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| AUTHORITY |
| AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980 |

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Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

[Signature]

C. A. STANFIELD
 Colonel, AGC
 Acting The Adjutant General

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Assistant Chiefs of Staff
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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969 (RCS CSPFOR 65)

THRU: Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Saigon
APO US Forces 96491

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
ATTN: ACSFOR
Washington, D. C. 20310

SECTION I
SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. COMMAND.
   a. COL Paul A. Swanson, 059047, TC, assumed command of the 48th Transportation Group (MT) on 8 December 1968, vice COL Frank B. Case, 078689, TC.

2. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE, AND DISCIPLINE.
   a. Civilian personnel. By message, AVCA SGN GP, dated 31 January 1969, 110 Local National spaces under the Program 6 Civilization were withdrawn from the 48th Group, leaving a remaining force of 70 employees under this program.
   b. Military personnel.
      (1) A serious shortage of officers, drivers, and mechanics existed during December 1968 and early January 1969. These shortages were affecting...
9 February 1969

Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

(AOS 362/02 55)

the ability of the 48th Group to perform its mission. Command action was
taken in early January to apprise higher commands of our situation, and we
were given priority on drivers and mechanics arriving in the 1st Logistical
Command. As of 31 January, this situation had improved to such an extent
that the problem was no longer affecting our mission posture. The officer
picture, although not as bright as the driver and mechanic situation, has
improved considerably.

(2) In late January 1969, it was determined the 319th Transportation
Company would be infused to reduce the rotational hump problem which
will occur next September when the personnel of this unit are scheduled
to rotate to CONUS. The 319th is a reserve unit activated to participate
in the Vietnam conflict. The unit has produced a consistently outstanding
performance while attached to 48th Group. Its personnel have displayed high
esprit de corps and an acute sense of mission accomplishment. A command
letter has been dispatched requesting that the 319th be allowed to remain
intact. The letter requests that if the unit is to remain in Vietnam after
the departure of its personnel in September, adequate replacements be pro-
grammed into the unit three weeks prior to their scheduled DEROS.

(3) Casualties from enemy action.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>WIA</td>
<td>MIA</td>
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<tr>
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(4) Awards and Decorations:

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<th>Jan</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
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<td>Bronze Star (Merit)</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal (Merit)</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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</table>

(5) Safe driving awards:

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<tr>
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<th>Jan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. OPERATIONS.


(1) All elements of 48th Transportation Group engaged in motor transportation operations in support of combat forces in III and IV Corps Tactical Zones on 91 of the 92 days of the report period.

(a) Operation LIBERTY CuNYON, the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) into the III CTZ, was supported during the period. Upon completion of the displacement, 48th Group continues to provide daily resupply convoy support to this additional element at its various locations in III CTZ.

(b) On Christmas Day the 48th Group enjoyed what is believed to be its first day off as an entire organization since its arrival in Vietnam. The day off was not formal; it was accomplished by insuring that all requirements for the 25th of December were met prior to that date.

(2) Tonnage hauled during the period decreased slightly, dropping from 391,384 tons during the previous reporting quarter to 376,444 tons. However, and reflecting the favorable trend to conduct more line haul operations, ton mileage rose from 8.9 million ton miles in the previous quarter to 10.1 million ton miles in this reporting quarter. While the major customer continued to be the 25th Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) accounted for a large share of the increase.

(3) Equipment availability improved during the period, though it fluctuated widely from highs and lows for varying reasons. EDP in field maintenance began to decrease slowly, but driver shortages in December kept operational equipment from full use and "usual" levels of operations were not exceeded until the latter part of January, too late to have pronounced effects. (See also Inclosure 3.)

(4) On 17 December the DAU TIENG convoy was ambushed, with relatively heavy losses (Inclosure 4).

(5) On 14 January the TAY NINH convoy was ambushed; losses were relatively light (Inclosure 5).

b. Statistical summary:

(1) Tonnage hauled, by equipment and class of supply: Inclosure 6.

(2) Tonnage hauled, by type of operation: Inclosure 7.

