CONCUR. Lashing Gear is becoming increasingly critical. Dir of Supply this headquarters has been working toward obtaining this material.

14. Reference Section 2, page 20, paragraph 2.e. (3). CONCUR. This not only constituted a maintenance manhour savings, but resulted in considerable savings in transportation and abuse to equipment thus eliminating double handling that would have resulted through turn-in at Long Binh. Continuation of this practice should be encouraged.

15. Reference Section 2, page 21, paragraph 2.e. (4). CONCUR. The Long vessel delay in the shipyard has a definite adverse effect on command capability. The shipyard maintenance program is monitored by Dir of Maint.

16. Lessons Learned, observations and recommendations are concurred in by this command, with the exceptions above. A copy of this endorsement has been provided the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LB 2604
AVCA GO-ME (30 April 69) 2nd Ind


DA: Headquarters 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 26 JUN 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 is forwarded.

2. Perinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Levying Personnel Assigned in Unauthorized MOS, page 15, paragraph 2 a (1). Nonconcurs. The personnel in question are primarily 11B (infantryman) who were assigned when an overstrength in this MOS existed throughout USARV. Because of a change in the strength posture, it became necessary to reassign these individuals, after 60 or 90 days on the job, back to infantry units where they could be utilized in their PMOS. However, USARV increased the assignment of replacements to this command to offset these losses. These replacements were in the required MOS in most cases, resulting in a minimal loss of time due to training. There was no noticeable decline in the assigned strength of the command due to the losses mentioned.

b. Reference item concerning Delay in Processing Authorization Documents, page 15, paragraph 2 a (2). Nonconcurs. Time frame for processing of authorization documents is 6-9 months. Minimum processing time can be achieved if subordinate commands prepare and process documents in accordance with existing regulations. The MTOE for the marine maintenance element was determined to be duplication of existing capabilities and was returned to the unit without action.

The 4th Trans Command is currently in the process of a complete reorganization that will involve the establishment of TDA organizations rather than TOE units. While authorization documents cannot be processed rapidly enough to keep up with the changing tactical situation, most required changes are of a temporary nature and could be resolved through redistribution of command resources rather than through the long term MTOE/TDA process.

The recommendation that authorization documents be approved at a level lower than DA is not feasible. While this process might prove acceptable from the personnel standpoint, the high dollar value of most equipment requires planning and budgeting at DA level or higher.

c. Reference item concerning Military Police/Security Guard Personnel, page 16, paragraph 2 a (3). Nonconcurs. This situation is due to a temporary shortage of replacements. A reply was forwarded to the unit concerned by this headquarters, informing it that HQ, USARV was aware of the problem.
Replacements for personnel lost through normal attrition will be made by U.S. ARV as personnel are made available, and greater numbers of infantry personnel will be available this month with priority of replacements going to the 4th Transportation Command units.

d. Reference item concerning Cost of Discharge or Loading of Ships, page 16, paragraph 2 b (1). Concur with recommendation to utilize military personnel to discharge heavy lifts and vehicles whenever possible. Nonconcur with recommendation to renegotiate contract. Procurement Agency personnel continually strive to award contracts at the lowest possible cost to the government. Contracts in force are also monitored to determine if cost reductions are possible. When contracts are let, every effort is made to award each contract to the most responsible and responsive low bidder.

e. Reference item concerning Rapid Discharge of LST's, page 17, paragraph 2 b (2). Concur. To provide assistance in this area, the 1st Logistical Command Terminal Service Guide will be published and will be given widest possible distribution.

f. Reference item concerning Coordination of Unit Moves, page 17, paragraph 2 b (3). Concur with recommendation that coordination for moves inland must be accomplished prior to the scheduling of troop discharge from a ship. This requirement should be made a part of the moves activity SOP or policy file as a matter to be considered when motor transport requirements involve night convoys. Transportation movement control offices can best coordinate the ship's arrival in port with that of wheeled vehicle requirements to prevent a convoy traveling at night unless the situation warrants it. Then necessary security of RON arrangements must be considered by appropriate commanders.

g. Reference item concerning Study of Overhead Road Clearance, page 18, paragraph 2 b (4). Concur with comments and actions in paragraph 10 of 1st Indorsement.

h. Reference item concerning Movement of Cargo by Rail, page 18, paragraph 2 b (5). Concur with proposed action set forth in paragraph 11 of 1st Indorsement. Although flat cars are in short supply and are being used to the fullest, coordination with TMA and WMS should provide additional rolling stock suitable to ease the shortage being experienced.

i. Reference item concerning Shortage of Lashing Gear for Retrograde Operations, page 20, paragraph 2 e (2). Concur. Obtaining lashing gear is a recognized problem area and is receiving attention at this headquarters. No large quantities of lashing gear are on hand at the depots and in the
26 JUN 1969


In the past it has had a small RO. The ICGV is in the process of standardizing lashing gear and obtaining requirements from all commands on that basis. In the past the ICGV was receiving many requisitions for lashing gear that was no longer in the supply system. Once the requirements have been consolidated into the standardized gear the problem should be eliminated.

j. Reference item concerning Maintenance Manhour Savings in Processing Forklift turn in, page 20, paragraph 2 e (3). Concur. Due to the proximity of equipment to the Newport retrograde yard this practice has saved manhours but should be limited to special situations and is not applicable to all equipment or all locations.

k. Reference item concerning Delay of Vessel Shipyard Repairs, page 21, paragraph 2 e (4). Concur. This Headquarters has made this a special item of interest and several actions have been initiated to improve the program. These actions include a survey of in-country dry-dock facilities to determine adequacy, reevaluation of contracting procedures, and closer liaison with all agencies concerned is being maintained.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: IBN 4839

LANNY K. KELSEY
1Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

CF:
USASUPCOM, SGM
4th Trans Comm
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Transportation Command for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-IV, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command (TML C) and concurs with the report as endorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

A.R. GUENTHER
CPT. AGC
ASST. ADJUTANT GENERAL

Cy furn:
4th Trans Comd.
1st Log Comd.
GPOP-DT (undtd) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Transportation Command (Tm C) for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 5 AUG 19

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

\[Signature\]

C. L. SHORT
CG, AG
Ass: AG
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 4th Transportation Command

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 - 30 Apr 69.

CO, 4th Transportation Command

Undated

32

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C 20310