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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (M) (27 Aug 69) FOR OT UT 692301 4 September 1969


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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adopted for use in developing training material.

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ROBERT E. BANCHE
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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UNCLASSIFIED REPORT
DISTRIBUTION NO FOREIGN WITHOUT APPROVAL OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT (ARMY) ATTN FOR OT UT. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

THRU: Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Saigon
ATTN: AVCA SGN GO
APO 96492

TO: Department of the Army
ATTN: ACofS for Force Development
Washington D.C. 20310

SECTION I
OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. COMMAND:

   a. Colonel John J. Irving, QIE, assumed command as of 26 April 1969, vice Colonel Thomas B. Mahone, Jr. QIE relieved. Colonel Mahone was awarded the Legion of Merit for his service as Depot Commander, 1968-1969, by CG, USARV. Presentation was made by the CG, US Army Support Command, Saigon. Colonel Mahone departed Vietnam to assume command of New Cumberland Army Depot, Pennsylvania, the prior command of Colonel Irving.

   b. Due to the short tour of twelve months in Vietnam, a 25% turnover of command within Troop Command, USADLB, was experienced. At the end of the reporting period the command and staff of Troop Command was as follows:

      | NAME             | DUTY ASSIGNMENT     |
      |------------------|---------------------|
      | LTC Robert U. Boyd Jr. | Commanding Officer |
      | MAJ John E. Weeks   | Executive Officer   |

Inclosure

CPT Edward J. Lee
NAJ George H. Zobrak
1LT Frank F. Gruber
1LT Robert K. Brown
1LT Richard C. Sessums
CPT Richard A. Hurka
CPT Ernest W. Murphy
CPT Lewis F. Willhite
CPT Barcus B. Adams
CPT Carl D. Cox
CPT Clyde W. Howard
CPT Leonard W. Davis
1LT Robert L. Dunn
1LT Wayland L. Godshall

ADJUTANT
Operations Officer
Intelligence/Security Officer
Logistics Officer
Chaplain
Company A
Company B
Company C
Company D
Company E
Company F
Security Guard Company
74th Engineer Detachment
518th Engineer Detachment

2. RELOCATION: During the reporting period the command continued to implement the relocation of activities into the New Depot Complex, Long Binh Post, Vietnam. This resulted in the clearing of depot operations out of Camp Davies, Saigon. The major relocation, other than the relocation of depot stocks, was the movement of the Food Management Division and its branches to Long Binh during the last 5 days of March 1969. This completed the movement of the major office/administrative elements. The major elements remaining outside the New Depot Complex are the Class I Chill & Freeze capabilities at Saigon & Long Binh Post proper, awaiting the completion of construction of new facilities later in 1969, and the proposed realignment of storage operations in the ancillary location known as Area 208, Long Binh. After these actions, the only activity physically located in the immediate Saigon area will be the Port Liaison Team located at the 4th Transportation Terminal Command Headquarters at the Port of Saigon.

3. VISITORS: The continuing expansion of facilities and operations of the command have resulted in the USADLB becoming one of the major activities
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within the Vietnam Theater of Operations. As a result the orientation and briefing of senior personnel continued during the reporting period. Our visitors included the following:

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<tr>
<td>MG Conroy</td>
<td>Asst. CofS, Logistics J4 MACV</td>
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<td>MG Horner</td>
<td>Commanding General, 2d Logistical Comd.</td>
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<td>MG Lollis</td>
<td>Commanding General, USATAC</td>
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<td>MG Harby</td>
<td>CofS, USARV</td>
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<td>BG Hurow</td>
<td>Commanding General, USASUPCOL</td>
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<td>COL Anderson</td>
<td>Deputy Comptroller, USARPAC</td>
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<td>COL McMillian</td>
<td>G4, 1st Cav Div.</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Young</td>
<td>G4, USARV</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL Trauger</td>
<td>COMARC Liaison Team</td>
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4. TACTICAL DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND TRAINING: Upon initiation of the enemy Post Tet Offensive in Feb 69, it was found necessary to initiate offensive patrols/sweeps outside the perimeter area of responsibility. The sweeping force consisted of APCs and gun-jeeps giving security to platoon-size patrols in search of possible enemy positions, supplies and personnel. In the vicinity of Honai Village and East of the PDO area, the discovery of numerous positions of observation of our perimeter, as well as possible cache spots, resulted in the levelling by fire and bulldozer of avenues of approach and positions of observation available to the enemy. These actions enabled the personnel of this unit to study first-hand the weaknesses of their positions in our perimeter and the viewpoints that the enemy held. The above action was accomplished simultaneously with the construction of twelve new bunkers in those areas most vulnerable to enemy action. Upon completion of this construction, it was found necessary to utilize the personnel of lettered units in Troop Command for guard duty in support of the SG Co. Their number at times was fully one-third the total guard commitment. As a result of the inexperience and lack of training encountered by the security guard personnel, an intensive program of instruction and training was initiated for these men. Security guard NCOs were hard pressed in the CJT of these personnel. The difficulties in command and control were directly responsible for the additional assignments of qualified NCOs to
the bunker line, to wit: one NCO per five bunkers. The chain of command was further altered to meet these additional requirements with the addition of one officer and two NCOICs. This realignment resulted in a more cohesive control by the utilization of senior NCOs as sector controllers. Command and Control OJT and related instruction as well as the accomplishment of the security mission was maintained by the Security Guard Company.

