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AUTHORITY
AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 125th Transportation Command, Period Ending 30 April 1969

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 125TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (TERMINAL A)
APO San Francisco 96307

AVCA-SGN-TC-XA-DO

11 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 125th Transportation Command (Terminal A), for period ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65

THRU: Commanding Officer
4th Transportation Command
ATTN: AVCA SGN TC GGPT
APO 96307

Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Saigon
ATTN: AVCA SGN GO
APO 96491

Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
ATTN: AVCA GO 0
APO 96384

Deputy Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHEC DST
APO 96375

Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GOPP OT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Section I - Significant Organisational Activities

Attached as Inclosure 1 is the current organisational chart of the 125th Transportation Command (Terminal A).

On 30 April 1969 this Command completed the transfer, to USAID, of its mission of advising the Saigon Port Authority. This transfer was originally directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 December 1968. No significant problems occurred during the transition phase and port fluidity has been maintained. The 125th Transportation Command (Tml A) continues to operate the US Army Terminal, Saigon, for OT UT

Inclosure
Subject: Operational Report of the 125th Transportation Command (Terminal A), for period ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSPOR-65

with the responsibility for discharge and port clearance of military and military interest cargo, to include the acceptance and backload of retrograde cargo.

Thirteen mandatory training sessions were conducted during the reporting period. Personnel were engaged in activities concerning the performance of assigned command mission a total of eighty-nine days.

Specific areas of interest during the last quarter:

a. Attachment of Units: During this past quarter, two additional units were attached.

(1) Detachment #3, TD Augmentation Unit to 4th Transportation Command, a 297 man harborcraft unit, was released from attachment to the 11th Transportation Battalion and attached to the 125th Transportation Command. The primary mission of the Detachment is to provide general support to 4th Transportation Command terminal operations and the Saigon - Dong Nai River complex by providing towing (tug), lift (crane), haul (barge) and administration (boat) support, as well as providing tanker support to the Saigon Support Command POL distribution systems in the III and IV Corp Tactical Zones.

(2) Detachment #4, US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam (Prov), a 30 man marine maintenance unit, has been attached to this command for rations, quarters, administration of Military Justice and logistical support.

b. Vessel and Barge Movements:

(1) Vessels are continuing normal movements, during daylight hours, from Cape St. Jacques to Saigon despite occasional harassing enemy fire. The frequency of such fire has increased since the opening of the enemy post-TET offensive on 22 February 1969. Several commercial vessels have sustained casualties and minor damage.

(2) Harborcraft operated by Detachment #3 came under enemy fire on six separate occasions during the quarter. On 15 March 1969, while under tow to the ammunition barge site at Cogido, a small tug, ST-2111, received four rocket hits, injuring two crew members. On 22 March 1969 the same vessel received two rocket hits, injuring one crewman and placing the vessel out of commission. On 22 April 1969 a Y-tanker, Y-66, operating in the Delta, received two rocket hits. One LN civilian crew member was seriously injured with moderate damage to the vessel's gear.

(3) An average discharge and backload time of four days or less for ships entering the Saigon Port has been maintained. The average for March for all types was 2.6 days.

Inclusion
c. During the reporting period several rocket attacks were made in the vicinity of the Saigon Port Complex. On several occasions rockets exploded in the commercial and residential areas surrounding the port and also in the river adjacent to ships at berth. No casualties or damage occurred within the U.S. Army Terminal, Saigon during any of these attacks.

d. Change in Organisational Structure. The 125th Transportation Command, (Terminal A) is currently preparing for a reorganization. Effective 25 May 1969, Headquarters and Headquarters Company 125th Transportation Command, together with Detachment #4, TD Augmentation to 4th Transportation Command (Tail C) is to be reduced to zero strength. These units will be succeeded by a HHD, Transportation Battalion, Saigon (Provisional) whose mission will be essentially the same as that of the 125th Transportation Command. Attached units will consist of the Harborcraft and marine maintenance detachments previously mentioned plus two Transportation Companies (Tail Svc) type B.

