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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGAM-P (M) (2 Feb 68) FOR OT RD-674149 6 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Cono), Period Ending 31 October 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, from Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Construction) (RCS CSFOR-65) (WCEL)

THRU: Commanding Officer
160th Signal Group
APO 96491

Commanding General
1st Signal Brigade
APO 96384

TO: Commanding General
USASTRATCOM
Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613

1. References:
   a. AR 1-19
   b. USARV Regulation 1-19
   c. SOCVR Regulation 1-19

2. Attached is the Operational Report (Lessons Learned) for quarterly period beginning 1 August 1967 and ending 31 October 1967.

1 Incl

MARCUS C. JORDAN
LT, SigC

STATEMENT #2 UNCLASSIFIED Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 40TH SIGNAL BATTALION (CONSTRUCTION)
GR 96421

SCVUG-FS-C

14 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967,
from Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Construction)
(RCS CSPG-65) (REL)

SECTION 1: Significant Organisational Activities.

The battalion was organized and located as follows at the end of this period:
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment located at Long Binh; Company A located
at Long Binh with one platoon at Can Tho; Company B located at Cam Ranh Bay with
one platoon at Long Binh and one platoon at Phu Bai; Company D located at Qui Nhon
with one platoon at Chu Lai. During this period the platoon of Company D previous-
ly located at An Khe rejoined its parent unit at Qui Nhon. At the close of
the period, this platoon was preparing for a further move to Chu Lai scheduled
for early November 1967.

The battalion continues to have as its primary mission the installation of
fixed plant communications cables in the Republic of Vietnam. On 28 August 1967,
the battalion was placed under the operational control of the 160th Signal Group.
Subsequently, the battalion has had a number of cable installation and maintenance
missions assigned in support of other 160th Signal Group activities.

The undersigned assumed command of the battalion from LTC Jesse Wang at a
change of command ceremony held at Long Binh on 5 September 1967.

Probably the most significant accomplishment of this period was the comple-
tion of the interim cable plant at Long Binh which serves among others, USARV
Headquarters. This project involved installation of 388,000 feet of cable, and
was complicated considerably by other construction activity throughout the area.
The initial cable construction project at Can Tho involving 40,000 feet of cable
was also essentially completed with the dial central office cutover on 14 October
1967. In addition, on 28 August 1967 the outside cable plant for An Khe
(175,000 feet of cable), the base camp of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile),
was completed. By the end of October the outside plant for Qui Nhon (135,000
feet of cable) had been completed and the dial central office was scheduled for
cutover on 4 November 1967. This project encountered significant delays because
of construction in the area, heavy rains, and splicing problems caused in large
part by lack of proper materials.

Since its arrival in Vietnam the battalion has installed a total of 1,450,000
feet of cable. During the period covered by this report, the battalion installed
154,000 feet of cable. A total of 14 communications tasking orders were received
during this period and 22 completed. Cable installed for the month of September
was the lowest for any month since the unit's arrival in Vietnam more than a year
ago. However, the splicing workload remained very heavy and a considerable amount
of cable maintenance work was accomplished during this period. With major
current projects in Chu Lai and Thu Bai and major anticipated projects in Long

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Subject: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, from Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Construction) (RCS GSFCR-65) (WCEL)

Binh, the amount of cable installed is expected to increase greatly during the next reporting period.

During this period the battalion utilized 25 platoon days in administrative troop movements. The rest of the period was largely devoted to accomplishing operational missions and training. It is estimated that 25% of the available mandays during the period were utilized directly in accomplishing assigned communications tasking orders. Administrative movements involved moving one platoon from Company B at Cam Ranh Bay to Phu Bai and moving one platoon of Company D from Qui Nhon to Chu Lai. Both of these moves were made by LST, with no unusual problems encountered. An additional move, that of Company D from Qui Nhon to a new company area in the Phu Tai Valley (a distance of about 8 miles) was also begun during this period.

