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ART AND REQUIREMENTS OF COMMAND

VOLUME II
GENERALSHIP STUDY

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prepared for

Office of the Director of Special Studies
Office of the Chief of Staff
Department of the Army

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VOLUME II: GENERALSHIP STUDY.

by

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THE FRANKLIN INSTITUTE RESEARCH LABORATORIES

SYSTEMS SCIENCE DEPARTMENT

NOTICE

The contents of this report, including the conclusions and recommendations, represent the views of the contractor and should not be considered as having official Department of the Army approval, either expressed or implied.

FOREWORD

This volume is part of a four-volume study conducted by the Systems Science Department of the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories. The overall study, *Art and Requirements of Command*, is aimed at identifying and analyzing the command-control support requirements of senior commanders. The focus of the study is the commander — his requirements for communicating and for receiving objective and subjective information.

Volume I, *Summary Report*, describes the methodology employed in, and the overall objectives of, the entire study effort. Study findings are presented and a detailed, four-stage description of the command process is included. In Volume I, a preliminary command-control support requirements model is developed.

This volume, *Generalship Study*, is the product of a major study effort. The questionnaire instrument on which it is based and the report itself were prepared by Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, USA Ret., and Gen. John G. Hill, USA Ret., consultants to The Franklin Institute. FIRL project members participated and assisted in the performance of this study. A "generalship" or "command" questionnaire was developed and distributed to 150 general officers — active and retired. On the basis of more than 80 replies, a composite command portrait was developed. This volume contains a compendium of selected questionnaire responses.

Volume III, *Historical Studies*, summarizes a composite command portrait developed on the basis of review of selected past commanders. This study was performed by Col. Wesley Yale, USA Ret., and Gen. I. D. White, USA Ret., consultants to The Franklin Institute; and by members of the Institute staff. It serves as a basis for comparing past with contemporary command methods, techniques, and prodedures and provides valuable insights into many aspects of the command process.

Volume IV, *Seventh Army Command Process Study*, reports another major effort. It summarizes the command-process description and analysis developed through a questionnaire-interview program. In that volume, common patterns of Seventh Army command methods, techniques, and practices are identified and integrated into a composite command portrait.

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PROCEDURE

The basic objective of the General Officer Questionnaire Program was to develop a composite picture of each of the four stages identified as together constituting the "command process."[1] For each stage, the commander was viewed as the key figure, and the attempt was made to focus on *his* perceptions of command requirements, obstacles, means, and objectives. It was thus intended that this breakdown would provide a broad picture of what general officers *do* - of how requirements are established and satisfied throughout the various stages of the command process.

A "Generalship" or "Command" Questionnaire, developed jointly by the FIRL staff and a senior military consultant, was first mailed to approximately 150 retired general officers - most of whom have had extensive combat command experience. (More than 55% - or 85 - of those contacted have completed and returned the questionnaire.[2]) The covering letter instructions for completion, and other sample pages are contained in Appendix A.

On the basis of the first forty replies received,[3] the questionnaire was extensively revised. Questions were clarified where necessary, and new areas of inquiry were introduced. Numerous questions pertaining specifically to the Vietnam combat environment were included in this revised version. (A list of the questions contained in the revised document is given in Appendix C.) Revisions completed, the

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1. These are:
   1. Mission Evaluation and Interpretation
   2. Issuing of Directives
   3. Monitoring of Staff Development of Coordinated Plans and Orders
   4. Follow-up and Evaluation

2. Appendix C includes a list of those who have responded to date.

3. These, and all other responses - to both the original and the revised versions of the questionnaire - are on file at the Office of the Director of Special Studies, Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army.

new questionnaire document was then pilot-tested on the student bodies of the Army War College and the Army Element of the National War College. It was also delivered to a sample group of active general officers for their replies, remarks, and suggestions. Several responses from these active officers have been received to date, including those of two who have served in Vietnam. Interviews have been arranged for with many of these officers.

The considerable body of data obtained through this questionnaire program was subjected to careful, systematic analysis. These data, and the resulting analyses, were organized into four composite portraits - representing each of the four command stages. This same four-stage breakdown was later employed in the development and presentation of a "command process description," reflecting all three of the separate, but parallel, study inputs.[4]

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4. See Volume I, *Summary Report*, Section III, "Study Findings."

EVALUATION OF METHOD

As stated repeatedly in previous sections of this report, there are serious limitations and difficulties involved in the use of questionnaires as research instruments. First, a questionnaire - by its very nature - confines the scope of comment. The mechanism of including separate pages for "additional comments," remarks, and criticisms only partially removes this built-in obstacle to free expression of views. The second, and related, difficulty arises from the fact that the questionnaire device does not afford the investigator an opportunity to seek clarification of responses. Well aware of this problem, interviews were arranged for with a number of the respondents to permit in-depth probing of their answers.

A third difficulty was anticipated at the time of distribution of the questionnaires. It was felt that because the document bore the signature of a well-known, highly successful senior commander, this might well have an effect on the formulation of replies. It should be noted, however, that this "difficulty" proved to be largely hypothetical. The response rate - and the consistently superior quality of individual replies - more than compensated for any such possible distortion.

Finally, the analysis of questionnaires is clearly subject to the leanings and limitations of the analyzer; total "objectivity," while possibly desirable, is almost certainly unachievable. In an effort to counteract and balance the biases of any one analyzer, the services of several reliable, qualified, and experienced persons were enlisted for purposes of review. The extensive review process to which the questionnaire analysis in particular - and the entire study report in general - were subjected, has, we believe, eliminated the possibility of slanted interpretation.

In summary, the numerous responses to the Generalship Questionnaire (and to the later revised document) provided an unusually rich and extraordinarily complete data base for study of the command process. In the following section, selected responses to each of the questions contained

in the original version are presented. The questions are organized by command stage and editorial comment is offered where appropriate.

We have elected to present this "compendium" of responses in part to allow the individual reader the opportunity to draw his own inferences from the basic data obtained. The complete questionnaires are, of course, available for review and study.

A COMPENDIUM OF RESPONSES
GENERALSHIP PROGRAM

A number of answers to each of the questions posed in the "Generalship" Questionnaire have been selected for direct quotation. These have been chosen as representative of both the majority and the significant minority points of view. In some instances, the complete answer is quoted; in others, only significant phrases or sentences have been cited. Editorial comment is offered, where appropriate, at the end of each section.

It was felt that since the data obtained through analysis of questionnaire responses were fully incorporated into the Report Volume, a compendium of this type would be of greater interest here than a straight recitation of findings. Such a collection of quotations - representative of those obtained from more than 85 experienced and senior military officers - should serve as a valuable guide to students of military affairs in general, and to future generations of general officers in particular. To our knowledge, there exists no comparable collection of the views, opinions, and comments of the outstanding senior officers of our time - as recounted *in their own words.*

The actual selection of quotations to be presented in this document was made by two senior military consultants on the basis of the excellence and clarity of particular responses. The anonymity of respondents has, in all instances, been preserved.

It is believed that the following compendium constitutes a unique and valuable addition to the existing literature on the art and techniques of generalship.

STAGE I MISSION EVALUATION AND INTERPRETATION

Determine, Isolate, and Define the Limits of the Mission You Must Accomplish

Question 1.1 Please state the general procedures followed and information needed to help you accomplish this step.

The following are among the more general comments offered:

> *"As C.G. of Division or higher level, I normally received instructions which were complete and precise as to defining my mission."*

> *"The general missions of my commands, as well as the details, were constantly under revision by the Plans Division of my staff."*

> *"Had an advanced planning group made up of Deputy C/S, member from each of G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and Artillery, who were continually studying possible future operations."*

Procedural comments included:

> *"The responsible person needs to know what is wanted by his superiors, what it is to be used for and (frequently, but not always) its relationship to the requirements placed upon others."*

> *"Read the problem...if possible, confront the directing authority face to face to: assure the entire mission is fully defined; limitations or problems are assumed or actual; that there is a complete meeting of minds. As much as possible, have C/S, 1, 2, 3, and 4 present at the beginning."*

"Where desirable, consulted with Commanding Generals of adjacent units to obtain further information of their plans and objectives. Consulted with C.G. of close-support Air Force unit to obtain further information on amount and nature of available air support."

"Upon receipt of the mission, I held a briefing with my Chief of Staff and principal officers...to acquaint them with what I would require and when such information would be needed."

"The Estimate of the Situation procedure is sound. This is a continuing process."

"Made estimate of the situation...a process that might take from a few minutes to several hours."

"An Estimate of the Situation must be made. The staff can assist you, but it is the commander's responsibility."

"Talked to key individuals to clarify and amplify my ideas of what the mission and problems were."

"I had the several staff officers study the problem and give me the key factors involved and their recommendations."

"Consultations with subordinate commanders should take place, if time permits, during this process."

Comments regarding information requirements included:

"Once you receive your mission, the first step is to know the terrain on which you are to operate."

"Evaluate all influences (enemy, terrain, weather, logistical situation, fatigue factor, etc.) that could adversely affect the outcome."

"Will communications operate? Can problem be supported logistically?"

"Assignment of missions to subordinate units was determined by terrain analysis from aerial photographs and existing topography; enemy strength and disposition as derived from intelligence reports, aerial, and in some cases ground, reconnaissance; availability of shipping, both tactical and support."

"In addition to detailed information regarding the hostile situation and possible reactions, detailed information was always needed on the vital components of the problem - What, When, Where, How, and Why (purpose)."

Question 1.2 To whom (except the General Staff chiefs) did you look for advice - Signal Officer? Engineer? Others?

As was expected, all respondents stated that the specific situation and nature of the mission determined who they would consult with:

> *"Intelligence generated within Sixth Army was augmented by that received from GHQ, which had access to reports from other Allied Forces, U.S. Air and Naval Forces. The Army Engineer and Army Signal Officer participated in planning for tactical operations, while all of the special staff with logistic responsibilities participated in logistic planning."*

> *"Ordinarily routine operational briefings bring to the commander the information he normally needs. However, swiftly changing situations may necessitate last minute reviews of particular aspects of the enemy/friendly situation and the condition of command or aspects of it such as, availability of replacements."*

> *"Varied greatly with situation and nature of mission."*

The following responses are representative of those in which more specific "rosters of participants" were given:

> *"Ordnance Officer, Transportation Officer, Ammo supply and transportation facilities were always most important."*

> *"Provost Marshal, Surgeon, Transportation Officer. I did not make it a practice of holding full blown staff meetings -- they were too cumbersome."*

> *"Provost Marshal, Surgeon, ALO, Artillery commander, Q.M., Ordnance, Armor."*

"Air, Armor, Artillery, Engineer, Ordnance, Chemical, Signal."

"In situations presenting special problems others such as Provost Marshal, Civil Affairs Officer, or other specialists, Subordinate Commanders if time and occasion allowed."

"Practically all of the technical staff at one time or another, including talking to the Chaplain, from time to time."

"Tank Bn, Artillery Commanders, Ordnance, Chemical Warfare, Air Units, Surgeon, Chaplain, Hq Commandant, A.G., and Provost Marshal."

"In administration these plus Chaplain, Provost Marshal and, for special cases, the Inspector General."

"I have usually found the Surgeon one of the best educated people on the staff who can give good advice on health and the human element."

"If a major factor of the problem required more than "SOP" action by the Signal Officer, Engineer, or others, they were present at the initial and subsequent conferences."

Many stress the importance of consultations with subordinate commanders:

"First and foremost, I looked to the next subordinate commanders for advice."

"First and always, the subordinate Commanders to whom I was assigning major tasks."

"Most usually subordinate commanders, to determine their views on feasibility."

"Major Subordinate Unit Commanders."

"I frequently consulted my combat commanders and sometimes even unit commanders."

"Local and adjacent commanders. Commanders of forces who will be assigned missions."

"C.O.'s of supporting weapons, i.e., tanks, etc."

"Administrative staff on occasion and subordinate commanders - next echelon."

"Talked to wide cross-section of command, making sure I was not isolated by my staff.

Question 1.3 Why did you seek advice from these people?

Most respondents explained that it was their practice to seek the advice of the "experts" or "specialists":

> *"Because they have knowledge that I need. To show my interest in them."*

> *"An operations plan requires an input from all members of the staff, both general and special."*

> *"My plan had to have adequate support to succeed. The better support the more chance of success. No one knew their technical capabilities like the chief technicians."*

> *"Because they are specialists - best qualified to advise in their own fields."*

> *"Because they had the information, background, judgment, etc. I needed (or because I thought they did) or because they knew where to get the facts, etc., or because of general or specific familiarity with the situation (terrain, human nature, weather, etc.)."*

The importance of consultations with subordinate commanders was repeatedly stressed:

> *"These commanders are a vital part of the Division Team effort."*

> *"With respect to Commanders because if you secure their full understanding and acceptance of the Mission you plan to assign them PRIOR to issuing any order, half the task is already accomplished."*

Many offered comment as to the various benefits and functions of consultations and conferences - ranging from information-gathering to morale-boosting to the "alerting" of subordinate commanders:

"I can't visualize a successful Commander who fails to seek and consider all the advice he can get before arriving at a sound decision."

