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<td>Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 17 FEB 1969. Other requests shall be referred to Office of the Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC 20310.</td>
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AGAM-P (H) (7 Feb 69) FOR OT UT 684239 17 February 1969


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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

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SECTION I

OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. COMMAND:

a. The United States Army Depot, Long Binh was operational for 92 days of the reporting period.

b. Troop Command, as the organization to provide housekeeping for nearly 3,000 troops for the newly formed US Army Depot, Long Binh, formally became operational 1 September 1968. The TDA provided for a command group and six letter companies to absorb the personnel from deactivated units of the 506th Field Depot. A security guard company was added in order to provide for both physical security of the depot and defense of assigned sectors of the Long Binh Post. Additionally, three units (518th Engineer Detachment, 563rd Supply Company and the 570th Supply Company) previously assigned to the 277th SSS Battalion retained their TO&E status and were attached to troop command.

c. The reorganization of the 506th Field Depot into the US Army Depot Long Binh, resulted in numerous problems for Troop Command, primarily in personnel and equipment transfers within the newly formed command. It became apparent that a number of essential officers and enlisted positions had been left off the original TDA. Subsequent temporary modifications

Inclosure

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to the TDA were authorized to alleviate some of the problems encountered; however, additional modifications are being reviewed for submission to correct other personnel shortages.

d. The S-1 section came into being 1 September 1968 as a provisional addition to the Troop Command headquarters since no Adjutant was initially authorized. The Adjutant undertook the task of compiling the necessary data to justify the staffing requirements of the Troop Command. Some of the problems recognized included:

(1) Special arrangements had to be made to retain key administrative personnel to minimize confusion during the initial reorganization period.

(2) Orders assigning personnel to the new TDA companies required close comparison against old unit rosters to facilitate accountability.

(3) Many companies did not recognize the need for transferring personnel actions, such as flagging actions, Article 15 and essential courts martial papers to the individual's new unit.

(4) To implement the movement of troops from Saigon to Long Binh, and to assure control of the personnel in transit, a reduced staff remained temporarily in Saigon. Together with the Long Binh personnel, the movement was virtually completed by 1 October 1968. As support activities of the Camp Davies portion of the Depot decrease, Companies A and B will eventually be transferred to Long Binh.

e. This Depot was visited during the quarter by a large number of dignitaries. Among those visiting the depot to view operations and facilities were:

(1) GEN Haines Commander in Chief, USARPAC
(2) BRIG Olson Australian Army
(3) COL Sumon Dep Spt Cndr, Thai Army
(4) COL Boonchai Division Chief of Staff, Thai Army
(5) COL Tallman G-3, USARV
(6) COL Schelfer AGofS, G4, USARV
(7) LTC Hook Australian Army
(8) LTC Harris USARPAC

(9) MAJ Parker
Australian Army

(10) MAJ Nelson
US Advisor, Black Panther Division

(11) Hon C.P. Cook
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Special Assistant for Training).

(12) Mr. Moore
Dep Director Sup and Maint, USAARPAC.

f. During the quarter, the following key personnel changes were made:

(1) 25 August LTC Howard replaced LTC Martino as Chief, Storage Division.

(2) 25 August MAJ Joyner replaced LTC Erickson as Depot Inspector.

(3) 1 September COL Kahone replaced COL Alexander as Depot Commander.

(4) 2 October LTC Satterfield replaced MAJ Lee as Director of Administration.

(5) 10 October LTC White replaced LTC Bryant as Director of Services.

(6) 15 October MAJ Keehne replaced MAJ Allen as Director of Management.

(7) 29 October Mr. Tamburri replaced MAJ Keehne as Acting Director of Management.

2. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE:

a. Personnel: At the end of this reporting period, authorized military strength was 3,485, authorized Department of the Army Civilian strength was 64, authorized Local National Civilian strength was 3,089. Assigned military was 2,299 or 66% of the military authorization; the Department of the Army Civilian assigned strength was 56 or 67% its authorization and the Local National strength assigned was 2,753 or 89% of the total authorized.

b. Administration: The unit listed below received an Annual Inspector General's Inspection. The inspection was conducted by United States Army Support Command, Saigon.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PATING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>563rd (HiS) Company</td>
<td>27-28 Sep 1968</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Morale and Discipline: Morale within the units of the United
AVCA SCN FD IGT
10 Nov 68


States Army Depot Long Binh is high and discipline is excellent.

3. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

a. The Provost Marshal:

(1) Conducted a briefing of all US personnel in a supervisory status over Local National employees on problems in physical security and law enforcement within depot activities.

(2) Participated in a conference concerning the policies on control and identification of Local and Third Country Nationals on Long Binh Post.

(3) Conducted a reconnaissance and coordination trip in an effort to solve the problems experienced in convoy escorts.

(4) Attended two 1st Logistical Command "Operation Overtake" Conferences. These conferences were held for the purpose of discussing the problems of cargo security while enroute from one consignee to another and to make recommendations for the improvements of cargo security and larceny by truck diversion.

(5) Attended the initial and exit briefing of the 1st Logistical Command "525 Inspection/Training Team". Spent two days with the team while inspecting Saigon and Long Binh activities. Their mission is to inspect and study existing policies and practices on cargo security and make necessary recommendations for improvements in an effort to combat cargo diversion and larceny.

(6) Implemented a new Control and Security Procedure to increase the security of cargo and to detect fraudulent documentation.

b. Coordination and liaison visits were made with:

(1) Colonel Dubois, Provost Marshal, 1st Logistical Command.

(2) Colonel Brandenburg, CO, 18th Military Police Brigade.

(3) LTC Bussell, CO and Major McGreedy, Operations Officer, 8th Military Police – Criminal Investigations Group.

(4) Major Shuttleworth, Physical Security Officer, FPO, 1st Logistical Command.


(7) Captain Sward, OIC, Special Squad, Criminal Investigation Detachment, Saigon.

(8) Captain Jorgenson, Assistant S-3, 16th Military Police Brigade.

(9) Mr. Nestler, Chief, CID, Long Binh Post.

(10) Special Agent in Charge, 524th Military Intelligence Det, Long Binh.

(11) Lieutenant Colonel Thanh, ARVN, Commander of Special Zone, M'Be District.

c. Loss and recovery statistics for the reporting period are also of significant importance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>KNOWN LOSSES</th>
<th>RECOVERIES</th>
<th>LINE ITEMS RECOVERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>$5,006.38</td>
<td>$5,006.38</td>
<td>31,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>$29,392.76</td>
<td>$27,942.06</td>
<td>18,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>$70,741.86</td>
<td>$52,563.16</td>
<td>35,313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

a. All personnel of the deactivated 506th Field Depot and its thirteen attached units were reassigned to the United States Army Depot, Long Binh. Reassignment was based on the paragraph and line number and the particular function being performed by each individual with the mission of the Depot.

b. The Depot Consolidated Motor Pool at Long Binh now has more than 80% of all the depot assigned vehicles and is undergoing major organizational changes. PLL has been consolidated at Long Binh. The control of vehicles on dispatch has been greatly increased. The draft design of a new Motor Pool, to be built in early CY 69, was completed and coordinated with Post Engineers.

c. The M&E Branch at Long Binh has grown from a satellited activity to the main M&E Shop for the Depot. The main office is located in a new Maintenance Shop, the finest of its kind in-country. All other Depot M&E Shops in outlying areas are now considered to be primarily for operator and minor organizational maintenance (principally component replacement).
d. All Depot vehicles, trailers and MHE have been placed on punched cards to more effectively account for and maintain control of their utilization. Property Book and hand receipt reconciliation is still in progress and a current accurate inventory of all vehicular type equipment will be produced soon.

e. Authorization has been requested and approved to maintain the Installation Property Records on DA Form 3329 and utilize visible files. The Property Book Branch is now in the process of initiating these files.

f. Guidance has been requested from higher headquarters concerning the disposition of the Depot's Procurement Branch which the MTDA does not authorize.

g. Hand Receipts have been updated and aligned with the new TDA structure.

h. Supply accounts have been established for the Property Book Branch with support activities at Long Binh.

i. Considerable progress has been made in removal of scrap property through term contracts. Contractor, General Pipe Supply (Korea) has removed a total of 2596 S/T. Contractor, Huynh Duy Thai, is in the process of removing 1,000 S/T shell casings, with completion date set for 5 Nov 68.