(3) Ton Mileage: Inclosure 8.
AVCA SGN AB CO

9 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1969
(ACS GSFO 65)

4. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION.


b. Transportation Company (Reefer) (SGN) (Provisional) became the 379th Transportation Company (Medium Truck) (Reefer) on 6 November 1968 by authority of 1st Logistical Command General Order 1064, dated 8 December 1968.

c. The 572nd Transportation Company (Medium Truck) (Cargo) was reassigned to 48th Group on 10 December 1968 by authority of Saigon Support Command General Order 1163, dated 10 December 1968, and General Order 1164, dated 10 December 1968. The unit, assigned from DA NANG, had two of its platoons already attached here at zero strength; only the headquarters and one truck platoon actually joined this organization, and the unit is now in the process of being built up to its TOE strength of personnel and equipment.

5. INTELLIGENCE. None.

6. LOGISTICS.

a. Eighty new 5 ton tractors were received and sixty-four were turned in during the period. Although this created a favorable balance, the Group is still short task vehicles. (See Inclosure 10.)

b. After receiving eighty new 5 ton tractors, they started experiencing power steering pump failure. This was caused by the rotor vanes wearing through the rotor ring. After the vanes wore through the ring a certain length, they would lock into the rotor causing the pump shaft to break. This failure occurred on vehicles with mileage of 100 to 3,600 miles. The failure rate was a 38 percent of the total new vehicle density, or 19 failures per density of 50 new vehicles. An AIR, Control Number R15101, was sent to the US Army Tank Automotive Center with one (1) complete unserviceable pump.

c. Five units underwent a Command Maintenance Management Inspection during the period, all units received a satisfactory rating. (See Inclosure 2.)

SECTION II

LESSONS LEARNED

COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. PERSONNEL. None.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 January 1969
(RCS CSF60 65)

2. OPERATIONS.

a. Convoy Communications:

(1) OBSERVATION.

(a) 48th Group convoys operate in all directions from its base at LONG BINH. Accordingly, they traverse the TIdO of the following major units: 1st Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division (airmobile), 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force Vietnam, 1st Australian Task Force, 9th Infantry Division, and the 25th Infantry Division. Travel daily to nine major destinations requires travel through two or up to four subordinate areas of operations.

(b) It is extremely difficult to obtain timely information on the frequencies and call signs of tactical elements that escort the various convoys or that secure the various convoy routes.

(2) EVALUATION.

(a) Some divisions (e.g., 1st Infantry and 1st Australian Task Force) provide distribution of their SOI. This practice, better than no information at all, is not a solution to the problem because information on the area of operations is not concurrently provided (i.e., the data required cannot be extracted unless the unit providing the escort or securing the route is also known). In addition, the receipt and maintenance of all these SOI's is a major administrative problem.

(b) No standard changeover of SOI's exists. As a consequence, attempts to research the situation and provide timely data to convoys is further complicated since most convoys (all except one) pass through two "autonomous" areas as far as SOI changeover is concerned.

(c) The use of rapid communications (telephone and radio) to obtain current information is impossible because, in addition to the many number of changeover combinations possible, the codes that could be used for this purpose are not standard; those that 48th Group uses are not compatible with those used by the divisions, nor are those used by the divisions compatible with each other.

(d) In January 48th Group took great pains to publish Operations Orders for four of its convoys (PHUOC VINH, QUAN LOI, DONG TAU, and VUNG TAU). The initial orders were published late enough in the month to be beyond the latest unit's changeover and, consequently, their use was practical during most of the month. The enthusiastic response and improved understanding of convoy operations was encouraging. However, as the month
drew to a close, a major effort to update the orders was required. It was visualized that a "simple" procedure could be adopted: merely send the Operations Order to the division concerned and the current version could be updated in ink, returned, and published in corrected form. As of the end of the period, this attempt was a miserable failure, partly for the reasons already mentioned and partly because no one agency in any area was appointed to furnish all the information required, and the process has been a hit-or-miss one.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. It is recommended that the headquarters at the appropriate level (II Field Force Vietnam or USARV) arrange for provision of convoy SOI's on a standard basis.

b. Cargo Information:

(1) OBSERVATION:

(a) Numerous agencies (shippers, receivers, tactical escorts, commanders at higher echelons, etc.) require current information on the cargo going to virtually all destinations, to include numbers of vehicles, tonnages, specific items, times of departures, and times of arrival. These requirements are not arbitrary; the data are required to facilitate operations; to consolidate MHE to facilitate unloading, to arrange for convoy security, to determine follow-on requirements, to plan tactical operations based on availability of supplies, ad infinitum.