"Commander can use all the help he can get."

"So as to be sure not to overlook any element or facet having a bearing on the solution or decision."

"To complete the picture. No one knows everything."

"To get a feel of capabilities, limitations, obstacles and critical areas."

"To assure these people of confidence and support by the commander."

"Primarily to avoid confusion which always exists to a degree in combat."

"Primarily to seek practical ways and means for minimizing limitations that may exist."

"Alert them and get them studying on the problem."

"Nothing detracts more from the value of a staff chief or a commander than by-passing him except in emergencies."

"Too often higher Hqts have neglected to seek suggestions from those in the field."

Question 1.4 What general principles did you follow in defining the problem?

"Clarity" and "brevity" were frequently cited:

"Express problem in clear language which could not be misunderstood, be as brief as justifiable."

"Be clear and concise in defining the problem."

"Clarity is the most important."

"Simplicity should be the guiding principle."

"Battlefield procedures should be simple. Consequently, battlefield techniques should be straightforward and should be free from all frills or embellishment."

The value of the "estimate of the situation" procedure was stressed:

"Follow the procedures for preparing an estimate of the situation."

"Always go through the who, what, when, where, and why routine."

"Follow the old "Estimate of the Situation".

"Who - What - When and Where in staff procedures have yet to be improved on in determining the mission or problem."

Among the more specific and pointed comments:

"First in every instance, consciously or unconsciously, you ask yourself: How much time do I have?"

"The Commander is solely responsible for what his troops do, or fail to do. Good Management and Leadership produces a superior organization. The ATTITUDE of the Commander is extremely vital to success. He must display confidence in organizations and his orders. Avoid developing a negative approach to suggestions. Get out where the troops are in action, talk to soldiers, and plan to greet all replacements coming into the unit. Be an example of cheerfulness, military bearing, showing an interest in and being courteous to fellow soldiers."

"The basic principles of good human relations. Every subordinate wants to get a look at the Boss, and maybe hear him speak. He wants to be assured that the Boss is aware of him, knows that he exists, and perhaps understands some of his problems. A pat on the back is a big help too."

"A thorough understanding of the mission and requirements in troops and materiel to accomplish it. An evaluation of means available and location of units and supplies. The status of training, fitness, morale and leadership of units. Time required for desired disposition of troops, materiel and supplies, location of reserves. The terrain and weather as it affects operation. The enemy disposition, strength, probable reaction. Possible deceptive measures that might be taken."

"Analyze the order. Know the capabilities of your troops. Know and respect the enemy. Confer with principal staff officers to bring about a meeting of minds as to 'what is wanted' and 'when'. Without

indication of prior decision, cause each to separately 'define the problem'. Keep an open mind until all returns are in! When the decision is made, make it clear and unequivocable. Know the terrain - never guess!"

And, finally:

"Biased and unfounded opinions must be replaced by firm facts pertaining to the problem at hand."

"The principles of war, modified by common sense and experience."

Question 1.5 What techniques and practices did you find particularly effective?

The overwhelming majority of respondents listed "personal contact" as not only effective, but critical:

> *"Personal participation and personal contact is the essence of getting this work done well at the very outset."*

> *"The best practice is personal contact."*

> *"Give subordinates every chance possible to participate. Be patient."*

The use of warning orders was widely recommended:

> *"Early WARNING ORDERS with essential logistic details are invaluable."*

> *"By far the most important was the use of warning orders."*

Other effective practices and techniques mentioned include:

> *"Talking informally to individuals. Reading existing directives. Getting to know personally key staff and commanders. Moving around - IMPORTANT!"*

> *"Established deadlines for presentation to me of any matters requiring decision after the initial conference."*

> *"An adequate 'war room' with graphic map and chart display of information. After broad framework of problem defined, test with staff for development."*

> *"After sufficient time had elapsed for digesting the directive, selecting two hard-nosed staff or commanders and questioning them individually as to their understanding of the mission and their responsibilities."*

"War gamed mission, from landing beaches thru all phases of advance to objective, so that all understood terrain, possible and probable enemy reaction and our counter moves."

And, more generally:

"To insure successful operation I found it essential to keep information flowing down to the unit commanders."

"Check and double check everything within time limits available."

"Try to break a difficult problem or mission into steps or phases."

"Establish firm and clear lines of authority."

"An absolutely confident attitude is essential. A Friendly attitude is helpful."

"Confidence in the judgment of tried and dependable subordinates."

Question 1.6 What techniques and practices do you think should be avoided?

"Complexity" and "indecision" were often mentioned as practices to be avoided:

"Complicated moves; 'Sing something simple'."

"It is my judgment that complex battlefield procedures should be avoided."

"The CG may have an 'if' in mind, but when he announces his decision there must be no 'if' about it."

Failure to properly use the staff was mentioned by approximately half of the respondents:

"Doing the work of the staff and failing to delegate responsibility are the most serious mistakes that a Commanding General can make and it must be avoided."

"Trying to do your own staff work - don't get involved in the pick and shovel work."

"Responsibility without commensurate authority. Too much staff operating. Command channels should be used."

Rigidity in thinking was cited as a practice to be avoided:

"Thinking what you did in last command will always fit the next one. Failure to listen."

"Do not, because of prior convictions, read something into a directive that is not in fact there."

"Adherence to an 'always' or 'never' type of approach to the solution of a problem, task, or mission."

The following are representative of the many diverse responses to this question:

"Do not try to accomplish too much or cover too great an area in one step or phase. Do not be caught at the end of a phase without a plan ready to jump right in to the next phase."

"Don't 'bite off' too much at a time. A mountain can be taken in parts but can't always be taken as a whole."

"Taking for granted that certain important actions will be accomplished automatically."

"Never issue orders that you do not think can be executed or that you would not be willing to execute if you were in the subordinate's position."

"Failure to consider the 'big picture' from the viewpoint of higher command."

"Avoid the 'how' except to insure coordination laterally and in depth."

"Keep away from the details - look at the 'woods' - the 'trees' are the problems of the staff sections."

"Overhasty reaction to reports from below which are not verified from other sources."

"Keeping information from C/S."

Question 1.7 Further Comments:

A variety of comments were offered. The following are only a few of the more interesting and pertinent:

"The old cliché: Issuing an order is 5%; seeing that it's carried out is 95%."

"There is no substitute for personal contact. Every subordinate wants to be assured that the C.G. knows he exists and what he is doing. He wants a little recognition, too. And maybe that pat on the back."

"Technical aids, i.e., computerized information, electronic display techniques, instant communications, make information speedily available as never before. However, the element of judgment must be applied by the commander."

"I don't want to sound like a Leavenworth Text Book - but the fact is - The Leavenworth Texts are right."

"Get out to the end of the line - find out what the troops are doing - getting - and thinking."

"The secret of successful offensive warfare is: 'Deliberate planning followed by violent execution'."

"Under any circumstances identical understanding of the problem by all persons involved is vital."

"The higher the headquarters, the more long range becomes the planning."

Summary Comments:

Variations in responses to the questions posed under Stage I were due, in part, to the different command experience levels of respondents (from Division through Field Army). It can be assumed that in assigning missions a higher authority will consider the means available, the enemy situation, physical characteristics of the combat area, and the time factor.

The responses were generally oriented to *offensive,* rather than defensive or hit-and-run operations (where the time between action and reaction and between decision and execution is considerably less.)

Responses indicate that upon receipt of his mission, the commander proceeds to make an analysis of the situation - however informal or brief. He undertakes to define for himself precisely *what* is expected of him, the purpose of the mission *(why),* the time requirements *(when),* the terrain most suitable in terms of the means available to him and most damaging to the enemy *(where),* and forms a tentative concept of operations - scheme of maneuver, coordinate tasks, support, etc. *(how).* This process might take from a few minutes to several hours depending upon whether it is a continuing operation, the time available, experience, and logistics.

His analysis completed, the commander contacted the persons upon whom he would rely for execution. Respondents state that such contacts are necessary if the commander is to procure additional detailed information and if he is to acquaint his subordinate commanders and staff with his preliminary evaluations. Again depending upon the situation and the time available, the form of these contacts can range from a full-blown conference to brief instructions to the Chief of Staff and messages to subordinates.

One factor which respondents neglected to mention is the demands of security if surprise is to be achieved. Security leaks occur in direct relation to the time of exposure and the knowledge of projected plans by persons in the lower levels of command who do not "need to know."

It is apparent that this first stage in the command process leads directly into the second stage; by the time that the first or "decision-making" step is completed, both the staff and the subordinate commanders are aware of the problem and of their commander's thoughts on how best to approach it.

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STAGE II ISSUING OF DIRECTIVES

Turn the Problem into an Operation by Issuing the Commander's Clear Directive for Conducting It

Question 2.1 To whom did you usually issue your directive?*

A small percentage of respondents stated that the directive was issued to the Chief of Staff alone:

> *"To the C/S for development into a complete operation order."*
>
> *"The Chief of Staff alone."*
>
> *"C/S"*
>
> *"To the Chief of Staff and G-3."*
>
> *"The Chief of Staff."*
>
> *"The Chief of Staff. If time permitted, and the situation warranted, to subordinate commanders, and the General Staff."*

Several stated that they generally issued the directive to the Chief of Staff and other staff officers:

> *"To the Chief of Staff and to the heads of the four staff sections plus the Artillery Commander, the Signal Officer and Engineer Officer."*
>
> *"To the general staff in combat units or administrative commands."*

---

* The term "directive" was intended to be taken as synonymous with "staff guidance" — i.e., as a command and staff procedure. In the responses received, however, some confusion was apparent; "directive" was taken by many respondents to be synonymous with "orders". This may explain the large percentage of responses which indicated that subordinate commanders were included.

"My directive for an important operation was invariably issued to the General Staff, including the C/S and his secretary. On occasion, vitally concerned special staff chiefs MIGHT be present, but this was not the norm."

"C/S, Gs, Engineer, Signal, Medical, Air, aides and other staff chiefs affected."

"Entire staff at a conference."

"To the staff, assembled, for transmittal to subordinate commanders. However, the necessity for speed may preclude this step in some operations. In such a case the commander may properly take over G-3's operational function, issuing fragmentary orders direct to subordinate commanders."

"To the assembled General Staff chiefs and certain chiefs of other staffs. Usually the subordinate commanders were advised personally by me."

More than 75% of the respondents stated that subordinate commanders were included:

"Major and immediate subordinate commanders; to my own staff; and to appropriate units directly under my Headquarter's control (such as artillery, signal, medical units plus reserve units)."

"To all major commanders in the presence of the General and Special Staff, if at all possible."

"Commanders and staff if possible."

"To those who would prepare the plan and later transform that plan into an operations order. If feasible, subordinate commanders concerned were present."

"General Staff and to subordinate commanders - time permitting."

"Staff and Commanders."

"Principal commanders involved in the operation. A directive of course had been prepared by staff sections and they were aware of its contents. Incidentally, I found it essential to keep my Chief of Staff completely in my confidence, and there were no secrets between the Chief of Staff and Commander."

"To the Commanders of the major elements of my command, to the Staff, and with copies to Commanders of supporting units or services, and superior authority."

"For a division operation, to the general staff assembled. On several occasions to staff and principal commanders assembled."

"To the command or staff level charged with the securing of the objective, delivering the finished product or making the final recommendation. This means the unit commander, the organizational division chief, or the Chief of Staff as appropriate."

Question 2.2 Was it usually issued in writing or orally?

Responses to this question fell into three categories. Approximately 20% stated that directives were always issued in writing. Roughly 30% claimed that "in writing" was the preferred manner of issuance, but that circumstances sometimes required oral delivery with written confirmation as soon as possible. The remaining 50% replied that directives were always issued orally - with written confirmation when possible. The following quotations are illustrative of responses received:

> *"In writing - supplemented orally, before and after issuance."*

> *"Invariably in writing or confirmed in writing at the earliest possible moment if an oral directive were issued."*

> *"Usually in writing."*

> *"Always in writing."*

> *"Directives were always written, although they may have been preceded by oral instructions."*

> *"Always in writing, though where time did not permit, first orally, with written confirmation following as soon afterwards as practicable."*

> *"In writing when time would allow."*

> *"75% of the time orally - followed by written confirmation."*

> *"Preliminary directive orally. When possible final directive on map overlay with written order on the overlay."*

> *"Orally."*

"It was usually issued orally, after a conference with all concerned."