5. **DEPT OPERATIONS**: Basic operations were carried on throughout the reporting period. The local national personnel were available at all scheduled times with the exception of one day: February 1969, immediately after the onset of the enemy offensive.

6. **PERSONNEL CHANGES**: The following changes occurred during the quarter reported on:

   a. **LTG S. Himic** replaced **LTG Piper** as Director of Services on 15 Feb 69.

   b. **Maj J. Hubbard** assumed duty as Depot Engineer on 18 February 1969.

   c. **LTG G. A. Brown** assumed duty as Chief, Quality Assurance Office on 2 March 1969 to include functions formerly within the Quality Control Division, S&T Directorate.

   d. **CSM J. Garrett** relieved **SGM J. Noonan** as Depot Sergeant Major as of 10 April 1969.

   e. **Maj P. Lebo** Trans Sgt Div, Dir for S&T went to CONUS on emergency leave resulting in his reassignment to CONUS duty.

7. **ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE**: See Inclosure 1.

SECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED
COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. PERSONNEL.

   a. Strength Accountability:

      **OBSERVATION**: This command was organized in 1968 with only one UIC and one morning report from the resources of the 506th Field Depot and some 17 assigned separate TO&E service type units. The result was the carrying of upwards of 3000 personnel on one daily report, and requiring the preparation of seven feeder reports from the company level.
EVALUATION: It was determined that the above procedure was cumbersome and precluded any accurate strength accountability. Action was initiated to obtain UICs to permit preparation of company level morning reports. This work is in progress one company at a time, with necessary supporting administrative actions, to be completed in the next reporting period – EDC 15 June 1969. There is a figure beyond which strength accountability of a larger group becomes wholly unwieldy and erroneous, requiring excessive effort to properly maintain.

RECOMMENDATION: Reorganizations resulting in one unit from the resources of several smaller sized units should be planned with sufficient UIC numbers being obtained in advance from proper authority to continue to provide for strength accountability actions at the company level as a function of unit command.

b. Administrative Actions (AR 235-206)

OBSERVATION: More expeditious compliance with regulations in certain administrative areas can be obtained by proper preparation of documentation, permitting the unit commanders more time for matters of which they cannot or should not be relieved.

EVALUATION: Preparation of similar and semi-repetitive administrative actions such as those initiated at the unit of assignment under AR 235-206 by experienced personnel leads to uniformity and fewer returns for administrative corrections and can lead to more rapid disposition of the cases.

RECOMMENDATION: When the circumstances so dictate, qualified personnel at depot level can assist unit commanders in the disposition of administrative cases to the benefit of all concerned.

c. Assignment to Troop Company on Duty Assignment Basis.

OBSERVATION: It was determined that a situation existed where company assignments were out of phase with the EM’s duty section and duty assignment.

EVALUATION: A plan was needed to result in a duty assignment/company assignment structure. The objective was established that it was desirable to have the same NCOs responsible for their men both on the job and for company functions and responsibilities. The principal group involved was vehicle and equipment operators who regularly work outside of the Director for Services. The planned movement of Bravo Company from Saigon to Long Binh was also to be considered. The result was the realignment of enlisted personnel between the seven units with four companies allocated to S&T Func-
tions, one to Services, one to Staff, and all SG personnel being assigned to that unit. This has proven successful.

RECOMMENDATION: Service units will gain platoon/section integrity and increase the effectiveness of programs such as "Know Your Man" if NCOs have the same personnel with them both on the job and in the company area. This concept is a tool for better unit control and administration.

d. Enlisted Personnel Strength.

OBSERVATION: Troop Command strength decreased slightly during the reporting period to approximately 2650 total.

EVALUATION: The replacement pipeline is essentially effective as to numbers and the majority of the more common MOSs, but it is not wholly effective in producing the scarcer MOSs essential to the effective accomplishment of the total mission.

RECOMMENDATION: The successful accomplishment of the logistical mission requires the assignment of at least a representative (50%) share of personnel in all authorized MOSs in all units, with emphasis on the less common MOSs.

e. Depot Safety Program.

