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**TO:**
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**FROM:**
Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 30 OCT 1968. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff Force (Army), Attn: OT-RD, Washington, DC 20310.

**AUTHORITY**
AGO A/D ltr, 29 Apr 1980
This report has been delimited and cleared for public release under DoD Directive 5200.20 and no restrictions are imposed upon its use and disclosure.

Distribution Statement A

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport), Period Ending 31 July 1968

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl

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UNCLASSIFIED REPORT
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DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

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Commanding Officers
  US Army Limited War Laboratory
  US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
  48th Transportation Group
AVCA SGN AB OP

7 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
(RCS CSFOR 65)

THRU: Commanding General
US Army Support Command, Saigon
APO US Forces 96491

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
ATTN: ACSFOR
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. COMMAND.
   a. LTC Irvin L. Hylton succeeded LTC Earl W. Goyne in command of the
      7th Transportation Battalion on 20 June 1968.
   b. LTC Orvil C. Metheny succeeded LTC Clinton K. Jones in command of
      the 6th Transportation Battalion on 29 June 1968.
   d. Annual General Inspections and Command Maintenance Management
      Inspections: Incloure 2.

2. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE, AND DISCIPLINE.
   a. Civilian personnel.
      (1) A USARV Manpower Survey, conducted on 26-27 July 1968, recommended that the local national
          authorization be reduced from 156 to 99. None of the proposed reductions will be placed under
          reclama.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
(RCS CSFOR 65)

(2) "Civilianization Program 5/6" became effective 15 July 1968. This program replaces some military spaces in current TOE's with civilian spaces, occupied by Vietnamese Local Nationals. "Civilianization Program 5/6" converts one light truck company to type B. This portion of the program is under reclama.

b. Military Personnel.

(1) The summer turnover of officers and men was substantially completed by the end of July, and the Group as a whole had most key positions covered, except maintenance warrant officers. At the end of the quarter, the Group was understrength 65 enlisted men and was continuing to divert approximately two light truck company equivalents from tasks contemplated by TOE to installation security and execution of necessary mission work not covered by TOE.

(2) Casualties from enemy action:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>WIA</td>
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<td>0</td>
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(3) Awards and decorations:

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<th>MAY</th>
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<th>JULY</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bronze Star (Merit)</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>48th Group Certificate of Achievement</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>3</td>
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(4) Safe Driving Awards:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5,000 Mile</th>
<th>12,000 Mile</th>
<th>20,000 Mile</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>
AVCA SGN AB CO

7 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarter: Period Ending 31 July 1968

(RCS CSFOR 6:

3. OPERATIONS.


(1) All elements of the 48th Group engaged in operations in support of combat forces in the Republic of Vietnam on all 92 days of the reporting period. Retraining of 86th Transportation Company 2½-ton truck drivers to drive medium trucks was accomplished without standing down the company. Elements of the Group participated in Operations TOAN THAN; PEOPLES ROAD, PHASES I and II; and TROUNG CONG BINH.

(2) Tonnages hauled declined from about 450,000 tons in the last reporting period to about 380,000 tons during this period, although ton-mileage was up slightly. Group authorized strength fell to 2082, with the reassignment of the 120th Transportation Company (Light Truck, 2½-ton Cargo), but the reduction in work was not attributable to lower strength. During the reporting period, several convoys into the Delta were delayed for several days and RON's in the 25th Division area were comparatively high due to enemy activity. Troop moves used a significant amount of Group capability on low-tonnage and low-mileage operations. A considerable amount of potential capacity was lost to these more or less unavoidable circumstances. Contract trucks handled the port clearance mission, except for ammunition. Ammunition deliveries to Cogido barge point were below capacity for much of the reporting period and ammunition port clearance tonnage was below objective as a result. Delivery of construction materials to the divisions appeared to be approaching satisfaction of requirements. On several days at the end of July, for the first time, substantial numbers of available trucks were not committed.

(3) Convoy routes were constricted several times during the reporting period. Enemy activity knocked out part of the NEWPORT Bridge on highway 14 from 11 May to 17 June. On 29 June, the BEN LUC Bridge on Route QL4 was heavily damaged. A pontoon bridge was installed immediately to maintain food delivery from the Delta to Saigon, but only mission essential military traffic was allowed to use the pontoon bridge during daylight. As a result, normal one-day convoys to MY THO and DONG TAM have required two or three days since 29 June.

