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AUTHORITY
AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Const), Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

STATEMENT #2 UNCLASSIFIED

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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40th Signal Battalion

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Support for the platoons located at Phu Bai and Chu Lai is still being provided in part by the Marine Corps with platoons at Can Tho and Cu Chi being supported by the area signal battalions. Support rendered continues to be excellent.

The battalion continues to be deployed from one end of Vietnam to the other, from Phu Bai in the North to Can Tho in the Delta. As might be expected, the battalion continued to experience considerable problems of control and coordination and in providing technical assistance and logistical and administrative support. These problems are particularly acute in Chu Lai, Phu Bai, and Can Tho.

The battalion continues, pending clarification of approved ITOE, to be organized under basic TOE's 11-25E, 11-26E, and 11-27E although USSTRATEGEN General Orders reorganizing under the ITOE with an effective date of 1 November 1967 have been received. Since the approved ITOE will not resolve many of the battalion personnel and equipment problems, (See ORLL for period ending 31 October 1967), changes to the ITOE were submitted on 8 December 1967.

SECTION 2: Commanders Observations and Recommendations.

PART 1: Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Personnel: None

2. Operations:

ITEM: Management of Mission Work.

DISCUSSION: In the ORLL submitted by this battalion for the period ending 31 October 1967, the effects of lack of planning information, shortages of hardware for construction projects and problems encountered in in-country transportation of personnel, equipment and construction materials on the battalion mission effectiveness were discussed at length. At the end of the current reporting period these problems continue to hamper the effectiveness of the battalion in accomplishing its mission. Probably the most serious result is that the full capabilities of the battalion are not always used.

The Chu Lai outside plant project provides an excellent example of how these problems can affect both the unit and the mission. The communications tasking order (CTO) for this project, which is associated

TO: Commanding Officer, 160th Signal Group, APO 96491

SECTION 1: Significant Organizational Activities

The battalion was organized and located as follows at the end of this period: Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment located at Long Binh; Company A located at Long Binh with one platoon at Can Tho and one section at Cu Chi; Company B located at Cam Ranh Bay with one platoon located at Phu Bai; and Company D located at Phu Bai with two platoons at Chu Lai. During this period a platoon of Company B that had been located at Long Binh since May 1967 deployed back to Cam Ranh Bay, Company B relocated to a new location within the Cam Ranh Bay cantonment area, and Company D moved from Qui Nhon to Phu Bai and moved a second platoon to Chu Lai.

The battalion continues to have as its primary mission the installation of fixed plant communications cable in the Republic of Vietnam.

The most significant accomplishments during the reporting period were completion of a large size tie cable interconnecting Long Binh - II FFV Vietnam and Bien Hoa Army telephone exchanges and the work done on interim outside plant facilities in support of DCO cutovers at Chu Lai and Phu Bai. These projects accounted for the installation of 112,000 feet of multi-pair cable. In addition, the outside plant cable required for support of major logistics agencies in the Long Binh area and an outside plant cable facility at Vinh Long were completed.

Since its arrival in Vietnam, the battalion has installed a total of 1,700,000 feet of cable. During the period covered by this report, the battalion installed 250,000 feet of cable. A total of twenty-three communications tasking orders were received during this period and twenty-four completed. Major projects are anticipated in Long Binh, Saigon, Can Tho, Phu Bai, and Sattahip, Thailand.

During this period the battalion utilized forty-six platoon days in administrative troop movements. The rest of the period was largely devoted to accomplishing operational missions and training. It is estimated that thirty-seven per cent of available man-days during the period were utilized directly in accomplishing assigned communications tasking orders.

"Protective Markings are canceled on 12 March 1971."

with a new 2000-line dial central office (DCO), was issued by 1st Signal Brigade on 15 August 1967. The estimated completion date on the CTO, which involves installing some 100,000 feet of cable, is 15 March 1968. Cable and hardware were promptly used on requisition by the battalion and two Platoons were moved to Chu Lai, (one in August and one in November), in order to accomplish the mission in the time allotted. It was not until 20 January, however, that any substantial amounts of cable or poles were received on site and very little hardware has yet been received. The outside plant work that has been done was done almost exclusively with borrowed or scrounged materials. When these were not available the Platoons have not been able to work on their mission work, and considerable construction time has been lost.