OBSERVATION: A large organization with hundreds of personnel engaged in a variety of duties is constantly and continually subject to a variety of accident producing situations.

EVALUATION: Continuing emphasis on all aspects of safety and the use of good safety practices at all levels of supervision is essential to an effective safety program. This has resulted in an overall decline in safety statistics: incidents, injuries and damage costs, for the period. LN personnel generally do not understand military safety standards, and this aspect requires more attention.

RECOMMENDATION: a. Basic safety instruction be emphasized in the PDI of the AIT for depot oriented enlisted MOSs.

b. Continuing and increased emphasis be placed on orientation of local national personnel in military safety standards, with repeated non-compliance the basis for dismissal where determined appropriate.

2. OPERATIONS.

a. General:
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OBSERVATION: The command continued to operate on a full time basis during the reporting period successfully increasing mission effectiveness.

EVALUATION: Matters of especial interest to the senior officers of higher headquarters continued to receive the required internal interest and emphasis. Problems capable of resolution within the command were generally effectively accomplished. The great majority of target dates were met or action completed in advance of established dates. One major action area was the continuation of the relocation of facilities into the New Depot complex as construction of new facilities progresses. Staff planning continued to provide for realignment of responsibilities and assumption of additional functions as guidance was received. The accomplishment of the missions within existing resources continually challenges the ingenuity of all members of the command. Details follow.

RECOMMENDATION: No specific recommendation.

b. Identification of Depot Stocks.

OBSERVATION: A certain amount of depot stocks requires inspection and identification, care and preservation and repackaging with the objective of placing it on record as depot assets.

EVALUATION: Many factors occurring in the past have resulted in an abnormal amount of depot stock requiring inspection, detailed identification, classification, repackaging, regrading and restorage with addition to the stock records as depot assets for subsequent issue or shipment as theater excess. Deterioration of cases and loss of identification through handling or long term storage; the rehandling incident to relocation from Saigon to Long Binh, receipt of turn-ins and items from other depots; the rapid logistical build-up in the past; relocation from open to coursed storage as warehouses were completed and similar factors have had their effect on this problem. Extensive progress has been made and the location and availability of depot assets has improved on the stock records to a marked degree. This is, of course, a continuing situation with 100% results perhaps never obtainable. However, with all resources, in house or contractual, this program must continue to be recognized and given the necessary financial and other support for its effective accomplishment within acceptable time frames. The objective is to retain within the logistical pipeline the maximum amount of stocks coming under depot control, provide for timely care and preservation, addition to asset records and subsequent disposition, as instructed, with an irreducible minimum subject to condemnation and disposition through Property Disposal action. The result can be extensive dollar savings, difficult to even estimate. Many actions in the program have been accomplished or are in progress. A small example is the rehabilitation of 1540 pieces of brass altarware for issue
to Chaplain activities.

RECOMMENDATION: The need for a viable and effective program to increase depot asset from stocks at hand be recognized by higher authority and appropriate support, contracted or otherwise, be provided for to accomplish the desired objectives through FY 1970 and beyond.


OBSERVATION: The depot complex, its stocks and the large number of personnel employed as well as the continuing stream of others entering and leaving for various purposes, subjects the depot stocks to pilferage or other inappropriate disposition.

EVALUATION: The stocks of the depot vary from tiny transistors to tanks and cranes in size and from a five cent pencil to sophisticated and expensive items in procurement costs, such as electronic units. The extensive facilities, even the trash piles, provide thousands of opportunities for the ill-advised to attempt to carry out theft, intentional destruction, and other improper disposition of stocks. The general economic condition of the majority of the local nationals only makes the opportunities more appealing. Temptation is placed in the path of both the VN & US personnel constantly. A strong and viable security program is essential in reducing stock losses. Fences, locked buildings and other similar facilities to deter the losses should be provided for without question, as they will pay for themselves quickly and this is being improved constantly. Guards and others must be constantly alert to their duty and surroundings and everyone act accordingly. Personnel uncovering thefts have been recognized with individual awards, and rightly so. Personnel apprehended should be dealt with without favor. New procedures for shaking down LN employees were placed in effect during the period.

RECOMMENDATION: The loss of US Government-owned property through theft or intentional damage to recognized as a continuing problem and responded to accordingly. A policy of liaison with VN officials to insure proper punishment of the apprehended culprits is essential in discouraging misappropriation of federal property. Repeated offenses by contractor personnel should result in the black listing of the firm involved.

d. Data Processing.

OBSERVATION: Timely development of required depot stock data is unsatisfactory at present.

EVALUATION: The present data processing capability of the command is inadequate for the accomplishment of tasks presently assigned, on a
timely basis. The long range solution is a capability that is tailored to the workload present and anticipated. Marked progress has been made in purification of data made available through inventory location and similar actions. Certain ancillary equipment has assisted in procedural improvements. The major difficulty is insufficient capacity and machine down time. An interim solution for more machine time is being sought, pending approval for and receipt of a larger and faster capability.