j. Arrangements have been made to ship 100 Conexes from Newport to NIK, Saigon Island Depot be be used for shipping construction vehicle repair parts (Retrograde) to 2nd Logistical Command, Okinawa.

k. The dispatch area of the main MHE Shop has been reorganized and it is hoped that the relocated Inspection Section will contribute to progressively better enforced and more effective operator maintenance.

l. A more effective and responsive bus schedule for shuttling military and DAC personnel between work, messing and billeting areas was established. Routes and schedules were published and have been modified as the depot geographic and physical arrangement changed. At present, six buses and one "cattle car" are employed.

m. The deadline rate on both MHE and motor vehicles continued to climb during this reporting period. This can be attributable to several causes: The equipment is now older and is getting considerably more and harsher use because of the conditions and physical size of Long Binh; the number of mechanics has steadily decreased as a result of DEROS; few replacements and increased extra duty commitments; more thorough inspec-

In order to combat this higher rate, all unauthorized field maintenance work is being stopped, one day vehicle stand-downs were reinstituted to correct all operator deficiencies and scheduled organizational maintenance stand-downs were re-established to correct all 2nd Echelon deficiencies.

n. REU continued to provide support to the depot which PA&E was unable to supply. This consisted of minor construction, carpentry work and basic electrical work. The removal of trash from the depot and disposals of human waste were two other major functions.

o. The shuttling of IN personnel from Saigon Market to the New Depot Area raised many problems, but at present 15 buses are adequately meeting this daily requirement. However, this is only possible because of the usual high daily absenteeism of 10-20%. A forecast of bus requirements thru June 1969 was submitted, based upon projected moves from the Saigon Area to Long Binh. Whether enough buses will be made available to meet future requirements remains to be seen.

p. The last quarter has been a significant period of growth for the Transportation Office at the new depot complex. The tonnage shipped has more than tripled and the staff has grown from five to twenty one. The major areas of operation have been the intra-depot movement of cargo which has approached 500 short tons daily, the depot move which involves the movement of up to 70 truck and 265 short tons on a daily basis from Camp Davies to the New Depot, and the normal shipment from the depot which rose from 133 short tons for the month of June to a high month of 3773 short tons in August.

q. The depot is now developing a controlled traffic flow procedure to be used within its complex. Under this policy, traffic flow will be basically one direction with the Receiving area near the entrance and the Shipping and Transportation area near the exit, with the last point on the exit route being a central banding and documentation point. This will be implemented in order that congestion be eliminated from the center of the depot complex and to check for valid documentation all trucks exiting the depot.

r. A shortage of condiment and accessory food items was experienced. This shortage was traced to several causes, among them being: (1) replenishment requisitions were based on factors contained in 28 day master menu, rather than demand data. Class I points were permitted to operate Self-Service Condiment Stores and units could obtain condiments they desired (within a monetary allowance) rather than by menu factor. (2) CONUS supply source did not meet ROD. (3) Vung Tau LSA did not become a sub-depot and was supplied from USADLB rather than directly from CONUS. During shortage
period, available stocks were pro-rated. Demand data are now being considered for condiments, in addition to menu factors in order to create more realistic replenishment requisitions.

s. An intensified program to prevent food spoilage continues. Dry stores have been re-warehoused to assure oldest stocks are issued first. More loss is experienced in perishable products that are required to be stored in prefabricated boxes. These boxes are designed primarily for short term storage. Some develop "hot spots" that are difficult to detect during normal inspections and product may thaw and spoil rapidly. This problem is complicated when freeze ship arrivals overlap and unusually heavy tonnages are received.

t. The Food Management Division remained as a separate Depot Division, although the approved TDA slotted personnel under Storage and Stock Control Divisions. No provision was made in approved TDA for the Food Traffic Management Branch. This branch performs a vital function arranging for the shipment of 19-20,000 tons of food per month. It now is staffed by personnel charged against Storage functions. TDA proposals will recommend staffing for this branch and increase personnel for Food Stock Control.

u. During this reporting period, the Foremost Dairy was unable to produce sufficient milk to satisfy total requirements. Arrangements were coordinated with 1st Logistical Command to have Cam Ranh Bay ship milk by SEA-LAND vans and other ships that were available. This procedure has enabled us to satisfy all milk requirements.