Support for the platoons at Chu Lai and Phu Bai is being provided in part by the Marine Corps. The support rendered thus far, which includes billeting classes I and III supplies, and limited maintenance, has been excellent.

The battalion is now deployed almost from one end of the Republic of Vietnam to the other, and one company has platoons at Phu Bai in the North, at Cam Ranh Bay and at Long Binh. As might be expected, this deployment creates considerable problems of control and coordination as well as in providing technical assistance and logistical and administrative support. These problems have been particularly acute in the case of Phu Bai and Chu Lai. In-country transportation of both personnel and materials has proven to be less than satisfactory generally and particularly to these two locations. At Chu Lai approximately 257,000 feet of cable is to be installed in connection with a new dial central office which will provide service to the Americal Division as well as other Marine, Navy, and Army elements. At Phu Bai approximately 88,000 feet of cable is to be installed also in support of a new dial central office serving primarily Marine Corps units including 3d Marine Division Headquarters. Both of these offices are scheduled to be outover in the near future. After three months of intensive efforts by lst Signal Brigade and this battalion serious shortages, involving poles, cable, and hardware, still exist at both of these locations. These items are generally available in-country; however, to date it has not been possible to support either location properly.

The battalion continues to be organized under TOE 11-25E. An MTOE and TDA which will provide additional essential capabilities (particularly additional cable splicers, an aviation section and non standard construction equipment) is required and as discussed in Section 2 will be submitted shortly.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, from Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Construction) (RCS CSFCU-65) (WCEL)

SECTION 2: Commanders Observations and Recommendations.

PART 1: Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Personnel:

ITB: Rotational Hump

DISCUSSION: The 40th Signal Battalion (Construction) arrived in the Republic of Vietnam in August 1966. As discussed in previous ORL II's, during its first year in-country some infusion of personnel took place which reduced the rotational hump in August 1967. However, infusion was not to the degree necessary to resolve the problem. This same report for the period ending 31 July 1967 pointed out the impact of the rotational hump of July/August 1967. With the personnel turnover during these months, the battalion was left without a great deal of the in-country expertise, particularly at the platoon level (platoon officers; NOO's and EM) needed to accomplish the mission effectively. Rotational problems involving staff personnel were further aggravated by an unanticipated change in command of the battalion. However, the impact of rotation of key staff personnel was minimized since the outgoing personnel had some overlap with incoming personnel, and more important, the outgoing personnel had detailed functional guides which were a significant factor in the smooth changeover.

The battalion is authorized twenty seven (27) officers and warrant officers by TOE and the MTOE to be submitted will request thirty four (34) officers and warrant officers. A total of twenty eight (28) officers and warrant officers are currently assigned. Twenty nine (29) senior non-commissioned officers (E7-E9) are assigned against the TOE authorization of twenty one (21) and an MTOE requirement of thirty five (35). During the period July - August 1967, nineteen (19) officers and twenty (20) non-commissioned officers (E7-E9) are scheduled for DEROS. Rotation of the remaining officers and non-commissioned officers is fairly evenly spaced throughout the year. This battalion exceeds the criteria in USARV Regulation 614-9, which defines a rotational hump as fifteen percent (15%) officer or enlisted personnel rotation in a 30 day period, by two (2) officers rotating in July and seven (7) rotating in August. As a part of the turnover the battalion Executive Officer, Adjutant, and Sergeant Major will rotate during this period, and under current policies a new commanding officer can be anticipated early in September. In other grades, senior NOO's (E7-E9) exceed the USARV criteria by eleven (11); L6's and E5's are evenly spaced and there is no problem; and in E1 to E4 the criteria will be exceeded by thirty five (35) in July.