e. Construction of Rail Spur. The construction of a new rail spur into the M&H piers, begun during the previous quarter, was completed on 14 February and was placed into service with the loading of refrigerator rail cars with cargo discharged from ships at adjacent piers. The completion of the rail spur has resulted in a substantial reduction in handling costs for those bulk commodities most suitable for shipment by rail. Total tonnage of rail shipment has significantly increased with over 16,000 short tons shipped this quarter. This represents an approximate 60 per cent increase over last quarter's figure.

f. Completion of Training Course. During the quarter this command, in conjunction with the Civilian Training Institute, graduated 7 classes of 82 Local National students who successfully completed a forklift driver's refresher training course. Since these operators had been hired during the period of port congestion in 1966 and had no previous experience, the school provided a valuable review of maintenance, safety, lifting and moving procedures. The value derived from these courses should manifest itself in increased driver proficiency, lower deadline rates and less damage to cargo. The substantial savings resulting should warrant continuation of the program.

g. Civic Action (Project Valentine). As part of the 125th Transportation Command's continuing civic action program, the members of the command played host to 114 children from the Shelter for War Orphans and War Widows at a Pre-Valentine's day party held early in February. This party was the climax of a project called "Operation Valentine", a month long effort by members of the command to paint the class rooms of the shelter and to construct a day care nursery. The 125th Transportation Command has been supporting the shelter with money, clothing and equipment since September 1968. This program has been an excellent means of helping the Vietnamese people and has proven to be invaluable in furthering relations between the local national population and US Army.
Command:

During the quarter a new Deputy Commander was assigned replacing the previous Deputy Commander who was reassigned to another organization within the Saigon Support Command. The following is a list of the Commander and principal Staff officers assigned to this Command as of the end of this reporting period.

COMMANDING OFFICER: COL Ernest A. Hinojosa, Jr.

DEPUTY COMMANDING OFFICER: LTC Crawford D. Russell

DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION: 1LT Dennis M. O'Hara

DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS: LTC Carrol H. Read

DIRECTOR OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES: MAJ Harold W. Cameron

This Command is organized under TOE 55-131E, Augmented.

2. Sections 2 - Commander's Observations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

ITEM: Reduction of Overtime.

OBSERVATION: Since the initiation of a significant build up in 1965 of US Forces in Vietnam, cargo backlogs at the US Army Terminal, Saigon were such that a local national labor force was required 24 hours per day - seven days per week. For reasons not now known the labor force worked a twelve hour day, two shift operation, with most employees working seven days per week. This practice resulted in 36 overtime hours per week for each employee, equalling over half of their pay. Over a period of years employees came to depend upon this overtime pay for their normal living cost and developed the assumption that overtime was a guaranteed job right. Work loads have recently decreased and command emphasis has been placed on the reduction of overtime. All efforts to reduce overtime have been bitterly fought by employees and their labor unions with frequent slowdowns, mass absenteeism, threats of strikes, critical newspaper ads and letters to higher headquarters.

EVALUATION: This situation should have been foreseen at least a year ago and perhaps avoided by originally initiating a three shift operation and rotational day off per week to provide the same work coverage without the excess use of overtime.

RECOMMENDATION: That civilian personnel labor offices continue to monitor the use of overtime and scheduling procedures in developing programs to avoid situations where unwise job rights are assumed through long custom.
b. Operations:

(1) ITEM: Repeat Attacks on Tugboats under Tow.

OBSERVATION: Tugboats are extremely vulnerable to enemy attacks while making the Cat Lai to Cogido run towing trains of barges, running at slow speeds, often close to shore and following predictable schedules.

EVALUATION: Since the schedules are rather inflexible and the mission most essential, maximum protection should be afforded the tugboats while making the Cat Lai - Cogido tow. Protection in the form of defensive armament installed aboard the vessels is presently adequate. Protective armor plating is now being installed on vessels for small arms/fragmentation fires. PBR escorts are afforded, but are marginally effective against surprise attack. Defoliation of river banks and adequate air cover appear to be two areas requiring expansion or exploitation. A friendly force physically occupying and securing the shoreline would provide the most effective security for the craft and the tow.