(b) Signal security agencies (e.g., Signal Officer, Saigon Support Command, and 101st Radio Research Company) are understandably concerned with communications security, to keep the enemy from learning of our logistical (and deducing our tactical) plans.

(c) The two primary means of communication are, in order of use, telephone and radio.

(2) EVALUATION:

(a) There are three methods of handling the problem: Give the data in the clear, use coded transmissions, and do not give the data at all. Of the three, only the second method is acceptable.

(b) A coded format was devised by this organization and submitted to Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon, explaining that use of numerical codes was too tedious in the first place (by virtue of volume and variety of data requested) and for reasons already mentioned (paragraph 2a(2)(c), Section II, above). The format was studied by the Signal Officer and the 101st Radio Research Company and was rejected. Use of numerical (KcC) codes was directed.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969

(RCS CFPOA 65)

(c) Use of directed codes is not possible.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that a special code be devised for use throughout USARV that will enable the rapid relay of voluminous data, and that the code be provided automatically to all agencies.

3. TRAINING. None.

4. INTELLIGENCE. None.

5. LOGISTICS. None.

6. ORGANIZATION. None.

7. OTHER. None.

SECTION III

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY INFORMATION

(EVASION AND ESCAPE)

This command has no evasion, escape, or survival experience to report.

PAUL A. SHANSON
Colonel, TC
Commanding

10 Incl

as

Incl 1 wd Hq, DA

Cy Furn:

2 - CINCUSAEPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT
3 - USARV, ATTN: VIHC-DST
AVCA SGN GO S (9 Feb 69) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1969
(RCS CSFOR-65)


TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO 8
APO 96384

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period
Ending 31 January 1969, of the 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport), is
forwarded in accordance with para 9, AR 1-19.

2. Reference Section I, para 2a: Action described in this paragraph
was directed by ACoS Personnel, 1st Logistical Command. The action
taken resulted from a change to Civilianisation Program 5/6 submitted
by this headquarters in January 1969. This change included inactivation
of the 87th Trans Co (Lt Trk) and the 151st Trans Co (Lt Trk). Under
the original civilianisation plan the 87th Trans Co was scheduled for
reduction to Type B unit civilianising 105 military spaces, and the
151st Trans Co was scheduled to be reduced by civilianisation of 5
military spaces, for a total of 110 military spaces. Now that the two
companies are offered for inactivation, the 110 civilianised military
spaces had to be deleted because there is no unit into which these LNs
could be integrated.

3. Reference Section II, para 2b: The 101st Radio Research Company
has been consulted and rejected the proposed codes on the grounds that
once a line number is broken, the code would be compromised and
broken. This headquarters has contacted 48th Trans Grp (S-2, S-3) to
set up a visit to 101st Radio Research Company to investigate possi-
bilities of an acceptable code.

4. Reference para 3, Inclosure 5: Paragraph 3 of Inclosure 5 is
misleading in that the enemy losses were nearly all the results of an
earlier ambush involving only 25th Infantry Division personnel.

5. Lessons Learned, observations and recommendations are concurred in
by this command, with the exceptions above. A copy of this indorsement
has been provided the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TFL: LB 2604

[Signature]

[Name]

[Rank] AG

[Title] Asst AG

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHEC-DST, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 48th Transportation Group for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning convoy communications, section II, pages 5 and 6, paragraph 2a. Concur. The administrative burden involved in maintaining updated communication information for convoy operation tends to be overwhelming for a headquarters not adequately staffed to provide such support. The headquarters having overall tactical responsibility for the area of operations should be able to provide the updated information required. Current communication information is essential for efficient coordinated convoy operations.

   b. Reference item concerning cargo information, section II, pages 6 and 7, paragraph 2b. Concur with action proposed in paragraph 3 of 1st Indorsement. Arbitrarily established code systems are in most cases easily broken and for this reason, lead to breaches in communication security. The Signal Officer, Saigon Support Command, is presently assisting the group to resolve the difficulties cited.

3. AR 525-15 is the current regulation governing the submission of the Operational Report - Lessons Learned. Saigon Support Command has been advised accordingly.

4. Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

LANNY M. KELSEY

CFO
USASUPCOM, Saigon
48th Trans Group
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-UT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport).

