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
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OPERATIONAL REPORT



ON LESSONS LEARNED

DDC
JUN 17 1968
BT

US ARMY DEPOT

CAM BANG BAY

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

1 JANUARY 1966 - 30 APRIL 1966

FOROT RD
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INTRODUCTION

Organized around the directorate concept, the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, was activated during this quarter. Likewise, this Operational Report on Lessons Learned is divided into chapters, each chapter being devoted to a particular directorate. However, activities of some of the newly formed directorates have been included in chapters of other older directorates. Several months after the activation of the US Army Depot, the 504th Quartermaster Depot was phased out. Therefore, this report includes the activities of the 504th Quartermaster Depot until its functions were integrated with those of the US Army Depot.

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of Staff for Force Development.

attn: FOP-OT-AD

Work Order 20310

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CHAPTER I

DIRECTORATE OF ADMINISTRATION

A. MISSION.

The mission of the Directorate of Administration is to provide assistance to the Commanding Officer in exercising staff supervision for military personnel, administration, safety, special services, billeting, civil affairs, civilian personnel and central post fund.

The directorate is also responsible for the formulation of policies and exercising staff supervision over the procurement, allocation, promotion, leave, morale and welfare, classification and reclassification, transfer and replacement, administration of the proficiency pay program, and separation and redeployment of personnel.

B. SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

The New Year began with the Directorate operating as a part of the 504th QM Depot, functioning both as a Depot operation and the post functions designated as the Cam Ranh Bay Logistics Area. TD P5-2500-08 was developed in Saigon by the 1st Logistical Command to augment the 504th QM Depot TOE for station functions. With a minimum number of TD personnel on hand the split out of station functions was accomplished late in February. Lt Col Homer H. Sittner remained as Director of Administration, 504th QM Depot and 1st Lt Jack D. Gilbert, his Adjutant. 1st Lt Wayne McDonnell was designated the SI/Adjutant of the TD. Major Edward L. Kidd arrived the middle of March and assumed duties of SI/Adjutant, and 1st Lt McDonnell was moved to the Special Services Division.

With an SI function both in the 504th QM Depot and in the TD of the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, there was considerable duplication of effort in such areas as mail and distribution, requisitioning and distribution of publications, handling of correspondence, and duties and details of personnel.

The Commanding Officer, US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, Colonel Arthur L. Friedman, was promoted to Brigadier General on 1 April 1966 and moved to Nha Trang on 15 April 1966. Colonel Alfred H. Crawford assumed command of the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay on 15 April 1966. One of his first actions was to organize his headquarters staff in the Directorate concept parallel with the organization of 1st Logistical Command. Depot and post functions were consolidated. TOE and TD people were placed together. The Director of Administration, 504th QM Depot and his staff; the SI/Adjutant, US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, were meshed and consolidated into one staff; a one headquarters concept was off the ground.

This concept is working and working well. It was soon realized that the mission of all activities had outgrown the TD augmentation authorization. With this realization, a revision of TD P5-2500-08 has been undertaken. It is envisioned that the present authorization of 39 officers, 4 warrant officers and 331 enlisted men will be revised upwards to a total of approximately 70 officers, 7 warrant officers, and 900 enlisted men to adequately perform the depot missions. At the end of the reporting period, work on revising TD requirements was progressing as rapidly as possible.

C. PROTOCOL AND DISTINGUISHED VISITORS.

Cam Ranh Bay continued to be the top attraction in the Far East for distinguished visitors. Important visitors included:

- 2 Jan 66 - Senator Stuart Symington (D-Mo)
- 4 Jan 66 - Hon Stanley R. Resor, Secretary of the Army
Brig Gen Keith R. Ware, DOPINFO USA
Brig Gen Norton, DCG, USARV
Col Geo S. Blanchard, Exec to Secy of the Army
Col C. H. Gomph, Mil Asst to Secy of the Army
Lt Col P. A. Hutcheson, Mil Asst to Secy of the Army
Lt Col Willingford, USARV Project Officer
- 4 Jan 66 - Maj Gen Yang Yu Pseng, ACofS, G3, Republic of China Army
and 6 other officers
- 5 Jan 66 - Senator Mondale (D-Minn)
Mr. Nelson, Minneapolis Newspaper
Mr. Borman, Minneapolis Newspaper
- 6 Jan 66 - Mr. Garry Barker, Melbourne, Australia Herald
- *10 Jan 66 - Gen Frank Besson, CG, USAMC
Maj Gen F.F. Chesarek, Asst DCSLOG
Brig Gen W. D. Latta, CG, USAFECOM
Brig Gen C. W. Eifler, CG, 1st Log Comd
Col J. D. Milano, Chief, Systems Div, Ofc, CofSA
Col W. D. Campbell, Jr., SGS, USAMC
Col R. A. Hansen, Chief, Data Systems Ofc, CofSA
Col E. J. Enguire, Dep ACS, G4, USARPAC
- 10 Jan 66 - Ambassador Hu, Republic of China Ambassador to RVN
Gen O Yu Lun, Dep CG, Republic of China
Secretary Wang, Rep of China Embassy, Saigon
and 12 Major Generals, Republic of China Army
- 11 Jan 66 - The 266th Army Band, USARV

- 12 Jan 66 - Brig Gen John Kelset, Dep CG, STRATCOM and party
- *8 Jan 66 - Mr. Ronald Ross, Minneapolis Tribune
Wally Beene, Stars and Stripes
William Gill, ABC
Robert Jennings, ABC
- 16 Jan 66 - Gen Frank Besson, CG, USAMC
Brig Gen Ploger, CG, 18th Engr Bde
- 17 Jan 66 - Maj Gen Weyland, CG, 25th Inf Div
Brig Gen Walker, DCG, 25th Inf Div
- 17 Jan 66 - Lt Gen Heintges, DCG, MACV
- 18 Jan 66 - Brig Gen Jones, USMC
Col Hamblin, Advisor, I Corps
- 19 Jan 66 - Gen C. W. Abrams, Jr., Vice CofS, US Army
- 25 Jan 66 - Ambassador Weir, New Zealand
Ambassador Istinvelli, Turkey
Ambassador Ovattara, Upper Volta
Ambassador Van Der Zwall, Netherlands
Ambassador Tabanera, Spain
Ambassador Sjolin, Sweden
Ambassador Laspiur, Argentina
Ambassador Munck, Denmark
Ambassador Darom, Israel
Mr. Bolt, New Zealand
Mr. Ryding, Denmark
Mr. Valete, Brazil
Lt Gen Heintges, DCG, MACV
- 26 Jan 66 - Adm U. S. Grant Sharp, CINCPAC
Gen Westmoreland, COMUSMACV
Adm Ward
Brig Gen Eifler, CG, 1st Log Comd
Brig Gen Ploger, CG, 18th Engr Bde
- 26 Jan 66 - Brig Gen Person, Bde Cmdr, 101st Abn Div
- 31 Jan 66 - Lt Gen Engler, Dep CG, USARV
Brig Gen Seitz, ADCG, USARV
- 3 Feb 66 - Larry Burrows, Life Magazine
Harvey Loomis, Life Magazine
- 6 Feb 66 - Brig Gen Dean, CofS, FFV