RECOMMENDATION: That a friendly force of sufficient strength be assigned area responsibility for the security of the shoreline of the river banks and physically occupy the land. Secondly, that air cover be provided the two trains daily. Thirdly, that defoliation of the shoreline be expanded and extended to cover the zone of exposure to fire, particularly where the channel brings the tugboats close to the shoreline.

(2) ITEM: Direct Shipment of Bulk Commodities.

OBSERVATION: In an effort to reduce handling and transportation costs, the US Army Terminal, Saigon has arranged through the Saigon Post Exchange Service for shipment of beer and beverage directly to the ultimate consignee. By careful coordination at the depot level this "through-put" delivery system has also been applied to bulk commodities such as asphalt, cement, tank tracks, etc.

EVALUATION: This practice has proven to be extremely valuable in reducing transportation and handling costs. By the elimination of staging and handling at the depot level, delivery time to consignees is greatly reduced and provides for better utilization of depot storage space.

RECOMMENDATION: That activities at depot and terminal levels examine all major commodities within the supply system in order that maximum utilization be made of this direct shipment program.

(3) ITEM: Inadequate Chill and Freeze Receiving Capabilities.

OBSERVATION: During this reporting period, chill and freeze operations
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 125th Transportation Command (Terminal A), for period ending 30 April 1969 RCS GSPO-65

in the US Army Terminal, Saigon, have been extremely slow due to the inability of the major Class I chill and freeze activities in Saigon to receive. There have been periods in recent weeks when the three local chill and freeze facilities could not receive any cargo. At other times their ability to receive was very limited. Because of this, discharge operations have maintained only forty percent tonnage capability.

EVALUATION: There is a chill and freeze facility under construction at Long Binh which will take over the obligation of receiving facilities in Saigon. It is anticipated that upon opening of this new receiving and issue facility, greater amounts of chill and freeze cargo will be handled through New Port, thus providing some relief for the Saigon facilities.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Class I chill and freeze facility in Long Binh be completed as expeditiously as possible.

(4) ITEM: Control of Contract Truck Demurrage.

OBSERVATION: Prior to January 1969, the US Army Terminal, Saigon had experienced some difficulty in controlling demurrage in the use of commercial contract trucks during night operations. The only times entries were made on the trip ticket were the time the truck arrived for loading and the time the final TC ID was issued. Consequently there were numerous instances when demurrage was accrued and it was almost impossible to determine the cause. There was no way to determine the time lapsed between the arrival of trucks for loading and the time loading was completed or to determine the time lapsed between completed loading and arrival at the documentation point.

EVALUATION: Through the use of a revised trip ticket, the US Army Terminal, Saigon is now able to control the use of contract trucks from the time they arrive for loading until the final TC ID is issued. Entries on the new trip ticket include the time the truck arrived at the loading site, the time loading was completed, and the time the final TC ID was issued. In addition, a "TC ID Time In" entry is made on the work copy and final TC ID to indicate when the loaded truck arrived for documentation. Under this system of truck control, this command has been able to reduce demurrage over the last four month period by eighty-three percent.

RECOMMENDATION: That this system of demurrage control be instituted at all military ocean terminals where commercial truck transportation is used.

(5) ITEM: Use of Machine Generated Preprinted Tally Sheets.

OBSERVATION: During the last month of this quarter, the US Army Terminal, Saigon began using the new machine generated hatch tally sheets prepared from the Ocean Manifest by 4th Transportation Command Cargo Accounting Division.
Previously, the vessel tally sheet (AVCA SGN TC XA Form 225) was used and had to be filled in manually.

EVALUATION: Using the old vessel tally system, all entries were made manually at ship side as the cargo was discharged. For each different commodity and consignee, a total of fifteen entries had to be made in the body of the form. The use of the manual form caused frequent delays in discharging and provided numerous opportunities for errors. The new system of preprinted hatch tallies is complete and no entries are required on the sheet except to count the cargo. The manual vessel tallies are still used for exception tallies, for damaged or pilfered cargo or for cargo not manifested.

RECOMMENDATION: That the machine generated preprinted tally system be continued and employed in all military ocean terminals where practical.

(6) ITEM: Operation During Local Holidays.

