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ago, d/a ltr, 29 apr 1980

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to AGSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TERMINAL)
APO 96307

AVCA TC-96-10

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR - 45)

THRU: Commanding Officer
4th Transportation Command
ATTN: AVCA TC-GL
APO 96307

Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
APO 96307

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVCA DH
APO 96307

Commanding General
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-HH
APO 96307

TO: Headquarters, Department of the Army
ATTN: ACSFOR
Washington, D. C. 20310

Section 1 - Significant Organizational Activities

As planning for base development at Cat Lai progressed, it was obvious that additional real estate would be required to accommodate all the Battalion units without undue crowding. Additional real estate adjacent to the present cantonement was requested and approved. With this new area approved for the Battalion's use, the Cat Lai base development plan was put into final form.
AVCA TO-DB-60

Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RC5 CSFOR - 65)

SUBJECT

A project number is assigned and funds are programmed for construction
then work can begin on construction of permanent type buildings with the
consolidated mess hall having top priority. The parts for seven (7) quonset
huts were picked up in January and it is anticipated that work will begin
to erect at least one (1) in February. The first one is to be the dispensary
and will be located on the newly acquired real estate.

The request for additional dump trucks that had been made in October
was approved by Saigon Support Command. Initially we received forty (40)
trucks a day, but this was increased to fifty (50) a day in early December.
The progress in the hauling of laterite was obvious on a daily basis and by
the end of January we had received a total of 3765 loads of fill. Operations
ceased in early January for two weeks when the 46th Engineers closed the
laterite pit. A request was sent to Engineer Command Vietnam for assistance
in locating a new source of fill and we were shown an area near the 64th
Quartermaster Battalion Contonment at Long Binh where there was an ample
supply of laterite. The engineers could not supply loading equipment so
a dumper and crane with operators from this battalion were sent to Long Binh
to work the laterite pit.

On 28 December 1966 the 117th Transportation Company (Terminal Service)
commenced operations at Area III, Saigon Port. This area consists of three
(3) deep draft berths (K8, K9, and K10) the Can Dock and two (2) in transit
storage warehouses (Warehouse 11A for all security cargo and PX items, and
Warehouse 13 for all transhipment cargo from Area II and Area III). Area III
is operated using contractor furnished stevedores with military supervision
and documentation responsibility. Area III is operational on a twenty-four
(24) hour, seven (7) day a week basis.

During the period 1 November to 30 November 1966, the 124th Transportation
Company (Terminal Service) continued its main mission of operating the
ammunition discharge sites for the III Corps Area. Operational sites during
this period were the ship-to-barge site at Nha Be and the barge-to-truck
sites at Binh Trieu and Thanh Tuy Ha. The most significant activity was the
turnover of the barge sites of Cogido on 21 November and Buu Long on 17 Nov-
ember 1966 to the 402nd Transportation Company (Terminal Transfer). All
equipment at both the Cogido and Buu Long sites along with the P1 and the
spare parts were transferred with the sites.

The loss in mission of the ammunition discharge sites was accompanied
by a loss in personnel. The 124th Transportation Company (TS) operated through-
out the month of November at present for duty strength of over one hundred
men below TOL strength. The great majority of replacements that were received
were not stevedore trained or experienced nor did they carry an MOS authori-
zed by TOL. Operational areas were bolstered with the "best" people available.

The 124th Transportation Company (TS) was tasked to provide the 4th
Transportation Command with forklift operators. On 25 November, seven (7)
forklift operators were assigned for duty to the 4th Transportation Command.
During the month of November, operations at Nha Be were slowed down for approximately one week as "lot discharge" was attempted. It was found that tonnage was cut drastically due to the lack of "lot stowage" in the hatches making it necessary to pick and choose and frequently move the barge. Because of required additional tug power to support the barge movement from hatch to hatch and speed of river current, total off-loading by lots was found to be impractical at this time, but whenever possible "lot discharge" will be attempted. Nha Be achieved record tonnage during the month of December. Over 49,000 long tons of ammunition were discharged. On 6 December over 2800 long tons were discharged during a 24 hour period setting a new Nha Be record.

On 19 December 1966, the 124th Transportation Company (TS) assumed the mission of operating Area IV in Saigon Port. This gave the 124th Transportation Company (TS) three major missions: (1) Operation of the Nha Be sub-port (ammunition ships to barge) (2) Operation of Area IV within the Saigon Port, and (3) the POL loading from POL's farms in the Nha Be area for support throughout Vietnam. The mission of operating Area IV Saigon Port entails complete responsibility for K-12, a berth capable of berthing one ocean-going vessel, pier staging, intransit warehouse staging, and all documentation. This is different from other areas in the Saigon Port complex in that other areas have local nationals who do the checking. In area IV the 124th Transportation Company does all ship side checking.

