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AUTHORITY

AGO/DA ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 37th Signal Battalion (SPT), Period Ending 30 April 1968

STATEMENT #2 UNCLASSIFIED

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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US Army Limited War Laboratory
972d Signal Battalion
37th Signal Battalion
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 37th Signal Battalion (Spt) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)

Commanding Officer
21st Signal Group
ATTN: SCCVNG-OPT
APO 96240

1. Section 1, Operation: Significant Activities.

a. The 37th Signal Battalion's mission is to provide communications support to III MAF, the advisory effort and other Free World Forces in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The Battalion also provides area communications support to logistics complexes, U.S. Government agencies located in the I Corps Tactical Zone, and performs other communications missions as assigned by the Commanding Officer, 21st Signal Group. The mission did not basically change during this period, however, the 63d Signal Battalion was organized at Phu Bai and has assumed operational control of communications north of Da Nang. This was a result of the build up of Army Forces in the ICTZ. Operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone had expanded beyond the capabilities of one battalion to support.

b. On 2 February 1968, the Battalion sustained four (4) KIA and one (1) WIA at the Khe Sanh Tropo Site when the personnel bunker took a direct hit from a 122 mm rocket which detonated inside the bunker.

c. On 18 March 1966, the Battalion was visited by Brigadier General Robert D. Terry, Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Communications Command, Pacific.

d. During the quarter, there were changes in the S-3, S-4, Motor Officer, Automotive Maintenance Technician (WO), Signal Maintenance Technician (WO), Cryptographic Technician (WO), Company A Commander, Commander of Company D, 43d Signal Battalion and Commander of the 337th Signal Company. Inclosure 1 provides an up to date organization structure of the Battalion. The Battalion unit changes were as follows:
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 37th Signal Battalion (Spt) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

1. Company B, 37th Signal Battalion, was assigned to the 63d Signal Battalion, effective 15 February 1968.

2. Company D, 63d Signal Battalion, was assigned to this Battalion effective 20 March 1968 at initial strength of 4 officers and 100 enlisted men. The unit is now responsible for the southern sites within the Battalion's area of responsibility.

3. The 514th Signal Detachment (Tropo) was assigned to this Battalion and attached, for operational control to the 63d Signal Battalion, effective 15 February 1968 with strength of 1 officer and 12 enlisted men. On 25 March 1968, 514th Signal Detachment was assigned to 337th Signal Company and under operational control of 63d Signal Battalion. This unit operates tropo terminals at Khe Sanh and Phu Bai.

4. The 513th Signal Detachment (Tropo) was assigned to this Battalion, effective 25 March 1968 with strength of 0 officer and 8 enlisted men. This unit is stationed at Hue and terminates the Hue-Khe Sanh system.

5. The 517th Signal Detachment (Tropo) was assigned to this Battalion and attached to the 337th Signal Company (R/R), effective 1 April 1968 with strength of 0 officer and 8 enlisted men. This unit is assigned at Danang and terminates the Danang-Phu Bai system.

e. This Battalion retains responsibility to maintain the strength of the three (3) signal detachments listed above from organic resources (337th Signal Company) and to provide support and maintenance not within the capabilities of the 63d Signal Battalion. Personnel assigned to these detachments and within this Battalion's other resources are rotated to preclude extended periods in extremely hazardous site locations.

f. The Battalion is at 97% of its authorized strength and 85% of its required strength. There still remains critical shortages in certain MOS requirements. During the quarter a considerable increase in requirements and utilisation of MOS 52B, 72B and 26L occurred. Radio operators and radio teletype personnel are currently under authorized strength but over required strength. These personnel are not considered as excess but are cross trained in a co-related MOS such as training an 05C as a 72B or 72C. Personnel requisitions have been consistently submitted on a timely and accurate basis; however, fill has been inadequate in the following critical job areas.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 37th Signal Battalion (Spt) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(1) 26L (EL, E5, E6)
(2) 31L (EL)
(3) 31M (EL)
(4) 31N (E5)
(5) 36C (EL)
(6) 52A (E3)
(7) 52B (EL)
(8) 72B (E3, EL)
(9) 72C (E3, EL, E5)