"Simple directives orally. In writing for longer or more complicated directives or those for missions which would take a long period of time to accomplish."

"Orally, especially in combat. There is too much writing for history and alibis. One has to win."

"Orally, to initiate staff action for a new operation."

"Usually orally with those present taking notes."

Question 2.3 Was it usually issued all at once or in fragments?

More than 90% of the respondents stated that "all at once" was the common or preferred manner of issuance:

> *"All at once, if possible; in fragments when exigencies of the situation - time, circumstance, or nature of task - require it."*

> *"All at once if at all possible."*

> *"Usually all at once - then in some cases supplemented with fragments."*

> *"Initially, all at once."*

> *"Preferred to issue all at once."*

> *"Usually all at once if possible in order to tie all elements together."*

> *"All at once initially; fragmentary as the situation developed through action."*

> *"In combat it was usually issued all at once. Sometimes, of course, additional instructions were necessary to some staff sections."*

Question 2.4 To what degree was direct contact with staff members or subordinate commanders necessary during this stage?

The majority of respondents stated that direct contact was not only desirable, but absolutely essential, during this phase:

"Always necessary, and always done. IF TIME PERMITTED."

"It is essential when time will permit it."

"Direct Contact is always desirable."

"Vital. Time again permitting, a continuous dialogue is necessary between the staff and the commanders, in order that the best possible common understanding be achieved."

"Essential. The Chief of Staff of course was main contact for staff."

"Absolutely necessary."

"All important."

"I consider direct contact the most desirable method."

"I believe direct contact during this stage to be absolutely essential to achieve best results."

"Often as I formulated my directive I would call key staff officers and commanders in or on the phone and 'try out' my proposals on them for size."

A small percentage of respondents claimed that while direct contact with the Chief of Staff and other key staff officers was necessary, contact with subordinate commanders was not required at this time:

> *"Close contact was necessary with Chief of Staff, G-3 and G-2. Less frequent and close contact with G-4. Contact with subordinate commanders seldom necessary."*

> *"Not much, usually worked through the S-3 or Chief of Staff, G-3. Gave my ideas as a guide. After plan developed, had briefing with all concerned. Each had a chance for comment. Directed any changes necessary."*

> *"Contact with and availability to staff members and subordinate commanders involved, by the commander essential. However, actual presence of subordinate commanders during the issuance of the directive is generally undesirable unless it is a directive to be issued to him personally, orally, by the CG."*

Question 2.5 What general principles did you follow in issuing directives?

The importance of clarity and brevity were stressed. "Assure full understanding" was a dictum offered by many respondents:

> *"Kept things simple and direct. Always check when the directive is issued to see if there are any misunderstandings."*

> *"Brevity. Clearness. Completeness."*

> *"Try to make it concise, but clear. Here it is important not only to be understood, but not to be misunderstood."*

> *"Simple, Logical, Complete. Open discussion of reasons and alternatives."*

> *"Simplify instructions as much as possible. Insure understanding of mission by all concerned."*

> *"Make certain that there was no misunderstanding."*

> *"Clarity and lack of ambiguity. Briefness as far as situation permitted. Simple language. Logical sequence."*

> *"First, SIMPLICITY. The battle field is complicated enough. Fancy, 'brilliant' maneuvers succeed only when there is nothing to stop them. TIMING. It must be realized how much time it takes for a commander's wishes to 'permeate the structure'."*

The use of warning orders was frequently cited:

> *"Issue timely instructions. Warning orders should be issued to subordinate commanders unless security requirements prohibit."*

"The warning order is of the greatest possible importance, and its use is a technique often neglected by commanders who leave subordinate units in the dark until a full order can be prepared and issued. Inasmuch as those processes always take more time than anticipated, subordinate unit planning is often rushed and troops badly discommoded. So as a usual thing, unless a great deal of time is available, an alerting warning order should be issued each unit stating only in the most general terms when the unit should be ready to do what sort of task."

Respondents again stressed the importance of direct contact:

"Face-to-face - if ot all practicable - this gives opportunity for questions and amplification."

"Insure adequate staff coordination. Prescribe what was to be done but now how to do it. When practicable it was desirable to discuss with subordinate commanders the objective and concept of the operation."

"Personal and informal briefings to 'communicate' - using necessary material aides - maps - charts - blackboards, etc. Opportunity for all present to raise questions and discuss points of misunderstanding."

Question 2.6 What techniques and practices did you find particularly effective?

Because the "effective techniques and practices" cited are generally the same as "the principles" offered in answer to Question 2.5 above, only a few quotations are presented here:

"Gave broad guidance to the planner to prevent 'spinning of the wheels'. If your thoughts are not known, someone is trying to guess them - this wastes time."

"Check the finished directive against a check list to insure completeness and to see that it is so CLEAR - that it is impossible to misinterpret."

"Be sure staff has time to fully study and comment on 'final drafts'. Similarly, frank discussion with commanders."

"To be available at all times to give guidance in the development of the plans and implementation of orders for the operation."

"After issuance of directive, clarify any matters in question so there will be no misunderstanding about what is to be included in the order prepared for issuance to the command. Always seek clarity without verbosity. A good staff appreciates this characteristic in the commander."

"The practice of being currently aware of the status of plans and situations of the principal elements in my command."

"Giving all those vitally interested in an operation the opportunity to state their case, to offer suggestions or objections, before the order was issued."

"Provide recipients of directive an opportunity to ask questions - for clarity or amplification within reason, and to voice objections and express exceptions if there are any. Demonstrate confidence in subordinates to produce high quality and timely results."

"Be readily available for conferences and discussions with staff members at which conferences the chief of staff must always be present."

"Build up confidence; participate - no ivory towers."

"Attainable objectives. Unobtainable objectives hurt the esprit of the unit. Objectives can always be added."

"After having determined the immediate objectives, and a more distant objective, the basic scheme of maneuver, and zones of action, I usually assembled the commanders of all major units, each accompanied by one or more of his staff officers. My principal staff officers were also present. I personally outlined orally the above decisions, using a map on which enemy dispositions and the principal terrain features were emphasized. Subordinate commanders were then encouraged to ask questions to clarify any points they wished."

"Placing the order as much as possible on a map as an annex to the order itself. In some cases the order itself was typed on the map."

"Full knowledge of problem. Firm decision based on capabilities."

"A hearty pat on the back."

"Go forward to issue the order as close to the action as one can conveniently arrange it, that is to say, do not bring subordinate combat commanders all the way back from their units to receive an order when it can be avoided."

"War-gaming."

Question 2.7 What techniques and practices do you think should be avoided?

In answering this question, most respondents offered the obverse of comments made in answer to Question 2.6 above. The following are illustrative:

"Non-accessability!"

"Failure to be accessible to commanders and staff."

"Bawling-out in public."

"Failure to keep abreast of changes in situation. Failure to keep all informed of latest information and developments on basis of need to know. Rigidity in thinking and planning."

"Arbitrarily issuing instructions which are not well conceived and thought out."

"Permitting 'yes' men."

"Verbosity and delay."

"Avoid speaking like an oracle."

"Remaining in an ivory tower."

"Minimize the 'how'."

"Getting into subordinates' jobs."

"Don't involve yourself too much in detail."

"Avoid interference with the duties of the chief of staff and the actions of the general staff."

"Over-simplification of the mission, and plan of accomplishment. Do not rob the staff of its expected initiative. If a staff member lacks this expected initiative and professional skill, get a new one who has them."

"Don't tell a man HOW to do his job."

"Bringing subordinate commanders back to the CP when excessive time and distance are involved."

"When units are in contact with the enemy do not call unit commanders back to DHQ, go to them."

"Unnecessary staffing thus consuming time needed by subordinate commanders for their planning and preparation."

"Reliance, ... by a commander on his staff to produce a concept without his prior guidance."

"Issuing orders without consulting the people who have to carry them out."

"Failing to develop rapidly and progressively one's plan and passing it on equally promptly."

"Avoid unnecessary detail and infringements. If intelligent response is expected do not withhold essential information. Don't assume that similar units have equal capabilities."

"VAGUENESS - INDECISION - and, at the same time, ARBITRARINESS. Too much 'hovering around', either staff or subordinate commanders. Failure to keep abreast of the progress of work - then having to make major changes at the last minute. Failure to relieve an incompetent staff officer or commander. Failure in TIMELY issuance of orders."

"Failure of Commander to have personal contacts with subordinate Commanders. Failure of Commander's Staff to have proper, friendly relations with subordinate Commander and his Staff. A haughty, know-it-all Staff, can cost a Commander dearly in his dealings with his subordinate Commanders, and usually does. Dependence on written directives without an oral briefing. These are invariably followed by numerous additions, changes, and deletions to the point that the end result is utter confusion. Any practice or technique that tears down 'The Team' spirit or a 'Can Do' attitude must be guarded against and avoided at all cost."

"There are many things that should be avoided, of course, but the more serious that I observed were those that had to do with lack of contact between the Commanding General and the subordinate units. Do not rely upon staff officers to issue orders in your name if you can possibly get up front and do it yourself. See the situation firsthand. No amount of written messages and telephone and radio conversations can give you the smell of battle like a visit to a battalion command post."

Question 2.8 Further Comments.

Most respondents took this opportunity to offer such diverse, but cogent and thoughtful, comments as the following:

"Coordination and cooperation are the prime requisites for a smooth running staff."

"For major directives a well-organized war room is an invaluable technique for keeping the commander informed of the details of the directive as it progresses - and also to insure full coordination on the staff."

"Up till the time of decision permit as much discussion - disagreement - alternate plans as TIME PERMITS - once the decision is made - everyone gets behind it - and make sure everyone understands."

"Accept full and complete responsibility for your decisions - actions - orders - If your staff was wrong - you were wrong - of course if they were right - tell them so - because they made you look good."

"Command has a psychological aspect which must not be neglected. It is a problem in human relations. Morale is three-fourths the battle, and without it you get nowhere. Therefore, the Commander must inspire confidence in subordinates and win their cooperation. He does not accomplish this by ignoring them, by not listening to them, by riding rough shod over their objections. He must take a little time out and listen. Maybe he can sell them on his ideas. And once in a while a subordinate might have a good idea too."

"As I recall it, there were not more than half a dozen times during more than nine months of continuous combat when I had an opportunity to assemble all battalion and higher commanders and staff for evening dinner at DHQ mess, discussion and issuing orders. I took these opportunities for a brief review, the big picture and a pat on the back. Then I would give the general plan and basic objectives and the general staff would give the directive for the next operation and field questions. These sessions were of great value in our division because we used a completely flexible organization. Battalions, companies and even platoons were trained and accustomed to assignment to any combat command. I do not believe we used any single combat command organization for more than a week throughout the war. They ranged from a reinforced battalion to ten battalions plus, depending on mission, enemy, terrain and condition of troops. It worked."

"One should not get the idea that all this takes up a great deal of time. It need not. All it requires is practice. Good 'professionals' can move fast, mentally and physically. If they can't or won't they should be replaced by those who can and will. The efficient - and respected - Commander maintains 'control' of his oral briefings. There are no 'debates'."

Summary Comments:

Respondents, almost unanimously, preferred written directives - even when considerations of time dictated initial oral issuance. This suggests the sentiment on their part that nothing assures common understanding and accurate execution as much as the well-considered, written word.

There were, however, those who felt that use of the *oral* directive was required by the increased tempo of modern warfare. These were generally persons known to be highly articulate and extremely proficient in the accurate and pointed use of the spoken word.

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STAGE III MONITORING STAFF

Monitor the Development, Preparation, and Issuing of Coordinated Instructions, Plans, and Orders for Implementing the Directive, with the Help of Your Chief of Staff.

Question 3.1 To what extent did you usually monitor and guide the staff during this "staffing" process?

More than 95% of the respondents stated that their personal monitoring was kept to a minimum:

"As much as needed without looking over their shoulders. I had to make sure that they had the same picture from my directive as I had when I gave it."

"Do not 'bother' them - when they need something from you they will come to you. Be available to them."

"Only the minimum necessary, I picked my staff and I trusted them until they proved I was wrong."

"Only to the extent of seeing that everyone was on the track heading in the same direction."

"Enough to insure I knew the status of the 'staffing' and to provide the necessary guidance - and NO MORE."

"To extent needed to see that my plans and orders were clearly understood and were implemented in the operation order."

"Spot check. Show yourself so staff will know you are available and willing to talk."

"Usually, first a conference with the C/S and GS Sec Chiefs, Air, Engineer, Signal, and Surgeon. Then personal visits to Staff Sec Chiefs as opportunity offered, to give them the opportunity to tell me their troubles, if any, and let me help."