(4) Completion of the PHU CUONG Bridge and the opening of Highway 8A on 29 June enabled convoys to the 25th Division area to bypass Saigon. Jeep travel time from Long Binh to Cu Chi was cut to just under an hour and convoys can make the run in less than two hours. Two freight delivery turnarounds a day between LONG BINH and CU CHI are now practicable, if loading and unloading operations are properly scheduled.
(5) On 3 July, the Class 13 bridge on Route QL15 near VUNG TAU was upgraded to Class 30. Since 5 July, medium trucks and refrigerator vans have run routinely to VUNG TAU. On 11 July, 48th Group was committed to begin delivery of SEALAND vans to VUNG TAU.

(6) Convoys were run to CAN THO on 11 and 24 June, to demonstrate the availability of road support when needed, although primary support for CAN THO is by water. CAN THO is in the ARVN TAOI and 48th Group convoys travel with ARVN convoys from Saigon to CAN THO. Convoys are co-ordinated with ARVN through the USARV Highway Traffic Regulating agency. The road to CAN THO is good but the rivers at VINH LONG and CAN THO must be crossed by ferry, a slow process.

(7) A night convoy was run from CU CHI to TAY NINH on 29 July. As a demonstration, it was a success. As a freight hauling operation, the resources invested for security made it expensive.

(8) Two trucks were lost to mines on convoy operations and two men were injured by mines, two by rockets, and one by ambush small arms fire.

(9) Retrograde movements from division areas continued. A total of 8,764 tons of retrograde has been moved out of CU CHI and TAY NINH since 23 March, 5,266 tons of that amount during May, June, and July. Small quantities have also been retrograded from the 1st Division area.

(10) On 18 July, 48th Group was committed to move all Army Air Cargo from TAN SON NHUT, replacing contract trucks which had previously handled the job. No difficulties with Army Air Cargo clearance have been experienced since 18 July.

b. Statistical Summary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MILES*</th>
<th>SHORT TONS</th>
<th>TON MILES</th>
<th>PASSENGERS</th>
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<td>TOTALS</td>
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</table>

* Includes both empty and loaded mileage.

4. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION.

a. Organizational structure. Inclosure 3.
b. The 120th Transportation Company (Light Truck, 2½-ton Cargo) was reassigned from 48th Group to 53rd Group and stationed at CAN THO on 22 May 1968, by General Order 469, USASUPCOM, Saigon.

c. Two platoons of the 572nd Transportation Company (Medium Truck), which remained on TDY to 48th Group when the company headquarters and one platoon were transferred to DA NANG in March, were reduced to zero strength and their assets redistributed to fill personnel and equipment shortages of other companies assigned to 48th Group. Total resources available to 48th Group were not changed and personnel and supply administration problems resulting from detachment of the 572nd platoons from their parent unit were eliminated.

d. The 86th Transportation Company, which was reorganized as a medium company by USARPAC GO 89, 5 February 1968, was re-equipped by redistribution of 51 tractors on hand in 48th Group within TOE authorizations but in excess of the number that could be operated by drivers available in other medium companies. This action increased the capability of the Group by using available drivers to operate medium trucks instead of 2½-ton trucks.

5. INTELLIGENCE.

None.

6. LOGISTICS.

a. The major equipment shortage during the period was stake and platform trailers; 479 trailers are assigned against TOE authorizations of 620 and about 450 are normally available. This is not enough to permit full utilization of the 300 tractors authorized five medium truck companies.

b. Trucks in the 261st Transportation Company (Light Truck, 5-ton Cargo) had accumulated an average of 32,000 miles by the end of July, with individual truck mileage ranging from 10,785 to 51,157. The 5-ton cargo trucks are used fully around the clock and accumulate an average of 1,800 miles per month. In the last four months, seven trucks have been washed out, six for cracked frames at between 24 and 35 thousand miles. The 261st will reach an average truck mileage of 40,000 miles by about 1 December and an increasing washout rate must be expected. If replacement equipment is not provided, the company will have little capability left by the first of the year.

c. Right fenders of M52 and M54 trucks break off under the weight of the fender-mounted air filter. The M50 fender brace designed to correct this shortcoming is not well-conceived. The body, including the fender, is mounted flexibly. The fender brace makes a rigid connection between the frame and the fender, with the predictable result that the fender breaks off the body only a little more slowly than it would without the brace. At the suggestion of 48th Group, the ATAC technical representative with 48th Group has designed a
I. Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968

Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968

spring-loaded brace (Inclosure 4). Fifty of the new braces are being fabricated and will be tested during the next quarter. The spring-loaded fender brace should help preserve fenders on equipment now on hand, but the long-term solution must be relocation of the air filter.