On 6 December 1966, personnel from the 124th Transportation Company working at the Army Air Cargo section, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, were transferred to the Saigon Support Command. Although the agreement was that replacement personnel would be relieved, replacements have not yet been assigned.

Area IV achieved a record monthly tonnage of 32,502 short tons discharged and backloaded during the month of January. Problems were encountered in obtaining sufficient trucks to clear the pier and warehouse. This was especially evident for cargo consigned to Tan Son Nhut where military trucks are required because of local VNAF security requirements. It is evident that Saigon Port requires a fixed commitment of military vehicles to handle cargo to areas requiring special security requirements (i.e. Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa Air Base).

On 29 January 1967 the 124th was officially relocated to Cat Lai, Vietnam, APO 96307. Although 124th personnel made up the first work party at Cat Lai from the 11th Battalion, it was 23 January before the first operational elements of the company were moved into Cat Lai. The move of all operational elements was completed on 29 January 1967.
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS GSPOR - 65)

Unit equipment for the 402nd Transportation Company (Terminal Transfer) arrived from CONUS on 3 November 1966 on the SS Linfield Victory. The primary elements of the 402nd Transportation Company (Terminal Transfer) moved from Cat Lai to Camp TC Hill at Long Binh, beginning 10 November 1966. The 402nd Trans Co (TT) assumed operational control of the Buu Long ammunition discharge site on 17 November and Cogido ammunition discharge site on 21 November. The first few days of operation at each site showed a decrease in tonnage because of inexperience of unit personnel. However, initiative and enthusiasm on the part of all concerned resulted in increased daily tonnages, achieving a high of 989 short tons at Cogido on 30 November. The 402nd Trans Co (TT) assumed control of two (2) additional barge discharge sites: Binh Trieu on 10 December 1966 and Thanh Tuy Ha on 29 December 1966. Operations were shut down at Binh Trieu during the first half of January due to the accomplishment of needed repairs to the pier by ARVN elements.

A new high for daily and monthly tonnages was experienced at the Cogido discharge site with 1924 short tons on 11 December 1966 and 33,664 short tons handled for the month of December 1966.

A new high for tonnage during a twelve (12) hour period was reached when Cogido handled 1063 short tons of ammunition from 1800 hours, 24 Jan 67 to 0600 hours, 25 January 1967. For the second month in a row, the monthly high for tonnages handled at Cogido was surpassed. The Cogido discharge site handled 33,155 short tons of ammunition during the month of January.

Another first was experienced in the operation of the Buu Long discharge site when 1300 barrels of JP-4 jet fuel were discharged and shipped to Bien Hoa Air Base. Although difficulties were experienced in transporting the cargo to Buu Long and insuring it was not stored with munitions, the operation went well.

An increase in direct support missions, typified by extended dispatch of LCM 8 to shift barges at various ammunition discharge sites, has changed the nature of operations of the 1099th Transportation Company (Medium Boat) from previous report periods. October tonnage totaled 60,089 short tons. The November tonnage, minus returns from six (6) boats, is well below 40,000. During the month of November, an average of 19.5 LCM 8’s have been in operation daily, with 6.5 on deadline. On an average three boats have been required and made available for daily dispatch for port clearance or short haul cargo runs to and from Vung Tau sub-port.

Cargo operations in December continued at about the same level as October and November. An estimated 60,000 long tons of cargo was moved in December. Most of the tonnage is derived from two (2) tugboat type missions. These are in support of the ammunition discharge system, which averaged seven (7) boats daily, and in support of the fuel barge shuttle which by-passes Saigon, and averaged three (3) boats daily.

In cooperation with the Navy’s Rung Sat Special Zone, a very successful heavy machine gun training program was carried out on the lower Sai Rap
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR - 65)

River. Over 50% of this unit's vessel personnel were able to fire assigned .50 caliber machine guns.

Support maintenance showed marked improvement during the month of November. While due outs and cancellations are still commonplace from Marine Maintenance Activity Vietnam, this unit has achieved success in other supply channels. Among major items procured were:

a. Heavy duty truck batteries in lieu of marine batteries, furnished through the vehicle DSU.

b. V-belts, purchased locally by the 4th Transportation Command.