v. A Bridge Park was started on 11 September in Yard 511, New Depot Complex. This will provide for storage of bridges by sets, and as of 31 October 14 sets of H4T6, 1 set of Bailey type and 3 sets of Bridge, Floating, 1-60 have been placed in the park. A separate Components Area will be maintained in Area 208, Ho Mai for issue of replacement components. Project should be completed by 30 November.

w. Project Count, Phase II, got underway on 23 September with Location Surveys being conducted in Open Storage sites 206 and 208. This was completed on 1 October and a total of 1,726 locations were recorded for 1,230 line items. Fifty-four line items were General Depot items that are being redistributed. Inventory of items in Areas 206 and 208 began on 11 October and as of 30 October, 60 line items have been inventoried.

x. Packing and crating activities in the new Depot Complex were moved from Area 215 to area adjacent to IHE Shop starting on 8 October and finishing on 12 October. Move was necessary to allow for the construction of three warehouses planned for the 215 Area. Move did not create any problems or significant interference with normal operations.
AVCA SGN FD NOT  

5. **Logistics:**

a. Depot Workload:

(1) Class I - Received and Issued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>RECEIVED S/T</th>
<th>ISSUED S/T</th>
<th>TOTAL S/THandled</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>18,390</td>
<td>17,916</td>
<td>36,306</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>23,171</td>
<td>24,356</td>
<td>47,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>19,319</td>
<td>20,756</td>
<td>40,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>60,880</td>
<td>63,028</td>
<td>123,908</td>
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(2) Class II & IV - Received and Issued

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<th>RECEIVED S/T</th>
<th>ISSUED S/T</th>
<th>TOTAL S/THandled</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>23,655</td>
<td>27,863</td>
<td>51,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>30,507</td>
<td>35,789</td>
<td>66,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>29,643</td>
<td>17,837</td>
<td>47,480</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>83,805</td>
<td>81,489</td>
<td>165,294</td>
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(3) Vehicle Park (Vehicles)

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<th>RECEIVED</th>
<th>ISSUED</th>
<th>ON HAND</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>1,221</td>
<td>1,801</td>
<td>1,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>1,283</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>1,329</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>2,461</td>
<td>3,492</td>
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(4) Stock Control (ECY):

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<th>DOLLAR VALUE (MILLION)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>1,999</td>
<td>11.2</td>
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SUBJECT: Operational Report United States Army Depot, Long Binh -
Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968

October

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<th>S/T REMHSED</th>
<th>ON HAND</th>
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<tr>
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<td>43,651.8</td>
<td>26,730.6</td>
<td>311,032.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>41,852.0</td>
<td>35,762.5</td>
<td>23,197.4</td>
<td>314,557.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>36,577.1</td>
<td>38,679.9</td>
<td>6,589.6</td>
<td>255,253.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>126,327.9</td>
<td>118,094.2</td>
<td>56,517.6</td>
<td>880,843.6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(5) Storage (ECMY)

(6) Packing & Crating (Class II & IV Materials):

(7) During this reporting period, 1,688 lines were inventoried with an accuracy rating of 83% and 3,272 locations were surveyed with accuracy at 84%. Warehouse denials averaged approximately 3%.

(8) ECMY loaded and/or offloaded 34,196 trucks during the period and received a total of 12,368.0 S/T of materials by rail and shipped 3,234.6 S/T by rail. Direct diversion from the port was accomplished on 18,658.7 S/T of materials.

6. SPECIAL STAFF SECTION: Approximately 150 S/T of unserviceable materials such as broken or rotten poles, lath wood, lumber, rusted tins, bent pipes, etc., was issued to units engaged in civic action programs by the Depot’s Engineer Construction Material Yard.

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AVCA SGN FD 167


7. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE: See Inclosure 1.

SECTION II. LESSONS LEARNED

COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. PERSONNEL:

   a. Hiring of DAC's:

      OBSERVATION: DAC Personnel are being hired in the States without the Supervisor in Vietnam having a chance to screen records for an evaluation of qualifications. This results in some cases in inexperienced or unqualified personnel being assigned to technical jobs.

      EVALUATION: Since time in-country is so short (1 yr), it is mandatory that DAC personnel hired for technical fields such as Data Processing be experienced. They must be technically qualified on the type of equipment used, Programming Languages used and have a background in logistics. This is necessary to prevent spending valuable time on training after arrival in-country.