d. Tailgates on 2½ and 5-ton cargo trucks have been bent, twisted and torn off most of the 48th Group's trucks in the last two years. Tailgate brackets are broken on most trucks. Nearly all the damage is caused by loading and unloading operations. The 6th Transportation Battalion installed 3-inch angle iron braces on replacement tailgates before they were mounted. This proved effective in thwarting the destructive tendencies of forklift operators. Accordingly, an EIR was submitted, recommending that the tailgate reinforcement be adopted as standard. The EIR acknowledgment concluded: "After weighing the cost and work involved to accomplish your EIR, as opposed to using a little operator caution, it is not considered economically feasible to apply it on a world-wide basis for 2½-ton vehicles." ATAC offered no objection to the modification for local use and it has been applied. The observation that a little operator caution would prevent damage is correct, but MHE operators in Vietnam are not operating under peacetime constraints and often are working with some urgency to get trucks loaded and unloaded. Most MHE operators are OJT trained and their training does not include emphasis on elegance of operation. And when a forklift operator slams into a truck which is a hundred miles from home and is trying to get turned around before dusk so it won't miss another load next day, neither the truck driver nor the convoy commander is going to hold up the operation to prepare a Report of Survey - although he may express his opinion of the MHE driver with a certain vigor. The truck is going to come back battered and it is going to stay battered until time and parts are available to fix it.

7. OTHER.

a. Management Improvement, Ammunition Beach Clearance. Prior to 29 June, 35 5-ton cargo trucks were used to haul ammunition from the Cogido barge point to the Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot. Seventy drivers were required for the two-shift day. The operation was efficient, compared with other local haul operations; the trucks averaged five turnarounds in two shifts. However, actual driving time was less than three hours, and trucks and drivers spent 17 hours a day waiting to be loaded or unloaded. When either loading or unloading operations slowed, the impact on the other end of the line was direct and almost immediate. On 29 June, the ammunition clearance operation was converted to medium trucks and the operation was designated the C0GID0 CANNON-BALL. The basic plan employed one 5-ton Tractor as a yard tractor at Cogido, 4 tractors as shuttles within the ammunition depot, and 5 tractors on road haul. Two additional tractors have been added to the system to maintain capability during equipment maintenance periods and to keep bottlenecks cleared. Twenty-four drivers are used, compared with 70 under the former system. The 35 5-ton trucks released for convoy use represent about 50 percent more one-time lift capability than the 12 tractors withdrawn from convoy for the ammo clearance operation. Because drivers are substantially freed from loading and
unloading processes, the road tractors average about eight turnarounds a shift. Loading surges and unloading slowdowns are accommodated by pushing trailers into the system, with no increase in drivers. During the last week of July, for example, for four days the ASD carried about 28 trailers under load at all times. This represents the tonnage of about 60 5-ton cargo trucks, nearly twice the total number available under the former system. With the tractor-trailer system in use during this period, the barge point was able to continue discharge at a high rate until the ASD could catch up and total system production was sustained. Tonnage cost under the new system is about 21 cents compared with about 36 cents using 5-ton cargo trucks. (See Incl 5 for cost summary.)

b. Management Improvement. Preloading for Convoy. Under the established local procedure, truck commitments are received early in the evening for the next day’s convoys and trucks are loaded at night. Night loading is inconvenient to both the loading and the trucking activity. During the report period, 48th Group began the practice of dispatching equipment which became available during the day for daylight preloading of routine supplies: construction material, other II and IV, dry Class I, and some ammunition. The practice reduces nighttime workload for all concerned, permits better loading and lashing, obtains better utilization of equipment during the day, and increases the number of drivers available for daytime operations.

c. Proposed Management Improvement. Use of Semitrailers with Cargo Trucks. Engineer units employ M199 heavy duty dolly converters to tow lowbed trailers behind 5-ton dump trucks in unit moves. There is no apparent reason why Transportation units cannot use the same dollies to tow ML27 semitrailers behind 5-ton cargo trucks in line haul operations, thereby converting 5-ton trucks into 20-ton trucks and hauling with one driver what would take four drivers using straight trucks. The 48th Group borrowed a dolly and hauled a loaded trailer around the post; the M54A2 truck handles the load easily, up and down hill and on tight turns. The rig is overlength and overweight but not excessively so. The 59-foot length and 43-ton gross vehicle weight, with a 20-ton payload, are manageable, less than the length and weight of other rigs on the road, and within bridge classifications on main routes. On 1 July, 48th Group requested 180-day loan of 10 dolly converters available in depot stock for experimental use. If the experiment is successful, allocation of an appropriate number of dollies and ML27 trailers to 5-ton cargo truck companies will be proposed.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
(RCS CSPGR 65)

SECTION II

LESSONS LEARNED:
COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. PERSONNEL.