(a) The turnover in personnel was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LOSSES</th>
<th>GAINS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICER</td>
<td>5 (CPT)</td>
<td>12 (LT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Although the gain outnumbers the losses, the Battalion is still short in the required critical MOSs listed above. If this trend of gains outnumbering losses continues and the gains are qualified in the above MOS's this shortage should soon be corrected. It should be noted however that this Battalion will lose 11 Officers, 2 Warrant Officers and 149 enlisted in the next quarter.

g. Appointments: Promotion allocations have been consistently adequate and promotion lists are held at a minimum level.

h. Awards and Decorations:

(1) The recognition of outstanding valor and merit by appropriate awards and decorations continued during the quarter. Particular emphasis was placed on recognition of members of the Hue Tropo Site during the TET offensive. Outstanding performance is encouraged by the timeliness of recognition and the continued emphasis toward identification of such
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 37th Signal Battalion (Spt) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(1) 26L (E4, E5, E6)
(2) 31L (E4)
(3) 31M (E4)
(4) 31N (E5)
(5) 36C (E4)
(6) 52A (E3)
(7) 52B (E4)
(8) 72B (E3, E4)
(9) 72C (E3, E4, E5)

(a) The turn over in personnel was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOSSES</th>
<th>GAINS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICERS</td>
<td>5 (CPT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Although the gain outnumbers the losses, the Battalion is still short in the required critical MOSs listed above. If this trend of gains outnumbering losses continues and the gains are qualified in the above MOS's this shortage should soon be corrected. It should be noted however that this Battalion will lose 11 Officers, 2 Warrant Officers and 143 enlisted in the next quarter.

g. Appointments: Promotion allocations have been consistently adequate and promotion lists are held at a minimum level.

h. Awards and Decorations:

(1) The recognition of outstanding valor and merit by appropriate awards and decorations continued during the quarter. Particular emphasis was placed on recognition of members of the Hue Tropo Site during the TET offensive. Outstanding performance is encouraged by the timeliness of recognition and the continued emphasis toward identification of such
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 37th Signal Battalion (Spt) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(7) An AN/MSC-29 communication center was installed at Danang East to improve classified message service to the area.

(8) An AN/MTC-9 switchboard was installed at Danang East to relieve the overloaded existing switchboard facilities.

(9) The new I Corps Communication Center was cut over to service providing more efficient message service to the Danang area. This project was completed on 5 March 1968.

J. Listed below are the communications facilities as of 30 April 1968, which are located in the I Corps Tactical Zone and operated by the 37th Signal Battalion and by the 5th TCMS (USAF) over which the Battalion has operational control.

(1) Long Lines Communications:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VHF Systems (12 ch)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHF Systems (12 ch)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microwave Systems (12 ch)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tropo Systems (60 ch)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tropo Systems (48 ch)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tropo Systems (24 ch)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tone Packs (16 ch)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tone Packs (8 ch)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF Circuits</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teletype Circuits (DC)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC Circuits</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Communications Centers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minor Relays</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tributary Stations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Telephone Switchboards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>600 Line Manual Switchboards</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 Line Manual Switchboards</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 Line Manual Switchboards</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Line Manual Switchboards</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Radio Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HF Radio Stations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSB Radio Stations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 37th Signal Battalion (Spt) for Period Ending 30 April 1966, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

k. Training:

(1) In addition to the required training implemented during the past quarter, this Battalion sent nineteen enlisted personnel to 1st Signal Brigade and 21st Signal Group schools. Thirty-five personnel were cross-trained and 29% received on-the-job training.

(2) Primary training emphasis was placed on cross-training and on-the-job training as the Battalion was operational for ninety days during the period.

(3) The AN/GRC-106 Radio Operators Course operated by this Battalion was not allocated any personnel to attend during the past quarter and no classes were conducted. However, one five day AN/GRC-106 Maintenance Course was arranged and given by the General Dynamics Technical Representative at the 37th Signal Battalion. Eleven personnel attended, including five from other maintenance units in the Da Nang area.

l. Intelligence

(1) A quarterly security inspection was conducted at all of the assigned companies. The individual sites also received at least one inspection.