Progress on the contractor installed DCO was much more rapid and in order to use the new DCO as rapidly as possible, 1st Signal Brigade informally directed that an interim outside plant be installed to permit dial service to high priority subscribers. The interim outside plant was complete by 20 January 1968, although no formal directive has yet been received from 1st Signal Brigade, and considerable difficulty was encountered in getting construction assistance from the Seabees in the absence of directives from their higher headquarters.

Since the plant at Chu Lai is to be accepted and operated by the Navy it will be necessary for all outside plant construction to meet their standards. However, technical coordination of engineering details was apparently not accomplished until late January at which time the Navy expressed several objections to the plant engineering. Of particular concern to the battalion was the Navy's unwillingness to accept one run of 26,000 feet of pole which was engineered to be installed on existing small poles along the railroad right-of-way. It now appears that this run will have to be buried which will require right-of-way clearance and cable designed for direct burial.

OBSERVATION: The Chu Lai experience is far from unique and in fact the problems encountered are similar to those encountered on most projects. To some extent solving these problems is a normal function of the installing unit. However, based on experience in Vietnam to date, if the maximum effective use of signal construction forces is to be obtained it is essential for the headquarters directing the project to:

a. Coordinate the installation of inside and outside plants at a given location so that when the DCO is ready for use the outside plant is also ready.

b. Allow adequate time for accumulation and shipment to the site of sufficient poles, cable and hardware to complete the project.

c. Coordinate fully the details of the project with the units to be provided service and, where appropriate, with external agencies whose participation in the project is required.

By the same token it is essential for the installing unit to:

a. Not permit construction forces to move to the project site until sufficient materials are on hand at the site to keep the forces at work to the completion of the project.

b. Insist that directed changes to projects be furnished as written changes to the CTO in order to prevent any misunderstanding concerning the exact scope.

c. Inform higher headquarters promptly when any problems are encountered that are beyond their capability to resolve and which may interfere with timely completion of the project.

ITEM: Outside Plant Engineering Support.

DISCUSSION: This battalion performed work on outside plant projects at fourteen different locations in the Republic of South Vietnam since 31 October 1967. These locations stretch from Can Tho in the South to Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon in the central portion to Chu Lai and Phu Bai in the North. This dispersion of projects and troops (ranging from a section to two platoons, depending on size of project) presented many problems requiring additional outside plant engineering support.

The work forces deployed by this battalion are, at the best, directly commanded by a first lieutenant. The complexity of outside plant construction requires that on site assistance and guidance be provided on each project, particularly on engineering changes and technical aspects. Normally, a number of engineering changes and material reevaluations are necessary during installation because of changes in site configuration (buildings shown on prints not yet built or not going to be built, construction of buildings or other types of construction in areas where prints indicate pole lines are to be constructed, new requirements caused by troop buildup, requirements no longer existing due to troop deployment from area, etc).
Order (CTO), issuance of the CTO to the battalion for installation and
the arrival of the work force and materials on site, depending on the
size of the project, varies from several weeks to a number of months). Consequently, it is a necessity that an outside plant engineer be made
available on site to meet the needs of the work forces in a responsive
manner and that engineering changes be published and placed in the hands
of the work force so as to prevent misunderstanding and to allow timely
completion of the project.

The Phu Bai outside plant project provides an excellent example
of the problems caused by inadequate on site engineering support. The
CTO for this project, which supports a high priority dial central office
(DCO), was issued by 1st Signal Brigade on 15 June 1967. The estimated
completion date on the CTO, which involves installation of some 99,000
feet of cable, is 15 March 1968. Although it became apparent in early
September that many changes were required on segments of this project,
Change 1 to the project issued by the 1st Signal Brigade is dated 5
December 1967, but was not received by this battalion until 29 December
1967. Response to requests for engineering assistance on this project
has consistently been slow because of available engineering personnel
being deployed to other areas. A request for assistance in the setting
of poles and anchors in areas on the project where the water level
prevented using conventional techniques, was finally fulfilled three
weeks after the request was made. Such delays cause a loss in proper
utilization of manpower and equipment at the most critical period in
the project cycle.