      RECOMMENDATION: That CPO forward to the appropriate Director the qualifications of all prospective DAC's prior to being hired so that a determination can be made as to whether or not the individual is fully capable of filling the vacancy. This will help eliminate malassignment of personnel.

   b. Personnel Services:

      OBSERVATION: It is necessary to transport individuals to and from the USA SUPCO, Saigon Personnel Services Center in Bien Hoa for various matters such as ID cards, records checks, processing for special leaves, DEROS, etc.

      EVALUATION: Much equipment and personal time is lost in making trips to and from the PSC.

      RECOMMENDATION: That a PSC Team be located in the Troop Command Area on Long Binh Post.

2. OPERATIONS:

   a. Chroming of Brass Altar Ware:

      OBSERVATION: There is sometimes a serious time-lag during which

customers are without the use of altar ware while it is being chromed.

**EVALUATION:** This affects both the men who worship and the Chaplains. The problem is further complicated by the fact that great distance, time and inconvenience is often experienced by those who bring the items to Long Binh.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Utilize direct exchange of brass items for chrome items in stockage as often as possible. Return newly chromed items to stockage as quickly as possible.

b. Security of refrigerated cargo and stocks:

**OBSERVATION:** Frozen meat items should be shipped and stored in securely locked containers.

**EVALUATION:** Frozen meat is highly pilferable and susceptible to theft. CONEX used to transport meat were banded with steel strapping but organized gangs of thieves would cut the strapping while the truck was moving and steal cases of meat. The latches on prefabricated reefer boxes are made from a light alloy, and cannot be properly secured by locks. To correct this problem, CONEX hauling frozen meat items were loaded with the door facing the head board of the truck. Doors on reefer boxes are being secured by a lock to the door handle or another eye bolt through the door.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That physical security instructions and prevention of pilferage and theft be incorporated in program of instructions for all supply and storage courses, officer and enlisted. That a dual means of locking prefabricated refrigerator boxes and vans be provided.

c. Shipment of Ice Cream:

**OBSERVATION:** Ice cream shipped without dry ice will not stay hard frozen.

**EVALUATION:** Local contractors are unable to produce sufficient dry ice to properly protect ice cream in transit. Condition of refrigerator vans prevents dry ice from being kept hard frozen. Ice cream shipped to distant supply points arrived in soft condition. Arrangements have been made to obtain dry ice from Japan.

**RECOMMENDATION:** That future contracts for local milk and ice cream production include provisions for dry ice to be manufactured in sufficient quantity to satisfy subsistence and medical requirements.
AVCA SCH FD 1111
10 Nov 68

d. Shortage of trucks:

**OBSERVATION**: Insufficient trucks, both military and civilian contract, were unavailable to meet the requirements for outgoing cargo on a timely basis and intra-depot movement of cargo.

**EVALUATION**: The lack of trucks impairs the mission of this depot to get supplies to the customer. Supplies often spend more than a reasonable amount of time in the Transportation Staging Area after being booked for transportation. The maximum time that supplies are supposed to take to get to the customer after they have been booked is thirty days. Often cargo is here at the depot for longer than that after being booked because adequate transportation is not available.

**RECOMMENDATION**: That the total requirements for transportation assets in the III & IV Corps areas be reevaluated to determine if more assets are required and if so that necessary action be taken to acquire assets.

e. Excess Serviceable Property:

**OBSERVATION**: Present indications are that large quantities of excess serviceable property are to be turned in to the Property Disposal Activity within a short period of time.

**EVALUATION**: As these items are to be serviceable items, adequate and secure storage for these items is essential. These types of facilities are not available at this time. Indications are that these facilities will not be ready in time to receive this property.

**RECOMMENDATION**: Acceleration of the program to provide facilities for the disposal activities.

f. Industrial Trash and R&U Activities:

**OBSERVATION**: Industrial trash is a major problem in the Depot. It is generated in vast quantities. PA&E does not have the capability to remove it, thus depot resources are used. This drains our resources and still results in inadequate trash removal. It is also necessary to supplement the contractor's effort in the field of repair and utilities. For example, the waiting period for a burn-out latrine requested from PA&E makes it imperative that we build our own. Yet there are no provisions in the TDA for such activities.