The battalion staff officers who will rotate next July or August include personnel who are specialists in a particular area, e.g., chaplain, unit personnel and supply technicians, and motor maintenance technicians. Replacements should be qualified to fill these positions without any appreciable loss in
mission effectiveness and with a minimum of overlap. All key staff officers and NCO's also have complete functional guides to aid their replacements. The disadvantages of these key staff officers changing jobs in mid tour must also be considered, and it is probable changes in personnel in these positions would have more disadvantages than advantages. It appears that the impact of the rotational hump problem can be alleviated without transferring personnel in battalion staff positions.

OBSERVATIONS: At the end of its second year in Vietnam the battalion will again have a serious rotational hump; action should be taken within the next three (3) months to alleviate the problem. The real key to maintaining mission effectiveness lies in the companies and the platoons. There must be a few months difference between the rotation dates of the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants and there should be a more even spread in the rotation dates of the enlisted man in grades E1 to E4. By infusion from other units of five (5) platoon officers, five (5) NCO's in the platoon sergeant/assistant platoon sergeant category, and thirty five (35) personnel in grades E1 thru E4, the battalion should be able to minimize the impact both of the rotational hump problem and the problem of losing trained personnel before their rotation dates. In addition, the platoon officers and NCO's received in any infusion program should have rotation dates in the October 1968 to January 1969 period. Personnel in the E1 thru E4 grades should have rotation dates in the December 1968 to January 1969 period. A further observation is that with such an exchange/infusion program, care must be taken in assignments to insure adequate separation of the rotation dates of platoon officers and key NCO's.

ITEM: Critical MOS Shortages

DISCUSSION: The battalion continues to experience a critical shortage of cable splicers (MOS 36E). The present TOE authorized only four (4) cable splicers per company as compared to mission requirements of twenty-one (21) per company including one (1) NCO (E7). The previously documented requirement for additional cable splicers is further substantiated by analysis of currently assigned communications tasking orders, which disclose that approximately one manday of cable splicing effort is required for each four mandays of construction effort.

The battalion submitted an MTUE in February 1967 which requested sixty-three (63) cable splicers, and has requisitioned personnel accordingly by authority of VUGG, 1st Signal Brigade. At present, twenty (20) cable splicers are on hand; therefore, the battalion has a shortage of forty-three (43) mission required cable splicers. As discussed under the item on MTUE the approved MTUE for the battalion does not contain any increase in cable splicers over the twelve (12) authorized in the basic TOE.

OBSERVATION: Command emphasis must be applied in authorizing additional cable splicer positions and securing personnel qualified in MOS 36E. The battalion is preparing and will submit a change to its MUE that will include the
additional cable splicer personnel required to accomplish its mission. (See also the item on cable splicers under training).

2. Operations:

ITEM: Mission Deployment

DISCUSSION: The mission of this battalion dictates that deployment of subordinate units be determined principally based on current and known future construction projects. This concept was followed in initially deploying one company each to Long Binh, Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon upon arrival in Vietnam more than a year ago. Major future construction tasks were apparent in each of these locations, and each possessed the added advantage of access to a major logistical base. In the past year the major known construction requirements at these locations, as well as many others, have been fulfilled. The mission of the battalion complicates assigning subordinate units to locations permanently; however, the known future construction tasks do not appear to warrant redeployment of an entire company to any one location.

OBSERVATIONS: For logistical, administrative and moral reasons, it is desirable that company size units develop suitable areas to function as operating bases. For these reasons and to resolve current undesirable conditions in present areas, Company B has been directed to establish a semi-permanent company area in Cam Ranh Bay and Company D has been directed to establish a similar area near Qui Nhon in the Phu Tai Valley.

The location of major future construction tasks should be known sufficiently far in advance (a minimum of three months is desirable) to permit determinations to be made at battalion level of the proper unit to perform the tasks, giving due consideration to other workloads as well as administration and control of units, and the effect of logistical and transportation support.