During November, the first ten of forty-five ARVN boat personnel were graduated from an 8-week OJT program. Advisor personnel have indicated that there is a possibility of activating an ARVN boat unit in the near future based on the results of this pilot program.

The OJT for the ARVN Medium Boat personnel was completed during the first week of January, 1967. Some sixty-two trainees have participated in deck, engine and maintenance work since the program was initiated by the US Advisor to Saigon Transportation Terminal Command, the bulk of the trainees began their duty with the 1099th in October 1966.

This unit continues to have trouble with AM radio repair. Several transmitters and convertors in support maintenance were returned in non-operating condition during November, causing this unit to resubmit work orders. At this date, the VRC-12 family FM radios for marine installations are at the 79th Maintenance Battalion, but have not been released for work. Lack of these radios and workable AM equipment is seriously hampering vessel control.

During the month of December, 20 VRC 46 radios were issued to the unit, replacing VRC-10 FM radios. The new equipment is capable of communicating 45 miles with a whip antenna.

December was the lowest month for vessel availability since May 1966, when all boats were cycled through a hull repair program. The average availability during the month was 70.2 per cent for 31 vessels.

Many of the deadlines were caused by the inability of this unit to perform hull and shaft work on the beach. The cargo barge assigned to this unit was withdrawn by 4th Transportation Command Marine Maintenance in early December, and was not replaced until 27 December.

Four (4) LCM 8's returned to home station 19 December after one hundred and twenty days temporary duty in support of LOTS operations at Qui Nhon. The return of these boats influenced deadline rates, as they required extensive refitting and repair work. At the close of the report period, one vessel is still deadlined for transmission rebuild, and a second is down for cooling systems repairs.

In cooperation with the 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery, 1st Infantry
Division, this unit supported a two week test of the 105mm Howitzer mounted in LCM 6's. Two boats completed the test 24 December, with a confirmed count of three (3) enemy KIA during experimental firing, and several additional kills in joint operations with US and ARVN ground troops. All tests were in the Rang Sat Special Zone, where the accuracy and mobility of the LCM 6 and howitzer were rated superior to guns brought in by air for ground placement.

Cargo operations in January continue to be dominated by the use of LCM's as tugs in the Saigon area. However, January saw requirements switch radically from ammunition to fuel barges. Seven barges are currently being moved daily by LCM, and on many days the local tonnage handled has exceeded 3,000 short tons. As a result, January tonnage figures, now being verified show an average of 90,000 short tons compared with 20,170 in January 1966.

Three special operations were carried out by the unit during January; four LCM's with support personnel were committed in early January to the buildup of a Mekong Delta US base camp. They remain on station at the close of the report period. Seven LCM's were committed for one week in support of Operation Cedar Falls. In addition LCM 6's were utilized in support of tactical operations in the Tuc district carried out by the 199th Light Infantry Brigade.

The 329th Transportation Boat Company (Heavy) was authorized, and assigned four (4) additional LCU's during December. Personnel to crew the additional boats have been requested, however, to date additional personnel have not been authorized. All twelve (12) boats assigned to the 329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) have been crewed and are now operational. This was accomplished by assigning personnel from the maintenance platoon and company headquarters as crew members. Each boat is authorized two (2) Warrant Officers (Masters and Chief Engineer). Fifty (50) percent of assigned boats have assigned men assigned as master and chief engineer. In addition, there is a shortage of from one (1) to three (3) crew members on each boat. Critical positions are as indicated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Authorized Grade</th>
<th>Current Manning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master</td>
<td>WO</td>
<td>WO (5); E-6 (5); E-5 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Engineer</td>
<td>WO</td>
<td>WO (6); E-7 (3); E-6 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Engineer</td>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>E-6 (1); E-5 (1); E-4 (3); E-3 (1) unassigned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boatswain</td>
<td>E-6</td>
<td>E-6 (3); E-4 (3); 6 unassigned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During this reporting period the following tonnage and passengers were transported by vessels of this unit.
15 February 1967
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR - 65)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOVEMBER</th>
<th>DECEMBER</th>
<th>JANUARY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Cargo</td>
<td>3395.47</td>
<td>19,867</td>
<td>29,963.21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>3250</td>
<td>8882</td>
<td>20,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td>2808</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,956</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Tonnage figures for December and January includes harbor tug movement of ammunition and general cargo barges.