**EVALUATION**: In determining the TDA, assumptions were made as to contractor capabilities which proved to be invalid.

RECOMMENDATION: That contractor capabilities be investigated more thoroughly before it is assumed they will perform a function. It is also recommended that the contractor shoulder the entire burden, or the depot be provided adequate resources to deal with the problem.

Shipping of supplies to Advisory Teams and/or Popular Forces Housing Project (PFHP):

OBSERVATION: Locations of Advisory Teams and/or PFHP are often in remote areas with limited or no road facilities, contact cannot be made to coordinate movements of supplies, no offload capability, and in some cases, no one willing to accept the materials.

RECOMMENDATION: That materials for PFHP or the III and IV Corps areas be turned over to the 40th ARVN Depot and they assume the responsibility for coordination and shipment to their Popular Forces installations.

3. TRAINING: None

4. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Operation of tactical vehicles on the Long Binh Highway:

OBSERVATION: Every night, at least between the hours of 1900 hrs to 2100 hrs, a US Army tactical unit operates tanks and armored personnel carriers along the stretch from the Dong Dai Bridge to the Newport Bridge. They operate with no lights, often cover two lanes, if not three, have no concern for commercial traffic, operate at high rates of speed which are definitely unsafe due to their limited visual capability, and will at times park in the outer of the road creating an additional safety hazard. I am certain the enemy is aware of their operation and nightly pattern of maneuver, is not fooled by blackout driving since the noise will alert him, and has the advantage of pre-picking his strike position. On the other hand, they are a definite safety hazard and this highway has considerable traffic during these hours.

RECOMMENDATION: That these vehicles operate with lights at least until curfew, slow down unless there is an actual enemy situation, and stay in one lane of traffic.

b. Theft and Operation of Government Vehicles:

OBSERVATION: There are numerous M151 and M38A1 jeeps, 2 ton pick-ups, and other types of vehicles operating on the Long Binh Highway and in Saigon, some with T-plates, some with no markings, and painted various colors which are possible stolen vehicles and are being operated by Ameri-
AVCA SGN FD NET


- Cans and Third Country Nationals. There was no in-country sale of jeeps and trucks to U.S. or TCN personnel, yet many have these type vehicles.

RECOMMENDATION: A joint effort by U.S. and Vietnamese Police to establish road traps and check types of vehicles that have not been imported for general sale.

5. LOGISTICS:

a. SEA-LAND van utilization:

- OBSERVATION: SEA-LAND van contract restricts maximum effectiveness and use.

- EVALUATION: Present contract does not permit consignee (depot) to partly unload straight load, and reload other items. Host Class I points cannot take a straight load of SEA-LAND fruit or vegetables. If contract were amended to allow depot to partly unload one van, and then reload other perishable products to be shipped to a single Class I point, then product would arrive in better shape with less handling. SEA-LAND vans of dry subsistence frequently arrive with Class II & IV items mixed.

- RECOMMENDATION: That SEA-LAND contract be amended to allow depot to convert straight load to mixed load to ship to second destination consignee. SEA-LAND van should also be used to maximum for sundry packs, condiments and accessory items. However, van shipment of subsistence should not be mixed with any non-subsistence items, as the receiving locations are widely scattered, and subsistence is highly pilferable.

b. Distribution of Produce:

- OBSERVATION: Customers were not getting maximum amount of fresh produce.

- EVALUATION: Allowances for fresh fruit and vegetables were manually computed by the "percentage break" method. However, many customers never received their full percentage break because of distribution problems. More reliable ship schedules, and SEA-LAND shipments enabled the commodity manager to more accurately forecast requirements and available stocks. This data was entered on the computer and MRO was released automatically. This changed procedure has reduced much clerical effort, firmed transportation requirements, and enabled produce to be distributed on a more equitable basis in accordance with menu factors, with less loss.

- RECOMMENDATION: None.
c. Insulated CONEX containers:

**Observation:** Inadequate availability of refrigerator vans necessitates field expedients to transport perishables.

**Evaluation:** There is a shortage of refrigerated transportation. Two CONEX were modified by insulating them and placing a wet ice rack inside. Produce was shipped and found to arrive at destination in excellent condition. More of these CONEX would augment inadequate refrigerator van assets.