RECOMMENDATION: A recommendation as to a short range solution is being approached separately under the Standing Committee concept, and will be reported upon accordingly.

d. Port Liaison.

OBSERVATION: Better handling of stocks arriving from out-of-country can be provided for by the operation of a Port Liaison Team.

EVALUATION: Certain advance information is available through Terminal Command resources as to the type and volume of incoming cargo prior to the actual arrival of the vessel at dock side. Though not always fully accurate, this advance data is highly beneficial in allowing for advance planning for the receipt and storage of the various classes of materiel, even to permitting the reservation of storage space for extensive cubage as may be required. It is immediately obvious that this information should be formulated and made available to all interested officials on a timely basis.

RECOMMENDATION: Authorization for personnel to effectively operate a viable Port Liaison Team function be recognized and approved in future TDAs for overseas Depots. The OIC, PLT should be under the direction of the Executive Officer or Deputy for S&T.

e. Shipment of Smaller Items to Customers.

OBSERVATION: Customer pick-up of small items ready for issue is inefficient and uneconomical in most instances.

EVALUATION: A method of delivery for small and light weight items of an unclassified nature to the customers was needed. It would be preferable that this method be under US control at all times to preclude theft and misappropriation of the materiel. A system existed to resolve this problem, namely parcel post shipments conforming to existing Army Postal System policy. This was implemented by the creation of an APO Shipping activity and the results have been most satisfactory. APO shipment increased from 7% to 50% of total shipments made.
Within two weeks a significant reduction in Open-in-Storage HROs was achieved. This also reduced requirements on the Multi Pack operation.

**RECOMMENDATION:** APO facilities be utilized by logistical units for customer shipment of material, as appropriate.

g. Cargo Movement (Receipt of Stocks)

**OBSERVATION:** A fluctuation in the volume of receipts of depot stocks from hour to hour is an inefficient and expensive condition.

**EVALUATION:** It is realized that there are advantages to and requirements for the constant clearing of dock facilities in connection with cargo unloading once the working of a vessel has begun, and that these are problems for the Terminal Command personnel which must be met. The movement of incoming material from port areas to depots must also be accomplished by the best use of available resources. This being true, it then follows that the receipt and spotting of cargo upon arrival at a depot must be performed as efficiently as possible, all factors considered. Since a number of commands are involved including contractor operated movement, it follows that the smoothest flow of cargo should be obtained by having the movement from shipside to depot controlled by a TIA or ICC type activity. The net result could be advantageous to all and might well lead to a reduction in demurrage charges. It appears that the Depot Port Liaison Team should or could be involved in this function. A saving in direct costs, time, manpower and better utilization of WES could result from more timely cargo movement.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the objective of a smoother and more orderly movement of cargo from port to depot be studied at the proper level of authority; the results to be as beneficial as possible to all, including contractor operations.

h. Mishandling of Cargo.

**OBSERVATION:** During the reporting period it was noted that abnormal percentages (up to 90% in one instance) of depot stocks were received on damaged pallets.

**EVALUATION:** It is realized that cargo handling results in damage to pallet, boxes and crates to a certain almost unavoidable minor degree. When up to 90% of a shipment is received which requires repalletizing prior to proper warehousing this represents an unnecessary workload on the depot and is considered to be subject to extensive review. The problem can arise, it is realized, at any point in the supply chain where the material is
SUBJECT: Operational Report for United States Army Depot Long Binh - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

handled, from supply source to overseas depot. Glaring instances of damaged pallets may, from time to time, be made the basis for a separate communication for proper disposition. However, within VN it is considered feasible to bring this matter to the attention of officials involved in port operation and over-the-road movement, military or contractor. The objective is to improve handling and transporting techniques, where possible to reduce to an acceptable level the need for repalletizing and recreating of incoming material before it can be stored and added to depot assets. Retraining cargo handlers may will be required.

RECOMMENDATION: A study be made of the sources of damage to pallets and cases, in-country or elsewhere, with the objective of reducing the requirement for depot rehabilitation of incoming stocks.

1. CC&S Operations.

OBSERVATION: The collection, classification and salvage functions of the depot have been eminently successful during the period.

EVALUATION: During the third week in April the Wash Rack facility reached a zero balance of stock for shipment from a large stock on hand in September of 1966. Availability of shipping space and command emphasis on the retrograde program contributed to the marked success of this effort and the new CC&S facility will make a major contribution to better working conditions etc, in the future. However, it is considered that the one major input to the program was good, honest hard work by the personnel involved. This was recognized by CC, 1st Log Comd upon the presentation of several individual awards, Bronze Stars and ACIs.