The vessel deadline rate for the quarter is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRAFT</th>
<th>AVAILABLE DAYS</th>
<th>DAYS D/L</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landing Craft</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor Tug</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 133rd Medical Detachment arrived in Vietnam on 28 November 1966 and proceeded to the staging area at Long Binh. The unit was deployed to Cat Lai on 7 December 1966, and assigned the mission of direct support of the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal). The Detachment was also charged with the responsibility of supporting adjacent infantry units operating in the Thu Duc District. This included elements of the 2/16th, First Infantry Division and HHC, 199th Light Infantry Brigade. In addition to this and in keeping with USAV directives an offer of medical aid was extended to the military personnel and dependents of the ARVN assigned to the Ordnance Arsenal, residing in the Cat Lai stronghold.

On 21 December the 133rd Medical Detachment began to participate in the Medical Civic Action Program (MEVAC), treating civilians in the surrounding rural hamlets within a 15 kilometer radius of the Cat Lai stronghold. Current statistics show that approximately 550 military personnel are treated in each calendar month, and 1,000 - 2,000 Vietnamese Nationals cared for during the same period.

A Battalion civic action program in the Cat Lai area was initiated with the start of construction on a foot bridge in the village of Binh Loi. English language classes for approximately 110 Vietnamese dependents instructed by military personnel of the Cat Lai garrison, were begun in mid-January.

Changes of key personnel in this command during the reporting period included the replacement of Chaplain (Captain) Verne A. Slighter by Chaplain (Captain) Norman E. Dornquist. The Battalion also welcomed the arrival of Captain John R. Galvin and his Medical Detachment in support of this battalion.

On 15 January 1967, command of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) and staff position of Battalion Adjutant were assumed by Captain Charles R. Shrader from Captain Terrence H. Gibbs.
15 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

Section 2 - Part I Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Personnel

a. Item: Replacement non-commissioned officers have for the most part been inexperienced in stevedore operations.

Discussion: Three categories of non-commissioned officers have been received:

1. Experienced stevedores
2. Inexperienced but have been through the Stevedore Officer Course at Fort Eustis.
3. Inexperienced without school training.

Due to the peculiarity of stevedore operations in Vietnam, where contractors perform much of the actual stevedoring work, lack of training or experience has not hindered the stronger non-commissioned officers.

Observation: Non-commissioned officers from the combat arms have done well regardless of their schooling. Technical Service non-commissioned officers have not done as well when the schooling was not provided.

b. Item: Training of ARVN personnel.

Discussion: Lack of interpreter personnel seriously hampered the effectiveness of on-the-job training for five (5) man ARVN boat crews.

Observation: Production of trained ARVN LCM engineers and coxmsains has been considerably behind the anticipated results of a six week program.

c. Item: Replacement personnel

Discussion: Ninety-five (95) percent of the personnel in the 402nd Transportation Company (Terminal Transfer) arrived in-country during the month of October. The other five (5) percent arrived in November.

Observation: Most of these personnel will rotate during the same months next year.

2. Operations

a. Item: Lot storage is not being accomplished on ammunition ships arriving in Vietnam.

Discussion: Ammunition is off-loaded from ships to barges, barge to trucks, and trucks to depot. Ammunition depots request trucks
loaded with one (1) lot number to facilitate rapid off-loading and storage. To accomplish this, the ammunition must be loaded on the barge segregated by lot. This is impossible at this time due to the mixed stowage in the ship's hatches. It is too time consuming to pick and choose within the hatch and/or move the barge for every draft.

Observation: Stowage by lots aboard ammunition ships must be accomplished before lot discharge is feasible throughout the ammunition discharge system.

b. Item: Ammunition loaded on the "poop" deck of the ship.

Discussion: Pallets and conexes of ammunition have been received loaded on the "poop" deck of the ship. Because discharge is from ship to barge and no dock crane or floating crane is available, it is necessary to break down conexes, pallets and off-load the ammunition by hand. This slows down operations.

Observation: Stowage of this type has been noticed on ships loaded at Sunny Point, North Carolina.

c. Item: Planning for artillery aboard LCM's.

Discussion: LCM's were committed to an artillery test that operated in an area of extreme tidal change. On at least two (2) occasions boats in place on high or rising tide were grounded in firing positions unable to back off or shift as the tide receded.

Observation: Loss of flotation of a vessel in unsecured areas presents a lucrative target for enemy mortar or ground attack.

d. Item: Inland waterways of the Mekong Delta

Discussion: Upon receipt of missions requiring transport of cargo to ports in the Mekong Delta, the Saigon Harbor Master recommended the use of the Mekong River Pilots Association to insure safe navigation of these waters. The Hydrographic Office Publication#93 states that the use of "pilotage" is compulsory, and is advisable due to the changing nature of the alluvial banks at the river mouths.