(2) Physical security at all signal sites was improved greatly. Progress at the newly installed sites at Hoi An East and Da Nang East was exceptional and both are almost completed.

(3) The Battalion policy of continual renovation of bunkers and other sand bag structures insures that deterioration and wear does not hinder the security of the sites.

(4) The defense plan for the Battalion Headquarters area at Da Nang has been rewritten. The defense of the compound was previously a function of Company A, but is now the responsibility of the Battalion S2/3 Section.

(5) During the quarter, a total of 63 SECRET and TOP SECRET clearances were validated. There were 51 Crypto access authorizations granted. The following is the quarterly summary of clearances granted:

Confidential = 3
Interim and Final Secret = 9
Interim Top Secret = 2
The number of classified documents in the repository stands at 140 Secret documents. There were 129 Secret documents on hand at the beginning of the quarter and 36 have been destroyed during this period. The large number of documents on hand is a result of the increased operational need during the quarter. Inventories are continually conducted to determine each document's retainability and destruction keeps the number on hand at a minimum.

There were 28 enemy initiated incidents affecting the 37th Signal Battalion sites during the reporting period. The enemy's TET offensive undoubtedly highlighted these incidents and accounted for some prolonged incidents, such as those at Hue and Khe Sanh.

Casualties from these incidents include 4 KIA and 1 WIA at Khe Sanh, when a personnel bunker took a direct hit; two WIA from shrapnel, one each at Hue and Khe Sanh.

Logistics:

1. Enemy activity in the I Corps Tactical Zone especially since the TET offensive has limited cargo shipments going north to combat and mission essential equipment. Shipments going north from Danang will vary depending upon the backlog and the priority assigned the cargo, but will usually require seven to ten days for air shipments and seventeen to twenty days by sea if they have a priority one or higher classification. Average waiting time to areas south of Danang such as Chu Lai requires two to four days by air and seven to ten days by sea. Air support from the lst Signal Battalion Aviation Section in Qui Nhon has averaged three to four times every fourteen days.

2. The total amount of cargo tons handled during this quarter decreased somewhat due to the transfer of Company B, 37th Signal Battalion to the 63rd Signal Battalion in Phu Bai. Shipments that involved transportation control movement documents (TCMD) amounted to 99 short tons. The utilization of truck convoys moving north proved to be a highly desirable method of moving bulk materials. The convoy tonnage during the quarter amounted to approximately 90 short tons.

3. The number of deadlined generators has declined slightly since the last period. The current percentage of deadlined generators rated between 5 and 10 KW is 8%. The percent of deadlined generators over 10 KW is 13%. The major causes for generator deadline have been traced to the fuel pump (2910-570-2945), fuel injector (2910-567-3432), and the control unit (6115-066-1165). Maintenance and supply support has improved, but lack of necessary repair parts still hinders generator repair.
SCCVNO-DN-OP

8 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 37th Signal Battalion (Spt) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(4) This unit has 81% of the total vehicles authorized. The decrease from last period resulted from the lateral transfer of M151A and M35A2 vehicles to the 63d Signal Battalion located in Phu Bai. A shortage of nine (9) each Truck, Cargo, 2½ Ton, M35A2 exists; however, the shortage has not affected the performance of the mission. Five (5) each Truck, Maint, 3½ Ton, M37B1, modified for telephone repair are also short. Cargo trucks have been substituted for use, but telephone maintenance trucks that are specifically designed for this type of job would increase the efficiency of the repair teams.

(5) Since 1 February, this unit has submitted 1,852 requisitions for repair parts and had 657 filled. This is a fill percentage of 35.4%. This organization has 2,887 authorized PLL items. Of this number 813 or 28.1% are zero balance. The total number of red ball requisitions submitted during the past quarter was 313. Of this number 147 or 47.0% were filled. The percentage of red ball requisitions filled for electronic repair parts was 47.3% as compared to 45.8% for ordnance maintenance fills. The lower fill rate is caused by the transition of the Support Command to a Depot and should improve steadily as the Depot fills their stocks from outstanding requisitions.