6. **Organization:** None

7. **Other:** None

**SECTION III**

**Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information**

This depot experienced no Escape, Evasion and Survival Information during this reporting period.

1 Incl

as

**DISTRIBUTION:**

Cy 1: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310 (thru Channels)

Cy 2-3: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

Cy 4&5: Hq, CINCPAC, ATTN: OROP-DT, APO 96558

Cy 6, 7&8: CG, USAV, ATTN: AVHGC-EST, APO 96375

Cy 9-15: CG, USAUPC, ATTN: AVCA SCH CO, APO 96491
TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVGA GO 
APO 96384

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period
   Ending 31 October 1968, of the US Army Depot, Lang Binh is forwarded in
   accordance with para 9, Art 1-19.

2. Reference Section I, para 4r: Certain seasonings and leavening agents
   will now be issued by case lots rather than pallet lots. This will allow
   for better distribution and less excesses.

3. Reference Section I, para 4s: Class I points have also intensified
   their efforts to prevent food spoilage. Continued inspections by veter-
   anarians and food inspectors is resulting in proper rotation, force issues
   and return of items having limited storage life to depot for redistribution.
   Continual rotation and weekly cleaning of freeze boxes has resulted in
   reducing spoilage.

4. Reference Section I, para 4u: Concur. In addition, care is taken to
   preclude shipping more milk than the Class I reefer boxes can accommodate.

5. Reference Section II, para 1b: Based on further review and evaluation
   by this headquarters, the recommendation to locate a Records Team from the
   Personnel Services Center in the USADIB Troop Command area is not favorably
   considered.

6. Reference Section II, para 2a: USAVR Regulation 750-17 makes no pre-
   visions for establishing such a float.

7. Reference Section II, para 2b: The Movement Control Center has been
   directed to establish an SOP to incorporate additional security directives
   for the loading procedures of reefer cargo.

8. Reference Section II, para 2c: Concur. This has been a substantial
   problem since Class I points have received ice cream shipments in which
   approximately 50% has been melted.

9. Reference Section II, para 2d: A study of transportation assets versus
   transportation requirements was completed on 20 October 1968 by this
   command and forwarded to 1st Logistical Command. The findings of the study
AVCA SGN GO S (10 Nov 68) 1st Ind


(RCS CSFOR-65) (R1)

were that this command was faced with a shortage of motor transport capability based upon motor transport requirements. Currently, the backlog of cargo at the USADLR totals approximately 1225 short tons and consists primarily of non-critical Class IV cargo.

10. Reference Section II, para 4a: A message has been dispatched to II FFV requesting their assistance in controlling the tanks and armored personnel carriers during the hours of 1900 hours and 2100 hours along the stretch of road from the Dong Nai Bridge to the Newport Bridge.


12. Reference Section II, para 5a: Negotiations are currently being conducted with Sea-Land to provide for conversions by consignee of straight load reefer cargo to mixed load for further transportation movement. Favorable reaction and performance to a contract modification of this type should lead to additional modifications to include dry cargo.

13. Reference Section II, para 5b: Class I points have been advised when receiving a short shipment to make a percentage break and not on a first come basis.

14. Lessons Learned, observations and recommendations are concurred in by this command, with the exceptions above. A copy of this indorsement has been provided the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LB 2604

Donald H. Greely
Colonel, Ord
Deputy Commander

DONALD H. GREELY
Colonel, Ord
Deputy Commander

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHC-G-DST, APO 96375


2. Pertinent comments follow:

   a. Reference Section I, paragraph 4a. The use of dunnage and proper stacking of these perishable items will also help prevent food spoilage. Closer control on the exact tons and ship arrival times is being used to cut down on this problem.

   b. Reference Section I, paragraph 4u. Concur. A close look at the consumption data to preclude any over shipments should be considered.

   c. Reference Section II, paragraph 1a. Nonconcur. The suggested procedure would delay individual administration, coordination with Department of the Army, placement processing, and acceptance or rejection notifications. Recruitment by name is practiced when the requesting official submits recommendations through CFO to DA. Grades GS-11 and below are processed and accepted by DA for technical ability even though they may not be qualified specifically i.e., Computer Programmer with Personnel experience may require orientation into the Logistics area.