Observation: Shipments of cargo must be geared to the availability of the pilots, which has often caused delays of two (2) to three (3) days. The pilots are not knowledgeable of the hydrographic characteristics of the smaller tributaries. The vessel masters are now familiar with the characteristics of the larger rivers and feel that they can safely navigate the smaller ones if given adequate charts.

e. Item: Multiple leg sling (FSN 3940-606-9961)

Discussion: The multiple leg sling (FSN 3940-606-9961) presently
is the only identifiable sling that is available for the use in discharge of projectiles and unpalletized 250 and 500 pound bombs at various ammunition discharge sites.

Observation: Experience shows that the life expectancy of the necessary safety device is approximately thirty (30) hours. It is imperative that a safety device be maintained to insure safe discharge operations.

f. Item: In stream ramp discharge of LST vessels.

Discussion: The original concept for a base camp supply operation involved the new marriage of LST and LCU vessels for discharge of rolling stock.

Observation: Experimentation at the site with LCU's and LCM 8's showed that both are compatible for bow marriage with the LST. It was also found that although the LCM 8 cannot accept nearly as many pieces of cargo, the turn around time is much faster on short hauls due to the increased speed and maneuverability.

g. Item: Improperly addressed cargo.

Discussion: The pallets, boxes and crates of ammunition are not being marked with applicable address data as outlined in Chapter 11-3, DOD Reg 4500.32-R. Old address data is not being blocked out, resulting in confusion in discharge and shipment.

Observation: Shippers are not complying with established shipping procedures as outlined in applicable regulations.

h. Item: Late manifests and stowage plans:

Discussion: Manifests and stowage plans on vessels loading in the Pacific Area are not being received prior to vessels arrival at Nha Be. This is causing considerable delay in discharge, particularly when the vessel is not a total discharge for Nha Be. An example of this is the USNS Huskingun which discharged at Nha Be on the 16th of December 1966. No manifest was available and the cargo was not marked with applicable data.

Observation: Pacific Area loading terminals are not expediting manifests in accordance with the short sailing time of vessels to this area.

i. Item: Transshipment of ammo by Nha Be

Discussion: Ammunition is being loaded for port of discharge Nha Be for further shipment to other ports of discharge in Vietnam. Nha Be does not have storage facilities to hold munitions for transshipment nor is the frequency of shipping sufficient to provide for expeditious movement. Approximately 250 long tons discharged from USNS Huskingun on 16 December
are still held on barges awaiting a vessel for Cam Ranh Bay and Chu Lai. This cargo is occupying critically needed barge capacity.

Observation: Shippers are not aware of the situation at Nha Be.

j. Item: Self-sustaining vessels

Discussion: All vessels scheduled for discharge at Nha Be must be self-sustaining and with gear that is in good operational condition. The SS Transpacific could not discharge all Nha Be cargo due to the lack of gear on hatch #6.

Observation: Loading terminals are not aware that Nha Be is a mid-stream discharge to lighterage.

k. Item: Air Force "Express" Vessels

Discussion: The Air Force "Express" vessel, the SS Alamo had cargo for other ports of discharge stowed in the squares of the hatches. This required the shifting of many tons of cargo so that cargo designated for discharge by the Air Force could be removed.

Observation: The concept of the Air Force "Express" was to selectively discharge vessels without shifting other munitions. The squares were to remain open to provide for total access to all items.

l. Item: Shuttle Boats for Nha Be

Discussion: Two (2) Contractor shuttle boats presently are being used at Nha Be to provide for movement between vessels. These two (2) boats cost the US Army $9,894.96 a year. They are inadequate as they cannot be used during the hours of darkness. This limits the movement and effectiveness of control personnel. Any utilization of these boats before 0700 hours or after 1900 hours is on an overtime rate.

Observation: An Army "J" boat would provide safer, faster, and broader use for the operation at Nha Be.

3. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

a. Item: Qualified winch operators

Discussion: School trained winch operators could not proficiently perform in school trained MOS. A pilot training program whereby personnel from this Battalion participate in winch operator training has been initiated with the 71st Terminal Battalion.

Observation: During the Saigon Port stevedore strike in the latter part of December 1966, it was quite evident winch operators were not
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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS GSFOR - 65)

proficient. Qualified crane operators were found to be able to operate a winch after a short familiarization period. Many of the same skills used in operating a crane are used to operate a winch. Crane operators usually qualified as winch operators after one (1) or two (2) hours of on-the-job training. Their skills on a winch are directly related to their skills on crane operations.

b. Item: TOE equipment for the OA (TOE 8-500D) Medical Detachment.