(6) The I Corps Communications Center is complete except for the revetment. An agreement has been made to have MCB-9 construct this revetment using materials supplied by A Company, 37th Signal Battalion. The chapel was dedicated on 31 March and continuing work on bunkers and billeting is currently in progress in the Danang cantonment area.

n. Safety:

(1) The following recordable accidents and personal injuries occurred during the quarter:

(a) Vehicle accidents: 0
(b) Personal injuries: 6

(2) Safety continues to be a matter for command emphasis. During the quarter, a vigorous safety program was initiated in the Battalion. Incentive type safety award are being made available for deserving units and individuals. Frequent lectures are given to the Battalion personnel by unit safety officer. These lectures cover all aspects of safety.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 37th Signal Battalion (Spt) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel

Adequate Personnel Accounting Tool.

(1) Observation. An up to date ADP personnel roster must be provided by USARV data processing facilities from which errors can be removed by roster and morning report corrections. An accurate monitoring system to insure timely receipt, immediate forwarding and complete processing of unit morning reports is essential to the effectiveness of the roster.

(2) Evaluation. Routine ADP personnel rosters were not available for the period July 1967 to March 1968, thereby making the task of accurate personnel accounting extremely difficult for the Battalion and subordinate units.

(3) Recommendation. Direct APO mailing to battalion by the Data Processing Service Center at Headquarters, USARV on a two month cycle with roster correction accommodation to be carded and integrated into tape at Headquarters USARPAC for in-cycle correction to be reflected for use by DA Management. This has been accomplished.

b. Operations

(1) Emergency system operations for tropo

(a) Observation. It is possible to provide limited communications on an AN/TRC-129A tropo system with only one operational frequency Synthesizer.

(b) Evaluation. Upon the failure of all except one RF module in the frequency synthesizers, it was believed that the equipment could be operated in only one mode, either receive or transmit. While this is true, there is however, no reason why the RF module can not be returned and changed between the transmit and receive frequency synthesizers on a scheduled basis. This type operation is not ideal for voice but is acceptable for TTY in that it operates similar to a half-duplex circuit.
RECOMMENDATION. Recommend that a standing operating procedures be established on all AN/TRC-129A systems that in event of the failure of all except one RF module, the procedure described above be implemented. This should not be allowed to continue for a long period of time and the change should be accomplished more often than once each half hour to preclude possible damage to the last RF module.

(2) Use of Existing Installed Tropo Antenna for a New System.

(a) OBSERVATION. A new tropo system was established between Danang and Phu Bai. Upon checking the profile, it was determined that the propagation path for this system was almost identical to the existing system between Danang and Hue.

(b) EVALUATION. By installing a system similar to quad diversity it was possible to install the new system without installing antennas. A circulator was installed on both receive waveguides and then the receiver waveguide was extended to both vans. The new van then connected the transmit waveguide to the antenna previously operating only as a receive antenna. Upon completion, both vans are operating on a space diversity system.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. When a situation exists as described above, an installation of this type will make a spare set of antenna available for replacement or deployment as needed. Also, this procedure will save installation time as antenna erection is not required.

(3) Substitution of Multiplex Equipment

(a) OBSERVATION. An immediate requirement existed for increased communication between Danang East and Danang.

(b) EVALUATION. To meet this requirement it was decided to install a microwave system, AN/TRC-29 using VHF multiplex equipment AN/TCC-7 in lieu of the authorized AN/TCC-13. A test was conducted to determine the feasibility of this type system handling voice traffic. It has been determined that by dropping the modulation level from 100% to 25% on the Negative Peak Scale of the VTVM, the intermodulation (cross talk) is reduced to the extent that the system is usable for voice communications.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Due to the problem of cross talk and noise level settings, it is recommended that this configuration be used only as a stop gap measure or in emergencies.
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(h) CommCenter Location.

(a) OBSERVATION. Flow of message traffic was not significantly impaired at the I Corps CommCenter during the TET offensive even though the area outside the commcenter was unsecure and subject to hostile fire.