3. Training and Organization:

ITEM: Cable Splicer Training

DISCUSSION: Since arrival in Vietnam the battalion has operated with a shortage of adequately trained cable splicers, particularly splicers proficient in splicing techniques and testing procedures for polyethylene insulated cable. This shortage includes the quantity of splicers authorized and assigned (see item on key personnel shortages) and the inadequate training of personnel received from CONUS. To alleviate these problems, the battalion initiated action to obtain a cable splicer school in the 1st Signal Brigade. The school was activated by and continues to be staffed, equipped and operated by this battalion. To further alleviate the cable splicer training problem, the battalion has adopted the functional training approach where an appropriate code is used on personnel requisitions for cable splicers to indicate a requirement for these
personal to be proficient in splicing PIC as well as paper insulated cable before being sent to Vietnam. It is too early yet to evaluate the effectiveness of the latter approach.

**OBSERVATION:** It should be the responsibility of schools in CONUS to train adequate numbers of personnel to the degree of proficiency needed to meet requirements of operating units. Cable splicers sent to Vietnam should be proficient in cable splicing and testing, to include PIC cable.

To develop proficient splicers the school would require expansion of the present three (3) week course to approximately the length of the CONUS cable splicing courses. This is not feasible considering the tour length in Vietnam.

**ITEM: MTVE**

**DISCUSSION:** As discussed in the ORR dated 3 August 1967, this battalion submitted an MTVE based on TOE 11-25E, 11-26E, 11-27E, for approval on 13 February 1967. The MTVE was based on six months in-country experience in Vietnam and was designed to attain the best organizational structure for the battalion's in-country mission. The MTVE contained significant additional cable splicer personnel (NCO 36E), and also stated a requirement for engineer construction equipment, commercial-type cable installation equipment, and material handling equipment. Although the battalion now has copies of the Golf series TOE, reorganization under the later TOE would not provide any significant amount of the added capabilities requested in the MTVE.

On 31 May 1967, the battalion received information copies of MTVE 11-26 and 11-27 reflecting changes made by the United States Army Strategic Communication Command (USASTRATOCOM). The changes extensively altered the MTVE originally submitted by the battalion and did not include the major desired changes in personnel or equipment resources. For example, the MTVE as submitted requested twenty one (21) cable splicers per company; the USASTRATOCOM approved version contains only the four (4) cable splicers per company authorized by the basic TOE. The USASTRATOCOM changes also deleted all non-standard construction equipment, and in practically all cases restored the standard items shown in TOE 11-26E and 11-27E; these items have been found through field experience to be inadequate for the mission and environment of this battalion.

The battalion has recently been shown an advance copy of the Department of the Army approved MTVE 11-25E for this battalion. Preliminary analysis of the DA approved MTVE indicates that DA approved the USASTRATOCOM version of the MTVE and added much equipment, particularly vehicles, for which no need currently exists and for which no additional maintenance personnel were authorized.

**OBSERVATIONS:** In developing the MTVE submitted in February 1967, which has now been approved by DA, there apparently was a lack of understanding in the battalion concerning what strength controlled the battalion request. The submission
included the additional cable splicers and other personnel in the 100% strength column whereas the 80% strength column was applicable. Apparently, the additional splicers should have been provided by deleting a corresponding number of spaces in other MOS's for which there was a lesser requirement. Inadequate understanding of the instructions for preparing the original submission of the MTOE was also partly responsible for an additional deficiency. The MTOE submission included non-standard items of equipment which it now appears must be requested by the TDA.

Approximately ten months has now elapsed since the MTOE was originally submitted. The changes made during the approval cycle have greatly reduced the benefits to be gained from the MTOE during the month of November 1967. This change will be accompanied by a TDA for the non-standard equipment. These two documents together will include the contents of the original MTOE submission with two exceptions. First, the MTOE will include a small aviation section (see discussion under the item on transportation), and second, personnel requirements in total will be kept to the current authorized strength of 638. Because of the deadline date for these submissions they must be based on local interpretations of the approved MTOE 11-25E since MTOE 11-26E and 11-27E are not yet available. It is anticipated that further delays and misunderstandings will be generated by this procedure.