"I did very little 'monitoring' as such except thru the Chief of Staff. I generally depended on him to handle this aspect of the problem, for I spent my time away from Hqrs as a rule during daylight hours. However, I could always be reached by the C/S or any G if needed. Usually, the draft of the finished product was laid before me by the C/S or G-3 upon my return to Hqrs - and always in plenty of time."

The following comments are representative of those offered by persons who had served in the capacity of Chief of Staff:

"As commander, minimal. Used Chief of Staff or Executive. As Chief of Section or Chief of Staff, continuous."

"Once CG had established the objective and concept of operation, he delegated to me as his Chief of Staff supervision of the staff in developing a plan and directive for the operation. When the directive was in final form and coordinated within the staff and with supporting Air and Naval forces, it would be presented to the CG for approval. Normally the G-3 would accompany me during this presentation."

Question 3.2 What importance do you attach to your personal availability during this time?

Approximately half of the respondents stated that their personal availability was critical at this time:

"Complete availability at any time after there had been sufficient time for complete digestion of the directive."

"I think this is most important to prevent future misunderstanding."

"The greatest importance. I am holding the bag, and I must know everything that is going on, including any difficulties that may arise."

"Great importance."

"This is no time to go 'fishing'. It is very important that the Commander be available to his staff."

"Of top importance. Supplementing implementing decisions and approvals."

"This is highly important."

"Most important. Not so much to verify accuracy as to be sure orders were in accord with other instructions by different staff sections or other commands."

"I consider personal availability of the Commander most important. He cannot go into the Ivory Tower while the staff is working."

"Utmost. Door always open."

"Absolutely vital - to save time, confusion and wasted effort. Visit staff officers as frequently as necessary (daily). Do not make them come to you - it wastes their time and breaks their coordination."

"It is imperative. In general it is by far the MOST significant single item."

The remaining 50% stated that while "availability" was important, the commander must rely upon his Chief of Staff at this time and himself undertake visits to his subordinate commanders:

"No commander can remain at his Hqrs. simply for the purpose of being available to his staff during this process. Yet he must always be available to the C/S of any G if necessary. How this is solved is usually a personal characteristic of the CG. I simply had my Aide notify my C/S where I was by phone or radio at each stop, how long I would be there and where I was going next. Only on few occasions was it necessary to return to Hqrs for conference with any G, but I did frequently talk to my C/S by phone about minor matters."

"If you have a good C/S your availability can be limited."

"I was available when and if needed, and I made it my practice, even though not called on, to visit and quietly listen to the staff officers involved to see whether we were thinking along the desired lines. I did not interfere with preparation or make myself conspicuous so as to lessen the effectiveness of the work being prepared."

"Not absolutely necessary to be personally available. I attach little importance to it."

"No staff can function unless the CG is available for decisions but if the original directive to the staff is good, the CG need not hesitate to absent himself. Of course I was always in radio range. On the other hand no staff is of value unless the C/S or G-3 (or other G) is willing to make decisions in the CG's name and in his absence. I always backed up my staff in public."

"Of great importance, but this is not to say that the commander should not absent himself from his headquarters in performance of the other functions of command, including consultation with subordinate commanders on the forthcoming operation."

"It is essential. But that does not mean that one must not leave his CP. In the time between the daily two conferences little of a routine nature could develop that couldn't be dealt with at the PM conference. Furthermore, while at Army or Division Hq. or in Corps or Division areas I always could be reached by phone or radio."

"If time permitted, I preferred to disappear from the Hqrs. and leave the C/S on duty. I would go see subordinate commanders if available or telephone them, but keep the C/S advised as to where he could find me."

"Great importance, but my deputy and C/S had much authority to act for me."

"With a good experienced staff little. With a new or inexperienced staff - or not used to your way of operating - a lot. I always believed in utmost delegation of details to staff."

"Of vital importance until my Chief of Staff has become practically my alter ego."

"Actually very little; if a commander begins to do the Chief of Staff's job or the staff's job, he is denied time that he needs for much more important purposes, such as, reducing problems and breaking bottlenecks and, most importantly, visiting throughout his command - particularly the forward elements."

Question 3.3 Did the staff feel free to come to your Chief of Staff or to you during this process for clarification or further guidance?

The vast majority of respondents answered "yes":

"They did and they must. Disaster would be invited otherwise."

"Yes - essential. (It is better to have someone break you out in the middle of the night with trivia than to have a disaster because a staff officer or a commander is afraid of the General.)"

"Yes, almost without fail."

"One of my first acts upon assuming command was to emphasize my availability and instruct the Chief of Staff to do likewise."

"I am careful to insure this. If you fail in this you have only yourself to blame for 'tie-ups'."

"Yes - and you must make them understand they can do it."

"Yes, but normally to the Chief of Staff first. My frequent presence in the operations center, at meals, and other times gave the staff ample opportunity to see me. The only restriction, if it can be called such, was that the staff officer was required to report the conversation to the Chief of Staff if he was not present, and pass on any instructions received from me."

"Yes - this is a must."

"Always. My Chief of Staff was thoroughly acquainted with my thoughts on a particular operation and was eminently qualified to adjust minor differences which might arise while I was elsewhere."

Question 3.4 Did they do so?

Once again, more than 90% answered "yes":

"Yes, always."

"Yes, depending sometimes on personalities."

"Yes."

"Eventually, but not nearly as much as I desired them to."

"Yes, when in their judgment, it became necessary."

"It is my thought that this was common practice throughout the campaign."

"As determined by the competence and experience of the personnel concerned. Direct relationship between the length of time they had worked with me."

Question 3.5 What general principles did you follow in monitoring the staff?

Respondents stressed that a commander must not harass his staff - that while he should check on progress, he should rely on his Chief of Staff for close monitoring:

"Selected monitoring to determine that things were on the track without making it appear I had a lack of confidence in personnel concerned."

"I followed the principle that once you have assigned a task to a person leave him alone. If he needs advice he will come to you. I held regular staff meetings. At these meetings many problems were resolved and teamwork resulted. When this is done there is no need for constant interference."

"I did not 'monitor' the staff in the sense of looking over their shoulders. I did monitor them in the sense of making very clear what I wanted and placing full confidence in them."

"Generally deal with heads of sections - but occasionally have a dialogue with a few subordinate staff officers - Hold your Chief of Staff responsible for staff efficiency - Use him as your alter ego."

"I hesitate to answer this one, but I believe in retrospect that I felt the staff worked more efficiently if they did not have the impression I was breathing down their necks."

"Leave the staff alone if they are proceeding satisfactorily. Advise and correct if not so doing."

"Monitoring the staff is the primary job of the chief of staff. Leave him alone to do it."

"Didn't bother them while they were producing the product. Was helpful upon requests for clarification. An occasional 'How are you coming along?' is helpful."

"Told them what was desired, i.e., the Mission, concept of the operation. Thereafter avoided harassing them or allowing any one else to harass them. Checked at intervals to see that work was progressing."

'I kept still and let them call on me if they needed help. After all - what have I got a good C/S for."

Other important "principles to be followed" in this stage are:

"Openness, i.e., availability; be cooperative, helpful, patient; reasonableness; check for completeness of the order they are preparing - its accuracy; distribution to proper addressees."

"Friendly, intense professional interest. A strictly military relationship is preferrable to a personal relationship - i.e., a matter of mutual respect and confidence coupled with sincere consideration and sympathy. Avoid first name relationships no matter how spiritually close you may be - it will save heart-aches and disappointments (and maybe impositions!)."

"Timely issuance of information and orders to subordinate commanders and staff. Make all information available to all concerned as soon as possible."

"Visits to staff sections. Conferences. Periodic reports by the Chief of Staff."

"Ask that carefully selected bits of work be submitted early for checking or for information. Casual visits to work areas to make verbal and visual spot checks. Require progress reports from chief of staff."

"While I personally made all the basic decisions as to operations, I always encouraged suggestions and frank expressions of personal views from members of the staff. They were trained to use their own initiative, in their respective areas, to the maximum extent within the broad plan of action."

"My phone and door were always open to them as was my C/S's. I did not let my aides form a barrier to protect me because 'I was too busy'."

Question 3.6 What techniques did you use to insure that your subordinate commanders received their orders on time and that they fully understood them?

The establishing of time schedules and deadline dates was repeatedly cited. The issuing of "warning orders" was generally stated to be an especially effective technique:

> *"Established briefing or deadline dates on directives and orders."*

> *"Set deadlines for the staff. Held infrequent meetings with the commanders concerned."*

> *"Specified the time and date by which the order would be distributed. Issued 'warning' and 'fragmentary' orders where the 'time factor' was short. Talked individually with commanders."*

> *"Personal visits and spot checks by commanders and staff. Deadline times were established for all critical events including issuance of orders."*

> *"No one ever has 'enough' time to do their job - always wanting more. Get information and orders out as early as possible - in fragmentary form if at all possible. Warning orders are especially helpful."*

> *"Ceaseless emphasis on the vital importance of the TIME FACTOR, in war this is the single most essential element there is."*

Several respondents stated that liaison officers were employed to assure timely delivery of orders to subordinate commanders:

> *"Use of selected and competent liaison officers as messengers if at all possible - themselves briefed completely on the directive as far as their particular units were concerned."*

"The use of qualified liaison officers and other means of communications. By check and counter-check on the part of the staff sections concerned, between senior and subordinate commanders."

"Use of senior staff officers for liaison with subordinate commanders."

Personal visits to - and direct contact with - subordinate commanders was the most commonly cited technique:

"Preliminary conferences with senior subordinate commanders are all important. While the operations order is being prepared in your headquarters, subordinate commanders should know sufficiently in advance what is expected of them so that they can initiate their own planning at an early date."

"My next subordinate commanders got their orders directly from me. Any confusion was cleared up at the time. When time permitted I visited them personally before the action to make certain that there was no misunderstanding."

"Nothing is more beneficial than a personal visit to subordinate commanders after they have had an opportunity to peruse new orders they have received."

"Personal contact at the time of the issuance of the order wherever possible."

"As firm portions of plan developed briefed subordinate commanders so their staffs could initiate their work."

"When orders were written I visited the subordinate commanders concerned, and talked with them re the proposed operation. But, in general, in my division, orders were oral and subordinate commanders had a chance to ask questions."

"Personal visits if possible early in the planning phase. Warning orders and plans. Carrying final orders to them if time was important. Final visit to key commanders before operations started to insure they were informed and fully supported."

Question 3.7 What techniques and practices did you find particularly effective?

A variety of different techniques and practices were cited. These ranged from such specific techniques as "the use of maps and overlays" to more general practices - such as "frequent personal contacts". The following comments are representative:

"Use of maps, overlays and personal visits."

"Marked maps - not overlays. Making sure they knew what would further my plan in case they ran out of orders or circumstances made my orders impracticable. Having a subordinate commander do nothing for lack of orders is inexcusable."

"Use of a War Room."

"Permanent liaison officers from subordinate units."

"Personal 'follow-up' on the projects as deadlines approached."

"Early alerting that order to do so-and-so would be forthcoming."

"By having groups of staff officers visit subordinate Hqs - usually two Hqs lower - and see what was needed - if everything understood - and see what my Hqs could do to help."

"Demonstration of confidence that all subordinates will do a good job. (Once they know you doubt them, they rapidly lose effectiveness.)."

"Often a personal conference will remove a doubt or solve a difficulty that an individual has hesitated to bring up at a general meeting."

"Have an excellent C/S - and use him - Be sure he knows what you want and also be sure that you yourself, know what you want."

"Personal contact to insure that the orders issued were clear and sufficient to carry out my plans."

"Drop in to see each staff section once in a while, not necessarily to check up but to let them know I was interested in them."

Question 3.8 What techniques and practices do you think should be avoided?

A few respondents suggested that too-frequent changes in plans were to be avoided unless circumstances were such as to make revisions absolutely essential:

> *"Changing your directives without overpowering reasons."*

> *"Don't change your mind each time the wind changes direction. Don't put the Staff in the position of starting in one direction, then having to discard their efforts and start anew in another direction."*

Several respondents strongly stated the need for keeping the Chief of Staff completely informed as regards all critical developments:

> *"Failing to inform the Chief of Staff of decisions made or instructions issued by phone or during personal visits."*

Subordinate commanders must also be kept informed of such developments as effect their planning. They should not be "kept in the dark" until formal orders are completed:

> *"Keeping subordinate units in the dark until all operations planning is completed. This is a waste of valuable time in both planning and training. A harmonious relationship between the staff of the senior command and the staff of the subordinate command is of utmost importance. This is particularly true of the general staff, the engineer, and the signal officer."*

> *"Issuing orders without prior warning or consultation with commanders of major subordinate units. Not making clear-cut decisions."*

"Do not wait for detailed and fancy orders to be typed or printed. Get material to the interested persons by the fastest means available."

"Calling subordinate commanders back for orders when time was important to them to prepare for the operation."