2. Reference item concerning convoy communications, page 5, paragraph 2(a). Nonconcur in basic recommendation and paragraph 2a, 2d Indorsement. Liaison with affected units and exchange of standing operating procedures information is a routine function of the Group Signal Officer. The 48th Transportation Group can be added to the standing operating procedures distribution list of any unit by request to that unit. The 48th Transportation Group should publish a monthly convoy standing operating procedures, with changes as required, and distribute to all units in the areas concerned. Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command has been advised of this position. A meeting has been arranged with the Signal Officers of the 48th Transportation Group, 1st Logistical Command and USAVACofS, C-E representatives to assist in resolution of this problem area.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

W. C. ARMST
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
48th Trans Gp
1st Log Comd
GPOP-DT (9 Feb 69) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 48th Trans Gp (Motor Transport) for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 MAY 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Ass AG
## ANNUAL GENERAL INSPECTIONS and COMMAND MAINTENANCE
### Management INSPECTIONS
**1 NOVEMBER 1968 - 31 JANUARY 1969**

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<th>Last AGI</th>
<th>Last CMD I</th>
<th>CMD I Rating</th>
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**Driver Availability Analysis**
 (% of Assigned)
 January 1969

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<tr>
<td>Ineff*</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Driving</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Day 36.4%
Night 15.8%


** Dispatchers, Admin Drivers, TIP, Tire Repair, Shotgunners, Etc.
Inclosure 4, Ambush of Dau Tieng Convoy on 17 December 1968

1. Narrative Description of Action:

a. On 17 December 39 vehicles of 46th Group, in two march units, departed LONG BINH enroute to Dau Tieng on a normal resupply mission. March Unit 1 consisted of 15 assorted task vehicles with administrative escort. March Unit 2 consisted of 12 SaP's, 1 2½ ton truck, and 1 ¾ ton truck. One additional march unit consisting of an unknown number of 25th Infantry Division vehicles fell in behind unit 2 at CU CHI. Finally, the convoy trail consisted of 2 wreckers, six bobtails, one SaP with ammunition, and one ¾ ton truck. Military police ¾ ton trucks and tactical vehicles were interspersed among the march units. Air cover was also provided. All SaP's in March Unit 2 were loaded with ammunition while the 2½ ton truck carried a load of potatoes.

b. At 1050 hours, in the vicinity of XT 430450, on Route 239, approximately 5 miles west of Dau Tieng, the second march unit began receiving approximately 15 rounds of 60 mm and 82 mm fire from vicinity XT 425455. The first march unit was not hit and continued to Dau Tieng unscathed. In fact, members of the march unit were not aware the convoy had been ambushed until they arrived at Dau Tieng. The terrain in the ambush area, although brush-filled, with small rolling hillocks, was relatively open and did not seem a very likely location for an ambush.

c. The MP jeep and tank leading March Unit 2 stopped when enemy mortar rounds began falling, to allow the tank to turn around. At this point the head element of the march unit was slightly beyond the kill zone. After the tank turned around the first three SaP's continued down the road to Dau Tieng and out of the "kill zone". Vehicle 4 was hit by a mortar or RPG round (rocket-propelled grenade), causing the ammunition to burst into flames, thus setting the canvas cab top on fire. The driver, seeing that he could not drive the vehicle out of the kill zone because of the flames in the truck cab, moved forward as far as possible before running the vehicle off the right side of the road, dismounted, and took cover in a ditch on the left side of the road. Vehicles 5, 6, and 7 proceeded past the burning ammunition truck and made it safely to Dau Tieng. Vehicle 8 received a direct hit in the engine compartment from an unknown caliber round which stopped the engine and wounded the driver, and he was unable to pull the vehicle completely off the road. The driver took cover in the ditch and was later evacuated to Dau Tieng. It is not known exactly what halted the remaining 5 task vehicles because five of the occupants are dead; the remaining three occupants were wounded and were evacuated. The original march unit commander's jeep broke down earlier and was being towed by a bobtail in the trail party; therefore, the commander and assistant were in the same jeep, which was the last vehicle in March Unit 2. The jeep was hit by an RPG round near the left front headlight but was only forced to stop when the 2½ ton truck directly in front of it had stopped. All of the jeep occupants dismounted and took cover as did the men in the 2½ ton truck. However, it appeared that the 2½ ton truck had been hit by something which wounded both men riding in the truck. Two of the jeep occupants and one of the 2½ ton truck occupants were subsequently killed.
Inclusion 4, Ambush of Dau Tieng Convoy on 17 December 1968 (Cont)