OBSERVATION: The problems encountered on the Phu Bai project are similar
to those on most projects of this magnitude and complexity. The engineering
support, which has been received by the battalion, is very professional
in nature and maximum effort has been exerted by the small 1st Signal
Brigade outside plant engineering force. However, if the installing
unit is to receive the required outside plant engineering support to
properly accomplish its assigned mission, adequate on site engineering
support must be available for each project site.

ITEM: Acquisition of Right-of-Way

DISCUSSION: Related to the items discussed above are the lessons learned
during this reporting period concerning obtaining advance approval of
right-of-way for cable runs. This subject has apparently not been of
particular concern previously in Vietnam; however progress

The project to bury 20,000 feet of cable between II Field Forces Vietnam and Bien Hoa along Highway 1A and a new road built by the US Army Engineers was halted on at least two separate occasions when Engineer personnel objected to the cable being plowed into the shoulder of the new road. Coordination was finally effected among the several Engineer and Signal units and headquarters concerned and the project was successfully completed, largely as engineered by 1st Signal Brigade.

Similarly, difficulties were encountered in Qui Nhon where the pole line constructed by the battalion in accordance with the communications tasking order paralleled a line that ARVN signal units had been tasked to construct. Because of restricted space in the city, the ARVN unit was unable to place their pole line without interfering with the US line although the ARVN project had been approved and military assistance program funded for some time.

OBSERVATIONS: The mission of the 40th Signal Battalion is to install fixed communications multipair cable. The battalion is not staffed with sufficient personnel, or personnel with the necessary expertise, to acquire right-of-way for proposed cable routes.

The acquisition of right-of-way should be a responsibility of the engineering agency. It is impractical to assume that a communications tasking order can be prepared and issued to an installing unit without first knowing if it is permissible to use the proposed route. In most cases, the inability to acquire right-of-way for a proposed route will change the complete cable configuration and require extensive reengineering on the part of the project engineer. Command emphasis is necessary to establish responsibilities applicable to the acquisition of right-of-way pertaining to outside plant cable projects.

3. Training and Organization: None

4. Intelligence: None

5. Logistics:

ITEM: Deficiency in V18 Auger Trucks

DISCUSSION: During the period 1 December 1967 through 30 January 1968, there have been a total of six frame cross member failures in the eighteen (18) V18 auger trucks in the battalion. These trucks are absolutely essential to accomplishing the battalion's mission since they provide the only mechanical hole digging capability in the battalion. Consequently, they are in great demand both for mission and other work and have received heavy usage in the case of the V18A for about sixteen (16) months and in the case of the V18B for about four (4) months. Although the trucks are equipped with rear jack legs which the technical manual states will be used when digging or pulling poles, use of these jack legs is time consuming and observance of the TM precautions has been rather lax.

The failure encountered has been buckling on the bottom and top of the left corner (as viewed from the vehicle rear) of the number six (6) cross member from the front. In some instances the bottom of the cross member channel cracked as if extreme upward force had been exerted on the riveted points where the cross member joins the longitudinal frame members. It is possible that these failures are related in part to using the auger without the rear jack legs down.

OBSERVATIONS: Coordination with USATAC technical representatives at USARV and 1st Logistical Command disclosed that change 2 to TB 9-2300-247-40 authorizes strengthening the cross members in question with a "fish plate". This is now being done to all auger trucks in the battalion. An urgent equipment improvement recommendation has been forwarded on this problem. Likewise, command emphasis is being given to using the rear jack legs.