   d. Reference Section II, paragraph 2b. Concur. The Movement Control Center representatives will be asked to present the SOP for review at the Operation Overtake Conference conducted by this headquarters to familiarize representatives at the meeting with the contents of the SOP and its expected impact on the problem. This headquarters will assist in the dissemination of procedures adopted by the Movement Control Center and, in conducting 525-2 inspections, will check for compliance to, and effectiveness of the SOP. No action required by higher headquarters.

   e. Reference Section II, paragraph 2c. Concur. The recommendation is considered valid and future PR&Cs (Purchase Request and Commitment) will include funds to cover the dry ice cost in the contract.

   f. Reference Section II, Paragraph 2d. Concur. Transportation requirements are constantly being reviewed by this headquarters. A study...
AVCA GO-0

is being conducted at the present time to determine the transportation requirements versus capability in III & IV CTZ. The recent addition of tractor/trailer capability in III & IV CTZ under the Philco-Ford contract will provide additional capability. Also the arrival of M-127 trailers which are due in from CONUS will increase the capability. No additional action is required by higher headquarters at this time.

g. Reference Section II, paragraph 2g. Nonconcour. Support of the Popular Forces Housing Project is covered in MACV Directive 405-4. At the present time this directive is being rewritten with a planned publication date of 1 Jan 69. The directive will provide for shipment of construction material to the twelve ARVN Engineer DSUs in country with further distribution to remote locations being the responsibility of ARVN. Therefore, there will be no need to turn these supplies over to the 40th ARVN Depot for further shipment.

h. Reference Section II, paragraph 4a. Concur. Assistance from II FFV will be of value in controlling armored vehicle traffic from the Dong Nai bridge to the Newport bridge. If armored vehicle traffic control problems exist south of the Newport bridge, coordination will be effected with the 18th Military Police Bde. No further action required by higher headquarters.

i. Reference Section II, paragraph 4b. Concur. Combined police units have been conducting checks of government issue type vehicles which appear to have been altered by painting, removal of distinctive markings or by exchange of body parts, however, due to many other commitments and duties, they are limited in the number of checks that can be made. Close controls and observation by support command headquarters of property disposal and retrograde yards within their commands would be a defensive measure which would not tax military police commitments, but could prevent possible pilferage or resale of scrap or salvage vehicles and repair parts.

j. Reference Section II, paragraph 5c. Nonconcour. USARV Regulation 55-7 paragraph 8b(3)(b) prohibits the altering or modifying of conex containers by using units. Action has been taken to relieve the reefer shortfall by providing additional military reefer vans, reefer boxes, and expansion of Sea-Land reefer services. When the equipment arrives and is put into service, the need for field expedients should be eliminated.

20
AVCA GO-0


3. Concur with the basic report as modified by indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LEN 2684

LANNY K KELSEY
111 AGC
Chief of Staff General

CF:
USASUPCOM-SGN
USAD-Long Binh
AVHOC-DST (10 Nov 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report United States Army Depot, Long Binh - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS CSPOR-65) (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, United States Army Depot, Long Binh.

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning hiring of DAC’s, page 11, Section II, paragraph 1a; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2c: Concur with the comment in the 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2c.

   b. Reference item concerning theft and operation of government vehicles, page 14, Section II, paragraph 4b; 1st Indorsement, paragraph 11; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 21: Concur. Combined police patrols make continuous checks of government vehicles to recover those that have been stolen. Some government vehicles have been issued to various military organizations that have the authority to repaint and register these vehicles with T plates for covert investigative/intelligence purposes.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

A.R. CUENTHER
CPT, AGC
ASST. ADJUTANT GENERAL

Cy furn:
HQ 1st Log Cmd
HQ USA Dep LBN

22
GPOP-DT (10 Nov 68) 4th Ind

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 8 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
## ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

**UNITED STATES ARMY DEPOT LONG BINH**

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**NOTE:** Personnel are attached to Letter Companies and are assigned to Number Companies and the Security Guard Company.

Inclosure 1 to ORLL of USADLB as of 31 Oct 1968.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Depot, Long Binh

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68

CO, US Army Depot, Long Binh

1. REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Depot, Long Binh

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 68

5. AUTHORISI (First name, middle initial, last name)

CO, US Army Depot, Long Binh

12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

13. ABSTRACT

N/A