4. Intelligence: None.

5. Logistics:

ITEM: Hardware for Communications Projects

DISCUSSION: The Class IV project system, as established under AR 105-22, is designed for implementation where sufficient time is available after approval of a project to accumulate the necessary bill of materials (BOM) before work is begun on the project. This amount of time is not available in Vietnam under current conditions. Compression of the time cycle produces two undesirable results. First, work on projects is continually subject to being delayed because of incomplete receipt of BOM. This battalion has been operating in Vietnam for over a year and has yet to receive a full BOM before the completion of a project. Since construction must continue in order to meet completion dates, in many cases substitute materials and hardware are necessarily used. This practice, although necessary, creates significant problems in producing a communications system that must meet high quality standards. For example, because of the lack of washers for splice cases in the past, cases were closed improperly using sealing compound. The result has frequently been that the splices later take in water and cause communications outages.

The second problem caused by the late receipt of BOM is that significant inventories of hardware and cable are accumulated ostensibly for projects that have already been completed. Under the circumstance these inventories are
necessary and desirable to the extent that they permit work on other projects to progress without waiting for BOM. However, they create a considerable burden on the receiving unit, and because of the unique nature of individual projects they frequently create excesses of supplies for which there is little demand. In addition it appears that in the past much outdated hardware and material for which there is little demand, was shipped to units in Vietnam presumably in an attempt to build up the in-country supply system.

Project materials also frequently arrive in Vietnam without being properly recognized and segregated in the supply system. When stock records are inaccurate or incomplete, needed materials can be on hand in the depots or in units but not available for use until located and identified by knowledgeable personnel.

OBSERVATIONS: Whichever possible the time for completion of a project should allow adequate time for requisitioning and receipt of BOM. Since this is not always possible, it is most important that adequate records be kept of materials on hand at all levels and that action be taken to keep inventory balanced and at a reasonable level. Command emphasis is necessary to ensure that requisitions for materials receive adequate follow up, that materials on hand are properly identified and controlled, and that in-country shipments receive the necessary priority and attention. In order to ensure delivery of in-country shipments of supplies, it is often necessary to have personnel accompany the shipments to their destination.

ITEM: Transportation Support:

DISCUSSION: Because of the extensive area over which this battalion and its companies are deployed, it is vital to have an adequate means of transporting both personnel and equipment between sites. In-country transportation is by air normally, with motor convoys and water movement being appropriate in certain instances. Although each method has certain disadvantages, a real problem exists when it is necessary to move urgently needed personnel or small quantities of supplies rapidly, and to ensure their arrival at the desired destination. Three examples will serve to illustrate the problem. In September, the battalion was unable for a period of almost 10 days to get a cable laying machine (weight about 1001b) from Long Binh to Can Tho where construction work had been halted pending the arrival of the machine. In early October it became urgent that the battalion 3-3 officer obtain up-to-date information concerning the status of construction work at Qui Nhon; this trip required four days of the 3-3 officer's time for what should have been accomplished in a one-day trip. The third example concerns a 600lb shipment of urgently needed hardware for Phu Red which was air shipped from Cam Ranh Bay in September. At the close of the period this shipment was unlocatable; however, it was subsequently found in a Special Forces supply area in Danang.
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SCCVUG-FS-... (14 November 1967)


OBSERVATION: Although the Golf series TOE for this battalion provides a considerable air section, the type of aircraft provided is the light observation helicopter. This aircraft would not materially assist the battalion in its transportation problems because of its limited range and load capabilities. However, provision of a smaller aviation section equipped with two UH-1A utility aircraft would alleviate the problem. The change to MTOE 11-25E, to be submitted for the battalion will contain such an aviation section. (see the item on MTOE).