"Harassment of the staff" was cited by many respondents as a practice to be assiduously avoided:

"Harassing staff by too-frequent visits or unnecessary conferences."

"Avoid the sometimes temptation to do it yourself. Let the other person do his work without interference. It is well to follow the old slogan-'Tell the person what to do but not always how to do it'."

"Not using the staff, not delegating responsibility, trying to actually command the subordinate units."

"Over-supervision!"

Finally, several respondents stated that while over-supervision was to be avoided, the commander must not fail to personally check on the progress of plan development:

"Not giving personal attention to the progress of the preparation of the directive."

"Putting orders or instructions in out-basket - or issuing oral or written instructions and then assuming that they are going to be carried out completely and effectively."

Question 3.9 Further comments.

The following are illustrative of the very thoughtful and sensitive comments offered by respondents:

"I attempted to instill in the staff the belief that our headquarters existed to serve subordinate echelons equally with higher echelons. I instructed the staff that before concurring in or issuing a directive to ask themselves: 'What would I do - How would I feel - if I were in the recipient's shoes?'. They were not to permit sympathy or sentiment to influence the answers. This was, however, a reminder that appreciation of the impact of the directive is always appropriate."

"The commander must gather around him a highly competent, dependable, and loyal group of staff officers."

"If I was a successful General it was simply that I had enough sense to surround myself with competent people, give them a mission worth doing, let them have the time to do their work and then lead them in the execution!"

"A commander needs an efficient staff. If he does not have one then he must develop one. Commanding a Division or higher is not a one man job. This, regardless of how good the one man is. There are just too many details for one person. An otherwise excellent Commander can be broken by an inefficient Staff. On the other hand, it is probable that some marginal Commanders have been 'carried' by an excellent Staff of someone else's making. For a short time anyway. A Commander has the duty of supporting his staff, but at the same time he has the duty of seeing that members of his Staff do not ride rough-shod over subordinate Commanders and their Staffs. Nor conduct themselves

improperly when dealing with units on the right and left. The Commander is responsible for his Staff, their efficiency and their conduct. Members of the Staff speak for the Commander, not for themselves. Too often otherwise good Staff Officers forget this. If this happens frequently it is the Commander's fault. If he doesn't correct it his Command is likely to fall apart. If a Chief of Staff issues orders in the name of the commander, without his knowledge, he is duty bound to so advise his Commander immediately, tell him all the circumstances. The same principle applies to other Officers on the staff also."

Summary Comments:

The great variety of considerations which receive the attention and occupy the minds of the commander and his staff during this period could not possibly be covered in detail in a study such as this.

It has often been said that the success of offensive operations is based upon "Deliberate and Complete Planning followed by Violent Execution of Plans". If this is so, then the deliberate and complete planning must cover not only the normal concepts of handling and assigning subordinate units and their support, but must also take into account such factors as:

Rehearsals for key elements;
Special vehicle loadings;
Precise time scheduling;
Adequate intelligence gathering;
Adequate and responsive communications;
Briefings for special operations;
Security and surprise;
Adequate pre-stocking of supplies;
Coordination with allies and other services;
Maintenance;
Replacement programs; etc.

The above are only a few of the considerations which must be borne by the commander with the help of his staff.

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STAGE IV FOLLOW-UP AND EVALUATION

Follow-Up to See that Instructions, Plans, and Orders are Understood and Carried Out, Making Necessary Modifications and Additions as the Operation Progresses to Completion.

Question 4.1 What was the principal type of information you needed?

Responses were fairly uniform. The information requirements cited parallel those stated to be critical in Stage I. The following are illustrative:

> *"Timely progress reports, especially reports of difficulties."*

> *"That information that assured me that all elements of the Command were functioning properly to achieve the desired result."*

> *"Immediate notification of time and place where the expected progress was not being made, and the reason. Immediate notification of time and place where the progress was substantially more than expected."*

> *"Had what I wanted done, been done, in the manner I wanted it done and on time."*

> *"What is happening at the end of the line, at the front, at the bottom of the hopper."*

> *"Progress of units in carrying out operation. Unforeseen developments caused by enemy, weather, terrain, etc. Losses, heavy resistance or lack thereof. Need for reinforcement in troops or supplies."*

"Where success has exceeded expectations and may possibly be exploited; where success is not achieved, Why?, and what action can or should be taken to correct a bad situation."

"Enemy, terrain, and weather. Information of our own troops, supply situation I generally had up to the minute through my own ceaseless visits and inspections."

"How the operation was progressing. The reaction of the enemy. Faults in my plan. The weak spot in the opponent's line. The quality of my enemy and his strength. Communications - Status of Supply - Casualties."

"The principal type, of course, is information of our own troops: how the operation is going. Hence G-3 and G-2 are dominant."

"Enemy reaction. Major difficulties encountered."

"The really essential elements of information. The really critical information. There are really 100 items of different information available during a battle. The trick is to detect the key bits and not be overwhelmed by the rest."

"What, where, when, how and why."

"Performance of the command measured against the requirements of the directives which had been issued."

Question 4.2 How did you get it?

Personal visits, inspections, and personal observation were cited by virtually all respondents as being essential mechanisms for information gathering:

> *"By personal visits and inspection. From reports by commanders and other trusted subordinates."*

> *"Some of it came to me through the staff, but in many instances I got it myself by being there when it happened."*

> *"By personal visits - by personal calls - by staff visits."*

> *"Personal reconnaissance and visits to units."*

> *"Being on the spot where the first information becomes available."*

> *"By spending my daylight hours with principal commanders at the front."*

> *"By personal reconnaissance and reports from unit commanders and staff."*

> *"Staff follow-up and checks. Personal observation and on-the-ground checks."*

> *"Go look, see, or send a qualified and trusted staff officer."*

> *"I went out to see. I sent some of my staff on staff visits."*

"Reports, calls, visits. The G-2, if smart, can direct essential information in a few key categories and hence give highlight to the essentials."

"From the responsible commander by radio, phone or liaison officer. Personal observation, or that of my staff members."

"From the staff and commanders whose duty required them to have it. By asking for specific needed information - not by blanket requests that invite unnecessary details."

Question 4.3 How much of the "follow-up" did you do yourself and how much did you delegate?

Responses to this question indicated near-universal agreement with the command principle which states that the commander must personally assume a large part of the follow-up responsibility. It is his duty to check on all critical actions, delegating follow-up responsibility in less vital areas to staff officers:

"You personally do as much as you can yourself, especially to the most significant or most vital or most critical places."

"I checked the 'main things', those that could cause the operation to fail."

"I did enough myself to assure myself that my orders were being carried out."

"My staff did what they could in their own fields. I visited the critical places myself as I determined them."

"Much of it myself. Some by the staff."

"Most all I did myself."

"As much as possible - yet trying to avoid pestering the commanders."

"I personally tried to be at the most critical points and delegated others to members of my staff."

"Combat operational matters of vital concern, where a favorable or unfavorable crisis might occur, I tried to watch over myself."

"In combat I did most of the 'follow-up' myself."

"I personally followed closely the major course of action either from an observation point or by visits to subordinate units."

"Do personally that which is critical to success. Delegate balance and spot check that as time permits."

"Hard to estimate. I personally visited from 1-3 divisions daily and my staff chiefs or representatives were equally engaged in these contacts."

"This is hard to break down in an exact manner, but the commanding general must go where his presence is needed."

"An organization does well only those things the boss checks."

Question 4.4 How did you conduct your own "follow-up"?

Well over 90% of the respondents replied "by personal visits":

"By personal visits to subordinate units and by acting on advice of Staff Officers who had observed a situation and considered that my personal intervention was necessary."

"Mostly by helicopter visit, which makes the task infinitely easier than it has ever been before."

"Go to the unit and see to it that your instructions are understood and carried out."

"By being personally on the spot at the crises of action, before they occurred whenever I could anticipate them in advance, and as soon as possible afterwards, when I could not do this."

"Personal contact is best. Simple progress reporting system is effective."

"By personal visits with principal commanders, conferences with them and by observing front line actions."

"Personal visit and by radio or telephone."

"Personal visits and discussion with key staff officers after their visits."

"By visiting commanders."

"By jeep, air, helicopter, telephone, visits!"

"By personal visits. I do not know any other way. In combat there is nothing more important than to have the commander visible to the troops.....In the face of danger nearly everyone needs a little prodding, and the man to do it is the CG."

Question 4.5 In this step, how important was face-to-face contact with subordinates?

As would be expected from the responses to question 4.4 above, the consensus was "all important". Face-to-face contact serves many critical functions as indicated in the following representative comments:

"Most important especially when unit had been having tough going."

"Vital. Always with the effort to impress them that my role was to help, where help was really needed."

"I regard it as vital."

"Your presence 'up-front' is good for the morale."

"Very important on vital problems - Mission - Reserve - Supplies - etc. - Also to administer praise and/or criticism."

"Very, but each one need not be seen every day. The commander need not chase himself around merely to say that he does so."

"Most important. But a commander is only one person. Getting around to and finding subordinate Hqts are not easy tasks. He must budget his time."

"No matter whether it is a combat situation or a normal routine matter - there is no substitute for a meeting between these two personally."

"A must."

"Absolutely, Number 1."

"The most important factor of all."

"Very important since it usually gives one first-hand information of any problems on the ground."

"Most important. Spreads confidence."

"Invaluable!"

"Essential to highest morale and confidence."

"Most important if the subordinate commander is a new one and not well known to the commander."

Question 4.6 Please list the subordinate echelons with whom this contact was important.

There would appear to be no clear cut "organizational rule" for determining which units a commander should visit. Several respondents answered "one or two echelons down". Most, however, replied that a commander should visit units involved in key actions - especially when these are in difficulty - no matter how far down in the formal channels of command:

"Preference to those having difficulty or with those commanders with whom I had had the least experience."

"All major subordinate commanders and the heads of appropriate services."

"I usually stopped at the headquarters of major subordinate units, but when necessary would visit lower commanders depending on the nature of any difficulties encountered by these units."

"Next two lower Hqs at least."

"The next level down is the most important."

"Whatever echelon was charged with the most difficult or vitally important missions."

"A good rule is to visit routinely two echelons below for control of operations."

"Down through the Command, selectively according to what operations were critical."

"All echelons to a degree. 1st and 2nd down regularly."

"One echelon down and maybe 2 down at the critical place and time."

"Commanders of the next lower echelon."

"Tactical units in contact. Signal communications units. Supply agencies. Supporting units."

"Personal visits to supply facilities are highly desirable to quickly assess true facts."

"The key attacking (or defending) combat forces."

"There was none too small; in fact, I'm inclined to believe that the importance of a visit from the old man is inversely proportional to the size of the unit."

Question 4.7 What factors and information led you to be at the critical place at the critical time?

"Living with the situation", "keeping informed", and "anticipation of trouble spots" were cited by the majority of the respondents:

"A clear understanding of the situation and comprehension of the effect of success or failure at a critical point."

"By living with the developing situation day and night."

"Unreconcilable reports. No reports. Loss of contact, direct, or with adjacent units."

"The plan and course of operations, which make the critical place and time obvious."

"A knowledge of the most critical points in the operation."

"Made it a point to always be near where the main effort was being made."

"ANTICIPATION, based on a careful study of intelligence factors."

"I would set up in my mind a set of red indicator flags. I asked myself: What acts or events can hurt me most and possibly defeat me? Those I watched carefully. A few red flags in these places insured my being there.

"Keeping informed."

Several respondents indicated that intuition and good luck played a major, if not decisive, role:

> *"Frankly, I don't know, and have often wondered. Of course it was partly due to living with the situation day by day and thus knowing where critical events might occur."*

> *"Intuition has something to do with this."*

Question 4.8 What techniques did you use to be sure your chief of staff and your next higher headquarters were kept informed of critical events and decisions known to you?

Frequent checks in to the Command Post - by radio or phone - was the most frequently cited mechanism. Many respondents also stated that, on their return to the CP, they would "debrief themselves" - relating any critical developments or actions taken:

> *"As soon as we arrived at any headquarters in the field, my aide would check by telephone with the Chief of Staff to let him know where we were."*

> *"Frequent check-ins by phone, radio or messenger from CP's at which I would call during my constant troop visits."*

> *"An aide can and should note instructions given orally. Radio reports are made as feasible."*

> *"My Aide could always reach the Chief of Staff from anywhere on the front."*

> *"Talked to C/S on my radio or on phone from subordinate command posts."*

> *"I kept in touch with my Chief of Staff by radio."*

> *"Ask a staff officer at a visited Hq to call and inform my C/S or have my aide do it."*

> *"Extensive use of liaison officers, oral reports in case time was pressing, daily written diary of actions and events."*

> *"It was SOP for the C/S and Signal Officer to keep higher HQ informed."*

"Personal conference after return from a visit to elements of the command. By the most rapid means of communication available, when information obtained on a visit to subordinate units indicated the desirability of urgent action by my headquarters."