(b) EVALUATION. During the TET offensive the I Corps Headquarters was an objective of a hostile force and even though under fire, the flow of traffic within the commcenter did not significantly reduce. This was a result of the commcenter being co-located with a major unit served and thus allowing for timely delivery and transmission of messages.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Whenever possible, commcenters should be located as close as possible to the major unit served.

(5) Cable location.

(a) OBSERVATION. Many cables to outlying areas have been installed along perimeters.

(b) EVALUATION. As a result of installing cables along perimeters, they are installed within fire zones of perimeter defensive positions. This subjects the cable to damage from both friendly and enemy fire and makes repair almost impossible.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Cable should be installed behind defensive positions whenever possible in order to minimize damage and to allow a reasonable chance to repair the damage if it occurs.

(6) Alternate Communications.

(a) OBSERVATION. A site that was cut-off during the TET offensive found itself able to talk to the distant terminal but unable to contact the local headquarters to request resupply, medical assistance and supporting fires.

(b) EVALUATION. The inability of this site to request those items of support mentioned above could have been serious except that the distant terminals were able to relay for the site unit direct communications could be established.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. All sites should be equipped with radios and frequencies to enable the site to communicate with the senior area headquarters during hostile activities. Further, tests should be conducted to insure proper frequencies and call signs are used.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 37th Signal Battalion (Spt) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

6 May 1968

1. Training

(1) Establishing Local Schools

(a) OBSERVATION. It appeared practical to establish a small informal school on tropo operating procedures which would be instructed by the Collins Technical Representative. This could be done within the tropo building on site and not interfere with operations.

(b) EVALUATION. The school was established initially without formal lesson plans or POI's to determine what should be stressed. It was discovered that a general class on a particular component followed by open discussion as to problems experienced by the operators, action taken, action recommended by the technical representative and symptoms to look for that will alert operators to a possible failure of this type, prior to failure, would be most useful to the company.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Recommend that this type of instruction be initiated at all sites where civilian employees or technical representatives are available. This should then be followed up with attendance in one of the Brigade schools.

2. Intelligence/Security

(1) Location of Sites within Cities.

(a) OBSERVATION. It was found during the TET offensive, that signal sites located in residential or urban areas were exceptionally vulnerable to enemy activity.

(b) EVALUATION. Sites which are bordered on one or more sides by permanent structures such as houses, office buildings or schools are difficult to defend. This type cover and concealment is ideal for sniper fire and makes return fire marginal. Additionally, the enemy is able to move about unobserved and can consolidate his forces for an attack from very close quarters.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. When considering locations of signal sites, consideration should be given to the feasibility of defending the site and not just the functional requirements. When it is necessary to locate in an undesirable location, M-79's should be provided with sufficient ammunition to defend the site for at least seven days without resupply. Additionally, coordination should be accomplished to obtain supporting fire from other units in the area.
(2) **Perimeter Lights.**

(a) **OBSERVATION.** Lights around the perimeter are made inoperative rapidly by either broken power line, failure of the power plant or broken or burnt-out bulbs.

(b) **EVALUATION.** In many instance there is a requirement for a back up emergency lighting system should the main system fail.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION.** That vehicles be parked at strategic locations around the perimeter to provide the emergency lighting as required.

(3) **Bunker Entrances.**

(a) **OBSERVATION.** During the TET offensive a bunker at Kho Sanh was the target of a 122 mm rocket which destroyed the bunker killing four men and wounding one.

(b) **EVALUATION.** Upon investigation it was determined that the rocket entered an opening in the bunker and detonated from within.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION.** All entrance to bunkers be constructed so that there is no direct access. Further a blast wall should be built to protect the entrance. All firing post be built so that they are smaller on the inside and large on the outside. The design should be similar to a "V". This will not impair the vision and will restrict incoming rounds, both small arms and rockets.

e. **Logistics**

(1) **Emergency Supplies.**

(a) **OBSERVATION.** During the TET offensive, several site had to rely on their emergency supplies of food, ammunition, water, etc.