None

2. OPERATIONS.

a. Medium Trucks in Local Haul Operations.

(1) OBSERVATION. Tractor-semitrailer combinations are preferable to straight trucks in most local hauling operations.

(2) EVALUATION. Conventional doctrine for Transportation Corps combat service support operations has held that straight trucks should be used for local hauls and tractor-semitrailer trucks should be reserved for long hauls. Medium trucks have been preferred for line haul because they have been the only big trucks in general transport operations and volume is important on line haul, where turnarounds are limited. Light truck companies, which are equipped with straight trucks, are notably inefficient for line haul because the trucks are small. However, straight trucks, regardless of their size, are even less suitable for local than for line haul. In local operations, loading and unloading time take up the greater part of the truck day. When straight trucks are used, most of the driver's day is wasted waiting for his truck to be loaded or unloaded. When the driver is separated from the loading and unloading processes, by use of tractor-semitrailer equipment, he is able to spend his time moving cargo. The CANNONBALL operation described in paragraph 7a, Section I, illustrates the point. Twelve tractor drivers move as much freight as 35 drivers previously moved with straight trucks.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That medium truck companies be provided in future force structure as the primary general support transport units, with light truck companies provided only for special purposes.

b. Control of Roll On/Roll Off Equipment.

(1) OBSERVATION. RO/RO Operations require positive control of equipment in the destination area as well as in the outloading area.

(2) EVALUATION. The OR/LL for the period ending 30 April 1968 reported that 48th Group had been assigned responsibility for physical custody of the RO/RO trailer fleet in III and IV CTZ. As of 25 July, a probable inventory of 441 trailers had been established. The inventory omits 65 trailers reported by the 2nd Logistical Command Trailer Service Agency which 48th Group has not been able to locate or account for as backloaded to Okinawa.
and includes 86 trailers which were not on the 2nd Logistical Command list but are known to be in the III and IV CTZ. The difficulty in establishing a reasonably accurate inventory results from over a year of moving RO/RO trailers into the area without any effective supervision or control after the equipment left shipside. The RO/RO operation requires steady, rapid turnaround of mobile assets which are in demand by every unit that has a tractor capable of pulling them. They can be kept in the RO/RO service only if a competent organization in the destination area has full and clear responsibility for keeping track of the trailers, recovering empties, and returning the trailers, whether loaded or empty, to the shipper.

3. RECOMMENDATION. That when future RO/RO operations are initiated, a competent organization be assigned responsibility for physical custody of RO/RO equipment in the destination area from the outset. The responsible organization must have tractor assets, secure holding areas and running repair maintenance capabilities.

3. TRAINING.

None.

4. INTELLIGENCE.

None.

5. LOGISTICS.

a. Cargo Truck Tailgates.

(1) OBSERVATION. Cargo truck tailgates should be designed to withstand heavy use and abuse in field operations.

(2) EVALUATION. See Paragraph 7d, Section I.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That tailgates on the 2½ and 5-ton cargo trucks be redesigned to be sturdy enough to stand banging, that they be provided with heavy hinges from which the pins cannot be lost, and that the brackets be reinforced so that they can't be knocked off.

b. Stake and Platform Trailer Design.

(1) OBSERVATION. A more effective and efficient S&P trailer than the ML27 type should be designed and supplied to the field.

(2) EVALUATION. The ML27 stake and platform trailer is smaller than it might be within the limits of reasonable convenience for general support hauling; there is no reason to limit the tractor-drawn load to 12 or 18 tons when the tractor can handle 30 tons. The sideboards are clumsy and heavy.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968

They are in the way when cargo is palletized and are inadequate for dense, hard-to-stow cargo like artillery projectiles. They cannot be removed and replaced by one man and when a driver alone picks up an empty trailer, he may be physically unable to stack some of the sideboards on the trailer - if they have not been damaged by being thrown on the ground and run over by passing MHE and trucks. The headboard is designed to be supported by the sideboards and when sideboards are not used, the headboard is rapidly broken up. Various attempts have been made locally to provide a lightweight siderack that the driver can remove and replace by himself, and to provide a headboard that will withstand normal usage without side-bracing. None of the lightweight sideboard ideas has been very successful. The best of the field expedient headboards is a bridge truck siderack, obtained from the property disposal yard (Inclusion 6). The rack is strong and can be mounted easily and securely.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That redesign of the standard S&P semitrailer be considered for future procurement. The redesigned trailer should be longer than the 28-foot XL27 and have more weight-carrying capability; a 40-foot, 25-ton capacity vehicle might be generally practicable for local and line haul. The trailer should have dropsides instead of sideboards and the headboard should be sturdy enough to withstand blows from swinging palletised loads.