"I have always kept my chief of staff informed of my whereabouts as the key figure in my headquarters during my absences... The test I have used to determine what should be the basis for special reporting as opposed to routine situation reporting has been: Does this matter significantly affect the accomplishment of my mission, or that of my next superior commander?"

Question 4.9 How did subordinate commanders keep you personally informed of critical events?

Personal contact, reports, radio and phone were most often cited:

"By personal contact, flash reports, visits by Staff officers."

"By the most expeditious means possible."

"By personal reports to me or through the Chief of Staff if not immediately available in person."

"My staff sought information."

"Personal contact."

"Usually by radio. If they could not get me personally their messages were relayed or passed on to me when I or a staff member visited them."

"By personal telephone calls, by message, or other means such as sending an aide or staff officer, but these incidences were relatively rare, because by other means I could sense impending difficulties. I always made it a principle to go see the individual, day or night."

"Contact with my Chief of Staff who informed me, and Army if necessary. At night, ... I went to bed between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m. with a phone next to my bunk. Division commanders and liaison officers could and did reach me at all hours when a critical event developed."

"By personal contact and all available means of communication and through liaison officers."

"By radio, and in some cases by liaison officer, to division CP."

"Usually by calls to my C/S. I called in and talked to him at every opportunity."

"Routine techniques: ... phoned, ... written reports ... visited their headquarters."

Question 4.10 **What amount of time during daylight hours did you generally spend in your headquarters during the execution of an operation?**

The majority of responses ranged from "virtually none" to "approximately 25%":

"Dawn checkup at operations center, then off to the field until dark."

"Not more than 30% unless overriding demands required more time."

"2, 3, maybe 4 hours as a maximum."

"I estimate 25%."

"Hardly any."

"Always tried to be at Hq for morning and evening briefing, rest of time visiting subordinate units."

"Variable, but generally I spent most of the day visiting the units forward and in the later part of the day stopped by such supporting units as time permitted."

"About three hours a day."

"Very little. I do not recall being in the CP at any time during a major operation. During less active periods I would average one or two hours a day at the CP. Unless prearranged,higher CGs did not find me in more than 3 or times during the war.

"Two or three hours."

"Relatively limited. My Chief of Staff knew my thoughts and probable actions and if I were incapacitated, he would carry on; therefore, I felt free to leave my headquarters after all orders were being implemented."

"From about 0830 to 1700 I usually was on the road."

"This varied considerably. I spent the least necessary."

"Only long enough to insure that all was set for impending action."

"This cannot be answered in an exact manner. Normally the commander visits units throughout the day unless more important reasons dictate his remaining in his own headquarters."

"Not much when it was possible to be with elements of the command. Whenever the commander was away from the Hq, the chief of staff remained, and vice versa."

Question 4.11 Where else did you go and with whom?

More than 95% of the respondents stated that they visited subordinate and adjacent commands at this time. Many replied that they were most often accompanied by an aide:

"Generally to the element with the major and most vital mission."

"Often to Hqs. of Units on my right or left. Always with a 'working' aide. Sometimes with an Officer of the G-3."

"Visited subordinate installations and units with ADC and occasionally the appropriate staff officer."

"Subordinate commanders, with aide. Sometimes a key staff officer such as the Engineer in case of a river crossing."

"Visits to commands - usually picked up the immediate subordinate and had him accompany me."

"Visited units (smaller, the better). Took aide and signal corps man."

"Main supply routes, hospitals, troop units. Important to visit battlefield as soon after an action as possible."

"Usually to subordinate headquarters and critical areas accompanied by an aide. At times a staff officer."

"To lower echelons with aide and a logistics and operations staff member if they could be spared."

"Anywhere I felt I was needed."

"Out with the troops, Division, Regiment, Battalion and others. Accompanied by an aide and a couple of soldiers and an additional jeep with radio."

"Usually with one aide. Daily to the front; on call to higher HQ; frequently to adjoining divisions; during lulls to hospitals and trains."

"Critical areas and other headquarters, with an aide and usually with an assistant G-3."

"Visits to adjacent commands and to higher commands when the situation permits."

"Such locations as would enable me to determine progress or need of corrective action. Always accompanied by at least one staff officer, usually an aide."

Question 4.12 When not in your headquarters, how did you arrange for your chief of staff to find you?

The most common pattern, as indicated by the responses, was for the commander to provide his Chief of Staff with an itinerary before leaving the command post. The commander would - either personally or through his aide - check in by radio or phone from his vehicle or during stops at subordinate commands. The Chief of Staff was kept informed of any changes in the basic itinerary:

"The aide always called when we reached a subordinate CP and informed him of next contemplated call."

"He knew my schedule. My aide would, when possible, report my location and pass on or receive any pertinent information."

"By checking in with him on arrival at a new place and telling him where I would be next, or by giving him a schedule and making periodic radio checks if a phone not available."

"We would arrange a map letter code so the Chief of Staff would know where I was when I radioed in a letter."

"I made my general itinerary known, and monitored the command radio net."

"When leaving the headquarters the Chief of Staff was informed where I would make my first stop. I would usually confer with him when I got there. He was always told where my next stop would be, etc. I was also in contact by radio. I am happy to say that I was never lost on the battlefield."

"By giving him my itinerary and having my aide check in with him from point to point, and for enroute periods we had radio communication."

"Give tentative itinerary and report in by available communication means on a fairly regular schedule."

"By having my aide report back each time we reached a new spot. Also I had a radio in my jeep with only C/S, Deputy Commander, and I in the net. Radio open and in the clear at all times."

"By providing him an itinerary before leaving. Having an aide report arrival and departure at scheduled stops. By having an aide report any deviation from the itinerary. By taking along a voice radio in my own or accompanying vehicle or aircraft."

"Told him where I was going. Had him notified when I arrived. Had him notified where I was going to next. This never presented any problem. If I changed destination enroute my Aide notified him by radio."

"If C/S found it impossible to contact me, which was rare, he had my full authority to issue orders in my name and my entire Command knew this was SOP."

Question 4.13 To what extent did the successful completion of your missions require you to appear where your men could see you, thereby influencing and motivating their actions directly?

A minority view was that a commander's being seen by his troops had little or no direct effect:

> *"This was not usually a conscious effort on my part, feeling that I had not much of an inspiration effect on subordinate warriors. If visits are made for other reasons, however, some corollary benefit may be achieved."*

> *"Never required - Appearance before start, during approach and during relief often contributory to confidence and pride."*

> *"Personal appearance helped, but was not too important if the intermediate commanders were good."*

> *"Moderately."*

> *"Pep talks and troop harangues are foreign to my nature and were not indulged in by me. I feel that as a result of my many hours traveling and visiting throughout my area I was recognized and identified by the markings on my jeep and by my insignia throughout the command. What effect that had in influencing or motivating the action of the troops I haven't the faintest idea."*

More than 75% of the respondents argued that while the effects cannot be precisely determined or measured, "being seen" is important - that this has a positive impact on morale, and serves to show both subordinate commanders and the troops that the CG is concerned:

> *"I don't know. One likes to think that his presence causes favorable results. However, someone other than the Commander could be the only judge of that."*

"I am convinced that a commander must be seen by his troops as frequently as possible without inviting capture or serious wound. Being seen by support units is almost as important as being seen by combat units."

"I think it is a good thing for morale. I never had a situation where it was absolutely necessary."

"I have always worked that way and most commanders for whom I have served have done likewise."

"Subordinates invariably feel that they are being fully supported if the 'old man' shares with them some of their activities."

"I believe that my presence at the front contributed greatly to division esprit, since the men did not have the feeling that they were ordered into places of danger by one who himself remained in a comparatively safe place in the rear."

"Never forgetting the admonition - 'General do you have to draw fire while you are inspiring us ?' - I feel the personal presence of a commander has great impact on the successful progress of an operation."

"Just as important for Commander to be seen as it is for him to see."

"A Commander must see his troops and be seen by them."

"I consider this to be very important, especially when the situation became critical or when the situation required a change in plans or more energetic action."

"Frankly, I do not remember any occasion when being present where 'my men could see me' actually influenced the successful completion of an operation or mission. I am not that much of an egotist. But I am certain that being at the right place at the right time did influence it, along with decisions made and orders issued. However, I insist that there is nothing more important to a commander than 'being seen by his troops', especially in critical periods at the critical place. There is no substitute for the fact that the troops know that 'the Old Man' is also up there to help out. I have witnessed the results of such actions by division, corps, army and army group commanders more than I have experienced it myself. As for me, I have often wondered just who got the greatest 'uplift' from such visits, the 'Old Man' or the troops. It is an inspiring experience to the 'Old Man' to move about the front in the dangers experienced by his troops and have some dusty, grimy G-I look you in the face with a satisfying grin and say 'General, when are you going to tell us to kick hell out of these SOBs.' 'Why won't they turn us loose?' I had just that happen to me on a few occasions in Korea when we were being held back from offensive action and fought defensively only to the annoyance of every command."

"Nothing takes the place of being seen by the troops - especially in places where you were shot at."

"This is a hard question for me to answer. Since the war I have met many ex-soldiers who told me what a lift they got when I visited their unit or spoke to them individually in a foxhole, on outpost, deploying into action, etc."

"I think this is a must for all commanders."

"'Require' is a strong word here. I don't know that my mission ever required me to appear, but I always made it a point to be where the action was and the decisions were being made, including being well forward in actions where a sudden change in the situation required instant decision."

"I can recall several instances where I am sure that my presence influenced the officers and men involved. For example, the night before the crossing of the Roer River, I visited personally the assault battalion and conferred with the commander and his principal subordinates briefly and this indicated my complete confidence in them."

"Young officers and NCO's, leaders, had their ups and downs. I feel the CG's being with them encouraged them, boosted their morale, helped in the success of the operation. Chatting with a strained leader was a great relaxer. Got him back on balance."

"This is a must requirement for a Commander. Just being present at critical times carries the greatest influence possible."

"A boost in morale results from the personal appearance of a commander, but it is difficult to say that successful completion of a mission depended upon my appearance."

"Particularly important in the case of new units or subordinate commanders."

"At the division level to a major extent. At higher echelons this is impractical except on special occasions, but it is important for all commanders to visit troop units as much as possible."

Question 4.14 What general principles did you follow in executing the operation?

The following are representative of the great variety of responses to this question:

> *"Insure that my orders were clear, that coordination was assured, thereafter give my subordinates the maximum freedom of action."*

> *"Be sure that the subordinate units are assigned and are carrying out roles that harmonize with the corps 'scheme of maneuver' and instill in the subordinate commanders the feeling that you are always available for help, encouragement and understanding and never create the feeling that you are breathing down their necks looking for mistakes to be used to enhance your reputation or chances of promotion or as an alibi in defending against the wrath or criticism of one's superior."*

> *"First, I would sit on a stump and smoke my pipe to give the local commander a chance to complete his plans and to get organized. Then I would pay him a visit of encouragement. If circumstances permitted I would visit a lower unit. I would be very careful to let him run his own show, unless, of course, he needed help."*

> *"Issue clear instructions. Follow through. Supervise - Supervise - Supervise!"*

"Once an order or directive has been given to the next subordinate commander, leave him alone. Don't bother him unless there is evidence that the order has been misunderstood."

"Using Mission type of orders whenever possible. Letting them know what to do in case they ran out of orders."

"Meticulous preparation when time permitted. Extreme effort to achieve surprise. Employment of all supporting weapons. Assignment of realistic goals. Follow-up to ensure complete understanding of the operations order."

"One could write pages in answer to this. It can also be answered just as well in one sentence: Give each unit a clear objective and then see that they carry it out."

"While the pressure is on LEAD - DON'T DRIVE. Be encouraging in voice, bearing and attitude. Keep all the staff fully informed. Recognize extraordinary merit instantly - and watch out for fakes."

"Keep informed at all times of progress of the operation. Personal knowledge of conditions being encountered. Insure that supplies and materiel are adequate for needs to extent possible. Maintenance of reserve, alert and so located as to favorably affect situation. The prompt employment of reserve when and where required. See that support is rendered between units and headquarters troops wherever practicable. Maintain and exhibit confidence in the success of the operation. Maintain flexibility in plans and operation to extent practicable."

"When operation progresses satisfactorily leave personnel alone with no more than a pat on the back. Make as few changes as possible if action is not progressing as desired. If progress continues to fail - personal intervention may be necessary. Relief of commander may be required."

"Went where I felt I was most needed and where I could do most good - Always maintain communication with your own Headquarters."