8 Feb 66 - T. F. Wilson, American Consul

8 Feb 66 - Charley Manly, Chicago Tribune

10 Feb 66 - Brig Gen H. D. Moore, Jr, PM, USARV
Col Lehman, PM, FFV

10 Feb 66 - Brig Gen Eggelston, USAMC
Brig Gen Bright, ASD Consultant

16 Feb 66 - Mr. Mansfield, Office of Secy of State
Brig Gen Machen

16 Feb 66 - Representative Buchanan, US Congress

17 Feb 66 - Ambassador Anderson, Australia and party

17 Feb 66 - Rear Admiral Pressey, CINCPAC and party

22 Feb 66 - Col Fujii, Japanese Army Attache
Lt Col Tschaschel, German Army Attache

23 Feb 66 - Brig Gen Lollis, G4, USARPAC
Brig Gen Taylor

24 Feb 66 - Lt Gen Engler, Dep CG, MACV
Maj Gen Adams, G4, USARPAC
Brig Gen Eifler, CG, 1st Log Comd
Brig Gen Floger, CG, 18th Engr Bde

25 Feb 66 - Maj Gen John Lane, TC

26 Feb 66 - Brig Gen Simpson, CG, MEC, St Louis

1 Mar 66 - Col Maedler, OSD
Col Clark, MACV, J4
Lt Col Storm, OSD

3 Mar 66 - Mr. Smith, USARPAC Historian

4 Mar 66 - Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC
Gen Westmoreland, COMUSMACV
Lt Gen Moore, CG, 2d Air Div

4 Mar 66 - Lt Gen Spivy, J5, DA
Brig Gen Seignious
Brig Gen Baker, Air Force

4 Mar 66 - Mr. Sam Anderson, USO, Executive, Vietnam

7 Mar 66 - Brig Gen Zais, Dep CG, FFV

10 Mar 66 - George Romilly, ABC News
Charles Roppolo, ABC News
Jack Casserly, ABC News

11 Mar 66 - Don Dedera, The Arizona Republic

12 Mar 66 - Jack Gurwell, Texan Newspapers (Houston)

12 Mar 66 - Maj Gen Hansen, CG, USA Munitions Comd and party

13 Mar 66 - Vice Adm Melson, CIA and party

13 Mar 66 - Brig Gen Crowley, MACV J4

13 Mar 66 - Sir Anthony Rumbold, British Ambassador to Thailand
Sir Efferington-Smith, British Ambassador to Vietnam
Col Napier, British Attache to Vietnam

13 Mar 66 - Brig Gen Hardin, CofS, Army & Air Force Exchange

15 Mar 66 - Gen John K. Waters, CG, USARPAC
Lt Gen Engler, Dep CG, USARV
Brig Gen Eifler, CG, 1st Log Comd

16 Mar 66 - Lt Gen Sir John Wilton, CofS, Australian Mil Forces
Air Vice Marshal Headlam
Brig Gen Jones, Combat Opn Center

17 Mar 66 - Maj Gen Hutchin, ACofS, P&O, CINCPAC
Col E. S. Williams, USAF
Col M. Rhode, USAF

18 Mar 66 - Brig Gen Zais, Dep CG, FFV

19 Mar 66 - Brig Gen H. C. Pattison, Chief of Mil History, DA

20 Mar 66 - Lt Gen Cassidy, Chief of Engineers, DA

22 Mar 66 - Gen Westmoreland, COMUSMACV

23 Mar 66 - Lt Gen Engler, Dep CG, USARV

26 Mar 66 - Maj Gen Critz, CG, Ft Sill

28 Mar 66 - Maj Gen Abbey, 2d Air Div

31 Mar 66 - Brig Gen Miller, DCofS, P&O, USARV and party

- 3 Apr 66 - Maj Gen Eifler, CG, 1st Log Comd
- 4 Apr 66 - Mr. Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secy of Defense
Mr. Eamer, Spec Asst to the President
Senator McGee
Mr. Ignatius
Mr. Goulding, Dep Secy of Def Personal Affairs
Mr. Wisner
Maj Gen Eifler, CG, 1st Log Comd
- 4 Apr 66 - Mr. Bartimo, Civ Pers, DA
Brig Gen Berg, USAF
- 5 Apr 66 - Brig Gen Bayers, Dep CG, 4th Inf Div
- 7 Apr 66 - Rear Adm McDonald, CO, MSTP, Far East.
- 8 Apr 66 - Danny Kaye and Vicki Carr, USO
- 9 Apr 66 - Col W. J. McGuigan, OJCS, Wash D.C.
- 10 Apr 66 - Shukichi Khjikawi, Japanese Police
Larry Whitanada, American Embassy
- 12 Apr 66 - Maj Gen Richardson, IG, DA
- 12 Apr 66 - Mr. Nicholas Johnson, Maritime Administration
- 12 Apr 66 - Congressman Stratton, D-NY
Congressman Leggett, D-Cal
Congressman Hicks, D-Wash
Congressman Chamberlain, R-Mich
Congressman Stafford, R-Vermont
Brig Gen Thrash
- 15 Apr 66 - Jim Lucas, Scripps Howard Newspapers
- 15 Apr 66 - Lt Gen Engler, DCG, USARV
Brig Gen Miller, USARV
- 16 Apr 66 - Adm Sharp, CINCPAC
Gen Westmoreland, COMUSMACV
Brig Gen Friedman, CG, USASC, Nha Trang
Brig Gen Durr, MACV Construction Officer
- 21 Apr 66 - Gen Harold K. Johnson, CofS, USA
SMAJ Castile, CONARC Sgt Major
- 22 Apr 66 - Richard Armstrong, Saturday Evening Post
- 27 Apr 66 - Eric Sevareid, CBS News
Dan Rather, CBS News

The Protocol Officer for this period was Captain John T. Ragusa. In addition to being the Project Officer for all visits which included fixing itineraries, arrangements for transportation and selection of briefing officers, Captain Ragusa provided briefings in many areas and conducted many tours of installation facilities.

CHAPTER II

DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY, PLANS AND OPERATIONS

A. MISSION

The Director of Security, Plans, and Operations has been given the mission of formulating operational plans and policies, planning for physical and tactical security of the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay and coordination of that security with contiguous bases operated by the US Navy and US Air Force; planning for special projects; planning for the reception of newly assigned units and coordinating allocation of real estate with the area Engineer for billets and operational areas; exercising staff supervision and coordinating of intelligence and counter-intelligence in the command; assigning missions of subordinate units; responsible for drafting orders assigning or reassigning subordinate units; processing security clearances and validations for 1st Logistical Command Units located in the command; monitoring and management of supplies shipped in support of combat operations; operation of a tactical operations center in event of an attack against the installation. The strength of the directorate at the close of the report period was 7 officers and 10 enlisted men.

B. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER DIRECTORATES AND UNITS.

This directorate has staff supervision over subordinate units in activities pertaining to operational readiness, training, security, intelligence and contingency plans; coordinates combat service support operations as well as other common actions with other directorates and staff sections as well as with higher headquarters; coordination between this command and the Navy/Air Force organizations on the peninsula.

C. SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

The new year began with the arrival of the advance party of the 14th Inventory Control Center. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 504th Quartermaster Depot was appointed to sponsor the new unit and the advance party began to line up supplies and equipment in anticipation of the arrival of the main body.

TD P5-2500-08, developed by Hq 1st Logistical Command to augment the 504th Quartermaster Depot to better enable it to perform a post, camp and station mission began to receive filler personnel in early January. Plans were initiated to split out depot versus station functions and to reorganize the command accordingly.

A detachment of one (1) officer, ten (10) enlisted men and four (4) ambulances from the 51st Medical Company (Ambulance) arrived on New Years Day and was attached to the 136th Medical Detachment (Dispensary).

The main body of the 14th Inventory Control Center arrived at Cam Ranh Air Base via C-130 aircraft on 8 and 9 January. The unit initially had 13 officers and 106 enlisted men in this command with the remainder of the company working in Saigon Logistical Area mechanizing that command's

supply system. As that task progresses, the personnel will be returned to Cam Ranh Bay.