Discussion: Many items of TOE equipment for the OA (TOE 8-500D) Medical Detachment are not suited for activity and displacement as an independent unit that is required in combat areas; particularly here in the tropics of the Republic of Vietnam.

Observation: Some examples of modifications that are needed are:

(1) Suture material - all too large for practical purpose. "Routine" lacerations cannot be repaired with issue items.

(2) Instruments - all too large; nothing suitable for "Small" and "Medium" type wounds.

(3) Medications - more antibiotics are needed.

(4) Radio communications - Since the MEDCAP program involves visits to surrounding isolated villages, radio communications involving both vehicular and non-vehicular radios would greatly improve operational efficiency and assist in timely intelligence gathering.

(5) Some of the TOE-items are unsuited to the tropics; example - fur-lined evacuation bags, pot-bellied stoves.

4. Intelligence.

a. Item: Weather Information

Discussion: When traveling along the Vietnam coast, heavy seas and high winds are often encountered making navigation conditions unsafe for shallow draft vessels of less than 65 feet.

Observation: Accurate weather reports are necessary for all vessels making coast-wise voyages.

5. Logistics.

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Discussion: The antenna tie-down device SC-C-208746, utilized on the jeep mounted AT-106/VRC antenna, is breaking at an abnormally high rate.

Observation: The plastic antenna tie-down device is breaking in the curved portion through normal wear.

b. Item: Shipyard Maintenance and Repair

Discussion: Vessels assigned to the 329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) will be in need of annual shipyard inspections and repair. The Maintenance Division of the 4th Transportation Command (Terminal) presently does not have adequate facilities to perform required annual shipyard refitting.

Observation: On 27 September 1966, a LCU sustained a ruptured port quarter above and below the water line after being rammed by another vessel. The repair work was handled by the Vietnamese Navy Shipyard in conjunction with the Marine Maintenance Activity Detachment in Saigon. The vessel repairs were found to be inadequate.

c. Item: Unit Assignment Diversion

Discussion: An inordinate delay in receiving TO&E vehicles for the 133rd Medical Detachment has caused a great deal of difficulty in setting up and maintaining an efficient operation.

Observation: Frequently, TO&E vehicles moving overseas to a theater of operations are inadvertently discharged at the wrong port. Two cases involving units in this battalion are good examples of this problem.

A 3/4 ton vehicle arriving in Saigon Port to be discharged with other vehicles for the 133rd Medical Detachment was left on board ship and had to be discharged at Vung Tau.

The 402nd Transportation Company's (Terminal Transfer) five (5) ton wrecker discharged in error at Cam Rahn Bay, has seriously hampered unit's maintenance capabilities.

d. Item: Burlap verses nylon sandbags

Discussion: Burlap sandbags have been replaced four and five times because of rotting. During the same period, nylon bags show no signs of deterioration.

Observation: It is not economical to ship burlap bags for use in Vietnam. Their use results in a waste of time in filling them as well as a great waste of money and shipping space.
e. Item: Shortage of building materials.

Discussion: The materials that are required for construction of tent floors and tent frames in a base camp are not always readily available in either type or quantity at the time needed.

Observation: Materials requisitioned and not on hand are usually back ordered to Okinawa and during the interim, a great deal of effort is expended in trying to locate excess materials from other sources.

f. Item: Shortage of bedding

Discussion: The supply of sheets, pillowcases, and mattress covers is not sufficient to meet the demands. Where a permanent base camp is to be erected in the vicinity of Saigon, these items are considered a necessity.

Observation: When the 402nd Transportation Company (TT) was airlifted from CONUS in October 1966 they brought with them mountain sleeping bags and wool blankets. It was discovered that these items were not conducive to the comfortable sleeping due to the warm climatic conditions found year round in the Saigon area.

g. Item: Lack of transportation for newly arrived units

Discussion: Units being airlifted from CONUS to Vietnam do not have their organic vehicles readily available for use. These units do require transportation in order to get themselves established with the various supporting agencies and to get the necessary liaison with their headquarters.

Observation: This transportation is not even available on a loan basis due to an overall shortage.

h. Item: Requirements for security equipment

Discussion: The situation in Vietnam has created a requirement for many units to provide their own security of not only an interior but also of a perimeter nature. Some of these units are not equipped by TO&E with those items of equipment with which to accomplish this task properly.