ITEM: Identification of Outside Plant Hardware

DISCUSSION: Hardware shortages on bills of material were increasingly apparent during the period covered by this report. A study of outside cable plant construction hardware has revealed major problem areas in requisitioning these materials. The main problem is in requisitioning materials which have P and G stock numbers (i.e. materials that are non-standard). Also many items listed on bill of materials have incorrect federal stock numbers, no federal stock number or are not listed in the Identification Lists provided to the battalion. Many items may be substituted on a bill of materials; however it is a difficult task for supply personnel to familiarize themselves with over 1,000 line items to determine which line items have substitutes in the Army Supply System. Also, many of the items listed on a bill of materials have federal stock...
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numbers which are actually a different item and cannot be used in outside cable plant installations at all.

OBSERVATIONS: Identification Lists, Technical Manuals, depot Authorized Stockage Lists, and commercial catalogs have been of some help in obtaining correct federal stock numbers and manufactures part numbers. However, it is apparent that a cross-reference catalog is a much needed item. Time lost in requisitioning incorrect Federal Stock Numbers and NSN items has become critical to this battalion's mission and causes an excessive burden on the supply system. It has been noted that good substitutable items for item shortages (found in depots through personal visit) were listed under federal stock numbers unknown to this battalion, but were listed in the Identification Lists as having the same specifications as items needed. With the aid of a cross-reference and item identification catalog requisitioning problems would be greatly reduced. Such a catalog would also increase the efficiency of depot processing and item identification.

6. Other: None

SECTION 2, PART 2: Recommendations

1. Personnel: None

2. Operations:

   a. The headquarters responsible for directing outside plant cable projects ensure that maximum effective use of signal construction forces is obtained by:

      (1) Coordinating the installation of inside and outside plants at a given location so that when the DCO is ready for use the outside plant is also ready.

      (2) Allowing adequate time for accumulation and shipment to the site of sufficient poles, cable and hardware to complete the project.

      (3) Coordinating fully the details of the project with the units to be provided service and where appropriate, with external agencies whose participation in the project is required.

   b. The unit responsible for installing outside plant cable projects should:

      (1) Not permit construction forces to move to the project site until sufficient materials are on hand at the site to keep the forces at work to the completion of the project.

(2) Insist that directed changes to projects be furnished as written changes to the CTO in order to prevent any misunderstanding concerning the exact scope.

(3) Inform higher headquarters promptly when any problems are encountered that are beyond their capability to resolve and which may interfere with timely completion of the project.

c. Adequate outside plant engineering support be available at each project site.

d. Right-of-way for cable runs be obtained prior to issuing the CTO to the installing unit.

3. Training and Organization: None

4. Intelligence: None

5. Logistics:

a. The number 6 cross member on the V18's be strengthened in accordance with change 2 to TB 9-2300-247-40 and that emphasis be placed on use of rear jack legs.

b. A cross reference and item identification catalog of items used in outside plant construction be provided supply personnel in order to facilitate requisitioning.

6. Other: None

MARCUS C. JORDAN
LTC, Sgc
Commanding
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CCVCP-C: (13 Feb 68)  1st Ind
SUBLECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968, from Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Construction) (AGC CBP3-65) (CEI)

DA, Headquarters, 160th Signal Group, APO 96491  MAR 1968

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade (USARMA) ATTN: CCVCP, APC 96384
  Commanding General, USAAM, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96375
  Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GFCI-OT, APO 96555

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Forwarded in compliance with AR 1-19.

2. Concur in the Commander's observations pertaining to the following items:

3. Concur in the Commander's observations regarding the following item and provide additional comments as indicated:
   Item: Management of Mission Work, page 2. During the latter part of the reporting period, a special engineering panel was established to assist in resolving some of the difficulties outlined in this item; e.g., lack of planning information, material shortages, and transportation problems. The panel meets every two weeks and consists of representatives of Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (CEMA, Logistics and TELM); Headquarters, 160th Signal Group; and the 40th Signal Battalion (Headquarters and unit representatives). These meetings have proved to be a valuable means of coordinating the efforts of all concerned in assuring maximum utilization of cable construction resources.

4. Comments concerning Commander's recommendations (Section II, Part II):
   a. Reference paragraph 2: Concur.
   b. Reference paragraph 5a: Concur, and further recommend that follow-up action be taken to ensure that all units having 1/8 vehicles have received and complied with change 2 to TB 9-236C-247-40.