The 934th Dental Detachment (RJ) arrived in the command 14 January. The detachment has eight (8) officers and seven (7) enlisted men.

The 67th Engineer Detachment with one (1) officer and twenty-five enlisted men arrived on 15 January 1966. Their mission is producing industrial gases for depot stocks.

The first big operation of the new year was kicked off on 12 January 1966. OPERATION BLUE LIGHT, consisted of debarking the 1/14th Infantry Battalion, 25th Infantry Division. The troops were debarked, placed on vehicles and convoyed to the Cam Ranh Air Base where they were flown out to a staging area in the vicinity of Pleiku. The operation was conducted without incident and completed on 17 January 1966:

Total tonnage moved	1008.6
Total Personnel debarked	821
Number of Sorties flown	113

Plans were formulated to move troop units into the new 4400 man cantonment when completed. In order to speed up construction of the tent-pads, logistics troops were put on a self help program under supervision of the 35th Engineer Group (Const). Three (3) teams of 21 men each were formed to execute this program.

On 8 February all companies and detachments assigned to the 10th Transportation Battalion (TML) were reassigned from the 4th Terminal Command, to this headquarters. The 10th Battalion is thought to be the largest battalion in the active army roles with in excess of 2700 personnel assigned.

On 17 February 1966, the Cam Ranh Bay Logistic area was redesignated US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay. Colonel Arthur L. Friedman assumed command of the newly designated organization on 19 February replacing Colonel A. L. Morrison who had been in command since August. The staffing of the headquarters element of this command is in accordance with EW 5P-2500-08.

This command received a directive to form a direct support element to support the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. The forward support element consisted of 5 officers and 69 enlisted men and was composed of personnel trained in the handling of class I, class III, class V as well as a graves registration team, MHE operators and vehicle drivers. The operation, dubbed GARFIELD, was kicked off on 25 February and lasted one month when OPERATION LINCOLN commenced which linked up the 3d Brigade with a brigade from the 1st Air Mobile Division. The latter operation was completed on 25 March. Both operations were supported by air line of communication from Cam Ranh Air Base to the forward support element some 80 miles away. Some 90 tons a day of class I, III and V were shipped on the average.

The 870th Transportation Company (TML Svc) arrived and was assigned to the 10th Transportation Battalion (TML). The company is authorized 329 men. The company was given 30 days on the job training in country before it was considered operational on 31 March 1966.

The 554th Ordnance Company (DAS) was transferred to this command on 28 February from US Army Support Command Qui Nhon. On the same date the 149th Ordnance Company (GS) was transferred to Qui Nhon. In early March the 129th Ordnance Company (Coll and Class) was transferred, with the company going to Qui Nhon and some of the recovery capability in the company sent to Long Binh.

The 18th Ordnance Detachment (TM BA) was transferred to Vung Tau, departing this command on 5 March. On 6 March two new units arrived, the 574th Quartermaster Company (Composite) and the 575th Adjutant General Detachment (Army Postal Unit). The 574th has three (3) bath platoons one of which was assigned to US Army Support Command Nha Trang. The APU has 2 officers and 18 enlisted men.

Brig Gen Friedman, CG US Army Depot Cam Ranh Bay was promoted to that rank on 1 April 1966.

Training was conducted in early April in the color coding system of identifying supplies and equipment. Warehousemen and stevedores attended the classes. A forklift class was also conducted to teach supervisory personnel a course of instruction to be given to all MHE operators prior to 15 May 1966. All company grade officers and non-commissioned officers were given a five hour class on general maintenance in an attempt to upgrade operator and organization maintenance within the command. All officers attended an intelligence class during the first week of April.

Hq and Hq Company, Ammunition Battalion (DS/GS)(Provisional) was organized on 1 April. The battalion was organized to reduce the span of control in this organization. Plans have been formulated to organize a provisional maintenance battalion and a supply and service battalion as well as Hq Special Troop to give this command adequate command and control headquarters.

With the requirement to increase security of the command with organic resources, a provisional security company was organized on 11 April. Forces committed to this company were provided by the three major commands in the area, that is, US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, 35th Engineer Group, and 10th Transportation Battalion. The Ammunition Battalion (Prov) is providing security force to secure the ammunition storage area.

Another major organizational change took place on 15 April 1966 when US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay became subordinate to US Army Support Command Nha Trang. Brig General Friedman assumed command of the latter headquarters on 15 April. Col A. H. Crawford, Transportation Corps, assumed command of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay on 15 April 1966. Staff elements of the 504th Quartermaster Depot and the Table of Distribution for the command headquarters were merged to eliminate duplication, increase efficiency and make maximum use of the personnel resources available.

Practice Defense Readiness Tests were conducted monthly during the reporting period. The intelligence officer maintained continuous liaison with other US Army, Air Force, Republic of Korea Forces and Vietnamese agen-

cies to insure timely interchange of intelligence information. Spot intelligence reports were published and disseminated to the command covering significant items of intelligence.

There was no overt enemy action within the geographical limits of the command during the report period.

II

LESSONS LEARNED

ITEM: There is an imbalance between the capability of the port and that of the depot.

DISCUSSION: a. Emphasis has been placed on up-grading the capability of ports in Vietnam without a simultaneous increase in supply personnel to handle the increased tonnage. The port battalion has in excess of 2700 personnel authorized to operate the port. Although all supplies coming ashore are not from the depot there is still a serious imbalance.

b. The results of this imbalance is the lowering of efficiency of the port operation because supplies and equipment delivered to the depot cannot be unloaded as fast as the port battalion delivers them. In addition, it causes a serious back log in the depot operation resulting in slow reaction time to supply requests. Units available to this command for Class I, II & IV combined have a total authorized strength of less than six hundred and many of these people are in the overhead of operating the units as well as security forces and other required tasks not to speak of personnel shortages in the units.

OBSERVATION: Future troop unit scheduling should consider all interrelated factors when developing phase-in dates of troop units.

ITEM: The 647th Quartermaster Company (Field Depot) depends on labor service troops to perform up to its capability.

DISCUSSION: The field depot company is normally organic to the Quartermaster General Support Battalion which also has three labor service companies organic. To perform its mission to full capacity the field depot company utilizes labor service troops. However the 647th Quartermaster Company was sent here at reduced strength and with no labor service troops available, the assigned mission is beyond their capability. In addition to the normal mission this company has had to staff reefer barges with Class I personnel which has further downgraded their capability.

OBSERVATION: No units should be sent to the combat zone at reduced strength and in the case of the cited company, it should have had labor service troops available to perform the mission.

ITEM: Lack of command and control units.

DISCUSSION: This command, which was actually organized with the arrival of the 504th Quartermaster Depot in July 1965, and which was sent here at reduced strength, was given the mission of operating the depot as well as the post, camp and station. Since the arrival of the 504th there was 15 separate companies assigned before the first battalion headquarters was organized, an Ammunition Battalion (Provisional) which was established on 1 April 1966 from resources made available by Hq 1st Logistical Command.

OBSERVATION: That sufficient command and control elements (Bn Hq) be phased in with separate companies. The lack of such headquarters results in an inefficient operation.

CH PART III

DIRECTORATE OF SERVICES

SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

During the cited period the Directorate of Services was assigned a larger services mission which encompassed the functions shown under the Depot Services Division on the attached organizational chart. Concurrently the retail supply support mission was transferred to the Director of Station Supply. The current organizational chart for the Director of Services, attached as an enclosure, provides for two basic divisions under the Director of Services. These are:

a. The Depot Services Division - This division provides all services in support of depot operations. Number of personnel requested to staff this division is shown in each organizational block. In developing the requirements for Department of the Army Civilians, consideration was given to providing some continuity within the organization and the utilization of civilians in particular areas requiring a high degree of specialization.

b. The Installation Services Division - This division provides the services normally associated with a post, camp or station operation. In staffing the offices of the division the same considerations outlined in the comments concerning the Depot Services Division were used in determining personnel requirements. The functions shown under the Field Services Branch are performed by TOE Units. The Branch Chief, Field Services Branch, exercises staff supervision over these units.