"Go where the action is. George Patton had a good slogan, 'You can pull spaghetti anywhere, but you can't push it anywhere.' In almost any sample of 100 combat infantrymen, usually about 10% are pretty courageous, 10% are pretty non-courageous, and the remaining 80% can be influenced either way. Successful command consists of pointing the most courageous in the right direction and influencing the 80% group to follow."

Question 4.15 What techniques and practices did you find particularly effective?

Responses to this question varied greatly. This was, of course, to be expected. The techniques and practices employed and advocated by any given commander will reflect his own personality and preferences. The following are only a few of the many diverse comments offered:

> *"The establishment and maintenance of a relationship of mutual confidence and respect."*

> *"Prompt availability at the critical point. Prompt decisive reaction to changing situation."*

> *"Frequent 'pats on the back'."*

> *"All practices that tended to inspire mutual respect and confidence between the subordinate and the senior headquarters and commanders and staff. This was enhanced by frequent visits, although care was exercised not to indicate a lack of confidence at any time."*

> *"Present awards at every opportunity and as soon after heroic action as possible."*

> *"Bother subordinate HQ as little as possible - Assist subordinate Hq to maximum, but let them do their job."*

> *"Exhibition of confidence and determination to carry out operation successfully. Keep all informed of decisions."*

> *"The proper use of a Control Office. Visits to all units of the command. The use of staff channels for transmitting information. Staying where communications were available in a crisis."*

"Patience."

"Clear, concise instructions. Personal contact."

"If practical, allowed the commander of the key unit to write his own order. Then, after I approved it, allowed others to plan how best to support it. I coordinated and approved each. This provided a high degree of motivation to each to succeed."

"Personal visits by the senior commander who takes over the leadership of the squad is wrong; therefore, one must be careful not to interfere unless necessary. Personal visits, if handled correctly, give the subordinate commander a feeling of security and confidence."

"I think the normal and usual techniques of Command that have been taught - and sometimes practiced - in the American Army during the last 48 years are correct. Each General Officer, over a period of time, develops his own particular style. He is influenced by his personal background and his own experiences and to a great degree by observing the good and bad practices of his Seniors. His style is also influenced by the type of troops he commands ...Most of the articles that one can read today on Leadership are sound. That does not mean that they can be followed blindly."

Question 4.16 What techniques and practices do you think should be avoided?

The most frequently cited "practice to be avoided" was harassment of subordinates and undue interference in their activities:

> *"Harassing subordinate commanders who are tense enough in combat without being made more so."*

> *"Being an annoyance. Being a recluse."*

> *"Harassing subordinate commanders for information. Properly trained subordinates will transmit as soon as it is a fact not rumor."*

> *"Nagging and worrying your subordinates with requests for information - progress reports - etc."*

> *"Hasty decisions generated by impatience. 'Breathing down the neck' of subordinate commanders."*

> *"Unnecessary interference with subordinate commanders. While the plan of action may not be perfect in 'your eyes,' it is better to let the commander execute his plan as long as it is reasonable."*

"Commanding from a Command Post" was also cited as a practice which the good commander will always avoid:

> *"Don't try to command by remote control. Above all keep in good physical condition and never become so physically and mentally exhausted that you lose your good judgment."*

> *"Fighting the battle with a grease pencil in a Command Post, based on the advice of the staff."*

> *"Command Posts located too far to the rear."*

"Trying to command an organization solely from a command post."

Several respondents stated that a commander must avoid humiliating a subordinate - that he should never criticize a subordinate commander or staff officer in the presence of others:

"Public bawling out."

"Disagreement with a subordinate in critical language before his staff or subordinates of any rank. An officer who has been humiliated before his subordinates can seldom be rehabilitated; a normal one relieved properly and without humiliation invariably 'comes back' in some capacity as a useful officer."

The following are among the many other "practices and techniques to be avoided" as noted by respondents:

"Don't get frantic. Reports of disaster are nearly always exaggerated."

"Rigidity in thinking or practice."

"Failure to judiciously delegate responsibility and authority. Avoid being a worry-wart and stay out of people's hair."

"Delay."

"Failure to keep interested officers informed."

"Do not 'second guess' your plans and orders. Remember success comes from careful planning and violent execution. The commander must do all he can to keep up the violent execution."

"Trying to be a 'one man Army'. Always criticizing, with never a kind word. Failure to 'give credit'. Being a 'CP Commander'."

"A Commander should keep in mind that his troops want him to be professionally qualified, to be honest and fair, confident in his own ability, and aggressive in all he does. I think a Commander should avoid any techniques and practices that cause his troops to lose that impression of him. He certainly should not indulge in any 'popularity' contest. To be liked is fine. To be respected is much better."

Question 4.17 Further Comments.

The following concluding comments were selected as being of especial interest:

"As the G-3 of a field Army, ... I would say that the most successful commanders were those who were the most daring, who exemplified personal leadership, who awarded decorations at the time when the award was really meaningful, and yet who were sound in their thinking and followed sound staff practices."

"No substitute for a competent, smooth working, loyal staff."

"The knowledge, the ability, and the incentive needed to command an American Division, Corps, or Army - successfully - depends on so many more factors than can be brought out in a short questionnaire. Preparation for such command requires years and years of study and observation. Commanders are not born, they are made, by study. There are no short cuts. It is dangerous to think that our Generals can win over others because they are Americans. To win, our Generals must be better trained and beter disciplined than the enemy. Our staff work must be as good and it must be faster. Training and morale may sometimes be more important than numbers and elaborate equipment. We are prone to over-staff and to over-equip. Commanders need to have flexibility of mind and a firmness of decision. Too often they call for a 'staff study' when what is needed is a firm decision, and they should make it. Petty differences between Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Air Force, and Navy must be crushed. We must work as a Team or fall. The

Commander must be ruthless in developing toughness in his Officers and men or his Team will lose. A command without toughness, and its resulting high morale, is worse than useless. The Commander should not be 'bull-headed' but at the same time he must have moral courage. This is as important as physical courage."

"There is nothing mysterious about command but it is an art as well as a science. It requires a team of dedicated mean who know their jobs and have complete confidence in each other. You must show them that you have confidence in them by telling them your plans and showing them that only by coordinated efforts can we succeed. You must unhesitatingly remove leaders who cannot lead."

"Physical condition in general officers is of major importance. In my opinion, a Division Commander should be in as good condition as his infantry battalion commanders; a Corps, as good as his infantry regimental commands; and and Army Commander just about the same."

"I have always felt strongly that a general officer in command of a unit from Corps, division or lower level, should make it an unfailing practice in combat to see each day every subordinate on whom he must make an efficiency report, and, as far as humanly possible, see every subordinate whose efficiency report he must endorse. I found this almost completely possible in Korea due to speed and utility of the helicopter. Hence, with Division CGs knowledge and concurrences, I almost invariably saw every regimental commander in my corps informally just for a pleasant visit during all quiet periods, and certainly during all periods in which they were involved in heavy combat. I discovered that they more than welcomed it; it boosted their morale. I was frequently taken to task by any one of them I had to miss, on occasion of my next visit."

Summary Comments:

The key to a commander's conducting of a battle is his obtaining sound and timely information which will permit him to act and react as necessary. All efforts must be bent to insuring that this information is available to the commander at the time when he needs it.

The successful commander must see much for himself. However, he must not neglect either his Headquarters or his staff, causing them to wait around for the instructions necessary to their carrying out their own proper functions.

A good commander must -- and does -- always have in mind the plans and actions to be taken in the event of a serious reversal. He may never have the need to bring such plans into effect, but failure to have thought these out ahead of time can be - and has been - fatal.

APPENDIX A

RESEARCH INSTRUMENT: GENERALSHIP STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE—SAMPLE PAGES

THE FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
RESEARCH LABORATORIES

THE BENJAMIN FRANKLIN PARKWAY • PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19103 • TELEPHONE (215) 448-1000

Bruce C. Clarke, Gen., U.S.A., Ret., Consultant

I need your experience and wisdom in contributing to the knowledge of the Army concerning the principles and techniques of command.

I have worked as a consultant for several contractors in the field of command, control and communications for the Army, and I have always found that the contractors were handicapped by not understanding the art and techniques of command. Therefore, I was very pleased when asked to work as a consultant on a project presently being conducted by The Franklin Institute Research Laboratories for the Office of the Chief of Staff. This study will attempt to identify techniques and methods, as well as general principles, which contribute to the successful practice of command in the Army. For this study, we are seeking the help and advice of the great commanders of Divisions, Corps, Armies, and Army Groups.

I am attaching a list of brief questions which I hope you will answer for me. Handwritten replies will be quite adequate. We are sending this to about 100 retired generals at this time, varying in rank from Major General to General of the Army and from Division to Army Group and Supreme Commanders.

From your replies and other associated research, we hope to develop a general pattern in the art and techniques of command which will guide our research study.

Please return the questionnaire with your answers in the enclosed stamped envelope. Please feel free to answer the questions in as much detail as you like. Nothing you say will be used commercially or outside of the Army.

When the answers are assembled, I hope they will be made available to the faculty and students of the Army Service Schools for their guidance. I believe they will be invaluable to them.

I hope that in later correspondence or by calling on you personally I may be able to explore leads which you give me. Many thanks for your help.

Respectfully yours,

Bruce C. Clarke
Consultant to The Franklin
Institute Research Laboratories

Data Collection Instrument 5-034

GENERALSHIP STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE

prepared for

A STUDY OF
REQUIREMENTS OF SENIOR COMMANDERS
FOR COMMAND-CONTROL SUPPORT

monitored by

The Office of the Director of Special Studies
Office of the Chief of Staff
Department of the Army

Contract No. DA 49-092-ARO-154

November 15, 1966

THE FRANKLIN INSTITUTE RESEARCH LABORATORIES
SYSTEMS SCIENCE DIVISION

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GENERALSHIP STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Name _____

2. Rank _____

3. Commands and high staff positions as a General Officer _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

4. Please give the address and phone number at which you may be reached during the next two to three months:

_____

_____

_____

_____

It may be inconvenient for you to use carbon, and you no doubt wish a copy of your answers. If you check here, one Xerox copy will be returned to you as soon as we receive your questionnaire . _____

Please check here if you wish to receive a copy of the final report of this study . _____

You may either handwrite or type your responses.

Please feel free to use the blank sheets provided at the end of the questionnaire for expanding any answer that does not fit into the space allowed.

Please note in answering this questionnaire that the study is focused the command of Division, Army, and Corps in combat.

To provide a framework in which we may approach specific aspects of the command process, we have divided "command" into the following four steps:

1. Determine, isolate, and define the limits of the problem (mission).

2. Turn the problem into an operation by issuing the commander's directive for conducting it.

3. Monitor and guide the staff while it prepares and issues coordinated instructions and orders for implementing the directive.

4. Follow up to see that instructions and orders are understood and carried out, making necessary modifications and additions as the operation progresses.

These four steps, suggested by General Bruce C. Clarke, have been selected to permit categorization of your responses. Use of these steps will ensure a consistent form in the responses from generals whose opinions on the specific points may vary. Such consistency will permit comparison of the responses. While we realize that command may be divided into other series of steps, we hope you will answer the questions under the indicated steps in the interest of standardization. If you have a different breakdown of steps in the command process that you feel should be considered, please indicate these on the page provided at the end of the questionnaire.

Please answer all questions in general terms based on general situations.

SECTION 1

COMMAND STEPS

DEFINING PROBLEM

STEP 1. DETERMINE, ISOLATE, AND DEFINE THE LIMITS OF THE PROBLEM (MISSION).

1.1. Please state the general procedures followed and information needed to help you accomplish this step. _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

1.2. To whom (except the General Staff chiefs) did you look for advice — Signal Officer? Engineer? Others? _____

_____

_____

1.3. Why did you seek advice from these people? _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

DEFINING PROBLEM (CONTINUED)

1.4. What general principles did you follow in defining the problem?

1.5. What techniques and practices did you find particularly effective?



Sample Return Envelope

APPENDIX B

REVISED RESEARCH INSTRUMENT - LIST OF QUESTIONS

The following is a list of the questions contained in the revised version of the Generalship Questionnaire. This revised research instrument was divided into four sections:

1. Command Steps
2. General Questions
3. General Questions—Vietnam
4. Illustrative Incident

SECTION 1. COMMAND STEPS

Mission Evaluation and Interpretation

Step 1. Determine, Isolate, and Define the Limits of the Mission You Must Accomplish

1.1 What importance do you attach to the personal transmittal of the mission by your superior commander to you?

1.2 What importance do you attach to contacts between your staff and higher headquarters' staff during this stage?

1.3 In determining and defining the limits of the mission, what kinds of information are necessary to your estimate of the situation?

1.4 Who, specifically, do you look to for these various kinds of information? Is all required information generally available through staff sources or do you look to subordinate commanders as well?