RECOMMENDATION: The value of the recognition of personal effort be continued through the Decoration and Awards program as currently in operation within Vietnam.

j. Contractual Effort.

OBSERVATION: Contractual effort on depot missions was satisfactory during the period of this report.

EVALUATION: The operation of the Non-Standard Repair Parts Key Depot was under contract for FY 69. Guidance was received that it was not to be put up for renewal and plans were developed to assume responsibility for the mission as of 1 July 1969 without contractor effort. Actions were also undertaken to relocate, commencing in April, the stocks and operation to the New Depot Complex at Long Binh. This will result in some 19,000 additional items coming under depot control. The best information available
to date indicates that the operation of the Engineer Construction Material Yard at Long Binh and Vung Tau (less Stock Control functions) and Care and Preservation requirements would be offered for contractual bid for FY 1970. This is highly pleasing to the command as the value of contractual effort, well performed, is recognized.

RECOMMENDATION: So long as overall conditions dictate, and funds are available, the continued use of contractual effort receives command approval.

k. Property Disposal Operations.

OBSERVATION: Considerable progress was made in PD operations during the period of this report.

EVALUATION: All-out efforts have been made to reduce the present Property Disposal inventory. Beginning inventory for February was $14,009,963; ending inventory for 19 April 1969 was $13,677,056. Our goal is to reduce the inventory to approximately $6,000,000 by the next report period. Continuous efforts are being made to report property for sale; as of 23 April 1969, $2,912,866 has been reported to FESO for sale. A total of $4,910,436 has been sold but not released to the purchaser. These figures are included in the overall ending inventory figures. Considerable progress has been made in removal of scrap property. Total removals during this period were 13,412 T/S. IFB 92-112-9047 (Sealed Bid Sale) for 7,000 T/S of scrap metal awarded to Vietnam Steel Casing and Rolling Mill for $93,500.00. Removal of the scrap property is expected within the next 60 days. MAAG representatives from Korea and Taiwan are screening surplus property for possible shipment to the MAAG countries.

RECOMMENDATION: The Property Disposal program continues to receive necessary emphasis at all levels of command.

3. TRAINING:

a. QM School Logistic Training Courses.

OBSERVATION: Fort Lee School trained officer and enlisted replacement personnel are not being trained in the primary logistic systems used throughout USAPAC and USARVN, specifically the 1st Logistic Command 3SVN Standard Supply System for Class II and IV Depots.

EVALUATION: Military personnel shortages continuously exist. The volume of work requires that arriving replacements immediately assume a productive posture involving a computerized system in which they have not been trained. Minimum early relief is obtained from intensive on-the-job training, supplemented by special instructions; however, effectiveness of this training is also curtailed by replacement's lack of basic knowledge of the local system. There is a major requirement for school trained personnel who possess a basic knowledge of the systems used in USAPAC, and in particular, the 3SVN used in Vietnam.
AVGA SGN FD MGT

SUBJECT: Operational Report for United States Army Depot Long Binh - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969,
RCS: CSFOR-65 (CI)

RECOMMENDATION: That the USAPAC Standard Supply System (3-S) be included in the Fort Lee Training program. Further, that Vietnam Depot replacement personnel be selected in sufficient time to permit training under the desired course.

b. Logistical Training of Vietnam Civilians.

OBSERVATION: There is urgent need to train qualified Vietnamese civilians in various echelons of essential logistic support operations. The primary requirement is within the supervisory and management levels.

EVALUATION: Ultimately Vietnam will become militarily independent, including internal logistic management. By necessity a strong association will prevail between our two countries in the field of logistic support. Although the Vietnam system may not be tailored to the degree of computerization enjoyed by US Forces, the basic logistic concepts and requirements will exist. Logistic support will depend largely on a capability to respond to, and interface the computer systems. It will be essential that supervisory and management personnel be skilled in the logistic field.

RECOMMENDATION: That training programs include provisions to cross-train qualified Vietnamese civilian or military personnel in Depot supervisory and management positions.

4. INTELLIGENCE. Negative.

5. LOGISTICS.

a. Depot Facilities.

OBSERVATION: A total of thirteen completed facilities were turned over to the Depot during the period. This represents an increase in covered storage space of 273,000 SF and 176,920 SF of operational area.