OBSERVATION: The Vietnamese Local National direct hire employees were authorized a four day TET holiday during the period 16-19 February 1969. During this holiday all direct hire cargo checkers, forklift operators and documentation clerks did not report for work. Through the emergency use of military supervisory personnel and prior scheduling of contract personnel, operations at the US Army Terminal Saigon continued without a noticeable effect. Non-essential functions were deferred until after the holiday period.

EVALUATION: A realization that direct hire employees could not be prevailed upon to work during this holiday period, coupled with adequate prior planning for the use of military and contract labor prevented what could have been a complete work stoppage in the discharge and port clearance of military cargo.

RECOMMENDATION: That favorable holiday pay clauses in commercial contracts be continued and also incorporated in pay regulations for direct hire personnel.

(7) ITEM: Installation Security and Pilferage Control.

OBSERVATION: Vietnamese and Third Country Nationals operating commercial trucks were wandering through warehouses and storage areas within the port as their trucks were being loaded. This free movement within the port was resulting in an increasing amount of cargo pilferage.

EVALUATION: By the application of a strict policy of requiring these drivers to remain inside or adjacent to their vehicles at all times, there has resulted a significant decrease in the amount of pilferage and larceny within the port.
11 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 125th Transportation Command (Terminal A), for period ending 30 April 1969 AGS CSFOR-65

RECOMMENDATION: That these procedures be rigidly enforced and that local and third country nationals remain under the constant surveillance of armed U.S. Forces personnel.

c. Training: None
d. Intelligence: None
e. Logistics:

(1) ITEM: Annual Overhaul Inadequacies.

OBSERVATION: The current policy for completing annual overhaul of vessels requires that vessels be shipped to the 2nd Logistical Command Marine Maintenance Activity in Okinawa. Turn around time is from six months to a year. Additionally, vessels returning from annual overhaul frequently require repairs before they are considered operational.

EVALUATION: The large number of vessels requiring out of country overhaul results in a shortage of vessels available to accomplish the assigned operational mission.

RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to increasing the in country marine maintenance capabilities so as to preclude the necessity of shipping vessels out of country for extended periods to accomplish annual overhaul.

(2) ITEM: Additional Communications Installation.

OBSERVATION: In the past there has been a noticeable lack of communications between some elements of this command, especially during alert conditions. In an attempt to alleviate this problem: two trunk lines between the 125th Transportation Command switchboard and the Tiger Switchboard were installed.

EVALUATION: The installation of these trunk lines, together with a twenty-four hour switchboard operation has greatly improved communications within the Command, thus increasing overall port efficiency.

RECOMMENDATION: That the twenty-four hour operation of the switchboard be continued and that additional lines be installed to meet the increase in operational area.

f. Organisation: None
g. Others: None

1 Incl

Incl wd Hq, DA

[Signature]
Colonel, MC
Commanding
AVCA SGH TC CCPT (11 May 1969) lst Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 125th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, HQ, 4th Transportation Command, APO 96307 MAY 23 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Saigon, ATTN: AVCA SGH GO, APO 96491

TO: Commanding General, lst Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO 0, APO 96384

1. The Operational Report of the 125th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for period ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

2. Section II Operations: (a) Item 1 - Repeat attacks on tugboats under tow: Concur - however the decision to implement these measures has to come from higher headquarters.

   (b) Item 4 - Control of contract truck demurrage: Concur - The current Philco Ford trip ticket is also being utilised by the US Army Terminal Newport. The US Army Terminal Vung Tau utilises another carrier in a different situation where the Philco-Ford trip ticket would not be applicable. The revised Philco-Ford trip ticket is one of several management tools used in effecting better utilisation of assets and control of demurrage. When properly used it can result in savings to the government.

3. Section II Logistics: (a) Item 1 - Annual overhaul inadequacies: Concur - lst Logistical Command has been requested to provide assistance in obtaining a meaningful solution to the numerous problems associated with the current shipyard overhaul program. lst Logistical Command is working with 2nd Logistics Command and USAMECON in an effort to expedite repairs on vessels in the shipyard and to establish a program which will provide the shortest possible turnaround time.