SECTION 2, Part II, Recommendations:

1. Personnel:

   a. Plans to alleviate personnel rotational hump problems be implemented as early as possible and that consideration be given to the nature of the positions involved and the impact of current as well as future operations. To insure that sufficient in-country expertise is maintained, particular attention should be given to maintenance of continuity at the company and platoon level.

   b. Command emphasis be applied in obtaining the additional cable splicer positions required and further, units be permitted to requisition personnel against MTOE as soon as it has been submitted since the time required for MTOE approval is extended.

2. Operations: Planning information concerning future construction projects be furnished the battalion in sufficient time to permit proper tailoring of the forces that must be committed to accomplish each project.

3. Training and Organization:

   a. Every effort be made to provide adequate numbers of trained cable splicers from CONUS who are proficient in the splicing and testing of polyethylene insulated conductor cable as well as paper insulated cable.

   b. Adequate information and guidance be provided to units preparing MTOE's and similar documents to insure that submissions are appropriate and complete. Further, that MTOE's be processed expediously in order to insure that the unit concerned promptly realize maximum benefit. Finally, that higher headquarters not make changes to proposed MTOE's without allowing submitting units to review and comment on the changes.

4. Intelligence: None

5. Logistics:

   a. Whenever possible, completion dates on projects permit adequate time for accumulation of BOM before the start of construction. Further, command attention be given to:

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(1) Maintenance of proper levels of balanced inventories of project type hardware and materials when time does not permit BCM to be accumulated before the start of construction.

(2) Adequate records and controls be maintained by the logistical system to insure that quantities and locations of project materials are identified and available.

(3) Insuring that hardware and materials for which no documented need exists not be shipped to Vietnam.

b. Adequate transportation support be provided for in-country movement of personnel and supplies, particularly for priority movements involving urgently needed personnel and project hardware and materials.

6. Other: None

MARKUS C. JORDAN
LTC, SigC
Commanding
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SCCVUG-OP (14 Nov 67) 1st Ind.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, from Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Construction), (RCSCS FOR-65) (WCEL)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 160TH SIGNAL GROUP, APO San Francisco 96491 29 Nov 1967

TO: Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade, ATTN: SCCVOP, APO San Francisco 96384

1. Forwarded in compliance with 1st Signal Brigade Regulation, SCCVR 1-19, dated 16 August 1967, of the 40th Signal Battalion (Construction).

2. Concur in Commander's observations on the following items:

3. Concur in Commander's observations with the following comments:
   a. Item: Rotational Hump, page 4. Action has been initiated within this Group to reduce the impact of rotational humps through the personnel infusion program. This program has as its objective a maximum personnel turnover of 15% in each thirty day period. This program will be fully implemented by 1 January 1968, and will preclude development of the critical problem as outlined in this observation.

   b. Item: Critical MOS Shortages, pages 4 and 5. This matter has been the subject of earlier command correspondence to 1st Signal Brigade. The in-country cable splicing training available in the 1st Signal Brigade School has partially alleviated the problem. The overall solution lies in rapid Department of the Army approval of the 40th Signal Battalion MTOE to be submitted in early December 1967.

   c. Item: MTOE, pages 6 and 7. Coordination meetings have been held with representatives of Headquarters, 1st Signal Brigade, and the Commander, 40th Signal Battalion, to resolve problem areas relative to the submission of new MTOE documentation. Although an early completion date has been imposed, the delays and misunderstandings anticipated by the Commander, 40th Signal Battalion, should not preclude submission of correct authorization documents.
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, from Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Construction), (RCSCS FOR-65) (WCEL)

/ d. Item: Hardware for Communications Projects, page 8. This matter has been the subject of earlier command correspondence to 1st Signal Brigade. Further, this problem area has been identified by the Group S4 as an area for detailed study and analysis. Upon completion of the study, appropriate additional recommendations will be forwarded to higher headquarters.