EVALUATION: To keep pace with expanding facilities and operations, some 13 requests for MCA construction were initiated, to include:

- Operational Lighting - Cover 3,802,000 SF
- Road Paving - 11 Miles
- Ditch Paving and Stabilization - 23,400 LF
- Motor Pool - 155,652 SF
- Security Fence & Lighting for Vehicle Park - 3,460 LF
- Security Fence, CC&S - 4,700 LF
- Extend CI herdstand, 72,600 SF
- Open Sheds, Open Storage Operations - 86,400 SF
- Prepare Depot Checkout Area - 1500 SY
- Administration Building PDC - 2,000 SF

13

RCS: CSFOR-65 (21)

Addition to Data Processing Building - 2,100 SF
Chain Link Fence & Lighting, PDC - 2,900 LF
Depot Street Lights - 15,000 LF

RECOMMENDATION: Requested MCA improvements to enhance the overall USADLB mission, including safety and security needs, continue to receive command approval.

b. Fire Protection.

OBSERVATION: There is a permanent need for a fire protection/fighting capability at USADLB.

EVALUATION: The period was marked by tremendous improvement in the Depot Fire Protection and Prevention Program. A military fire fighting team, part of the 507th Engineer Detachment, Long Binh, was assigned to the Main Depot Complex 16 April 1969 to provide on-site fire protection. The unit consists of six personnel, a 400-gal fire truck, and a 3/4-ton vehicle. Its services were required on 24 April 1969 when a concessionaire-operated Local National snack bar was destroyed by fire. An area is presently being prepared at Storage Area 208 to locate another Military Fire Team there. An aggressive fire prevention program was revitalized during the quarter. Over 200 fire barrels with necessary buckets were prepared, distributed and filled with water throughout the Depot. Continuous Fire Prevention Inspections were conducted by Depot fire prevention specialists, along with personnel from the Long Binh Post Fire Department. Fire Marshals were updated for all areas and they were challenged to provide positive leadership for the Depot's far-reaching Fire Prevention program.

RECOMMENDATION: Fire protection/fighting capabilities be furnished major operational units for the continued protection of government property.

6. ORGANIZATION. Organization of Logistical Units on a TDA basis.

OBSERVATION: This command was redesignated as U.S. Army Depot, Long Binh as of 1 August 1968, and organized from the resources of the prior TO&E organization, the 506th Field Depot, and assigned and attached TO&E units. The current TO&E concept is reflected in TO&G 25-512G, 21 Jan 69. The reasoning set forth for the change was that a TDA basis would permit the tailoring of personnel and equipment requirements to the specific mission and functions of the command.

EVALUATION: This "tailoring" of the structure of an organization to specific missions, functions and workloads is valid with one major flaw. The procedures set forth in pertinent directives for the initial approval of a TDA and subsequent changes in the form of MTMDs are cumbersome, highly detailed and extensively time-consuming at all levels of command. The approval of a modification required by a change in mission or other significant factor requires detailed staff review at least five echelons of command and a period of at least six
months. This is an expensive and involved procedure for the quality of the result obtained and negates the advantages of the utilization of the TDA concept to a very high degree. Since the authorization for and utilization of US and indigenous civilian manpower would not normally be contained within the TC&E concept, it follows that the TDA concept is preferable for the organization of non-tactical units such as USADLB. However, in order to furnish the commander with essential manpower and equipment resources without undue delay upon a change in mission, a more responsive standard procedure within an active theater of operations is considered to be in order and highly desirable. The requirement can be developed in a number of ways from within the resources of the theater commander, to include:

a. Establish a policy that significant mission changes, when directed, must include authorization for predetermined manpower and equipment needs. A reassign requirement should include transfer of resources from the losing organization; a new requirement should contain authorization from theater resources.

b. When determined to be a long-term requirement, the establishment of attached or assigned provisional organizations should be considered, pending approval of an MTD A change, as required, or at least a temporary authorized overstrength for a specified period.

c. For short-term requirements the diversion of manpower on a TDY or change of duty station concept should suffice, accompanied by immediate authorization for 130-day loan of essential mission equipment.

d. A major improvement in the present system would be to require more expeditious processing of TDA changes, at least within the theater; each echelon being required to perform review within specified time frames.

e. Consideration might be given to requesting authority to finally approve, at theater level, internal organizational changes within approved personnel strengths, with information copies being forwarded to higher headquarters after the action is taken. The same approach can also be applied to equipment changes, substitutions, etc.

RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to reducing the effort and time involved in the current procedure for processing TDAs and MTDAs, with emphasis on detailed staff review and increasing the approval authority delegated to the theater commander, at least in instances where total manpower and equipment requirements are not materially altered.

JOHN W. IRVING
Colonel, QMC
Commanding

HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon, AFO US Forces 96491

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO 0

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Depot, Long Binh, for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.

2. Reference Section I, page 3, paragraph 4. CONCUR. Personnel of lettered units, and Troop Command should be used more extensively for perimeter guard duty. The rotation of guard duty throughout an organization may present a temporary hardship (not insurmountable) on an operation section and detract somewhat from the professionalism of the perimeter line. However, when evaluated in depth, it offers an indoctrination to those involved by giving them feel for the situation. The man who has experience cannot help but become a more effective participant if called upon to respond.