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Reference paragraph 5b: Concur. This problem has been coordinated with reporting unit and Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade (CSEMA and Logistics Directorate); the present mission-essential list of outside plant construction hardware has been revised and is being coordinated with 1st Logistical Command to ensure in-theatre stockage of required materials.

BLAINE O. VCOT
Colonel, SigC
Commanding
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SITREP (13 Feb 65)  2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968, from Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Construction), (13S CSPOR-6) (3
eys)

DA, HQ, 1st Sig Bde (US:STRATCOMM), APO SF 96384  13 MAR 1968

To: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC-DH, APO 96375

Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Communications Command, ATTN: SCCOP, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613

1. Subject report is forwarded for your information.

2. Concur in the Commander's observations. The following additional comments are provided with respect to Section 2, Part 1 (Observations).


      (1) This headquarters endorses the Group Commander's comments. In addition, the special engineering panel discussed was specifically established to assist the 40th Signal Battalion. Its purposes were to provide current planning information and to assist in obtaining and moving construction materials. It should be realized that the very nature of the conflict in Vietnam will mean that requirements may develop with little or no advance notice, and that the movement of bulky cable and cable construction materials may be delayed for the movement of combat essential and combat resupply shipments. When this happens, project completion will be delayed. Fixed plant cable projects normally require at least 18 months from statement of requirement until installation. In Vietnam, it is not unusual for installation of large projects to start within one or two months after the requirement is stated. Under the circumstance, it is understandable that requirements may be refined, initial engineering may have to be revised to use available installation materials, and that construction unit work schedules will change on short notice.

      (2) In addition to the Group Commander's comments on the engineering panel, the desire for information as far in advance as possible is understandable and most desirable; however, the nature of the conflict means that many requirements develop with little, if any, notice. This means that the construction unit must maintain a flexible posture that will allow for frequent shifts in emphasis.

      (3) Reference observation 2a, page 3. In all cases, the outside plant required to cut over a dial central office (DCC) is considered in the initial planning. Cable projects are of such magnitude and undergo

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so many changes due to shifting population centers that most large cable projects are divided into phases. It is not practical to stop the cut over of a DCO until all cable is installed. Cable systems will always be expanded and extended after a DCO cut over to provide additional service in the area.

(4) Reference observation c, page 4. It is standard practice to fully coordinate with the user and in particular, other services when they are involved. This was the case at Chu Lai. A complete change in personnel occurred in the Navy organization from the beginning of the project until now. New people with new ideas will necessarily mean discussion of the project. It should be pointed out that the items that did come up were minor and immediately resolved. Considering the size of this project, there has been little difference of opinion between the Navy representatives and those of the Army. It is only proper for the Navy to continue to review the activities of the installation forces and to question those things they feel are improper. The Navy must look forward to the time that they accept responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the installation.

b. Item: Outside Plant Engineering Support, page 4. Good engineering practice calls for constant project supervision on-site by the project engineer. Due to the magnitude of the engineering support required in RVN and the complexity of the engineering and transportation problems in-country, this cannot be accomplished. The best solution to this problem at the present time is a free exchange of information and reviews between on-site personnel and the project engineer, after the initial engineering is done. Thereafter, when assistance is required, the nature of the problem should be forwarded to the project engineer by the most expedient means available. Many questions can be answered on the phone with a discussion between the on-site platoon leader and the project engineer. Further, many problems that arise do not require a work stoppage. Personnel in the field must work in areas where problems do not exist while waiting for on-site assistance or advice.


(1) Ninety-five percent of the hardware items utilized in the construction of outside plant systems have valid Federal Stock Numbers (FSN's); however, less than 50 percent of these items have had FSN's assigned within the past 12 months. Because of this, new items will not appear in any of the Defense Department's identification lists. Also, when new items were ordered by Brigade units and depots before the assignment of the FSN's, they were procured by the National Inventory Control Point (NICP) under an interim stock number that usually contained a Z or Y in the 5th
position of the number. Material was then shipped to RVN from CONUS under these interim stock numbers. Results of the above may be summarized as follows:

(a) Material entered depots not properly identified and placed on depot records.