4. Comments on Commander's recommendations follow:

a. Recommendation 1a. Appropriate action has been initiated as outlined in paragraph 3a supra.

b. Recommendation 1b. Concur.


e. Recommendation 3b. Concur.


g. Recommendation 5b. Concur.

1 incl
nc

BLAINE O. VOGT
Colonel, Sig
Commanding
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967,
from Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Construction) (RCS
GSPUR-65) (W.C. LKH)

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AWHGC-DH, APO
96375
Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Communications
Command, ATTN: SCCOP, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613

1. Subject report is forwarded for your information.

2. Correspond in the Commander's observations. The following additional
   comments are provided with respect to Section II, Part I (Observations):

   a. Item: Rotational Hump, page 3. On 28 October 1967, this head-
      quarters implemented a controlled infusion program to eliminate rotational
      humps. The infusion of in-country units will be completed by 1 January 1968.
      This plan also provides for immediate infusion of incoming units.

   b. Item: Cable Splicer Training, page 5. Commencing in July 1967
      the Brigade was allocated 100 quotas annually in the Air Force cable splicers
      course at Keesler Air Force Base. This course includes instruction in splic-
      ing polyethylene cable. The problem of inadequately trained personnel should
      be corrected when graduates of the Air Force cable splicers course begin
      arriving in-country.

   c. Item: Hardware for Communications Projects, page 7. This head-
      quarters has prepared a tasking order for Lockheed contract personnel to re-
      search this exact problem and to present the following recommendations:

      (1) Quantity and type of outside cable plant materials to be
          placed in depot stock as an Authorized Stockage Level (ASL).

      (2) Quantity and type of outside cable plant which should be
          on hand at the unit level as a basic load.

      (3) Establishment of the stockage level for the remainder of
          FY-68 and a forecast for FY-69, FY-70 and FY-71.

      It is intended that the stockage level be an amount capable of providing
      sufficient quantities of standard items; this will allow units to requisition
      all cable hardware for Class IV projects and extensions of plant, directly
      from the 1st Logistical Command Depot. A copy of the Lockheed tasking order
      will be provided to the 40th Signal Battalion Commander, and his assistance
      in the preparation of the required data will be requested.
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SCCVP (14 Nov 67) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1967, from Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Construction) (RCSC-F-65) (C&HB)

3. Concur in the Commander’s recommendations. The following additional comments are provided with respect to Section II, Part II (Recommendations):

   a. Recommendation: Personnel, paragraph 1b, page 9. This headquarters is taking action to expedite the processing and submission of the 40th Signal Battalion’s MTOS documents. Regulations do not permit a unit to requisition personnel against a pending document.


   c. Recommendation: Training and Organization, paragraph 3b, page 9. Although information received from higher headquarters has been sporadic, it has been adequate for the basic preparation of modification documents. The principal problem lies in the lack of approval and published documents, without which an accurate update and resubmission cannot be performed. It is not expected that these published documents will be received prior to the TAADS submission deadline. Every effort is being made toward the expeditious processing of documents at this headquarters, and no changes are made in a unit’s MTOS without establishing coordination on the change. It is considered unlikely, however, that Headquarters, USASTRATCOM, in their review of documents, would return them for comment prior to taking final action.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

THOMAS D. BILDSO, JR
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
AVHGC-DST (14 Nov 67)  3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967, from Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Construction) (RCS CSFOR-65) (WCEL)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Construction) (CELH) as indorsed.

2. Concur with report as indorsed. Report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

JOHN V. MARCHALL
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

cc: HQ, 40th Sig Bn
    HQ, 1st Sig Bde
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 from HQ, 40th Sig Bn (Const) (UIC: WCELAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 12 JAN 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding endorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

[Signature]

HEAVRIN SNYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

1 Incl
nc
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 40th Signal Battalion (Const)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967

CO, 40th Signal Battalion (Const)

14 November 1967

674149

N/A

N/A

N/A

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310