Installation Services Division During the reporting period the installation services functions continued operations in support of personnel located in Cam Ranh Bay. Number of personnel supported increased from 12,000 as of 31 Dec 1965 to 17,000 as of 30 April 1966. Certain additions were made to existing operations. These additions are as follows:

Bath Support The 574th Quartermaster Company Composite Bath arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 10 March 1966. This company is composed of 3 bath platoons with 4 bath teams per platoon. One platoon was immediately deployed to Nha Trang with two platoons remaining in the Cam Ranh Bay Area. Three shower points have been established to date in support of personnel located at Cam Ranh Bay. These facilities became operational on 29 March, 15 April and 21 April 1966, respectively. This unit provides hot showers which is a necessity to our troops working in rock quarries, on road construction, off loading ships, handling supplies and operating maintenance shops. Hot showers are equally important during the monsoon season when temperatures preclude personnel from utilizing cold water showers. Additional shower points will be established as required or furnished to support operations as directed by higher headquarters.

Laundry Support The capability of the laundry was increased during the period by the installation of a 100 KW generator in lieu of seven 12.5 KW generators as a power source for the laundry plant. Maintenance problems with respect to a power supply continually plagued the laundry equipment.

The 100 K/ generator appears to have solved this problem. In order to provide better service to the customers and introduce some needed competition into the contract laundry service, a second source was requested and obtained on approximately 1 April 1966. The additional source located in Nha Trang, has allowed a more adequate distribution of the work load and improved the quality of the finished product.

Depot Services Division: The Depot Services Division was organized during the reporting period. This division provides services support to the operational elements of the depot. In order to describe adequately this segment of the Director of Services, each branch is described in detail below to include a brief description of their functional responsibilities.

MHE and Labor Control Branch: This branch is responsible for the control and dispatch of Materials Handling Equipment and the control of local national labor utilized in depot operations. As the depot mission workload was developed, it was readily apparent that in order to utilize properly the MHE organic to TOE units and the MHE organic to the depot, a consolidated control facility was needed. This facility was organized using personnel resources of the 504th Quartermaster Depot and was located on a 6,000 square foot area of pierced steel planking. Instructions were furnished TOE units under operational control of the depot that all MHE could be presented to the equipment pool for technical inspection and subsequent hand receipting to the pool. Concurrent with this action, depot and station elements were solicited to determine their static requirements by type of MHE. To be classified as a static requirement a piece of equipment must receive 80% utilization. Specific times were established, commensurate with work shift changes, to effect motor stables and the dispatch of equipment to the customers. This facility became operational 15 March. Results to date have been very gratifying. The pool controls dispatch and operators maintenance with respect to all MHE. In addition, it monitors on a continuous basis the utilization of equipment, receives and acts on requirements for additional equipment and processes equipment into field maintenance shops for scheduled maintenance and repair.

Concurrent with the establishment of the MHE facility, planning was initiated for a labor control office. This office is responsible for the processing of labor requirements for operational elements of the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay. It receives requirements from these elements and effects necessary liaison with the Civilian Personnel Office to insure that requirements are reflected in the form of requests to hire. It further maintains a complete file on all requests for hire by depot elements. When fully developed this office will also monitor time and attendance reports.

Packing and Crating Branch: Prior to January, 1966 initial plans were developed for the establishing of a packing and crating facility to support depot operations. To obtain some basic guidance on this type operation, other depots overseas with mission workloads similar to that at Cam Ranh Bay were queried. Based on the current mission and guidance furnished from sources queried, the detailed plan was developed for a packing and crating facility in early January 1966. Power tools for this facility were placed on order at that time on a priority 12. When items were not received by the required delivery date, items were placed on purchase request to 1st Logistical Command for procurement in Japan. Concurrent with the developing of power tool requirements, facility requirements were prepared and submitted to the Area

Engineer for inclusion in the MCA construction program. This facility is currently programmed for FY 67. Since certain packing and crating support was needed immediately in support of depot operations, a small facility was opened on 15 February 1966, in a maintenance tent utilizing 4,000 sq ft of pierced steel planking for hard stand. This facility to date has constructed and repaired pallets and constructed shelving for storage of repair parts in depot warehouses. As power equipment and the permanent facility became available, functions performed by this facility will be expanded to include packaging of supplies for shipment.

Services Branch: The Services Branch consisting of the Reclamation Laundry Section and the Purchasing and Contracting Section is not completely operational as of this date. Currently no requirement exists for a reclamation laundry facility. Should the need arise, the field laundry operated by the 59th Quartermaster Company could perform this mission on a limited basis. The Purchasing and Contracting Section receives requirements from operational elements of the depot for procurement, verifies the need for local purchase, prepares the necessary Purchase Request and Commitment document and forwards the request through appropriate channels for procurement action by Purchasing and Contracting Division, 1st Logistical Command. As required this office performs follow up action on purchase requests to staff elements of 1st Logistical Command.

SECTION II - COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Lessons Learned:

Item: During the later part of the monsoon season and during January 1966 the service provided by the contract laundry at My Ca was below desired standards. Time required for the laundry of contract items was excessive.


Discussion: It was observed that excessive time was being used by the civilian contract laundry in processing contract items.

Observation: A survey was made of commercial laundry firms in this area. Based on this survey it was discovered that a firm in Nha Trang, currently performing contract laundry for the Nha Trang Support Area could accept an additional workload. A request for an additional contract agreement was forwarded to 1st Logistical Command. This request was approved. Results to date have been very satisfactory and the service to the customer has been substantially improved.

Item: The power supply for the laundry units which consists of a gasoline engine that provides power for the unit's generator were continually breaking down. This reduced the capability of the laundry plant.

Discussion: The power supply for each laundry unit is supplied by a gasoline engine which provides power to drive the 12.5 KW generator on each unit. Due to the high deadline rate among these engines the productivity of the laundry was greatly reduced.

Observation: A 100 KW generator was installed and provided sufficient power to operate all laundry units. This action has enabled the laundry to operate at maximum capacity.



*Functions to be performed by Field Services GS Co 1
FCR 29-11AF

CHAPTER IV

DIRECTORATE OF MAINTENANCE

1. Significant Organizational Activities

This directorate was increased from 3 officers and 7 enlisted men to 9 officers, 36 enlisted men, and 12 Department of the Army civilians. These personnel covered the areas of RED BALL administration, purchasing and contracting. Tech supply, Light QM Equipment maintenance, automotive and MHE maintenance, and electronics. This directorate also has a CMMI and road side spot check team under its operation control.

Direct and General Support maintenance were rendered by the following units:

- 31st Ordnance Company (DAS)
- 554th Ordnance Company (DAS)
- 59th Quartermaster Company (Fm)
- 128th Signal Company
- 82nd Transportation Company (AGS)
- 510th Engineer Company

The above units are all operational at the present time.

Effective 11 March 1966 a consolidation of Organizational and Direct Support maintenance was established. This centralized MHE Maintenance Shop was established for all using units under command of 504th Quartermaster Depot so that utilization and control could be properly exercised. All organizational and direct support mechanics were placed under the operational control of the OIC of this maintenance shop.