3. Reference Section II, page 4, paragraph 1.a. NONCONCUR. The Chief, ISC was instrumental in obtaining the UIC's for USA Depot Long Binh. Maximum assistance was furnished in the reorganization. The Composite Team Chief servicing the USA Depot, Long Binh, cut all the orders involved in the transfer of personnel enabling the new unit to open the morning report with a group remark. A similar program is now under way in 4th Transportation Command.

4. Reference Section II, page 5, paragraph 1.b. CONCUR. A vast improvement in the processing of personnel actions has been noted. Proper preparation of the initial request has been repeatedly stressed at our FSNCO conferences. Maximum utilization of the FSNCO in his primary area of responsibility will insure that correction of administrative cases will be held to an absolute minimum.

5. Reference Section II, page 6, paragraph 1.d. CONCUR. Proper requisitioning procedures are followed at Personnel Service Center. All replacements are assigned according to the requirements of the major subordinate commands. Shortages in hard-skill MOS's are repeatedly made known to Personnel Management, 1st Logistical Command.

6. Reference Section II, page 8, paragraph 2.c. CONCUR. The incumbent Depot Provost Marshal is aggressively pursuing a program of preventive enforcement. Unquestionably preventive enforcement is the key to success in a physical security program. The search for new procedures is never ending, both on the part of security personnel and those who would steal.
SUBJECT: Operational report of the United States Army Depot, Long Binh, for the Period Ending 30 April 1969

8. Reference Section II, page 8, paragraph 2.d. CONCUR. The problem is well known and documented by a Staff Study of the USADLB ADP capability. Third generation equipment is scheduled to replace the present system; Sept-Oct 1969. Borrowed computer time is being used to alleviate the computer backlog as a temporary solution.

9. Reference Section II, page 8, paragraph 2.e. CONCUR. With the recommendation for authorization of personnel to operate on a Fort Liaison Team, authorization should be recognized and approved in future TDA's for overseas depots.

10. Reference Section II, page 10, paragraph 2.g. CONCUR. The port is discharging cargo at a scheduled uniform rate. The problem stems from the fact the commercial contract operator, Philco-Ford, is not moving the cargo from the port at a uniform rate. The problem occurs when the loaded trailers are staged in the TTP waiting line tractors. Several hours of staged trailers may accumulate before being moved to the depot. Under the present contract with Philco-Ford, there are not provisions which require an even flow from the trailer staging area to the consignee. This matter will be examined in great detail.

11. Reference Section II, page 12, paragraph 2.k. CONCUR. The progress that is being made in FDO, while it is considerable, could be greatly expanded by installation of that special equipment which has been received. The work order on the installation of this equipment is presently being considered in Base Development and Planning Board meetings. Receipt of the magnetic attachments for the 20 ton cranes, will enhance the scrap metal operation. The inability to rapidly move the scrap metal after sale contributes to an excessive accumulation in the FDO yard. Also contractors who have purchased large quantities of salvage materials are slow in moving them out of the yard. This has been brought to the attention of 1st Logistical Command, who has indicated they are exerting every possible pressure to get the material moved. The recent command impetus in the FDO area will increase the available work force to the point that more rapid classification, packaging, reporting for sale and eventual disposal of scrap, waste, and useable material will occur.

12. Lessons Learned - observations and recommendations are concurred in by this command, with the exceptions above. A copy of this indorsement has been provided the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. S. ROBBINS
CPT, AAC
Asst AG

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHOC-DST, APO 96375.


2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Strength Accountability, page 4, paragraph 1a. Concur. Organization of this size should be given more than one UIC. Action taken by unit is considered adequate.

b. Reference item concerning Administrative Action, page 5, paragraph 1b. Concur. LC Mag 1829, DTG 090920Z Feb 69 required Support Commands to establish a board system at their level and Special Court-martial level to assist unit commanders in preparing elimination cases.

c. Reference item concerning Enlisted Personnel Strength, page 6, paragraph 1d, Concur. The Adjutant General, HQ, USARV, is made aware of the shortages of personnel in hard skill MOS via the requisitioning system. Proper requisition procedures are being followed.

d. Reference item concerning Depot Safety Program, page 6, paragraph 1e, Concur. United States Army Depot, Long Binh, is considered to have an extremely successful safety program. However, the additional safety instruction and enforcement recommended would greatly enhance the program. Repeated non-compliance with safety instructions and regulations is sufficient cause for dismissal of a local national employee and this action can serve as a means to minimize accidents and insure safety awareness. This headquarters continually distributes safety material in the Vietnamese language to subordinate commands for the purpose of informing local nationals of safety policies and requirements. This headquarters will publish a directive implementing referenced recommendation.