   (b) As an intermediate solution, additional contractual help in the Saigon area is being requested for the establishment of a second in-country overhaul facility. If approved, this will greatly reduce the time a vessel is lost to the using unit.

4. This headquarters concurs with the observations, evaluations and recommendations contained therein.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: Tiger 3735

J. L. WESHENFELDER
Major, AGC
Adjutant General
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 125th Transportation Command for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, ACS CSF0h-65 (HI)

HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon, APO 96491 15 Jun 69

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA: GO O
APO 96384

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 125th Transportation Command for the Period Ending 30 April 1969 is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.

2. Reference Section 2, page 5, paragraph 2b (2). CONCUR. This action reduces transportation and handling cost and reduces delivery time to consignee for those items that can be "through-put". Recommend depot activities examine major commodities to determine those items which might be "through-put" and coordination be made through MCC and port terminals for their delivery. For the month of May "through-put" was 8.3% of cargo cleared from Saigon Port and Newport. Depot activities through their port liaison people are in the best position to coordinate "through-put" with the port terminals.

3. Reference Section 2, page 6, paragraph 2.b. (4). CONCUR. As indicated in the 4th Transportation Command indorsement, this system is employed at all USASUFCON, SGN port terminals which employ commercial trucks, except Vung Tau which is a Navy contact and is not applicable to this system. During the quarter, reduction in demurrage at Saigon Port has been significant as indicated; Jan - $6,210, Feb - $4,203, Mar - $2,099, Apr - $1,297. Use of a revised trip ticket as a tool to reduce demurrage at Newport has not been quite as effective as indicated by the following demurrage figures: Jan - $12,256, Feb - $9,738, Mar - $14,565, Apr - $6,751.

4. Reference Section 2, page 7, paragraph 2.b. (6). CONCUR. Favorable holiday pay clauses in commercial contracts will be continued. The possibility of incorporation of favorable pay clause for the direct hire personnel will be investigated.

5. Reference Section 2, page 7, paragraph 2.b. (7). CONCUR. This policy will continue in effect.

6. Reference Section 2, page 8, paragraph 2.e. (2). CONCUR. No difficulty has been experienced in obtaining additional lines.

7. Lessons Learned, observations and recommendations are concurred in by this command, with the exceptions above. A copy of this indorsement has been provided the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LB 2604

[Signature]

M.D. HUSTON
Capt, AG
Asst AG
AVCA GO-ME (11 May 69) 3rd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 125th Transportation Command for Period Ending 30 April 1969 ROS GSFCR-65 (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHOC-DST, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 125th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Reduction of Overtime, page 4, paragraph 2a. Concur. However, the primary responsibility for monitoring overtime and scheduling procedures, within the framework of mission capability, must remain with the employing agency. Guidance from civilian personnel labor offices should be requested only when problems cannot be resolved at the unit level.

b. Reference item concerning Repeat Attacks on Tugboats under Tow, page 5, paragraph 2b(1). Concur with exception. Action recommending that friendly forces occupy and secure shorelines is highly desirable but not practical as the number of troops required to perform such a mission is prohibitive. The use of PBR escorts, air cover, and defoliation, plus having a small stand-by reaction force to lift immediately into contact areas appear to be the most feasible countermeasures.

c. Reference item concerning Annual Marine Overhaul, page 6, paragraph 5. Concur. Both FY 70 and FY 71 in-country marine overhaul programs have been increased.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous intersements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. STAFFORD

TEL: 4839

C. D. STAFFORD
1Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

GT:

UHASCOC-SON
4th Trans Cmnd
125th Trans Cmnd
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 125th Transportation Command (Terminal A), for period ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters 125th Transportation Command (Terminal A) and concurs with the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

A.R. Guenther
CPT. AG
ASST. ADJUTANT GENERAL

Cy furn:
125th Trans Comd
1st Log Comd
GPOP-DT (11 May 69) 5th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 125th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 12 AUG 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
D. A. TUCKER
CPT. AGC
ASST AG
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 125th Transportation Command**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.**

**CO, 125th Transportation Command**

**Report Date:** 11 May 1969

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