(b) **EVALUATION.** The stationing of emergency supplies at the isolated and semi-isolated sites proved to be a wise decision.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION.** That all sites maintain a minimum seven day supply of essential supplies such as food, water and ammunition.

(2) **Cable supplies**

(a) **OBSERVATION.** The requirement for repair cables far exceeded normal requirements after the TET offensive.
8 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 37th Signal Battalion (Spt) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(b) EVALUATION. During the offensive, numerous cable outages occurred in the Danang Area as a result of bullet and shrapnel damages.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. When establishing the amount of repair cable to be stocked, consideration must be given to requirements after a coordinated attack. This cable should be above the normal MTOE cable which should also be on stock.

e. Organization. None.

f. Other. None.

2 Inc1
1. Organization Structure of
   37th Sig Bn
   Signal Sites
2. Diagram of 37th Sig Bn
   Signal Sites

JERRY DAVIS, JR.
LTC, SigC Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 37th Signal Battalion (Spt) for Period Ending 30 April 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (R1)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 21ST SIGNAL GROUP, APO 96240 22 May 1968

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade, APO SF 96384
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO SF 96307
Commanding General, United States Army Pacific, APO SF 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Transmitted herewith is one copy of , Headquarters, 37th Signal Battalion Report, subject as above.

2. Concur in the commanders observations and recommendations with the following comments and/or exceptions:

   a. Reference Section 1, para 1m (4): Truck, maintenance, 3/4 ton, M37B1, are not available for issue at the present time. This shortage has been reported to higher headquarters for the past three (3) quarters.

   b. Reference Section 1, para 1o: Because of the shortage of aviators and aircraft, this Group is able to man only two of its six authorized aviation sections. The spaces in non-manned aviation sections have been recommended for elimination with the spaces being diverted to other critical areas. This battalion received air support from the 41st Signal Battalion averaging more than twelve days per month over the last quarter.

   c. Reference Section 2, para 2b (1): Use of one RF module to provide half duplex operation of a tropo system is not considered feasible. The possibility of damage to the last remaining module is too great to warrant its use in providing this extremely limited capability. All units have been directed to establish standby VHF systems as a means of maintaining communications from sites that do not possess alternate routing capabilities. This will allow at least 12 channels to remain in full service in the event of a tropo system failure.

   d. Reference Section 2, para 2b (6): 21st Signal Group Regulation 105-4, presently being revised, will require all sites to have AM or FM communications capability with the senior sub area commander. The next MTCE submission will include requirements for the additional radio sets.

   e. Reference Section 2, para 2c (2): An authorized stockage list for cable and associated hardware was distributed to all battalions on 2 May 68. This list includes enough material to repair any foreseeable damage to multipair cable that may occur.
3. This report considered adequate.

[Signature]

DANIEL W. McEELWEE
OCH, SigC
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 37th Signal Battalion (Spt) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS OSFOR-65 (RL)

DA, HQ, 1st Sig Bde (USA S TRA T CC O N), APO SF 96384, 13 JUN 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO SF 96375

1. Subject report is forwarded in compliance with USARV Regulation 525-15.

2. Reference 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2e, "para 2c(2)" should read "para 2e(2)".

3. Concur in the Commander's observations, evaluations, and recommendations as indorsed with the following comments:

   a. Item: Critical MOS Shortage, 1f, p.2 and p.3. Shortages in MOS's 52B, 72B, and 26L are Brigade-wide. At the present time there is no foreseen alleviation of shortages from Department of the Army as is indicated by the low percentages of fill action.

   b. Item: Shortage of Telephone Repair Vehicles, 1m(1), p.6, with paragraph 2a, 1st Indorsement. Action has been taken on the shortage of the 3/4 ton vehicle, M37B1, modified for telephone repair; however, this shortage is one which is a world-wide problem.

   c. Item: Unmanned Aviation Sections, 1o, p.9, with para 2b, 1st Indorsement. The concept of diverting spaces from unmanned aviation sections to other critical areas is considered sound only as an interim measure. Due to changing tactical situations, this headquarters does not favorably consider a permanent diverting of these spaces.