d. The enemy, estimated at battalion (minus) strength, was located on both sides and from 15 to 150 meters from the road covering a 1200 meter "kill zone." RPG, mortar, recoilless rifle, automatic weapons, and small arms fire were directed at the convoy. Approximately 2 minutes after the ambush was initiated, effective friendly artillery fire began to fall on enemy positions, and, within 12 minutes, at least one enemy mortar position had been knocked out. Gunships and tactical aircraft were employed against the enemy within a matter of minutes. Charlie Co, 2/22 Inf; Bravo Co, 1/27 Inf; and Bravo Troop, 3/4 Cav were rushed to the scene. Although the ambush element broke contact at about 1300 hours, 25th Infantry Division units were able with supporting aircraft to maintain contact until 1735 hours. A total of 2,171 rounds of artillery alone were fired in direct support of the convoy during the ambush.

e. Actions taken by March Unit 3 from the 25th Infantry Division are not known. The trail party initially was closed up with the end of March Unit 3 by Military Police. It appears that the Military Police at first thought to keep the vehicles rolling through the ambush but were thwarted in their efforts to do so by the vehicles blocking the road in March Unit 2. A person in March Unit 2, believed to be the March Unit Commander, did warn the trail party that an ambush had been sprung. Therefore, most of the trail party drivers were prepared to fight as required. When stopped, the trail party dismounted and returned fire in the general direction of the enemy. No logistical personnel in the trail party actually saw the enemy although sporadic small arms fire was directed towards the trail. The trail party never did enter the "kill zone"; it was turned around by the Military Police and marshalled further down the road near CP 36.

2. Friendly Casualties and Damage:

a. The 48th Transportation Group suffered 7 men killed in action and five men wounded. There were no other known combat arms personnel killed.

b. Six 5 ton tractors, six 12 ton S&P's, one 2½ ton truck, and one ½ ton truck from 48th Group were combat losses.

3. Enemy Losses: Enemy losses have been calculated at 52 KIA (BC) and 59 KIA (Poss).

4. Observations - Lessons learned:

a. The Convoy Commander and March Unit 2 Commander was killed when he returned to his jeep, after reaching a covered position, to warn the trail of the convoy that an ambush was in progress. If he had had an AN/PRC-25, he would not have had to recklessly expose himself in performance of his duty.

b. The constant stress on "keep your vehicle moving" must be credited in preventing needless casualties. It is presumed that vehicles 9-12 did not move from the "kill zone" because their occupants were dead or wounded.
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Incl 5, Ambush of Tay Ninh Convoy on 14 January 1969

1. Narrative Description of Action:

a. On 14 January 1969, the TAY NINH Convoy, consisting of 52 vehicles divided into three march units, departed LONG BINH at 0700 hours en route to TAY NINH on a normal resupply mission. At approximately 1000 hours the convoy was halted at Cau Xeo (XT 343454), between Check Points 36 and 25, to wait for road clearance due to enemy activity in the vicinity of Check Point 25. At 1045 hours the convoy was given clearance to proceed to TAY NINH. The convoy received sporadic fire between CP 25 and TAY NINH, but no damage or injuries resulted.

b. At approximately 1430 hours, 14 January 1969, the convoy departed TAY NINH to return to LONG BINH. The convoy consisted of 40 vehicles in three march units. March Unit 1 consisted of 15 vehicles from the 48th Group, with MP escort. March Unit 2 was made up of 10 tankers from the 64th Quartermaster Battalion and a 10th Transportation Company tractor (#70) towing another 10th Trans Co tractor (#17). March Unit 3 was composed of vehicles from the 25th Division destined for CU CHI and recovery vehicles for the convoy.

c. At approximately 1530 hours, in the vicinity of coordinates XT 341455, the convoy came under small arms and rocket fire from the left side of the road. The head of March Unit 1 speeded up and proceeded to the check point at XT 370424. Four vehicles in the rear of March Unit 1 were disabled and the operators of these vehicles became casualties as or after their vehicles were pulled off to the side of the road, enabling the vehicles behind them to proceed past. The vehicles disabled in the kill zone were 534th Trans Co #45 (Driver KIA), #33 (Driver WL), #26 (Driver WL), and 352nd Trans Co #25 (Driver WL). The trailer towed by 534th Trans Co #17 was hit by an RPG round, but proceeded out of the kill zone.