During the periods 19 thru 21 March and 22 thru 24 March MOCOM had an instruction team at Cam Ranh Bay to conduct classes on the operation of forklifts. Fifteen to twenty operators were taught in each class in an effort to decrease poor driving habits

To decrease the workload on the automotive shops a daily motor stables check was established on 22 April. Personnel from the CMMI team checked motor pools to insure that motor stables were being performed according to schedule. All units submitted a schedule of daily motor stables to this directorate and a series of checks was initiated. This seems to have eased the work load on the Direct Support Automotive Shops by increasing the efficiency of organizational and operator maintenance within the using unit.

On 10-11 March 1966 Lt Col. James F. Lynn, and CWO James H. Stinnett attended the first maintenance conference conducted by the 1st Log Cmd. The Maintenance Directorate 1st Log Cmd. discussed the following topics.

- a. Maintenance Rebuild Program
- b. TAERS Reporting
- c. M-151 Repair Parts Program
- d. Standardization program for MHE and construction equipment

- e. Electronics
- f. Maintenance float
- g. ASL's

The deadline continues at an unacceptable rate due to the following factors:

- (a) Insufficient repair parts available
- (b) Unusual operating conditions (sand and inadequate roads)
- (c) Insufficient training at organizational level in the operation and maintenance of equipment under adverse conditions

Action taken to eliminate items (b) and (c) are as follows:

- a. Enforced supervised motor stables
- b. Implementation of training in units and review of maintenance programs
- c. Increased emphasis on road side inspections to keep commanders informed
- d. Initiation of formal command maintenance inspection on 15 Feb 1966

The Directorate of Maintenance Office has sent supervisory personnel as well as contact teams into other areas of Vietnam to attempt to solve some of their maintenance problem areas. This work has been conducted in the Ordnance, Engineer, and Artillery fields.

Red Ball requisitions have removed 424 items of Ordnance, Quartermaster, Engineer, Signal, and Marine equipment from deadline. However many repair parts requisitioned through normal supply channels are still in a due-out status due to the lag in shipments.

2. Commanders Recommendations

(1) Personnel: There is a shortage of trained personnel in the fields of Signal, Engineer, Ordnance and Quartermaster. Following is a list of shortages in each of the above fields.

(a) Signal:

Radar Rep. Tech.	282A	WO	1 ea.
Radio Rep. Tech.	281A	WO	1 ea.
ADPS Equip. Rep. Tech.	301A	WO	1 ea.
Blacksmith	44D20	E-4	1 ea.
Welder	44C20	E-4	1 ea.
Radio Repmn.	31E20	E-4	1 ea.
Radio Repmn. Helper	31E20	E-3	1 ea.
II Equip. Repmn.	31J20	E-4	2 ea.
II Equip. Repmn. Helper	31J20	E-3	1 ea.
Camera Repmn.	41E20	E-4	1 ea.
Gen. Repmn. Helper	52A10	E-3	2 ea.
Aux. Equip. Repmn.	34C20	E-5	1 ea.
Elec. Wfare. Repmn.	26N20	E-5	1 ea.

(b) Engineer:

Wireman	36A10		1 ea.
Gas Turbine Gen. Repmn.	52A10		1 ea.
Supply Handler	56A10		4 ea.
Engr. Equip. Maint. Help.	62A10		6 ea.
Wheeled Vech. Mech. Help.	63A10		1 ea.
Shop Clerk	71B20		1 ea.
Platoon Leader	4880		2 ea.

(c) Ordnance:		
Auto Repmn.	63H20	3 ea.
Light Truck Driver	63A10	9 ea.
F & E repmn.	63G20	2 ea.
Machinist	44E20	1 ea.
Welders Helper	44A10	2 ea.
Canvas and Lth. Repmn	213C20	1 ea.
Shop Clerk	71B20	2 ea.
Cooks Helper	94A10	1 ea.
Swdb Operator	36A10	1 ea.
(d) Quartermaster		
Heavy Equip. Repair		3 ea.
Welder		1 ea.
Fabric and Lth. Repmn		7 ea.

There is also a shortage of clerk typists in all fields of maintenance. These shortages are due largely to the rotation of many personnel. It is recommended that increased emphasis be placed on the filling of requisitions for qualified replacements.

(2) Intelligence: N/A

(3) Security: N/A

(4) Operations and Training: In many instances, personnel arriving in Vietnam as truck drivers or heavy equipment operators had insufficient training before arrival to cope with the severe conditions of sand and heat at Cam Ranh Bay. It is recommended that increased emphasis be placed on proper driving procedure and operator maintenance during the initial training period. This added training will help considerably in the reduction of the deadline rate.

(5) Logistics: The invocation of RED BALL has removed many items from deadline however increased emphasis should be placed on the processing of regular requisitions. At the last report there were 40,267 requisitions outstanding. As a result of the slow reaction to normal supply requisitions.

Lessons Learned

Power Steering Pumps

Item: Failure of 5 ton multifuel power steering pumps

Discussion: The failure rate of 5 ton multifuel power steering pumps in the Cam Ranh Bay area is on the increase

Observation: Operators can help increase pump life by running the multifuel engine at a fast idle when steering at a halt; this will reduce wear and tear on the pump.

Generators

Item: Generator breakdown

Discussion: Many of the recent generator breakdowns can be traced to condensation of moisture inside the equipment.

Observation: Cold generators should be run for at least ten minutes before applying a load. The circulation of air around the stator windings will tend to remove accumulated moisture.

Multifuel Engines

Item: Cracked heads on multifuel engines

Discussion: Failure to allow the engine to cool at idle speed is causing uneven cooling and frequently results in cracking of the cylinder heads.

Observation: Commanders and operators have been reminded that proper operation of the multifuel engines require that the engines be run at idle speed to avoid uneven cooling.

Work Areas

Item: Work areas are unsuited for maintenance

Discussion: Most of the repairs are being made on metal aircraft landing mats and in the sand.

Observation: Work areas are being constructed in the Depot area. These areas will be on concrete slabs and housed in large warehouses. Construction is in the final stages on most building.

Truck, Forklift, RT

Item: Failure of governor

Discussion: Failure of the governor is caused by the weights and their shaft striking the lock ring on the center shaft and dislocating it. The weights fly out further than normal which scores the inside of the case, eventually causing a circumferential split.

Observation: Steps are being taken to correct this fault by modification of the governor.

CHAPTER V

DIRECTORATE OF SUPPLY

Chief of Storage Division

1. Organization:

a. The Directorate of Supply was reorganized to a Storage Division as a result of the 14th Inventory Control Center assuming the Stock Control and Supply Control mission for Class I and II for the II Corps area. Stock Control personnel from the depot units remained with the 14th ICC, as the 14th ICC was not up to full strength and due to the lack of qualified personnel to assume the Stock and Supply Control mission.

b. The depot ADP's officer, Major John J. Rooney, was released from the Storage Division and was assigned for duty with the 14th ICC Stock Management Division. Captain Ralph D. Cahill was released from duty with the Storage Division and assumed the duties of Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 504th Quartermaster Depot. Captain Bobby B. Spoonmore was released from Storage Division and assigned for duty as Chief Stock Control, 14th ICC. Captain Donald P. Brown, Class III Officer assumed the duties as Commanding Officer, 524th Quartermaster Company (Petrol Depot). Sergeant First Class Lonnie K. Starrett was assigned for duty with the 14th ICC, Class I Branch. Sergeant First Class Ervin H. Hoffer, Class III operations sergeant, was placed on TDY to Phan Rang to set up a new POL supply point and pumping station for the support of the new Air Force Base located at Phan Rang. First Lieutenant Charles T. Dobson formerly Class III operations, assumed the duties of Class III Officer. Major Robert L. Davis and Sergeant Major Amos O. Sensenig were assigned to the Storage Division, effective 1 February 1966. Major Davis assumed the duties of the General Material Branch. S/Major Sensenig assumed the duties of Chief Clerk for Storage Division.

c. The Storage Division lost the ammunition storage mission effective 5 April 1966. The ammunition battalion assumed the storage mission for ammunition.