   d. Item: Emergency System Operations for Tropo, 2b(1), p.9, with paragraph 2c, 1st Indorsement. This headquarters concurs in the recommendation as indorsed provided that all possible efforts have been made to alter route circuits on the system.

   e. Item: Use of Existing Installed Tropo Antenna for a New System, 2b(2), p.10. This situation, however, in all probability will not occur too often and in instances where this recommendation is applied, provisions must be made to have the necessary equipment available for sudden relocation of either terminal.

   f. Item: Communication Center Location, 2b(4), p.11. Brigade practice is to locate the Communication Center close to the major unit served, preferably adjacent to the AG message center of that unit.
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 37th Signal Battalion (Spt) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

g. Item: Cable Location, 2b(5), p.11. In addition to installing cables behind defensive perimeters, the burial of such cable to the maximum extent possible would also help alleviate the problem.

h. Item: Alternate Communications, 2b(6), p.11, with paragraph 2d, 1st Indorsement. The recent MTOE submission of 21st Signal Group containing the requirement for additional radio sets for this purpose will be favorably considered by this headquarters.

i. Establishing Local Schools, 2c(1), p.12. The IWCS contractor has a contractual responsibility to conduct OJT for military operators of that system. Additionally, a textbook has been compiled to further enhance the training posture of units employing tropospheric scatter radio terminals. This will be used as a supplement to the course of instruction offered by the SEA Signal School in the operation and maintenance of the AN/TRC-90 series radio terminals. This text is being placed in final form and will be reproduced at the U.S. Army Printing Plant in Japan. After publication, copies will be sent to all sites in Vietnam in a number such that there will be a copy for each van and adequate reference copies for the site training program.

j. Item: Bunker Entrances, 2d(3), p.13. These features are included in the 1st Signal Brigade standard designs for personnel and fighting bunkers.

k. Item: Emergency Supplies, 2e(1), p.13. A letter from this headquarters, subject: Local Contingency Plans, 26 May 68, was forwarded to all groups directing a review of local plans and SOP's to ensure that provisions have been made for prepositioning, instruction, and use of emergency equipment.

l. Item: Cable Supplies, 2e(2), p.13, with paragraph 2e, 1st Indorsement. 1st Signal Brigade has recently issued lists of cable construction and maintenance supplies to be stocked by all units responsible for cable. The quantities to be stocked include an allowance for repair of extensive damage by enemy activity.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MERRELL H. SMITH
LTC, OS
Acting Chief of Staff

Copy furnished:

Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Communications Command,
ATTN: SCCOP, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 85613.
AVHGC-DST (8 May 1968) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 37th Signal Battalion (Spt) for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 37th Signal Battalion (Spt).

2. Concur with report as submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN V. GETCHELL
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ 1st Sig Bde (USASTRATCOM)
HQ 37th Sig Bn (Spt)
GPOF-DT (8 May 68) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 37th Sig Bn (Spt) for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558  3 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG
**Organizational Structure of the 37th Signal Battalion**

1. **HQ & HQ Det, 37th Signal Battalion**  
   - Organic

2. **A Company, 37th Signal Battalion**  
   - Organic

3. **C Company, 37th Signal Battalion**  
   - Organic

4. **D Company, 43d Signal Battalion**  
   - Assigned

5. **337th Signal Co, 37th Signal Bn**  
   - Assigned

6. **544th Signal Det (Tropo)**  
   - Assigned to 337th Sig Co
     - Attached to 63d Sig Bn for OPCON

7. **513th Signal Det (Tropo)**  
   - Assigned to 37th Sig Bn
     - Attached to 63d Sig Bn for OPCON

8. **517th Signal Det (Tropo)**  
   - Assigned to 37th Sig Bn
     - Attached to the 337th Sig Co

Incl 1
**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 37th Signal Battalion (SPT)**

**Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations.** 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968

**CO**, 37th Signal Battalion (SPT)

**Report Date** 8 May 1968

**Contract or Grant No.** N/A

**Originator's Report No.** 682212

**Other Report No(s).**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT**

**SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

**SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY**

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

**ABSTRACT**

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