6. ORGANIZATION.
None.

7. OTHER
None.

FRANK B. CASE
Colonel, TC
Commanding

6-1nc1:
43 Incl 1 and 2
Withdrawn, HQ, DA

Cy Furn:
2 - CINUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT
3 - USA RV, ATTN: AVHEC-DST
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
(RCS CSFOR-65) 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)


TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968, of the 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport), is forwarded in accordance with the provisions of para 9, AR 1-19.

2. Reference: Section I, para 6b: Information available from the Director of Supply, 1st Logistical Command, indicates that during time frame, August through December 1968, 226 each 5-ton Cargo Trucks are programmed to arrive in-country. The high priority of issue assigned to the 48th Transportation Group should preclude any serious shortages of this equipment.

3. Lessons Learned, observations, and recommendations are concurred in by this command, with the exception noted above. A copy of this endorsement has been provided to the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

Frederick R. Huck
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
I. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 48th Transportation Group for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Section I, paragraph 6a. Concur. The 549 12 ton S&Ps scheduled to arrive in September and October should alleviate the cited shortage.

b. Reference Section I, paragraph 6b. Concur. Current lift data mentions only those 5 ton Cargo Trucks which will be issued to ARVN-128. There is presently no information available on shipments expected to arrive in December 68 and January 69.

c. Reference Section II, paragraph 2a. Concur. Current logistical operations in HVN have proven that conventional transportation doctrine holding that straight cargo trucks be used in local haul operations and semi-trailers in line haul operations is not valid. Tractor trailers are more efficient in local haul than straight cargo trucks. Five light truck companies have been converted to medium truck companies. The ratio of tractor - trailers to straight cargo trucks employed in local haul under commercial contract is also being increased.

d. Reference Section II, paragraph 2b. Concur. The present problem of accounting for and controlling RO/RO assets resulted from the initiation of the program without concurrent established procedure. In the initiation of any future RO/RO operation a responsible organization must be established with adequate control procedures prior to the arrival of any trailers into the new area of operations.

e. Reference Section II, paragraph 5a. Concur. Present tailgates are not sturdy enough to withstand the punishment to which they are subjected in field operations. Many field expedients have been applied to strengthen the tailgates, but the ultimate answer is to redesign the present tailgate.
f. Reference Section II, paragraph 5b. Concur. Redesign of the S&P trailer should be considered for future procurements. Sideboards and the headboard on the standard S&P trailer are very unsatisfactory. Consideration should be given to using dropsides instead of sideboards on the trailers.

3. Concur with basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

John S. Waddell
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

TEL: LEN 2684

Copy Furnished
48th Trans Gp
USASUPCOM, SGN
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport).

2. Comments follow:

   a. Reference item concerning shortage of stake and platform trailers, page 5, paragraph 6a; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2a: Concur with the 2d Indorsement. The problem will be alleviated by the arrival of additional trailers during September and October, 1968.

   b. Reference item concerning replacement of 5-ton cargo trucks, page 5, paragraph 6b; 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2, and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2b: Concur. The problem will be alleviated by the arrival of additional 5-ton cargo trucks by the end of September 1968. Based on expected losses and expected replacements, there should not be a shortage of 5-ton cargo trucks at the end of the year.

   c. Reference item concerning control of roll on/roll off equipment, page 8, paragraph 2b; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2d: Concur. Prior to the initiation of another roll on/roll off operation, procedures and responsibilities will be established in order to maintain effective control over the equipment as it arrives in-country. It is recommended that roll on/roll off operations and the lessons learned in Vietnam be included in the instruction given at appropriate service schools.

   d. Reference item concerning cargo truck tailgates, page 6, paragraph 6d; page 9, paragraph 5a; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2e: Concur. The unit has taken proper action by submitting an EIR (Equipment Improvement Recommendation).

   e. Reference item concerning stake and platform trailer design, page 9, paragraph 5b; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2f: Concur. Headquarters,
AVHGC—DST (7 Aug 68) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968
(RCS CSFOR 65)