2. Accomplishments and New Problems:

a. Class I. Covered storage space has increased during this reporting period. Class I has 62,000 square feet of covered storage space, of which 7,000 square feet is occupied with sundry items. The depot recently received a large number of 1,600 cubic foot reefer boxes of which 91 will be installed at Can Ranh Bay. A letter requesting real estate and erection of reefers was forwarded 1st Logistical Command on 25 March 1966.

b. Class II

(1) Covered storage space has improved during this reporting period. Currently Class II has 76,000 square feet of covered storage space available and is expected to receive an additional 24,000 square feet within the next 15 days. However, based on stocks due in, a critical shortage of covered storage space still exists. The full impact of this shortage of storage space

will become route as additional piers become available for discharge of cargo. A critical shortage of storage aids still exists, i.e. box and flat pallets and storage bins; however, a contract has been released by 1st Logistical Command and is expected to be delivered within the next thirty days. In addition to the local contract, a shipment of box and flat pallets and storage bins is due to arrive from U. S. Army Depot, Japan, in the very near future.

(2) Mr. Spears, Mr. King and Mr. Yamaguchi, U. S. Army Depot, Japan, Storage Assistance Team, arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 7 April to assist in rewarehousing and obtaining necessary storage aids.

c. Class III

(1) Cam Ranh Air Base continued to grow and bulk jet fuel consumption continued rising sharply from 2,894,200 gallons in December 1965 to 7,224,500 gallons in March 1966. Bulk Mogas and Diesel continued to increase slowly but steadily as new units arrived and the construction effort was increased. Bulk Avgas consumption remained low during this period, increasing only slightly.

(2) With the air base becoming operational, 55 gallon drums and 500 gallon collapsible drums were used to support inland airfields and in support of tactical operations. Approximately 1200 55 gallon drums and 1512 500 gallon collapsible drums were airlifted during this period.

(3) The use of the 500 gallon collapsible drum greatly increased our support capability, but drums were in short supply during this period. A large percentage of drums handled were damaged and leaked after very little use. No repair facility was available during this period to repair leaking drums and approximately 250 leaking drums were on hand at the end of this period. A repair facility was being set up and became operational on 1 April 1966.

(4) During this period, several LCU loads of drums, 55 gallon, were shipped to Phan Thiet and Tuy Hoa. Approximately 3500 drums were shipped.

(5) A total of 11,501 drums of JP-4, 1,407 drums of Avgas, 2,979 drums of Mogas and 3,922 drums of diesel were consumed or shipped during this period.

(6) Due to the receipt of additional drums and packaged oils and lubricants, a new storage area of approximately 130,000 square feet was prepared to meet immediate requirements.

(7) Taking advantage of the harbor, ESSO Corporation stationed a T-2 tanker here to be used as a floating storage to supply Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon. A T-1 vessel was used to shuttle from Cam Ranh Bay to Qui Nhon. The US Army continued to use USNS ships in a similar method to supply Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Phan Rang and Cam Ranh Bay, with Cam Ranh Bay as the central station.

(8) Permanent storage tanks were under construction during this period and a 172,000 barrel steel bolted tank farm consisting of 16 each, 10,000 barrel tanks and 4 each, 3,000 barrel tanks was approximately 75% completed at the end of this reporting period. Of these tanks, one 10,000 barrel tank was put into service to be used as a settling tank.

(9) In early March the petroleum pipeline facility in Phan Rang was completed and 8 men from Cam Ranh Bay were sent to operate it until scheduled terminal personnel would arrive in several months.

(10) In February, one officer and 10 enlisted personnel were sent to Ban Me Thuot to operate a forward Class III Supply Point in support of Operation Garfield.

(11) During this period, petroleum personnel continued to rotate with few replacements. This trend continued throughout the period and at present a critical shortage of personnel exists.

d. Engineer Class IV

(1) Class IV Storage facilities have improved during the current reporting period. Engineer Class IV storage occupies 1,290,000 square feet, with approximately 30,000 tons on hand. The 1,290,000 square feet have recently been rewarehoused and organized into storage bays 20' x 40'. Laterite roads have been constructed. These roads and cross aisles have saved many valuable man hours by permitting rapid movement of heavy equipment, cranes, etc. from one area to another. A recent location survey was made and an accurate stock locator system has been established.

(2) Improvement of security was made by the installation of a barbed wire fence around the storage area. Plans have been prepared to install a permanent lighting system which is required for a more efficient night operation.

(3) The Engineer Class IV storage operation handles an average of 500 tons daily. This heavy work load is accomplished by cross training all personnel. To maintain flexibility, these personnel, primarily supply handlers, are cross trained to operate cranes, trucks and rough terrain forklifts.

(4) During this report period, the ASL for construction items was increased by 400 line items. Stocks are expected to arrive at the depot within ninety days and will increase the stocks and tonnage on hand from 30,000 tons to approximately 150,000 tons.

e. Tactical Support:

The U. S. Army Depot had the logistical support responsibility for Operation Garfield (Ban Me Thuot). Major Johnson, Assistant Chief of Storage, and 52 personnel from the Storage Division participated in the logistical support for Operation Garfield. The operation began on 24 February and the phase out of supplies began 1 April 1966. All troops returned to Cam Ranh Bay on 26 April 1966.

Fifty Thousand Gallon Collapsible Containers

ITEM: The largest collapsible POL containers that the Army uses are of 10,000 gallon capacity.

DISCUSSION: The Air Force purchases and uses 50,000 gallon collapsible containers for POL for use at forward airfields where they do not have steel tankage. These items would be very useful to the Army in forward areas particularly for aviation products such as JP-4. A great deal more fuel could be stored in these containers with less real estate than would be the case with five each 10,000 gallon containers.

OBSERVATION: The Army should procure and use 50,000 gallon collapsible POL tanks.

Assignment of Supply Detachments

ITEM: More small TO&L 500 series supply detachments could be profitably used in Vietnam type wars.

DISCUSSION: In build-up type logistical operations it is necessary to run many small supply points for retail and combat support operations. Small TO&L 500 series supply detachments are ideal for such operations and they prevent the dissipation of wholesale depot-type units on small jobs to the detriment of their primary depot missions.

OBSERVATION: A considerably larger number of TO&L 500 series supply detachments should be provided in troop build-ups for limited-type wars.

Push Shipment of Small Quantities
of Repair Part Type Items

ITEM: The Department of the Army computes the quantities of push shipments to accompany the troops for each build-up. A very large quantity of these items are small repair part type items but frequently only one or two of each item may be shipped.

DISCUSSION: These repair-part type items are shipped on the basis of so many for the repair of such and such a density of end items present. This causes the absurd situation of receiving large triple wall containers of small packages, sometimes 500 or more line items in each container. Each line item consists of one transistor, two screws, five cotter pins, or two gaskets, etc.

OBSERVATION: Consideration should be given to shipping standard packs which would be faster to ship and receive and less subject to loss enroute.

CHAPTER VI

DIRECTORATE OF AMMUNITION

Section I - Significant Organizational Activities

1. On 1 April 1966, the Ammunition Battalion (DS/GS)(Prov) was organized by paragraph 1, General Order #13, Headquarters, US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay. At the same time, the 174th Ord Det (AR), 611th, 630th, and 606th Ordnance Companies (Ammo) were attached to the battalion for all purposes by paragraph 1, General Order #14. The 133rd Ord Det (EOD) was attached for administration, rations, and quarters by General Order #14, dated 1 April 1966.