(b) I and K numbers were not known by units; therefore, even if the numbers were recorded on depot records, units could not requisition the item.

(c) Material arrived and could not be identified. Since no demands were recorded, the material was returned to Okinawa.

(2) This headquarters has recognized this problem and a cross reference list of over 1000 line items was developed, placed on IBM cards and a limited amount of listings were made. This list was not provided the Signal groups because it is presently being reviewed and updated to ensure accuracy of FSN's. This cross reference list and catalogue, will also contain a list of known and authorized substitutions. Supply personnel must become more familiar with construction materials to include:

(a) The function of the item.

(b) The item's appearance.

(c) The result of non-use of the item.

(d) The possibility of replacement by a like item.

(3) Presently, a construction bill of materials is being developed which will contain virtually every type of material utilized in the construction of outside plant systems. Moreover, this list will contain 95 percent of the FSN's and it will provide detailed instructions on how to requisition non-standard items. Estimated completion date of this listing is 31 March. Copies of this list will be provided all construction elements of the 1st Signal Brigade. With the initiation of depot stockage in accordance with the above mentioned bill of materials, the shortage of hardware and similar items should decrease. With all Brigade elements requisitioning the same items, the supply system will provide the material required.

3. Nonconcur in the Commander's observation as stated in Section 2, Part 1, on the following item:
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968, from Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Construction), (RCS CSFOR-65) (SCCP) (U)

Item: Acquisition of Right-of-Way, page 5. Communication Tasking Orders (CTO's) are not issued prior to determining "if it is permissible to use the proposed route." Preliminary engineering is done and a proposed route to the responsible Signal group is forwarded on appropriate drawings with space provided for project concurrence. Upon return of the project concurrences, the project is updated as required and then the CTO is prepared and forwarded to the construction unit. Acquisition of right-of-way is part of the concurrence process of the responsible Signal group. The practice of tasking the Signal group to obtain the right-of-way is the only practical way of accomplishing the task. Local personnel are familiar with the local government officials, the location of offices, travel restriction or requirements and they are on the scene to provide follow-up action as required. This method provides the most expeditious means of obtaining right-of-way and the best utilization of extremely scarce engineering resources.

4. Concur in the Commander's recommendations. The following additional comments are provided with respect to Section 2, Part 2 (Recommendations).

   a. Recommendation: 2a (1), page 8. It is standard practice of this headquarters to coordinate the installation of inside and outside plant in an attempt to have them ready at the same time.

   b. Recommendation: 2a (2), page 8. Every attempt is made to allow as much time as possible for the accumulation and shipment of cable installation materials; however, operational requirements dictate start and completion dates. In practice, this will mean that personnel must start projects before all project material is on-site.

   c. Recommendation: 2a (3), page 8. This is standard practice, and it must be realized that the nature of the operation in RWN means that changes will occur; therefore, changes should be anticipated.

5. Nonconcur in the Commander's recommendations as follows:

   a. Recommendation: 2b (1), page 8. This suggestion is impractical. The very concept of good personnel management would be violated by this practice. It would mean that when no work existed for a platoon, they would not start a new job because only 70 percent of the BOM was available. Such a quantity could keep a platoon occupied for months. Further, this practice would mean a delay in meeting operational requirements.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968, from Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Construction), (RCS C3FGC-65) (CEL)

b. Recommendation: 2b (2), page 9. Operational necessity precludes such action. To leave cable unrestored or immediate operational requirements unfulfilled because the construction unit does not have drawings and a technical narrative is unacceptable. The very nature of immediate operational requirements means that changes should be expected.


FOR THE COMMANDER:

THOMAS D. BLEDSOE, JR.
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Construction) (WCELAA) as indorsed.

2. Concur with report as indorsed. Report is considered adequate.

3. Correct UIC WCELAA.

4. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JOHN V. GETCHELL
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
HQ, 1st Sig Bde
HQ, 40th Sig Bn (Const)
GPOP-DT (13 Feb 68) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 40th Sig Bn (Const) for Period Ending 31 January 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 MAR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]
K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG
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