d. The MP escort with March Units 2 and 3 instructed their march units to speed up and move through the ambush area. March Units 2 and 3 moved through the ambush area returning fire and were escorted by AHC's, helicopter gun ships, and artillery. The towbar between 10th Trans Co tractors #70 and #17 broke while going through the kill zone and tractor #17 was abandoned; there was no operator in this vehicle. Truck #15, 534th Trans Co, which was in the rear of March Unit 3, was proceeding through the kill zone when it hit a 25th Division 5 ton cargo truck stopped in the middle of the road. This truck had the radiator pushed back into the fan but continued to proceed through the ambush area until it reached friendly troops outside the kill zone. The driver and shotgunner abandoned the truck at this point and jumped onto a passing truck and rode out of the ambush area. The March Unit Commander's Jeep, 534th Trans Co #62, was hit by one estimated .50 caliber round that went through the rear body of the jeep just in front of the spare tire. This vehicle continued through the ambush area and the Commander maintained control of his march unit.
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Inclosure 5, Ambush of Tây Ninh Convoy on 14 January 1969 (Cont)

2. Friendly Casualties and Damage:
   a. The 48th Group suffered 1 man killed in action, two men wounded, and one man missing in action. Casualties of the combat arms personnel is unknown.
   b. Two 5 ton tractors and one trailer suffered heavy damage.

3. Enemy losses have been calculated at 120 KIA (BG) and 60 KIA (Poss).

4. Observation - Lesson Learned: The drivers in the convoy reacted promptly and properly when the ambush took place by speeding up and moving through the ambush zone and directing the maximum amount of fire toward the sides of the road. The drivers of the disabled vehicles moved their vehicles off to the side of the road, enabling vehicles behind to pass through.
### TONNAGE HAULED

For the Quarter Ending January 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BY EQUIPMENT</th>
<th>100%</th>
<th>BY CLASS OF SUPPLY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL TONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24T</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5TL</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>II &amp; IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5TM</td>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II &amp; IV</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
<td>119,017</td>
<td>16.51%</td>
<td>26.22%</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>72.4%</td>
<td>122,962</td>
<td>16.29%</td>
<td>25.08%</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>82.9%</td>
<td>134,465</td>
<td>13.86%</td>
<td>32.05%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
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*Incl 6*
DONNAGE HAULED

(CONT)

BY THE TYPE OF OPERATION

FOR THE QUARTER ENDING JANUARY 1969

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<th>LOCAL HAUL</th>
<th>F&amp;B (LOCAL)</th>
<th>F&amp;B (LINE)</th>
<th>LINE HAUL</th>
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<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>44.5%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>

376,444

81,530

1.0%

(3,757)

108,829

4.0%

(14,826)

167,502

44.3%

100,029

20.9%
TON MILEAGE
FOR THE QUARTER ENDING JANUARY 1969

<table>
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<th>BY TYPE OF OPERATION</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24TL</td>
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<td>5TL</td>
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<tr>
<td>5TH</td>
<td>70.9%</td>
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<td>TOTAL TON MILES</td>
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<td>LOCAL HAUL</td>
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<td>18.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>P&amp;B LINE</td>
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<td>LINE HAUL</td>
<td>1,278,365</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RETRO</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| NOV | 11.4% | 27.1% | 61.5% | 2,959,313 | 12.6% | 16.4% | 3.6% | 60.4% | 7.0% |
| DEC | 7.7%  | 18.9% | 73.4% | 3,756,727 | 12.8% | 13.6% | 1.4% | 67.5% | 4.7% |
| JAN | 4.2%  | 17.9% | 77.9% | 3,423,270 | 12.4% | 17.2% | 2.4% | 62.7% | 5.3% |

Incl 8 20
## EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES - TASK VEHICLES

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<th>DECEMBER</th>
<th>JANUARY</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td>ASGD</td>
<td>% SHORT</td>
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<tr>
<td>2⅔ Ton Cargo Trk</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Ton Cargo Trk</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Ton Tractor</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Ton S&amp;P Trailer</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Ton RFR Van</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69.

CO, 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)

9 February 1969

691267

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C 20310