2. The personnel used to staff the battalion headquarters and headquarters and headquarters company was drawn from assets of the 52 Ord Group in Saigon. The advance party began to arrive at Cam Ranh Bay on 19 March 1966. The TOE equipment available to the provisional battalion was also drawn from the 52 Ord Group. On 1 April, eleven people had arrived at Cam Ranh Bay to begin the organizational planning. The company commanders of the units to be attached to the battalion were contacted and plans were made to move into the new cantonment area. Troops assigned to the battalion began arriving on or about 3 April 1966 and all had reported by 5 April 1966.

3. The cantonment area was organized and tents were erected on cement pads which presently houses the entire battalion. As mess halls, latrines, and showers were completed, the ordnance units commenced moving into their respective areas with the 606th Ord Co. being the first unit to move. The 630th Ord Co. moved subsequently and the remainder of units are presently in the process of occupying their respective areas.

4. Concurrently with occupation of the cantonment area, the depot ammunition personnel have handled a daily average of 370 S/T of ammunition.

5. The battalion was given an additional mission of providing security for the ammunition depot. Personnel were drawn from each unit and communication equipment installed to offer adequate security measures.

Section II - Commanders Recommendations

1. Personnel: Based on the degree of performance, it is evident that units should be deployed as full strength TOE as opposed to reduced strength.

2. Intelligence: Not applicable.

3. Security: In most theatres of operation, indigenous personnel are usable as security guards. This is not true in Vietnam, and the resulting burden of security is too great for the ammunition companies to cope with. Provisions should be made for security guard companies to assure this responsibility, thus relieving the ordnance companies for ammunition duties.

4. Operations and Training: In view of the increasing palletization of ammunition, ammunition handlers should be trained in fork lift and crane operations as an integral part of their training.

5. Logistics: All ammunition ships arrived in country should carry a predetermined basic load of repair components and materials for maintenance of ammunition boxes. Material handling equipment used for off-loading of ammunition should be of equal capability as that used in loading. This will prevent needless damage to ammunition and missiles at the port.

6. Lessons learned: The sandy type soil at Can Ranh Bay will not support heavy ammunition stacks and has been known to shift to the extent that stacks have tumbled overnight. Pierced steel planking has been used to afford a more stable foundation.

7. Due to the intense heat and heavy rainfall it is necessary to provide covered storage for small arms ammunition and pyrotechnics. This should include a definite means of ventilation.

CHAPTER VII

DIRECTORATE OF TRANSPORTATION

Section 1, "Significant Organizational Activities"

A. The pontoon bridge which connects the Cam Ranh peninsula to the mainland was opened to traffic at approximately 0230 hours, 9 January 1966. This increased the traffic flow capability from approximately 785 (by ferry) to approximately 3500 vehicles per 24-hour period.

B. A COMUSMACV Transporter utilization survey was conducted during the period 15 - 31 January 1966. This survey was made to ensure that these items of equipment are effectively utilized and properly maintained.

C. Effective 19 January 1966, the 1st Logistical Command has in direct support one (1) CV-2 aircraft serving all logistics areas and support commands Monday through Saturday.

D. Letter, this office, subject: Documentation of Shipments, 27 January 1966, was distributed to all units in the Cam Ranh Bay area to insure that all shipments made from this area are documented in accordance with AR 55-10 (MILSTAMP).

E. Letter, this office, subject: Return of Cargo Pallets to the Local Port, 27 January 1966, was distributed to all units in the Cam Ranh Bay area, requesting that immediate action be taken to have all available cargo pallets returned to the local port. These pallets are required to expedite vessel discharge and delivery of supplies and material to consignees.

F. An Installation Capacity Report was submitted to the Director, 2nd Traffic Region, TMA MACV, APO 96240, on 23 February 1966. A requirement was submitted for sixty (60) Trucks, 2 1/2 Ton 6x6, for intra-depot operations.

G. Colonel Cary A. Kennedy, Jr., TO, Project Officer for the establishment of RO/RO (Roll On/Roll Off) service in Vietnam, visited this area on 26 February 1966. His objective was to establish RO/RO service AJAP, but NLT 1 July 1966. The Taurus (a RO/RO vessel) arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 22 March 1966 and backloaded approximately 92 S/T of unserviceable assemblies for Okinawa. This vessel, or one with similar capability, will make two trips per month between Cam Ranh Bay and Okinawa.

H. A requirement was submitted to the Civilian Personnel Office on 27 February 1966 for 340 local national employees. This figure represents personnel requirements through 31 December 1966 in support of the transportation motor pool operation.

I. Letter AVLC CAN-TO, this headquarters, subject: Administrative Vehicle Requirement for FY 1967, 25 March 1966, was submitted to the 1st Logistical Command, requesting 221 administrative vehicles for the Cam Ranh Bay Transportation Motor Pool.

J. The Alaska Barge and Tug Line began operation in the Cam Ranh Bay area in early April. These barges are used extensively in support of resupply operations.

K. Prior to 1 March 1966 the 504th QM Depot Transportation Office performed a dual function; staff supervision of transportation activities of the depot and the station. O/A 1 March transportation personnel started arriving against TD P5-2500-08 and on 10 March the Area Transportation Office and Depot Transportation Office became separate activities. It soon became apparent that separation of the two offices had resulted in duplication of effort, ineffective utilization of available manpower, and a requirement to maintain two central file systems. As a result of a command reorganization on 15 April 1966, the two offices were once again consolidated and became the Directorate of Transportation, U.S. Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay.

L. The Cam Ranh Bay Transportation Motor Pool established "taxi" service for the first time, effective 28 April 1966.

M. Authority was received from the Traffic Management Agency (TMA), Saigon, to ship unaccompanied baggage directly from Cam Ranh Bay to CONUS via Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft, effective 1 May 1966.

N. Eight (8) 36-passenger buses were received on 5 May 1966 for assignment to the Transportation Motor Pool.

O. Two (2) military buses departed the depot area for Cam Ranh Air Force Base at 1435 hours 6 May 1966 with fifty-four rotatees. This was the first time buses have been used by the Army in the Cam Ranh Bay Area.

Section 2, "Lessons Learned"

IT-11: When operating in sand, the cargo carrying capability of a 2½ Ton Cargo truck is limited to approximately 2000 pounds.

DISCUSSION: During the early development stages of Cam Ranh Bay, 2½ ton trucks transporting Class V supplies from the Army Ammunition Depot were limited to approximately 2000 pounds per vehicle. In order to support tactical operations, LARC-V vehicles had to be utilized to augment the 2½ ton truck capability. This greatly reduced the lightering capability of the local port.

OBSERVATION: When developing a logistical complex such as Cam Ranh Bay, the development of stabilized roads to critical supply points should be given high priority.

IT-12: When loading packaged POL aboard an LCU vessel, the use of 500 gallon collapsible drums is much more satisfactory than using 55 gallon drums.

DISCUSSION: 500 gallon collapsible drums can be loaded aboard an LCU vessel 5 times as fast as can 55 gallon metal drums. In addition to vehicle turnaround time and handling time being reduced, the amount of POL that can be transported is increased from approximately 31,600 gallons to approximately 50,000 gallons.

OBSERVATION: Due to the limited transportation equipment and man-power available, every effort should be made to use available resources to the maximum.

ITEM: Use of 12-ton Stake and Platform Trailers and LOU vessels in emergency resupply operations are very effective.

DISCUSSION: Speed of delivery is of utmost importance in satisfying an emergency resupply requirement. Due to the shortage of airlift capability, it is often necessary to resort to delivery by sea. Very satisfactory results have been obtained by loading class V supplies on SHP trailers and moving them to destination by LOU vessels. This roll on/roll off method eliminates double handling of the cargo and expedites loading and discharge of the vessel.