e. Reference item concerning Identification of Depot Stocks, page 7, paragraph 2b. Concur. The contract for Care & Preservation at Long Binh Depot was increased in both personnel slots and anticipated workload production for FY70. Along with this increase, and as a method of providing input for the contractor, Projects Condition (condition coding all stocks) and Count II and Count Always (theater wide inventories), are currently underway.
A7GA GO-MH (10 May 69) 2nd Ind

f. Reference item concerning Port Liaison, page 8, paragraph 2a. Concur. AR 310-32 contains information concerning authorizations for personnel and equipment on TDA/TDA.

g. Reference item concerning Shipment of Smaller Items to Customers, page 10, paragraph 2f. Concur. Recommended action has been stressed and put forth many times within the last year. Parcel Post shipping is now making a sufficient contribution to the supply effectiveness and efficiency at all command depots.

h. Reference item concerning Cargo Movement (Receipt of Stocks), page 10, paragraph 2g. Concur. Road security between port and depot during hours of darkness necessitates vehicles to move in convoys accompanied by security escorts. This problem is being studied by the USASUPCON, SG and every effort is being made to achieve a smooth flow of traffic to the depot.

i. Reference item concerning Mishandling of Cargo, page 10, paragraph 2h. Concur with comments offered and actions being taken by USASUPCON, SG as stated in paragraph 10 of 1st Indorsement.

j. Reference item concerning Contractual Effort, page 11, paragraph 2j. The contract for Engineer Construction Material Yard and Care & Preservation at USADLB has been split in two. Due to increased workload requirements, (6,200 3/T per month) the repacking and recreating function has required the increase of the personnel authorization by 149 slots effective 1 Jun 69. This headquarters is acutely aware of the importance and contribution of contractors in country, especially when goals and work standards are met and upheld.

k. Reference item concerning QM School Logistical Training Courses, page 12, paragraph 3a. Concur. OJT Action taken by Saigon Support Command is adequate. Additionally, HQ, 1st Log Command has a 3S Vn team which provides classroom training and OJT. The existing supply system (AR 725-50) is being taught in CONUS logistics' schools, regardless of how many times instructors say it will work both in peacetime and wartime, has proven to be ineffectual for the Vietnam theater as shown by the special systems and projects (red-ball, closed loop, CCIL, R&amp;R, etc) that have had to be implemented to accomplish the mission.

l. Reference item concerning Logistical Training of Vietnamese Civilians, page 13, paragraph 3b. Concur. Provisions of USARV Reg, 690-10 provide means whereby most types of training for local nationals can be established by the Central Training Institute. A report of training required is forwarded quarterly to the CFO and based on these reports, appropriate
training courses are established. This program falls within the scope of the 1st Logistical Command's SKILLS II A program.

m. Reference item concerning Depot Facilities, page 13, paragraph 5a. The projects listed have been submitted as part of the Army FY 71 Military Construction Program, except for the depot checkout area project which has been submitted as a current MCA-funded construction requirement.

n. Reference item concerning Fire Protection, page 14, paragraph 5b. Nonconcur. Fire protection capabilities should be available for all operational units, but not necessarily assigned to them. The assignment of a fire fighting team to the depot may be the best arrangement in this case, but in other cases it may be more effective to assign all fire fighting assets to a centrally controlled fire department. Even when centrally controlled, fire fighting assets need not be centrally located.

o. Reference item concerning Organization of Logistical Units on a TDA Basis, page 14, paragraph 6. Nonconcur. For budgeting and planning purposes TDA's and MTDA's must be processed at DA level. This headquarters processes all documents as expeditiously as possible and has been quick to provide assistance on any matters including preparations or processing of authorization documents.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

C. D. STAFFORD
ILt, ACC
Asst Adjutant General

CF:
USASUPCOM-SGN
USADLB

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 15 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GFOP-DT, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, US Army Depot, Long Binh and concurs with the report as indorsed.

FOR THIS COMMANDER:

[Signature]

A.R. GUENTHER
CPT, AGC
ASST. ADJUTANT GENERAL

Cy: USA Dpt, Long Binh
1st Log Comd

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference Section II, paragraph 2h, page 10. The Department of Defense should consider the use of container/container service to, from and between overseas areas to reduce the amount of losses and damage to cargo. Cargo loaded containers remain intact from place of loading (vendor, shipper, POE) to consignee. Container service would also tend to eliminate the problems noted in paragraph 2g, since delivery of containers on trailers (chassis) can be called forward from the port or from the depot container staging area as needed. This will provide for a smooth flow of cargo to the receiving activity.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, US Army Depot, Long Binh

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb 69 to 30 Apr 69.

CO, US Army Depot, Long Binh

10 May 1969

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N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C 20310