Observation: The use of USARV Form 47 request for equipment in excess of TO&E is no longer available as higher headquarters believes such requirements should be justified and submitted in the form of an NTE. This procedure takes time not only to prepare but also to process through channels and time is not always available.

SECTION 2 - PART II RECOMMENDATIONS

1. PERSONNEL
Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR - 65)

a. Recommendation: Command emphasis be placed in current CONUS training program of replacement personnel.

b. Recommendation: That US units not accept ARVN OJT trainees for technical instruction unless an interpreter can be obtained for each piece of equipment or each crew involved. While the buddy system of "show and do" masters this problem, it is extremely time consuming, to the extent that it must be abandoned in the face of operational requirements.

c. Recommendation: That CONUS schooling be increased to provide trained replacement personnel for turnover of personnel.

2. OPERATIONS

a. Recommendation: That command emphasis in CONUS stress the stowage of ammunition by lot number to expedite and facilitate discharge operations of ships arriving in Vietnam.

b. Recommendation: Stow all ammunition manifested for Saigon where it can be reached by ships gear.

c. Recommendation: That personnel engaged in use of landing craft for firing platforms pay particular attention to tidal conditions, and plan to relay and relocate the vessel and gun every half hour during extreme stages of the tide so that adequate flotation can be maintained at all times.

d. Recommendation: The utilization of River Pilots be discontinued.

e. Recommendation: Request assistance in the identification of some other device for the discharge of projectiles as well as loose bombs, to meet the present safety requirement in keeping with regulations concerning ammunition discharge operations.

f. Recommendation: That the technique of LST-LCM bow marriage be publicized to all potential users for planning and use if the situation warrants.

g. Recommendation: All shipping agencies be advised that cargo must be marked with appropriate address data.

h. Recommendation: Pacific Area loading terminals be advised that manifests are not being received prior to vessel arrival.

i. Recommendation: Loading terminals be advised that Nha Be should not be used as a transhipment point.

j. Recommendation: All loading terminals be advised that vessels scheduled for discharge at Nha Be be self-sustaining.
15 February 1967

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k. Recommendation: The Air Force be advised of the problems encountered in the selective discharge of their munitions. The concept of delivery of Air Force munitions be reviewed with the possibility that selective discharge be discontinued.

1. Recommendation: The two (2) contractor shuttle boats be replaced by one (1) Army "J" boat.

3. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION

a. Recommendation: That all crane operators be cross-trained as winch operators. That the present winch training program conducted with the 71st Terminal Battalion be continued to insure qualified winch operators.

b. Recommendation: Recommend a restudy of TOE items (TOE 8-500 D) Medical Teams.

4. INTELLIGENCE

a. Recommendation: Vessels leaving for coastal trips north and south should receive weather information from the Naval Coastal Surveillance Headquarters in Vung Tau.

5. LOGISTICS

a. Recommendation: Redesign the SC-C-208748 to eliminate the curve or the possible use of different material.

b. Recommendation: Future major-marine repairs and shipyard maintenance be handled by the Army Marine Maintenance Activity in Cam Rahn Bay.

c. Recommendation: That units deploying from CONUS be permitted to send one (1) or two (2) of their assigned personnel on board ships carrying their equipment.

d. Recommendation: Utilize only the nylon type sandbags where climatic conditions such as those found here in South Vietnam exist.

e. Recommendation: Units should attempt to procure the necessary construction materials in CONUS and ship them to Vietnam in their organic vehicles. If the time permits, the lumber should be pre-cut for quick assembly of tent pads and frames upon arrival at the base camp area.

f. Recommendation: Units arriving from CONUS should obtain an authorized stockage of sheets, pillowcases and mattress covers prior to coming to Vietnam.
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15 February 1967

g. Recommendation: 1st Logistical Command should establish policies and procedures to make a certain number of vehicles (2½ ton trucks, 3/4 ton trucks, and 1/4 ton trucks) available to these units on a loan basis until the E&E equipment arrives in-country.

h. Recommendation: A table of authorization should be established which would make such equipment as .50 caliber machine guns, M-79 mm Grenade Launchers, 7X50 binoculars, new series radios, and even the recently developed starlight scope available to units which have perimeter security responsibilities.

1 Inc1

THOMAS H. HOY
LTC, TC
Commanding
AVCA TC-EX-00

15 February 1967


11TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TERMINAL) ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

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11TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TML)

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HEADQUARTERS, 4TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, APO 96307 24 MAR 1967

TO: Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The attached Operational Report for the quarterly Period ending 31 January 1967, submitted by the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), has been reviewed and is deemed representative of the reporting period.