OBSERVATION: Use of the above system should be continued in efforts to satisfy emergency resupply requirements to coastal areas not having an airfield or when aircraft are not available.

ITEM: M-Series vehicles, or commercial design vehicles with 4-wheel drive (4x4), are more suitable, at the present time, than standard commercial design vehicles (2-wheel drive 4x2) for use in support of transportation motor pool operations in the Cam Ranh Bay Area.

DISCUSSION: Cam Ranh Bay is an area of few hard-surfaced roads and a 4x4, M-Series or commercial design, vehicle would have the necessary mobility to negotiate the sand roads with normal loads, whereas a 4x2 type vehicle would not be able to operate in some of the areas.

OBSERVATION: Until such time as a hard surfaced road network is established in the Cam Ranh Bay Area, continued emphasis should be placed on acquisition of 4x4 vehicles rather than 4 x 2.

ITEM: The non-availability of local national vehicle operators will present a major problem as administrative vehicles are received for the transportation motor pool.

DISCUSSION: This headquarters is authorized in excess of 150 vehicles for the operation of a transportation motor pool. In order to operate on a 24-hour basis, 2 drivers per vehicle are required. A request was submitted to the Civilian Personnel Office in December 1965 for a sufficient number of drivers to operate 156 administrative vehicles on a 24-hour basis. To date, only 1 local national driver has been hired.

OBSERVATION: Due to the obvious shortage of local national vehicle operators, strong consideration should be given to adding military vehicle operators to TD P5-2500-08.

POST ENGINEER

Significant Organizational Activities

The mission of the Post Engineer is to provide the units of Cam Ranh Bay with repair and utility support. However, during the continuing buildup on Cam Ranh Bay the Post Engineer has provided many new facilities. Some of these are latrines, shower stalls, quonset buildings for the USO, tropicalization of existing quonset buildings and the provision of centralized power generating stations of 100 to 200KW. R&U work is performed by Pacific Architects & Engineers under contract to the US Army. Since January 1966 their authorized work force has increased from 47 to approximately 475 personnel. This increase has considerably increased the productive effort of R&U. However, the equipment that is to be furnished PA&E by the Army has just begun to trickle in. Lack of equipment has seriously hampered the productive effort and capabilities. When the required equipment is received R&U will be able to perform many jobs that at the present time are not within R&U's capability.

Commanders Recommendations

Personnel. Filling the TD of this section with qualified military personnel will greatly increase the supervisory operation of the Post Engineer over the PA&E contract.

Logistics. Presently requisitions for 90% of R&U supplies must be approved by 35th Engineer Group. If approved and available the supplies are then drawn from the 53d Engineer supply point. This system does not provide an adequate supply of material to properly perform the R&U mission. To eliminate this situation R&U supplies should be marked for and shipped directly to R&U.

AVLG-GO-H (27 May 66)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1966. RCS CSGPO-28 (RI)

Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96307 30 JUN 1966

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVG (Hist
APO 96307

1. Forwarded in accordance with AR 525-24 and USARV Circular 870-1.
2. Concur with the comments and recommendations of the commander except as noted.
3. Reference page 14, Item 2: Four Mitsubishi engines were shipped to US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay on or about 18 May to help alleviate the problem with the engine-generator units of the field laundry sections.
4. Reference page 26, section II, Item 5: Recommendation 5 is not valid. Paragraphs 160 and 165, Chapter 9, FM 9-6 explains the procedures adequately. Each installation is responsible for establishing stock levels of required repair parts and material. These levels are based on demand criteria and the stockage list must be reviewed periodically to maintain levels commensurate with requirements. Materials required for repair of ammunition boxes are obtained through Class II and IV supply channels except hasps, which are a Class V item. Complete boxes are obtained through Class V supply channels. The return of empty containers from the using unit to the Class V depot would alleviate the repair problem and is a source for repair material. Command emphasis is required on a continuing basis to assure the return of empty containers.
5. Reference page 31, Chapter VIII:
 - a. The following actions have been taken to alleviate the difficulties experienced in obtaining R&U supplies. PR&C-116-EN-0301-66, submitted 13 December 1965 authorized the procurement of a 30 day stockage of R&U supplies over 1,000 line items, total cost approaching \$4,000,000 for each military installation receiving R&U support. Shipment of these supplies to be on an 02 priority directly to the PA&E depots. A check on the current status of supplies indicated that large quantities are now being received in country, but a sizeable backlog still exists at the Japanese port.
 - b. The equipment situation has been somewhat less than desirable throughout RVN. Requisitions for TOE equipment (generators, erdlators, rock crusher components, etc.) have been returned unfilled by USAMC because they have not recognized PA&E as a user of combat support equipment. A meeting was held with the USARV Engineer's representative on 20 June 1966, and a command request for expedited shipment of this equipment to PA&E is now being drafted by USARV. Constant and continued efforts are being made to expedite shipment of all these items of equipment and R&U supplies to RVN.

30 JUN 1966

AVIC GO-H (27 May 66) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1966. RCS CSGPO-28(RI)

FOR THE COMMANDER:



GLENN A. DOYLE
Capt, AGC
Asst. AG

Incl
AVC-DH (27 May 66) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 30 April 1966. RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307, **14 JUL 1966**

THRU: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters concurs with the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay,
operational report on lessons learned as indorsed.

2. It is noted that the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, report also
covers the activities of the 50th QM Depot. This is in consonance with
paragraph 3m, USARV Circular 870-1. The 506th QM Depot is not expected
to prepare a report.

3. Reference Chapter IV, paragraph 2(1): Department of the Army has
been informed of this command's MOS shortages. The MOS shortages shown in
the report are primarily attributed to rotational losses and shortfall of
replacement personnel. The following MOS's are considered critically
short:

31J Equipment Repairman	43K Canvas and Leather Repairman
43A Fabric and Leather Repairman	63A Wheel Vehicle Repairman
44D Blacksmith	63K QM Heavy Equip Repairman

FOR THE COMMANDER:

for *W R Autrey* *1/2 TAGC*
JAMES R. PERRY
Major, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl
nc

GPOP-MH (27 May 66)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
30 April 1966. RCS CSGFO-28 (R1)

HQ, U.S. ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 23 AUG 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The Operational Report on Lessons Learned of the U.S. Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, for the period 1 January - 30 April 1966 is forwarded herewith. This is considered an outstanding, highly informative report that reflects considerable thought and effort.

2. Reference Chapter V, page 24, Item on Collapsible Containers. In March 1966 USAMC shipped to the RVN four 50,000-gallon collapsible tanks, each equipped with a 350-GPM pump, a filter separator, 12-point refueling manifold, and a 1-year overpack of spares. USARV was advised at the time of shipment that 25 additional tanks, with accessories, were available through normal procurement, if needed. This headquarters has recommended to USARV that requisitions be submitted if a requirement for additional tanks still exists.

3. Reference Chapter V, page 25, Item on Push Shipments. Concur with the commander's observations. USAMC OPLAN, Change 30, 30 June 1966, states that push shipments will consist of no less than unit pack quantities.

4. Reference Chapter V, page 29, Item on 500-gallon Drums. Concur with the commander's observation. However, it should be noted that LCU transportation of drums is no longer necessary, inasmuch as a tanker discharge facility has been established.

5. For the rest, this headquarters concurs with the basic ORLL and the preceding indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



D. A. HARRISON
Capt, AGC
Asst AG

1 Incl
nc

Copy Furnished:
CG USARV, Attn: AVC-DH