1st Logistical Command has been advised that in order to initiate action
for redesign of the tailgate, the unit should submit an EIR as provided
for in TM 38-750.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

A.R. GUENTHER

A.R. GUENTHER

A.R. GUENTHER

CoP for:
HQ 1st Log Cmd
HQ 48th Trans Op (Motor Transport)
GPOP-DT (7 Aug 68) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 48th Trans Gp (Motor Transport) for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 OCT 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Assi AG
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
(as of 31 July 1968)

48TH TRANS GP (MT)

6TH TRANS BN (TRK)
- 86 TRANS CO** (MED)
- 87 TRANS CO (2½ T LT)
- 151 TRANS CO (5 T LT)
- 261 TRANS CO (5 T LT)
- 352 TRANS CO (5 T LT)
- 543 TRANS CO (2½ T LT)

7TH TRANS BN (TRK)
- 202 DISPENSARY
- 524 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
- US RV LOCATOR
- 10 TRANS CO* (MED)
- 62 TRANS CO (MED)
- 321 TRANS CO (MED)
- 534 TRANS CO (MED)
- 506 TTP DET
- 506 TTP DET

--- TENANT UNITS

* Plus Refrigerator Truck Detachments.
** Converted during the period from LT.

Inclosure 3.
COGIDO COST SUMMARY

1. The comparison estimate on Cogido operations from 1 July - 31 July using 5-ton medium or 5-ton light trucks is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>5 TON MED (ACTUAL)</th>
<th>5 TON LT (Estimated for equal workload on basis of past performance)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Ton Miles</td>
<td>193,734</td>
<td>193,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Total Short Tons</td>
<td>32,289</td>
<td>32,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Total Miles</td>
<td>43,453</td>
<td>82,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Total Cost</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Payroll</td>
<td>$11,804.34</td>
<td>$28,330.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Ordnance Cost</td>
<td>4,400.00</td>
<td>7,400.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Organization Cost</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Maintenance</td>
<td>1,320.00</td>
<td>2,200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Tires</td>
<td>1,610.00</td>
<td>1,750.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Tubes</td>
<td>2,790.00</td>
<td>3,006.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Fuel</td>
<td>1,593.24</td>
<td>2,274.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Amortization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Trucks</td>
<td>12,166.84</td>
<td>23,986.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Trailers</td>
<td>5,648.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) TOTAL COST</td>
<td>$41,333.31</td>
<td>$68,947.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Cost Per Ton Mile</td>
<td>$0.21</td>
<td>$0.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Basis of cost shown in 1, above, are:
   a. Ton Miles: Tonnage x distance from Cogido to 3rd Ord.
   b. Payroll:
      (1) For 5T MED: Total entitlements of 34 individuals.
      (2) For 5T LT: Total entitlements of 80 individuals.

Inclosure 5.
c. Ordinance Cost:

(1) For 5T MED: 1 Engine at $3,000.00 ea., 4 Clutches at $150.00 ea., and 2 Transmissions at $400.00 ea.

(2) For 5T LT: 2 Engines at $3,000.00 ea., 4 Clutches at $150.00 ea., and 2 Transmissions at $400.00 ea.

d. Organizational Cost:

(1) For 5T MED: 30% of Ordnance Cost; 23 Tires at $70.00 ea, and 155 inner tubes at $18.00 ea.

(2) For 5T LT: 30% of Ordnance Cost; 25 Tires at $70.00 ea, and 167 inner tubes at $18.00 ea.

e. Fuel:

(1) For 5T MED: Total Miles (43,453) divided by 3 MPG, times $.11 per gallon.

(2) For 5T LT: Total Miles (82,712) divided by 4 MPG, times $.11 per gallon.

f. Amortization:

(1) For 5T MED: Cost of vehicle divided by 40,000 miles = cost per mile ($0.28) times total miles (43,453).

(2) For Trailers: Cost of Trailer divided by 40,000 miles = cost per mile ($0.13) times total miles (43,453).

(3) For 5T LT: Cost of vehicle divided by 40,000 miles = cost per mile ($0.29) times total miles (82,712).

g. Ton Mile Cost: Total cost divided by Ton Miles.
PHOTOGRAPH OF BRIDGE TRUCK SIDERACK HEADBOARD
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) (U)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68

CO, 45th Transportation Group

7 August 1968

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

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ITEM 2

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ITEM 3

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ITEM 5

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* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD #: Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page #: That page on which the item of interest is located.