1.5 How is the required information most frequently conveyed to you? Through direct consultations? Radio? Phone?

1.6 Is personal reconnaissance of the battle area necessary during this stage? If yes, what specific kinds of information do you feel you can acquire only in this way?

1.7 To what extent do you rely upon the helicopter as a vehicle for personal reconnaissance? What other means of transportation are most frequently employed?

1.8 Do you frequently send staff personnel on reconnaissance and information-gathering missions during this stage?

1.9 Do you generally issue warning orders to subordinate commanders at this time?

1.10 How are warning orders generally transmitted?

1.11 What personal techniques and practices do you find to be especially effective in this stage in the command process?

1.12 What practices do you feel should be avoided during this stage?

1.13 What specific techniques or practices do you feel are most effective in meeting the requirements for coordination and consultation with allied commanders and officials?

(For those who have served in Vietnam)

1.14 To what extent were direct consultations with allied commanders necessary during this stage in the command process?

1.15 How much of your required information was available through allied sources?

1.16 Did you feel it desirable and/or necessary to check on information transmitted to you by allied sources? If so, what means did you employ to assure accuracy of reporting?

1.17 To what extent did you utilize allied liaison personnel?

Issuing of Directives

Step 2. Turn the Problem into an Operation by Issuing the Commander's Clear Directive for Conducting It

2.1 To whom is the directive issued? Staff only? Staff and subordinate commanders?

2.2 In what manner are directives most frequently issued? Orally? In writing? Orally with written confirmation when possible? What factors determine manner of issuance?

2.3 Are directives generally issued all at once or in fragmentary form?

2.4 To what extent do you view direct contact with staff and/or subordinate commanders as necessary or desirable at this stage?

2.5 What do you believe to be the principal benefits of such direct contacts?

2.6 What specific techniques do you employ to assure that your staff and subordinate commanders fully understand your directives?

2.7 What specific practices do you feel should be avoided during this stage?

(For those who served in Vietnam)

2.8 Were ARVN or other Vietnamese officials contacted during this stage? If so, then at what level and directly or indirectly?

2.9 Were you required to contact representatives of other U.S. Government agencies at this time? If so, then specifically who did you contact or consult with and by what means?

Monitoring Staff

Step 3. With the Help of Your Chief of Staff, Monitor the Development, Preparation, and Issuing of Coordinated Instructions, Plans, and Orders for Implementing the Directive

3.1 Your directive having been issued, and the detailing of plans begun by your staff, to what extent do you find it necessary and/or desirable to personally monitor and guide plan development?

3.2 How much of the monitoring function does your Chief of Staff assume?

3.3 What importance do you attach to your personal *availability* at this time?

3.4 What means do you employ to insure that orders and plans a) reach subordinate commanders as quickly as possible and b) are fully understood?

3.5 Do you find personal visits to subordinate commanders a useful device during this stage? What functions do such visits serve?

3.6 Does the availability of the helicopter as a means of rapid transportation prompt you to make more frequent visits to subordinate commanders during this stage?

3.7 Do you use liaison officers during this phase to deliver and explain plans and orders?

3.8 Are liaison officers an effective alternative to your own personal visits? If not, why?

3.9 Is contact by radio, phone, or other reliable electronic means an effective alternative to personal visits during this stage?

(For those who served in Vietnam)

3.10 What specific problems are imposed by the need to consult and coordinate with allied commanders during this phase?

3.11 What techniques do you find most effective in coping with the problems indicated in your reply to 3.10 above?

Follow-Up and Evaluation

Step 4. Follow Up to See that Instructions, Plans, and Orders are Understood and Carried Out, Making Necessary Modifications and Additions as the Operation Progresses to Completion

4.1 What *specific* kinds of information do you require during this stage?

4.2 Who, specifically, do you look to for this information?

4.3 What means do you employ to assure the accuracy of the information conveyed to you?

4.4 How does this information generally reach you — through which channels and by what means?

4.5 How much of the follow-up responsibility do *you* assume and how much do you feel can be delegated — and to whom?

4.6 In the conduct of your follow-up activities, where do you place your general officer subordinates? How are they employed in the overall supervisory role? Are they, for example, dispatched to combat elements only or across the entire force? Why?

4.7 At what point in the operations phase do you intensify your follow-up activities?

4.8 What techniques do you employ in conducting your own part of the follow-up responsibility?

4.9 Please outline your night-time supervision activities in relation to combat units in contact and the means you employed in such activities.

4.10 What importance do you attach to face-to-face contact with subordinate commanders during this stage?

4.11 At which subordinate echelons is such direct contact especially desirable?

4.12 What general pattern do you follow in visiting subordinate units, elements of the support command, etc.?

4.13 What changes, if any, in your command techniques and concepts resulted from the widespread use of helicopters? a) How do *you* personally employ helicopters in this follow-up phase? b) How do you direct their employment within your staff and your units?

4.14 What adverse effects, if any, do you believe can be precipitated by primary reliance on the helicopter for command and control during this follow-up phase?

4.15 What factors and/or information generally lead you to be at the critical place at the critical time?

4.16 What means do you employ to assure that your Chief of Staff is kept informed of critical events and decisions known to you?

4.17 What means do you employ to keep higher headquarters so informed?

4.18 What importance do you attach to visits to your C.P. or lower unit C.P.s by your superior commander during this stage?

4.19 How are subordinate commanders kept informed of critical events and decisions?

4.20 How do subordinate commanders keep you informed of critical developments?

4.21 How much time do you generally spend in your headquarters during this stage?

4.22 Who generally accompanies you on your visits to the combat area?

4.23 When not in your headquarters, how do you arrange for your Chief of Staff to locate and contact you?

4.24 If you cannot be located, for whatever the reason, who has the authority to issue orders in your name if this becomes necessary?

4.25 As regards your own personal visits to the combat area, what purposes do such trips serve? Are visits made chiefly to gather information (if so, of what kind)? to boost morale?

4.26 What techniques do you find especially effective during this phase?

4.27 What practices do you feel should be avoided during this stage?

(For those who served in Vietnam)

4.28 What means did you employ to keep allied commanders informed of critical events and developments known to you?

4.29 How did they keep you informed of events known to them?

SECTION 2. GENERAL QUESTIONS

1. In the past, some generals have elected to carry a number of their key staff officers with them as they change assignments. Others have organized their staffs, building around the personnel available at their new assignment. Which method do you prefer, and why?
2. Please answer the preceding question with reference to subordinate commanders.
3. What would you project the requirements of a Division Commander to be five years from now, in terms of a) communications, b) display, c) other command mechanisms? We do not expect highly technical responses, but would appreciate your outline of general requirements.

SECTION 3. GENERAL QUESTIONS - VIETNAM

1. What, in theory and in practice, were your command relationships in those operations undertaken jointly by U.S. and allied troops?
2. What special methods did you employ in dealing with allied commanders?
3. Did you establish any special mechanisms — such as an operations center or a support coordination center — to assist you in coordinating operations undertaken jointly by U.S. and allied troops? If yes, please describe.
4. What were the effects on your command methods and techniques of the need to confer and consult with representatives of non-military U.S. Government agencies?
5. What special command problems were posed by the existence of various kinds of enemy forces — ranging from local guerilla, to main force V.C., to regular North Vietnamese units?

6. Did the lack of effective censorship or other aspects of news media coverage pose problems for you as a commander in Vietnam? If so, please describe.

7. What methods did you employ to keep allied commanders informed of your operations while denying this information to the V.C.?

8. What proportion of your time was devoted to briefing and escorting visitors to your command (military, civilian, governmental, etc.)?

9. As a commander, what were your feelings about the one-year rotation policy as related to staff and key subordinates?

10. What specific command problems were posed by the wide-dispersion, relatively small-unit engagement pattern in Vietnam?

11. What specific command problems were involved in the coordination of close air and naval support?

12. What specific communications and transportation mechanisms were available to you in Vietnam that had not been available in prior commands? How do you rate their impact and effectiveness?

13. Does availability of, and reliance on, the helicopter promote over-follow-up in daylight and under-supervision at night?

14. Please feel free to comment on any command-relevant specifics of the Vietnam environment not covered in the above questions.

SECTION 4. ILLUSTRATIVE INCIDENT

Please consider an incident in your experience when success or failure of an important operation hinged on proper or inadequate exercise of the art and techniques of command. (You need not necessarily have been in command.)

Name

Date

Location

Which good techniques of command were employed?

Which inadequate techniques of command were used?

APPENDIX C
RESPONDENTS

The following is a listing of those Officers who have responded to the "Generalship" questionnaire.

Adams, Paul D., GEN (USA Retired)
Allen, Roderick R., MG (USA Retired)
Andrus, Clift, MG (USA Retired)
Arnold, Archibald V., MG (USA Retired)
Aurand, Henry S., LTG (USA Retired)
Burress, Withers A., LTG (USA Retired)
Butchers, Ralph J., MG (USA Retired)
Byers, Clovis E., LTG (USA Retired)
Chamberlin, Stephen J., LTG (USA Retired)
Clarke, Bruce C., GEN (USA Retired)
Clarke, Christian H., Jr., MG (USA Retired)
Cole, Robert H., COL (USA Retired)
Collins, Arthur S., Jr., LTG (USA)
Collins, J. Lawton, GEN (USA Retired)
Davis, Ellsworth I., MG (USA Retired)
Decker, George H., GEN (USA Retired)
Del Mar, Roland H., MG (USA Retired)
DePuy, William E., MG (USA)
Devine, John M., MG (USA Retired)
Dewey, Lawrence R., MG (USA Retired)
Eddleman, Clyde D., GEN (USA Retired)
Ennis, William P., Jr., LTG (USA Retired)
Farrell, Francis W., LTG (USA Retired)
Gavin,James M., LTG (USA Retired)
Gay, Hobart R., LTG (USA Retired)

Gillem, Alvan C., Jr., LTG (USA Retired)
Grow, Robert W., MG (USA Retired)
Harkins, Paul D., GEN (USA Retired)
Harris, Hugh P., GEN (USA Retired)
Harrison, William K., LTG (USA Retired)
Hays, George P., LTG (USA Retired)
Herren, Thomas W., LTG (USA Retired)
Hickey, Thomas F., LTG (USA Retired)
Hill, John G., BG (USA Retired)
Hoge, William M., GEN (USA Retired)
Howze, Hamilton H., GEN (USA Retired)
Huebner, Clarence R., LTG (USA Retired)
Jenkins, Reuben E., LTG (USA Retired)
Johnson, Harry W., MG (USA Retired)
Johnson, Wilhelm P., MG (USA Retired)
Kendall, Paul W., LTG (USA Retired)
Kerwin, Walter T., Jr., MG (USA)
Keyes, Geoffrey, LTG (USA Retired)
Kinnard, Harry W.O., MG (USA)
Leonard, John W., LTG (USA Retired)
Lindeman, Philip F., MG (USA)
Lutes, Leroy, LTG (USA Retired)
Meloy, Guy S., Jr., GEN (USA Retired)
Middleton, Troy H., LTG (USA Retired)
Miley, William M., MG (USA Retired)
Moore, Ned D., MG (USA Retired)
Morris, William H. H., Jr., LTG (USA Retired)
Myers, Samuel L., LTG (USA Retired)
Newman, Aubrey S., MG (USA Retired)
Nutter, William H., MG (USA Retired)
O'Daniel, John W., LTG (USA Retired)
Oliver, Lunsford E., MG (USA Retired)
O'Neill, Edward J., LTG (USA Retired)

Pattison, Hal C., BG (USA Retired)
Powell, Herbert B., GEN (USA Retired)
Preer, Carleton, Jr., COL (USA)
Reeder, Russell P., Jr., COL (USA Retired)
Ridgway, Matthew B., GEN (USA Retired)
Roper, Harry McK., MG (USA Retired)
Russ, Joseph R., MG (USA)
Ryan, John L., Jr., LTG (USA Retired)
Salet, Eugene A., MG (USA)
Seaman, Jonathan O., LTG (USA)
Smith, Albert C., MG (USA Retired)
Smith, Robert B., BG (USA)
Smythe, George W., MG (USA Retired)
Tucker, Reuben H., III, MG (USA Retired)
Upham, John S., Jr., LTG (USA Retired)
Van Orden, George O., BG (USMC Retired)
Vittrup, Russell L., LTG (USA Retired)
Waters, John K., GEN (USA Retired)
West, Arthur L., Jr., MG (USA)
West, Sir Michael, GEN (UK Retired)
Westphalinger, H. R., MG (USA Retired)
Williams, Samuel T., LTG (USA Retired)
Wogan, John B., MG (USA Retired)
Wood, Robert J., GEN (USA Retired)
Wright, John M., Jr., MG (USA)
Wright, W. H. Sterling, LTG (USA Retired)
Wyman, Willard G., GEN (USA Retired)