2. The following are this headquarters' comments, keyed to the appropriate paragraphs in Section 2, Parts I and II of the subject report:

   a. Paragraph 1c: The 11th Transportation Battalion has the capability and will be directed to take necessary reassignment action within their own resources to eliminate the rotational hump.

   b. Paragraph 2a, b, f, g, h, i, j and k: This Headquarters is reviewing the ammunition system of the 11th Transportation Battalion to determine specific corrective actions required.

   c. Paragraph 2d: Pilots are no longer being used in the Delta re-supply operations.

   d. Paragraph 21: This headquarters concurs in the observation but all J-boats available to this command are heavily committed and, if an additional boat were made available to this command, a crew for it could not be made available within current personnel resources. The ACofS, Comptroller is presently developing alternate means of providing adequate transportation to meet this operational requirement. When evaluation is completed, findings and recommendations will be forwarded to the appropriate staff section for implementation.

   e. Paragraph 3b: Some items of TOE Equipment for medical as well as other cellular type units are unsuitable for the Vietnam area. Approval to turn-in TOE items that are not suitable for this area may be obtained through channels. Suture materials, instruments, and other medical supplies may be obtained through normal Medical Supply Channels. Radio equipment is required based on assigned mission and can be requested on an MTOE. The recommendation to include radios as a TO&E equipment item for the OA (TOE 8-500D) Medical Detachment warrants favorable consideration in this particular case since any measure taken to provide for timely intelligence gathering will enhance the command's capability to continue with normal operations and decrease the possibility of any surprise enemy action.

   f. Paragraph 4: The ACofS, G-2, in the near future, will formulate an SOP on dissemination of weather information. It is hoped
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
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that the ACofS, G-2, will be in a position to furnish weather information
to elements of the headquarters and subordinate units. Pending the pub-
lication of an SOP on weather, headquarters elements and subordinate units
must continue to obtain weather information required for their operations
direct from the local weather stations.

g. Paragraph 5a: The primary cause of radio antenna tie-down
breakage is due to antennas being tied down too tightly thus placing undue
strain on the tie-downs. The part of the antenna parallel to the ground
should be no closer to the ground than seven (7) feet. A secondary cause
of tie-down breakage is climate.

h. Paragraph 5b: Vessels assigned to the 329th Transportation
Company (Heavy Boat) have been scheduled for Annual Depot Shipyard repair
period from the present date through 1972. These vessels will be inspected
by personnel assigned to the US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam
prior to being placed into the depot facility. The emergency repairs made
to the LCU 1534 were intended to return the vessel to an operational status
with minimum delay and were not intended to be permanent. LCU 1534 is
presently undergoing its annual shipyard repair and permanent repair will
be made to the hull area that had been temporarily patched.

i. Paragraph 5d: The first synthetic sandbags used in Vietnam
were procured from Japan at a much higher cost than the burlap bags from
CONUS. Sandbags used on tactical operations are left behind based on
preconceived plans where there is no requirement for long-lasting capability.
Presently manufacturers in CONUS are gearing production so that they can
supply Vietnam with 12,000,000 synthetic sandbags per month.

j. Paragraph 5e: There is an overall shortage of all types of
construction materials throughout the theater. This is partially being
remedied by incoming units bringing pre-cut tent frames and floors as
WABTOC equipment. There will continue to be a shortage until the Logistical
Base is filled. Use of dunnage, not required for re-use, has helped all
units in the past and will continue to help in the future.

k. Paragraph 5f: The shortage of bedding that existed when
the 402nd Transportation Company arrived in country does not exist today.
1st Logistical Command is prepared to issue a supply directive to release
bedding that is presently available in the 506th Field Depot.

l. Paragraph 5g: The local Transportation Motor Pool (TMP)
lacks the necessary vehicles to support this requirement. This head-
quarters appoints a unit to sponsor incoming units, and support is to
be provided within the available resources of the sponsoring unit. Any
requirement exceeding the resources of the sponsoring unit should be
referred to this headquarters.
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m. Paragraph 5h: The requisition of equipment in excess of authorized allowances is available by means of a USARV Form 47. 1st Logistical Command and USARV are exercising more stringent control over the approval of Form 47's, but if a requirement is considered as being emergency in nature, approval will be granted for a 60 day period. An MTOE must be submitted before the 60 day period expires. If this is done, the equipment may be retained pending approval of the proposed MTOE. The requirement for searchlight equipment for perimeter defense is considered valid.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl: nc

SIGNED
CPT, AGC
Asst, Adjutant General